ANDREWS UNIVERSITY

SEMINARY STUDIES

VOLUME VIII JULY 1970 NUMBER 2

CONTENTS

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY PRESS
BERRIEN SPRINGS, MICHIGAN 49104, USA

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY

SEMINARY STUDIES

The Journal of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary
of Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES publishes papers and short notes in English, French and German on the following subjects: Biblical linguistics and its cognates, textual criticism, exegesis, Biblical archaeology and geography, ancient history, church history, theology, philosophy of religion, ethics and comparative religions.

The opinions expressed in articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the editors.

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES is published in January and July of each year. The annual subscription rate is $ 5.00. Payments are to be made to Andrews University Seminary Studies, Berrien Springs, Michigan 49104, USA.

Subscribers should give full name and postal address when paying their subscriptions and should send notice of change of address at least five weeks before it is to take effect; the old as well as the new address must be given.

The Journal is indexed in the
Index to Religious Periodical Literature.

A STUDY OF VON SODEN'S H-TEXT IN THE CATHOLIC EPISTLES

J. TIM GALLAGHER
Berrien Springs, Michigan

A great deal of text critical work has been done in the Gospels and Acts. By contrast, the rest of the NT text has been given inadequate attention. An example of this is the paucity of work done in the text of the Catholic Epistles. This neglect is evident with respect to the task of classifying manuscripts as to text type. Heretofore it seems that scholars have depended largely on the work of Hermann von Soden for determining the textual pedigree of manuscripts of these epistles.

As recently as 1943, J. M. Bover [1] seems to have accepted without criticism von Soden's classification of manuscripts of the Catholic Epistles. On the other hand, A. Merk, [2] who generally stays very close to von Soden, recognizes that some manuscripts seem to have been wrongly classified. He therefore shifts 323 and 1739 from the I^{b2}-text into the H-text group but makes no mention of the doubtful classification of other manuscripts such as P, that von Soden had classified as witnesses to the H-text. Eberhard Nestle [3] seems to follow essentially the same practice as Merk by moving 1739 from the I^{b2}-text to the H-text group and leaving P unchanged.

Von Soden's classification has lately come up for more scrutiny. Two studies recently carried on deal extensively

[1] J. M. Bover, *Novi Testamenti Biblia Graeca et Latina* (3d ed.; Madrid, 1943), pp. lxxiv-v.

[2] Augustinus Merk, *Novum Testamentum Graece et Latine* (8th ed.; Rome, 1957), pp. 39-40.

[3] Eberhard Nestle, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, edited by Erwin Nestle and Kurt Aland (25th ed.; Stuttgart, 1963), p. 15.

with most of the Catholic Epistles. These studies by S. Kubo [4] and M. M. Carder [5] have demonstrated the untrustworthiness of von Soden's classifications of certain H witnesses. Kubo's work in 1 Pe, 2 Pe, and Jude has shown P to have been misplaced by von Soden in classifying it with the H-text. At the same time, he is in agreement with Carder and others in changing the classification of 1739 from I^{b2}, von Soden's classification, and including it among the H-text group.

These studies, however, have not included Jas. Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to see whether P and 1739 are correctly classified by von Soden in Jas or whether these two manuscripts need to be reclassified.

The method used in this study is a modification of the "Multiple Reading Method" as proposed by E. C. Colwell.[6] Colwell's method of establishing textual affinities involves the examination of the relationship of individual manuscripts to each other in places in the text where there are three or more variants. He contends that by restricting such a study to what he calls "units of variation" [7] which exhibit at least three variant readings, the distinctive characteristics of text types are more readily apparent. However, this could not be done in Jas because there were normally only two variants

[4] Sakae Kubo, "A Comparative Study of P^{72} and Codex Vaticanus" (Ph. D. dissertation, Dept. of New Testament and Early Christian Literature, University of Chicago, 1964), pp. 253-291. Kubo's dissertation has been published without the above cited section. Kubo, *P^{72} and the Codex Vaticanus*, "Studies and Documents," Vol. XXVII, ed. Jacob Geerlings (Salt Lake City, 1965).

[5] According to an abstract of Muriel M. Carder's Ph. D. dissertation "An Enquiry Into the Textual Transmission of the Catholic Epistles" (Toronto, 1968), sent to Kubo by the author June 26, 1968.

[6] E. C. Colwell, "Method of Locating a Newly-Discovered Manuscript Within the Manuscript Tradition of the Greek New Testament," *Studia Evangelica: Papers Presented to the International Congress on "The Four Gospels in 1957" Held at Christ Church, Oxford, 1957*, ed. Kurt Aland, *et al.* (Berlin, 1959), pp. 757-777.

[7] A unit of variation is that place in the text where there is a difference among manuscripts.

in each unit. This seems to be true, with very few exceptions, also in the Catholic Epistles generally.

In order to select the units of variation which were to be studied, an examination was made of several editions of the Greek NT which contain extensive critical apparatus. The editions used were those of Tischendorf, [8] Tregelles, [9] von Soden,[10] Merk,[11] and Nestle.[12] The units of variation which were to be used were chosen on the basis of the number of supporting manuscripts. The manuscripts considered significant in the selection of these units were the ones to be used in this study (see below). If three or more of these manuscripts were in agreement with a reading and this reading opposed another reading supported by the rest of the manuscripts, the unit containing these two readings was selected for examination in this study.

Insignificant details such as movable nu's were not included in these apparatus. Itacisms, however, were included among the first list of units of variation,[13] but later they were dropped because some of the collations that were used did not make note of them.

The application of this method for gathering units of variation for examination yielded 172 such units. Among the 172 units of variation there were only 15 which included three or more variant readings. This circumstance would prohibit the use of Colwell's Multiple Reading Method in this study.

Manuscripts were chosen which represented von Soden's various text types. Virtually the same manuscripts were used in this work as in Kubo's study.

[8] Constantinus Tischendorf, *Novum Testamentum Graece*, II (Leipzig, 1872), 248-272.

[9] Samuel Prideaux Tregelles, *The Greek New Testament, Edited from Ancient Authorities, with Their Various Readings in Full, and the Latin Version of Jerome* (London, 1857-1897), pp. 617-627.

[10] Hermann von Soden, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, II(Goettingen, 1913), 614-623.

[11] Merk, *op. cit.*, pp. 740-751.

[12] Nestle, *op. cit.*, 573-582.

[13] Tischendorf made quite a point of including these in his apparatus.

These are the manuscripts and their classifications by von Soden:[14]

H------B, ℵ, C, A, P, Ψ, 33	I^{c1}---1611, 1518
I^{a1}-----1874, 917	I^{c2}---614
I^{a2}-----623, 5	J-----K
I^{a3}-----920, 69	K----S, L
I^{b1}-----260, 1758	K^{c}---223, 479
I^{b2}-----1739 323, 440	K^{r}---201

Of these Kubo had collated manuscripts B, ℵ, C, Ψ, 1874, 917, 623, 5, 920, 69, 260, 323, 440, 1611, 614, S, and 201.[15] Manuscript 223 was collated in Clark's *Eight American Praxapostoloi*.[16] Scrivener's *Codex Augiensis*[17] included a collation of 479. The work of Lake and New, *Six Collations of New Testament Manuscripts*,[18] contained 1739. A collation of A was done by the writer.[19] Manuscripts 1758 and 1518 were cited quite fully in von Soden's critical apparatus.[20] The same was true of manuscripts K, L, and P, in Tischendorf's critical apparatus.[21] Manuscript 33 was included in the apparatus of both Tischendorf and Tregelles.[22]

After this selection of manuscripts was made, a chart was set up (see Appendix) with the manuscripts listed horizon-

[14] Von Soden, *Die Schriften des Neuen Testaments*, Vol. I, Part 3 (Goettingen, 1911), p. 1705.

[15] The writer is deeply indebted to Kubo for the use of these collations. Had it not been for this generosity on his part this study could not have been undertaken.

[16] Kenneth W. Clark, *Eight American Praxapostoloi* (Chicago, 1941), pp. 97-103.

[17] F. H. Scrivener, *An Exact Transcript of the Codex Augiensis* (Cambridge, 1859), pp. 454-457.

[18] Kirsopp Lake and Silva New (eds.), *Six Collations of New Testament Manuscripts*, "Harvard Theological Studies," Vol. XVII (Cambridge, Mass., 1932).

[19] *The Codex Alexandrinus (Royal Ms. 1 D V-VIII): In Reduced Photographic Facsimile, New Testament and Clementine Epistles* (London, 1909).

[20] Von Soden, *op. cit.*, II, 614-623.

[21] Tischendorf, *loc.cit.*

[22] Tregelles, *loc. cit.*

tally across the page and the units of variation down the page so that the reading of each manuscript could be charted. For each unit the reading of the *Textus Receptus* [23] is cited first with the manuscripts that agree with it. Next, the variant, or variants, were cited with their support.

Each manuscript was checked against each of the original 172 units of variation. However, Codex C, the only incomplete manuscript, has a lacuna beginning with ch. 4:2 and running through the rest of the book.

After the attestation of all the manuscripts had been recorded in each unit of variation it became apparent that many of the units show no significant family grouping. Instead of a grouping, many of the units show scattered and random variation of scribal idiosyncrasies or very limited agreement of only three or four scattered witnesses. This came as no surprise since every unit of variation which met the support requirement of three or more manuscripts was included in the chart. A unit of variation was occasionally chosen with only one or two manuscripts supporting one of the variant readings if the manuscript, or manuscripts, were important. It seemed better to include more than necessary in order to avoid missing an important unit.

The next step was to eliminate the units of variation that were of no use to this study. Since it is the H-text with which the study is concerned, the unit had to contain a distinctive H-text reading. It did not, at this point, have to be a unique H-text reading but it did need to be distinct from at least the majority of either the I-text or the K-text.

With this in mind the readings had to be chosen that could be called H-text readings. These readings include:

1. any reading supported by all the H-text manuscripts,
2. any reading supported by both B and ℵ,
3. any reading supported by B and at least two other H-text manuscripts,[24]

[23] The writer used the 1873 Oxford edition of the *Textus Receptus*.

[24] Manuscript P could not be considered an H-text witness at this

4. any reading supported by all the H-text witnesses, other than B, when they are united in agreement against B.

There is one exception to this fourth rule, this being the last unit on the chart (see Appendix) found in ch. 5:20. This reading fo'lows the fourth rule except for the deviation of Ψ. However, as can be seen, there is almost no support outside the H-text for the reading of the majority of the H-text witnesses, a circumstance which suggests that this reading should be regarded as peculiar to the H-text.

The delimitation according to the principles just set forth reduces the body of usable evidence to 57 units of variation. These units together with their manuscript support are all included on the charts shown below in the Apendix.

In order that the conclusions of this study might be complete, another step was taken. An attempt was made to isolate from the 57 units of variation those units that contain unique H-text readings.[25] A unique H-text reading, as understood there, is one that is distinct from both the I-text and the K-text, being supported by the H-text group and receiving the support of no more than two manuscripts outside the H-text group.[26] There are 18 units [27] out of the 57 units of variation that contained unique H-text readings.[28]

point, since its classification is partially the purpose of this paper, and without it three manuscripts were half of the H-text group. Half of the group is enough, if B is included, to make an H-text reading, providing, of course, that this reading is distinct from the majority reading of either the I-text or the K-text.

[25] Colwell, *op. cit.*, p. 762.

[26] As was the case with P (see *supra*, n. 24), 1739 was considered as neither an I^{b2} nor an H-manuscript since it is one of the manuscripts being tested.

[27] These unique readings are marked on the chart in the Appendix with an asterisk.

[28] Von Soden notes six readings in Jas that he considered unique H-text readings. Five of these have been included in this study. These are found in ch. 1:19; 2:10; 3:3, 5 and have been distinguished on the chart in the Appendix by the use of an S next to the asterisk. The sixth reading used by von Soden is found in ch. 5:4. Here the T. R. reads εισεληλυθασιν and has support of every manuscript used except B, C, and P. B and P support εισεληλυθαν which is the reading

The phenomena of attestation exhibited in the 57 units of variation selected for analyzing have been set forth in

TABLE 1

AGREEMENT WITH H-TEXT READINGS

(The total possible number of agreements is 57)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*
B	53	93
ℵ	51	89
C	27 of 36	75
A	38	67
1739	36	63
Ψ	33	58
P	33	58
33	27	47
614	26	46
1518	26	46
206	25	44
1758	25	44
1611	24	42
623	20	35
5	17	30
323	12	21
K	11	19
440	10	18
479	9	16
69	8	14
917	6	11
201	5	9
920	4	7
L	4	7
1874	3	5
223	3	5
S	1	2

von Soden cites as a unique H-text reading. C is the sole suppport for εισεληλυθεν. It seemed impossible to include this unit of variation in the 57 units used for this study. Since P is one of the manuscripts being considered, its support could not be counted. This left εισεληλυθαν supported only by B and just one manuscript. The support of a witness as important as B, with the sole corroboration of one other manuscript, seems hardly enough to justify the use of the reading in this study.

Table 1 and the corresponding data for the eighteen readings unique to the H-text are displayed in Table 2. In these tables are listed the number of times each manuscript agrees with the H-text reading in each unit of variation. The percentage of this agreement is then computed with the total number of agreements possible (*i.e.*, either 57 in Table 1 or 18 in Table 2).

Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are explained in their headings and discussed in the conclusion.

TABLE 2

AGREEMENT WITH UNIQUE H-TEXT READINGS

(The total possible number of agreements is 18)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*
B	17	95
ℵ	16	89
C	14 of 16	88
A	10	56
1739	10	56
Ψ	6	33
33	6	33
P	5	28
623	2	11
323	2	11
5	1	6
206	1	6
1758	1	6
1518	1	6
K	1	6
479	1	6

The conclusions to this study can be drawn from the data shown in the first two tables. This paper is, however, primarily concerned with the classification of P and 1739. It can easily be seen that manuscript 1739 should be included among the H-text group. In fact, its agreement with the H-text readings is considerably stronger than that of Ψ, P, or 33, two of which have not been in question. However, it

appears from Table 1 that the classification of 33 could undergo some further scrutiny, since its inclusion in the H-text group on the basis of Table 1 alone would also justify the inclusion of manuscripts 614, 206, 1518, and possibly even more. Yet, it can be said from this table that P looks very much like a witness of the H-text group.

The second table seems to give a clearer picture of the H-text. It would be expected that B, ℵ, and C would show stronger affinities to each other than to the other manuscripts of this group. Scholars today generally accept these three as being the best Alexandrian witnesses. Beyond these three, the H group appears to be somewhat amorphous. This is pointed up in the decision of Westcott and Hort to make a separate group, the "Neutral" text, which contains primarily the readings of ℵ and B. Westcott and Hort then constructed the "Alexandrian" text from "a group which is less distinct."[29] One of the most "Neutral" members of this group is C.[30]

Table 2 shows that this is also true in Jas. B, ℵ, and C demonstrate strong bonds with each other, forming the nucleus of the H-text. 1739 appears to be as strong a member of this group as A, with which it shares the same percentage of agreement. Ψ, 33, and P seem weaker but still with a right to be classified as H-text witnesses.

To check these conclusions, Tables 3-7 were formulated. A comparison of Table 3 with Table 1 shows that 1739 does not exhibit as much agreement with the I^{b2}-text as it does with the H-text group (see Table 4). When the percentage of agreement of P with the other manuscripts in the control group is studied (see Table 5), it becomes apparent that the text of this uncial is somewhat mixed, displaying affinities with witnesses of both the H-text and the I-text. This mixture of relationship is further studied in Table 6. Here it can be

[29] J. Harold Greenlee, *Introduction to New Testament Textual Criticism* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1964), p. 79.

[30] Bruce M. Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament* (2d ed.; New York, 1968), p. 133.

seen that the non-H-text element of P is quite mixed. Finally, Table 7 indicates the relationship of P to von Soden's K-text. It is significant to note that both P and 1739 maintain their position among the other H-text witnesses in their relationship to the K-text. While P displays a higher degree of affinity with the K readings than does 1739, neither manuscript contains a significant K-text element.

TABLE 3

AGREEMENT WITH I^{b2} READINGS

(Units in which 323 and 440 agree are used for tabulation. The total possible number of agreements is 37)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*
1874	35	95
917	35	95
S	35	95
L	34	92
201	34	92
920	33	89
69	33	89
223	33	89
479	32	87
K	30	81
5	26	70
623	24	65
1611	24	65
206	22	59
1758	22	59
614	22	59
1518	20	54
Ψ	19	51
P	18	46
33	16	43
1739	16	43
A	14	38
C	9 of 26	35
ℵ	5	14
B	4	11

Therefore, the conclusion must be that von Soden was wrong to exclude 1739 from the H-text of Jas. At the same

time he seems to have been correct in including P in this group. While P offers weak attestation to the H-text, it is quite certainly part of the H-text group in distinction to the other non-H manuscripts used in this study. A further conclusion in regard to P can be drawn by comparing this study with that done by Kubo. If Kubo is correct in saying that P is not an H-text manuscript in 1 Pe, 2 Pe, and Jude, then P must be a mixed text in the Catholic Epistles.

TABLE 4

THE RELATIVE AGREEMENT OF ALL OTHER MANUSCRIPTS WITH 1739

(The total possible number of agreements is 57)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*
C	24 of 36	67
P	37	65
ℵ	36	63
A	36	63
33	34	60
B	32	56
Ψ	32	56
323	31	54
614	29	51
1758	28	49
1518	28	49
623	25	44
5	25	44
1611	24	42
206	21	37
479	21	37
917	20	35
440	20	35
69	19	33
920	18	32
1874	17	30
S	17	30
L	17	30
K	16	28
201	16	28
223	15	26

TABLE 5

THE RELATIVE AGREEMENT OF ALL OTHER MANUSCRIPTS WITH P

(The total possible number of agreements is 57)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*	*von Soden's Classification*
1758	41	72	I^{b1}
623	37	65	I^{a2}
1518	37	65	I^{c1}
A	36	63	H
1739	36	63	
614	35	61	I^{c2}
33	33	58	H
5	33	58	I^{a2}
1611	33	58	I^{c1}
Ψ	32	56	H
206	32	56	I^{b1}
C	20 of 36	55	H
440	31	54	I^{b2}
B	29	51	H
ℵ	29	51	H
201	28	49	K^{r}
920	27	47	I^{a3}
69	27	47	I^{a3}
323	27	47	I^{b2}
479	27	47	K^{c}
K	26	46	J
917	25	44	I^{a1}
L	25	44	K
1874	24	42	I^{a1}
S	24	42	K
223	22	39	K^{c}

TABLE 6

AGREEMENT OF OTHER MANUSCRIPTS WITH P WHEN P IS IN OPPOSITION TO THE H-TEXT READING

(The total possible number of agreements is 24)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*	*von Soden's Classification*
920	23	96	I^{a3}
S	23	96	K
1874	22	92	I^{a1}
440	22	92	I^{b2}
L	22	92	K
917	21	88	I^{a1}
69	21	88	I^{a3}
223	21	88	K^{c}
479	21	88	K^{c}
623	20	83	I^{a2}
201	20	83	K^{r}
5	19	79	I^{a2}
K	19	79	J
1758	18	75	I^{b1}
323	18	75	I^{b2}
1611	16	68	I^{c1}
1518	16	68	I^{c1}
614	15	63	I^{c2}
33	14	58	H
206	14	58	I^{b1}
Ψ	11	46	H
1739	11	46	
A	10	42	H
C	6 of 18	33	H
ℵ	1	4	H

TABLE 7
AGREEMENT WITH K-TEXT READINGS
(The total possible number of agreements is 56)

Manuscript	*Number of Agreements*	*Percentage of Agreement*
S	55	98
223	55	98
920	53	95
L	52	93
201	52	93
1874	51	91
917	50	89
440	48	86
K	48	86
479	48	86
69	46	82
323	40	71
5	36	64
1611	33	59
623	31	55
206	30	54
1518	29	52
614	29	52
1758	28	50
33	23	41
P	22	39
Ψ	22	39
A	18	32
C	10 of 35	29
1739	16	29
B	6	11
ℵ	6	11

APPENDIX

Units of Variations in James Used in This Study

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
1:5	μη	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X			
	ουκ												X	X									X	X		X		X
1:12	κυριος			X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	Θεος																X	X										
*	omitted	X	X		X		X								X													
1:18	αυτου	X							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	εαυτου		X	X	X	X	X	X									X												
1:19	ωστε					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	ιστε	X	X	X	X												X											
1:19	εστω				X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	και εστω							X																			X	
*S	εστω δε	X	X	X		X											X											
1:20	ου κατ- εργαζεται			X		X		X					X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ουκ εργαζεται	X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X				X					X							

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{e}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
1:25	ουτος (1)					X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	omitted	X	X	X	X			X									X	X										
1:26	εν υμιν								X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X				X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								X	X	X		X	X	X						
1:27	τω	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							X	X	X			X	X	X						
	omitted								X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X
2:2	την		X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	omitted	X		X			X														X							
2:3	και επιβλεψητε		X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X
	επιβλεψητε δε	X		X		X	X								X	X	X			X	X	X						
2:3	αυτω					X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X	X	X		X	X							X					X	X	X						
2:4	και (1)					X			X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	
	omitted	X	X	X	X		X	X							X	X	X				X	X						X
2:5	του κοσμου				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	τω κοσμω	X	X	X													X											

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
2:10	τηρησει					X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X
*S	τηρηση	X	X	X																								
	τελεσει						X										X											
	πληρωσει				X										X	X				X	X	X						
2:10	πταισει					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	πταιση	X	X	X	X																							
2:13	ανιλεως						X		X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X		X		X				X
	ανελεος	X	X	X	X	X							X	X			X				X		X		X		X	
	ανηλεος							X																		X		
2:13	ελεος (2)	X	X		X	X	X		X		X		X		X	X					X						X	
	ελεον			X				X		X		X		X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X
2:15	δε	X		X	X	X	X						X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted		X					X	X	X	X	X		X			X	X										
2:15	ωσι				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	omitted	X	X	X																								
2:17	εργη εχη								X	X			X				X	X					X		X	X	X	X
	εχη εργη	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X						

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
2:18	εκ								X	X		X	X			X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted					X		X			X							X										
	χωρις	X	X	X	X		X							X	X		X					X						
2:18	σου			X					X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X		X	X	X	X			X						X				X	X						
2:18	δειξω σοι			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X
	σοι δειξω	X	X					X						X	X					X		X						
2:24	τοινυν								X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X	X	X	X	X	X								X	X				X	X						
2:26	των			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X				X								X					X		X						
3:3	προς				X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*S	εις	X	X	X			X										X											
3:4	σκληρων ανεμων				X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X							X	X	X	X	
	ανεμων σκληρων	X	X	X		X								X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X					X

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
3:4	αν			X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	omitted	X	X																									
	εαν										X	X																
3:4	βουληται			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
	βουλεται	X	X																						X			
	βουληθη							X																				
	βουλοιτο														X	X												
3:5	μεγαλαυχει		X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*S	μεγαλα αυχει	X		X	X	X																						
3:5	ολιγον						X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*S	ηλικον	X	X	X	X	X					X																	
3:6	ουτως					X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X					X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X	X	X		X										X	X		X	X	X	X					
3:9	θεον								X	X	X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	κυριον	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X				X	X											
3:12	ουτως ουδε-μια πηγη αλυκον και					X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
*	ουτε αλυκον	X	X	X	X		X	X			X						X	X										

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
3:17	και (2)			X	X				X	X			X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	omitted	X	X			X	X	X			X	X			X	X				X								
4:4	μοιχοι και					X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
				†																								
*	omitted	X	X		X			X									X											
4:4	αν				X		X	X	X	X			X	X		X		X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	εαν	X	X			X					X	X			X		X			X	X	X						
4:10	του κυριου								X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X					X	X	X	X	X
	του omitted	X	X		X	X	X	X							X	X				X	X	X	X					
	θεου																X											
4:11	και κρινων	X							X	X		X	X	X				X					X	X	X	X	X	X
	η κρινων		X		X	X	X	X							X	X	X		X	X	X	X						
	κρινων										X																	
4:12	νομοθετης								X	X			X								X		X	X	X	X		
	+ και																											
	κριτης	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X					X	X
4:12	ος κρινεις								X	X			X			X			X				X	X	X	X		X
	ο κρινων	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X		X	X		X	X	X					X	
	κρινης																											

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
4:13	και (1) αυριον				X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	η αυριον	X	X				X	X				X					X	X										
4:13	πορευσωμεθα				X		X	X	X			X	X	X	X				X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X
	πορευσομεθα	X	X			X				X	X					X	X	X		X						X		
4:13	εμπορευσωμεθα						X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	εμπορευσομεθα	X	X		X	X				X						X	X	X										
4:13	κερδησωμεν				X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	κερδησομεν	X	X			X				X						X	X	X										
4:14	επειτα δε							X						X		X												
	επειτα και	X	X		X		X				X	X									X		X					
	επειτα δε και					X			X	X			X				X	X	X					X	X	X	X		
	δε omitted														X					X		X						X	
4:15	ποιησωμεν						X	X	X	X	X			X					X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	ποιησομεν	X	X		X	X						X	X		X	X	X	X			X							

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
5:7	αυτω	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X		X						
	αυτον								X	X			X					X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X
5:9	κατ αλληλων αδελφοι		X						X	X			X	X				X					X	X	X	X	X	X
	αδελφοι κατ αλληλων	X			X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X		X	X	X	X						
5:11	ειδετε	X	X							X					X				X	X		X	X			X	X	X
	ιδετε				X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X			X			X	X				
5:11	ο κυριος		X		X	X	X	X			X	X				X	X			X	X	X						
	omitted	X							X	X			X	X	X			X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X
5:12 *	εις υποκρισιν				X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X
	υπο κρισιν	X	X					X									X									X		
5:16	εξομολογεισθε		X				X		X	X			X	X				X	X					X	X	X		X
	+ουν	X			X	X		X			X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X	X				X	
5:16	τα παραπτωματα								X	X			X	X				X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X
	τας αμαρτιας	X	X		X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X			X	X	X						

Passage	Variation Units	H							I^{a1}		I^{a2}		I^{a3}		I^{b1}		I^{b2}			I^{c1}		I^{c2}	J	K		K^{c}		K^{r}
		B	ℵ	C	A	P	Ψ	33	1874	917	623	5	920	69	206	1758	1739	323	440	1611	1518	614	K	S	L	223	479	201
5:19	αδελφοι							X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X		X			X				X	X	X	X	X
	+ μου	X	X		X	X	X				X						X		X	X		X	X					
5:20	ψυχην	X					X		X	X			X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
	+ αυτου		X		X	X		X			X	X					X											

* = Asterisks indicate unique H-readings
S = Capital S indicates von Soden's unique H-readings
(1) = Numbers in parenthesis indicate first or second occurrence of the word or phrase in the passage referred to
† = From this point on there is a lacuna to the end of Jas in Manuscript C

LUTHER'S VIEWS OF CHURCH AND STATE

ERWIN R. GANE
Union College, Lincoln, Nebraska

I. *Luther's View of the Church*

1. *Congregation of Saints.* To Martin Luther the Church in the truest sense comprised a community of saints, a congregation of genuine believers wherever they may be found. Since his central theological tenet was *sola fide,* Luther viewed the Church as the sum total of men who experience a genuine faith-grace relationship with God. As pointed out by William A. Mueller, the Church conceived of in this way "is rather a spiritual entity that is being built, as it were, from above." [1] John M. Headley cites Luther's work *Operations on the Psalms* in which the Church is defined as the spiritual collection of the faithful wherever they may be. [2] Such a Church is not bodily or visible, neither can it be geographically confined. Just as faith is not a tangible entity that can be perceived by the senses or confined within physical limits, so the true Church, as understood by Luther, transcends any natural boundaries. It is primarily a spiritual entity because the relationship that characterizes its members is a spiritual one. This understanding of the Church was reflected in the Augsburg Confession (1530) which stated: "Also they teach that one holy church is to continue forever. But the church is the congregation of saints, the assembly of all believers." [3]

[1] William A. Mueller, *Church and State in Luther and Calvin* (New York, 1965), p. 7.
[2] John M. Headley, *Luther's View of Church History* (New Haven, 1963), p. 31.
[3] Philip Schaff, *The Creeds of Christendom* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1966), III, 11, 12.

It seems to be the consensus of scholarly opinion that Luther viewed the Church as a spiritual, invisible communion of believers; spiritual because of the primary qualification for membership, and invisible because it is impossible ultimately to determine the presence or absence of faith. J. W. Allen maintains that to Luther "the Church Universal on earth, consists of those only who know and do the will of the Lord." [4] Lewis W. Spitz says:

> For Luther the church was the communio sanctorum, die Gemeinde der Gläubigen. Only true believers in the gospel were actually members of the church, the kingdom of grace, and only God knew who had such faith. . . . The church is not an institution, but a holy people, comprised of specified persons who through faith belong to the body of Christ.[5]

E. G. Schwiebert concurs that Luther considered the Church an invisible body "no longer symbolized by the papacy as in former days." [6] Schwiebert argues that Luther's concept of the Church was the predominant factor requiring a change in the church-state relations which prevailed in the late Middle Ages. [7]

2. *Visible and Invisible Church.* Luther in no way suggested that the Church is a metaphysical entity in the Platonic sense. [8] Wilhelm Niesel rightly argues that Luther's true Church "is not an idea of the church, existing somewhere beyond the phenomenal world, but is here on earth, only we are unable to determine its boundaries because none of us can recognize with certainty the faith of others." [9] Although

[4] J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1960), p. 23.

[5] Lewis W. Spitz, "Luther's Ecclesiology and His Concept of the Prince As Notbischof," *CH*, XXII (1953), 121.

[6] E. G. Schwiebert, "The Medieval Pattern in Luther's Views of the State," *CH*, XII (1943), 109.

[7] *Ibid.*

[8] Hajo Holborn, *A History of Modern Germany*: *The Reformation* (New York, 1967), p. 185.

[9] Wilhelm Niesel, *The Gospel and the Churches* (Philadelphia, 1962), p. 244.

the Church is invisible it is manifested perceptibly in time and space. Headley refers to Luther's *Reply to Ambrosius Catharinus* written in the spring of 1521. Thomas Murner had charged that Luther, like Plato, was building a church which was nowhere. In his reply, Luther emphasized the substantiality of the visible church and also the inseparability of the visible from the invisible church.[10] The visible manifestations of the true invisible church, in Luther's view, can be perceived only by faith. "To the believer alone is the Church visible; by faith alone do the signs and means of grace constitute the visible Church." [11] By faith one church member can discern the evidences of faith in another, [12] and by the same means both can recognize the presence of the true invisible church by the preaching of the Word and administration of the sacraments. Gordon Rupp points out:

> We misunderstand if we suppose that because a thing is "sola fide perceptibilis" it is therefore purely inward, or in some sense unreal. But it is only faith, Luther insists, which can recognize the Church for what she is. Ernst Rietschel is surely right when he says that Luther's judgments about the Church are "Glaubensurteile"—judgments of faith.[13]

The two salient, visible evidences of the Church are the preaching of the Word and the correct celebration of the sacraments.[14] All those who apparently accept by faith the preaching and take part in the sacraments of baptism and the eucharist are regarded by Luther as members of the visible church. But undoubtedly this number will include some non-believers who are not, therefore, members of the invisible Church of the faithful for, as Headley explains, "the circle in which the means of grace are administered is greater than the one in which they are believed." [15] On the other hand, it

[10] Headley, *op. cit.*, p. 32.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 33.
[12] Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[13] Gordon Rupp, *The Righteousness of God: Luther Studies* (New York, 1953), p. 317.
[14] Niesel, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
[15] Headley, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

is also true, in Luther's view, that the confines of the visible church cannot be limited by the presence of preaching and the sacraments. Luther refused to recognize the sacraments as the means of grace. When a true believer is not, for geographical or physical reasons, able to celebrate the sacraments, salvation may nonetheless be his in view of his faith.

It would seem to be Hajo Holborn's misunderstanding of Luther's *sola fide* doctrine that led him to state:

> Luther believed essentially that once the Word would be left unimpeded, it would regenerate the world. The visible Church, in his opinion, should not be confined to a group of elect; the Word should reach everyone. He continued, therefore, the medieval idea of a general membership in the Church. . . . For Luther, the congregation was always identical with the political community.[16]

Without doubt Luther included in the visible church others apart from the elect. But this did not involve a continuation of the medieval idea of general membership in the Church. The medieval church could not be defined as the *communio sanctorum*, the invisible community of saints. Spitz nicely distinguishes between the medieval theory of the Church and that of Luther by pointing out that "in its most literal meaning Schleiermacher's famous definition applies to Luther's view of the Church—the relation of the Catholic to Christ is determined by his relation to the Church; the relation of a Protestant to the Church is determined by his relation to Christ." [17] Luther included the non-elect in the visible church only because he saw the impossibility of determining who were the elect and who were not. He did not regard membership in the visible church and participation in its sacraments as the means of grace and salvation. Whatever his later attitude to the territorial church, in the early period up to 1525 Luther's theology ruled out identification of the Church with the political community. A sacramental

[16] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
[17] Spitz, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

church may be commensurate with the political community simply by virtue of every citizen's participation in the sacraments. But a theory of the Church of which the *a priori* principle is *sola fide* excludes from membership non-believers except insofar as human insight is unable to discern their lack of faith. Luther was all too aware of the majority of non-believers in the political community.

3. *Priesthood of All Believers.* The hierarchical, sacramental, and sacerdotal character of the medieval church was seriously threatened by Luther's doctrine of the priesthood of all believers. In his tract *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,* the first of the three papal walls which Luther attacks is the theory that the clergy (pope, bishops, priests, and monks) comprise the spiritual estate while princes, lords, artisans, and farmers comprise the temporal estate.[18] Luther's answer to this theory is as follows:

> All Christians are truly of the spiritual estate, and there is no difference among them except that of office. Paul says in 1 Corinthians 12 [:12-13] that we are all one body, yet every member has its own work by which it serves the others. This is because we all have one baptism, one gospel, one faith, and are all Christians alike; for baptism, gospel, and faith alone make us spiritual and a Christian people.[19]

Thus Luther argued that baptism consecrates all as priests. Papal or episcopal consecration, apart from the divine blessing granted in baptism, could not make a priest. Hence when necessary anyone can baptize and give absolution.[20] Luther refers to the Early-Church custom by which bishops and priests were chosen by Christians from among their own number. Episcopal consecration simply confirmed the popular vote. Augustine, Ambrose, and Cyprian each became

[18] Martin Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation,* "Luther's Works," ed. by James Atkinson (Philadelphia, 1966), XLIV, 127.

[19] *Ibid.*

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 128.

bishops in this way. Any ruler or common person was, in Luther's opinion, constituted a priest, bishop, or pope by the act of baptism. "For whoever comes out of the water of baptism can boast that he is already a consecrated priest, bishop, and pope, although of course it is not seemly that just anybody should exercise such office." [21]

Schwiebert indicates that in the Middle Ages the Catholic clergy were regarded as belonging to the "geistlicher Stand" while the secular authorities were relegated to the "weltlicher Stand." Luther was at pains to emphasize, on the basis of his understanding of Scripture, "that there is no true, basic difference between laymen and priests, princes and bishops, between religious and secular, except for the sake of office and work [*Amt*], but not for the sake of status [*Stand*]." [22] All believers have the same spiritual status but there is a distinction between them in terms of office. It is the office, not the spiritual status, that distinguishes a clergyman from a prince.

4. *Opposition to Sacramentalism.* Brief mention has already been made of the non-sacramental nature of the Church as conceived by Luther. By "non-sacramental" is not meant the abolition of all sacraments, although Luther did reduce them to two (baptism and eucharist) or three (including the sacrament of penance). Sacramentalism refers to the use of the sacraments as the means of grace. Luther saw the sacraments as aids to faith and evidences of faith, but in no sense substitutes of faith. The *sola fide* doctrine recognizes faith as valid for grace and salvation quite apart from any works, whether sacramental or secular. Luther could write in the *Babylonian Captivity of the Church*:

> Similarly, because the priests are servants, they ought to administer baptism and absolution to one who makes the request as of right. If they do not so administer it, the seeker has full merit

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 129.
[22] *Ibid.*

in his faith, whereas they will be accused before Christ as wicked servants.[23]

Mueller comments on Luther's teaching in regard to the sacraments:

> Luther, while not denying the sacraments as such, had nevertheless and most consistently emphasized the need of faith on the part of the recipient of baptism, that is, faith in Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour. Faith and faith alone makes the sacraments efficacious. The meaning of faith is indeed so great that it may replace, should external circumstances prevent a person from receiving either baptism or the Lord's Supper. . . . Man may be saved, the reformer asserted in these earlier writings, even without the aid of sacraments but never without the Word of the Living God.[24]

Holborn sees Luther's attack on the Catholic sacraments as threatening "the very existence of a universal Church led by an intellectual elite." [25] Luther's doctrine of the universal priesthood of believers along with his sacramental teaching was bound to comprise a major threat to the hierarchical, sacerdotal structure of the papal church. His theology undermined the status of the spiritual aristocracy which arrogated to itself the sole right of administering mystical, sacramental rites.

Luther followed Paul and Jerome by equating the bishop (ἐπίσκοπος) and the priest (πρεσβύτερος).[26] As Spitz points out, Luther considered the ministerial office itself to be the true bishopric.[27] The real bishop is a preacher of the Word, but he lacks juridical power.[28] And the pope is no exception. The pope is not the only one who can interpret Scripture.[29] The keys were not given only to Peter but to the whole

[23] Luther, *The Pagan Servitude of the Church*, "Luther: Selections from His Writings," ed. by John Dillenberger (New York, 1961), p. 264.

[24] Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 15, 16.

[25] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[26] Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, p. 175.

[27] Spitz, *op. cit.*, p. 124; cf. Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[28] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

[29] Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, p. 134.

Church.[30] Luther objected to reducing the Church to one man.[31] Not only the pope has the right to call a general council. In fact, he should be subject to a council's rulings.[32] Thus, at least in theory, Luther rejected the monarchical episcopate whether applied locally in the sense of the supremacy of territorial bishops or universally in the sense of the primacy of the pope.

5. *Church Not Superior to State.* Luther's concept of the ministry, the bishopric, the sacraments, and the priesthood of believers implies that the Church is in no sense superior to the state in temporal matters, nor are the clergy a special class who may justly be exempt from those secular controls to which all other Christians are subject. Luther vehemently opposed the canon law stipulation that a bad pope could not be punished or deposed by secular authority.[33] In his address *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation* he urges that temporal matters should be left to temporal authority and not referred to Rome.[34] Bishops' courts, he argued, should deal only with "matters of faith and morals, and leave matters of money and property, life and honor, to the temporal judges." [35] Luther deplored sentences of excommunication passed by bishops' courts in cases in which questions of faith and morality were not involved.[36]

Luther denied that the pope had any authority above the emperor except in spiritual matters, and then only by virtue of office, not by virtue of superior sanctity or sacerdotal privilege.[37]

[30] *Ibid.*
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 132.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 160.
[35] *Ibid.*
[36] *Ibid.*
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 164.

> It is not proper for the pope to exalt himself above the temporal authorities, except in spiritual offices such as preaching and giving absolution. In other matters the pope is subject to the crown, as Paul and Peter teach in Romans 13 [:1-7] and 1 Peter 2 [:13], and as I have explained above.[38]

It was childish, in Luther's opinion, for the pope to claim that he was the rightful heir to the empire in the event of vacancy. Pope Clement V's decree to this effect in 1313 was later included in the canon law (Clementinarum).[39] The pope, so argued the reformer, should confine himself to spiritual and pastoral functions and forego all right to temporal authority in such territories as Naples and Sicily, Bologna, Vicenza, and Ravenna.[40] And the church should cease to use secular authority as a means of overcoming heretics. Luther urged, "We should overcome heretics with books, not with fire, as the ancient fathers did." [41]

6. *Autonomy of the Local Church.* In 1520 Luther urged that each town should choose its own minister from among the congregation. He was to be supported at the expense of the congregation, was to be free to marry or not, and was to be assisted by several priests or deacons.[42] In 1523 Luther wrote a tract entitled, "Why a Christian congregation or Church has the right and power to decide all doctrine and to call, induct, and depose teachers, the reasons and cause shown from Scripture." [43] Consistently throughout 1525 Luther responded positively to the first article of the peasants which affirmed the right of the entire community "to choose and appoint a pastor." [44] The peasants also sought the power to

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 165.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 165, 166.
[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 166, 167.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 196.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 175.
[43] Niesel, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
[44] Luther, *Admonition to Peace, A Reply to the Twelve Articles of the Peasants in Swabia,* "Luther's Works," ed. by H. T. Lehmann and R. C. Schultz (Philadelphia, 1967), XLVI, 10.

depose the pastor where necessary and stipulated that his function was to preach the gospel. Addressing the princes in his *Admonition to Peace* Luther wrote: "In the first article they ask the right to hear the gospel and choose their pastors. You cannot reject this request with any show of right." [45]

If the pastors were chosen in a Christian way Luther could see no reason why the local community should not exercise this function.[46] On the other hand, Luther opposed the second article of the peasants requesting that they be permitted to appropriate the tithe. This, he said, belongs to the ruler and appropriation of it by the peasants would be tantamount to deposing him.[47]

Again in 1526 Luther presented the idea of the autonomy of the local church and "expressed the ideal of the church as a voluntary group of committed Christians. . . ."[48] According to Franz Spemann, Johannes Warns, Friedrich Heitmüller, Roland Bainton, A. H. Newman, and William Mueller, in his *German Mass and Order of Worship* (1526) Luther came closest to the idea of a "free, separatist, congregationally organized church." [49] Mueller suggests that it was Luther's lack of confidence in the majority of professed Christians that caused him to hesitate to institute his ideal.[50] He feared disorder, disunity, and revolt; and he reacted violently to the Anabaptists, whose church polity, in fact, more nearly approximated what he regarded as the New Testament order. Such a *Freiwilligkeitskirche* (voluntary association of believers) was certainly very consistent with Luther's theology. To whatever extent he later contributed to the ascendency of the territorial church in Germany, the fact remains that Luther's theology of the Church pointed clearly in the direction of the autonomy of the local congregation.

[45] *Ibid.*, p. 22.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 38.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[48] Mueller, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[50] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

II. *Luther's Concept of Secular Authority*

1. *Civil Order Ordained by God.* Martin Luther was not a political scientist. He always spoke as a theologian. In the few instances in which he set out to define his attitude to secular authority, it was always in the context of a specific situation which was of real concern to the Church and to individual Christians.[51] Commenting on the relationship between Luther's theology and his political theory, Rupp says:

> No teaching of Luther has been more misrepresented than his teaching about the nature, extent and limits of temporal power. Partly this has been due to an attempt to by-pass Luther's theology.[52]

Rupp continues by emphasizing that Luther cannot be explained in terms of classical political philosophy. Luther was primarily a theologian and a preacher. His theology of politics results from an application of the Word to the concrete situations which he was obliged to meet.[53]

Luther's understanding of natural law was basic to his concept of secular authority. Natural law was not for him, as it was for Thomas Aquinas, an area of knowledge attainable by man's unaided reason. Rather, Luther thought of natural law as based on divine law and as a divinely implanted expression of the will of God.[54] To him, natural law is described in the Epistle to the Romans, chapters 1 and 2 (especially Rom 2:15). Natural law conceived of in this way, then, underlies all positive law which is the conditioned, ever-changing law of man. Therefore human government, though instituted and sustained by positive law, is, in fact, firmly rooted in natural law, which is an expression of the divine will.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[52] Rupp, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
[53] *Ibid.*
[54] Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 46 ff.

Luther's view of temporal authority was distinctively theocentric. Gustav Törnvall stressed that Luther's idea of secular rule must be considered from the aspect of God's own rule.[55] Secular authority is, to Luther, one of the ways in which God manifests his justice and love to men. God rules through earthly rule. Thus the secular order is an expression of the government of God.

Writing *To the Christian Nobility* in 1520, Luther argued that, inasmuch as secular rulers are baptized Christians they belong to the Christian body and therefore comprise a spiritual estate, even though their work is secular.[56] Although the 1523 tract *Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed* placed definite limits on the power of rulers, it strongly emphasized the divinely ordered nature of worldly government. "We must firmly establish secular law," Luther wrote, "and the sword, that no one may doubt that it is in the world by God's will and ordinance." [57] Speaking of John the Baptist's instruction to soldiers, Luther said:

> If the sword were not divinely appointed he should have commanded them to cease being soldiers, since he was to perfect the people and direct them in a proper Christian way. Hence it is sufficiently clear and certain that it is God's will that the sword and secular law be used for the punishment of the wicked and protection of the upright [1 Peter 2: 14].[58]

Perhaps the most pertinent reason for Luther's opposition to the rioting peasants in 1525 was his view that this was rebellion against God, who had ordained secular rule. It was irrelevant, in Luther's opinion, to argue that princely rule was corrupt. No peasant was qualified to decide that; and, even if it were true, no Christian has been given a divine mandate to purge temporal authority. What God ordains he is perfectly well able to punish and purify. As we shall see,

[55] Rupp, *op. cit.*, p. 289.

[56] Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, p. 131.

[57] Luther, *Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should be Obeyed*, "Luther: Selections from His Writings," p. 366.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 367.

Luther's theory of war as revealed in his 1526 work *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved* was firmly rooted in the theology of the sovereignty of God. He wrote:

> Thus, in the end, all authority comes from God, whose alone it is; for he is emperor, prince, count, noble, judge, all else, and he assigns these offices to his subjects as he wills, and takes them back again for himself.[59]

This same doctrine was quite consistently reiterated by the Augsburg Confession (1530), "Concerning civil affairs, they teach that such civil ordinances as are lawful are good works of God. . . ." [60]

2. *Duty of Princes to Rule Justly.* Because in his view secular authority is ordained of God, Luther stressed that princes, and indeed all secular rulers, are under a compelling obligation to rule justly and with due regard to the welfare and happiness of their subjects. Christian princes are to be subject to Christian principle as non-Christian princes are subject to natural law.

Luther was as much concerned in *Admonition to Peace* (1525) to correct princely abuses as he was to restrain the peasants. The first part of the tract was an address to the princes urging them to take the threatened rebellion seriously, to attempt conciliation, to modify their demands on the peasants, and to reform their way of life. Luther pointed out that the princes had no one on earth to blame for the rebellion but themselves.[61] He refers to them as "dictatorial tyrants" and blames them for inviting the wrath of God by their treatment of the peasants. He urges the princes to try conciliation before blows:

> Do not start a fight with them, for you do not know how it will end. Try kindness first, for you do not know what God will do to prevent the spark that will kindle all Germany and start a fire that no one can extinguish. . . . You will lose nothing by kindness; and

[59] Luther, *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,* "Luther's Works," ed. by Lehmann and Schultz, XLVI, 126.

[60] Schaff, *op. cit.*, III, 16, 17. [61] Luther, *Admonition to Peace,* p. 19.

even if you did lose something, the preservation of peace will pay you back ten times.[62]

Even in his rather violent tract, *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants*, written later in 1525 after the revolt had developed to dangerous proportions, Luther could urge, "Now the rulers ought to have mercy on these prisoners of the peasants. . . ." [63] He was referring to genuine Christians among the peasants who had been inveigled into revolt by more extreme spirits. Later still in 1525 Luther defended his earlier book *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants* by issuing *An Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants*. He reminded his critics that he had enjoined mercy toward those peasants who relented.[64] He refused to take blame for the lords' and princes' misusing their swords and punishing too cruelly.[65] The same ambivalent attitude is evident in this document as in the earlier two dealing with the same episode. Luther sees faults on both sides. He is thoroughly aware of the undue cruelty of the princes and vehemently repudiates it, but he is also aware of the gross wrong perpetrated by the peasants. This ambivalence appears in the following statement:

I had two fears. If the peasants became lords, the devil would become abbot; but if these tyrants became lords, the devil's mother would become abbess. Therefore I wanted to do two things: quiet the peasants, and instruct those pious lords.[66]

Luther knew that he had failed with both groups. There is, however, throughout the three 1525 documents a consistency of political theory. Both peasants and lords have duties and responsibilities, and both are at fault. Albert Hyma saw no inconsistency in the 1525 tracts.[67]

[62] *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22.

[63] Luther, *Against the Robbing and Murdering Hordes of Peasants*, "Luther's Works," ed. by Lehmann and Schultz, p. 54.

[64] Luther, *An Open Letter on the Harsh Book Against the Peasants*, "Luther's Works," ed. by Lehmann and Schultz, p. 69.

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 74. [66] *Ibid.*, p. 84.

[67] Albert Hyma, *Christianity and Politics* (Philadelphia, 1938), p. 117.

Although Luther saw it as mandatory Christian duty for princes to repress sedition and rebellion, in the early years of the Reformation he argued that they have no right to enforce any particular belief. Their authority is strictly limited to matters temporal. A prince should not force the conscience of any man. This motif appears in the 1520 address *To the Christian Nobility* [68] and again in the 1525 *Admonition to Peace.*[69] The latter document contains a statement which in the light of Luther's later attitude to the Anabaptists is surprising indeed, but a statement nonetheless thoroughly consistent with the theologically based political theory enunciated in his earlier works. He wrote, "Indeed, no ruler ought to prevent anyone from teaching or believing what he pleases, whether it is the gospel or lies. It is enough if he prevents the teaching of sedition and rebellion." [70]

> As late as 1528 Luther strongly opposed the brutal persecution of religious radicals, insisting that every one should be allowed to believe according to his conscience; that the most that might be done to a "false teacher" was to banish him.[71]

3. *The Question of Civil Obedience.* The Augsburg Confession stated succinctly Luther's teaching on the question of civil obedience:

> Christians, therefore, must necessarily obey their magistrates and laws, save only when they command any sin; for then they must rather obey God than men (Acts v. 29).[72]

Luther's consistent position during the peasant revolt was that rebellion against divinely constituted civil authority is rebellion against God. It is the Christian duty of lords and princes to punish sedition and revolt with death. As Rupp

[68] Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, pp. 125, 126, 196.
[69] Luther, *Admonition to Peace*, p. 22.
[70] *Ibid.*
[71] Harold J. Grimm, *The Reformation Era, 1500-1650* (New York, 1954), pp. 230, 231.
[72] Schaff, *op. cit.*, III, 16, 17.

explains, "Luther's doctrine of obedience to authority is rooted for him in the Biblical doctrine of Christian obedience and Rom. 13 is its locus classicus." [73] On the other hand, R. H. Murray takes the position that Luther's application of this principle in his hard book against the peasants (1525) "sacrificed liberty to order." [74] But Luther did not conceive of liberty as the right of subjects to depose and murder rulers not according to their liking. He saw the danger of the subjective judgment that existing rulers are unjust. Only God has ultimate wisdom in such matters, hence only God can depose and punish princes and lords. Christian freedom, to Luther, was not physical freedom, freedom from serfdom. He saw it as freedom of the spirit which renders the Christian patient under suffering or duress.[75]

There were circumstances, so Luther taught, in which civil rulers should be disobeyed. Heinrich Bornkamm regards the 1523 treatise *On Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed* as "a protest against what we today would call the totalitarian claims of the State. . . ." [76] The immediate occasion of Luther's writing this document was the banning and burning of his translation of the NT in the Duchy of Saxony and other territories. Luther essayed to answer the question, whence did the territorial rulers derive this right ? His investigation of the nature of secular authority thus became at the same time an inquiry as to its limits.[77]

Holborn represents Luther's demand that Christians render complete civil obedience as in conflict with human rights. He argues:

> Submission with complete obedience was the supreme and absolute law that Luther preached, in all matters except one,

[73] Rupp, *op. cit.*, p. 301.

[74] R. H. Murray, *The Political Consequences of the Reformation* (New York, 1960), p. 74.

[75] Luther, *Admonition to Peace*, p. 39.

[76] Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther's Doctrine of the Two Kingdoms in the Context of His Theology* (Philadelphia, 1966), p. iv.

[77] *Ibid.*, pp. 5, 6.

> namely religious conviction. Adherence to and open confession of the Christian faith could not be limited by any secular authority. But this faith could not establish any right of the individual either.[78]

Allen disagrees on the grounds that opposition to armed resistance is not repudiation of resistance in any form, nor does it lead logically to the absolutism of the State.[79] Carlson reminds us that Luther stressed the duty of preachers to rebuke rulers "publicly, boldly, and honestly."[80] Spitz points out that in Luther's order "oral protest could be voiced against injustice, even if the hand could not be raised against it."[81] It seems to the present writer that Holborn has overlooked the power and effectiveness of passive Christian resistance. Matters of Christian conscience can involve numerous issues apart from mere questions of doctrine and theology.

4. *The Question of War.* Holborn says, "Luther could understand that a Christian might hesitate to participate in the functions of governments as rulers, judges, soldiers, or hangmen."[82] Quite the contrary, Luther not only condoned but strongly urged the Christian's participation in these functions. His attitude was reflected in the Augsburg Confession:

> Concerning civil affairs, they teach that such civil ordinances as are lawful are good works of God; that Christians may lawfully bear civil office, sit in judgments, determine matters by the imperial laws, and act as soldiers, make legal bargains and contracts, hold property, take an oath when the magistrates require it, marry a wife, or be given in marriage. They condemn the Anabaptists who forbid Christians these civil offices.[83]

[78] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 190.
[79] J. W. Allen, *A History of Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century* (New York, 1960), p. 19.
[80] Edgar M. Carlson, "Luther's Conception of Government," *CH*, XV (1946), 265.
[81] Spitz, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
[82] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
[83] Schaff, *op. cit.*, III, 16, 17.

The definitive statement of Luther's attitude to war is contained in his 1526 work *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved.* He argued that war and the sword were instituted by God to punish evil-doers and so preserve peace.[84] The work of the soldier is, therefore, the work of God. Luther distinguished three kinds of people who make war.[85] First, an equal may make war against an equal. Second, an overlord may fight against a subject. Third, a subject may fight against his overlord. Luther could see no instance in which the third kind of war could be justified. He ruled out unequivocally not only peasant rebellion against princes but princely rebellion against the emperor. Even the emperor was a subject of God and therefore required to rule with equity.[86]

On the question of whether equals may war against equals, Luther ruled that whoever starts a war is in the wrong. Princes should wait until the situation compels them to fight and then to fight only in self-defense.[87] It is interesting to note that Luther does not extend to the individual Christian the same right to use the sword in self-defense.[88] The Christian may justly join in a defensive war conducted by his prince. In fact, it is his duty to so support the secular powers. But he has no right to use physical force in defending himself from the personal attacks of evil-doers. It is the function of God and the secular powers to so protect him. As a Christian he is duty-bound to abide by the Sermon on the Mount. A Christian may kill only in cooperation with punitive measures adopted by the secular authorities. Such a war is just only when a prince is forced to defend his realm. That is, the war must be one of necessity as distinct from a war of desire.[89]

To the question whether an overlord has the right to go to

[84] Luther, *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,* p. 95.
[85] *Ibid.,* p. 103.
[86] *Ibid.,* p. 116.
[87] *Ibid.,* p. 118.
[88] *Ibid.,* pp. 121, 122; cf. Luther, *Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed,* pp. 372 ff.
[89] Luther, *Whether Soldiers, Too, Can Be Saved,* p. 121.

war with his subjects, Luther answered that if the subjects rebel it is right and proper for the ruler to forcibly suppress them. But the ruler must be sure of the justice of his cause.[90] Wars motivated by selfishness are never just. Should a prince, however, attack his subjects for any other motive but to suppress evil-doers he is not to be forcibly resisted. "If injustice is to be suffered, then it is better for subjects to suffer it from their rulers than for the rulers to suffer it from their subjects." [91] Vengeance in such cases Luther saw as belonging solely to God.[92]

5. *Secular Authority in Relation to the Church.* In 1523, Luther took the position in *Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed* that government is to keep order, protect property, enforce the laws of the land, care for the poor, punish the wicked and generally maintain those conditions conducive to the happiness of the people and well-being of the church. Secular authority however, has no qualification in matters of the soul. Temporal matters which are related to the prosperity of the Church are to be regulated by secular power, but the Church is to maintain its autonomy in matters of polity, choice of ministers, doctrine, and spiritual emphasis.[93]

This was in no way a contradiction of the position taken in the 1520 address *To the Christian Nobility.* In 1520, Luther was seeking to motivate the secular powers to take control of those temporal matters related to the health of the Church in Germany. In 1523, he was seeking to define the limitations of such intervention. The earlier work does not enjoin secular assumption of prerogatives which Luther elsewhere relegated to the local congregation. Rather, he urges the German princes as Christian members to break the power of a cramping

[90] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 106.
[92] *Ibid.*, p. 107.
[93] Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp. 41, 42.

episcopate by calling a general council, by refusing to support so many cardinals, by repudiating payment of annates, by passing laws against the papal months and by restoring to the German bishops "their right and responsibility to administer the benefices in the German nation to the best of their ability." [94] Luther admitted that such general reform of the Church properly belonged to the clergy.[95] But such was the political involvement of the late medieval papal church that only legal, governmental interference was sufficient to relegate to their rightful provinces the secular and spiritual kingdoms.

III. *Luther and the Medieval Concept of Church-State Relations*

1. *The Medieval Two-Sword Theory.* It seems important to distinguish between the traditional medieval concept of the Church-State and the extreme papal theory of the ecclesiastical empire. W. Ullmann represents Gelasius I (died 496) as teaching that the "final authority in a Christian society was the pope's alone." [96] The Church-State, according to Gelasius, was not a dichotomy consisting of two equal realms, the secular realm ruled by the emperor and the spiritual realm ruled by the pope.[97] There was, indeed, in Gelasius' theory a division of labor, but real sovereignty concerning basic and vital matters remained with the pope.[98] Philip Schaff agrees with Ullmann that Gelasius "clearly announced the principle, that the priestly power is above the kingly and the imperial, and that from the decisions of the chair of Peter there is no appeal." [99] Roland Bainton, on the other

[94] Luther, *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, p. 158; cf. pp. 123, 137, 142, 143, 145, 156, 157.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[96] Walter Ullmann, *A History of Political Thought in the Middle Ages* (Baltimore, Md., 1965), p. 43.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 41.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

[99] Schaff, *History of the Christian Church* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1964), III, 324.

hand, represents Gelasius as insisting on the mutual independence of spiritual and civil powers, although stressing the superiority of the Church in spiritual matters.[100] Whether Gelasius intended to describe a monolithic ecclesiastical empire in which the pope was supreme, or a Church-State in which, as Bainton suggests, the two swords were equal and mutually independent, it would seem that both concepts were held through the Middle Ages and both were current in the early 16th century.[101]

It seems to the present writer that the real difference between the medieval Church-State theory and Luther's theory resulted from their divergent doctrines of the Church. The medieval view of the Church may be summarized as follows: (1) The Church is a visible entity only; (2) This visible entity consists of the sum total of political entities; The Church transcends political and geographical barriers and is virtually equivalent to human society wherever it is to be found; (3) The Church is bound by sacramentalism and sacerdotalism; (4) The hierarchical concept is based on the idea of apostolic succession; (5) The primacy of the pope of Rome is undoubted.

This doctrine of the Church could lead logically to the position of the late medieval papacy that the Church, and specifically the pope, is supreme over secular authorities. The subjects' first loyalty is to Rome since Rome rules the visible society-church. Rome's political aspirations could be represented as spiritually motivated and Rome would justifiably rule the world.

More conservative medieval theorists adhered to the two-sword theory which put Church and State in separate and virtually watertight compartments. But given the medieval concept of the Church, there was bound to be endless tension. What is a purely secular issue for the State, and a purely spiritual one for the Church ? Where does the spiritual begin

[100] Roland H. Bainton, *Christendom* (New York, 1966), I, 158.
[101] Allen, *op. cit.*, pp. 12, 13.

and the secular end ? Luther faced the same problem but did not attempt a separation of the two spheres on the basis of sacerdotal and sacramental concepts.

2. *Luther's Two-Sword Theory.* Luther also distinguished between the kingdom of God and the kingdom of the world.[102] As we have seen, both are branches of God's rule. Secular authority would not be necessary if all were true Christians, but even most professed Christians are not always impeccable in conduct. Therefore the restraining, controlling secular power is essential. Luther emphasized the divinely ordained nature of secular authority to a degree not generally accepted in the Middle Ages.

It is Luther's doctrine of the Church which sharply distinguishes his two-sword theory from that of the Middle Ages. His view of the Church may be briefly summarized as follows (1) The Church is an invisible community of saints; (2) The visible church is manifested to the faithful by certain signs; (3) All believers are priests; (4) The Church is non-sacramental, non-sacerdotal, and non-hierarchical; (5) The Church is not to rule the State, nor is it to be ruled by the State.

Certain conclusions may be drawn from this. Luther did not conceive of a Corpus Christianum in the medieval sense of a society-church. His church was a spiritual unity of believers everywhere. Luther did not adhere to a two-sword theory in the medieval sense of entirely separate spiritual and secular realms. In Luther's theory there is much greater interaction between the two swords without one ruling the other. If a prince influences doctrine he does so only as a Christian, not by virtue of princely authority. If a Christian takes part in secular government and enforcement of law and order, he does so as subordinate to secular laws and as an instrument of secular order. The prince is not to force uniformity of belief, nor is the individual Christian to take part in secular rule for

[102] Luther, *Secular Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed*, pp. 368, 369.

the sake of enforcing the teaching of his church. Faith is a spiritual matter to be engendered by spiritual weapons. Secular order is ordained of God but concerned with matters temporal as distinct from matters spiritual. Here, at least in theory, would seem to be the roots of later separation of Church and State. Society is a monolithic structure under God, but it is compartmentalized into secular and spiritual offices; not monolithic by virtue of the supremacy of one sword, and not compartmentalized in the sense of exclusion of Christian interaction between the two kingdoms.

3. *Luther's Dilemma.* According to Leonard Verduin, Luther's dilemma was that he was torn between his desire for a confessional church and a territorial church including all in a particular locality.[103] Schwiebert explains that the territorial church was well-established in Germany before the time of Luther.[104] By the time of Charlemagne, the *Eigenkirche* was well-recognized throughout Germanic lands.[105] The medieval investiture controversy from the time of Pope Gregory VII (1073) to the Concordat of Worms (1122) revolved about this *Eigenkirche* tradition "which had almost completely secularized the Roman Church in Germanic lands." [106] The German princes were the real victors in the Concordat of Worms and the *Eigenkirche* survived as the territorial church.[107] By the second half of the 15th century the power of the Holy Roman Emperor had virtually been broken in the German lands, and the territorial princes were substantially sovereign in their areas.[108] When the Diet of

[103] Leonard Verduin, "Luther's Dilemma: Restitution or Reformation," *The Dawn of Modern Civilization*, ed. by Kenneth A. Strand (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1962), p. 167.

[104] E. G. Schwiebert, *Luther and His Times: The Reformation from a New Perspective* (St. Louis, Mo., 1950), pp. 613 ff.

[105] *Ibid.*

[106] *Ibid.*

[107] *Ibid.*

[108] *Ibid.*, p. 614.

Speyer in 1526 sanctioned the principle *cuius regio eius religio*, it recognized a principle which had been applied for centuries.[109]

Luther's theology of the church was, therefore, in conflict with the political situation in which he found himself. Verduin argues that Luther hesitated to institute the confessional church which was his ideal because of the political and social circumstances with which he was confronted.[110] In 1523 and again in 1526 he wrote of his desire for a gathered church of believers but expressed hesitancy because the people were not yet ready for it. Finally he settled for the *Landeskirche* and, according to Verduin [111] and Holborn,[112] launched Germany on the course that led to the authoritarian state and the tragedy of Nazism. Spitz, on the contrary, argues that Luther never regarded the prince as anything but a *Notbischof* (emergency bishop), temporarily invested with certain controls over the Church until such time as the latter could stand on its own feet as a spiritual community separate from the State.[113]

Suffice it to say, Luther's theology up to 1526 is clearly in conflict with the concept of a state-church. One gains the distinct impression that he was attempting, despite the political situation of 16th-century Germany, to extol the virtues of the first-century confessional congregation of true believers in Christ.

[109] *Ibid.*, p. 615; cf. Spitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 114, 115.
[110] Verduin, *op. cit.*, pp. 175, 176.
[111] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[112] Holborn, *op. cit.*, p. 193.
[113] Spitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 126-134.

THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HERMENEUTICS OF SHAILER MATHEWS [1]

SAKAE KUBO
Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan

Shailer Mathews (1863-1941) was the leading member of what is known as the Chicago School of Theology.[2] He was reared in a strict Puritan environment but when he went to college (1880-1884) he was influenced by Darwin, Huxley, and Spencer. Although some of his contemporaries were abandoning their evangelical affiliations, Mathews remained within the evangelical group; but "it led to an attitude of mind which was sensitive to theological adjustment." [3]

He came to Chicago in 1894 and after serving as Associate Professor of NT History (1894-1897), Professor of NT History (1897-1905), Professor of Systematic Theology (1905-1906), and Professor of Historical and Comparative Theology (1906-1926), he became Dean of the Divinity School.

The Problem

The problem that led Mathews to his theory of interpre-

[1] No definitive study has yet been published on Shailer Mathews. C. H. Arnold, *Near the Edge of Battle: A Short History of the Divinity School and the "Chicago School of Theology" 1866-1966* (Chicago, 1966), p. 125, reported that a doctoral dissertation was being written on Mathews as theologian. For two short studies, see Kenneth Cauthen, *The Impact of American Religious Liberalism* (New York, 1962), pp. 147-168, and John S. Reist, Jr., "The Dread of the Father: An Analysis of the Theological Method of Shailer Mathews," *Foundations*, VIII (1965), 239-255. A paper by Luther Martin, "Shailer Mathews and the Current State of Biblical Studies," is reported to have been read at the 1968 meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature (*JBL*, LXXXVIII [1969], 126).

[2] On the Chicago School, see the bibliography listed by Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-131.

[3] Shailer Mathews, *New Faith for Old* (New York, 1936), p. 18.

tation is a common basic one. It is the very basis of interpretation itself. Von Dobschütz explains it neatly:

> A sacred book, like a legal code, calls for interpretation, as a means of bridging the chasm which, in religion as in law, exists between the progressive development of life and the fixed letter. The book and the legal code do not supply all the information that may be required; to many questions, they give no satisfactory answer; while again, they contain much that can no longer be used, and much that to a more advanced stage of thought seems antiquated, erroneous, and objectionable. Interpretation thus comes to be a process partly of supplementing the original record, partly of giving it a new significance.[4]

The Bible was written for particular people of a particular time. It would not do to take this Bible and apply it literally to modern man, for with time, many types of changes have taken place. The environment of men has changed not only from Jewish to Western civilization but from agricultural to industrial; the thinking of men has changed not only from an Oriental to Hellenistic-Western mind but also from a pre-scientific to a scientific mind. The four differences that Mathews gives are: [5]

1. The modern age is primarily scientific and controlled by the conception of progress.
2. A second and closely akin characteristic of the modern world is its conception of God as immanent in this process rather than an extramundane monarch.
3. If possible an even more remarkable characteristic of our day is the growing sense of social solidarity.
4. And, finally, another characteristic of our modern world is its refusal to accept authority or metaphysical deduction as the basis of truth.

These differences make it imperative that the Bible be interpreted so that it has relevance to modern man.

[4] Ernst von Dobschütz, "Interpretation," *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, VII, p. 390.

[5] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man* (New York, 1912), pp. 36-54.

> The church must preach some form of theology, and theology in the final analysis is the result of an attempt of the thinkers of an age to make religion intelligible to their fellows. It is the correlation of the facts of religion with the other things they know.[6]

Mathews urges the importance of this matter in a crusading spirit, for he sees the situation as "a matter of life and death for both the church and the new social order." [7] He feels that unless the church defines rightly its attitude toward formative forces now at work, unless it leaves off archaic world-views and interprets Christianity in the light of the present world-view, it will be ignored by scholarship and have no dynamic role to play in shaping the forces that will make a better tomorrow.

> When, therefore, the church insists that in order to become one of its members one must assent to a series of doctrines embodying the cosmology, the psychology, and the philosophy of the New Testament taken literally, it inevitably sets up a test which will compel a man under the influence of to-day's scholarship to abandon not only a life of evil thinking and of evil action, but also the results of his education. The church in standing uncompromisingly by anciently formulated dogma as an expression of the facts of religion as known in the life of Jesus and in human experience is also standing for a philosophical world-view, for scientific conceptions, and for a religious philosophy that sprang up in an age that was not only pre-scientific, but was also untouched by the modern ideals of political democracy and social evolution.[8]

This most extraordinary intellectual transition presents to the Christian world a crucial challenge.

> There are three ways in which this challenge can be met. Religion can be abandoned. Scientific findings can be abandoned. Religious faith can be tested and, if possible, justified from the point of view of the methods of the new culture. Of these, the first is being applied in large scale to communist states: the second has been made familiar to us in the struggle between orthodoxy and modernism; the third is the method of creative Christianity.[9]

[6] Mathews, *The Church and the Changing Order* (New York, 1913), p. 12.
[7] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 17.
[9] Mathews, *Creative Christianity* (Nashville, 1935), p. 121.

To Mathews there is no alternative. Christianity must make itself relevant. Its teaching must be shaped according to the social mind and the patterns of society governed by evolutionary concepts.

The Solution

How can the Bible with its outmoded world-view, its eschatology, with its salvation by catastrophe and its strange imagery, with its conception of God as an oriental monarch, be made relevant to modern man ? How shall the Bible be interpreted to make it intelligible for modern man ?

Mathews outlines five steps in his methodology:

> (a) The discovery by the methods of historico-literary criticism of the oldest records of the life of Jesus and of the primitive Christian faith.
>
> (b) The comparison of the world-view of the New Testament times with the contents of such records and the classification of the elements of the world-view found in the gospel.
>
> (c) The distinction between such world-view and the positive data of the spiritual life of the gospel it correlates or interprets.
>
> (d) The discovery by comparison and other tests of the elements of such world-view as are actually constructive principles of the gospel in the formulation of the content of the spiritual life in a particular historical situation.
>
> (e) The combination of the positive data of the gospel in accordance with concepts which are the equivalents of such of these primitive constructive and interpretative concepts which have been found to possess more than temporary and pictorial value.[10]

As I analyze what Mathews has written it is easier to classify his method into four basic steps:

1. Establish the historical basis of Christ and his message.
2. Understand the nature of doctrines.
3. Distinguish between the pattern and the essence.
4. Apply the essence to the modern pattern.

We shall follow this outline in our analysis of Mathews' method and interpretation of the NT.

[10] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 72.

1. *The historical basis of Christ and His Message.* Mathews insists upon a historical Christ although he concedes that Christianity might still continue without it.

> True, the evangelic message of a God of love who delivers man by reinvigorating him with new spiritual power might still help us even if the Jesus of the New Testament should disappear in the crucible of historical criticism. The religious conception of the universe built up by Christian experience would be still a message of deliverance. Conceivably—but to my mind tragically—Christianity might supplant Jesus. As shaped by the century-long experience of the Christian community, it contains much that is self-validating. Social evolution enlightened by the Christian church would teach us it is better to live in accordance with the supposition that a God of Law is a God of Love, that individual development is not to be stopped short by death, that the spiritual order is superior to the natural, and that a better community is yet to be formed. But, apologetically strong as such a daring, I had almost said reckless, position may be, it is weak indeed when compared with the same teachings backed by an assurance of the trustworthiness of the evangelic picture of a genuinely historical Jesus, the concrete exposition of the supremacy of the spiritual life.[11]
>
> However much we may argue that apart from any historical basis the essential truths of the New Testament are in themselves capable of evoking faith, few of us have so accustomed ourselves to the high altitudes of academic thought as to find it possible to gain spiritual uplift in an alleged historic fact we are convinced has become merely "functional." An empty revolver functions admirably as long as the highwayman thinks it is loaded, but what if he discovers his mistake ? History that has lost its historicity becomes, except perhaps among philosophers, of equally dubious value.[12]

Mathews' real contribution is not in the field of source analysis. While he accepts the results of historical criticism, he leans to the less radical results of source criticism. His concern can be seen in the following quotation:

> It is desirable to distinguish as far as possible between the real Jesus and those estimates and descriptions with which the New Testament writers present him. But why should we not get positive results from the criticism as well as negative ?[13]
>
> The business of a positive theology is not to discover how much

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 93.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 102.

> of that primitive belief can be omitted, but how much of it is really correlatable with other things we know, and so is capable of being built inductively into a positive message for to-day's life.[14]

What are these positive results of historical criticism according to Mathews? He finds in the oldest sources of the Synoptic Gospels the following picture of Christ:

> In their light we must say that he was a person of moral perfection, possessed of remarkable powers to work cures through the evoking of faith on the part of others; a teacher who carried to what, so far as we can see, are their final results, the religious and ethical possibilities and conceptions of humanity; a religious master whose very life was an imperative call to trust in the fatherly love of God; and, although he never explicitly demanded such faith of his disciples, one who regarded himself as such an altogether unique manifestation of the Spirit of God as to be able to deliver men from sin and misery and death.[15]

Along with this very liberal picture of Jesus, he admits a strong emphasis on the eschatological hope.[16] And while he sees two uses of the term "kingdom," he makes the eschatological use swallow up the present use of the term "kingdom." He explains the use of the latter term as a reference "(1) to those who were to be received into the kingdom when it appeared, and (2) to the triumphs he and his followers were winning over Satan and his kingdom." [17] He does not neglect the eschatological elements in the teachings of Jesus as so many liberals have done in the past. However, we shall see how he deals with them in terms of their relevance to modern man.

Having established the fundamental elements concerning Jesus and his message, Mathews can now begin to show how these can be made relevant to modern man.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[15] *Ibid.*, pp. 104, 105.
[16] Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament* (Chicago, 1905), p. 69.
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 80.

2. *The Nature of Doctrines.* His methodology of interpretation really begins here. The first step, though basic, is only preliminary. This second step comes into the heart of his methodology. Before he goes on to his next step he needs to show what he considers to be the nature of doctrines. This is the foundation of his superstructure. This must hold firm or his superstructure will fall.

What is doctrine or theology ?

> Strictly speaking there is no history of doctrine, but only history of the men who hold doctrine. The historian of doctrines must be the historian of society, for doctrine is, after all, only the attempt made by the social mind of a given period to make intelligible to itself its religious experience.[18]

The first statement in the above quotation is made repeatedly by Mathews in his articles and books. He means by it, as one can see from his definition of doctrine, that doctrines are shaped according to the social forces operative at the time. Doctrines cannot be understood apart from the social mind of a particular period.

Inherent in the definition of doctrine is the distinction between the basic religious attitude and its expression (doctrine).

> To put the matter more distinctly, theology is the outgrowth of the needs of religion for intellectual expression. Wherever religion is practised it is forced to meet the needs set by the social life of those to whom it ministers.[19]

Doctrine, then, is something transient, fit only for one particular epoch. It becomes out-of-date when a new social mind is developed. But if doctrine gets out-of-date, then that of which it is an expression is permanent. This is the basic religious attitude.

> A study of the origin and purpose of our doctrines shows how patterns have originated and served actual needs of a group. By them attitudes and convictions are given expression in doctrines.

[18] Mathews, "A Positive Method for an Evangelical Theology," *The American Journal of Theology*, XIII (1909), 41.

[19] Mathews, "Generic Christianity," *The Constructive Quarterly*, II (1914), 705.

> But they are not of necessity the same. Convictions are individual; doctrines are social. Convictions inspire attitudes; doctrines are "accepted." Convictions are to be expressed dramatically as well as intellectually; doctrines are analogies and social patterns raised by common usage and group authority into symbols of convictions. Through a knowledge of their origin and a sympathetic interpretation of patterns used in doctrines we discover the basal attitudes and convictions they express. And these are more fundamental than their expressions.[20]

History of doctrine, then, being a history of society and its changing social mind, is a study of a constantly changing subject. Doctrine not only changes, but should change if Christianity is to be relevant. And if doctrine is only an expression to fit a particular period it has no relevancy, authority, or significance for the next period. The creeds and the formulations of doctrine throughout the history of the church are as outmoded as its social mind or world-view is to ours. There is no need to consider them in our day. All that needs to be done is to recover again the essence, the basic religious attitude, and with it the social mind of our day and shape our doctrine or theology to fit the modern mind.

Since doctrine, though a part of our religion,[21] is not to be identified with our religion, it stands to reason that the important question is not whether it is true or not. If it is simply an expression of our convictions or attitudes molded to fit a particular social mind, it is expendable.

> From such a point of view the ultimate test of any doctrine is not absolute, but pragmatic—that is to say, its capacity to indicate the deepest faith and the moral conduct of that group of Christians by which it is drawn up.[22]
>
> In every case the definitive question is not whether a doctrine is true but how successfully it co-ordinates religious experience with unquestioned beliefs and thus satisfies men's search for satisfaction and courage in the pursuit of the ends they seek to realize.[23]

[20] Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism* (New York, 1924), p. 59.
[21] *Loc. cit.*
[22] Mathews, "Doctrines as Social Patterns," *JR*, X (1930), 3.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

A doctrine is true if it effectively expresses the attitudes of Christians for their generation. Thus Mathews can define heresy simply as the belief of a defeated party. "If it had succeeded it would have been orthodoxy. . . . The decisions reached by the fathers of orthodoxy were usually nearer the truth than the views proposed by heretics, but their survival was due to vital social forces rather than academic discussion." [24] Orthodoxy simply becomes the view that most effectively expresses the attitude of Christianity to a particular social mind.

If all this is true, then the history of doctrine will coincide with the history of society.

> Doctrines, when analyzed according to their origin chronologically, synchronize with the creative epochs of European history. And what is of even more significance, they strikingly resemble the dominant characteristics and practices of the period in which they were finally organized.[25]

This synchronization of doctrine and social mind, Mathews makes in the following manner:

> . . . the Semitic which gave us the New Testament and the Messianic drama; the Hellenistic which gave us Ecumenical dogma; the Imperialistic which gave us the doctrine of sin and the Roman Church; the Feudal which gave us the first real theory of atonement; the National which gave us Protestantism; the bourgeois which gave us modern Evangelicalism; and the Modern or Scientific-Democratic mind which must give us the theology of tomorrow.[26]

3. *Content and Essence.* Having explained the nature of doctrines, Mathews can now move on to the next step in making the gospel relevant to modern man. If doctrines are temporary and essence is permanent, the next problem is to distinguish the temporal from the permanent, the doctrine from the essence. While it is interesting to study the history of doctrines for this purpose, it is not essential or primary.

[24] Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism*, pp. 64, 65.

[25] Mathews, "Theology from the Point of View of Social Psychology," *JR*, III (1923), 340.

[26] Mathews, *The Constructive Quarterly*, II (1914), 707, 708.

The most important thing is to get back to the gospel of Jesus, for there this essence ought to be most clearly seen. But it is not so simple as merely to get back at what Christ taught and said. For the sociological process was present in the time of Christ as well. Christ used the social patterns of his time to express his message. How can we distinguish between form and essence ?

Mathews says that the search for the essence is not to be sought by first determining what is true but by first determining the points of identity between the NT and the world of the first century.[27] This is necessary to see how Jesus and the NT writers have used the concepts of the social mind of that period to effectively express what is essential. Mathews insists, however, that many of these concepts were actually believed to be true. In fact, he says:

> A satisfactory interpretation comes only when a description is regarded as fact rather than analogical, axiomatic rather than imagined. When the past spoke of God as a spirit or as a sovereign, when the practices of courtiers and the conceptions of the law-court were employed to describe men's relations with God, such descriptions were not regarded as analogical but as elements in the religious conceptions themselves. That is to say, they were patterns rather than metaphors. . . . Later criticism may discover the analogical character of the pattern, but as long as it brings intellectual serenity and allays intellectual obscurity a pattern is regarded as fact rather than as metaphor.[28]

Therefore where the NT accepts certain concepts as patterns and as essential truths, it is not necessarily the evaluation that we ought to give them today. The criterion is the actual existence of the concept. The criterion is not whether the concept is Biblical but whether it exists.

> If the concept appears to be wholly a priori, in no clear way expressive of facts of experience, but is rather the outgrowth of rhetoric, faith, hope, and other emotions; and if it appears chiefly as interpretative and appreciative of what is obviously experience and personality; and especially if the concept in question be one

[27] Mathews, *The American Journal of Theology*, XIII (1909), 37.
[28] Mathews, *JR*, X (1930), 8, 9.

that obviously is derived from a cosmogony or a theology that does not square with historical and scientific facts and processes; it will not be difficult to give it its true value and significance for the constructive and systematizing processes.[29]

Another criterion that Mathews uses to sift the form from the essence in Jesus' teaching is the extent to which he is dependent upon certain concepts to express his teaching. In this he maintains that the conception of God as love is the basis of his ethical teachings and not messianism. Therefore the latter must be only form, not essence.[30]

From this point of view the student of the life of Jesus becomes increasingly convinced that none of the essential teachings of Jesus are dependent upon the messianic scheme as such. Jesus does not use the idea of the kingdom as inclusive of all his teaching. If it be abandoned, his general ethical and religious teaching would not be injured. The idea of the kingdom is a point of contact between himself and his hearers. Could he, conceivably, have been a Greek, it must have been something different. His own experience of God, his own personality, led him to enlarge upon eternal life rather than upon the kingdom.[31]

Mathews then on this basis reduces messianism merely to a pedagogic instrument. It was "the great channel by which the fundamental verities were valued and brought to a generation under the control of messianic expectation." [32] The interpretation was not necessarily incorrect, but its efficiency will be seen only among those whose thinking was controlled by messianism.

What then is the essence of Christianity ? What is the essence that the doctrines of successive periods sought to express ? Here is Mathews' answer:

It is not difficult to see, back of these successively organized doctrines, the elements which go to make up generic Christianity. Stated as far as possible without the doctrinal forms given them by successive social minds they are as follows:

[29] Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, p. xix.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[31] *Ibid.*, p. 126.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 319.

(1) Men are sinful, and, if they are to avoid the outcome of sin, need salvation by God. (Sin, guilt, and the need of redemption.)
(2) The God of law is knowable as the God of love, who in threefold personal self-expression seeks reconciliation with men. (Trinity.)
(3) God has revealed Himself as Saviour in the historical person, Jesus. (Deity of Christ.)
(4) God comes into any human life that seeks Him, both directly and indirectly through social organizations like the church, transforming it and making it in moral quality like Himself. (The Holy Spirit as experienced in repentance and regeneration.)
(5) The death of Christ is the revelation of the moral unity of the love and law of God. (Atonement.)
(6) Those who accept Jesus as the divine Lord and Saviour constitute a community in special relationship with God. (The church.)
(7) Such persons may look forward to triumph over death and entrance into the kingdom of God. (Resurrection and eternal life.) [33]

4. *Relationship to the Modern Pattern.* Having established the essence or the permanent elements in Christianity, there remains only the expression of them into our modern pattern. For a belief, according to Mathews, gets theological value only when interpreted.

> To be understood a fact must be integrated with some unquestioned social conception or practice. When one is convinced that a fact has a bearing upon actual life the desire to rationalize such a belief leads to the discovery of some inclusive formula which connects it with that which is unquestioned.[34]

Because Mathews sees such a vital relationship between the essence and its expression, it is very necessary for him to find equivalents to these expressions. Messianism may have no relevancy to the modern mind, but its equivalent is important. Thus, since messianism has no relevancy, it is not enough to cast it aside. It must be studied in order to find its modern equivalent. Mathews gives the reasons for this necessity:

[33] Mathews, *Constructive Quarterly*, II (1914), 719, 720.
[34] Mathews, *JR*, X (1930), 8.

> For while the method will recognize to the full the fundamental verities of the Christian experience, it will also give full value to historical facts . . . . On the one side, this method avoids that assertion of the perpetual authority of interpretative concepts and that dogmatism which have always proved fatal to the spontaneous and persuasive expression of the Christian spirit; and, on the other hand, it avoids that mysticism which belittles the historical facts which really have made Christian assurance possible.[35]

The historical facts in this case are the concepts of messianism. Not only because one must give the historical facts their full value should one find modern equivalents but because it is necessary to find some unifying principle that will have the same redemptive power as messianism.

> But in order that it shall have the power which messianism gave it in the first century, an evangelical theology must be something more than an ethic. It must group and unify its data by some great principle that shall give them the same appeal and the same quality as did messianism. And only if it be fundamentally messianic can it be divinely redemptive. For the very heart of messianism in general was that God would deliver his people, and of Christian messianism in particular that he would deliver the believers in the Messiahship of Jesus from Satan, sin, and death, and erect a new kingdom. Any evangelical gospel must do something more than outline a code of duties and a system of metaphysics. It must set forth the regenerating significance of the facts of the gospel. As these facts are the epitome of the redemptive process, so must the general scheme by which they are brought into intellectual harmony with the other things we know be fundamentally redemptive.[36]
>
> While a completely systematized theology is not necessary to the success of an attempt to bring the gospel to the modern man, in the very nature of the case, we must, if possible, find some coordinating principle that on the one hand shall bring the elements of the gospel into harmony with the controlling world-view. If such a unifying thought is to be true to the gospel, it must be an equivalent of the messianic formula. Indeed, the method of equivalency must control the entire presentation of the gospel if it is to be true to its original content. For, as we have already seen, the gospel was not merely a group of truths and facts; it was also the valuation of those truths and facts in terms of messianism in the interest of the spiritual man. That is to say, it was the historical form given to ultimate spiritual realities, which form itself, in so far as it, too, was the expression of the spiritual life, has permanent value.[37]

[35] Mathews, *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament*, p. 320.
[36] Mathews, *The American Journal of Theology*, XIII (1909), 43.
[37] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, pp. 79, 80.

What then are the modern equivalents of the general scheme of messianism "which, despite the unaccustomedness of their formal expression, are obviously contained in our modern world-view ? " [38]

The three most important elements he reduces to the sovereignty of God, eschatology, and salvation. These are only transient patterns and must be translated into modern equivalents.

A. The Sovereignty of God.

> Sovereignty was an analogy, but it was the most inclusive analogy under which the ancient world which shaped our ecumenical orthodoxy undertook to set forth its conception of God. The modern man with his democracy and his science can hardly be expected to get full value from either the concept or the terms of such a world-view. God is more than a sovereign. He is *God*. Yet sovereignty expresses a reality which cannot be overlooked—God as the ultimate and controlling reality in human life both individual and social. We do not look to Him to find any likeness to the oriental monarch, but regarding Him as immanent Life, beneficently working through, determining and expressing Himself in the age-long process which involves both matter and history, we conceive of Him, not as Process but as the source and guide of all progress. Humanity must submit to and conform to God, conceived of not as politically but as cosmically personal.[39]

To Mathews, however, the sovereignty of God involves more than his general relationship to mankind. As he says above, he considers it as "the most inclusive analogy under which the ancient world which shaped our ecumenical orthodoxy undertook to set forth its conception of God." Involved in this pattern are

> . . . such corollaries as the absolute power of the monarch, decrees, law and its violations, trials, sentences, pardon, reward, and punishment. . . . Indeed, every doctrine of the atonement may be said to be the use of some social pattern expressing a difficulty perceived in God's forgiveness of sinners and of the death of Christ as a basis upon which this forgiveness could be justified.[40]

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[39] *Ibid.*, pp. 81, 82.
[40] Mathews, *JR*, X (1930), 9.

Translated into theological terms, the corollaries involved in this pattern would become the doctrine of sin, atonement, and the deity of Christ.

> The abandonment of divine sovereignty means the abandonment of the entire political pattern. Human guilt is the correlate of divine sovereignty and cannot survive its disappearance. And with the disappearance of sovereignty as a literal attribute of God and of guilt on the part of man, the need of satisfying the divine honor or punitive justice also disappears and the death of Christ no longer gets significance as expiation, satisfaction, or vicarious suffering.[41]

These involvements come under the third of these messianic elements and will be discussed under that heading, *i.e.*, salvation.

B. Eschatology.

What can eschatology couched in these bizarre symbols mean to the modern mind ? Mathews sees three things to which they point in our day.

> In the first place it was pictorial presentment in terms of catastrophe of what we should call the teleology of social evolution. For it was primarily a politico-social hope. It looked not to a theological heaven, but to a social order, the kingdom of God. Its very heart was confidence in that divine deliverance which God was to give His people by establishing through the national Saviour an actual, triumphant, and ideal society. Catastrophe was only incidental to such a hope. It was simply the way in which the ancient world conceived of God's accomplishing his redemptive purpose in human history.[42]

Eschatology in modern terminology, then, is the hope of the establishment of the kingdom of God on earth. It is symbolic of God's triumph in the social order through Jesus and his teaching.

> Eschatology, in the second place, included the hope of personal immortality and resurrection . . . . The resurrection was not that of the physical body from the grave, but, if we correctly interpret Josephus, was a formula for expressing the Pharisees' belief in the

[41] Mathews, *The Atonement and the Social Process* (New York, 1930), p. 182.

[42] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 83.

efficient and superior form of individual existence to be enjoyed by the righteous.[43]

How do we square belief in the resurrection with modern man and his scientific and evolutionary concepts ?

Immortality is "a new birth upward; a new advance, a new stage of human evolution; a freer and more complete spiritual personality." [44] In this case

> From the point of view of evolution something like the resurrection of Jesus seems to be demanded. For, as has already been said, the course of evolution has not been simply towards the production of new species. It is rather towards the production of decreasingly animal and consequently increasingly free spiritual individuality. It is at this point that the gospel appears to give significance to the process. In a sense almost startlingly true, Jesus is a second Adam. As the first man marked the rise of the new type of individual above the brute, so Jesus reveals the completion of the next step ahead in the process of the development of the spiritual individual. The *a priori* probability that there should develop some life through its identity with the End of the spiritual order made strong enough to conquer the conditions set by our physical limitations, is met by the message that such a life has appeared. The *a priori* probability meets the historical.[45]

The third element which eschatology expressed was that of "the inevitableness of the postponed outcome of forces resident in national and individual character." [46] The pictures of the Judgment Day and of hell can be understood in the axiom "what a man sows, that he shall also reap." It is the inevitability of "pain or blessing as the outcome of character because of God's working in the moral-personal realm." [47]

Punishment for sin then is not forensic but inevitable within the process, not only in the present but also in the future. "The terrible pictures of the Judgment Day and hell have reality back of them. The loss of the body in itself is as truly punishment for those who have 'lived to the flesh' as would

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 235, 236.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 84.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 85.

be the loss of a hand to a pianist." [48] Death simply introduces a new mode of existence where joy or misery will depend on the soul's readiness to live in it. A bad man in a spiritual world will be in misery.

C. Salvation.

Salvation from the NT concepts of Satan, sin, and death have meaning for us today. The first represents the relentless natural forces that bring so much misery and suffering. Deliverance comes when by spiritual growth and mastery the soul rises superior to these impersonal forces of the universe as it embodies the will of immanent love.[49]

Sin is not a violation of law in the political sense, on the one hand, and does not arise from the corruptness of human nature from Adam's sin, on the other. Concerning this, Mathews says that "human nature is not corrupt, but atavistic." [50] He describes it as "voluntary action opposed to the divine purpose as seen in the steady progress of life up from the vegetable into the animal and so out into the social and ever more personal realm." [51] The grosser sins are cases of voluntary reversions to lower types. He illustrates this by comparing the thief to the animal that prowls by night and "the man who sinks his individual responsibility for wrongdoing in corporations like a wolf that runs with the pack." [52]

Salvation is found in harmonizing our life with the life of God. "The fact that such a divinely regenerate life will be ultimately victorious over passion and sin and death, is to-day's equivalent of that removal of guilt which Paul described as justification." [53]

Atonement is not sacrifice, ransom, or satisfaction. Atonement is only the explanation of the experience of forgiveness.[54]

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 177.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 150.
[50] Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism*, p. 98.
[51] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 168.
[52] *Loc. cit.*
[53] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 185.

It is an explanation of Christ's vocation as deliverer. "Christ does not save by dying, but he died because he saved." [55]

> He could not save without dying; for death was the penalty of sin from which men were to be saved, and the revelation of the possibility of such deliverance could be made only by an actual and typical example of such deliverance. In a truer sense than men have sometimes seen, the Christ bore the sin of the world; for as part of the world in which sin was socialized he bore to the full its outcome of hate and violence and death.[56]

Christ's life and death are a revelation of the manner in which our deliverance can be wrought. Two truths of elemental importance can be seen in Jesus' death. First, there is Jesus' faith in the justice of God's moral order. Thus he accepted as just the suffering involved in the social effects of sin. Man reaps the results of other men's wrongdoing. He also accepted as just that service rendered by love to the higher needs of the world is given at the expense of suffering caused by the sin of others. Therefore though innocent he willingly accepted suffering for wrongdoers. In the second place the sufferings of Jesus exhibit his faith in the love of God. He saw no Reign of Terror in God's kingdom. [57]

Our salvation is wrought when we too exhibit faith in the love and justice of God as we face the sufferings caused by social sins and impersonal evil. We triumph over these forces by faith and by a spiritual life that is in right relations with God, even though like Jesus we may be apparently crushed by these forces.

Where theories of atonement sought to meet the difficulty of God's right to forgive those who deserved punishment, the modern understanding of the atonement is to harmonize evil and God's love. It is to exhibit faith in God's justice and his love in the cosmic process.

Salvation from death is accomplished in the same way as salvation from sin.

[55] Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism*, p. 155.
[56] Mathews, *The Gospel and the Modern Man*, p. 187.
[57] *Ibid.*, pp. 195-200.

> To have a life strong enough through personal relations with God to overpower the force of the "body of death," the survivals of animalism, in the moral realm, is to have a life also strong enough to overcome its other result, death.[58]

Death is overcome for such a life, for his victorious personality "is the embryo of that new stage which is made possible by the emancipation of self from the survival of the strictly physiological aspects of the process." [59]

> What is that salvation which the gospel of the New Testament asserts can be brought to individuals ? We have defined it negatively as deliverance in New Testament terms, from Satan, sin, and death, and in the modern equivalent as deliverance from physical necessity, from the backward pull of the vestiges of past stages of development surviving in the individual and society, and from the collapse of the process of physical development in death.[60]

Analysis

It is apparent from this study that Shailer Mathews is influenced heavily by evolutionary ideas current in his time, the scientific method and its results, sociology, the social gospel, and the liberal presuppositions concerning the nature of Christianity. He accommodates his gospel to every one of these influences.

Concerning his method of interpretation, one is impressed with his similarity to three men—Hegel, Harnack, and Bultmann.

He is similar to the first in his conception of the eternal essence within the changing forms. This, of course, has been very popular in liberal reconstructions of the essence of Christianity.

Aubrey, however, notes this difference from Hegel: "His basis is not on *a priori* metaphysical, but a social psychological fact; human nature and its needs remain substantially the same throughout the ages." [61] Nevertheless one can see this influence in his fundamental concept of transient doctrine

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 201. [59] *Ibid.*, p. 219. [60] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[61] Edwin Aubrey, "Theology and the Social Process," *The Process of Religion*, ed. by Miles H. Krumbine (New York, 1933).

and eternal attitude. This is his most important conception. His house of interpretation stands or falls with it.

The similarity of his ideas to those of Harnack consists in seeking to find the kernel of the gospel in the simple teachings of Jesus. There is also some similarity in their concept of form and essence throughout history. Harnack looks for the kernel in "what is common to all the forms." [62] He also speaks of doctrine as against the gospel.[63] But these are somewhat superficial similarities, for while Mathews sees in each changing form an expression of the gospel to a new social pattern, Harnack usually sees a preservation of the essence not in the form but rather in some individuals who have not been blinded by the new forms or who, though affected (Clement of Alexandria), were still able to see the pure gospel.[64] In other words, gospel and doctrine are antithetical. Mathews sees the gospel unaffected by social process, only changing in form or expression to fit the social mind of its period. There is no real development, no change as far as the essence is concerned. Besides his theory of interpretation, his definition of Christianity as "that religion which Christians believe and practice" and "not a hard and fast system of philosophy and orthodoxy" [65] precludes this. He is confident that "Christianity will breed true to itself because it will be developed by groups of Christians whose needs and satisfactions are of the same general type." [66]

In this respect, is not Harnack more true to the facts ? Though the theses of both control their conclusions, is not Harnack more realistic here ? At least we cannot admit both conclusions. Since there is for Mathews no development and church history can be disregarded, he says that "the great demand today is not so much a manipulation of the inherited theology into some form acceptable to our modern way of

[62] Adolf Harnack, *What Is Christianity* ? (New York, 1903), p. 16.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 312.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 231.
[65] Mathews, *The Faith of Modernism*, p. 16.
[66] Mathews, *JR*, III (1923), 351.

thinking; it is rather a frank disregard of inherited beliefs and a return to the primitive gospel itself. . . ." [67]

The creeds of the church and the history of doctrine are to be studied only to see how the church at different periods expressed its Christian attitude, rather than to find any basis for establishing what is Christian doctrine. There is no importance or authority in the church or in tradition. In fact, inherited theology gets in the way of reconstructing a theology for modern man.

So Harnack would remove doctrine to find the gospel while Mathews would find his gospel in the analogy of the gospel formulated in doctrine. Both seek to separate the essential from the non-essential elements, but the former by removing the intruding accretions and the latter by reducing the analogy to a universal truth.

Another important difference is seen in their consideration of the messianic and eschatological elements. Harnack removes them as simply Jewish elements which Jesus shared with his contemporaries.[68] Mathews seeks to reinterpret them in modern terms. He does not disregard them as most liberals have done. In this he has anticipated Bultmann and his demythologization method. This brings us to a comparison of Bultmann and Mathews.

The common problem of Biblical interpreters throughout the centuries but particularly in modern times is to make the Bible relevant for their age.

Cosmology, demonology, messianism with eschatology and soteriology are elements that modern interpreters feel need to be explained to modern man. Bultmann mentions allegorization, elimination of temporary elements (liberalism), and emphasis on religious experience (history-of-religions school), as previous attempts to do this.[69] Bultmann de-

[67] Mathews, *American Journal of Theology*, XIII (1909), 41.
[68] Harnack, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
[69] Rudolf Bultmann, "New Testament and Mythology," *Kerygma and Myth*, ed. by Hans Werner Bartsch (New York, 1961), pp. 13, 14.

scribes the difference between the methods of older liberals and himself thus: "Whereas the older liberals used criticism to *eliminate* the mythology of the New Testament, our task today is to use criticism to *interpret* it." [70] In this, however, Mathews has anticipated Bultmann by about forty years. Mathews was demythologizing since 1905, as is seen in *The Messianic Hope in the New Testament.* A more complete elaboration of this method is found in *The Gospel and the Modern Man* published in 1910. It is interesting to note that both men are controlled by one idea, Bultmann by existentialism and Mathews by social reform, and that their interpretations always end up with these ideas. This is really the basic difference—the controlling idea in their interpretation. For this reason the historical plays a minor role in Bultmann's thought while Mathews takes seriously the historical elements which he can interpret in terms of social reform.

How valid is Mathews' principle of equivalency or demythologization ?

The first question that must be asked is, "How does one distinguish the form from the essence ?" "What elements do we take as subjects of demythologization ?" It is just at this point where differences abound. Mathews' criterion for distinguishing form from essence is relative because it is dependent on what social mind makes the judgment. Thus what is form in one age may become essence in the next and vice versa. In this case there is no real essence. The fact that there are so many differences in this respect shows that the criterion is questionable.

Again, granted that we are agreed on what needs to be interpreted, how do we determine its meaning for modern man ? Take the question of eschatology. How varied has been its interpretation ! Bultmann, Dodd, Mathews, all have different views. Though Mathews might say that the interpretation is dependent on the current social mind, he seems convinced that it refers to a social order, a far cry from Bult-

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 12.

mann's existential interpretation. Here it seems to me there is danger that interpretation reverts back to allegorization, no matter how scholarly the approach may seem. The kingdom-of-God concept was held by others interested in social matters such as Ritschl, Harnack, and Hermann, [71] but theirs was not the eschatological interpretation that Mathews fashioned. Eschatology was dismissed, not interpreted. The fact that most liberals eliminated the messianic and eschatological elements in Jesus' teachings instead of interpreting them, as does Mathews who has the same presuppositions, makes them seem altogether displaced elements in Mathews' theology. Knowing Mathews' liberal mind, one would have thought that Mathews would have eliminated these elements. Is not the fact that he has not done this evidence that his zeal for social reform has been a controlling concern in selecting these elements for interpretation ?

The principle of equivalency or demythologization is not so easily applied. Equivalents must be carefully selected, but with different social minds this may be impossible. Actually, if we are serious about making equivalents, we need to remythologize rather than demythologize. An interpretation is not an equivalent but an explanation of the meaning of the myth. In this respect there is no principle of equivalency in Mathews' thought; rather, there is only interpretation.

Are messianism and eschatology really interpretable in modern terms ? If myth comprehends suprasensual reality, how can this be interpreted in accordance with a scientific world-view that is immanentist ? As Thielicke says, "Whenever mythology is translated into scientific and rational terms there is an inevitable loss of meaning and consequent superficiality, which shows the inadequacy of the scientific approach to this kind of truth." [72]

[71] C. C. McCown, *The Search for the Real Jesus* (New York, 1940), p. 261.

[72] Helmut Thielicke, "The Restatement of New Testament Mythology," *Kerygma and Myth*, p. 159.

If we cannot interpret messianism and eschatology into modern terms, can we remythologize ? Here we run into the same problems, according to Thielicke. [73] Modern myths are compatible with the modern world-view. There is no element of transcendence, which was the reason these myths were created.

Then how can we make the NT relevant if the world-view which provides the mythological framework of the Bible is not translated into a modern mythology ?

Thielicke's[74] answer is that this can be done not by demythologizing in Bultmann's manner according to science, not interpreting as Mathews does in modern concepts, nor remythologizing, which is not possible, but by interpreting the contemporary myth of NT times in the light of its world-view.

> May it not be that this temporal limitation is something more than an incumbrance upon the gospel to be swallowed as it stands ? May it not be that it possesses a positive meaning within the Kerygma ? May we not go so far as to say that the contemporary myth of New Testament times, with its three-storied universe of heaven, earth, and hell, left open the door for the idea of transcendence ? This is what made it peculiarly fitted to express the otherness of God and his intervention in salvation history. For this myth does not assume that the universe is a self-subsistent, finite entity, as does the secular myth. It is for this reason that the secular myth cannot become the vehicle of Biblical truth without disintegrating it.[75]

While Thielicke is writing an answer to Bultmann, it seems to me that he also attacks Mathews' principle of equivalency.

[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 162-165.
[74] *Ibid.*, pp. 168-172.
[75] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

NOTATIONS ON A RARE REFORMATION-ERA WORK

KENNETH A. STRAND
Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan

Professor George A. Hoar and I presented companion studies in *ARG* several years ago on Bartholomaeus Arnoldi von Usingen's *Sermo de Matrimonio Sacerdotum et Monachorum* from a rare edition presented to me by Professor Albert Hyma.[1] This interesting publication apparently had previously gone unnoticed. In addition to Usingen's *Sermo* this book contains a second piece consisting of some anti-Lutheran documents from Poland. The purpose of the present brief article is threefold: (1) to furnish a description of this book, (2) to call attention to the Polish materials not treated earlier, (3) and to present new information about the publication facts concerning the book.

I

This rare Reformation-era publication is a sixteen-leaf octavo edition. Its first eight leaves contain the title-page and Usingen's *Sermo*, followed by seven leaves devoted to the Polish materials, and a final leaf which is blank on both sides. The title-page (leaf 1, recto) carries titles for both pieces: *SERMO / DE MATRIMONIO SACERDOTVM / & Monachorum exiticiorum. F. Bar- / tholomei de Vsingen, Ordi / nis Eremitani S. Au / gustini* and *EPISTO / LA ANDREAE CRICII ET / Edictum Regis Poloniae, in / Martinum Luthe / rum* (see Plate I). On the verso of leaf 1 the text of Usingen's *Sermo* begins, preceded by the title *SERMO / DE MATRIMONIO SACERDOTVM ET / monachorum, Quem praedi-*

[1] *ARG*, LVI (1965), 155-165: George A. Hoar, "Early Evidences of Catholic Reform in the Thought and Actions of Bartholomeus von Usingen"; and pp. 145-155: Kenneth A. Strand, "Arnoldi von Usingen's Sermo de Matrimonio Sacerdotum et Monachorum: The Text of a Rare Edition."

SERMO
DE MATRIMONIO SACERDOTVM
& Monachorum exituorum. F. Bar-
tholomei de Vsingen, Ordi
nis Eremitani S. Au
gustini.

EPISTO
LA ANDREAE CRICII ET
Edictum Regis Poloniæ, in
Martinum Luthe
rum.

Title page (leaf 1, recto) of the rare Reformation-era book containing Usingen's *Sermo* and some materials from Poland. (Actual size.)

Hæc habes quanq; sis, tuæ q̃stionis resolutionẽ, & meã quã postulasti respõsionẽ, quã libentius præter-mu sissem ob reuerẽtiã utriusq; sexus ordinũ, nisi quo tidie suggesta publica hæc sonarẽt & uulgarẽt p pri apistas ipudẽtissimos, q cũ summa innocẽtiũ infamia li bẽter sua tegerẽt crimina, q̃ tegere quo plus molium-tur, eo cõspectiora reddere cõperiũtur. sed fucũ quæ rant suo fãcto criminoso utcũq; uelint apud uulgũ, summo iudicio imponere nõ posunt nec illudere. Exẽ plo Forchemij sui, nisi toti cæci eẽnt, merito cõmouẽ-ri deberẽt. Qui cũ publicæ de suggesto nõ semel, sed crebro cenobitis utriusq; sexus pari infamia insultas set, cora maxima etiã ppli frequẽtia. publicæ quoq; et priuatim admonitus obstinatus remaneret in sua præ sumptõe, facta est manus domini sup eũ, q̃ ei interdi-xit tantã seuiẽdi licentiã, quãdo nemo hoim cũ cohi bere poterat, passit eni cũ subito & liberauit inno-cẽtes ab ore malignãtis impudẽtissimo. Sic eni ut. I. Pe. ij. legitur, nouit deus pios de tentatõe eripere, ini quos uero in diẽ iudicij reseruare cruciandos magis aũt eos q post carnẽ in cõcupiscẽtia immunditiæ am bulãt, dominationẽq; cõtemnũt, audaces sibi placẽtes sectas nõ metuũt introducere blasphemãtes. Et in quos hæc magis cõgruũt q̃ in priapistas nostros, q p oia illis se conformãt. qbus quotidie in ore est illud, cre-scite & multiplicamini & replete terrã. quasi mũdus cõseruari nõ posit sine illorũ multiplicatione contra sua uota. Soli Deo Gloria.

Epistola

EPISTOLA ANDREAE CRICII ET Edictum Regis Poloniæ, in Martinum Luthe rum.

R. DOMINO LADISLAO ZALKA-no Episcopo Agrien. Sereniss. Hungariæ Regis Cæsario, Francisc. Bachien. pannonius. S.

INciderat nuper in manus meas. R. & doctissime Antistes epistola. R. Andreæ Cricij episcopi premislien sis ad Sereniss imũ Sigismũdum Poloniæ Regem, docte & luculẽter scripta: meo quidem iudicio, interea quæ hactenus in Luterũ unt edita, maxime digna, q̃ publicæ legeretur. Nam optima quæq; nisi in cõi hominũ usu sint, nihilo plus sunt meliora opib. absconditis. res enim usus ipse cõmendat. Solẽ & lu nam eo antiqtas in deorũ numero uoluit, q his nihil cõmunius cõmodiusq; uitæ mortaliũ esse norat. Vo-lui itaq; hanc, ne lateret, tuo nomini nũcupare, q & eruditissimus sis, & Christianæ ueritatis amore fla-grantissimus. quid enim ineptius q̃ a Menelao equos

Facing pages (verso of leaf 8 and recto of leaf 9) showing conclusion of Usingen's sermon and beginning of the Polish materials.

cauit. F. Bartholomeus / de Vsingen Erphurdie, in monte b. Mariae / uirginis, ipso die diuae Margaretae / uirginis & martyris Anno / domini. M.D.XXIII. The Polish materials carry the title (on leaf 9, recto) *EPISTO / LA ANDREAE CRICII ET / Edictum Regis Poloniae, in / Martinum Luthe / rum* (see Plate II). The book lacks imprint.

It should be added that both sections of material also appeared in separate editions. The Usingen sermon was published in Leipzig [2] as well as in combination with another Usingen sermon in an Erfurt edition of 1523.[3] The Polish materials were published in a 4-leaf quarto edition (lacking imprint).[4] By way of contrast, the present book is, as we have already noted, a small 16-leaf octavo edition, in which the Polish materials occupy both sides of leaves 9 through 15.

That this work is indeed *one* publication, rather than simply two separate works bound together, is evidenced by several facts: (1) There is throughout the book a common type face and page style (normally 28 lines including catch-word line, with no running head); [5] (2) the numbering (before the catch-words, on such pages as it does appear) indicates a continuous sequence throughout, the leaves devoted to the Usingen sermon being in an "A" section (first octavo) and those to the Polish materials in a "B" section (second octavo); [6] (3)

[2] See *Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon*, Vol. I, col. 1431; and Nicolaus Paulus, *Der Augustiner Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen. Luthers Lehrer und Gegner: Ein Lebensbild* (Strassburg & Freiburg i.B., 1893), p. 129.

[3] The rather lengthy title for this work is given in my earlier article, p. 146, n. 4.

[4] See the listing of Theodor Wierzbowski, *Bibliographia Polonica XV ac XVI ss.*, III (Warsaw, 1894; Nieuwkoop, 1961), p. 28, entry no. 2108.

[5] Some pages show slight variation, such as leaf 8, both recto and verso. See Plate II for leaf 8, verso, which has 28 lines plus catch-word line.

[6] The numbering actually indicated is as follows: "Aij" (leaf 2, recto), "Aiij" (leaf 3, verso), "AIiij" (leaf 4, recto), "B" (leaf 9, recto), "Bij" (leaf 10, recto), and "Biij" (leaf 11, recto). The complete numbering pattern throughout is, however, simple to determine.

the concluding page of the Usingen sermon has a catch-word "Epistola," the first word of the title at the top of the page where the Polish materials begin (see Plate II); and (4) the complete work has, as already mentioned, a title-page of its own, which bears the titles for both sections (see Plate I).

II

The Polish materials comprising the second part of this rare Reformation-era work contain three items: (1) the epistle of Andreas Cricius (Andrzej Krzycki) to King Sigismund I (Zygmunt I) of Poland, beginning on the verso of leaf 9 and concluding on the verso of leaf 14; (2) an anti-Lutheran edict by Sigismund, beginning on the verso of leaf 14 and concluding on the verso of leaf 15; and (3) a brief introductory letter, beginning on the recto of leaf 9 and concluding with eight lines at the top of the verso of that leaf (the recto of leaf 9 is shown in Plate II).

The two first-mentioned items above (those mentioned in the title for this section of the book) are, of course, the most important. Cricius, a leading clerical opponent of the Reformation in Poland, was known for poetic satire against Luther as well as for defenses of Catholicism; and thus it is not surprising to find a letter of his included in this book. [7] The edict of Sigismund was issued in Cracow in 1523. It belongs to a series of edicts issued by that king in Thorn and Cracow from 1520 to 1523.

[7] Details regarding Cricius and concerning the events outlined below may be found in various treatments of Polish history of the Reformation period. Still standard as a treatment of the history of the Reformation in Poland is Walerjan Krasinski, *Historical Sketch of the Rise, Progress, and Decline of the Reformation in Poland*, 2 vols. (London, 1838-40). Very useful for brief overview is the *Cambridge History of Poland*, I (1950), 322-347 (chap. XVI, "The Reformation in Poland"). Also useful are Paul Fox, *The Reformation in Poland: Some Social and Economic Aspects* (Baltimore, Md., 1924), and standard histories and church histories pertaining to Poland, such as O. Halecki, *A History of Poland* (1943 & 1956); E. Hanisch, *Geschichte Polens* (1923); and K. Voelker, *Kirchengeschichte Polens* (1930).

In Thorn, enthusiasm for Luther ran high by 1520—so high, in fact, that a papal legate, Zacharias Fereira (or Ferrei), was stoned when he endeavored to burn Lutheran books and a picture of the Reformer. Sigismund, in turn, issued his notable Thorn edict, variant copies of which are dated May 3 and July 24, 1520. [8] This edict prohibited possession of Lutheran works on penalty of exile and forfeiture of property. On March 7, 1523, the king issued a new edict at Cracow, now intensifying the penalty to burning at the stake. [9] A further edict of Cracow, usually dated August 22, 1523 (September 5, 1523, in the text as given by Fox),[10] even provided for search of homes in that city, and added other significant stipulations. It is this last edict which is published as a concluding piece in the little Reformation-era work we are treating. The text given therein indicates no date.

III

Our little book has presented somewhat of an enigma with respect to its date, place of publication, and printer; for no imprint information is included. As to time of publication, aside from being able to ascertain the date of Sigismund's edict, we do find two clues within the book itself. One is mention of the fact that Usingen preached his sermon in 1523, and the other is the date appearing at the end of the brief introductory letter which precedes Cricius' epistle: "Nonis Februarij. M.D.XXIIII." [11] The latter is the latest date we have in reference to the book and the materials it contains, and it furnishes us with at least a *terminus non ante quem* for the time of publication.

[8] See Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 141, as well as O. Balzer's *Corpus juris Polonici*, III, 579-584, where the document appears. (Fox provides in a series of Appendices extended excerpts from various significant Reformation-era documents, including this one.)

[9] See Balzer, *op. cit.*, IV, 3.

[10] See Fox, *op. cit.*, p. 144; also cf. Balzer, *op. cit.*, Document 9, IV, 28-30.

[11] On leaves 1, verso, and 9, verso, respectively.

The question of provenience has posed an even more difficult problem, for not only is no printer nor place of publication indicated, but also the book contains materials originating in both German and Polish lands. Professor Hoar suggested Erfurt as the place, a conclusion in which I at first concurred, though not going into print on the matter.[12] I soon began to have second thoughts, however, and a discussion with Professor Hyma led me to suspect that the book probably was printed somewhere in Poland. This seemed to be logical because it is much more understandable that anti-Reformation interests in Poland would utilize an anti-Lutheran sermon by Usingen, a former teacher of the Reformer at the University of Erfurt, than to see why Germans should have had any particular desire to publish and promulgate the anti-Reformation materials from Poland.

Use of this working hypothesis proved most fruitful, for ere long I was able to match the type face used in our book with that appearing in a work known to have been printed by H. Vietoris in Cracow—an edition of *Cebetis Thebani* bearing full imprint information: "Cracouiae, in Officina Hiero. Vietoris. Mense Iunio. An. M.D.XXIIII." Further comparisons of type faces used in works of that time have thus far led me to no other possibilities regarding the printer, and I would therefore submit, tentatively at least, that Vietoris was indeed the printer and Cracow the place of publication.

[12] See Hoar, *op. cit.*, p. 157, continuation of n. 5.

BOOK REVIEWS

Ackroyd, Peter R., *Exile and Restoration: A Study of Hebrew Thought of the Sixth Century B.C.* "The Old Testament Library." Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968, xv + 286 pp. $ 6.50.

A careful study and interpretation of the inner nature of the period of the exile and restoration has been needed for some time, and the book under review will be illuminating for all who take the sixth century B.C.E. seriously. The author, Samuel Davidson Professor of OT Studies, Kings College, University of London, is aware of the problems involved in such an effort: The historical events of this period are not always clear-cut, and the literature of the time is plagued with an abundance of difficulties which make any serious historical reconstruction an almost sheer impossibility. Nonetheless, with admirable courage he tackles the sources themselves, and showing a certain impudence towards the accepted ideas of the secondary literature which he has brilliantly mastered, he maintains that the issue at hand is not essentially a problem of history but one of attitude. Ackroyd's evaluation of Israelite thought concerning the destruction of the Temple, the collapse of the Judean state resulting in the breakup of the community, the exile, the restoration, the new community, and the new age is deceptively compact in content and demands the careful attention of the reader to follow the line of argument. The effort by the historian and theologian will, however, be amply rewarded.

The contents of this book, originally given as the Hulsean Lectures at the University of Cambridge in 1962, represent a significant critique of Christendom's perennial failure to reconcile history and dogma as far as the Hebrew Bible is concerned. By fabricating the period 587-165 B.C.E. as "background of the New," Christian scholars have been false to the historical data, and originated the fallacy that Judaism is not *a* worthy successor to the Biblical tradition. By detaching himself from the devices of the Christian apologists, the author is able correctly to assess the positive value of cult, rite, and law, the three major elements of exilic and post-exilic Judaism. Furthermore, he avoids the common scholarly pitfall of viewing Hebrew prophecy as derived mainly from the eighth-century writing prophets, and he insists that the later prophets—especially Ezekiel, Haggai, and Zechariah—are legitimate, respectable examples of a unique movement in the history of Hebrew thought which must be seen as a whole and not piecemeal as is often done by the apologists.

In chapter one (pp. 1-16) the author raises the significant question of what constitutes the exilic age, and he presents the scope of the present study including the sources used. This is followed by a short

review (pp. 17-38) of Judah's historical position against the background of the Neo-Babylonian empire under Nabopolassar and Nebuchadrezzar. This chapter shows an awareness of the latest developments in the field, whether linguistic, historical, or archaeological. Chapter three (pp. 39-49) discusses the response of the Jews in Judah and Babylonia to the calamity of the age, and it posits four types of reaction: (1) Return to older cults; (2) Acceptance of the religion of the conquerors; (3) The recognition of divine judgment; (4) The disaster and the "Day of Yahweh." The fourth chapter (pp. 50-61) is an attempt to characterize the attitude of the Jeremiah tradition to the exile, but since we can never be sure just what part of the material belongs to the years before the calamity, and what part to the years following 587, we are inevitably led to the conclusion that the reconstruction of the prophet's attitude towards the destruction of the state and his outlook towards the future must only be tentative.

The next chapters (pp. 62-102) are devoted to the philosophies and teachings of the historians and theologians of the exilic age: The Priestly Work (ircorporating the Holiness Code, Lev 17-26), and the Deuteronomic History, which views the divine Torah as the fundamental expression of Israel's obedience, and at the same time the tool of divine intervention and salvation. The seventh and eighth chapters (pp. 103-137) are some of the most important in the book. They offer a discriminatory account of the attitudes of Ezekiel and Deutero-Isaiah to the present catastrophe and to the future restoration. Ezekiel expresses the thought that it is the exilic position of the nation that enables God's name and nature ("I am Yahweh") to be vindicated to Israel and beyond Israel to the nations of the world. A similar view proclaiming that the people of Yahweh is always under judgment is found in the writings of Deutero-Isaiah, who envisions the fortunes of Israel as part and parcel of God's divine plan for the restoration of Zion and the judicious salvation of the nations.

The following section, "The Restoration and its Interpretation" (chapters ix-xi; pp. 138-217), comes to grips with the reality of the return and attempts to probe against the background of the political and economic situation of the time the thinking of those who were living in an era of divine favor rather than one of wrath, such as marked the previous generation. There is much which is fresh and original in the author's discussion of the narrative complex of Hag, and Zec 1-8. His picture of a restored Israel centered on the Temple, the most potent symbol of divine presence on earth, and needing to reassure itself that Yahweh's covenantal relationship was not broken in the exile, cannot fail to stimulate. One may not agree with all of Ackroyd's opinions concerning the messianism of Haggai and the visions of Zechariah, but the author is able to discern what is central and what is peripheral and often challenges the reader to re-examine familiar notions. The oracular and Psalm material not previously investigated (*e.g.*, Is 13-23; Jer 46-51; Ob; Mal; Pss 44,

74, 79, 137, etc.), but which are dated to the sixth and early fifth centuries are now briefly analyzed because of their relevancy to the contemporary thought concerning the exile and restoration. In such a study as this, it is right that no detailed discussion of these passages is given, since this would suggest a greater stress upon the material than is called for, particularly since it has been acknowledged by Ackroyd that *some* of these reflect the great debacle of 485 B.C.E. The book ends with an interesting and comprehensive statement of which part has appeared in a slightly different manner in the *CJTh*, XIV (1968), 3-12, on the importance of the exile and restoration in the history of Hebrew thought, which touches upon NT thinking but surprisingly avoids rabbinic logic.

Despite the fact that the author's thesis is at times overdrawn and repetitious, it represents the kind of tedious labor which is in the best tradition of English literary scholarship. It provides direction and substance for a mature analysis of the cultural and intellectual history of Israel during one of its most elusive and important epochs. The nature of this type of investigation as well as the literary and exegetical problems involved in the primary literature consulted reveal a number of questions, however, which the author has left unanswered. For example, Ackroyd discusses the messages of Haggai and Zechariah to the people, but what is the relationship of the original Haggai and Zechariah utterances to each other, and to those who fixed them in writing ? What is the origin, nature, and history of the blocks of oral tradition that had gone into the making of the narrative history and the prophetic speeches found in the prophetic literature ? How do we relate the extra-Biblical prophetic phenomena, the value of which has been much discussed in recent years, to the Haggai and Zechariah traditions ? How is the evidence of the post-exilic prophets to be evaluated if one takes seriously the claim that they pointed the way to the later pseudepigraphical apocalyptic writings ? Also, one misses in the section on Haggai a fuller investigation on the similarity between the third-person form narrative with the first-person reports found in Amos, Hosea, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Zechariah; and one looks in vain to find references to the medieval Jewish commentaries of Rashi (1040-1105), Rashbam (1085-1160), Abraham ibn Ezra (1089-1164), Redak (1160-1235), Nahmanides (1194-*ca.* 1270), Gersonides (1288-1344), and their schools whose daring hints at understanding the exilic and post-exilic age foreshadow and border on important aspects of Ackroyd's thesis. Nonetheless this volume, enriched with indices to the names, subjects, scriptural loci, select bibliography, and a list of abbreviations, is an invaluable contribution to our understanding of that obscure period between the fall of Jerusalem and the reforms of Ezra and Nehemiah.

University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California

ZEV GARBER

Cartledge, Samuel A., *Jesus of Fact and Faith*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968. 160 pp. $ 4.50.

By entitling his book *Jesus of Fact and Faith*, the author puts himself squarely against the view which makes a distinction between the Christ of faith and the Jesus of history. The dividing line between the two differing view-points, he finds in the attitude that scholars take toward the miraculous. This in turn affects their respect for the accuracy of the sources dealing with other matters. Faith, he says, is the key that determines whether one will have a high regard for the historical facts or not.

While cursorily surveying recent scholarship, the author does not grapple with the basic issues current in NT scholarship. His attitude is tolerant, sympathetic, and open-minded toward those who differ from his positions. Nevertheless, it seems a bit simplistic to say that faith determines how one will regard the historical elements in the Gospels. There are scholars of faith who will find it difficult to accept Dr. Cartledge's position on many points.

He deals with only the major aspects of the life of Jesus, such as miracles (only 7 pages), the person of Jesus, the virgin birth (8 pages), the chronology of the life of Jesus, the Kingdom of God, Jesus as Teacher, the death and the resurrection of Jesus. All of this is treated in approximately a hundred pages (the fifty or so pages before are introductory). One can see that such a minuscule effort is inadequate to deal with the topic at hand. Ultimately the book is written simply to assure the saints that nothing significant has changed in regard to the Gospels in spite of form criticism, redaction criticism, existential eschatology, and all the rest. The book is directed primarily to laymen and in spite of its weaknesses is written with clarity and simplicity.

Andrews University SAKAE KUBO

Congar, Yves, *Ecumenism and the Future of the Church*. Chicago: The Priory Press, 1967. 181 pp. $ 3.95.

Pope John, who summoned Vatican II, did not singlehandedly inaugurate the ecumenical dialogue which is one of the characteristics of today's Roman Catholicism. Nor did he initiate it. He released a concern that was represented by a group of Catholic ecumenical pioneers. Several, and pre-eminently among them Fr. Yves Congar, a Dominican, after having been under gravest suspicion, happily lived to see some of their foreshadowed tendencies finally come to fruition in the Roman Catholic Church.

The major portion of the book under review is a translation by John C. Guinness of a series of six essays originally published in French. An additional seventh chapter, which did not appear in the French edition, is translated by Geraldine F. McIntosh. Most of the

essays were written before Vatican II. The last alone, "The Future of the Church," is dated 1963.

The first three chapters set forth the stages of the ecumenical dialogue. The present situation did not drop from heaven. It is the consequence of a long and painful development. If the Catholic Church has not participated officially in the ecumenical movement, it has not been for lack of interest, but rather because she cannot act as though the unity of the Church of Christ were an open question, or something still to be attained. Congar rightly sees that an understanding of the disunity of Christians in the light of history and of differences in thought and outlook is necessary for a fruitful form of confrontation. The main point which underlies his discussion here is that the awareness of the various historical steps through which the Roman Catholic Church has come to her present ecumenical moment is indispensable for a true understanding of her present attitude towards Christian unity.

Chapter four is a penetrating discussion of the need for dialogue in Roman Catholicism. While quite aware that many Catholics think that Christianity exists uniquely within their Church, Congar points out that it is possible to imagine that the same Church might try to include in her thinking the relations of others with her, and her own relations with others. In fact, he states, "the Christian who desires to have an adult faith must be a man who is open to dialogue" (p. 75). Applying this idea to the then forthcoming Council of Vatican II, he suggested what the latter might be, or at least what he hoped it may be.

In chapters five and six Congar's concern for practical implementation comes to expression. In an attempt to help the faithful who sense that they are answerable to the ecumenical effort, the French Dominican proceeds from a study of the spiritual components of the ecumenical conjecture that the Christian world was living through at the eve of Vatican II to setting forth some ground rules for the Christian dialogue. A few practical suggestions for achieving a transformation of climate are given which apply to the formal specialist as well as to lay members of the Catholic Church.

In the concluding essay, written at a time when Vatican II was in session, Congar dares to dream dreams as to the "Future of the Church." He rightly sees that "the real future of the Church is eschatology" (p. 154), towards which history is striving. But he deals here with the historical future of the Church on earth. Far from ignoring the existence of unknown factors that qualify one's expectations, he is convinced that a sound understanding of the past, an awareness of present-day movements, and the direction they are taking enable the Christian historian to anticipate the life of the man of tomorrow. Congar envisions a new form of institutional life and a new kind of individual participation for tomorrow's Church. In this vision, the future of the Church which "is less *of* the world and more *to* the world" (p. 159) belongs to a minority who are conscious of having ul-

timate responsibility for all and of having a mission to all mankind. The Church would become once again the People of God made up of Christians.

Congar's hope for the future of the Church and his awareness of the complex background of the present ecumenical epoch are clearly reflected in all seven essays. His historical approach is extremely successful. His remarkable openness is demonstrated in almost every chapter. But it is not to be mistaken for vagueness or uncertainty. He deeply believes in the efficacy and the ever-present reality of the Holy Spirit, but he also stands firmly in the midst of the Roman Catholic Church. This is not a question of pride with him, but of honesty and loyalty to the special vocation his Church has received. Almost every chapter reflects his basic and courageous concern: To what extent will Catholicism be open to ecumenical exploration ? How far can it go in surmounting the consciousness of being adequately the Church in order to concede that the Church transcends all ecclesiastical institutions and structures and exists to some degree in all Christian communions ?

It is perhaps inevitable that in such a volume as this there should be some overlapping of material, even in citations (see pp. 31, 47-48). The reviewer would like to have found an attempted analysis from so well-qualified a critic of the changed situation *since* the end of Vatican II. He also regrets that we are not told the date and original setting of each of the seven essays here included. Cross references to other articles and books by Congar would have helped the interested reader to have a better opportunity for understanding the author's thinking.

This volume is worth reading. It contains a mixture of old and new. It is an appropriate Roman Catholic introduction to a subject which has become increasingly interesting and important throughout the Christian world.

Andrews University RAOUL DEDEREN

Eberhardt, Walter, *Wege und Irrwege der Christenheit von der Urgemeinde bis zur Vorreformation.* Berlin: Gemeinschaft der Siebenten-Tags-Adventisten, 1968. 438 pp.

This book consists of 21 chapters dealing with Christian history from its beginnings to the 15th century (pp. 7-281), followed by extensive notes (pp. 282-391) and other tools of various sorts (pp. 392-438).

All major aspects of church history of the period are touched upon in the main text. The author reveals good mastery of facts, and includes many interesting details and sidelights; he even treats such subjects as "The Bible Among the Germans" (chapter 8) and "The Orthodox Church and Islam" (chapter 13). As implied in the title of the book,

however, his material has been presented with a certain theme in mind. The presentation itself leaves one with the impression that the "Great Church" is usually characterized by apostasy and the "Sects" by reform. His efforts to tie history to prophecies of the book of Revelation, such as the seals and trumpets, further reveal the tenor of his work.

Although this book provides a fairly good general coverage of Christian history from the early church to the period just prior to the Protestant Reformation, the account is sometimes too sketchy and disjointed. There is a tendency to treat developments in isolation rather than to weave them into a cohesive whole. One example among many which could be furnished is the discussion in a section entitled "The Blood of the Christians is Seed" (p. 20). Here the story is briefly told of the martyrdoms of Ignatius, Polycarp, Justin, and Blandina, without any apparent effort to give a picture of martyrdoms as a whole or to explain how or why the blood of Christians should be described as "seed" by Tertullian.

Occasionally, the sketchiness of the account may leave wrong impressions. When, for example, was the Mediterranean cleared of pirates—during the time of "The Roman Peace" (p. 10) ? ! Sometimes a generalization may leave, or lead to, a rather questionable conclusion; as, for example, that in the period prior to A.D. 250 one of the important factors in the growth of the church was the baptism of unconverted people (p. 21). Membership increase on this basis may have been very significant in a later period, but should hardly be thrown back to this era. Or in any event, a generalization of the kind the author has made should probably be balanced by a discussion of the rather long process by which people were made ready for church fellowship, as well as by mention of the fact that decisions to become Christians were frequently made at great personal sacrifice in a society which was at this time still generally hostile to Christianity.

In this book there are at times also inaccuracies in providing the historical data themselves, though such inaccuracies are surprisingly few for the amount of detail covered. One example is the choice of 30 B.C. rather than 27 B.C. for the beginning of the principate of Augustus (p. 9).

The section of notes following the main text reveals a fair acquaintance with German sources, though mainly in the category of general rather than specialized treatments. Furthermore, the author ignores the rich literature available in other languages. A better acquaintance with scholarly literature would have guarded him against certain interpretative pitfalls, such as his erroneous conclusion connecting sabbath-keeping among the Waldenses with the term "Insabbati" (pp. 247, 382).

The helps in the final portion of the book include a useful glossary (pp. 392-398), index (pp. 399-409), chronology of the period of Christian history covered (pp. 410-423), and bibliography (pp. 424-431), as well as a detailed table of contents (pp. 433-438). A pocket

inside the back cover contains three maps of the Christian world relating to the period treated in the text.

Andrews University KENNETH A. STRAND

Hunter, Archibald M., *According to John: A New Look at the Fourth Gospel.* Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968. 128 pp. Paperbound $ 1.65.

This is a deceptive little book. It has been written in the very intimate tone ("if you compare . . . you may well come to the conclusion . . ." p. 114) of a father who teaches his little children the Sabbath School lesson with some sophistication. But what is given to the innocent neophytes is sometimes not quite right. The book at one and the same time wishes to be a report of current research in Johannine studies in order to show "some remarkable and encouraging turns" (p. 9), and also to present "a new look" with some arguments of its own ("if our arguments are sound . . ." p. 88). But what Hunter presents as new arguments of his are old arguments of someone else, and what he considers settled questions he sees in that way because they have been placed within the wrong framework. He caricatures the position of scholars who are referred to as "them" (p. 29), and then finds support in other scholars who, from different perspectives, happen to agree in one general point with what he wishes to say. These he refers to as "our scholars" (pp. 30, 47).

Wishing to argue that the Fourth Gospel is "a quarry for historical facts," Hunter goes through the traditional paces, including the questioning of the historical value of Mark (pp. 63, 114). Thus if K. L. Schmidt noticed discontinuity in the narrative of Mk 1:13, 14, this is taken by Hunter to mean that "we need not hesitate to fill it [the gap] with the traditional material we have been studying. The general probability of a traditional preliminary Judean ministry of Jesus, we may fairly claim, has been established" (p. 59). The importance of establishing "general probabilities" is, however, never defended. Rather it is assumed that what has been established is the historical trustworthiness of the Johannine tradition. Whereupon by some loose handling of the word *fact*, facts of the tradition are made to be facts of history (*pace* the attempts at making distinctions on p. 74). But still when confronted with the account of the changing of water into wine, Hunter suggests that "St. John is giving us here a dominant theme of his gospel" (p. 76).

In his analysis of the parables and the sayings of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, Hunter has no difficulty in finding a "true Dominical *obiter dictum*" here and there. Not quite satisfied with that, he also wishes to use the sayings and parables to find out the way in which the mind of Jesus operated (p. 84). But for this process he sets up straw men or straw texts from the OT, as when he says, "Despite Jülicher,

some of Jesus' parables have strong allegorical elements" (p. 86), or when he builds on Is 26:17 ff. in order to establish the doctrine of the resurrection.

There is no questioning the fact that the book gives some valuable information to beginners who are unaware of the archaeological discoveries of the last forty years which have some bearing on the Fourth Gospel. But, again, as is also the case with the reporting of the philosophical currents of the first century which must inform an intelligent reading of the Gospel, the total effect serves more for caricature than for understanding. Can it really be claimed that it is actually the *philostraton* mentioned in Jn 19:13 that "can be seen and walked on" now (p. 13) ? And does it help matters to say that "neither in the rabbis nor in the Stoics was there 'any kick, any joy.' All was dull as ditchwater" (pp. 109, 110) ?

Unlike some of Hunter's other attempts to introduce a large reading public to the advances of Biblical scholarship, this book is not a reliable guide to the Gospel according to John. In fact, Hunter seems to be not at all concerned with what John is concerned with.

St. Mary's College
Notre Dame, Indiana

HEROLD WEISS

Kuitert, H. M., *The Reality of Faith.* Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968. 213 pp. $ 5.50.

The main task of the author's book, *The Reality of Faith,* is to focus on the antimetaphysical trend in contemporary theology, as found in existential theology. Such existentialists as Bultmann, Fuchs, Ebeling, and Gogarten are given consideration in the study. Kuitert also briefly analyzes Van Buren's neo-positivism, since it shares with existential theology a common concern for subjectivism. It becomes quite evident, as the author's study progresses nicely to a realistic and most persuasive conclusion, that he wishes to extract the best thoughts of existential theology as they are expressed in man's existence and his need to experience redemption "here" and "now." However, the weaknesses of existentialism are pointed out and could best be explained by its peculiar hermeneutics, which Kuitert discusses in his chapter, "The Problem of Hermeneutics." With keen perception Kuitert penetrates the philosophical jargon of existentialism and crystallizes the ultimate error of existential theology. Paraphrasing this theology, he says, "Faith is genuine faith only as it lets itself be founded by God Himself in the here and now; faith fails whenever it looks to what someone else in the past has said about God" (pp. 112, 113).

Whatever Kuitert may imply about existential theology, he wishes the reader to grasp the idea that there is a legitimate motive in the efforts of this theology, *i.e.*, its driving concern to *apply* the redemptive

message to man's existence. The reader soon gathers from the book that classic Protestant orthodoxy with its metaphysical system cannot leave the conflict with existentialism unscathed. If orthodoxy has erred, it has done so in overstressing the *content* of the Christian tradition as universally valid truth or dogma at the expense of ignoring man's need to encounter "here" and "now" in his own existence the message of this content.

After revealing the weak and strong points of existential theology and orthodoxy, Kuitert steers a clear course between and beyond the two. In his chapter, "Revelation Within the Mold of History," he shows how the reality of faith exists in the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future by saying, "In memory, one celebrates the past in its significance for the present and future, . . . and insinuates the past into his own life as the fuel for his hope" (p. 181). Thus, in one sweep he masterfully pulls the rug out from under existential theology's persistent concern for the all-inclusive "here and now." But he wishes us to remember that orthodoxy has received a favor by being reminded of the need to stress the application of the *kerygma* to man's existence in the present.

With skill Kuitert weds the objective and subjective in theology: He shows how NT content is handed down in the diversity of witnesses as the text becomes a transmission of *events* which were about human *beings*. This approach is one of his ways to steer between and beyond both existential theology and orthodoxy.

Kuitert does orthodoxy a favor by pointing out that "the fierce fidelity to the Christian tradition that orthodoxy exemplifies can be twisted into a legalism . . . " (p. 171). The reviewer disagrees with the author when he says that Christian truth cannot exist as unchangeable, eternal formulations (p. 171). Here he falls into the trap of existentialism itself with its relativism and subjectivism, which snare he has endeavored to deny in his study.

A very commendable service that Kuitert has performed has been to show that the dialogue between antimetaphysical and metaphysical theology involves real pragmatics. Thankfully he has translated this dialogue into understandable language. Kuitert's book deserves attentive consideration from every serious theologian and Bible student since he does not pursue a one-track theology but one which extracts the best of the two systems under discussion and formulates a new and significant theological dynamic.

Orlando, Florida — H. Elison Adams, Jr.

Lambert, W. G. and A. R. Millard, *Atra-ḫasīs: The Babylonian Story of the Flood*. Oxford: The Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. xii + 198 pp. 70sh.

This edition of the oldest preserved Old Babylonian epic with

all the available materials of the Babylonian and Sumerian story of the flood would have been impossible even half a decade ago. Until 1965 only about one-fifth of the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs was known, while now over four-fifths of the whole can be restored.

The story of the recovery of the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs begins with George Smith's volume, *The Chaldean Account of Genesis* (1876) in which he gave a general account of all the Babylonian literary texts he had discovered with excerpts in translation. The "Story of Atarpi," which is now known as the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs, was among them. Only in 1956 did the Danish scholar Jørgen Laessøe finally remove the complicated problem of sequence, and thereby produce a story (J. Laessøe, "The Atraḫasīs Epic: A Babylonian History of Mankind," *BiOr*, XIII [1956], 89-105; already Sidney Smith [*RA*, XXII (1925), 63-68] had recognized that col. ii should be v and col. iii should be reckoned as col. iv).

Those who have no access to the present edition and must still rely on the translations of E. A. Speiser in *ANET*, pp. 104-106, should note the following corrections: (1) The "Creation of Man by the Mother Goddess" which Speiser gives on pp. 99-100 is to be included in the Atra-ḫasīs Epic. Of the two versions of this episode, part of that of the Old Babylonian has been re-edited with many improvements by Wolfram von Soden, "Erste Tafel des altbabylonischen Atramḫasis-Epos," *Or*, XXVI (1957), 306-315. (2) The late Assyrian version is part of the same tablet as Speiser's "Atrahasis D." (3) The column numberings of Speiser's D have been altered: The previous (i), (ii), and (iii) should now be read in the sequence of (iii), (ii), and (i), which correspond to (iv), (v), and (vi) in Lambert's and Millard's book under review, pp. 107 ff.

Once Laessøe had succeeded in establishing the correct sequence of the story, more text material was needed to fill out the details. This came forth by the same writers in volume 46 of *Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum* (London, 1965), consisting of two large tablets and many small pieces both Old Babylonian and Late Assyrian. To these are added in this edition still more new pieces, both Old and Late Babylonian, so that four-fifths (so A. R. Millard, "A New Babylonian 'Genesis' Story," *Tyndale Bulletin*, XVIII [1967], 4) is now available. The main edition used by the authors is the Old Babylonian Recension, since it is the most complete available to date. It was copied out in the reign of Ammiṣaduqa (1646-1626), great-great-grandson of the famous Hammurabi, by Ku-Aya (former spelling was Ellet-Aya or Mullil-Aya), and consists of three tablets with eight columns each and a total of 1,245 lines. The text in transliteration and translation, each on opposite pages, of this main recension, is given on pp. 42-105. The Assyrian Recension, so called "because it shows Assyrian dialectal forms" (p. 6), comes largely from the library of Ashurbanipal. It was written on two tablets, not three, and is presented in the same manner as the Old Babylonian Recension on pp. 106-125. The authors suggest on internal evidence

"that the Assyrian Recension goes back to a Middle Assyrian original" (p. 37), but it cannot be ascertained whether it had a longer history in Assyria. However, there is hardly any question that it ultimately derives from the Old Babylonian Recension, not necessarily from Ku-Aya's edition, because there are fragments of Old Babylonian texts "which attest the presence of at least three widely different recensions" (p. 84) in the town of Sippar alone.

This volume contains furthermore the texts in transliteration and translation of two Middle Babylonian pieces, one from Nippur (pp. 126,127, and one from Ras Shamra, *i.e.*, ancient Ugarit (pp. 131,132). The former fragment (CBS 13532), is dated to the Old Babylonian period by the majority of scholars (for instance, H. V. Hilprecht, A. T. Clay, E. Ebeling, A. Heidel, etc.), in contrast to the Middle Babylonian date of the present authors. The latter represents the first English transliteration and translation of the small fragment of the Flood Story from Ugarit (RS 22.421), the cuneiform text of which was published by J. Nougayrol in *Ugaritica V* (1968). It was written on a single tablet of which only the beginning and end survive and which dates from the fourteenth century B.C. Unlike Atra-ḫasīs, it covered only the flood itself, much like Tablet XI of the Gilgamesh Epic, and represents to date the only version of the Babylonian flood story found outside Mesopotamia. The flood account of Berossus' *Babyloniaka* quoted by Polyhistor and Abydenus (pp. 134-137) concludes the section of the Akkadian Recension of the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs with related Akkadian stories of the flood. The only Akkadian flood accounts not included in this volume are the ones in Tablet XI of the Gilgamesh Epic and in Tablets I and IV of the Erra Epic. The reason for this is that the former Epic will soon appear in a new critical edition, while with regard to the Erra Epic it is briefly stated that "every detail referred to is either lacking from, or cannot be reconciled with the various versions of the story of the great flood. Presumably, then, this is another flood" (p. 27). This short note—the only information of the flood accounts in the Erra Epic in this volume—is hardly sufficient to justify the entire dismissal of the flood narratives in the Middle Babylonian Erra Epic. The author of the most recent critical edition of the Erra Epic maintains that there is no reason to suppose that the flood account of Tablet I of this epic does not belong to the Babylonian tradition of the flood (see Felix Gössmann, *Das Era-Epos* [Würzburg, 1956], p. 65.). Even if a contrary position should be maintained, the inclusion of this material would have enhanced the usefulness of this important volume by making available for critical perusal material of a tradition that would or would not go back to the same origin.

On the other hand, this volume is enriched with "The Sumerian Flood Story" (pp. 138-145), edited by M. Civil of the Oriental Institute of Chicago. As is well known, the Sumerian flood account is preserved on a single tablet (CBS 10673), of which only about a third of the original text remains. Although there is a similarity of content, the

size of the Sumerian epic is quite different, namely some 300 Sumerian as opposed to 1,245 Akkadian lines. Civil dates CBS 10673 "not earlier than Late Old Babylonian" (p. 138), while Lambert seems more specific: "In its present form the Sumerian text is hardly much older than the tablet on which it is written (c. 1600 B.C.) . . ." (p. 14). This is the very time when the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs was written down in its Old Babylonian Recension of Ku-Aya. Civil makes the following observation: "The theme of a flood which destroys mankind does not seem to belong to the main body of Sumerian traditions . . .[but] it became popular during the Isin dynasty" (p. 139). Regarding the generally held opinion that the Babylonian flood story "is of Sumerian origin" (S. N. Kramer, *Sumerian Mythology* [New York, 1961²], p. 98; cf. A. Heidel, *The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels* [Chicago, 1963²], p. 102; L. Matouš, "Zur neueren epischen Literatur im alten Mesopotamien," *ArOr*, XXXV [1967], 4; Millard, *op. cit.* 5, 6, "it is now evident that this Sumerian narrative belongs to the same tradition as the Atraḫasīs Epic"; T. H. Gaster, *Myth, Legend, and Custom in the Old Testament* [New York, 1969], p. 82); Lambert is now maintaining that the Akkadian author could possibly have known the Sumerian text, but that he "did not need to know the Sumerian text to write as he did" (p. 14). Lambert formerly spoke of the Sumerian text as "the Sumerian prototype of the Epic of Atraḫasīs" and "the Sumerian recension" of the Mesopotamian flood story, dating it to ca. 1700 B.C. (W. G. Lambert, "New Light on the Babylonian Flood," *JSS*, V [1960], 114, 115). The present position of Lambert indicates a more cautious stance toward the problem of the relation of the various Mesopotamian flood stories without offering an explanation. Why did the author of the Ku-Aya recension "not need to know the Sumerian text to write as he did" ? Although the wording between the two agrees nowhere, it is obvious that there is a "similarity of content" (p. 14), to use Lambert's own words. This "similarity of content" between the Sumerian flood story and the Epic of Atra-ḫasīs must be accounted for. Would it not be likely that both accounts belong to the same Mesopotamian tradition and are related to each other ? May not the tradition contained in the Sumerian text belong to an older Sumerian archetype which was reworked into a long epic by the Babylonian poet ? To consider the "similarity of content" as merely accidental and unrelated is a position for which hardly anyone would opt.

A comparison of Civil's translation of the Sumerian flood story with that of S. N. Kramer in *ANET*, pp. 42-44, read along with the former's "Philological Notes" (pp. 167-172), represents a vast improvement over Kramer's attempt to up-date Arno Poebel's initial study of the Sumerian text from the year 1914. Civil's translation with his philological notes must from henceforth be considered the standard treatment of this difficult text which is filled with grammatical and lexical irregularities compared to standard Sumerian.

The structure of Atra-ḫasīs outlined briefly is the following: I.

The insurrection of the Igigu-gods (Tablet I, cols. i-iii); II. The solving of the problem by the creation of man (Tablet I, cols. iv-vi); III. The multiplying of mankind; the curse of Enlil with its result, the plague (Tablet I, cols. vii-viii); IV. Further punishments of mankind: (a) second judgment of mankind by famine (Tablet II, cols. i-ii), (b) third judgment of mankind by renewal of famine and drought (Tablet VI, cols. iii-vii); V. Fourth judgment: The decree to destroy mankind, the flood, the rescue of Atra-ḫasīs and thus the survival of mankind (Tablet III, cols. i-viii). This outline indicates that there are definite parallels to Gn 1-11, the so-called primeval history. It corresponds in the over-all scheme of events: Creation-Rebellion-Man's Achievements-Flood. Thus we have here a not insignificant parallel account—the only one in fact from Mesopotamia—covering the same sequence of events as the first eleven chapters of Gn. However, any critical reader of the two accounts will readily recognize that while the over-all scheme is identical, most of the details are so divergent as to discourage belief in literary borrowing or dependence of one upon the other. All those who would suspect or even suggest borrowing by the Hebrews would be compelled to admit large-scale revisions, alterations, and reinterpretations in a fashion that cannot be substantiated for any other composition of the ancient Near East or in any other Hebrew writing. The relationship between the two accounts seems possibly to indicate that both go back to a common tradition which the Babylonians and Hebrews appropriated each in his own particular way.

The Old Babylonian Recension of the Atra-ḫasīs Epic begins with the words *inūma ilū awīlum* which in the present edition are translated as follows: "When the gods like men" (p. 43). This translation of the opening line is not without its problems. Before the full cuneiform text of Tablet I was published, scholars supposed that the clause in line 1 was incomplete. The following translations were offered (none of which regrettably were referred to in the authors' discussion of the translation in the philological notes on p. 146): A.T. Clay, *A Hebrew Deluge Story in Cuneiform* ("YOS," V/3; New Haven, Conn., 1922), p. 14: "When God, man . . ."; Laessøe, *op. cit.*, 98, reads *enūma ilū awīlam* translating "When the gods . . . man"; A. L. Oppenheim, *Ancient Mesopotamia* (Chicago, 1968²), p. 166: "When the gods (and ?) man . . ." ? C. Westermann, *Genesis* ("*BKAT*," I/2; Neukirchen-Vluyn, 1967), p. 97 quotes the translation which was produced in the last Seminar of the late Assyriologist A. Falkenstein of Heidelberg, which was based, in contrast to the other translations, on the full cuneiform text of *CT*, XLVI (1965): "Als die Götter noch Menschen waren." The authors of the present volume support their translation with the crucial argument that "*a-wi-lum* has the locative *-um* with the meaning of the comparative *-iš* . . ." (p. 146). It is true that in the later stages of the Akkadian language (1300 B.C. and later) the adverbial ending *-iš* is often the semantic equivalent of *kima* and gen. The authors argue that the first examples of the "com-

parative"-*um* in Old Babylonian are found in Tablet II. ii. 19 and again in the reconstructed line II. ii. 33 which reads: *ki-ma ša-ar-ra-qí-tu*. This is clearly an adverbial phrase to be translated "like a thieving one." *kīma* can here hardly be considered as pleonastic. It does, however, not correspond to the first line of this epic, where the preposition *kīma* is lacking. Furthermore, in the later stages of Akkadian -*um* and -*iš* interchange freely before suffixes, but this is not the case without suffixes. Since *a-wi-lum* does not contain a suffix and is not preceded by *kīma*, the argument that already in this Old Babylonian text the ending -*um* has the semantic meaning of -*iš*, and should therefore be translated with "like," is philologically not well founded. W. von Soden (*ZA*, XLI [1933], 128, 129) denied the occurrence of comparative -*iš* in the Old Babylonian period. This means that the doubtful character of the translation of the incipit should at least be indicated by italicizing if not bracketing the preposition "like" (so Matouš, *op. cit.*, p. 5).

In the present reviewer's opinion the translation, which on the whole is smooth, is doing more than merely "modifying some metaphors and putting the words in English order" (p. 7) as is claimed by the authors. The authors should therefore have provided in the translation some means—such as the use of italics—to assist the reader who is not versed in the intricate science of Assyriology to know where doubtful or problematical translations exist. The helpful "Philological Notes" (pp. 146-167) are, of course, not designed to do that, but to treat certain difficult points.

Now a word regarding the transliterated text. The Ku-Aya text is taken by the authors as the main recension while the other available Old Babylonian tablets serve to restore the text where the Ku-Aya edition is deficient. Thus the reader is presented with a "reconstructed text based on Ku-Aya's tablets where they are preserved, but the text is arranged metrically" (p. 39). The critical reader must always be aware of the fact that this "reconstructed text" does not now exist and likely never had existed in its present form.

The apparatus falls short in at least two significant respects: (1) There is no indication just exactly where the various tablets begin and end; and (2) only a limited number of variants are listed, as for instance a comparison with E = BM 92608 or other tablets shows. This means that the careful scholar cannot recognize at just which word a given tablet begins and ends (though a general idea can be gained from the margin), and he cannot be sure about the number and quality of the variants in a given tablet without going to the publication of the original cuneiform texts.

This volume opens with a valuable 25-page "Introduction" with an excursus on "Early Human History" (pp. 25-27) and one on "A Quotation of Atra-ḫasīs for an Assyrian King" (pp. 27, 28). This is followed by "Notes on Orthography and Grammar" (pp. 29, 30), "The Manuscripts" (pp. 31-39), and a "List of Manuscripts" (pp. 40, 41). The closing part of this volume consists of a "Bibliography" (pp. 173,

174) which lacks the following items under "(i) Editions of Whole or Part": F. Delitzsch, *Assyrische Lesestücke* (3. Aufl.; Leipzig, 1885); P. Haupt, *Das babylonische Nimrodepos* (Leipzig, 1891); K. D. Macmillan, *Some Cuneiform Tablets Bearing on the Religion of Babylonia and Assyria* (Leipzig, 1906); and under "(iii) General Discussions, Particular Notes, Etc.": D. Hämmerly-Dupuy, "Some Observations on Assyro-Babylonian and Sumerian Flood Stories," *AUSS*, VI (1968), 1-18. Then follows a "Glossary" (pp. 175-197), prepared by Millard, that contains all words found in the "reconstructed text" of Atra-ḫasīs. It not only helps to find words and passages, but also indicates the source of restorations and serves as a concordance of all its texts. A "List of Names in the Akkadian Texts" (p. 198) serves as a handy concordance of all proper nouns found in the texts. This volume concludes with eleven plates of cuneiform texts. In this connection, attention should be drawn to "Addenda" (pp. xi, xii and 172), which contains the cuneiform text of K 10097, its transliteration, translation, and philological notes. K 10097 is recognized as a join of cols. ii and iii of S.

Throughout the volume the spelling of Atra-ḫasīs instead of Atram-ḫasīs is adopted. No explanation is given why the former is preferred to the latter. As a matter of fact, all Old Babylonian and Middle Babylonian tablets consistently read *^{I}at-ra-am-ḫa-si-is*. In Late Assyrian tablets the name appears five times, as *^{m}a-tar-ḫasīs(geštu)*, and only in Late Babylonian the spelling is twice *^{m}at-ra-ḫa-si-is* (and possibly once in DT 42 l. 11). This evidence indicates that this name should properly be spelled "Atram-ḫasīs." There is no lexical or philological basis for any other spelling. It is more than misleading to adopt against the overwhelming and clear Old and Middle Babylonian evidence a Late Babylonian spelling for a work reconstructing the oldest Old Babylonian epic.

These and the foregoing remarks are not intended to diminish the value of this well-done edition of all available materials of the Babylonian and Sumerian stories of the flood, but it is hoped that they will contribute toward a better understanding of it.

The following errata were noted: "text" for "texts" (p. 5, l. 10); "*li-bi-il*" for "*li-bi-il$_5$*" (p. 56, l. 196); "*k -ma*" for "*ki-ma*" (p. 146. n. 1).

Andrews University GERHARD F. HASEL

Lampe, G. W. H., ed., *The Cambridge History of the Bible*. Vol. II: *The West from the Fathers to the Reformation*. Cambridge, England: University Press, 1969. ix + 566 pp. $ 12.50.

This is the second in a three-volume set which is appearing in reverse order. Volume III, including the period from the Reformation to the present day, was published in 1963. A further volume which

will treat the history of the Bible from the beginnings to Jerome is still awaited. The first three chapters of the present volume, however, give a survey of what will be treated in that forthcoming volume. Chapter 4 herein deals with Jerome himself. The remainder of the book is divided into chapters carrying the following titles: "The Medieval History of the Latin Vulgate," "The Exposition and Exegesis of Scripture," "The 'People's Bible': Artists and Commentators," "Bible Illustration in Medieval Manuscripts," "The Vernacular Scriptures," and "Erasmus in Relation to the Medieval Biblical Tradition." These chapter headings give an impression of the wide range of coverage in this book.

This publication is literally packed with information, but care has nevertheless been taken to give sufficient space for explanation of terms which might not be clear and for illustrating various points which are treated. For example, sometimes concrete examples are given of the method of lecture which medieval scholars used.

In discussing the vernacular Scriptures, the author gives the greatest amount of attention to the English Bible (understandably so), but the vernacular Bible in Spain is also given a fair amount of space (probably because relatively little has been done in this area). The treatment of the German vernacular Scriptures, however, is somewhat disappointing. Except for mention of the Mentel High-German Bible and three Low-German Bibles, none of the other 15th-century German printed Bibles is named. It would seem to this reviewer that at least the Koberger Bible of 1483 ought to have been mentioned because of its particularly great importance in the sequence of pre-Lutheran German Bibles. Furthermore, no mention is made of either Wilhelm Walther or Wilhelm Kurrelmeyer (neither in the text nor in the bibliography), whose outstanding contributions to the study of the early vernacular Bibles should not have been overlooked (especially when other scholars such as J. Berger have been duly noted).

Other deficiencies may be noted too, caused largely, perhaps, by the fact that so much material is packed into this volume. For example, on page 494 the treatment of the *Devotio Moderna* is hardly clear, and the place at which this movement was supposed to have "inspired" Erasmus is perhaps given erroneously. Did not Erasmus secure more influence from the *Devotio* at Deventer than at Steyn ?

Aside from rather minor criticisms, however, this book is an excellent piece of work. It will be an indispensable reference tool for anyone interested in the history of the Bible.

Andrews University KENNETH A. STRAND

Lowell, C. Stanley, *The Ecumenical Mirage*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1967. 205 pp. $ 4.95.

There are two facets of ecumenism. The first facet refers to the cooperation among Christian bodies in their work. This has always existed to some extent. The second facet refers to the present assumption that ecumenism is a drive to bring all Christian bodies, including the Roman Catholic, into one organic structure. This latter concept of ecumenism is a fact; and to substantiate this fact, Lowell begins his book with a lengthy documentary composed of statements from religious leaders representing many denominations, showing that structural unity is the accepted goal of ecumenism.

Lowell points out that the "ecumenical assumption" is that the organic, structural unity of all denominations is the best thing that could happen to Christendom, although ecumenists do not readily admit this. The ecumenical movement is led by clerics who have a kind of obsession for organizing everything under one big ecclesiastical tent. He calls this passion for ecumenism an "occupational disease." These ecumenists solemnly think of separation as a grave sin and ecumenism as the remedy. Lowell firmly believes that if the differences among churches are of no significance, then there is no reason for the churches to exist at all. Again, abundant documentation is given to establish the point.

There are other ecumenists who think of ecumenism as the will of God. They base this assumption upon the prayer of Jesus in Jn 17. Lowell at this point differs with this view, stating that Jesus is not referring to structural unity but spiritual unity. Therefore, he feels that the ecumenical movement has no basis in Scripture. He challenges the idea that Christian unity in the form of one great church represents the will of God, and calls it a "naive assumption." He firmly believes that within the true church there should be many and varied churches, and he devotes two chapters to showing why he believes this way.

Ecumenism, he says, produces sterility, while proliferation and separation produce health and vitality in the church. This sterility, as he speaks of it, is caused partially by the absorption of getting the machinery running satisfactorily after mergers have taken place. A second and perhaps more important reason for sterility comes in the surrendering of distinctives which are involved in union. As he puts it, "One gives up something for everything and ends up with nothing."

To substantiate these two points, Lowell furnishes statistics showing the growth or lack of growth among churches, comparing those which have been active in the ecumenical movement and those which have not. The evidence presented does reveal a stifling of growth among those churches involved in ecumenical endeavors while non-ecumenical communions have continued to grow. The assumption involved here is that if one church is as good as another, why evangelize? Therefore, the rise in ecumenism has produced a decline in evangelism.

Lowell goes on to point out that "proliferation" is necessary for the health of the Christian church. He cites some of the controversies that have arisen since the first century, showing that as these controversies split the church they actually kept the church from dying a slow death in its own complacency.

One of the weak points in the author's presentation is that he tends to give the impression that unity is intrinsically evil. He almost goes so far as to imply that disunity is the will of God, taking the exact opposite position from that of the ecumenists.

The approach of Roman Catholicism to Protestantism has changed drastically over the centuries and especially within the last few decades. The traditional strategy of Rome against division was to stamp out heretics and schismatics. When religious execution became awkward, says Lowell, "an alternative strategy has been to stunt Protestant growth by political and economic disabilities" whenever possible. Even this approach has given way in many cases to the new appeal to return to the "Mother Church." There is also an approach through reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants. This final approach, however, in actuality is the same as the appeal to the Mother Church but shows more of a willingness on the part of Roman Catholics to work with Protestants to bring it about. At any rate, the aim of ecumenism in the eyes of Roman Catholicism is the absorption of whole communions. Rome has so bound herself by her own dogma that little conciliation on her part is possible, and Lowell gives many examples of this.

When one compares the major differences between Roman Catholics and Protestants, it appears that reunion is virtually impossible, though ecumenical leaders are forging ahead none the less. Lowell devotes an entire chapter to these major differences—Papal Infallibility, the Concept of Authority, and Mariology—and what is being done to resolve them. It is apparent, however, that while Rome appears to be conceding in some areas, the concession actually comes from the Protestant side. No basic Roman Catholic doctrines have been or can be changed. The rules governing ecumenical dialogue in the past seem to have been formulated to the liking of Roman Catholics. These rules put them in an advantageous position, making concession on the part of Protestants necessary if anything were to be accomplished. It is assumed that ecumenical dialogue should exist for the sole purpose of "getting together." Lowell, however, states that the purpose of dialogue should not be compromise or accommodation but simply an understanding of each other's position.

This is primarily a book for laymen and pastors on the "grass-roots" level of the church who do not fully understand what the ecumenical movement is about or the dangers inherent in it. They will find it both informative and stimulating. Because of Lowell's rich experience as editor of *Church and State* magazine, Associate Director of Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, and an accredited correspondent to Vatican II, he can well speak with authority. By virtue of his work in these areas he has come in direct contact with many of the issues presented in this volume. In many cases his book is documented with his own encounters with leading personalities of the ecumenical movement.

Orlando, Florida MARVIN G. LOWMAN

MacGregor, Geddes, *A Literary History of the Bible.* Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon Press, 1968. 400 pp. $ 7.95.

This book covers both familiar ground and material which is generally not so well known. In the former category is the treatment of the English Bible, which occupies some two-thirds of the volume (pp. 73-81, and most of pp. 110-372). The story of Tyndale's NT, and of the Wyclif, Coverdale, Matthew, Taverner, Great, Geneva, Bishops', Douai-Rheims, King James, Revised, and other English Bibles is told once again. The richness of historical background and other allusions perhaps justifies this new treatment, as does also the fact that somewhat more than the usual attention is given to very recent Bible editions. Furthermore, this book contributes more than is commonly done to the matter of literary features. For example, ch. 33, "Conspectus of a Passage in Various English Versions" (pp. 357-372), illustrates over 50 English renderings of Heb 1: 1-4 from the late 14th century to the Jerusalem Bible of 1966.

The more unusual part of the book, however, consists of the chapters dealing with such topics as the following (before p. 110): vernacular Bible manuscripts and early printed editions (other than English); use of Scripture in the Middle Ages; medieval Hebrew scholarship; textual study and the development of Bible commentary; attitudes toward literal and figurative; and the 16th-century Biblical Renaissance. Unfortunately, such items have had to be covered rather sketchily. Nevertheless, the author has packed a wealth of useful information into this section (as indeed he has throughout the whole book). Inasmuch as the kind of material here presented would often require consultation of various sources not readily accessible to the general reader, the service rendered is particularly important.

MacGregor's book furnishes very little with which one could or should quibble. The writer provides excellent historical backgrounds for various points, and presents balanced evaluations in areas where dispute exists. His mastery of a truly large amount of significant material is outstanding. In this reviewer's opinion, the main drawback of the book (by no means a serious one) is the sketchiness of some parts of the treatment. In addition, one could raise questions on a few relatively minor points, such as the following: Why is the rich field of early German Bible manuscripts treated only very cursorily and even introduced only rather obliquely (p. 68)? Is it correct to say that "the theological teaching of the Reformers accorded with the dictum of Cyprian (d. 258) that 'he cannot have God as his Father who has not the Church for his Mother' " (p. 87)? Should not the first word of line 39 on p. 51 be "exceed" instead of "excel"?

The scholar will also note the paucity of footnotes and the omission of a bibliography. However, one receives the impression that the book is, after all, intended to be a popular work. As such, it has less need for footnotes and bibliography.

On the whole, this is a good book. It deserves to be in the libraries

of both laymen and scholars interested in the literary history of the Bible.

Andrews University KENNETH A. STRAND

Martyn, J. Louis, *History and Theology in the Fourth Gospel*. New York: Harper and Row, 1968. xi + 168 pp. $ 7.00.

The book deals with the origin of the Fourth Gospel. Martyn's intention is to trace a completely new path on a terrain already marked by several criss-crossing footsteps. The key to success in this journey is to recognize that the author of this Gospel created a literary genre of his own "quite without counterpart in the body of the gospels" (p. 21). The purpose for devising this new technique was to demonstrate that the life of Jesus is being relived in his disciples and that therefore his disciples should take courage under persecution. The foundation is theological, but the theology has two historical *points d'appui*, one in the life of Jesus, designated *einmalig*, and one in the life of the disciples, designated contemporary. The way in which this was done was by means of *dramatic expansions* of miracle stories (specifically two miracles of healing: the lame man and the blind beggar) which no longer are true to form, according to the model established by *Formgeschichte*.

This means that reading the Gospel, Martyn sees two sets of actors playing identical roles on two separate stages. The primary historical foundation for this approach Martyn finds in the story of the blind beggar who "plays not only the part of a Jew in Jerusalem healed by Jesus of Nazareth, but also the part of Jews known to John who have become members of the separated church because of their messianic faith and because of the awesome Benediction" (p. 41). Martyn develops a rather lengthy argument to establish the historical reference of Jn 9: 22 in the contemporary level. Here a characteristic in the argumentation of the book is clearly made evident. There is nothing new in arguing that the threat to put out of the synagogue anyone who confessed Christ is not a reference to the Jewish ban (either as נזיפה, נדוי, or שמחה), but rather should be understood in terms of the rewording of the 12th Benediction done at Jamnia by Samuel the Small under the auspices of Gamaliel II. Moore, Simon, Barrett, Foerster, just to name a few, have so argued.

But Martyn wishes to recreate the exact historical circumstances which permitted this Benediction to be used in order to discover members of the synagogue who had a divided allegiance. Thus while dropping disclaimers profusely along the way, he advances with a sense of certainty not quite warranted by the evidence he himself provides. The author introduces new steps in the argumentation by: "strongly to suggest" (p. 17), "appears to be highly probable" (p. 39), "The further step ... *may* have been taken.... And if that be true"

(p. 48, italics his), "a rereading of chapters 5 and 7 impress one with the possibility . . . Therefore," (p. 48), "We may therefore suggest—and I emphasize that at the present juncture it is a tentative suggestion" (p. 51), "the suggestion is all the more attractive because it goes a long way toward solving other problems as well" (p. 58), "I do not want to press this suggestion too far" (p. 59), "we must exercise extreme caution in suggesting" (p. 64), "A number of answers are possible, and dogmaticism is clearly out of place here. It may be however . . . that is precisely what I am suggesting" (p. 68), "Nevertheless, we must consider the possibility" (p. 69), "we may proceed with reasonable probability" (p. 101), "But if we are correct in identifying . . ." (p. 105), "Apparently, therefore, we are able to identify with reasonable probability" (p. 107), "and that means, in all likelihood" (p. 116), "From this affirmation we may perhaps conclude" (p. 118). And by this means of conveyance Martyn arrives at the conclusion that the masterful theological step of creating the two-level drama was taken for the sake of the concept of the Paraclete.

It was in this way that theology informed the story. Further, and more explicitly, disclaimers are given by Martyn concerning his whole enterprise. The reader is assured that John did not intend his readers to analyze the *dramatis personae* in the way Martyn has done it (p. 77); therefore, a certain tension is to be expected between Martyn's analysis and John's intentions (p. 129). This reviewer must confess to have found this tension. But the question that presses at such times is whether any (or all) attempt at *Redaktionsgeschichte* is not bound to be based on a series of probabilities which mysteriously become certainties. One must confess also, however, that having examined this series of probabilities has been a rewarding exercise. The basic insight that John reflects the struggles between the church and synagogue towards the end of the first century is here given a definite configuration. The validity of the insight is not to be questioned, but that of the configuration here outlined is.

On the matter of style, I found Martyn distracting with his predilection to categorize the work of others. Articles or books are either "brilliant" (p. 11), or "fascinating" (p. 25) or "superb" (pp. xvii, xxi, n. 5; 33, n. 65), or "classic" (p. 65), or "excellent" (pp. 68, n. 108; 103, n. 163), or "remarkable" (p. 68, n. 109), or "extremely valuable" (p. 86, n. 137) or "a model of careful research" (p. 95, n. 147), or a "balanced treatment" (p. 101, n. 160). Surely if the author is quoting the work of another for support he must have found it to be all these things. Finally, let me point out three typographical slips. On pages 39 and 40 "be" has been left out of two sentences which now in part read respectively: "he would excluded from the synagogue" and "somehow excommunicated from the synagogue." Page 97, n. 152, as the previous line makes clear, should read Meeks'.

Saint Mary's College
Notre Dame, Indiana

HEROLD WEISS

Meye, Robert P., *Jesus and the Twelve*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968. 257 pp. $4.95.

In a time when NT scholarship emphasizes the kerygmatic Christ and thus the kerygma of the early Church, the author, Professor at Northern Baptist Seminary, goes beyond the kerygmatic Christ to the historical Jesus and beyond the kerygma of the early Church to the didache of Jesus himself.

This monograph based on his Basel dissertation limits itself to the didactic motif in Mk. His basic thesis is that Mk emphasizes the didactic function of Jesus. Connected with this function is Jesus' intimate relationship with the Twelve and his revelation to them of the Messianic secret. Meye also seeks to demonstrate the historicity of the Twelve.

Meye shows quite conclusively in chapter II that Mk emphasizes Jesus' function as teacher. However, the meaning of teaching is so much expanded that one wonders whether teaching can be so clearly distinguished from preaching. In Mk 1:21-28 the "new teaching" includes Jesus' exorcism. One wonders also how that which cannot be understood can be used as a teaching medium. I am referring to the use of parables with the crowd. The section on parables, because of this aspect, needs much more clarification. At one point Meye speaks of the parables as having a "didactic or teaching function, *i.e.*, they actually give a clear statement of Jesus' proclamation" (p. 43). Elsewhere Meye makes a clear distinction between teaching and proclamation but it is interesting that he has combined the two here. Has he made a Freudian slip, that is, is the content of teaching basically the same as the content of proclamation, and can the issue, teacher or prophet, be sharply drawn? On page 48 Meye says that "Jesus' way as a teacher is for Mark a direct cause of the way of the cross." How can this be except that the content of his teaching is connected with the reason given for condemning him to the cross, that is, that he proclaimed himself as the Christ? Manifestly while proclamation is a less fitting word for private instruction, hence "there is no private proclamation," *kērussein* and *didaskein* are not so neatly distinguished. In Mk 6:30, as Meye has pointed out, the preaching activity (6:12) of the disciples is later summarized as what "they had done and taught." The prophetic aspect of Jesus' ministry is so intertwined with the didactic aspect, as Dodd has shown, that great care has to be exercised in trying to distinguish them.

In discussing the narrative pattern in Mk, Meye has selected the three significant sea crossings, the confession at Caesarea Philippi, and the resurrection as the key events in the didactic process. In the sea crossings the disciples ask, "Who is this man?" and Jesus replies, "Do you not yet understand?" The disciples find their answer at Caesarea Philippi where the "not yet" of Jesus' question becomes "now." But the confession that Jesus is the Messiah is not the final answer. Jesus must teach them that the Messiah must take the way

of the cross. This the disciples do not fully understand till the resurrection. It seems somewhat arbitrary to select the three sea crossings and suggest a pattern although there are similarities. What part does the rest of the narrative play in the didactic process ? Again it seems that not much is gained at Caesarea, which Meye assumes "as a central and pivotal event" (p. 71), if mere (Meye would say "sheer") Messianic confession is obtained. They are charged not to tell any one about him. And futher, Peter's understanding is so far from right that Jesus has to rebuke him with the words, "Get behind me, Satan ! For you are not on the side of God, but of men" (Mk 8:33). It would seem that lack of understanding would be a gain over misunderstanding.

Meye makes clear from the outset that he is interested not only in putting forth Mk's theology but in establishing the reliability of the entirety of the Gospel including the redactional sections. Thus the redactional sections are accepted as historical. Much of the material on which Meye builds his case is in these sections. Perhaps the Achilles' heel of his study is at this point and his refusal to see an intricate intertwining of the pre-Easter and post-Easter understanding of Jesus in the Gospel. The validity of his study, actually, is not dependent upon the historicity or non-historicity of the materials. He could have made a strong case for Mk's understanding of Jesus as teacher and the role of the disciples without insisting on the historicity of the redactional sections.

Since Meye has schematized the role of the disciples (instruction before the cross, proclamation after), he has a problem with the sending out of the Twelve. His solution—"the one mission of the Twelve is a point of beginning for Jesus' instruction in the full meaning of their mission" (p. 112). It seems hardly possible that the disciples who had not yet understood could have gained much from such a mission in preparation for their post-Easter mission. What is described is basically a healing mission with the call to repent.

Meye agrees with Wrede concerning the Messianic secret as it relates to the disciples except for this one significant difference, *viz.*, for Wrede it is a non-historical dogmatic construction by Mk to resolve the tension between a non-Messianic historical ministry of Jesus and the Church's Messianic confession, while for Meye it is not a non-historical dogmatic construction but a historical description of what actually took place. Though the disciples did not understand, the secret was revealed to them, and after the resurrection this secret Messianic didache became their kerygma. Here again the question should be raised concerning the content of the didache and that of the kerygma. Ultimately they are the same, as Meye indicates on pp. 136 and 214, so that the real issue is whether Jesus is to be conceived primarily as one who reveals his secret to a closed circle or one who spreads this secret abroad, and not whether he is a teacher or a herald. A teacher can teach a crowd, as Mk has Jesus doing. What Meye has not made clear in the early chapters is this distinction.

In dealing with those texts which seem to broaden the concept of disciples beyond the Twelve, Meye generally deals with the problem satisfactorily but has difficulty with Mk 2:14 and is least convincing with Mk 4:10, 11, 34. If the expression "those about him" can be shown to be an expression in Mk for a small circle of disciples within the Twelve, it would remove the problem, but until then it seems more likely that it refers to other disciples than the Twelve, since the phrase "with the Twelve" is connected with it.

The fact that the Twelve are recorded even when the names of the Twelve are not identical in the lists, Meye contends, argues for historicity of a group of Twelve. However, it could be argued that the Twelve is a later imposition, that actually there were more than Twelve but when the term Twelve was adopted to agree with the twelve tribes, various attempts were made to select only this number. There would be a general consensus regarding the majority of those who should be included in the Twelve, but beyond these some would favor one over another and thus lead to differences. I do not think Meye sees the force of this argument.

Although there are points at which the book can be strengthened, on the whole it is a well-constructed and well-developed book. There are many valuable insights throughout and it will be worth careful study. This is a positive contribution to the understanding of the Marcan Gospel and the didactic motif presented in it.

Andrews University SAKAE KUBO

Minear, Paul S., *I Saw a New Earth: An Introduction to the Visions of the Apocalypse*. Washington, D. C.: Corpus Books, 1968. xxvi + 385 pp. $ 10.00.

An understanding of the literary structure of the NT book of Revelation is essential to correct hermeneutics in dealing with this book. Unfortunately, such analysis of literary features is altogether too often neglected in studies of the Revelation. *I Saw a New Earth* is different. One of its truly strong points is that it gives extensive and careful attention to literary features as well as to historical backgrounds.

This publication contains three major parts: (1) "The Visions" (pp. 1-197); (2) "Issues in Interpretation" (pp. 199-298); and (3) "Translation with Annotations" (pp. 299-365). There is a bibliography (pp. 367-384), but no index.

Part I contains a section-by-section presentation of Minear's own translation of the Apocalypse. Following the translation, there is an analysis of the literary structure of each section, consideration of special items for discussion and reflection, and notation of points for further study. Helpful bibliographical references are given in connection with the points for further study. The sections into which

Part I is divided are as follows: "The Triple Introduction," "The Promise of Victory," "The Lamb as Victor," "The Prophets as Victors," "The Faithful as Victors," "Victory over Babylon," "Victory over the Devil," and "The Triple Conclusion."

Part II, "Issues in Interpretation," includes the following nine chapters: "The Significance of Suffering," "The Prophet's Motives," "Sovereignties in Conflict," "The Kings of the Earth," "Death and Resurrection of the Sea-Beast," "The Earth," "Heaven," The Clouds of Heaven," and "Comparable Patterns of Thought in Luke's Gospel." These are all stimulating and challenging studies. Often they touch on points which are quite debatable. The final chapter is particularly interesting to the present reviewer because of its abundance of evidence marshalled against a current trend to treat the book of Revelation as unlike the rest of NT thinking. Minear has chosen Luke's Gospel for this study because it supposedly is the farthest from John's mode of thinking, and he has done well in proving a similarity.

It may seem unusual and redundant that a translation of the Revelation should be given twice in this publication—first section-by-section in Part I, and then as a whole in Part III. However, in this particular work it is a happy choice that this is so. The repetition of the translation provides a better overview of the Revelation and enables the reader to grasp more readily the totality of that book's message. At the same time, this second presentation of the text affords the author opportunity to add extensive annotations which would have been cumbersome if attached to the translation and discussion given in Part I.

Minear's literary treatment is twofold. Not only does he analyze the literary structure of the book of Revelation section by section, but he provides his translation in a typographical arrangement which makes literary features stand out. Of this typographical arrangement he himself says that it "is designed to break up long prose paragraphs and to free readers from the lock-step of verses and chapters. The arrangement of the material may also help one to visualize basic units of thought and symmetries of structure. It separates narrative from dialogue and clarifies the roles of various actors and speakers" (p. xxiv).

As for the author's translation, his choice of wording may at times seem rather novel as compared with standard translations. But his is a translation worth reading. Regarding this translation he says, "In many cases the Greek text offers a plurality of nuances which justify various renderings in English. The choosing of one of these rather than another gives a particular emphasis which may at times exclude other nuances. Yet I believe that each word of the translation chosen here is justified by the sense of the original" (*ibid.*).

The interpretational perspective from which Minear views the book of Revelation is interesting. He does not deny "the urgency with which John was addressing himself to a specific situation," but he also finds "continuing relevance" of John's message (see *e.g.*, p. 127). His

approach is what I would call "philosophy-of-history," though I do not know whether this term is one which Minear himself would use to describe his perspective.

A pivotal interpretational point at which many, including this reviewer, will differ from Minear is his tendency to apply the various warnings and judgments of Revelation as being directed against Christians. As Myles M. Bourke points out in his "Foreword" to Minear's book, "If I have not misread Dr. Minear, one of his major preoccupations is to show that the tribulations sent upon men in the three visions of the seals, the trumpets, and the bowls, and also the punishments spoken of in Vision 4 . . . are not primarily, and surely not exclusively, punishments of the Church's persecutors, but of Christians who are in one way or other faithless to their vocation" (p. ix). To this view Bourke himself takes exception on various grounds (see pp. ix-xiii).

On the other hand, one must admire Minear's effort to break with the common view that the apocalyptic and prophetic literatures of the Bible are poles apart, the former being a prime example of hate literature whereas strong ethical appeal is characteristic of the latter. This view, which provides a deep cleavage between apocalyptic and prophetic, has, of course, been competently attacked also by Amos N. Wilder. However, the fact that the Apocalypse is not a "revenge missive" does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the judgments described in that book must be intended for the church rather than for the church's persecutors.

Andrews University KENNETH A. STRAND

Pannenberg, Wolfhart, *Theology and the Kingdom of God.* Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969. 143 pp. $ 2.45.

This rather slim volume contains four essays, three of which previously appeared in *Una Sancta* and the fourth in *Journal of the American Academy of Religion.* The size of the book is swelled by a 42-page introduction (longer than any of the chapters) by Richard John Neuhas. His sketch of Pannenberg, the man, consists largely of personal reminiscences of the author's visit to the United States, and despite nonessential observations of Pannenberg's "unathletic build" and his "remarkably youthful, almost boyish, face," it is an engaging portrayal and provides a valuable insight into the wide range of Pannenberg's intellectual pursuits.

The first essay, after which the collection is titled, begins by calling for a transition from an ethical to an eschatological understanding of the Kingdom of God, which must be recovered as the key to the whole of Christian theology. Pannenberg's consistent emphasis on the future as a fundamental theological category is the keystone in his theological arch. He consequently rejects a formulation such as

Cullmann's D-day, V-day scheme, which gives the past priority and regards the future as merely the outgrowth of the past. Pannenberg precisely reverses this direction and regards the present not as piling up on the past so much as peeling away from the future. Destiny, rather than origin, thus becomes the key to determining the meaning of everything in the present.

Although the theme of this essay—the priority of the future—rests upon the proposition that the futurity of the Kingdom of God was foundational to Jesus' message, Pannenberg does not labor the point as to whether this was indeed the case. Presumably he has laid his historical-critical groundwork elsewhere, or intends to do so in the future.

The major portion of the second essay consists of a programmatic explication of the task of the Church and deals with a wide range of topics, including politics, liturgy, missions, and ecumenical themes. Pannenberg strenuously objects to any identification of the Church with the Kingdom of God, including the view that the Church constitutes the present reality of God's Kingdom. Instead, he equates the Church's existence with that of an organized community in the world, the primary contribution of which is identified as giving individuals access to wholeness of life in the presence of eternity. This piece on the Church is significant in demonstrating that a theology of the future need not smack of other-worldliness, but may actually provide the means by which contemporary man is freed from the authoritarian character of traditional ecclesiastical roles and thus enabled genuinely to confront the present.

In the third essay Pannenberg explores the ethical implications of the Kingdom of God. He contends that the idea of the good is essentially related to man and his world because the good is concerned with the future of this man and his world. The temptation to respond with the caveat that such a position could lead to the neglect of present responsibilities, vanishes when Pannenberg points to a third way between superficial optimism for the present and detached other-worldliness, *viz.*, commitment to the provisional. In spite of its provisionality the present must be affirmed because of that to which it is preliminary, the destiny of man and his world.

An obviously crucial question raised by this concept of provisionality is the relation of the present to the future. Precisely in what way does the present relate to the future if the one is not in fact negated by the other ? This question is addressed in the concluding essay. Using as a theological model the reign of God as both future and present in the ministry of Jesus, Pannenberg proposes that appearance in the present constitutes the arrival of the future. Thus the future may be realized in the present. This would appear to place "commitment to the provisional" on firmer ground, but one has the feeling, nevertheless, that with the emphasis on the "not yet" of the future, the "even now" of the present has lost an element of certainty. It would be helpful if Pannenberg elaborated on the relation of pres-

ent to past, but the structure of his presentations is apparently determined by the primacy of the future, which is nowhere fully established.

Although this volume makes no pretensions of approximating a definitive work, it reveals the major themes in Pannenberg's thought and is a useful steppingstone to the discussion focusing on the future, which Pannenberg, along with Moltmann, has done so much to advance. While critical comparison of the two on the part of English readers awaits the futher translation of their works, *Theology and the Kingdom of God* indicates that there are themes common to both, such as the challenge to Kantian concepts of reality and history, the recasting of theological categories in light of the eschaton, and an emphasis on the social obligations of the Church. The latter stands in contrast with the individualism with which the thought of Rudolf Bultmann may be charged by the use it makes of corporate categories. While not echoing the optimism of the social gospel, future-oriented theology is an important summons to the Church to fulfill a paradoxical task—the affirmation of a world destined in some sense to pass away. This volume is a provocative introduction to the stimulating possibilities such a position suggests.

Riverside, California RICHARD RICE

Slusser, Dorothy M., and Gerald H. Slusser, *The Jesus of Mark's Gospel*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967. 157 pp. $ 2.25.

This small paperback commentary, the product of a husband-and-wife writing team, deserts the usual format of its genre. The conventional approach of introduction and verse-by-verse exegesis is eschewed; instead the authors sweep through whole sections of Mk at a time, concentrating singlemindedly on exposing the contribution of each section to the theology of the evangelist. They firmly lay to rest the notion that Mark (who is identified without elaboration as Peter's secretary) was a sloppy, semiliterate editor who put together "a mere patchwork of reminiscences" (p. 11). They cite approvingly the growing appreciation of Mark's creativity found in the treatments of Austin Ferrar, R. H. Lightfoot, John Bowman, *et al.*, and add their own emphatic judgment that "Mark's work . . . was a carefully engineered piece of literary art done by a man of great skill with an extraordinary knowledge of the Old Testament and its subtleties" (p. 12). This literary and exegetical craft was used by the evangelist to express his understanding of the meaning of the life of Jesus. Yet, though the Gospel presents the story of the life and death of Jesus, "it is no less the story of the death of the orthodox Judaism of that day" (p. 13), replete with references, both explicit and veiled in symbolism, to the crescendoing tension between Jesus and the professional exponents of the Jewish faith. Indeed, it is the Slussers' thesis that the chief purpose of Mark's Gospel was to show the dissolution of the

orthodox Judaism of Jesus' day and the emergence of the new Israel in light of the mission of Jesus.

This thesis contains a measure of validity insofar as it expresses a general truth about *one* feature of the Gospel material; all of the Gospels, Mk included, testify to the tension existing between Jesus and Judaism, between the old order and the new. This is hardly a novel insight. What *is* novel about the Slussers' interpretation (and herein lies both the originality and the vulnerability of their enterprise) is the central role which they assign to the Markan treatment of this tension as the controlling influence on the structure and content of the Gospel.

After stating their thesis, the Slussers proceed to marshal evidence from Mk in its support. Exorcisms, healing stories, and other incidents in the Markan account are examined and found to be symbolic representations of the collision of Jesus with Judaism, the collapse of the old Israel, and the emergence of the new Israel. Throughout the highly evocative and symbolic fabric of his material, Mark, the authors contend, has ingeniously woven numerous references (usually implicit rather than explicit) to the OT which give design and shape to the finished product.

Basic to the study is the premise "that Mark used historical events as symbols whose meaning is not dependent upon the fact that they happened" (p. 12). It is apparent from their subsequent elaboration that what the authors mean by this is not that Mark was wholly indifferent with regard to the historical roots of his material (though they do not exclude the possibility that he may have consciously invented some of the incidents he narrates to supplement the material which he found in the tradition in order to serve his theological intentions). Rather, the authors are suggesting that since Mark used his material not to narrate "facts" for their own sake, but to provide his readers with an interpretation of the tradition, the interpreter of Mark's Gospel may discover its meaning without needlessly entangling himself in the issue of its historicity.

The general principle enunciated here is respectable enough (though we might be somewhat more equivocal than the Slussers have been in speaking of Mark's use of events as "symbols"). However, implementing even an impeccable principle can be tricky, especially where exegesis is involved, and particularly where theological exegesis of the Gospels is involved. To say that the Gospel writers wrote testaments of faith rather than chronicles of fact is to lead exegesis out of the blind alleys and dead-end streets of a discredited historiographical approach to the Gospels. But once out of that hopeless labyrinth, exegesis finds itself in a limitless expanse with few clearly-marked roads and fewer maps. Once the point is conceded (and it must be) that there is a large area of meaning beyond the recitation of "facts" in the Gospels, the exegete must explore that theological territory. The rub is that the boundary between interpretation which is trenchant and that which is merely bizarre is not always clear.

This fact should not immobilize the exegete, but it should function as a restraint to keep him from "finding" more than the Gospel writers intended!

As one reads the Slussers' commentary, one cannot shake off easily the impression that the authors have "found" too much in substantiation of their thesis. An example of this may be seen in their interpretation of Jesus' baptism. In their exegesis, the obvious Christological significance of the Markan story withers away. The authors conclude that, for Mark, Jesus is a symbol of Israel; it is Israel which is baptized. This remarkable conclusion is reached after the authors assert that Mark has the Septuagint of Is 42: 1 in mind when he reports the voice from heaven declaring the divine approval of Jesus as the "beloved Son" (Mk 1: 11). Since the Septuagint in the Isaiah passage speaks of "my Son," "Jacob," "Israel," and "my elect" (interchangeable titles all referring to Israel) as the object of divine approval, it is contended that Mark must have intended that Jesus, likewise designated as "Son," be regarded in the baptism account as a symbol of Israel. Thus, the Slussers would have Mark say to his readers "that Jesus was not merely a preacher from Nazareth, or even a promised Messiah come to deliver God's people—he was himself Israel, and his baptism was the symbol of the passing away of the old Israel" (p. 26).

Such exegesis is as tendentious as it is agile and ingenious. Unfortunately, the foregoing is not an isolated instance of dubious interpretation in the book under review; examples abound. This is not to say that the Slussers' treatment of Mk is without merit. In fact, it offers suggestive exegetical analysis at many points, though even in such places the wheat is not always free of tares. For instance, it may be possible to see, as the authors have (pp. 36 ff.), some symbolic meaning in the fact that the exorcism reported in Mk 1: 21 ff. takes place in a synagogue. But the subsequent argument (worked out at considerable length, but to no great effect) that Mark intentionally modeled the story after the account of the revolt of Korah, Dathan and Abiram in Num 16, is far-fetched. The recurrence of this sort of unconvincing interpretation throughout the study places a heavy tax upon its credibility.

The fact of the birth and vigorous growth of the Christian movement, with Jesus as the focus of its faith, was already a matter of history when Mark wrote his Gospel. The independence of the Church from institutional Judaism was likewise a *fait accompli*. Undoubtedly, the evangelist, along with his Christian fellows, believed that the Church was the new Israel, and that the Jewish nation had ceased to be God's true covenant people. Moreover, it is made plain enough in the parable of the vineyard in Mk 12 (as the Slussers have correctly noted) that Mark closely connected the life and death of Jesus with the break-up of literal Israel's covenant relationship with God and the appearance of new, spiritual Israel. But the Slussers have erred in exaggerating the extent to which the Gospel of Mk has been molded by this particular connection of ideas in the mind of its author.

Two notable formal deficiencies of the book under review are the lack of a bibliography and the absence of any indexes (subject and scriptural indexes would have been useful). A further weakness is the lamentable paucity of notes, a circumstance which at least provides a measure of the book's independence!

A brief appendix treating the long, spurious ending of Mk (16: 9-20) concludes the work. In the appendix, the Slussers note a parallel between the spiritual tone of Is 11 and the genuine ending of Mk. They suggest that "some discerning spirit" added the spurious ending to the Gospel because the variant ending likewise was similar in tone to Is 11 (especially vs. 6-9).

Whatever its deficiences, this little book at least serves to remind us again of what so much recent Gospel research has been insisting: that the writers of the Gospels were much more than witless editors who merely assembled the Gospel material without shaping it. In fact, the evangelists were men of faith who unabashedly permitted their convictions to control their work and contribute to the form and substance of the tradition they handled. It is possible to speak, as the Slussers have, of Mark's "understanding of Jesus" (p. 12), as a distinctly Markan entity. Each of the Gospel writers has left his own ideological signature on the tradition. Sometimes the influence of the evangelist's point of view on his material is conspicuous; as often, it is barely discernible, almost subliminal. It is the latter quality of the Gospels as much as the former which so tantalizingly has drawn scholars into the always adventuresome—but sometimes risky—business of Gospel interpretation. The Slussers' genuine insights and daring departures evoke the sense of adventure; their interpretative excesses expose the risks.

Andrews University LAWRENCE ELDRIDGE

Smith, John E., *Experience and God.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. viii + 209 pp. $ 4.75.

This book is a persuasive argument for putting the concept of experience at the center of philosophical discussions concerning the meaning of "God." Claims to religious truth within the context of an understanding of man as religious will become irrelevant to man as a living and thinking human being. We must examine experience to see if there are "signs" of a divine reality present within it. We must take reality as it is presented to us within human experience and by reflecting upon it, assisted in this task by the traditions available to us, come to understand its significance as medium of the reality of God.

The question concerning God is the question concerning the meaning of human life as a whole. There are certain "occasions" when this question presses itself upon man, where life is not ordinary but where the question about and concern for the ground and goal of human

existence come to be raised. That the question is raised is a universal phenomenon. This proposition is the basis for the argument for the essential rationality of the concept of God.

Smith holds that the process by which the move is made from the apprehension of the "sacred," given in the concerned questioning about the meaning of human existence as a whole, to the conviction of the reality of the religious object is not by a process of deductive argument. The Anselmian conception of reason is proposed as an alternative to such rationalism. Within human experience one finds the "signs" of the presence of God. The task of reason is to read these signs, not by a process of inference coming to the conclusion of a reality hitherto unknown, but by reflection upon a reality present but not understood, perhaps indeed unrecognized. The logical process is one not of demonstration but of *interpretation.*

The arguments for the existence of God (so-called) are not to be seen as syllogistic processes wherein one makes the move from a reality other than God in a deductive process to the necessary existence of a reality not yet known. They represent processes of interpretation through which certain data given in experience come to be understood. The making intelligible of experience must be given an essential role in *determining* commitment to the reality of the divine presence (p. 155). "The intelligible development of experience makes an indispensable contribution, and . . . *the very intelligibility itself* is a factor, and indeed the most important factor, in bringing the self to accept and commit itself to the reality of the divine presence." The appeal to experience, as sign, via appropriate processes of understanding is thus essentially rational, and is proposed by Smith as an alternative to different forms of irrationalism (*e.g.*, that of Kierkegaard and Barth).

The appeal to experience has a further aspect. We have seen that the interpretative means for the understanding of the signs of the presence of God are provided by traditions known and preserved within specific communities. Since he has proposed a generic concept of religion, he must show this concept to be applicable to different particular religious traditions. Smith proposes a theory of a common "experiential structure" of the great religions in terms of the schema of "ideal," "need," and "deliverer." The basic concept is that of "need." The way in which the obstacle which stands in the way of fulfillment is conceived has its counterpart in the particular kind of deliverer proposed. Although the great religious communities define the problem differently, and thus the ideal and remedy in different ways, there is still a basis of comparison in the similar structure of experience involved. The different religions represent varying responses to the same problematical situation: The situation which the book had earlier analyzed in terms of question and concern about the ground and goal of human existence.

We have found Smith's suggestion of an alternative between the "absolute distinction between immediacy and mediation, or between immediate experience and inference" (p. 52), to be a most helpful one.

The category of *interpreted experience* recognizes both elements of immediacy and rational mediation of the reality of God as essential. Experience of God is rational since mediated through structures of interpretation.

What Smith has shown is that a rigorous philosophical treatment, which cannot be required to answer all the theological questions involved, may employ the concept of God with vigor and with decision. It is refreshing when so much undisciplined and uncritical language is spoken about God, or his death, about experience and the self, that a book of such caliber as this offers an alternative way of opening up the question on fundamental lines of empirical grounding for religious commitment. It is the presuppositions that must be re-examined, the question of the burden of proof driving us beyond explanation and attempted theoretical justification to the issue of experienced and experienceable. The book taken as a whole presses the question: Taking the full range of human experience into consideration, does such experience and such consideration not provide for meaningful symbols for the understanding of "God" and of propositions concerning God, whether there is not a piece, a quality, a dimension of our human experience which may be the legitimate occasion for "God-talk" ? Smith's book is an invitation to take a second look, to see whether empiricism cannot be rescued from narrowness, experience from subjectivity, and reason from rationalism.

Because of the empirical grounding of faith and the rationality of the media of experience, faith is capable of an explicit philosophical definition, which can be further determined within specific religious communities. The self, in the midst of the world which impinges upon it, finds itself existing in different dimensions, (*e.g.*, the moral and the aesthetic) and one of these is the religious. Here the matter rests within the realm of assertion. Futher definition of the tricky conception of the self seems called for, especially since so much of the argument rests upon it.

A most important issue which the book raises is as to where the burden of proof lies. To a restrictive, logical empiricism which would rule out "God-talk" Smith says: "Show me your credentials. The burden of proof lies with you." But he knows that this is also what the opposite side has been saying. His answer is that an adequate looking at experience will give the lie to such restrictiveness. Since this it the case, the job of the philosopher is to point the way, to point to what is assumed. One cannot go beyond experience; the question concerns its definition. The way to get such a definition is to take into account all the "experiencing" delivers and when the definition is proposed it is an "end-of-the-line" appeal.

Cambridge, England EDWARD W. H. VICK

Smith, Charles W. F., *The Paradox of Jesus in the Gospels*. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969. 236 pp. $ 6.50.

Many writers have emphasized that in the Gospels we find the Jesus of history and the Christ of faith inextricably interwoven, that the Gospels are not history written on the spot but history interpreted from the new understanding gained through the resurrection experience. Smith's contribution in this book is to show this tension by a series of paradoxes, such as the familiar Jesus and the unknown Jesus, the baptizer who was himself baptized, the provincial preacher who was the universal Saviour, the Eternal Son who must die, the Messiah who refused the Messianic role, the King who enters the city as a pilgrim, and the Saviour who could not save.

Basing his conclusions on the assumption that the familiar one is the historical Jesus, and the unknown one is the resurrected Christ, Smith takes Mk 4:35-41 and 6:45-52 as a model for this paradoxical tension existing in the Gospels. In the former account, Jesus is addressed as "Rabbi" and is rebuked for sleeping while the disciples desperately seek to keep their boat from sinking in the storm. In the latter, Christ, taking the initiative, is unrecognized and unapproachable. Mk, by placing "a tale about a clearly human Jesus and a tale about a clearly supernatural Christ" in the same basic account, has placed the paradox in the sharpest relief. The Gospels are at "one and the same time about the historical Jesus and the Risen Christ" (p. 19).

To illustrate Smith's method, we examine his chapter on the baptism of Jesus. One paradox is the baptism of Jesus by John. Why should the sinless Son of God be baptized by John ? Yet for Smith the greater paradox is the fact that we have preserved faithfully in Mt 3:11b-12 and its Lucan parallel (which Smith considers earlier than Mk) that the baptism of Jesus was to be "by holy spirit and by fire." "Spirit" should be translated "wind" according to Smith, and thus the phrase is understood as the primitive agricultural metaphor for "separation" and "judgment." The wind separates the wheat from the chaff and the latter is burned by fire. However, this expectation was not fulfilled in the eschatological sense in which it was meant. The radical separation and judgment did not take place in the work of Christ. The preservation of this contradiction (Smith calls it a paradox) witnesses to the basic "integrity" of the Gospels. We have preserved John's expectation of the work of Christ which was shared by the first Christians. But instead of judgment, there is mercy and healing. Is the expectation ever fulfilled ? Yes, but in an altogether different way. Luke sees its fulfillment in Acts in the coming of the Spirit with wind and fire. In this way the promise of John is "fulfilled." Another important paradox is the fact that though the Gospel had gone as far as Rome when the Evangelists wrote, they still depict Jesus as a provincial preacher who limited his activities to Israel, and in his mission charge to the disciples forbade them to go outside of Jewry. This

again for Smith is witness to the integrity of the Gospels. Smith is throughout quite concerned about the integrity of the Gospels and emphasizes this point with reference to these strange paradoxes. While some alteration and reinterpretation has taken place to smooth the gap between what happened in Jesus' life and the later work of the church, yet the clear indications of these paradoxes remain.

In Chapter V Smith deals with the passion predictions of Jesus. Here again the author finds a paradox. What Jesus actually said was that he must die like any other man, that he would not bypass death like the other apocalyptic figures such as Enoch, Melchizedek, and the Son of Man. According to Smith, "there stands behind the predictions, not a prophecy of the passion, but a disclaimer by Jesus of any Messianic or apocalyptic role which involves the bypassing of death" (p. 115). The "rising again" does not refer specifically to the resurrection but to the apocalyptic exaltation. "It is this which Jesus here disclaims insofar as it requires that death be avoided" (p. 116). The post-resurrection treatment of this saying of Jesus becomes a passion prediction including the resurrection of Jesus after three days. The "integrity" of the Gospels for Smith is again maintained since they preserve the basic substance of what Jesus said even if they have reinterpreted it somewhat drastically.

According to Smith, much of the passion narrative is originally to be connected with the Feast of Tabernacles rather than the Passover, including Jesus' riding upon an ass. The crowds would be shouting "Hosanna" in any case and many others would be riding as Jesus was. This "veiled claim" to kingship would be understood only by his followers and indicates how "Mk has again carefully guarded against any open claim by Jesus or any acceptance of Messianic dignity" (p. 151).

The "paradox of all the paradoxes" is expressed in the statement, "He saved others; himself he cannot save." Barabbas and the two brigands who were crucified with Jesus were members of an underground resistance movement against Rome. They represented the conception of a political and historical Messiah, which role Jesus steadfastly refused to accept. Jesus instead transformed the current Messianic figure and became the Messiah who would die, be crucified. And in his death, indicated by the cry from the cross, "there is that element of the final insecurity of human plans and life which can be redeemed only by the security of the faith that God's purpose will triumph in his way rather than in ours" (p. 179).

The resurrection, as Smith explains it, was "not a *discovery* of the witnesses but a *disclosure* made by a power or a manifestation from outside themselves" (p. 186). This is illustrated by the Emmaus story. Jesus acting as host when he was the guest is the clue to the disclosure.

A significant question is raised concerning the correlation between what Jesus said and did and the Church's interpretation of these. Is the Church's interpretation fitting ? Does it really correlate or is it something altogether different ? Take the paradox concerning the

expectation of John the Baptist and the early Christians of Jesus as a judge bringing radical separation and judgment. If the Church understood this of the coming of the Holy Spirit, the "fulfillment" does not correlate to the expectation. If the expectation was false, then there need be no fulfillment. What we have then is an attempt to find fulfillment of a false expectation. Is this what Smith means ? The paradoxical nature of Smith's expression illustrates what my question is all about—"The paradox of unfulfilled expectation which was yet fulfilled, the discontinuous continuity" (p. 213). I think Smith makes an especially strong case of expectation-fulfillment in chapters IV and VII.

Another question that can be raised concerns the uncanny way in which expectation and fulfillment, though quite different, are found so beautifully in the same words. For example, "holy wind" and "Holy Spirit." The same Greek word can be used with either meaning. Another example is the passion prediction where an original "to be exalted" is interpreted in its fulfillment as "to be resurrected," the same Greek verb being used again for either meaning. Such a phenomenon is altogether possible, but I doubt that these two cases are examples of this. I accept Smith's basic argument in regard to the expectation of the Baptist, but not this specific argument. In regard to the passion prediction, my doubts touch the basic argument.

In spite of these criticisms the book makes fascinating reading and is full of new insights. Smith's positive aim to point up the basic integrity of the Gospels is commendable. While not written primarily as a direct contribution to the "search for a historical Jesus," it does contribute in a significant way to that quest.

Andrews University SAKAE KUBO

Vriezen, Th. C., *The Religion of Ancient Israel.* Translated by Rev. Hubert Hoskins. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967. 328 pp. $ 7.50.

The translation into English of Vriezen's *De godsdienst van Israël* (1963) will provide a very useful introduction to the Hebrew religion for students of the Bible and the ancient Near East. The work is a history-of-religions approach to the knotty problems of what constitutes the religion of Israel, its dynamic historical development, and its uniqueness. It covers the earlier periods to the Exile remarkably well, but regrettably portrays post-exilic Judaism with the traditional Wellhausian animosity which sees Judaism's fidelity to the Torah as a bondage to the tradition it created and providing no stimulus for new forms of living. Jewish and Christian scholarship since the 1920's (notably George Foot Moore, R. Travers Herford, James Parkes, Frederick Grant, W. D. Davies, and A. Roy Eckardt) has convincingly shown that this view is at best a Christian caricature, and at worst a fatal fallacy which has no place in a serious reconstruction of

Israel's religious history. In methodology and purpose this volume by Vriezen, an outstanding Dutch Biblical scholar who is currently serving as Director of Higher Studies, Old Testament, at The Near East School of Theology, Beirut, Lebanon, serves as a logical sequel to the author's previous investigations on the theology (*Hoofdlijnen der theologie van het Oude Testament* [1949]) and literature (*De literatuur van Oud-Israël* [1961], a second edition of his earlier work, *Oud-Israëlitische Geschriften* [1949]), of Israel.

In the introduction, and in the complicated but incisive second chapter which discusses Israel's *Weltanschauung* against the background of the ancient Near East, Vriezen establishes the basic questions in regard to the nature of Israel's religion. Why, for example, in light of the many similarities with her neighbors, Israel's religious experience and expression are something altogether different from theirs. The inner structure of Israel's religion is summarized at the end of chapter two, and then developed at length throughout the rest of the book. At the center of Israel's distinctiveness is Yahwism, a doctrine associated with Moses and the prophets, which maintains that Israel's knowledge of God is not derived primarily from nature as was the case of the ancient Oriental peoples, but from the acts of God in the history of the people. Yahwism displays an ability for adaptation and at the same time it rejects that which is foreign to it. Furthermore, Yahwism is a universalistic concept which proclaims that the relation of Yahweh, the God of Sinai, to Israel is not primarily national, but historical, and that all nations like Israel have their share in the "corpus Jahwisticum" (cf. Deutero-Isaiah, and to a lesser extent, Zechariah). It is to the author's credit that he is aware of the difficulties involved in developing such a thesis, of which the major problem is the ability to associate the literary traditions of the Biblical record to particular strata and periods. For the most part Vriezen is both cautious and critical in his examination, but occasionally he oversimplifies the evidence, as when he states that 1 Sa 9; 13:16 to 14:46; 16:14-23; 18:1 to 2 Sa 21; 1 Ki 1 and 2 represent a reliable contemporary record of the religious life of Israel about the year 1000 B.C.E. (chapter three).

Chapters four through six deal with the religion of the patriarchal times and the emergence and victory of Yahwism. Vriezen's mastery of the secondary literature is keenly shown in these chapters, and unlike the schools of Alt-Noth and von Rad he sees a greater amount of authentic history in the patriarchal and Mosaic ages than they maintain. Chapter seven probes the influence of Yahwism on the state in the post-Davidic period, and chapter eight is a highly refreshing interpretation of Yahwism in the teachings of the great prophets. The remaining chapters deal with the religion of Israel from the reformation of Josiah till the first century B.C.E., but offer very little more than what is found in B. C. Eerdman's *De godsdienst van Israël* (in a revised translation, *The Religion of Israel* [1947]), a Dutch predecessor to the book under review.

The chief value of this work is the judicious survey by the author of the many monographs and articles written on the religion of ancient Israel which are often inaccessible to the beginning student of the subject. However, it should be noted that the necessary tentative and theoretical nature of much of the discussion in regard to the Biblical text itself raises the question whether Vriezen has really succeeded in his task. The translation by Hoskins is fair. His English is plagued by the Dutch original, and many of his sentences are hastily executed. The book is enhanced by 31 pages of notes at the end of the volume, good indices, Biblical references, and 16 pages of plates.

A minor point: On page 150 the Paschal legends are associated with the feast of Maṣṣoth, and not Massoth as printed. Also, on page 286, n. 158, Sh. (for Shemuel) Yeivin is the author of *A Decade of Archaeology in Israel, 1948-58* (1960).

University of Southern California ZEV GARBER
Los Angeles, California

Westermann, Claus, *Basic Forms of Prophetic Speech*. Translated by Clayton White. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967. 222 pp. $ 5.00.

The volume under review represents primarily a form-critical appreciation of the most characteristic form of prophetic speech, the judgment-speech, with a special emphasis of that speech form as directed against individuals and against the nation Israel. The fact that no recent major study on the patterns of prophetic speech has appeared which does not consider Westermann's *Grundformen prophetischer Rede* (1960) as a point of departure, indicates the value of this highly informative guide, which is sufficiently well-documented to point the way to further areas of study. White as a translator is excellent. His translation, interspersed with a few printers' errors, reads smoothly, with hardly a Germanism, and he wisely adheres to the terminology of the original. His most significant departure is the translation of the German expression *Wort*, used frequently by the author to describe the basic prophetic message, by the English word, "speech" or "utterance" rather than the more accepted term "oracle," which is restricted to translate the German *Orakel*.

Professor Westermann, at present Professor of OT at the University of Heidelberg, begins the study with a selective review of the form-critical scholarship of thirteen scholars who have investigated the patterns of prophetic speech since 1900. No one can write such a survey without inviting disagreement. He mentions *inter alia* the research of Steuernagel, who discovered the major forms of prophetic speech: The accusation directed by the prophet to the nation Israel, and the announcement of judgment; Hölscher, who analyzed the rhythmic form of the prophetic speech; Gunkel, who exposed the

diversity of the prophetic speech forms; Balla, Scott, and Hempel, who recognized that Gunkel's categories of reproach (*Scheltwort*) and threat (*Drohwort*) constitute the basic unit of prophetic speech and cannot be separated; and L. Koehler and J. Lindblom, who independently of each other revealed that the prophetic speech was primarily delivered as a messenger's speech. However, he devotes little attention to articles by S. Mowinckel, H. Junker, A. R. Johnson, A. Haldur, and others who maintain a definite cultic influence on Israel's prophetic literature. Westermann's charge that the Scandinavian and English research on cult prophecy is not concerned with speech forms is unconvincing and unwarranted. Thus, what we have in the first third of the book is a stimulating discussion of much of the scholarship on the problem of the formal structure of prophetic speech, and this review should prove immensely valuable to those for whom the German works—all the selections are in German except R. B. Y. Scott, "The Literary Structure of Isaiah's Oracles" (1950)—are inaccessible.

In his own contribution Westermann, following the lead of H. W. Wolff, maintains that the basic unit of prophetic speech is the judgment-speech (*Gerichtswort*) which appears to have a definite form: (1) Commissioning of the messenger (at times wanting); (2) Summons to hear; (3) Acusation (*Anklage*); (4) Messenger formula (*e.g.*, "Thus) says the Lord . . . "); (5) Announcement (*Ankündigung*). The Accusation and Announcement constitute the main elements of a messenger's speech (*Botenwort*), which the prophetic speech form is essentially, and the prophet is seen as a unique messenger since the messenger formula (*Botenformel*) which accompanies his words is *koh ʾāmar Elohim/YHWH,* and the announcement of his message, usually terse and direct, is considered as the word of God. The author's appeal to the messenger-commissioning procedure as found in the Mari letters does not add to his thesis, since his discussion is fragmentary and fails to consider the position of these letters in the life of the people.

Westermann is most impressive and illuminating in his sections on the "prophetic judgment-speech directed toward individuals" (= JI), which he closely associates with the regular court legal form, but fails to elucidate the nature of their dependency, and in his description of the "judgment-speech against the nation Israel" (= JN), a speech form developed from the JI by the writing prophets of the eighth-seventh century. A detailed selection of texts and pericopes from prophetic and non-prophetic Biblical passages supports Westermann's understanding of JI and JN, which are essentially characterized by the two elements of the Announcement: (1) Intervention of God; and (2) Results of the divine intervention. However, the distinctive usage of JI and JN (borrowed intentionally from the Formgeschichte terminology of Psalms ?) appears to be overemphasized by Westermann since the individual addressed is not a person *per se,* but a representative of the nation, *i.e.*, king, prophet, etc., and the message

directed toward him has implications for the collective body of Israel. The last twenty pages of the book deal with the variants of the prophetic judgment-speech, *viz.*, the woe-speech (*Wehe-Worte*); the curse; the legal procedure; the disputation (*Streitgespräch*); the parable; the lament; and the prophetic Torah. This section, while containing much that is thought-provoking, is regrettably sketchy and incomplete. Noticeably lacking, for example, is a clear distinction between the prophets of doom and prophets of weal (*Heilspropheten*; an evaluation of the promise oracles, exhortations, and utterances to foreign nations, all three important variants of the basic prophetic speech, is also missing.

Professor Westermann expresses in the preface to the English edition that this translation can encourage contemporary discussion of Biblical studies between American and German scholars. It is this reviewer's belief that his wish is being fulfilled. But more important, this volume stands as an exemplary introduction to mature form-critical research, and will reward careful reading by the student of the Biblical interpretation. Finally, it is hoped that in future printings indices to the authors cited and to Biblical references would be included to enrich the value of this book.

University of Southern California ZEV GARBER
Los Angeles, California

Williams, Colin W., *The Church*. "New Directions in Theology Today," 4. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968. 187 pp. $ 2.45.

Since the task of the Church is to bear witness in the world and not simply to maintain traditional structures of organization and of doctrine, it will follow that if it is to perform that task of witness it will seek to understand how that will be appropriate or even possible in the changing world of today. This is not of course a new thesis. This book, and the series of which it is a part, in spite of the title, "New Directions in Theology Today," does not attempt a developing of new directions, but a reporting of them. To perform the task of witness appropriately will involve enterprising rethinking on the Church's part of its structure, methods, theology, and ministry. This book serves as a reminder of the earnest work that has been done (and often not by recognized leaders of the Church viewed as an "organization") for the sake of improving the effectiveness of the Church's witness. If Williams' thesis is correct, the leadership of the churches will be less and less in the hands of a traditionally ordered institutional form. He is careful to point out, however, that this will not mean the abandoning of "institutions." If new forms and new places of obedience are demanded, new direction for the Church may come in spite of institutional diehardism. Williams makes us aware of the need for the Church to be flexible and responsive in the face of the world's need. Indeed, in a certain sense the world must be allowed

to write the Church's agenda if the Church is to fulfill a genuine servant role; the agenda, but not the answers. We may have learned from the NT that a variety of forms of organization and of teaching is necessary to make the ministry of the Church effective.

Williams writes from considered experience when he affirms that, although the appropriate expression of the Church is always institutional, any particular institutional form may have to be by-passed by God in order for him to fulfill his purpose. It is salutary to be reminded, if we can take it, that all the institutional forms of the Church stand under judgment, and need justification. If the Church is to perform the servant role genuinely, it will avoid corporate selfishness by manifesting humility and love in its affairs, both "within" and "without." The Church has often responded with concern when its own institutional role has been questioned or curtailed by the state, but has been far less interested in exercising the servant role for the sake of obtaining *human* rights for those who lack them when the state has encroached upon these. In this way self-concern has replaced genuine humility and servant-love.

To insist on the traditional forms of ministry as the only forms (*i.e.*, the parish ministry) would today mean that the ministry of the Church would be isolated from where the ministry is now most urgently needed. One reason for this is the shift from residence to non-residence congregations. Where at present old forms are inadequate, new forms of ministry must emerge. The tasks of the Church remain. The forms of the ministry through which they are to be achieved must change. The time we live in is characterized by our immersion in the diverse structures of contemporary life (p. 124), and because of this a variety of ministries is demanded.

The Church's witness is to be not simply in word but also in deed. Williams expresses a widespread concern that the Church make its presence felt where key decisions are made within secular institutions. Such obedience as is now called for will be an "ever new event." Reformation of the old is not sufficient. Renewal is demanded (p. 146). Witness will be in act as well as word.

The immense complexity and change in our pluralistic society demands a "pluriform of presence" on the Church's part. Change in the world requires change in the Church to meet the worldly change, but no abandoning of the Church's task. The ways he suggests (and he is representing the views of others and of ecumenical discussion as well as his own) are pointers. His treatment reminds us that the ecumenical movement is not seeking for a uniformity of organization and of practice, nor even of interpretation. It is concerned with the fulfillment of the Church's task to make the future open to Christianity, when other ideologies and institutions are bidding for it. This can be done, Williams claims, only by its assuming responsibility for the present and for the immediate future.

It is salutary, even if painful, to be reminded of the situation. It is helpful, if not decisive, to be reminded of possibilities for renewal

and for changed expression of our responsibility. The book, whether read as an introduction to the doctrine of the Church in contemporary theology, or as an expression of dedicated concern for irrelevant institutionalism and for the fulfillment of churchly responsibility, cannot but, if carefully considered, lead to examination of heart and soul. It is to be hoped that its message may be heeded before it is too late. But that such discussion is possible is a sign of hope, hope that the genuine tasks of the Church may be performed in unlikely places by unlikely people. The book does not simply express the pious dream of a visionary. It documents views and changes already evident and operative. In the nature of the case, the "theology" presented is tentative, for theology expresses understanding, and act precedes both.

Cambridge, England EDWARD W. H. VICK

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY
SEMINARY STUDIES

VOLUME VIII
1970

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY PRESS
BERRIEN SPRINGS, MICHIGAN 49104, USA

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEWS

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW

CONSONANTS

א = ʾ	ד = *d̲*	י = *y*	ס = *s*	ר = *r*
ב = *b*	ה = *h*	כ = *k*	ע = ʿ	שׁ = *ś*
ב = *b̲*	ו = *w*	כ = *k̲*	פ = *p*	שׂ = *s̱*
ג = *g*	ז = *z*	ל = *l*	פ = *p̲*	ת = *t*
ג = *g̲*	ח = *ḥ*	מ = *m*	צ = *ṣ*	ת = *t̲*
ד = *d*	ט = *ṭ*	נ = *n*	ק = *q*	

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

ַ = *a*	ְ, ׃ (vocal shewa) = *e*	◌ֹ = *ō*
ָ = *ā*	ֵ, ֶ = *ê*	וֹ = *o*
ָה = *ā*	ִ = *i*	וֹ = *ô*
ֶ = *e*	ִי = *î*	וּ = *u*
ֵ = *ē*	ֹ = *o*	וּ = *û*

ABBREVIATIONS OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

AAS	Annales archéol. de Syrie
AASOR	Annual, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.
ADAJ	Annual, Dep. of Ant. of Jordan
AER	American Ecclesiastical Review
AfO	Archiv für Orientforschung
AfP	Archiv für Papyrusforschung
AJA	Amer. Journal of Archaeology
AJSL	Amer. Journ. of Sem. Lang. and Literature
ALBO	Analecta Lovan. Bibl. et Orient.
ANET	Ancient Near Eastern Texts, J. B. Pritchard, ed., 2d ed., 1955
ANF	The Ante-Nicene Fathers
AO	Acta Orientalia
ARG	Archiv für Reformationsgesch.
ARW	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft
ASAE	Annales, Serv. des Ant. de l'Ég.
ASB	Acta Sanctorum (ed. Bolland)
AThR	Anglican Theological Review
AUSS	Andrews Univ. Sem. Studies
BA	Biblical Archaeologist
BASOR	Bulletin, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.
Bib	Biblica
BIES	Bulletin, Israel Expl. Soc.
BIFAO	Bulletin, Inst. Franç. d'Arch. Or,
BiOr	Bibliotheca Orientalis
BJPES	Bulletin, Jewish Pal. Expl. Soc
BJRL	Bulletin, John Rylands Library
BMB	Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth
BQR	Baptist Quarterly Review
BR	Biblical Research (Chicago)
BRG	Biblioth. Rerum Germanicarum
BS	Bibliotheca Sacra
BSHPF	Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français
BT	Bible Translator
BZ	Biblische Zeitschrift
CBQ	Catholic Biblical Quarterly
CC	Christian Century
CdE	Chronique d'Égypte
CH	Church History
CIL	Corpus Inscript. Latinarum
CIS	Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum
CJTh	Canadian Journal of Theology
CSEL	Corpus Script. Eccl. Lat.
CT	Christianity Today
ER	Ecumenical Review
EThL	Ephemer. Theol. Lovanienses
ET	Expository Times
HJ	Hibbert Journal
HThR	Harvard Theological Review
HUCA	Hebrew Union College Annual

IEJ	Israel Exploration Journal
IG	Inscriptiones Graecae
Int	Interpretation
JACh	Jahrb. für Ant. und Christentum
JAOS	Journ. of the Amer. Or. Soc.
JBL	Journal of Biblical Literature
JBR	Journal of Bible and Religion
JCS	Journal of Cuneiform Studies
JEA	Journal of Egyptian Arch.
JJS	Journal of Jewish Studies
JNES	Journal of Near Eastern Studies
JQR	Jewish Quarterly Review
JR	Journal of Religion
JSS	Journal of Semitic Studies
JThS	Journal of Theol. Studies
KJV	King James Version
LQ	Lutheran Quarterly
MGH	Monumenta Germaniae Historica
MPG	Migne, Patrologia Graeca
MPL	Migne, Patrologia Latina
MQR	Mennonite Quarterly Review
NKZ	Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nic. Fathers
NRTh	Nouvelle Revue Théologique
NT	Novum Testamentum
NTA	New Testament Abstracts
NTS	New Testament Studies
Num	Numen
OCh	Oriens Christianus
OLZ	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung
Or	Orientalia
OTS	Oudtestamentische Studien
PEQ	Palestine Exploration Quarterly
PJB	Palästina-Jahrbuch
PRE	Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche
QDAP	Quarterly, Dep. of Ant. in Pal.
RA	Revue d'Assyr. et d'Arch. Or.
RAC	Rivista di Archaeologia Cristiana
RB	Revue Biblique
RE	Review and Expositor
RdE	Revue d'Égyptologie
RHE	Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique
RHPR	Revue d'Hist. et de Philos. Rel.
RHR	Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
RL	Religion in Life
RLA	Reallexikon der Assyriologie
RQ	Revue de Qumrân
RSR	Revue des Sciences Réligieuses
RSV	Revised Standard Version
SJTh	Scottish Journal of Theology
STh	Studia Theologica
ThEH	Theologische Existenz heute
ThQ	Theologische Quartalschrift
ThT	Theology Today
ThLZ	Theologische Literaturzeitung
ThR	Theologische Rundschau
Trad	Traditio
ThS	Theological Studies
ThZ	Theologische Zeitschrift
VC	Verbum Caro
VD	Verbum Domini
VCh	Vigiliae Christianae
VT	Vetus Testamentum
WThJ	Westminster Theol. Journal
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes
ZA	Zeitschrift für Assyriologie
ZAS	Zeitsch. für ägyptische Sprache
ZAW	Zeitsch. für die allttes. Wiss.
ZDMG	Zeitsch. der Deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellschaft
ZDPV	Zeitsch. des Deutsch. Pal. Ver.
ZKG	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte
ZHTh	Zeitsch. für hist. Theologie
ZKTh	Zeitsch. für kath. Theologie
ZNW	Zeitsch. für die neutest. Wiss.
ZDTh	Zeitschrift für syst. Theologie
ZThK	Zeitsch. für Theol. und Kirche

Printed by E. J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands