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TOWARD AN AMERICAN THEOLOGY
A SYMPOSIUM ON AN IMPORTANT BOOK

Editorial Note: Herbert W. Richardson's book *Toward an American Theology* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967; xiv + 170 pp.; \$ 3.95) blazes new trails in the field of theology. The last chapter, which emphasizes the sanctifying influence of Sabbath observance in the realm of the theological experience of the modern Christian, is a refreshing and uniquely thought-provoking essay on the subject. Believing that the book for this reason deserves more than an ordinary notice in the Book Review section of *AUSS*, the editor requested an ethicist, who is also a close friend of the author of the book under review, a theologian, and a NT scholar, to discuss the implications and merits of Richardson's thesis as presented in his final chapter. The three contributions of this symposium appear in the alphabetical order of the reviewers' names.

I

This symposium of reviews concentrates on the final chapter of Herbert Richardson's *Toward an American Theology* because it is in his final, longest chapter (almost one-third of the book) that the author presents his ideas on the Sabbath. It seems appropriate, however, before discussing the last chapter to give a brief description of the rest of the book so that readers can put the reviews in perspective.

It is a paradox that Richardson makes unity the fundamental principle of his metaphysics, only to write one of the most varied books for its size to appear in recent theological literature. Although he repeatedly tries to argue the unity of his book, he admits that "I have developed my arguments in relative independence of one another" (p. 161).

Richardson has been severely criticized for writing a book

that pursues several ideas at once. But why is it not appropriate for a young theologian in his first constructive work to invite the general Christian community to consider how he is making up his mind? If Richardson's protestations that the book has an intrinsic consistency can be brushed aside, the reader should be delighted by the opportunity to pursue one of the most original minds on the American theological scene. System and organization can begin later when Richardson is on the other side of middle age. Now is the time for him to experiment, and for Richardson's readers to delight in his courage.

The author uses different styles and levels of discourse in his book. His first two chapters are written in the form of Christian apologetics. He attacks both the death-of-God theologians and Christian secularists, such as his Harvard colleague Harvey Cox. In these chapters his method is history of ideas. He outlines the periods of intellectual history assumed by the death-of-God theologians and Cox, and shows how their arrangement can lead to a sense that the future does not lie with relativism and secularity but with unity and religious presuppositions.

Richardson's third chapter, "The Myth is the Message," is a venture in philosophy of language. It is perhaps his least original essay, and therefore some would say his most sound. Even so, his relating of Jerome Bruner's theory of language to Christology puts traditional Christian statements in an arresting context. Christ becomes the necessary word, making the story of the Scriptures intelligible.

In Richardson's fourth essay, he makes no compromises with his reader. Up to this point, Richardson seems to be wishing to talk to those church members or secular fellow-travelers who have been excited by Cox's *Secular City*. Now he launches into the most rigorous sort of metaphysical discussion. He outlines what he clearly thinks could be developed into a major philosophical alternative.

Richardson argues that unity is the most basic metaphysical

principle, more fundamental even than being. The principle of unity is distinguished by the categories of individuals, relations and wholes, each with its appropriate language. At the end of the chapter, Richardson points out that his philosophical analysis coincides with such orthodox Christian doctrines as the Trinity. In its original form, as an essay in the *HThR*, Richardson promised a second article developing further the implications of his philosophical analysis for theology. He should be held to his promise. Of all the directions in which Richardson's originality might take him, surely an explication of his "henology" would be the most important.

Although in his final chapter Richardson leaves the discourse of apologetics or philosophy of religion to write theology, he cannot get away from certain polemical concerns. One that he picks up again from his first two chapters is secularism. He reacts to those who say that American technological society, and therefore eventually world civilization, is moving towards greater individual freedom from both nature and God's immediate sovereignty (for example, Cox and the death-of-God theologians). On the contrary, he says, "God's activity is as omnipresent as ever. We simply are not aware of His personal presence with us."

Richardson considers the preoccupation of the theologians of secularity with "what God is doing" to be a typically American concern. He puts it in the form of a question, *cur creatio*? Richardson's answer, a Sabbath perspective on creation, Christ and the Spirit, is consistently teleological. Every act of God leads to another, until once again we reach God, our true end.

The institution of the Sabbath at the end of creation week emphasizes that the creation culminated, not in man's appearance, but in God's presence. The Sabbath shows that the creation has been made to be a receptacle for God's holiness.

Not only creation but Christology is understood teleologically. "Since, therefore, God created the world for Sabbath

holiness, He must personally enter the world and dwell therein" (p. 126). The purpose of the Sabbath is a microcosm of the purpose for creation. Both must be filled with God, who is most present when He is personally present. Eventually, according to Richardson, there had to be an incarnation. Until the incarnation the Sabbath served as the formal bearer of God's presence. "The Sabbath is, so to say, the world's aptitude for the incarnation" (p. 126).

Even the incarnation is not an end in itself. "Sending the Holy Spirit is the chief thing that Jesus seeks by His ministry of obedience to God... the aim of His ministry is to send the Holy Spirit to dwell in our hearts... the indwelling of the Holy Spirit effects what the incarnation requires" (p. 146). So, creation is for the Sabbath, where God dwells. The Sabbath continues as the opening in time and space for the personal coming of God. Christ, that coming, that God with us, is for the Spirit.

But the Spirit, too, is for something else. It is for taking us to God Himself. Richardson believes the Holy Spirit is "the very perichoresis that unites the persons of God with each other. Hence, when the Holy Spirit indwells us, we are lifted into the very life of God Himself" (p. 146).

In retrospect we can see that creation, the Sabbath, Christ and the Spirit have all gained their significance by their end, God Himself. "We may say that God's purpose in creation is to manifest His triune holiness to Himself by making a world and bringing it into His own holy life" (p. 153).

Richardson looks at this entire process as sanctification. Creation, Christ's incarnation, and the outpouring of the Spirit are all part of God's bringing the world to Himself, which is sanctification. But sanctification is not simply a sequence of events. It is not just history. Sanctification is a present possibility for every Christian. It is an ontological reality.

But how can we know the world is not secular, but sanctified? How can we feel even more than human freedom, divine

holiness? How can we realize that sanctifying is what God is doing? Richardson anticipates such questions from his fellow theologians, and in response points to the Sabbath. It is in experiencing the unseen, but real, presence of God in this sacrament, that we can know and feel the holiness and glory of God. In the fellowship, the oneness among believers and their God, sensed on Sabbath, there is a microcosm of the oneness and fellowship of all creation with and in God, which is true sanctification.

Richardson's discussion of sanctification is a helpful antidote to the death-of-God and secular theologians. But he tries to kill two polemical adversaries with one doctrinal stone. He tries to show the shortcomings of not only American secular theologies, but European theology as well. He says Europeans distort Christian theology by emphasizing the sinfulness of man so strongly they are forced to overstress the doctrine of redemption. Christology overwhelms the doctrine of creation and pneumatology. Within Christology the crucifixion supersedes the incarnation. What is Richardson's corrective? His omnibus doctrine of sanctification, highlighted by creation, the incarnation, and the Spirit.

The question arises, of course, Does the Sabbath, Richardson's sacrament of sanctification, need to get caught in a transoceanic crossfire among theologians? To be a symbol of sanctification, does the Sabbath have to be excluded from being a symbol of redemption? To be a time when we realize our ontological relationship to God, does the Sabbath have to cease being a period when we remember God's mighty acts in the history of redemption? Why do we need to limit ourselves to Exodus 20 (Sabbath as a symbol of creation) and exclude Deuteronomy 5 (Sabbath as a symbol of God's redemption in the Exodus)?

Richardson's reply is arbitrary, to put it mildly. "According to the canon of Scripture, the 'creation interpretation' of the Sabbath is affirmed to be theologically prior to the 'redemption interpretation.'" Since when does an account become

theologically prior because it appears a few passages before another? Does this mean that the gospels are less important than Is 53, or the flood narrative? This theological method seems especially strange for a theologian who stresses pluralism within unity as much as does Richardson. Would not our view of the Sabbath, and by extension our understanding of sanctification, be richer and more complete if we considered creation and redemption as equally important? In fact, Richardson's discussion does assume a history of salvation within his doctrine of sanctification. Richardson's instinct to be inclusive in theological method has been betrayed by his polemic against European theology.

The opposition of redemption and sanctification seems unnecessary, even alien, to Richardson's discussion of Christology. In some of his most effective passages, Richardson talks of Christ's mission in terms of friendship. "To know Christ is to enjoy the presence of His person, to take delight in His nearness, to love Him as a friend 'being with' whom is its own sufficient reason" (p. 131). Richardson says this is sanctification. Is this kind of friendship all that different from the overcoming of estrangement, which European theologians wish to describe as redemption?

Because Richardson's writings are so original and creative, questions concerning his inconsistencies are far less important than requests for further elaborations. These could all be gathered under the single question, How is the last chapter related to the rest of the book?

For instance, is the Sabbath a sacrament that is equally relevant for all kinds of *intellectus*? If not, is it most appropriate for a faith of reconciliation responding to the *intellectus* of relativism? Furthermore, is the Sabbath the message? If it is an image according to Richardson's particular definition, does the Sabbath have the same status as a symbol as does the crucifixion?

In terms of the chapter on "A Philosophy of Unity," is the Sabbath more a word specifying an individual, a sentence

appropriate for describing relations, or a capsule story conveying the unity of the whole? If it partakes of all three levels, for which is it most appropriate? Or does the Sabbath symbolize unity itself, the unity of particulars, relations, and wholes, and the unity of their unities?

As we have seen, Richardson employs different modes of discourse in his book. In the future, when he comes to expand his essays into "a comprehensive theology, integrated by a sustained single argument" (p. 161), he will have to decide whether his language will be ordinary, philosophical, or theological. If, as I suspect, it will be more philosophical language than any other, it will be interesting to see how Richardson relates Sabbath to unity and freedom, to history and time. That enterprise may lead other thoughtful Christians to agree with what is now Richardson's testament of faith. "The Sabbath is no minor article of religion, but a key to the whole of life—its very sacrament" (p. 117).

Andrews University

ROY BRANSON

II

"Toward an American Theology," the final chapter in Herbert W. Richardson's book of essays, is a wide-ranging constructive statement whose most obvious features are its bold creativity, tangled organization, and sometimes-careless formulations. Fortunately the first of these characteristics need not be obscured by the other two, especially if they are recognized for what they are. The organizational confusion arises from the complexity of the author's intention, which is to outline a theology that will integrate many of the distinctive elements of American religious experience and at the same time be a "full and comprehensive" statement of the Christian faith. These goals are legitimate enough; the problem is that Richardson tries to do everything at once. Probably it would have been better to do first the historical task of identifying the distinctive characteristics of American religion, then the

constructive task of interpretation and integration, and finally the apologetic task of demonstrating its adequacy as a Christian theology. In any event, once it is discovered that in spite of its continual references to American religious history, the primary intention of the essay is constructive rather than descriptive, its glib generalizations (such as the judgment that in American religion the Sabbath has replaced the sacraments of baptism and the Lord's Supper) are less distracting. Then can begin the more edifying reflection on questions concerning the essay's success and significance.

Richardson wants to formulate a theology that is systematically coherent, distinctively American, and authentically Christian. Therefore the first question is: How well does his construction succeed in exhibiting each of these qualities? About systematic coherence there is no doubt. Richardson has a single, central motif—namely, the question *cur creatio* and its answer, the idea of sanctification within the world—to which he relates the disparate religious expressions which are the materials for his theological structure: the Puritan Sabbath, the glory of God, incarnation, Mary as *theotokos*, etc. The creativity with which these relationships are developed is the chief source of interest in the essay. Moreover, the main themes form a progressive elaboration of the central idea: (a) as a symbol of sanctification by the presence of God within the world, the Sabbath is the first answer to the question *cur creatio*; (b) in fulfillment of the divine purpose in creation, the work of Christ is grounded in the incarnation (as "God with us") rather than the crucifixion ("God for us"), and Jesus must be understood to be God Himself; (c) the coming of the Holy Spirit is implied both by the incarnation, through which God obligates Himself to permanent, personal union with man, and by the Sabbath, which expresses the divine intention to bring the created world into God's own life. "*Cur creatio*? For the sake of the indwelling Spirit, for the sake of the sanctification of all things, for the sake of holiness—the glory of God" (p. 155).

In the process of being incorporated into the theological structure, however, some of the original materials are transformed. For example, the Puritan Sabbath with which Richardson begins is useful systematically only as it points to creation and the dignity of man. Although to the Puritans it may have been a chronologically discrete segment of experienced time, a separate day of "holiness" in opposition to the inevitable "worldliness" of the rest of the week, to Richardson it is instead the experience of the personal presence of God to man, which makes 'holy worldliness' possible. A similar transformation occurs in regard to the key idea of intramundane sanctification, which at the beginning of the essay is synonymous with the creation of the Kingdom of God in a righteous society, but which at the end is the becoming-holy of the creature through the mystical indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Such shifts in meaning leave the reader wondering just what Richardson has in mind when he talks about keeping the Sabbath holy, and how "the sanctification of all things" might be recognized, objectively or subjectively, as actually taking place.

Richardson's claim that his theology is "American" means that "its primary themes are unique to, or persistently characteristic of, American religious history," and that "the unique perspective [*i.e.*, *cur creatio*] which governs their systematic arrangements is suggested by American religious experience" (p. 157). Now it might be objected that the Sabbath is neither "unique to" nor "persistently characteristic of" American religion; but that would be a quibble about Richardson's terminology. A case could be made to support the judgment that sabbatarianism has been *relatively* more important in America than elsewhere, so that it would qualify as a "distinguishing characteristic" of American religion. In the long run it is difficult to dispute Richardson's general claim that what he has outlined is a distinctively American theology, for it reflects both the typically American concern to make the world better, and the typically American

feeling that the dignity of man is more fundamental than his sinfulness.

Although Richardson has evidently been successful in offering a distinctively American theology, it is not so evident that he has succeeded in providing "a full and balanced interpretation" of Christian faith. His difficulty here is a direct consequence of his theological ground rules. By choosing as his materials only those religious expressions which reflect the difference between "American" and "western European" religion, Richardson has *ipso facto* abstracted them from the total American religious experience, as well as from the total Christian history. What is distinctive may not, after all, be most important: maleness distinguishes a man from a woman; but even though he never exists apart from this distinctive sexuality, what is truly fundamental in the existence of any man is not his *masculinitas* but his *humanitas*. A distinctively American theology can be considered a "full and balanced interpretation" of the Christian faith only if the religion of western Europe is such a distortion of Christianity that any "European" elements in American religion can be disregarded as not authentically Christian. Richardson is willing to make this judgment; he is sure that the Christianity of western Europe has overemphasized the NT and the doctrine of sin, underemphasized the OT and the work of the Spirit, and distorted Christology. To be convincing, this evaluation needs to be supported by an appeal to some broader criterion such as Scripture or the whole Christian tradition. While such an appeal would certainly show up deficiencies in the distinctive religious tradition of western Europe, it would also disclose a one-sidedness in the distinctively American tradition. A theology founded on the uniqueness of American religion is very likely to be blind to some of the richness of the Christian faith.

The most glaring weakness in Richardson's proposed theology is, in fact, one of its distinctively American elements: an overly optimistic view of man and a correspondingly super-

ficial view of sin, an outlook which is no more shared by the OT than by the NT. In a generation that has witnessed extermination camps and nuclear incineration, and that even now watches the world's mightiest military establishment justifying the devastation of a small and faraway land in the interest of "national honor," and at home sees white adults screaming their hatred at black children on their way to a formerly all-white school, Richardson's confidence that "secular therapies" are on the way to "the vanquishing of sin within history" seems very dubious. His frankly Pelagian view of human nature seems out of touch with the blunt actuality of human experience as it is abstracted from the total Christian tradition. A theology fundamentally concerned with redemption may not be guilty of having a "vested interest" in man's sin and weakness, as Richardson charges; such a theology may simply be understanding the human situation as it is.

But if Richardson's offering is something less than an adequate expression of the Christian faith, and even of its American actualization, his constructive effort is by no means wasted. For he has helpfully illuminated the various elements in his structure by bringing them into a new set of relationships. In particular, the essay is valuable for the contribution it makes to an understanding of the Sabbath.

Only rarely is the idea of the Sabbath in any form taken seriously in modern theology; nowhere else does it have the systematic importance it is given in Richardson's essay, which is therefore an important addition to the previous interpretations of the Sabbath by Karl Barth and A. J. Heschel. Richardson makes the following points: (a) as the answer to the question *cur creatio*, the meaning of the Sabbath is primarily ontological rather than soteriological, more a matter of sanctification than of redemption; (b) it directs man to a higher goal than the fulfillment of man, that is, to the holiness which is the glory of God; (c) it is the ground of "holy worldliness," as the means of sanctifying ordinary life by the personal

presence of God; (d) it is not repudiated but affirmed by the Christian observance of Sunday, which is an indication of the establishment of the eschatological Kingdom of God.

The distinction between the ontological and soteriological meanings of the Sabbath is valid, and Richardson is right in emphasizing this dual orientation in the OT. It may be questioned, however, whether it is either necessary or helpful to subordinate one meaning to the other; it is quite possible to maintain both in a polar tension. According to the Genesis narrative, in which the divine designation of the Sabbath is the climax of Creation, distinct from and prior to the Fall, the fact of the Sabbath is not dependent on the fact of sin; but this does not imply that the fact of sin is irrelevant to the meaning of the Sabbath. On the contrary, the existential predicament of man makes the ontological symbolism of the Sabbath all the more significant.

The relation of the Sabbath to the currently fashionable idea of "holy worldliness" is also an important suggestion. The experience of the Sabbath enables the Christian's participation in the ongoing life of the world to be a "holy" participation. And it is just here that the "negative," separative function of the Sabbath is significant: only on the basis of a distinction from the world is a "holy worldliness" possible; otherwise there is nothing but secularity (although perhaps at a high humanitarian level). Richardson tacitly acknowledges this kind of "separation" when he affirms a goal for human existence higher than man's own good. It is more than coincidental that in the OT the Sabbath is closely related to the vocation of Israel, whose separateness from the world was a necessary condition for blessing the world. On the other hand, those for whom the Sabbath is religiously important are often inclined to forget that Sabbath holiness is empty apart from an appropriate involvement in the world; they should be benefited by, and hence grateful for, Richardson's connection of the Sabbath to "holy worldliness."

In all of his talk about Sabbath holiness, including his

affirmation of Sunday as a holy day, Richardson does not take into account a crucial characteristic of contemporary American religion: its decreasing sensitivity to the transcendent. Without such a sensitivity, the whole idea of holiness collapses. Does a culture that has so much trouble making sense out of the idea of God have any way of comprehending a Sabbath made holy by His "personal presence"? Richardson is not alone in needing an answer to this question.

Loma Linda University

FRITZ GUY

III

Herbert W. Richardson is to be thanked for his penetrating study of the meaning of the Sabbath and for his originality in discerning it as a central feature on the contour of his futuristic view of American theology. Not only does much of what he says represent a conscious reaction against both Reformation and neo-Reformation presuppositions, but his pages are filled with a succession of new insights. And this makes exciting reading.

As this reviewer read Richardson's chapter on the Sabbath, however, he repeatedly found himself saying "yes" and "no" at the same time: "yes" to a provocative idea, "no" to its being set over in an altogether exclusive way against that which Richardson sees as its opposite. In setting up an "American," creation-oriented theology as an alternative to the Reformed, cross-centered theology, he seems to err at least as badly as he feels the Reformers did, in that he also provides too narrow a basis for his structure.

Richardson rightly claims that Reformed theology has neglected the Old Testament. He proposes therefore to turn from "the western theological concern with the question *cur deus homo*" to the question *cur creatio* which he sees to "contrast sharply" with the former (p. 118). The question of creation is a frequently needed counterbalance to an exclusively cross-centered theology; however, to consider creation

and cross as sharply contrasting alternatives is to fragmentize biblical theology and overemphasize the OT at the expense of the NT. Although too often neglected, nevertheless the OT assumes its full meaning for the Christian only when it is understood in the light of the NT. We can adequately understand *cur deus homo* only when we also ask *cur creatio*. Yet for the Christian, creation can only be looked at in the light of the incarnation. To do otherwise is to ignore Jn 1:1-3, 14, 15 which asserts the incarnation of the Creator.

Richardson proposes to "allow our answers to the question *cur creatio* to guide our reflection on Jesus Christ. This means, of course, that Christology will be the second rather than the first topic in the doctrinal system" (pp. 126, 127). He goes on to demonstrate that "the theology of the cross can actually be shown to be a western accommodation to Arianism and naturalism," because it makes "the chief end of Christ's work less than the chief end of God's work in creating the world" (pp. 127, 129). This reviewer agrees that the *historia salutis* does indeed have a deeper and broader purpose than just the salvation of man, the restoration of the *imago dei*. There is a cosmic dimension involved which cannot be divorced from the question *cur creatio*. Richardson is right when he declares, "The incarnation is, therefore, not a rescue operation, decided upon only after sin had entered into the world. Rather, the coming of Christ fulfills the purpose of God in creating the world" (p. 130). But this can, and must, all be said while maintaining the centrality of Christology and incarnation precisely because it is Christ who is the Creator, "slain from the foundation of the world." The fact that incarnation cannot be limited to the single purpose of the redemption of man, but must be understood in the light of creation, raises it to a cosmic level that makes it the overarching theme of the whole *historia salutis*. From a biblical standpoint the question *cur creatio* cannot be asked or answered apart from *cur deus homo*.

Much the same is to be said of the "conflict between the creation and the redemption interpretations of the Sabbath"

(p. 115), with reference to Ex 20:11 and Dt 5:15. Ostensibly in conflict, the basing of the Sabbath in creation and in the redemption of Israel from Egypt may be seen as complementary when cast in the perspective of the whole biblical history of salvation: the biblical creation story is told for the sake of the *historia* to follow and can only be understood in the light of it; from the biblical point of view, to ask *cur creatio* is also to ask *cur testamentum salutis*—and that is *cur deus homo*! And the liberation from Egypt is a moment in the *historia* which captures within itself the significance of the whole. That the Sabbath can be connected with both, far from involving a contradiction, means that it stands as a symbol of salvation in its fullest dimension.

Another point at which this reviewer believes Richardson has provided a valuable insight, but has made too sharp a dichotomy, is in the characterization of the Sabbath, and particularly of it as having eschatological implications, as American. While Sabbatarian observance was clearly a hallmark of American Puritanism, and carried over into other areas of Protestantism in this country, such as nineteenth-century Methodism, yet it is by no means distinctively American. In this regard the Puritan tradition derives from the very Reformed theology and practice against which Richardson sets up his "American theology." To assert the distinctive Americanism of the Sabbath, while in a sense correct, is nevertheless to oversimplify its history.

Furthermore, the connection of the Sabbath with eschatology, with "the sanctification of all things" (p. 113), is a theme that may be traced through rabbinical literature to the Jewish apocalyptic notion of the "world-week," in which the Sabbath stands as a symbol of the Messianic Age.¹ This theme carries over into the early patristic literature.² Later the

¹ Strack-Billerbeck, *Kommentar*, IV: 2, 989-991; W. Rordorf, *Der Sonntag* (Zürich, 1962), pp. 49-51.

² Barnabas 15: 7, 8 ("Then only [*i.e.*, on the eschatological Sabbath] will we truly rest and sanctify it . . . because we ourselves have first been sanctified"); Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 5, 30, 4; 5, 33, 20.

notion of the hereafter as an eternal Sabbath is a familiar theme.³ Here again "American theology" draws on a rich and ancient heritage.

Although Richardson sometimes draws his lines too sharply and narrowly, at the same time he has said many things to broaden our understanding of the Sabbath. The notion of the Sabbath as a sacrament (but not to replace "the Christological sacraments characteristic of European Christianity!" p. 118), the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of the Sabbath, and the holiness of the Sabbath as the glory of God (p. 119) are emphases that give the Sabbath its rightful position in Christian theology.

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EARLE HILGERT

³ Origen, Hom. on Num 23, 4; Eusebius, Commentary on Ps 91 (92); cf. H. Dumaine, "Dimanche," *Dict. d'arch. chrét.*, IV: 1, 921-924.

POTTERY FROM SHECHEM EXCAVATED 1913 AND 1914

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In a previous article dealing with the objects of bone, stone and metal discovered in the 1913 and 1914 expeditions at Biblical Shechem the history of the rediscovery of this mate-

¹ The first-mentioned author contributed the historical section, made all drawings, and was responsible for writing the article, while the second author worked on the identification of all vessels for an unpublished M. Th. thesis, "The Whole and the Restored Pottery of the 1913, 1914 Shechem Campaigns," deposited in the James White Library of Andrews University. It is a pleasure to express gratitude to Dr. Egon Komorzynski, director of the Egyptian collection of the Kunsthistorisches Museum at Vienna, for permitting us to study and publish the material presented in this article. Thanks are also offered to the Archaeological Research Foundation, New York, N. Y., for a grant which enabled the first-mentioned author to study the material presented in this article in Vienna and have it photographed in November, 1965.

Gratitude is especially due to four readers of this article, each an expert in Palestinian ancient ceramics in general and in the pottery of Shechem in particular. Daniel P. Cole and Joe D. Seger have contributed notes with regard to comparative MB II B and MB II C material from Shechem which has been obtained from stratified excavations carried out by the Drew-McCormick expedition in recent years. This material provided the basis for the following two doctoral dissertations: Cole, "Middle Bronze II B Pottery at Shechem" (Drew University, 1965), and Seger, "The Pottery of Palestine at the Close of the Middle Bronze Age" (Harvard University, 1965). These dissertations are cited in the text as "Cole" and "Seger" respectively. Roger S. Boraas, whose dissertation "Judges IX and Tell Balatah" (Drew University, 1965) deals mainly with the Iron I Age, and John S. Holladay, Jr., who wrote a dissertation, "The Pottery of Northern Palestine, in the Ninth and Eighth Centuries B.C." (Harvard University, 1966), have both contributed critical comments on the Iron age vessels, and made helpful suggestions. Their intimate acquaintance with the pottery excavated during the recent American expeditions at Shechem make these notes and observations especially valuable. However, it should be pointed out that the authors remain responsible

rial in Vienna is told.² When that article was written there was still some doubt whether all material identified as coming from Shechem had really been discovered there, because no records of it were found in the Vienna Museum. All identifications had been made on the basis of the type of material revealing its Palestinian provenance, and on the basis of the

for any imperfections, errors and faults which this article may still contain.

The following abbreviations are used in addition to those listed on the back cover of this Journal:

AAA = *Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology* (Liverpool, 1908-1948).

AG I-V = F. Petrie, *Ancient Gaza I-V* (London, 1931-1952).

Ain Shems, IV-V = Elihu Grant and G. Ernest Wright, *Ain Shems Excavations*, Vols. IV and V (Haverford, Pa., 1938, 1939), 2 vols.

Beth-shan, II = G. M. Fitzgerald, *The Four Canaanite Temples of Beth-shan*, Vol. II, Part II, *The Pottery* (Philadelphia, 1930).

Bethzur = O. R. Sellers, *The Citadel of Beth-zur* (Philadelphia, 1933).

Corpus = J. Garrow Duncan, *Corpus of Dated Palestinian Pottery* (London, 1930).

Gibeon = J. B. Pritchard, *The Bronze Age Cemetery at Gibeon* (Philadelphia, 1963).

Hazor I-IV = Yigael Yadin *et al.*, *Hazor I-IV* (Jerusalem, 1958, 1960, 1961).

JEOL = *Jaarbericht, Ex Oriente Lux* (Leiden, 1933—).

Jer., I-II = Kathleen M. Kenyon *et al.*, *Excavations at Jericho*, I-II (London, 1960, 1965), 2 vols.

Lach. II-IV = Olga Tufnell *et al.*, *Lachish II-IV* (Oxford, 1940, 1953, 1958), 5 vols.

Meg. I = R. S. Lamon and G. M. Shipton, *Megiddo I* (Chicago, 1939).

Meg. II = Gordon Loud, *Megiddo II* (Chicago, 1948), 2 vols.

Meg. Tombs = P. L. O. Guy, *Megiddo Tombs* (Chicago, 1938).

PCC = Paul W. Lapp, *Palestinian Ceramic Chronology 200 B.C.-A.D. 70* (New Haven, Conn., 1961).

Sam., III = J. W. Crowfoot *et al.*, *Samaria-Sebaste*, III (London, 1957).

TAH, I-II = R. W. Hamilton, "Excavations at Tell Abū Hawām," *QDAP*, III (1934), 74-80; IV (1935), 1-69.

TBM, I-III = W. F. Albright, *The Excavations of Tell Beit Mirsim*, I-III (New Haven, Conn., 1932, 1933, 1938, 1943).

TN, II = Joseph C. Wampler, *Tell en-Naşbeh*, II (Berkeley, 1947).

² Siegfried H. Horn, "Objects from Shechem Excavated 1913 and 1914," *JEOL*, No. 20 (1968), pp. 71-90, Figs. 1-5, Pls. XV-XIX.

hand-written numbers found on the objects. Yet the first-mentioned author continued to be haunted by the fear that mixed with this material there might be objects from Ta'anach, a site which Ernst Sellin, the first excavator of Shechem, had excavated from 1902-04 during the time when he was professor at Vienna. Since it was not known and still remains unknown what had become of Sellin's share of the Ta'anach material, the suspicion seemed justified that it might be among the so-called Shechem material.

Fortunately this fear proved to be groundless. After the first article, mentioned above, had been completed, the *Fundbuch* of the 1913 and 1914 expeditions was found by Prof. A. Kuschke in the library of the "German Evangelical Institute of the Archaeology of the Holy Land" in Jerusalem. This little notebook was kindly turned over to the Drew-McCormick Archaeological Expedition to Shechem. It was written by Prof. C. Praschniker, Sellin's associate-architect of the expedition. In a footnote³ some information about this *Fundbuch* was added to the first article.

This book showed that the objects identified as coming from Shechem had not been mislabeled. It is true that a few of the identified objects had lost their original number or label, for which reason absolute certainty with regard to their origin cannot be ascertained. However, there is reason to believe that even these pieces come from Shechem, because of certain weaknesses found in the records. Some of the objects recorded in the *Fundbuch* carry sketches from Praschniker's hand and can easily be recognized, but many do not, and even the description of many objects is so brief that no definite identification is possible where an object has no number. Plate I presents a photographic reproduction of the last two pages of the *Fundbuch* containing most of the entries for May 5, 1914. It shows that No. 489 is the last recorded object, although further down on the same page a remark is made about No. 505 (which is our No. 157). From Sellin's published

³ *Ibid.*, p. 75, n. 11.

reports it is known that actual excavations were carried out during the 1914 expedition until May 7, which means that the objects found during the last two days remained unrecorded. A bronze needle, published in *JEOL*, 20 (1968), p. 82, No. 57, bears the date of May 6 on a slip attached to it. Our numbers 146, 147, 156 and 187 probably also come from these last two days of the 1914 campaign.

It is obvious that the material now in the Vienna Museum does not constitute all the objects found during the 1913 and 1914 excavations. It was the custom in the Turkish empire, to which Palestine belonged before World War I, to give a representative portion of all excavated objects and of the pottery to the excavator's sponsors, and transfer the objects retained in the division of finds to the Archaeological Museum in Constantinople (now Istanbul). The *Fundbuch* has some clear indication that a division of finds took place after the 1913 expedition, because behind most entries there are found such notes as W or N, standing for Wien (*i.e.*, Vienna) or Nablus respectively. In a few cases the names of the cities "Wien" and "Nablus" are actually written out.⁴ The division of finds in 1914 is not indicated in the *Fundbuch*, although it contains a few notes that some objects were turned over to the Turkish representative of the Department of Antiquities.⁵ In order to find the Shechem material of the 1913 and 1914 expedition which was retained by the Turkish authorities,

⁴ In the *Fundbuch*, Nos. 11 and 31 have the notes "Nablus," and No. 32 "Wien." No. 3, which is the record of a large jar that contained 850 arrow-heads, has an "N" placed after the sketch of the jar indicating that it went to Nablus, while underneath the sketch of an arrow-head a note is found, "50 Wien," meaning that 50 of the arrowheads went to Vienna; 49 of these were identified. There is at least one faulty annotation, because No. 9 in the *Fundbuch*, claimed to have gone to "N[ablus]" is actually in Vienna, and is our No. 182.

⁵ For example, under No. 263 the finding of 19 juglets is reported and the note is added "bis auf 4 dem Kommissar übergeben." This note, that all but four had been surrendered to the commissioner, again contains an error, because seven of the juglets in Vienna bear the number 263. No. 310 records and depicts the fragments of a goblet with the remark: "Kommissar übergeben."

the first-listed author of this article spent several days in Istanbul in June, 1967. Thanks to the kindness of Dr. Nezih Firatlı, curator of Classical Antiquities of the Archaeological Museum, he was enabled to make a thorough investigation of the holdings of the museum's storerooms with regard to objects originating in Palestine. This search was unsuccessful. The museum has items from the excavations of Sellin in Ta'anach, of Schuhmacher in Megiddo, of Macalister in Gezer, and of expeditions in Jerusalem, but not a piece could be found from Shechem either in the drawers or on the shelves of the storerooms. Also the museum records are completely silent concerning any of its holdings as originating from Shechem. The only explanation for this lack of Shechem material in Istanbul is that it remained in Nablus or Jerusalem, because the outbreak of World War I prevented its transfer to the Turkish capital. During the war years or after the war these objects may have come into the hands of dealers and were thus dispersed. It seems that there is little hope that this material will ever be rediscovered.

The present article deals with 53 vessels of pottery which are either complete or restored.⁶ Except for five, all vessels discussed here bear the excavator's numbers, but the provenance of one other is somewhat uncertain because of ambiguities in the records.⁷ However, the probability is great that all 53 vessels come from Shechem.

A word must be said with regard to the amount of restoration: of the 53 vessels published here for the first time, nine are complete and unbroken; four are broken and mended,

⁶ No records exist with regard to the restorations performed on the vessels, or under whose supervision they were made. It is most likely that this work was carried out shortly after the expeditions were completed, and most probably in the workshop of the Kunsthistorisches Museum at Vienna.

⁷ While the *Fundbuch* contains good sketches and measurements for some vessels which facilitate identification, in many cases the entries are very insufficient, as for example the one for No. 486: "Versch. Gefässfgte," meaning either "Different fragments of a vessel," or "Different fragments of vessels."

without any parts missing; 16 contain minor restorations; and 24 contain major restorations.

Unfortunately almost nothing is known of the provenience of any of the vessels published here. Sellin's published preliminary reports—the only records of the two pre-World War I campaigns still existing—are so brief that nothing can be learned with regard to the objects found during the excavations. ⁸ Praschnicker's *Fundbuch* contains a few brief notes with regard to the origin of some objects, but even these are not very helpful. For example, Praschnicker provides the information under No. 3 that on Sept. 5, 1913 a jar containing 850 arrowheads was found "Im Grossen NS Graben." This north-south trench dug in 1913 was 52 meters long, 5 meters wide, and had a depth of 6.50 meters. In the course of this massive earth-moving operation Sellin's workmen must have cut through several occupational layers reaching from the Middle Bronze Age to the Hellenistic Period, as the extant pottery shows. A statement that a certain jar was found in this tremendous trench is therefore of no help, for which reason the dating of all objects from the excavation must be based on typological criteria only.

Under the date of Sept. 8, 1913 the remark is made that the objects Nos. 19 and following had come "Aus dem Lehmhause in der Mitte des Grabens 1.80 [Meter] unter der Oberfläche." Again this information is of little help. From three vessels found there (his Nos. 20, 24, and 26b, which are our Nos. 176, 179, and 180) it is clear that the so-called "clay-house," probably the remains of a building of sun-dried bricks, must have belonged to the Iron I Age, because the three vessels in question belong to that period.

The foregoing remarks make it clear that the preserved

⁸ Ernst Sellin, *Anzeiger der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien*, Phil.-hist. Klasse, Vol. 51, No. VII (March 4, 1914), pp. 35-40, 2 pls.; No. XVIII (July 8, 1914), pp. 204-207. See for a summary of the work carried out in 1913 and 1914 according to the published reports, G. Ernest Wright, *Shechem* (New York, 1965), pp. 7, 8; Horn, "Shechem," *JEOL*. No. 18 (1965), pp. 289-291.

pottery of the 1913 and 1914 Shechem expeditions must be dated by comparing it with vessels coming from stratigraphically controlled excavations of Palestinian sites. Its value for the reconstruction of the history of ancient Shechem consists in its correlation with the pottery found by the Drew-McCormick Archaeological Expedition to Shechem. This pottery is also of interest because of the fact that Sellin in his massive earth-moving activities at Shechem obtained a proportionately large number of whole, near-whole, and restorable vessels. This was also true of Sellin's post-World War I excavations, as proved by the numerous well preserved vessels, now in the Leiden Museum, which still await study and publication. For these reasons the publication of the pottery of these earlier excavations is necessary, and the present study tries to make a contribution in this respect.

*Description*⁹

(Plates II-IX)¹⁰

Goblets. The carinated vessels on a high trumpet foot, listed as goblets in Nos. 136-139, are given various names in the

⁹ In order to date the vessels described on the following pages, pottery obtained from stratified excavations must serve as comparative material. In the process of dating, profile similarity has been uppermost in consideration, with stance, diameter, finish and texture following in that order. If a vessel is decorated, the decoration plays a great role in the determination of age.

The dating of strata of various published excavation sites follows the conclusions reached by Wright, "The Archaeology of Palestine," in Wright, ed. *The Bible and the Ancient Near East* (Garden City, N. Y., 1961), pp. 73-112. In accordance with Wright's study the following table indicates the archaeological designations used in this article and their approximate time periods in the B.C. scheme:

(Note 9 is continued on p. 24.)

¹⁰ The scale of all line drawings on Plates II, IV, VI and VIII is 1:4. Broken lines indicate either that the restored part is conjecturally restored or that it is missing and has not been restored. Parts of vessels of which enough sherds are preserved to make their restoration certain are drawn as if they were perfectly preserved. In such cases the amount of restoration is not indicated in the drawings.

publications of MB pottery. Albright does not name them but merely says that they belong to the categories of the classical crater, stamnos and cylix.¹¹ Y. Yadin simply calls them "bowls."¹² K. Kenyon,¹³ followed by J. Pritchard,¹⁴ distinguishes between "Pedestal Vases" and "Goblets," the pedestal vases consisting of a trumpet foot, a wide body and narrower neck,¹⁵ while the goblets have instead of a neck an open bowl of which the rim has a larger diameter than the lower body.¹⁶

136. A major part of a goblet of which the sherds were found in the Northwest City Gate April 4, 1914. It is made of buff clay, has neither core nor grits, and shows a buff slip. The lower part of the body has a diameter of 126 mm.

Middle Bronze Age:

MB II A	1900-1750/1700
MB II B	1750/1700-1650/1600
MB II C	1650/1600-1550/1500

Late Bronze Age:

LB I	1500-1400
LB II A	1400-1300
LB II B	1300-1200

Iron Age:

Iron I A	1200-1150
Iron I B	1150-1000
Iron I C	1000-900
Iron II A	900-700
Iron II B	700-586

Persian Period: 539-331

Hellenistic Period: 331-63

Roman Period: 63-

¹¹ *TBM*, I, pp. 22, 23. He refers to the unpublished Shechem goblets of the 1913 and 1914 excavations as being "in the Berlin Museum." Actually they are in the Kunsthistorisches Museum at Vienna.

¹² *Hazor II*, Pl. CIX; *Hazor III-IV*, Pls. CXCVIII: 1; CCXXXIX: 2, 15.

¹³ *Jer.*, I, pp. 428-430, Nos. 14-20.

¹⁴ *Gibeon*, pp. 144, Nos. 10-15.

¹⁵ In *TBM*, IA, pp. 76, 77 these vessels are called "carinated bowls" by Albright.

¹⁶ Garstang reversed the names. He called the pedestal vases "goblets" and the goblets "cups" (*AAA*, XXI [1934], Pl. XXI: 1-4, but is inconsistent on Pl. XXII: 14).

It was in its complete state a much larger vessel than the three following goblets.

137. A goblet found September 15, 1913 together with Nos. 138 and 139, in addition to three others of the same type which must have been retained in Nablus (Excavator's Nos. 141-144, of which No. 143 lists three vessels). The profile of its rim differs from its two fellows, and also the lower part of the body, which is round, while those of the others have sharp edges. It is restored from many fragments. Its thickness is only 2.5 mm. It is of orange clay, has a buff slip and is wheel-made. Its rim has a diameter of 155 mm, the trumpet foot has a diameter of 62 mm, while the height of the vessel is 137 mm.

138. A goblet found together with Nos. 137 and 139. It shows many similarities with No. 139; the clay, however, is of a gray-brown color and shows white grits. The rim has a diameter of 160 mm, the trumpet foot of 56 mm, and the total height is 142 mm.

139. A goblet found together with Nos. 137 and 138. It is restored. The egg-shell-thin vessel (2 mm thick) is of dark brown, finely levigated clay with no grits visible. The rim has a diameter of 150 mm, the trumpet foot of 56 mm, and the height of the vessel is 165 mm.

Both the pedestal vases and the goblets belong to the MB II period. Praschniker's *Fundbuch* indicates that many more sherds of goblets were found than were saved for restoration. The four goblets described in the preceding paragraphs differ in detail but find parallels at other MB II sites:

For No. 136 cf. the MB II B goblet of Stratum XII from Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pl. 29: 5), and the MB II goblet from Hazor (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CCXXXIX: 15). According to Cole and Seger, direct parallels to MB II materials from the recent Shechem excavations are lacking. Typologically it may be a transitional form between our Shechem 138-139 and 137, although an early LB date cannot be ruled out. The lack of a sharp inner edge, absence of burnish and the height of the

shoulder argue against a date earlier than MB II C.¹⁷

For No. 137 no close parallel could be found with regard to the combination of body shape and rim indenture. The lower body is represented in a MB II goblet from Hazor (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CXCVIII: 1); in an example from *Tell Beit Mirsim* from a Level D substratum (*TBM IA*, Pl. 8: 13); further from Megiddo Tomb 3048 of MB II C Stratum X (*Meg. II*, Pl. 44: 27) and Tombs 3096 and 3085 of the slightly earlier Stratum XI (*ibid.*, Pl. 37: 7). On the basis of the stratified Shechem material this vessel lacking burnish but having an elaborated high pedestal base must be placed in the MB II C horizon.

For Nos. 138 and 139 cf. the MB II C goblet from *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 43: 6), and those from Jericho (*Jer.*, I, Fig. 179: 20), and *el-Jib* (*Gibeon*, Figs. 61: 15; 97: 7). On the basis of the stratified Shechem material Shechem 138 and 139 also cannot be dated earlier than the MB II B or MB II C. Cole in his remarks on these goblets suggests that the typological progression was probably from 139 to 138 to 136 to 137, although it is quite possible that they could all occur in the same context.

140. The body of a cylindrical juglet or oil flask found April 18, 1914. The neck, mouth and most of the handle are lost. It is made of orange-buff clay, has whitish grits, and is well fired so that no core is visible. It has neither slip nor burnish and was probably made on a slow wheel. Its greatest diameter is 63 mm, its preserved height 54 mm.

This type of flask occurs in MB II B-C strata, though not in great numbers. From Hazor comes one of similar size from the MB II Locus 8210 of Area F (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CCXXXIX: 18; CCCV: 9) and a larger one from the MB II Stratum 3 of Area D (*Hazor I*, Pl. XCIV: 15, CLXVIII: 13). In *Tell Beit*

¹⁷ A detailed discussion of the stratified goblet specimens from Shechem's recent excavations is presented in the dissertations of Cole, Pls. XXIX: a-c, and XXVIII: d-g, and Seger, Pl. XXV, and related analysis sections.

Mirsim flasks of this type were found in MB II C Stratum D (*TBM*, IA, Pl. 15: 1-3, 6).

Cole suggests that this type of cylindrical juglet cannot be dated closer than MB II from the stratified Shechem material. There are four stratified sherds in the MB II B material; three of them, thick unburnished ware, came from good Temenos 3 loci (= ca. 1725-1700 B. C.; see for the date Wright, *Shechem*, p. 122). Seger would allow for Shechem 140 even a LB I horizon.

141. A jug found April 15, 1914. It is made of orange clay and has been restored. Wheel-made, well fired and burnished, it shows no grits on the outside. Its greatest height is 142 mm, and the greatest diameter 118 mm.

This type of jug does not frequently occur, and its production seems to have been restricted to the MB II period. The closest parallel comes from Hazor, Area D, Stratum I (*Hazor I*, Pl. CIII: 15), but similar jugs were also found at Megiddo in MB II B Strata XI-XII (*Meg. II*, Pls. 24: 36; 25: 4; 33: 31; 41: 31; 50: 24). From *Tell Beit Mirsim* comes a jug with a similar general shape, although handle and rim differ (*TBM*, I, Pls. 9: 4; 42: 10). It represents a transition from the MB II C forms.

Cole says that the stratified Shechem material lacks clear specimens of this vessel except for several handle and rim fragments (Cole, Pl. LXXXII: e-g), but Seger had MB II C examples with higher shoulder and more articulated rim-neck transitions (Seger, Pl. LV).

142. A bowl, restored in its upper part, found, according to the *Fundbuch*, Sept. 15, 1913, in "dem Hause am Nordende des Hauptgrabens." It is wheel-made of buff clay, shows no grits on the outside, and is well fired. The diameter of its rim is 180 mm, its height 50 mm.

Similar bowls have been found in the MB II B-C Strata D-E of *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, IA, Pl. 10: 7-9) and in MB II B-C Strata IX-XII of Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pl. 38: 2, 7, 8). Another parallel is a bowl from an MB II context of Hazor

(*Hazor II*, Pl. CIX: 8). The stratified Shechem material suggests that the combination of features on this specimen are not likely to be found before the latter half of MB II B. The slightly thickened and inward rounded rim, the high, flat ring base and the lack of slip and burnish all point to a date after *ca.* 1700 B. C. (Shechem Temenos 4 and following).

143. A carinated bowl. It carries the excavator's number 39, but this must be considered a mistake, because the *Fundbuch* lists under the date of Sept. 9, 1913 as No. 39 a "Beinmesser" of 80 mm length. The bowl is restored from numerous sherds. It is of orange-colored clay with white grits, wheel-made and well fired, but has neither a slip nor a burnish. Height is 86 mm and greatest diameter 154 mm.

The closest parallels to this vessel are some bowls found in several tombs of the southern *Tell el-Far'ah*, and dated by Duncan to the Hyksos period (*Corpus*, 18:J 4)¹⁸ and to the 19 Dynasty (*ibid.*, 18:P 5).¹⁹ This type of carinated bowls with a flaring rim is common in MB II C Stratum D at *Tell Beit Mirsim*, and at other sites for which Albright has given references (*TBM*, I, p. 22, Pl. 42: 4-6). Similar bowls come from the following MB II tombs at Jericho: No. 9 (*AAA*, XIX, Pl. 36:9), J1 (*Jer.*, I, Fig. 179:12), H13 (*Jer.*, I, Fig. 209:2), J20 (*Jer.*, II, Fig. 212:13), and J45 (*Jer.*, II, Fig. 230:8).

The stratified Shechem material shows that this bowl reflects the last stage in the deterioration of the MB II carinated bowl shape. Accordingly it should be dated to the end of MB II C or early LB. The parallel vessels of stratified Shechem MB II B specimens are lower in proportion to their

¹⁸ Tombs Nos. 371, 550, 565 and 704, but there is a question about the accuracy of the drawings of Duncan's work, because the additional reference made to a bowl drawn by Macalister in *Excavations in Palestine* (London, 1902), Pl. 34: 13, has an entirely different shape in its upper part including the rim.

¹⁹ The dates of Duncan cannot be trusted. His 18: J4 is dated as coming from the 15th and 16th Dynasties, which according to p. 5 would range from 2400-1600 B.C., while in reality the two dynasties cover only the last two centuries of this period. On the other hand the vessel 18: P5 is probably dated too late.

diameter, have more carefully articulated flat or low disc-bases, and rims that curve more gently outward and upward. Even though the sharp edge of the earlier MB carina is often reduced to a gentle curve, there is still a noticeable turning-in of the upper vessel walls. (See Cole, Pls XXV: c-e; XXVI: a-g.) MB II C examples show decline in all these features approaching the form of Shechem 143, but not quite duplicating it (see Seger, Pls. XVII: a-h; XIX: a-d).

144. An unusual bowl with a trumpet-foot found Sept. 12, 1913. The bowl, restored from several fragments, is of buff well-levigated clay which shows no grits. It was wheel-made and well fired, but not burnished. The diameter of its rim is 180 mm, and its overall height 50 mm.

The combination of a wide flat bowl with a trumpet foot is unusual. It is obvious that it is influenced by the pedestal vases and goblets of the MB II period. It is therefore not strange that the only close parallels to this vessel have been found in MB II contexts. In Tomb H13 at Jericho containing MB II material, a large bowl (320 mm in diameter) with a trumpet foot was found (*Jer.*, I, Fig. 209:1), although its foot is much squatter than that of the Shechem bowl. A smaller bowl (150 mm in diameter) on a high trumpet foot comes from the MB II B Stratum E at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, IA, Pl. 8:16).

The Shechem bowl 144 should be dated in the second half of MB II B (Shechem Temenos 4) according to the stratified Shechem evidence. The simple rim and the graceful concave bowl run through MB II (see Cole, Pl. I: a-f; Seger, Pl. I: a-f), but the high pedestal base on platter bowl ware is not evidenced earlier than Temenos 4 (see Cole, Pl. XXXVIII: a, g). The base of Shechem 144 is more closely related to specimens from Temenoi 4-5 than to those of the Shechem MB II C strata, where the bases tend to be more elaborately profiled (see Seger, Pl. XIV).

The following four long-pointed, one-handled jugs or juglets (for the smaller specimens) belong to a very common

type of MB vessel. Albright says that this jug originally "had a flat base instead of a sharp point" (*TBM*, IA, p. 86), and that "it died out rapidly in the LB I" period, being later replaced "by a type superficially much the same in appearance, but showing marks of vertical paring with a knife all around the body" (*TBM*, I, p. 21).

145. This jug and No. 146 must have been found during the last two days of digging in 1914, after May 5, the last day on which the entries were made in the *Fundbuch*, because the excavator's numbers are 500 and 502, while the *Fundbuch* ends with No. 489, although a reference is made on the same page to a photograph of an object numbered 505 (see our No. 157). The jug is wheel-made, of light gray clay showing white grits, and has a buff slip; it is restored from several fragments. Its greatest diameter is 85 mm and height 240 mm.

146. For the date of discovery of this jug, also restored, see No. 145. It is of orange clay and shows white grits, but has no slip. Its greatest diameter is 73 mm and height 180 mm.

147. This jug does not bear the excavator's number, but an attached slip contains the information "Abfallgrube F IV." It is of buff clay, shows whitish grits, and has a buff-gray slip. Its greatest diameter is 71 mm and height 200 mm.

148. The excavator's number of this jug is lost. It is also restored. Made of orange clay with white grits, it has a greatest diameter of 71 mm and a height of 172 mm.

Parallels to the jugs 145-148 are found in MB II strata at Hazor, Megiddo, Beth-shemesh, Lachish, Jericho and elsewhere (*Hazor I*, Pl. CXX: 9-11; XLVII: 2; *Meg.*, II, Pl. 33:22, 23, 25, 26; *Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. XXXV: 11; *Lach. IV*, Pl. 51: 16, 17; *Jer.*, I, Fig. 123:1-4 [Tomb G37]; Fig. 210:1-3 [Tomb H13]).

The stratified specimens from Shechem indicate that these unburnished vessels should be dated in the later MB II B or MB II C periods, for the early MB II B examples are usually burnished. The carelessly fashioned handles on Shechem 147 and 148 are more expected in MB II C. Otherwise the shape

of these jugs can occur any time from the beginning of MB II B to the end of MB II C (cf. Cole, Pl. LXXXIV with Seger, Pl. XLVII).

149. The upper part of a goblet of which the excavator's number has been lost. In its present condition it consists of six sherds, but the pre-war photo of the Vienna Museum reproduced on Pl. V shows more than is now preserved. It is of red finely levigated clay which has no grits. The vessel was wheel-made and is well fired, having neither a slip nor burnish. The diameter of the rim is 140 mm. Underneath the rim and again at the lower part of the cup are two horizontal lines. The lower two are connected by triangles. A stylized tree (upside down) and vertical lines connect the upper and lower double horizontal lines. The decoration seems to put the vessel in the LB period, but close parallels cannot be found either to its shape or decoration in the published Palestinian pottery. Somewhat parallel vessels without its decoration have come to light at Hazor (*Hazor II*, Pl. CIX: 19, 20) and Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pl. 29:4). For the tree-motif standing between horizontal lines see the sherd from *Tell el-'Ajjûl* (*AG II*, Pl. XL: 36).

The stratified Shechem MB II B material contains nothing approaching the shape or decoration of Shechem 149. One example of MB II C painted ware on a rim fragment from a flaring carinated bowl or goblet might be compared with our vessel (Seger, Pl. LXXXV: m). However, the latter's thick section and decorative motif suggest a date in LB I or even LB II. Seger knows of a good LB parallel for our fragment found in Shechem Field III in 1964.

150. A Cypriote milk bowl restored from several fragments. It was found on May 5, 1914. It is of gray-reddish, well levigated clay, is well fired, burnished on the outside, and has a slip on the inside. Its exterior bears the common decoration of the Cypriote milk bowls, consisting of ladders suspended perpendicularly at regular intervals from the rim. The ladders with rungs are alternated with ladders having diamonds

instead of the rungs, a feature often observed on this type of vessels. Its greatest diameter is 160 mm, its height 100 mm.

The sherd collection in the Vienna Museum originating from the 1913 and 1914 excavations at Shechem contains also numerous sherds and a wishbone handle coming from similar vessels. For parallels to Shechem 150 see *Hazor I*, Pl. XCII: 16; *AG II*, Pl. XXVIII: 19Q1; *Lach. II*, Pl. XLIII: 155. All vessels in question come from LB contexts and it is safe to date Shechem 150 in the LB period. A more specific date cannot be given, because attempts to date these vessels according to the variety of designs of the decorations found on them have no validity, as Albright has shown (*TBM*, I, pp. 45, 46).

151. A decorated vase, restored from several fragments which were found May 2, 1914. The vessel was made of yellow clay and decorated with a lattice design (= criss-cross lines) of brown and red paint. It shows white grits, is wheel-made, has a buff slip, and was well fired. The diameter of its rim is 140 mm, of its body 138 mm, and the height of the vase is 140 mm.

Similar vases have been found in the LB I Stratum 3 of Area D at Hazor (*Hazor I*, Pl. CXXIV: 3-5), called "goblets" by Yadin. One of them—which unlike the Shechem vase has a handle—has also a criss-cross decoration. The rim and shape of the body find a close parallel in a fragment from a Megiddo tomb (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 38:11), also dated to the LB period. The decoration has been discussed by Albright (*TBM*, I, p. 48) in connection with some similarly decorated sherds found in the LB II Stratum C at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 20:5, 6). Examples of this decoration occurred frequently on vessels in the LB temples at Beth-shan (*Beth-shan*, II, Pls. XLIII: 19; XLV: 18, 20; XLVI: 5, 11; XLVIII: 22, 23; XLIX: 27), but also at various other sites.

152. A pointed juglet found March 28, 1914. It is of reddish clay. Only the body and handle are preserved, but all restored parts are certain. It was probably wheel-made,

0 473 Bronzeste

474 2 Metallteile von Bronze
Silber.

475 Teile von Pfeil aus Bronze
von, leicht bemalt

A (476) kleine Silberne aus Bronze
Fingerring, unvollständig

C (477) Haifischzahn Plat III

E (478) Bronzemedaille mit Aufschrift

Plat VI



Plat I (479) Hals in Bronze, Kugelform
mit Querschnitt



(480) verziertes Bronzemedall
0.60 by
Plat VII

481 Bronzeste 0.065 by

482 Bronzeste 0.048 by

(483) Bronze, silber Schicht Plat II

484 Gold. Saphir



485 Teile von Kupfer-Schale

(486) Bronze Saphir Teile


487 Bronze, Silberdraht 0.022 l.

(488) Bronze ?




489 Teile von Fun & Bronze III Pl

105 Plat VIII


Last two pages of C. Praschniker's *Fundbuch*. Objects Nos. 473-489, listed on these two pages, comprise most of the finds recorded May 5, 1914



MB Pottery from Shechem



MB Pottery from Shechem. For size see Plate II.
(Copyright: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien)



MB and LB Pottery from Shechem




145




146




147



148




149



150



151




152



153




154



155

MB and LB Pottery from Shechem. For size see Plate IV.
 (Copyright: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien)




LB and Iron Age Pottery from Shechem



LB and Iron Age Pottery from Shechem.


For Size see Plate VI. (Copyright: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien)




Iron Age, Hellenistic and Roman Pottery from Shechem



176



178



177



180



179



181



182



183



184



185



187



188



186

Iron Age, Hellenistic and Roman Pottery from Shechem.
 For size see Plate VIII. (Copyright: Kunsthistorisches Museum, Wien)

is well fired, but has neither slip nor burnishing. Its greatest diameter is 90 mm and height 150 mm.

Similar vessels have been found in LB I Stratum IVa at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. XXVIII:11), in the LB Tomb 532 at Lachish (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 79:822), in the LB II Strata E and D at Hazor (*Hazor I*, Pls. CXLVI: 3; CVIII: 10, 11), at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 44:1), where this type of vessel may be as late as Iron I (*TBM*, I, p. 41), and elsewhere. Although none of the samples referred to is an exact replica of the Shechem juglet under discussion, there can hardly be any doubt that it belongs to the earlier phase of the LB age.

153 and 154. Two LB juglets, both lacking necks, mouths and handles (the necks having been restored). No. 154 was found between March 26 and 28, 1914 (*Fundbuch*: "Bis 28.März"), while No. 153 came to light April 5, 1914. The two vessels are very similar except that No. 154 has a somewhat more pointed base while that of No. 153 is round.

153. A juglet of orange clay but with no visible grits. It was probably wheel-made and is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 78 mm, and the height of the preserved part 125 mm.

154. This juglet also is of orange clay and shows white grits; it was probably wheel-made, and is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 73 mm, the height of the preserved part 113 mm.

Similar juglets have been found in Hazor's LB II Stratum I of Area D (*Hazor I*, Pl. XCVI: 15-17), in Strata VIII-V (LB II A to Iron IC) at Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pls. 58:6; 63:5), and in different LB tombs at Megiddo (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 41:25, 32; 45:29).

Shechem juglets 152-154 are difficult to date more closely than to say that they come from LB, because the rims, handle-rim attachments, and in two cases the handles are lacking.

155. A large, deep bowl with the base missing. The preserved

part, consisting of 18 fragments, was found Sept. 12, 1913. It is made of gray clay which contains white grits, has an orange-buff slip, and is well fired. The diameter of its rim is 410 mm. On the inside, shown in the photo on Plate V, it is decorated with dark brown straight and wavy lines and triangles. On the outside it is decorated only underneath the rim by means of triangles in brown paint standing with their point downwards on a horizontal line. Red dots hang on the sides of the triangles.

Carinated bowls showing this type of rim have come to light in MB II levels, such as a bowl from *Tell Beit Mirsim's* MB II B Stratum E (*TBM*, Ia, Pl. 8:2). Cf. also the large bowl of the MB II tomb J1 at Jericho (*Jer.*, I, Fig. 179:11), and a bowl from Lachish (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 51:24). However, the decoration indicates that Shechem 155 must be dated in the LB period. Decorations of straight and wavy lines appear most frequently in LB, though they begin already sparingly in MB and reach down into Iron I. For triangles with dots see a LB bowl from *Tell el-'Ajjûl* (*AG II*, Pl. XL: 26) and the fragments of a LB II platter from Hazor (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CCLXXVII: 14).

156. A juglet, found May 5, 1914. Its upper portion is well preserved but its base is missing. It is of buff clay, has a dark gray core and white grits, is wheel-made, well fired, but has neither slip nor burnishing. Its preserved height is 115 mm and greatest diameter 64 mm.

There can be no doubt that this juglet belongs to the group of elongated dipper juglets which have a pointed base and a handle that reaches above the rim. All close parallels—as far as one can be sure, due to the lack of the base in the Shechem juglet—come from the LB period. For example, similar juglets were found in several LB Lachish tombs: Pit 555 (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 78: 784, 785) which is dated to *ca.* 1500-1300 B.C.; Tomb 536 (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 79: 821), dated to *ca.* 1375-1325 B.C.; and Tomb 216 (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 52: 9), dated to *ca.* 1450-1300. Other similar juglets come from LB II and

Iron I Strata V and IV of *Tell Abu Hawam* (*TAH*, I, Pl. XXII: 1, 7), and other sites.

157. A vessel which could be called a jug, pitcher or mug. The excavator's number (505) shows that it must have been found during the last two days of the 1914 season, for which no records exist in the *Fundbuch*.²⁰ This restored vessel is of buff clay with white grits. It is hand-made, somewhat crudely formed, and shows neither slip nor burnish. Its greatest diameter is 137 mm and height 144 mm.

The decoration, especially on the handle, but also its shape, place it without doubt in the LB period. A comparatively close parallel comes from a Hazor LB II B context (*Hazor II*, Pl. CXXXIV: 11). A decorated crater from the LB Fosse-temple at Lachish has a similar-shaped body, but neither its rim nor base come close to the Shechem jug (*Lach. II*, Pl. XLIX: 260). Vessels in general resembling the Shechem jug, or belonging more or less to the same category, have come from *Tell el-'Ajjûl* (*AG II*, Pl. XXXI: 1137; *AG III*, Pl. XXXV: 1056), Beth-shan (*Beth-shan*, II, Pl. XLII: 19), Lachish (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 84:959-969), and Megiddo (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 12:21).

158. A black burnished juglet. The excavator's number is lost. Its greatest diameter is 68 mm and height 92 mm.

A similar juglet, though slightly bigger in size and of pink clay, was found in the LB II Stratum IA of Area C at Hazor (*Hazor I*, Pl. XCII: 6). Other parallels are a juglet from *Tell Abu Hawam*'s LB II B Stratum V (*TAH*, IV, p. 41, No. 247), and a vessel from Megiddo (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 62:12).

159. A two-handled jar or miniature pithos, perfectly preserved except for one missing handle, found Sept. 9, 1913. It is of orange clay, shows no grits, is wheel-made and burnished, and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 125 mm, its height 255 mm.

This type of pointed jar with two handles beneath the

²⁰ See p. 19 for a discussion on the *Fundbuch*'s weaknesses in general and on the case of Shechem 157 in particular.

shoulder is common in the early Iron Age after originating in the latest phase of the LB period, but exact parallels to the Shechem jar, especially with regard to the profile of the rim, have not been found in the published corpora of Palestinian pottery. A similar jar of this general type came from the LB II Tomb 216 at Lachish (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 53: 24) and other LB tombs and loci (*Lach. IV*, Pl. 85: 970-985; pp. 218, 219). Iron Age examples have been found in Iron I C Stratum V at Megiddo (*Meg. I*, Pl. 22: 130, 131), also in Megiddo's Iron I B Stratum VI (*Meg. II*, Pl. 83: 2). For its rim see the parallels from Megiddo (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 72: 1), and those from Stratum III B of Afula (*'Atiqot*, I [1955], Fig. 16:5-9, 14-17). The stratified Shechem material of this type of jar shows much simpler lines, both interior and exterior. Holladay suggests an 11th/10th century date for Shechem 159.

160. A deep bowl, restored, found April 4, 1914, evidently in the Northwest Gate. It is of yellow clay which contains large white grits. The vessel is wheel-made and well fired, but is not burnished. Its greatest diameter is 150 mm and height 75 mm.

Parallel bowls have come to light at the Iron I B Strata VI at Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pls. 78:5; 84:19) and Iron I Stratum IX at Hazor (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CLXXVIII: 17), although the Hazor bowl lacks a base, for which reason it is unknown whether it is really a close parallel. The rim finds parallels in Stratum III rims from Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. LX: 9, 11, 12), and there is also a similar vessel from *Tell Beit Mirsim*, probably coming from Stratum B (*TBM*, I, Pl. 47: 7, cf. § 50). Holladay would assign an 11th/10th century date to Shechem 160.

161. A one-handled dipper juglet with pinched lip. It was found April 4, 1914, and has been restored. It is of orange clay and has white grits. It seems to have been wheel-made and is well fired, but is not burnished. Its greatest diameter is 79 mm and its height 130 mm.

Parallels to this Iron I Age vessel have been found at

many sites. Examples are vessels found in Stratum B at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 51:11, 12), Stratum V at Megiddo (*Meg. I*, Pl. 5:138-140), and in the Iron Age Tomb A 85 at Jericho (*Jer.*, II, Fig. 253:18). Shechem 161 with its body form, pinched rim and lack of burnish is more typical of the last phase of Iron I, and, according to Holladay, must probably be dated in the latter part of the 10th century.

Six pyxides (singular pyxis), squat vessels with vertically pierced loop handles or lug handles, come from the 1913 and 1914 Shechem excavations. Four of them belong to LB II and two to the late phase of Iron I. In the literature these vessels are called by a multitude of names and designations such as miniature amphorae, squat pots, squat vases, squat juglets, squat jars, squat pyxes, pyxides, and pyxoid pots.

The origin of the pyxis seems to be Mycenae or Crete (see for references *TN*, II, p. 47, notes 46, 47). Imitations of the Mycenaean or Cretan pyxides first appear in Palestine in the 14th century. By the 11th century they had become more numerous, but they quickly decreased in number in the 10th century, and hardly occur after that time.

162. This pyxis was found Sept. 10, 1913, "slightly below the surface" according to the *Fundbuch*. It is almost completely preserved, is made of orange clay, shows white and brown grits, was wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 96 mm, its height 63 mm.

163. This pyxis was found May 5, 1914. Its rim which was missing has been restored. It is of orange clay with white grits, seems to have been wheel-made, and is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 99 mm and the preserved height 68 mm.

164. This pyxis was found together with No. 165. The pyxis is of brown clay and completely preserved, but has some small cracks. It seems to have been wheel-made and is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 80 mm and the height 68 mm.

165. This pyxis was found together with No. 164 in the E-W Trench March 30, 1914. According to the *Fundbuch*

either one or both of these vessels contained a "Körnerfrucht," of which nothing more specific is said. It is of orange clay and is completely preserved except for one handle. It was probably wheel-made and is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 80 mm and the height is 64 mm.

Parallels to these four pyxides show that they must be dated either to the latest phase of LB II or early Iron I. Similar vessels have come to light in the LB II Stratum IVB at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. LVI: 9), and in an LB tomb at Megiddo (*Meg. Tombs*, Pl. 35:21), while other parallel vessels have been found in Iron I B Stratum III at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. LIX: 21), and at other LB or Iron I sites.

Seven juglets with flat or ring bases. Six of them were found together on April 9, 1914,²¹ while No. 172 was found Sept. 5, 1913 in the great N-S Trench.

166. A juglet of brown clay with white grits with its neck missing (now restored). It was wheel-made and well fired, and has a gray slip. Its greatest diameter is 56 mm, the height of its preserved part 98 mm.

167. A juglet of black-gray clay, burnished, and completely preserved. No grits are visible and no marks of a wheel. It is well fired. Its greatest diameter is 67 mm, its height 106 mm.

168. A juglet of orange clay, burnished, with white grits, completely preserved. It is probably wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 64 mm, its height 110 mm.

169. A juglet of orange clay, burnished, with its broken-off handle replaced. It is wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 61 mm, its height 102 mm.

170. A juglet of red clay, burnished with its broken-off handle replaced. It is wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 63 mm, its height 111 mm.

²¹ Two of the juglets (Nos. 166, 168) contain paper slips with the penciled note: "263 Wenig unter Oberfläche II," while two others (Nos. 167, 171) have slips with the following note: "263 Unter der Oberfläche."

171. A juglet of red clay, burnished, and completely preserved. It is possibly wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 65 mm, its height 110 mm.

172. A juglet of gray clay, not burnished, with its handle and rim missing. It has a dark gray core, large white grits, is hand-formed and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 80 mm and the height of the preserved part 116 mm.

For a description of these juglets see Wampler in *TN*, II, p. 24. Parallel juglets have been found at *Tell en-Naṣbeh* (*TN*, II, Pl. 41:798-802), in Iron I C Stratum VB at Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pl. 146:2-4), Iron I B Stratum III at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. XXXVII: 22, 23, 27), at Iron I tombs 109 and 218 at Lachish (*Lach. III*, Pls. 76:19; 88:318, 326), in the Iron I Tomb A85 at Jericho (*Jer.*, II, Fig. 253:15), and elsewhere. The Shechem juglets must be dated to the 11th and 10th centuries.

173. A black burnished juglet with a round base, restored. It was found together with Nos. 166-171 and 12 others on April 9, 1914. It shows no grits and was wheel-made. Its greatest diameter is 70 mm and its height 108 mm.

Albright, who discusses the characteristics of these juglets, says these "black burnished juglets of EI I" have "more graceful bodies and longer necks than the ubiquitous black burnished juglets of EI II," having "handles which join the neck some distance below the rim," this being "the most striking distinction between the juglets of the two periods" (*TBM*, I, p. 71). Although the Shechem juglet No. 173 has no exact parallels among the published Palestinian pottery, it clearly belongs to the type of juglets found in Stratum IIB (= Iron I C-II A) at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. XLIV: 32) and in Iron I B-C Stratum B at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 51:2, 3).

174. A button-based juglet, almost perfectly preserved, found Sept. 9, 1913. It is of gray-black clay, shows no grits, is probably wheel-made, well fired, and burnished. Its greatest diameter is 60 mm, its height 98 mm.

For parallels see juglets found at *Tell en-Naşbeh* (*TN*, II, p. 24, Pls. 41: 802-807; 42:842-845), in Iron I C Stratum VA at Megiddo (*Meg. II*, Pl. 146:22, 23), and from the Iron Age tomb A85 at Jericho (*Jer.*, II, Fig. 253:14, 15), also from Locus 418 of the northern *Tell el-Far'ah* (*RB*, LXII [1955], p. 577, Fig. 16:5) which must be dated in Iron I C.

175. A dipper juglet with pinched lip found Sept. 11, 1913. It is almost completely preserved, is of buff gray clay, shows white grits, was probably wheel-made, is well fired, but has neither slip nor burnish. Its greatest diameter is 68 mm, its height 116 mm.

This type of dipper juglet is common in Iron I and goes into Iron II, although the earliest samples come from LB II (*TN*, II, p. 23). Parallels have been found at numerous sites as listed by Wampler (*TN* II, 86, 87). Other parallels (not listed by him) have come to light at Samaria from the 8th-century Period VI (*Sam.*, III, Fig. 10:22), in the Iron I C Stratum II A at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. XLII: 16, 17), and in Iron II A Niveau II of the northern *Tell el-Far'ah* (*RB*, LVIII [1951], 415, Fig. 11:18).

Two pyxides, coming from a somewhat later time than the four vessels described under Nos. 162-165.

176. This pyxis, completely preserved, was found Sept. 8, 1913, according to the *Fundbuch* in "the clay house, in the middle of the trench, 1.80 m below the surface." It is of yellow-brown clay, was wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 62 mm, its height 60 mm.

177. This unusually shaped pyxis, well preserved except for minor cracks, was found April 28, 1914. It is of brown clay with white grits, was wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 100 mm and its height 95 mm.

Parallels to No. 176 come from the Iron I B Stratum III of Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. LX:17), and Lachish (*Lach. III*, Pl. 91:415), which is dated in the early Iron Age.

Shechem 177 has an unusual form. For the upper part parallels have come to light in Megiddo's Iron I A-B Strata

VII B-VI (*Meg. II*, Pls. 84:11; 144:9), but this vessel has a flat base while Shechem 177 has a convex base; a closer parallel comes from Iron I A-B Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 178, Fig. 26:1). Holladay is inclined to date both Shechem pyxides 176 and 177 in the 10th century B.C.

178. A bowl, in part restored, found Sept. 9, 1913. It is of red clay, shows no grits, was wheel-made, well fired, and burnished. Its greatest diameter is 215 mm, its height 74 mm.

Parallels for this flat-rimmed, ring-based bowl were found in Iron II Stratum A at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 65:20b), in *Tell en-Nasbeh* (*TN*, II, Pl. 56:1282), and in Iron II A-B Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 140, Fig. 13:18). After tracing the history of this particular bowl form from the 10th century, the date of its first emergence, to the 7th century, when it bowed out, Holladay would assign to Shechem 178 a date in the middle of the 8th century.²²

179. A spouted, two-handled jar, restored from many fragments. Enough of the rim, body and base, including one handle and the spout, is preserved to make the restoration certain. It was found Sept. 8, 1913. The *Fundbuch* states that "Reste zweier ineinander stehender Amphoren" were found, of which our vessel is apparently one. It is of yellow-brown clay, shows some gray grits, was wheel-made, well fired, and is burnished. Its greatest diameter is 162 mm, its height 206 mm, and the diameter of its rim 92 mm.

Parallels to this jar come from the Iron I B and C Strata VIA and V at Megiddo (*Meg. I*, Pl. 19:106; *Meg. II*, Pl. 77:12), and from *Tell en-Nasbeh* (*TN*, II, Pl. 13:226, p. 8). The vessel form is last witnessed in stratified contexts by one from Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 103, Fig. 2:1), dated to about 900 B.C. Shechem 179 lies between the vessels referred to above and probably should be dated in the 10th century.

180. A bowl found Sept. 8, 1913. The *Fundbuch* says that

²² Holladay's analytic history of bowls with an everted, slightly thickened rim, plus a high ring-base, fills two typewritten pages of notes with references to published examples.

there were found "Reste von 5-6 Tellern, darunter ein ganzer." The "whole" vessel is drawn and its dimensions are given as having a diameter of 180 mm and a height of 65 mm. Since these dimensions are exactly those of our restored vessel it seems that Praschniker used the word "ganzer," whole, in the meaning of "nothing missing," but not as "unbroken," because our vessel is restored from many fragments. It is of orange-buff clay, shows white grits, was probably wheel-made and well fired. It has neither a slip nor burnish.

A similar bowl was found in the Iron II Stratum A at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 65:9), while other parallel bowls come from Iron II Strata II-IV at Megiddo (*Meg. I*, Pl. 24:45), from 8th century Niveau II of the northern *Tell el-Far'ah* (*RB*, LVIII [1951], 415, Fig. 11:17; LIX [1952], 569, Fig. 8:10), and many other Iron II sites.

181. A large one-handled wide-mouthed jug, found in the east-west trench April 4, 1914. It has a long cylindrical neck with the handle attached to it just below the rim. This restored jug is of orange clay, shows white grits, was wheel-made, well fired, and burnished. Its greatest diameter is 165 mm, its height 250 mm.

Parallels are fairly numerous and come from widely separated sites. As examples may be cited vessels which come from Iron II Stratum A at *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, III, Pl. 14:6), from *Tell en-Naşbeh* (*TN*, II, Pl. 36), from Megiddo's Iron II Strata IV-II (*Meg. I*, Pl. 3), and from Iron I C Stratum II at Beth-shemesh (*Ain Shems*, IV, Pl. LXVII: 10). A date somewhere in the 10th or 9th centuries for Shechem 181 seems to fit the evidence.

182. A globular jar, restored, was found Sept. 6, 1913 in the "grossen Quergraben." It contained numerous pieces of metal, in part unworked, also some ear rings. The *Fundbuch* says that the vessel went to Nablus, while it actually is in Vienna. It is of brown clay and shows no grits, was wheel-made, well fired and burnished. Its greatest diameter is 98 mm, and the height 106 mm.

The nearest parallel is from an Iron II B context of Hazor (*Hazor III-IV*, Pl. CCXXI: 6); other similar vessels come from Iron II Strata II-IV at Megiddo (*Meg. I*, Pl. 9:13-15), and from Iron II Stratum A of *Tell Beit Mirsim* (*TBM*, I, Pl. 67:20-30). It seems that Shechem 182 should be put in Iron II.

183. A plain delphiniform lamp, restored, found April 5, 1914. It is of buff gray clay, shows no grits, and is well fired. It has a length of 86 mm, and a diameter of 60 mm.

It belongs to the Hellenistic period and according to Lapp's *PCC*, p. 194, is to be dated in the first half of the 2d cent.

184. A delphiniform lamp which has lost its excavator's number. It is probably No. 469, found May 5, 1914, because Praschniker's sketch fits it well, and his given length "0.09" approximates the actual length of 94 mm of our No. 184. It is perfectly preserved, was made of orange clay, shows white grits, and is well made. Its diameter is 62 mm, and height 30 mm.

It belongs to the type of Hellenistic lamps described by McCown (*TN*, II, p. 56, No. 1647), of which examples have also been found at Beth-zur (*Beth-zur*, Fig. 42), Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 366, Fig. 85:4), and elsewhere.

185. A restored, small deep bowl found April 28, 1914. It is of buff gray clay, shows no grits, may be wheel-made and is well fired, although it lost its original shape before firing. It is neither burnished nor does it have a slip. Its greatest diameter is 110 mm, its height 45 mm.

It seems to belong to the Hellenistic bowls classified in Lapp's *Corpus* under his type 51.1: G, H (*PCC*, p. 172, where references are given; see also *Sam.*, III, p. 224, Fig. 38:6).

186. A small, restored bowl found April 17, 1914. It is of brown clay, shows white grits, was wheel-made and well fired. It has neither slip nor burnish. Its greatest diameter is 120 mm, its height 50 mm.

Close parallels to this type of bowl come from Hellenistic contexts at Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 265, Fig. 56:10, 11), and other sites referred to in Lapp's *PCC* (Type 51.1: G, H, K, p. 172).

187. A cooking pot, restored from numerous fragments, found evidently during the last two days of digging in 1914, because the excavator's number 510 goes beyond the records of the *Fundbuch*, which ends with No. 489 on May 5, 1914. It is of dark red clay, shows white grits, is wheel-made and well fired. Its greatest diameter is 150 mm, its height 118 mm.

This globular cooking pot without a lid device seems to come from the Roman Period and belongs to the Type 71:1 of Lapp's *PCC* (pp. 187-188, where other parallels are referred to). The closest parallel to Shechem 187 is a cooking pot from Samaria (*Sam.*, III, p. 299, Fig. 69:9) dated to the turn of the 1st cent. B.C.-A.D. The question naturally arises whether this vessel actually comes from Shechem, whose history ends about 100 B.C. It must be considered possible that it comes from a Roman site and was given to Sellin by his workmen as coming from the excavation though they had brought it in from elsewhere to obtain the usual *bakshish*. It is known that the supervision of his workmen in his pre-war excavations with only three European staff members was extremely poor.

188. A miniature jar found April 29, 1914 on a refuse dump ("Abfallhaufen F"), according to a note on a slip of paper found in the jar. It is of orange clay, slightly restored at the pointed base. It shows white grits, was wheel-made, well fired, but not burnished. Its greatest diameter is 40 mm, its height 87 mm.

The earliest dated examples in Palestine for this type of jar come from the 7th-century Adoni Nur tomb (*PEF Annual*, VI [1953], Fig. 22:94-99), from 7th-6th cent. Niveau I of the northern *Tell el-Far'ah* (*RB*, LVIII [1951], 419, Fig. 12:10, 13), and from the Sahab and Meqabelein tombs of the same period (*QDAP*, XIII [1948], 98, 99, Figs. 4:31-37; 5:42, 43). Fragments of this jar type were found in the recent Shechem excavations in 7th-century contexts.²³

²³ We owe all references in this paragraph to the kindness of Holladay.

LIST OF POTTERY IN THE
KUNSTHISTORISCHES MUSEUM, VIENNA

Publication Number*	Museum Inventory Number	Museum Zettel- Katalog Number	Excavator's Number	Negative Number
136	30	265	195	II. 13995
137	29	151	143	II. 13990
138	27	149	141	I. 2274
139	28	150	142	II. 3990
140	40	134	309	II. 13995
141	4	128	284	II. 13994
142	43	146	140	I. 2274
143	32	166		II. 13995
144	41	147	112	I. 2274
145	7	129	500	II. 13991
146	12	161	502	II. 13992
147	8	118		II. 560
148	9	119		I. 2260
149	58	171		III. 246
150	48	133	485	II. 14001
151	31	160	452	II. 13990
152	13	143	179	II. 13991
153	10	138	214	II. 13992
154	16	142	178	II. 13992
155	59	261	115	II. 559
156	11	132	488	II. 13993
157	5	130	505	II. 13994
158	25	120		II. 13993
159	3	167	28	I. 2261, II. 250
160	45	139	205	II. 13995
161	18	141	208	II. 13992
162	34	164	44	I. 2274
163	33	162	484	II. 13994
164	37	153	188a	II. 13994
165	38	152	188b	II. 13994
166	17	144	263	II. 13993
167	23	158	263	II. 13993
168	19	157	263	II. 13993
169	22	156	263	II. 13993
170	20	154	263	II. 13993

* Numbers 1-135 are used for the objects of stone, bone and metal from the 1913 and 1914 Shechem expeditions. See Footnote. 2.

Publication Number	Museum Inventory Number	Museum Zettel- Katalog Number	Excavator's Number	Negative Number
171	21	155	263	II. 13993
172	15	123	5	I. 2261
173	24	145	263	II. 13993
174	26	165	43	I. 2260
175	14	148	84	I. 2261
176	35	163	20	I. 2261
177	36	159	391	II. 13994
178	42	126	30	I. 2274
179	2	124	24	II. 561
180	44	125	26b	I. 2274
181	1	140	197	II. 13991
182	39	122	9	I. 2260
183	70	127	223	II. 13995
184	71	121	469 (?)	II. 13995
185	46	135	381	II. 13995
186	47	136	303	II. 13995
187	6	131	510	II. 13994
188	49	137	411	II. 13993

1 JOHN 3:9: ABSOLUTE OR HABITUAL?

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If we place 1 Jn 3:9, "No one born of God commits sin; for God's nature abides in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God," alongside 2:1, "My little children, I am writing this to you so that you may not sin; but if any one does sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous," we would have either to admit a contradiction or to understand the former in the habitual sense, deriving it from the present tense in contrast to the aorist of the latter. Thus, "He cannot sin" is not understood absolutely but in the sense, "He cannot continue in a habitual life of sin." However, some have questioned whether such an explanation is entirely satisfactory. Brooke, although following the above interpretation, admits that "the writer speaks, here as elsewhere, in the absolute language of the prophet rather than with the circumspection of the casuist."¹ Dodd doubts "whether the reader could be expected to grasp so subtle a doctrine simply upon the basis of a precise distinction of tenses without further guidance."² Further, he concludes that "the apparent contradiction is probably not to be eliminated (though it may be qualified) by grammatical subtlety."³

Some find support for the absolute view by referring to parallel ideas in contemporary Jewish apocalyptic literature. Hans Windisch⁴ refers to Enoch 5:8, 9: "And then shall

¹ A. E. Brooke, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Johannine Epistles*, "The International Critical Commentary" (Edinburgh, 1912), p. 90.

² C. H. Dodd, *The Johannine Epistles*, "The Moffatt New Testament Commentary" (London, 1946), p. 79.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁴ Hans Windisch, *Die katholischen Briefe*, "Handbuch zum Neuen Testament," Band IV, 2. Teil (Tübingen, 1911), p. 118.

be bestowed upon the elect wisdom, and they shall all live and never again sin, either through ungodliness or through pride: But they who are wise shall be humble. And they shall not again transgress, nor shall they sin all the days of their life.”⁵ Similar ideas are found in Jubilees 5:12⁶ and in Ignatius, Eph. 8:2. Dodd countenances this view although, it seems to me, with some hesitation. While this Jewish apocalyptic background must be kept in mind, it is not adequate to explain Christian eschatology, since there is a basic difference between them, as Cullmann has shown.⁷ Described in Christian terms, eschatological fulfillment in Jewish apocalyptic is still in the future and coincides with the parousia. It is at once complete and final. In Christianity, eschatology begins with the coming of Christ but finds its complete fulfillment at the parousia. In Judaism then, one can speak of sinlessness in the eschatological era, but in Christianity sinlessness cannot yet be considered in that final sense. For the Christian the decisive event has taken place on the cross and in the resurrection, but he lives in a tension between the “already” and the “not yet.” The victory is assured; the enemy has been dealt a mortal blow, but the battle still rages. The author of 1 Jn describes this condition when he designates the Christian as a child of God (3:1, 2; 5:1), as the possessor of eternal life (5:12), as one who abides in God and in whom God abides (4:16), as one in whom God’s seed abides and who cannot sin because he has been born of God (3:9). But he needs to be warned against following unchristian practices (disobeying God’s commandments, 2:4; hating his brother, 2:9; loving the world, 2:15-17; etc.); furthermore, he can sin (2:1; 5:16), and needs to purify himself (3:3). Throughout this Epistle the indicatives

⁵ R. H. Charles, ed., *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English* (Oxford, 1913), II, 190.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

⁷ Oscar Cullman, *Christ and Time*, trans. Floyd Filson (London, 1951), pp. 81-93.

stand beside the imperatives, the "already" beside the "not yet." The eschatological background of the late Jewish writings does not fully explain the situation in 1 Jn since no absolute perfection is envisaged as in those writings. This means that the absolute view cannot be supported by parallels from Jewish apocalyptic literature because there are no genuine parallels and, therefore, the comparison is misleading and inadequate.

However, support for the absolute view can be found in the context of the verse. In this particular passage the author has in mind those who are morally indifferent. Their conception of sin is not based on its relationship to morality. Sin is ignorance, not lawlessness. Perfection consists in being enlightened. The author, therefore, gives the Christian definition of sin over against theirs. Sin is lawlessness. Sin has to do with moral relationships. This has to be made clear because righteousness, to the heretics, is connected merely with a religious experience; in Dodd's words, "as though a man might be righteous in a religious sense even though his actual conduct showed no marked conformity with recognized moral standards."⁸

This kind of sin Jesus Christ came to take away, and there was none of it in Him. Therefore, sin is the complete antithesis of what a Christian should do. If we abide in Him we will not sin. Jesus is the chief representative for righteousness and His counterpart is the devil, who sinned from the beginning. Two antithetical forces, righteousness and sin, are at war against each other. How one lives indicates on which side he stands. The one who sins shows thereby that he stands with the devil, for the one who is born of God does not sin. The children of God are shown to be such when they do what is right and practice love, and the children of the devil when they do wrong and hate their brother.

The kingdoms of light and darkness are distinguished by sharp contrast. The Gnostic and the Christian likewise are

⁸ Dodd, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

sharply distinguished. The Gnostic is morally indifferent; he does not call sin what the Christian calls sin and, therefore, brazenly sins. The Christian, on the other hand, knows what sin is and that it stands directly opposed to what Christ stands for. If he is a Christian, therefore, he does not and cannot sin. Sin is what the heretic does; righteousness is what the Christian does. The verse needs to be understood in this sharp contrast. There are only two sides, and for the moment there are no gradations or intermediate stages between or within them. Either you sin and are a heretic, a member of the forces of darkness and of the devil, or you do not sin and are a Christian and a member of the forces of right and of God. To say in this context that the author means only that the Christian does not habitually sin is appreciably to weaken his point. He cannot and he does not sin because he is a child of God. As Dodd has said, "Of the personal problem raised for one who acknowledges all this, and yet is conscious of sin, he is not at this moment thinking." ⁹

The author has isolated in his thinking this one situation and is speaking forcefully to it. The heretic who defines sin as ignorance and not as lawlessness can sin, but the Christian who recognizes sin as lawlessness and that Jesus came to destroy sin and its instigator, the devil, cannot sin. The sharp antithesis is intentional and any qualifications or reservations at this point would undermine the argument. The sharp antithesis must stand. The absoluteness of the statement must remain.

This does not mean, however, that in actual fact the Christian never sins. For he has already been said to do so, in 2:1. We must therefore, when speaking comprehensively, say both things: In the idealistic context of 1 Jn 3:9, the Christian cannot sin, but in the realistic context of 2:1, he may. It is possible for a Christian to sin; but this possibility must not qualify 3:9, and thus weaken and even destroy the author's argument.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

While the supporters of the absolute view must take into consideration 2:1, the supporters of the habitual view must note 1:8: "If we say *we have no sin*, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." If the tense is pressed and one concludes that 3:9 is habitual, then 1:8 must likewise be habitual where a present tense stands. But as Dodd reminds us, "Logically it is not clear why a person of whom the former statement [3:9] is true should not make the latter statement [1:8] about himself. Yet the former is affirmed, the latter is denied."¹⁰

However, not all commentators agree with Dodd's interpretation of this verse in making ἀμαρτίαν οὐκ ἔχομεν identical in meaning with ἀμαρτίαν οὐ ποιεῖ and οὐ δύναται ἀμαρτάνειν. Many commentators¹¹ follow Westcott¹² in interpreting ἀμαρτία in 1:8 as sinful principle instead of sinful acts. These commentators make the distinction between these two meanings on the basis of verses 8 and 10, the former referring to a sinful principle and the latter to sinful acts. "Thus 'to have sin' is distinguished from 'to sin' as the sinful principle is distinguished from the sinful act itself."¹³

This meaning goes against the usage of the expression in the Fourth Gospel (9:41; 15:22, 24; 19:11), where Law maintains that it "specifically denotes the guiltiness of sin."¹⁴ According to this interpretation, the heretics are denying their guilt, which would imply that they have not sinned. Brooke feels that even if it means "guiltiness" in the Fourth Gospel, that does not exhaust its meaning, and further-

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

¹¹ Among these are David Smith, "The Epistles of John," *The Expositor's Greek Testament* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1956), V, 172; George Findlay, *Fellowship in the Life Eternal: An Exposition of the Epistles of St. John* (London, 1909), p. 106; Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

¹² B. F. Westcott, *The Epistles of St. John* (Cambridge, 1892), p. 22.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ Robert Law, *The Tests of Life: A Study of the First Epistle of St. John* (Edinburgh, 1909), p. 130.

more, it would not necessarily bear exactly the same meaning in the Epistle.¹⁵ Westcott connects the meaning of sinful principle with that of the Fourth Gospel by including the idea of personal guilt within the principle. It seems difficult to get around the meaning of personal guilt for the expression in the Fourth Gospel. However, Brooke is right in contending that such a meaning cannot automatically be transferred to the Epistle even if the author is the same. In the Gospel itself the meaning of the expression is determined by its use and so must it be here.

Of course, if these commentators are correct, the contradiction is resolved, since 1:8 would mean that the heretics were claiming that they had no sinful principle and therefore could not sin. Such a claim no Christian would make (cf. 2:1).

Alfred Plummer does not think that it is necessary to inquire into the specific meaning of 1:8—"The expression is quite general, covering sin of every kind."¹⁶ Friedrich Hauck¹⁷ asserts that it refers to an act of sin and that verse 10 is a repetition of verse 9 but with a more severe consequence. While in verse 8 "we deceive ourselves" by this claim, in verse 10 "we make him a liar."

This distinction which Brooke¹⁸ and Westcott¹⁹ make between verses 8 and 10, though convenient to explain the differences in expression, is difficult to maintain. While we are not bound by the meaning that the Fourth Gospel places on this expression, there is no reason to depart from it. While

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

¹⁶ Alfred Plummer, *The Epistles of St. John*, "The Cambridge Bible for Schools and Colleges" (Cambridge, Engl., 1938), p. 83.

¹⁷ Friedrich Hauck, *Die Briefe des Jakobus, Petrus, Judas und Johannes*, "Das Neue Testament Deutsch" (Göttingen, 1957), X, 122. Rudolf Schnackenburg (*Die Johannesbriefe*, "Herders Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament" [Freiburg, 1953], p. 73) cannot see the distinction made by Brooke on the basis of the Greek expressions found in verses 8 and 10.

¹⁸ Brooke, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

¹⁹ Westcott, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

Hauck's "act of sin" does not mean the same as "guiltiness of sin," the former is certainly implied in the latter. Verse 9, "If we confess our sins," follows very well if this meaning of "guiltiness" is maintained. The heretics are not saying that they are *not* guilty although they sinned, but that they are not guilty because they have *not* sinned (verse 10). The tense here (1:8) is an aoristic present as in Jn 19:11, where Jesus describes Judas as the one who "has the greater sin." The Christians are encouraged to confess their sins and not deny them because God is true to His word and will forgive. The whole point of verse 8 is again emphasized in verse 10 by means of a more serious consequence of such a claim. Therefore, "not to have sin" virtually means the same as "not to have sinned." They are not guilty, because they have not sinned.

If such is the case, to say that this (1:8) is an aoristic present does not immediately solve the problem of the tenses, because even though it is aoristic the basic meaning remains unchanged. For cannot the Christian affirm that he does not sin and at the same time say that he does not have sin because he has not sinned? ²⁰ Yet he must affirm the former and deny the latter.

Dodd admits the similarity of these statements which are denied, in 1:8 and 10, to what is affirmed in 3:9. What he objects to is the forthright assertion of moral innocence—"to assert roundly, *we are not guilty*, is self-deception." ²¹ But he confuses the situation when he states that the Christian does sin, and therefore, must acknowledge it, since he had compared this verse with 3:9 where it is asserted roundly that the Christian does not sin. And it is Dodd himself who states, "Logically, it is not clear why a person of whom the former statement [3:9] is true should not make the latter

²⁰ This must have reference to his Christian period and not his pre-Christian period, for no one, including the heretic, would make such a claim for the pre-Christian period. It would obviate the necessity for his becoming a Christian.

²¹ Dodd, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

statement [1:8] about himself.”²² Is it only because it is asserted *roundly*, *i.e.*, because of pride in one’s accomplishments even assuming that he really does not sin, or is it because it is not so, *i.e.*, that the Christian does sin? Dodd says the latter, although one would have expected the former. However, is it not more precisely the case that, as Dodd himself implies,²³ the author is not speaking to the situation of a genuine Christian and his occasional failings but to the claim of the heretic who believed that he had a new nature superior to that of other men and consequently was already sinless? The author is not dealing with orthodox Christians but with Gnostic heretics who were making such claims because they considered themselves to be sinless.

The previous verses indicate that the author is trying to show that one who has fellowship with God walks in the light and not in darkness, *i.e.*, that one who has fellowship with God lives a righteous life. The heretic was claiming this fellowship and also the righteous life by insisting that he had no sin because he had not sinned, while all the time living a life of sin. That is why he deceives himself and makes God a liar.

The heretics were making claims which were not supported by tangible moral results. It is not merely the claim that is being criticized but the claim without support. They could make the claim because their definition of sin allowed them to do so; according to them, because sin is ignorance, the possession of gnosis by means of a mystical communion with God brought them to a state of perfection. Therefore, they could make such claims; and yet from the Christian’s standpoint these were empty claims because according to his conception of sin these persons were far from sinless. The claim placed beside 3:9 is not any more inappropriate, as Dodd indicates,²⁴ than the claim that they had fellowship with Him or that they were walking in the light.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 79.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 21, 22.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

It is the very delicate task of the author throughout the Epistle to deal with heretics who had taken over certain Christian expressions for their own use. They were legitimate expressions such as, "We have fellowship with God," "We walk in the light," "We have no sin," "We know him," and so forth. But the mere verbalizing of these formulae did not guarantee orthodoxy. He, therefore, sets up criteria to test their validity, but this he does not need to do for an expression that in itself is clearly unorthodox, such as, "Jesus has not come in the flesh" (1 Jn 4:2-3). In such a case a categorical judgment can be made merely on the basis of the statement apart from any moral demands. And superficially this may seem to be the case with 1:8. But this verse along with verse 10 is part of the discussion beginning with verse 5. Verses 8 and 10, furthermore, are in parallel construction with verse 6. Both of these verses, then, ought to be qualified with the phrase "and walk in darkness," as in that verse. Thus, "if we say that we have no sin [and walk in darkness], we deceive ourselves and the truth is not in us," and verse 10 should be read in the same manner. His purpose in 1:8 is not to indicate that Christians cannot make these assertions. Rather it is to point out the falsity of such statements made by those who were walking in darkness, who were living in sin, but who could make these claims because their conception of sin was altogether different from that of the Christian.

Dodd's solution to the problem posed above, given in a different context from his previous statement,²⁵ is that the heretical teaching had different effects. "Some of them were

²⁵ His previous statement was made in the context of 1:8 and this in the context of 3:9. Dodd, I think, is misleading and confusing in saying first that he can see no reason why the Christian cannot say what is denied in 1:8 if 3:9 is true, and then saying that he cannot roundly assert it even though he is not expected to sin. By this statement he has shifted the argument, directing it against the Christian rather than against the heretic, whom he seems to have in mind in his previous statement as well as in this one. The confusion would have been avoided if he would throughout see the claim made in 1:8 as that of the heretic.

led to assume that, being 'enlightened,' they were already perfect in virtue. Others thought it did not matter whether they were virtuous or not, provided they were 'enlightened.' ” The former he applies to 1:8 and the latter to 3:9. Actually as we have seen it is very difficult to make this kind of subtle division among the heretics. In fact, even Dodd's description does not make a clear-cut distinction. The heretics described in 1 Jn are quite homogeneous and it is not necessary for our interpretation of these verses to require distinctions among them. On the contrary our interpretation requires just the opposite. They are the same people making the same claims on the same basis. In 1:8 they claim to be sinless; in 3:9 they claim to be born of God. Both claims arise from a common ineffable experience and one implies the other. In 1:8 the reason their claims are denied is that they continue to walk in darkness; in 3:9 because they sin. Both claims are denied on the same grounds, their sinfulness. In 1:8 they make the claims because their understanding of sin is different from that of the orthodox Christians (this is implicit rather than explicit); in 3:9 for exactly the same reason (3:4). There is no difference between those dealt with in 1:8 and those in 3:9. They are the very same people. The author in his circular method is approaching the same subject again and again but from different angles.²⁶ This is an illustration of it.

We conclude, then, first of all that the absolute view is more in line with the author's context in 3:9; that the habitual view actually plays havoc with the author's intention and argument. Secondly, 2:1 is not really in contradiction with this view; it is realistic while the other is idealistic. Third, 1:8 is dealing with the very same people as 3:9, and the expression "to have sin" must be taken to mean "guiltiness." Furthermore, it is not in contradiction with 3:9 but in complete harmony with it, more so than is apparent on the surface.

²⁶ See Brooke, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxiv-xxxviii, but especially Dodd, *op. cit.*, pp. xxi-xxvi, for evidence of the use of this method in 1 Jn.

DOES THE KIDDUSH PRECEDE CHRISTIANITY?

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Possibly one of the oldest prayers of the Jewish Liturgy is the Sabbath Kiddush. According to the Babylonian Talmud, the scholars of the schools of Shammai and Hillel (*ca.* 35 B.C.)¹ discussed this prayer and witnessed to its age by assigning its origin to the men of the Great Synagogue.² The translation of the prayer as found in Singer's edition of the prayer book reads:

Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who createst the fruit of the vine.

Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast sanctified us by thy commandments and hast taken pleasure in us, and in love and favor hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance, a memorial of the creation—that day being also the first of the holy convocations, in remembrance of the departure from Egypt. For thou hast chosen us and sanctified us above all nations, and in love and favor hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance. Blessed art thou, O Lord, who hallowest the Sabbath. Blessed art thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who bringest forth bread from the earth.³

¹ Walter Ducat, "Hillel I," *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, V (New York, 1941), 362.

² "R. Shaman b. Abba said to R. Johanan [a contemporary and disciple of Hillel (*ca.* 35 B.C.)]: Let us see: It was the Men of the Great Synagogue who instituted for Israel blessings and prayers, sanctifications [Kiddush] and *habdalaks*," *Babylonian Talmud, Berakoth* 33a (Soncino ed., p. 205; references from the *Talmud* herein will be from the Soncino ed. unless otherwise indicated). Cf. Lewis N. Dembitz, "Kiddush," *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, VII (New York, 1904), 483. What, perhaps, should be implied is that these prayers predate the sources with which the schools of Shammai and Hillel were acquainted. Cf. William O. E. Oesterley, *The Jewish Background of the Christian Liturgy* (Oxford, 1925), pp. 79f.

³ S[imeon] Singer, ed., *The Standard Prayer Book: Authorized English Translation* (New York, 1924), p. 181. Cf. Philip Birnbaum, ed., *The Daily Prayer Book: Ha-Siddur Ha-Shalem* (New York, 1949), p. 278; David de Sola Pool, ed., *The Traditional Prayer Book for Sabbath and Festivals* (New York, 1960), pp. 83-86; Joseph H. Hertz, ed., *The Authorized Daily Prayer Book* (rev. ed.; New York, 1957), p. 409.

According to Mihaly, a textual criticism of Kiddush has never been published. ⁴

I

If Kiddush is as old as or older than the birth of Christianity, it may have significantly influenced both Christian theology and worship. It should be remembered that it was the custom of Christ to worship in the synagogue; and after His death, His followers continued to be found worshipping in the synagogue. ⁵ The Jewish customs and prayers which were familiar to the "many thousands of Jews . . . all zealous of the law" ⁶ who believed in Jesus, continued to live on in the daily lives of the people and therefore could be expected to influence to a great degree the embryonic development of Christianity. Even though Paul was accused of teaching Jews not to "walk after the customs," ⁷ he denied the charge completely: "Men and brethren, though I have committed nothing against the people, or customs of our fathers, yet was I delivered prisoner from Jerusalem into the hands of the Romans." ⁸

As is the case with all the major prayers of the Jewish liturgy found in the Talmud, the complete text of Kiddush is not preserved in full. ⁹ In Talmudic times there was an injunction against writing down the text of prayers. ¹⁰ However, there is no confusion in the minds of the Talmudists as to what the text of the prayer was, for we read:

R. Zera said: [The formula] in *kiddush* is "who did sanctify us with His commandments and did command us"; that of prayer is

⁴ Eugene Mihaly, personal letter received March 5, 1967, from Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati, Ohio.

⁵ Lk 4:16; Jas 2:2.

⁶ Acts 21:20.

⁷ Acts 21:21.

⁸ Acts 28:17.

⁹ Louis Ginzberg, "Saadia's Siddur," *JQR*, XXXIII (1942-1943), 315. Cf. David Hedegård, *Seder R. Amram Gaon*, Part I: *Hebrew Text with Critical Apparatus* (Lund, 1951), p. xvi.

¹⁰ *Shabbath* II, 115b, p. 565; cf. Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

“sanctify us with Thy commandments.” . . . R. Aḥa b. Jacob said: And he must refer to the Egyptian exodus in the *kiddush* of the day. [For] here it is written, *that thou mayest remember the day [when thou camest forth out of the land of Egypt]*, while there it is written, *Remember the Sabbath day, to hallow it* [by reciting *kiddush*].¹¹

The main concepts of the Kiddush are based on Scripture.¹² Lev 23:2, 3 lists the Sabbath first among the “feasts of the Lord, which ye shall proclaim to be holy convocations.” The connection of the Sabbath with the deliverance is based on Dt 5:15: “And remember that thou wast a servant in the land of Egypt, and that the Lord thy God brought thee out thence through a mighty hand and by a stretched out arm: therefore the Lord thy God commanded thee to keep the sabbath day.”

An indication of the antiquity of the Sabbath Kiddush is the stability of the text in the various ancient liturgies. According to Elbogen, “The text of Kiddûsh is, but for minor details, identical in all the copies, a proof that it rests on sound tradition.”¹³

The oldest known Jewish prayer book was written by Rab Amram ben Sheshna (died *ca.* A.D. 875),¹⁴ Gaon (or principal) of the academy at Sura in Babylon.¹⁵ It is called *Seder Rab Amram*. Four complete MSS of this work are known, and are described by Marx in German and Hedegård in English.¹⁶

¹¹ *Pesahim* 117b, p. 603.

¹² Israel Abrahams, *A Companion to the Authorized Daily Prayer Book* (rev. ed.; London, 1922), p. cxl; cf. G[eorge] H. Box, “The Jewish Prayerbook: A Study in the Worship of the Synagogue,” *ET*, XV (1904), 364; and Hedegård, *op. cit.*, pp. xxxii f.

¹³ Ismar Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (Leipzig, 1913), p. 112 (cited by Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 80).

¹⁴ Judah D. Eisenstein, “Prayer-Books,” *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, X (New York, 1905), 171; cf. Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xx.

¹⁵ Joseph Marcus, “Amram ben Sheshna,” *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, I (New York, 1939), 282.

¹⁶ Alexander Marx, *Untersuchungen zum Siddur des Gaon R. Amram: Die handschriftliche Ueberlieferung* (Berlin, 1908), pp. 15 ff.; Hedegård, *op. cit.*, pp. xxi ff. The MSS are the *Codex British Museum* 613 (*ca.*

The oldest of these MSS probably dates from the 14th-15th century.¹⁷ The text of Kiddush is nearly identical in the editions of Frumkin¹⁸ and Coronel¹⁹ to that of our text in Singer: Frumkin and Coronel give שַׁבַּת [ן] where Singer gives וְשַׁבַּת.

The best MS is the Sulzberger Manuscript of *Seder Amram Gaon* of the Jewish Theological Seminary.²⁰ The text of Kiddush from this MS is given below with an addition to our present text underlined.

בורא פרי הגפן . . . באי אתלֵה אֶקֶב ורצה בנו ושבת קדשו באהבה הנחילנו
 זכרון למעשה בראשית כי יום זה תחלה מקראי קדש זכר ליציאת מצרים
 כי בנו בחרת ואותנו קרשת מכל העמים ושבת קדשך באהבה וברצון הנחלתני
 באי מקדש השבת

In the translation of this text, given below, abbreviations of words and phrases are written in full and put in parenthesis, omitted words are in brackets and the added word is underlined>.

Who creates the fruit of the vine. . . .

Blessed (art thou, O Lord our God, [King] of the universe, who hast sanctified us by thy commandments) and hast taken pleasure in us, and in love [and favor] hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance, a memorial of [the] creation, because this day is first of the holy convocations, in remembrance of the departure from

14-15th century) discussed by George Margoliouth, *Catalogue of Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum* (London, 1905), II, 206; the *Codex 1095* of the Bodleian Library, Oxford (1426), discussed by A[dolf] Neubauer, *Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library*. . . (Oxford, 1886), I, 299; the *Codex Sulzberger* of the Jewish Theological Seminary of America (1506) discussed by Marx who (in his work cited above) collected and discussed the variants of this MS from the Bodleian MS; and the *Codex British Museum 614* which is a copy of the *Codex 1095* of the Bodleian Library.

¹⁷ Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

¹⁸ A[ryeh] L. Frumkin, ed., *Siddur Tefilla Keminhag Ashkenaz in Seder Rab Amram ha-shalem*. . . (Jerusalem, 1912), II, 41 f. This edition is, according to Hedegård (*op. cit.*, p. xxi), based on the *Codex 1095* of the Bodleian Library.

¹⁹ N[ahman] N. Coronel, *Seder Rab Amram Gaon* (Warszawa, 1865), II, 41 f. This edition is based on the *Codex British Museum 613*. Cf. Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

²⁰ Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xxi.

Egypt. For thou hast chosen us and sanctified us above all nations, and in love and favor hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance. (Blessed art thou, O Lord,) who hallowest the Sabbath.

Seder Rab Amram was written at the request of Spanish Jews who had asked for the prayers "which they have taught from heaven,"²¹ implying a belief that they were of divine origin. Amram is recorded to have declared: "We must not deviate in anything from what the sages had said in the Talmud [about either holiday or Sabbath prayers] When we come to a place where the reader recites a prayer at variance with the mold formed by the sages, we depose him."²² The introduction to his Seder says the work was "in accordance with the tradition which is in our possession, in conformity with the institution of the Tannaim and the Amoraim."²³ It is therefore clear that the prayers Amram sent were quite old, going back to the Talmud. We have already noted that the Talmud traces the prayers back to the men of the Great Synagogue.²⁴

The text of Kiddush given in *Seder Amram Gaon* cannot be proved to be original, as the book suffered from many additions and omissions. Ginzberg has remarked, "We shall probably never know its—referring to the Siddur—true original form; it was used until it was used up."²⁵ "There is in the Siddur very little liturgical . . . material which could be described with certainty as having reached us in the form given it by R. Amram [however] there is still enough of the original material in it which clearly shows that the Gaon sent to the Spanish congregations a complete order of prayers."²⁶

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.

²² Amram's response cited by Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, Vol. VII: *Hebrew Language and Letters* (2d ed.; New York, 1958), p. 65.

²³ *Seder Rab Amram* cited in *ibid.*, p. 70; cf. Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁴ See above, n. 2.

²⁵ Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 320 f.

The next oldest prayer book is by Saadia B. Joseph (born A.D. 882, died 942) who became Gaon at Sura in 928.²⁷ Elbogen considers this work the oldest prayer book, arguing that all of the prayers in Amram were later additions.²⁸ Ginzberg and Hedegård reject Elbogen's position.²⁹ Ginzberg argues that Saadia's Siddur has suffered less in transmission and that "one is safe in stating that on the whole the Siddur reached us in a fairly good state."³⁰ Only one nearly complete MS is known and was edited in 1941.³¹ This MS is described by Steinschneider, and according to Ginzberg has "high antiquity."³² In the text of Kiddush below, omissions are starred and additions are underlined:

ב אתה יי אלהינו מלך העולם אשר קדשנו* ורצה בנו* שבת קדשו באהבה*
הנחילנו וזכרון למעשה בראשית* היא* תחלת* באהבה* מקרא* קדש זכר
ליציאת מצרים כי בנו בחרת* אותנו קדשת מכל העמים* שבתות קדשך
באהבה* ורצון הנחלתנו ב אתה יי מקדש השבת.³³

The changes are minor and the basic concept of the text is retained. We read, for instance, "It is first in love of holy convocations which recall the exodus from Egypt." The expression *באהבה* (in love), is the only addition compared to Singer. The omissions include all internal punctuation, *בְּמִצְוֹתַי* (with Thy commandments), *וּבְרָצוֹן* (and favor), the preposition *ל* and final *י* from *לְמִקְרָאֵי*, the conjunction *ו* from

²⁷ Wilhelm Bacher, "Saadia B. Joseph (Sa'id al-Fayyumi)," *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, X (New York, 1905), 579; Robert Gordis, "Saadia ben Joseph," *The Universal Jewish Encyclopedia*, IX (New York, 1943), 289; Jacob Mann, "A Fihrist of Sa'adya's Works," *JQR*, XI (1920-1921), 423 f.

²⁸ Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung* (2d ed.; Frankfurt a.M., 1931), p. 265.

²⁹ Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, pp. 321, 328; Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xxvi.

³⁰ Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

³¹ Hedegård, *op. cit.*, p. xxvii, n. 9.

³² Moritz Steinschneider, *Catalogus librorum Hebraeorum in Bibliotheca Bodleiana, jussu curatorum digessit et notis instruxit* (Leipzig, 1894), cols. 2203-2211; Ginzberg, *op. cit.*, p. 328.

³³ I[srael] Davidson, S[imcha] Assaf, and B. I. Joel, eds., *Siddur R. Saadja Gaon* (Jerusalem, 1941), pp. 114 f.

וּבְרִצּוֹן and וְשֵׁבֶת (comp. Amram above), and ב from וּבְרִצּוֹן (at the end).

The Yemen rite from Southern Arabia omits כִּי הוּא יוֹם but otherwise is the same as Singer's text.³⁴ This rite was influenced by Saadia Gaon and Maimonides and approaches closely the Spanish rite although it borrows also from the German rite.³⁵ According to Neubauer, the copies of the Yemen prayer book are from about the 15th century A.D.³⁶

The Chinese liturgy from Kai-fung-fu has been studied by Williams, who gives the variations.³⁷ The blessing over wine is substituted for that of bread. The White-Williams translation reads:

Blessed be thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast sanctified us by thy commandments, and hast taken pleasure in us, and in love and favour hast given us thy holy Sabbath as an inheritance, even the Sabbath of the remembrance of good; a memorial of the creation, the first of the holy convocations, in remembrance of the Exodus from Egypt, to make known that it is us whom thou hast chosen (BWR!) and us thou hast sanctified above all the peoples; and thy holy Sabbaths hast thou given us as an inheritance in love and favour. [Blessed be thou, O L]ord, from the midst of (*sic!* *vd.* who hallowest) the Sabbath. "Who giveth food to all flesh, [for] his mercy endureth for ever." (Psalm 136:25). Blessed be thou, O Lord our God, King of the universe, who bringeth forth bread from the earth. Amen.³⁸

סידור כולל כל תפלות השנה עם כל הברכות אשר יסדו אנשי כנה"ג הנקרא בל' קדמוניו תכלאל כמנהג כל קהלות הקדש תימן. עם ספר עץ חיים . . . אשר פעל ועשה . . . (Jerusalem, 1894-1898), II, 112. Cf. "Liturgies. - Yemen. - Daily Prayers [1894-1898]," *Hebrew Union College, Dictionary Catalog of the Klau Library* (Boston, 1964), XVI, 261.

³⁵ Baron, *op. cit.*, p. 120 and p. 278, n. 77; A[dolf] Neubauer, "The Literature of the Jews of Yemen," *JQR*, III (1891), 617.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ Ronald J. Williams, "Notes on the Hebrew Text of the Codex," *Chinese Jews*, ed. William White (2d. ed.; New York, 1966), Part III, p. 83.

³⁸ William C. White, and Ronald J. Williams, trans., "Codex in Hebrew and Chinese from the K'ai-feng Synagogue," *Chinese Jews*, Part III, p. 29.

The MS containing the Chinese liturgy was written *ca.* A.D. 1642.³⁹ According to E. N. Adler, the Chinese liturgy is based on the Siddur of Saadia Gaon.⁴⁰ Neubauer says,

The Persian which is found in their Prayer-book is not the old language, but that spoken now and since Firdusi. If they had emigrated in the third century we ought to find a trace of the old Persian language. . . . There is no quotation in their book from the Gemara, but parts of the Mishnah are to be found in their Prayer-book. Of course, if they had emigrated to China in the eighth century, they could scarcely have had the Gemara with them.⁴¹

The Jews of China believed their colony dates from the Han Dynasty (202 B.C. to A.D. 220),⁴² and Baron accepts this as possibly true.⁴³ The earliest date Baron cites with certainty is the ninth century, when Ibn Zaid al Ḥasan reported Jews massacred during riots at Khanfu.⁴⁴ Thus the Chinese version of Kiddush may be as old as Saadia.

Rashi (Rabbi Solomon bar Isaac, born A.D. 1040, died 1105) of Troyes, France, in commenting on Kiddush gives only a part of our text:⁴⁵ **כִּי הוּא יוֹם תְּחִלָּה לְמִקְרָאֵי קוּדֵשׁ**

The *Maḥzor Vitry*, written about A.D. 1100 by Simha b. Samuel of Vitry, France, a disciple of Rashi, contains the complete text of Kiddush except for one variation from our present text, *i.e.*, the omission of the conjunction ו from **וְשִׁבְתָּ**.⁴⁶

The texts of Kiddush found in the following rites are identical, except for differences in phrasing and pronunciation, to the text as found in Singer: the German (Ashkenazic) rite,⁴⁷

³⁹ White, "A Chinese-Hebrew Manuscript," *Chinese Jews*, Part III, p. 2.

⁴⁰ E[li]kan N. Adler, "The Persian Jews: II. Their Ritual," *JQR*, X (1898), 601.

⁴¹ A[dolf] Neubauer, "Jews in China," *JQR*, VIII (1896), 129.

⁴² *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 128.

⁴³ Baron, *op. cit.*, Vol. III: *Heirs of Rome and Persia*, p. 115.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 285 f., n. 51.

⁴⁵ Rashi, Tractate *Berachoth* 46a, *Babylonian Talmud* (Jerusalem, 1962), p. 91.

⁴⁶ S. Hurwitz, ed., *Maḥzor Vitry* (Berlin, 1890), p. 146.

⁴⁷ Seligman Baer, ed., *Seder 'Abhodath Yisrael . . .* (Rödelheim, 1868), p. 198.

the Spanish and Portuguese (Sephardic) rite,⁴⁸ and the rite of Southern France.⁴⁹ The differences in phrasing are discussed by Mishcon.⁵⁰

Our study tends to support Elbogen's position who, after having studied the text of Kiddush in the European rituals as well as the older liturgies outside of Europe, said: "Der Text des Kiddusch ist in allen Vorlagen bis auf geringfügige Abweichungen gleich, ein Beweis, dass er auf guter alter Überlieferung beruht."⁵¹

This brief survey through time and from China to Europe reveals a basic stability of the text.

II

Another line of evidence as to the high antiquity of our prayer is its relationship to Justin Martyr's *Dialogue with Trypho* xli (ca. A.D. 135), which reads:

And the offering of fine flour . . . was a type of the bread of the Eucharist, the celebration of which our Lord Jesus Christ prescribed, in remembrance of the suffering which He endured on behalf of those who are purified in soul from all iniquity, in order that we may at the same time thank God for having created the world, with all things therein, for the sake of man, and for delivering us from the evil in which we were. . . .⁵²

Justin connects this giving of thanks with the "bread of the Eucharist."⁵³ Oesterley, who pointed out this relationship, said:

This conjunction of the two thoughts of Creation and Redemption are just those which figure prominently in *Kiddûsh*. And if . . .

⁴⁸ David de Sola Pool, ed., *Book of Prayer According to the Custom of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews* (New York, 1936), p. 155.

⁴⁹ Michaël Milhaud, ed., *Rituel des prières en Hébreu à l'usage des Israélites de l'ancien comtat . . . contenant . . . les prières des jours ouvrables . . . des jours de Sabbat . . . des jours de fêtes* (n. p., 1855), pp. 16, 17.

⁵⁰ A. Mishcon, "Disputed Phrasings in the Siddur," *JQR*, VII (1916-1917), 536.

⁵¹ Elbogen, *Der jüdische Gottesdienst*, p. 112.

⁵² *ANF*, I, 215.

⁵³ *Ibid.*

Kiddush formed the background, as far as the form was concerned, of the words of consecration, it would explain where Justin got the idea that it was Christ's desire that thanksgiving for the Creation should be uttered during the eucharistic prayer. Thanksgiving for redemption from sin would naturally enough correspond to that for deliverance from the Egyptian bondage which occurs in *Kiddush*.⁵⁴

This eucharistic prayer indicates that a prayer dealing with creation and redemption was an accepted prayer during Justin's time, and such early acceptance may indicate that the prayer had been known for some time. Another eucharistic prayer is found in *Didache* 9:2-4. Although it seems completely different from Justin's, both may have common roots, for this prayer is recited over wine and bread in the same order as *Kiddush*, and has, as Box has pointed out, many similarities with *Kiddush*.⁵⁵ The Goodspeed translation for it is:

First about the cup, "We thank you, our Father, for the holy vine of your servant David, which you have made known to us through your servant Jesus. Glory to you forever." And about the piece of bread, "We thank you, our Father, for the life and knowledge you have made known to us through Jesus your servant. Glory be yours forever. Just as this piece of bread was scattered over the mountains, and then was gathered together and became one, so let your church be gathered together from the ends of the earth into your kingdom. For the glory and the power are yours through Jesus Christ forever."⁵⁶

This prayer can hardly be more than an expansion of the blessing of wine and bread in *Kiddush*. Both have similar introductions, both speak of the vine and bread from the earth, although *Didache* elaborates the expression "who bringest forth bread from the earth" into a symbol of the church gathered from the ends of the earth.

⁵⁴ Oesterley, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

⁵⁵ Box, "The Jewish Antecedents of the Eucharist," *JTS*, III (1902), 363.

⁵⁶ Edgar J. Goodspeed, trans., *The Apostolic Fathers: An American Translation* (London, 1950), p. 15.

If we combine the eucharistic prayers of Justin Martyr and the *Didache* we have a prayer blessing the vine, a prayer dealing with creation and redemption, and a prayer blessing bread only slightly modifying the thought of "from the earth" into a symbolic expression. Both Justin's prayer of thanksgiving and the *Didache* prayer (which the text says is "in regard to the eucharist" ⁵⁷) are blessings for bread and therefore have similar or even identical functions. The similarity of these blessings over bread with Kiddush, the intimate union of the ideas of creation and redemption in Justin's prayer in the same style as Kiddush, and the whole similarity in thought can most easily be explained by the continuation of usage of Jewish prayers in the early Christian community and can least likely be due to random chance. Therefore we may safely conclude that in the early Christian community a prayer closely identical to or at least based on the Kiddush prayer was known and used. This prayer can be reconstructed to contain three parts: a blessing over (the fruit of) the vine, a prayer dealing with creation and redemption, and a blessing over bread which the Lord brought from the earth.

We can conclude from the similarity of this reconstructed eucharistic prayer and Kiddush that Kiddush was well known, well accepted, and therefore old at the time Christianity was born. We can also conclude that at first either the two prayers were identical (that is, Kiddush was in fact the early eucharistic prayer) or Kiddush was the model from which a slightly altered eucharistic prayer was fashioned. Our evidence also indicates that Jewish customs and prayers were not rejected by the early Jewish Christian community, but were retained, and influenced the development of Christian prayers and worship as well as thought and theology.

⁵⁷ *Early Christian Prayers*, ed. by G. A. Hamman, and trans. by Walter Mitchell (Chicago, 1961), p. 91; cf. *The Apostolic Fathers*, ed. by J. B. Lightfoot, and completed by J. R. Harmer (London, 1891), p. 126.

III

We may now summarize: The Talmud assigns the origin of the Kiddush to the men of the Great Synagogue. Although only fragments of the text occur or are alluded to in the Talmud, there is enough to establish that the prayer in its present form is essentially the original text. Kiddush, as found in the earliest books of prayer, is nearly identical to our present text; and, although Jewish communities were widely scattered from China to Europe, our present text has been retained throughout the world and shows very little variation, thus indicating its wide acceptance at a very early date. Evidence as to the age of our text is found also in the fact that it is possible to reconstruct from the early Christian eucharistic prayer(s) a prayer nearly identical both in style and content to our present text of Kiddush. All of these lines of evidence come together to indicate that our present text of Kiddush is essentially the original text.

CORRECTION

The editors sincerely regret that in the last stage of composition, after the page proofs had been read, a serious error came into the article "Albigenses and Waldenses" by Daniel Walther in the July, 1968, number of *AUSS* (Vol. VI, No. 2), p. 180. Please note that lines 1-3 under heading "I" should precede lines 1-3 at the top of the page, in reverse order: 3, 2, 1.

BOOK REVIEWS

Aharoni, Yohanan, *The Land of the Bible: A Historical Geography*.
Translated from the Hebrew by A. F. Rainey. Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1967. xiv + 409 pp. 34 maps. \$ 7.95.

There is no dearth of books dealing with the geography of Palestine. Some of them confine their scope of study to a pure geography of the country and all its features, such as the works of George Adam Smith, F.-M. Abel and Denis Baly, while others treat the geography of Palestine in the light of its political history. To these works belong the *Bible Atlases* of Emil G. Kraeling and Charles F. Pfeiffer. Aharoni's new book belongs more or less to this last-mentioned category, although it blazes new trails and is intended to be a textbook (p. xiv).

The book under review has certain advantages over others, because its author through interest and training is extremely well versed in Palestine's ancient history and geography. He writes about his own country, in which he was born and reared, and in which he has worked as a scholar and archaeologist for many years. As an Israeli, Aharoni also uses a great number of Hebrew sources which usually are ignored by other scholars, and as a student of Benjamin Mazar, the great Israeli archaeologist, to whom the book is dedicated, Aharoni reflects his teacher's views throughout his work without divergence or disagreements. Another strong point of this book is the thorough and abundant use of Egyptian source material, and to a lesser degree of thoroughness the use of Hittite, Assyrian and Babylonian sources.

The Christian reader of Aharoni's book will be disappointed that the Bible ends for the author with the last book of the OT, with the result that NT Palestine remains undiscussed. Aharoni also fails to use the NT, Josephus, later Jewish writings, or the reports of the pilgrims as source material, and does not deal at all with the country's historical geography after Nehemiah. Christian students who are not satisfied in being limited by the author to the historical geography of Palestine during the OT period will thus be forced to supplement Aharoni's book by turning to other works. This is a regrettable shortcoming of the book.

Another weakness is the brevity or lack of discussion of certain geographical problems, especially with regard to sites of which the identification is still questionable. For example, J. Naveh's identification (made in 1958) of Ekron with *Khirbet el-Muqanna'* is accepted without question, and the archaeological remains of that site are used to elucidate the history of Ekron (pp. 198, 248, 251). While Naveh's identification is plausible, it is far from certain, and a discussion of the problems connected with the identification of Ekron with various

possible sites as well as the views of other scholars in this respect should have been given. The same criticism can be made with regard to another Philistine city, Gath, of which the problems of identification are even graver than those of Ekron. Aharoni suggests (p. 250) its location as *Tell es-Safi*, where scholars of an earlier day had placed it before others identified it with several other sites. In a few places he attaches a question mark to his proposed identification (pp. 23, 339), but in other passages his identification of Gath is made as if no problem existed (pp. 45, 149, 376 and elsewhere), and the student of the Bible, who may be neither an expert in geography nor acquainted with the intricate problems connected with the identification of this site, is not sufficiently warned that the proposed identification is rather uncertain. Many other examples of a similar nature could be cited. But the two samples used show that the serious student of Palestinian geography will still need Abel's discussion of, and bibliographical references to, the various Biblical sites which are presented in Volume II of his monumental work, although that work, published more than 30 years ago, is now badly out of date.

The translator deserves a special word of commendation. He has done a superb job. Hardly anywhere is the reader aware of the fact that the book is a translation. A. F. Rainey, a scholar in his own right, could hardly have found better expressions to transfer Hebrew idioms into English ones, than he does throughout the book. The maps are no masterpieces, being all in black-and-white. However, they show what the author wants them to present and are clear enough to be useful. The book is well produced and remarkably free from disturbing typographical errors. It certainly is a pleasure to recommend it highly to students of the Bible who want to have a good and quite authoritative historical geography of OT Palestine.

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SIEGFRIED H. HORN

Braaten, Carl E., *History and Hermeneutics*. "New Directions in Theology Today," Vol. II. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966. 205 pp. \$ 3.95.

Occasionally books appear which enable the serious reader to start with almost the rudiments of a particular discipline, by providing interesting and relatively brief but fair and summary treatment of the situation. With economy of words, involving economy also of the overall size of the book, the issues are focused and the main figures presented, so that one may thereafter move to further study. Such, essentially, is the book here under review. In it we are invited to consider the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg as addressed to the chief problems of contemporary theologians (mostly German), and are provided the most suggestive approach to a contemporary constructive systematic theology.

The method of the book is to give an historical survey of the treat-

ment of the chief themes of current theological interest, and then to indicate Pannenberg's suggestions *apropos* to that theme. This method is consistently carried through each chapter (except the last, the sketchiest of them all, where Pannenberg's "proleptic eschatology" is only hinted at). A contrast is thus drawn in each chapter, the essence of which will become clear from the following summary.

Pannenberg insists upon the universal scope of history against views of revelation which play off kerygma against history, that is, against non-historical views of revelation, which result in an over-emphasis on the category of revelation as the answer to a modern epistemological skepticism.

Pannenberg insists on reason's knowledge of history and the co-essentiality of reason and faith in the "total act of a person" (p. 49). But reason must be brought to its natural condition in order to make it capable of historical knowledge. Here the aid of the Spirit and of the kerygma is necessary. So an integration of dogmatic and historical disciplines is recommended against the rejection of the historical-critical method, and against a "bi-focal" view (p. 37) which sets the two in co-existence but not in integrated relationship.

Pannenberg insists on the historicity of the resurrection, and refuses to by-pass it in his theological program. The resurrection resists all hypotheses which fail to reckon with its simplicity.

Pannenberg insists that the main features of the apocalyptic eschatology can be true for us today, that a theology of the resurrection must establish itself squarely upon the historical Jesus, that the historian's ideas (based on an alien epistemology) must be made as vulnerable as the documents he investigates, and the history be defined in the light of the reality of Jesus' resurrection. All this is held in opposition to a position which acknowledges that the NT writers believed in the historicity of the resurrection but which refuses that historicity dogmatically, and to a positivistic historicism which refuses to begin with the resurrection.

In opposition to that interpretation which finds radical discontinuity between the historical Jesus and the resurrection, Pannenberg insists on the existence of hope and also of an adequate language of hope in the pre-Easter situation (thus showing the continuity of pre-Easter with post-Easter), and appeals to the findings of a phenomenology of human existence to show that the idea of resurrection expresses meaningful truth for us.

Pannenberg insists on the importance of the OT and its relevance for dogmatic theology, and on the importance of the development of tradition within the context of historical reality, in opposition to a neglect of the OT by dogmatic theologians. Since Israel's history occurred both in the interpretation of historical episodes in new situations as well as in the historical episodes themselves, we find a relationship between the OT and the NT in the "historical" relationship between them (Braaten's fourth rubric). The NT enters into a history of promises and fulfilments, which characterizes the OT.

In the brief survey of the history of hermeneutics, Braaten presents Pannenberg as avoiding problems which others have not. If one insists on the likeness between the one who writes history and the one who makes it (as did Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Bultmann) the uncommon cannot be accounted for. If one insists on narrow concerns (as do Fuchs, Ebeling and Bultmann), essential elements in the tradition will be overlooked. Pannenberg insists on the enlargement of the horizon of the present-day interpreter so that the concern of the text may be encompassed. An over-arching perspective, that of *historical process*, is necessary to bring together the two different perspectives of interpreter and interpreted. The totality of history is incorporated within a Christian theology of history. This will mean that attention must be given to the particular structures within the contemporary church through which the hermeneutical process takes place, and will involve re-opening the whole question of the relationship between Scripture and tradition.

In the final chapter Braaten welcomes Moltmann's *Theology of Hope* as employing the Biblical category of promise rather than that of the Greek *logos*, and states criteria for adequate eschatological discussion: it must be existentially relevant, controlled by the kerygma derived from Scripture, Christological, and futuristic. Pannenberg's proleptic eschatology fills the bill.

When much is said in little space, there is always the risk of over-simplification. With this we need not tarry, for one who is concerned with the problem of over-simplification can always go to the texts indicated if he is serious enough. There are, however, certain one-sided observations which cannot be accounted for on the basis of lack of space, as for example the criticism that Barth overlooks the category of reconciliation for that of revelation. The twofold assertion "that Jesus Christ is not the sole medium of revelation and . . . that much more than revelation was accomplished by him" (p. 14) is intended as a criticism of Barth's theology!

But since the purpose of the book is to present an *apologia* for the theology of Pannenberg, a few questions relative to that presentation seem in order. In what sense is the basic notion of "universal history" to be taken? Does the concept of revelation through universal history mean that revelation is universally available to all men, or that, in some way or other, all men participate in the revelation of God by participating in universal history, which is by definition all-inclusive? This is not simply a theoretical question, since the term "revelation" has soteriological connotation as well as epistemological. As Braaten himself observes, it is absolutely essential that the significance of a slogan such as that of "revelation through history" be most carefully defined if it is to convey anything specific. In the summary which expounds this term (pp. 28, 29) a distinction is drawn between God's direct acts of revelation and his historical acts, which are indirect revelations, available for everyone to see! We need further specification in order to make this far-reaching contention intelligible. This is

especially the case in the light of the quite fundamental assertion that revelation occurs at the end of history. Theology has always found terminological ambiguity convenient. It appears to be playing with words to talk of an "end" having occurred proleptically, since "end" in normal parlance means *finis* in a temporal sense. How can history go on if its end has occurred? We have great sympathy with the idea being expressed and would want to endorse it, but consider the terminology unfortunate, even if the meaning of "end" as "goal" or "fulfilment" or "purpose" makes it plausibly ambiguous. The adjective "final" (p. 95) is a more obvious pun than the noun "end." We also welcome the insistence that an epistemology which will be at all adequate to the NT kerygma will have to start with the resurrection, from "the substantive, historical nucleus of the apostles' resurrection affirmations" (p. 84), although we are not told what *that* is. The argument from phenomenology, that man is constituted by hope, is a most effective way of indicating the meaningfulness of eschatological assertions. Here we have one of the more useful employments of the notion of the universal. But, it must be pointed out, the status of the phenomenological account of man as hopeful does not prove anything about the truth of that which he anticipates, namely the resurrection, but only that the hope is meaningful. Nevertheless, it provides a useful argument against those who will confine discussion (at least at the outset) to the problem of meaning.

The following errata were noted: "betwen" for "between" (p. 68); "clean" for "clear" (p. 70); "hinderances" for "hindrances" (p. 101); "difference" for "different" (p. 133); "pre-supposes" for "pre-supposes" (p. 135); "escatology" for "eschatology" (p. 164).

Andrews University

EDWARD W. H. VICK

Breen, Quirinus, *Christianity and Humanism: Studies in the History of Ideas*, ed. by Nelson Peter Ross. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publ. Co., 1968. xviii + 283 pp. \$ 6.95.

In his editor's note, Nelson Peter Ross indicates the purpose and occasion which have brought forth this volume: "When Quirinus Breen retired from his professorship of history in the University of Oregon in 1964 some of his colleagues, students, and friends sought to mark the occasion with a permanent tribute. The result is this collection of some of his essays, now published in his honor" (p. ix).

In the Preface, Heiko A. Oberman characterizes an aspect of Breen's work which manifests itself well in the present publication: "comprehensiveness and comprehension" which "may entail a risky trek into a 'no man's land' between fields." He also points out that Breen, with "his humanistic respect for rhetoric as a method *cum fundamento in re* . . . would not wince when this trek is compared with the ongoing search to expose and combat that *veritas duplex* which Breen has described as an eminent problem in the symbiosis of Christianity and 'humanism'" (p. vii).

In the Foreword, Paul Oskar Kristeller calls to attention the fact that the present volume omits Breen's "books and some of his more detailed scholarly papers, but . . . illustrates very well the unity and range that characterize Breen's work as a whole, and also the twofold orientation that has evidently inspired him throughout his life as a person and as a scholar"—his "persistent concern to combine and to reconcile his faith as a liberal modern Protestant and his work as a free and objective secular scholar" (p. v).

The foregoing quotations have been presented because they state so well what is the intent, nature, and scope of the volume here under review. In brief, the selections from Breen's published articles appearing in this volume are collected in chapters bearing the following titles: "Three Renaissance Humanists on the Relation of Philosophy and Rhetoric" (the three humanists are Pico, Ermolao Barbaro, and Melanchthon), "The Twofold Truth Theory in Melanchthon," "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," "John Calvin and the Rhetorical Tradition," "The Twelfth-Century Revival of the Roman Law," "Renaissance Humanism and the Roman Law," and "The Church as Mother of Learning."

The briefest glance at the above array of titles indicates the breadth of Breen's scholarship, and a look into any chapter in the book will at once reveal the depth of that learning. The fact that the articles here represented have appeared in a wide array of journals such as *CH*, the *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *Review of Religion*, *Encounter*, and the *Oregon Law Review*, bespeaks the degree to which he has achieved success in the "comprehensiveness and comprehension" spoken of by Oberman.

The volume is enhanced by the inclusion of a "Curriculum Vitae" (pp. xi-xvi) and a "Bibliography of the Writings of Quirinus Breen" (pp. 269-274). The latter contains well over 100 titles of books, articles and book reviews, beginning with Breen's first major work, *John Calvin: A Study in French Humanism* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1931). This bibliography expresses even better than the book itself can do, the true breadth of Breen's scholarly interests and competence, as we find listed therein studies reaching out to touch even such areas as law-school curriculum, Italian libraries, the history of education, and international relations.

The selection made for the present volume could hardly encompass all the areas represented in the Bibliography, but has rather been directed toward one major thrust of Breen's scholarly work as indicated in the title *Christianity and Humanism*. It seems to the present reviewer that the choice of essays has been good. The fact that they center about one theme lends unity to the presentation, and the fact that they treat a variety of topics—such as philosophy, rhetoric, law, and learning—gives the book a special richness of detail and perspective. Moreover, they are timely, for although they speak about the past, they also speak from that past to concerns which are relevant and alive today. In addition, the book is eminently interesting and read-

able. Indeed, this volume furnishes an excellent representation of the work of one of the truly great scholars of our time, and provides a fitting tribute to him.

Andrews University

KENNETH A. STRAND

Cullmann, Oscar, *Salvation in History*. Translated by Sidney G. Sowers et al. New York: Harper & Row, 1967. 352 pp. \$ 6.50.

Cullmann has for several years persistently engaged in a running debate with Rudolph Bultmann. His earlier book *Christ and Time* has met with heavy criticisms not only for the obscurity in which certain cardinal points have been left, but also from its general orientation, from which conclusions have been drawn that are distasteful to its author. This new book is an attempt to answer explicit criticisms and to clarify Cullmann's positions against implications which have been drawn from former obscurities.

If the tension between the "already" and the "not yet" in the NT and in the Christian message is maintained, we are not led to an antagonism between "salvation-history" and Christian existentialism. Indeed the two positions are complementary. To raise the essential question of continuity between the historical Jesus and the Christ of faith is to press beyond the position of Bultmann. The question is whether a sequence of events can be an object of faith as well as of assent. Cullmann answers with an emphatic affirmative. In faith the believer is overwhelmed by that in which he did not participate (p. 115). The events of salvation are *pro nobis*, but first they are *extra nos*.

In contending for the priority of salvation-history over revelation, the polemic is directed against Pannenberg, who according to Cullmann, subordinates salvation to revelation. We must press back behind the process of interpretation to get at the events. The historical must be separated from the interpretative and the mythological if we want to see how revelation occurs in history. The interpretation must come from the events themselves, "out of the naked events" (p. 96). This is repeatedly emphasized by Cullmann.

There is, however, a relationship to the facts that is independent of faith, a preliminary hearing (p. 71). There is a sequence of events which can be unfolded as history quite independent of whether the faith-encounter ensues or not. But when faith is present there is to the believer a coincidence of the historical and the theological (p. 71). Before this coincidence there must be the *Vorverständnis* of the acceptance of the objective reality of "a series of divine events." The discernment of this crucial sequence of events, selected out of history as such, is what constitutes faith. To the historian the sequence upon which faith depends is quite meaningless. Proper interpretation of the events is disclosed in and with the events themselves. The

supreme example of this is the resurrection of Jesus (pp. 102-123), where we are given the paradigmatic case of the coincidence and simultaneity of event and interpretation. Here the divine event is known through a proper interpretation of historically accessible facts, open to alternative interpretations. The essential ingredient of salvation-history, that which constitutes an event a "divine event," is beyond the range of historical knowledge. Thus there is a fundamental, *a priori* distinction between historical knowledge and salvation-historical knowledge of a divine event (p. 151).

Eschatological considerations are worked out from this viewpoint. The decisive events, *extra nos*, at the basis of the Christian faith constitute the mid-point of time. What is essential at the mid-point must come to its expression at the end. The eschatological consummation expresses the meaning of all history. "Light from the eschaton falls back upon the central portion of history" (p. 147). Thus the *eschaton* is anticipated in the central happenings of the Christ-event.

A note concerning the relationship between history and myth will clarify the position regarding faith. A distinction is made between what is historically controllable and what is not. The historically controllable is open to investigation by the historian. The historically uncontrollable does not admit of verification or of falsification. Cullmann is at pains to contend that the process of demythologization has already taken place in the NT, where myth is presented in narrative form, and historicized. A divine event is set in the midst of a cluster of historically controllable events and is pointed to by them, although itself is beyond historical control. The distinction between the two types of the historically uncontrollable is essential. We must distinguish between (1) what is presented as if it were identical with the historically controllable, namely the myths of the *Urzeit* which have been historicized, but which are beyond the range of the historian's control and, (2) the divine event which is, so to speak, hidden in a nest of historically controllable events but which is not reducible to any of them. However, those events indicate the divine event when viewed from the proper perspective. What is here defended is a realistic view of history and an epistemological dividing up of the field of such objective events between history and faith, with such a specification of the overlap or coincidence, as to make a claim for a relationship between faith and history which is historically defensible and theologically acceptable (= based upon faith).

It is with this paradox of the convergence of the historical and the theological that we may begin our questions concerning the book. It would seem that if the distinctively theological categories have been excluded from historiography (*e.g.*, transcendence, providence, miracle, God), it would be impossible, without revising the whole idea of an historical science, to speak of a convergence, indeed of a coincidence between them, except by giving up either the theological interest, or the naturalism of science for some other philosophy of historical methodology (Harvey, in *The Historian and the Believer*, has made this

quite clear). Bultmann's efforts have developed a view of "history" which will provide this point of coincidence. This has meant the application of a particular conception of history to the matters of interest to faith. What Cullmann requires is neither capitulation to the secular historian, nor a re-appraisal of the historian's science, but general independence of both theologian and historian with convergence at one central point, the point at which faith seeks for its ground in the world of what happened once upon a time.

This is reflected in Cullmann's terminology. "Divine event" is actually a contradiction of terms, if the view of history makes such a co-ordination impossible. It is to be understood that the term "event" is being given a most unusual meaning. It is similar with the term "salvation-history." Cullmann is indeed quite aware of this (p. 77). The problem then would be to give a clear definition of what is meant by "history." Unfortunately Cullmann does not do this. What happens is that in different forms the paradox of the terms mentioned earlier in the paragraph is asserted in several different places throughout the book. So, it is claimed, scientific exegesis is a means of furthering faith, while faith cannot be dependent upon the probabilities of scholarship. No historical research can establish faith, but once faith has been established, it may be assisted and strengthened by historical research. By what means does what was irrelevant at one stage now become relevant? What is it that makes the difference? Since no reconstruction of historical methodology is contemplated, the answer would seem to be in terms of the analogy between salvation-history and history, as now one aspect of the ambiguous term is called into play, *salvation-history* for the initiation of faith, *salvation-history* for the relevance of the work of the historian. The thesis of the book could be expounded in terms of the capacity of a hyphen to do what a hyphen normally does, that is, to bind separable ideas together so that they can be used together as a unified conception.

Cullmann insists upon the objectivity of salvation-history. Thus two realities are distinguished: the reality of events *extra me*, and the reality of my relation to a series of events. If indeed one can only speak of events *extra me* when one has stood within the context which they make possible, in what sense are they *extra me*? That the objective events of salvation-history are objectively real is known only to faith. Divine events are beyond the range of the objective historian. Here Cullmann agrees with Bultmann. He then goes on to assert what to Bultmann is unnecessary, that we must be able to assert the objective factuality of such events. For Cullmann this is to be done on the basis of faith, which makes available facts of interest to the historian. Salvation is history and it is not history. In one sense, history is what is known by the historian to have happened. In another sense it is what happened but is not known to him. Cullmann's theology is dependent upon a dialectic between the two. It is a possibility that is seriously open to question.

A view of time that may be symbolized by a line is related to this

view of history. The figure is an unfortunate one, since it suggests that the future of time is to be seen in relation to quantitative similarity rather than qualitative difference to the present. The nature of the event which occurs at the "mid-point" of history requires a more dynamic conception of the reality of time than is possible by the quantitative notion of a time-line, especially as this is made a paradigm for the nature of eternity. Moreover it still remains to be shown that such a view of time is the one single principle for approaching the Biblical evidence. The Biblical attitudes are much more complex than such a simplistic approach recognizes.

Andrews University

EDWARD W. H. VICK

Eichrodt, Walter, *Theology of the Old Testament*. Translated by J. A. Baker. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967. Vol. II, 573 pp. \$ 7.50.

Since 1913 when H. Wheeler Robinson published *The Religious Ideas of the Old Testament*, the English-speaking world has been awakening to the theological content of the OT to such a degree that today there is avid expectation for significant works in this field. The OT theologies of Jacob, Vriezen, and von Rad were hardly off the presses in their French, Dutch, and German garbs when they were already being transferred into English. It was only right, therefore, that the work of Eichrodt, which had stood in a class by itself for 25 years, and had provided the seed-bed for the "rebirth of Old Testament theology," should also be given an English dress. It is interesting to note that while Vol. I, which appeared in 1961, is a translation of the sixth edition of *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Teil I (1959), Vol. II is a translation of the fifth edition of *Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Teil 2/3 (1964). That Vol. I had already gone through an extra edition is indicative of the fact that it is there that Eichrodt develops his major thesis and has been forced to maintain the validity of his structure in the face of further research.

In his attempt at OT Theology, well described in Vol. I, Eichrodt is concerned to liberate the study of the OT from a superimposed systematization whose major categories are derived from philosophy or dogmatic theology, and from the hegemony of *Religionsgeschichte*. In order to do this Eichrodt dedicates Vol. I to the establishment of a concept native to the OT which may serve as a key for the unlocking of the OT treasure house. Instead of organizing his work under the traditional headings: God, Man, Judgment, Salvation, etc., Eichrodt conceives of the OT as dealing with a relationship and therefore uses the concept of the covenant as his key. It would have seemed more logical to organize this relationship under the headings God and the world, God and the nation, God and the individual. This would have been a consistently diminishing scale. But Eichrodt wishes to do justice to the OT. The Covenant is primarily between God and Israel as a people; therefore Vol. I explores the character of the Israelite religion.

Eichrodt is also to be admired for the manner in which he maintains theology in its relation with *Religionsgeschichte*. In order to establish the former he does not cavalierly dismiss the latter. He is concerned with maintaining a controlled and purposeful dialogue between the two. If one has reservations as to the validity of some of Eichrodt's attempts to connect organically everything in Israelite religion to the covenant concept, one cannot deny that in the process he has learned from Eichrodt.

The volume under review in these pages elaborates on the extensions of the basic relationship in the direction of the world at large, and in the opposite direction to the individual Israelite. In extending the concern of theology in these two directions, Eichrodt continues to maintain the more traditional conception of the task against von Rad's more limited delineations. First Eichrodt deals with the ways in which God is understood to be present in the world; then he deals with Creation and Providence, Heaven and Sheol. Again theological considerations determine organization. It is only after the awareness of the presence of God in the world has been formulated that God can be understood as Creator. What has traditionally been described as Hebrew psychology is dealt with under Creation. In his summary statement Eichrodt says that "Hebrew thought . . . was dominated by the effort to describe as vividly as possible the qualitative difference between the various psychic processes" (p. 147), and that "it is precisely the distinctive characteristic of Hebrew thought that it constantly sees the whole in the individual part, and even when apparently describing isolated expressions of vitality with a law of their own still has in mind the personal life as a totality" (p. 148). In a footnote he approves the emphasis in this direction given by J. Pedersen and A. R. Johnson and disagrees with H. Wheeler Robinson's view of the "diffusion of consciousness." All this comes as reassurance against one's surprise with the subheading "Die Bestandteile des menschlichen Wesens" which in English is even less clear when it reads "The Components of Human Nature" (p. 131).

The second part assumes at times a tone too pompous for a discussion whose sources deal with individualism and ethics in very human terms. Most helpful in this section is Eichrodt's lucid analysis of the "fear of God," "faith in God," "love for God" as they are related to each other in the OT, as well as the inward nature of OT law in its most lofty conceptions.

Reviewing a work of this nature is like trespassing on a monument. One can only join the chorus of those who have sung its praises for being the work of genius that it is. Sincere thanks can also be expressed to the translator, the chaplain of Corpus Christi College at Oxford. When Eichrodt himself considers the English edition "almost an advance on the German original in clarity and comprehensibility" (p. 9), there is no room left for criticism of the translator. Indeed he has devoted years of his life to this work of love. If one questions the propriety of certain expressions, this may be due to the perspective

these acquire on this side of the Atlantic. Some sentences, however, have retained some degree of complexity not called for by the original. For example, "According as the effective influence is that of the age-old primitive conceptions of impersonal numinous power or that of a clear theistic faith, so . . ." (p. 443), and "By concentrating as regards the concept of sin on the Law, . . ." (p. 400). Others have in them expressions which seem out of place in a work that maintains scholarly discourse at a very high level. Expressions like "all along the line" (p. 282), "not for nothing" (2 × p. 282), "tuned to a different wave length" (p. 398) sound a bit colloquial, and "in the teeth of" (pp. 178, 440, 456) is used in contexts which would have been served better by "in spite of." The sentence, "Through thick and thin it is tribe-centered thinking which exerts the decisive influence upon him" (pp. 236-237), just does not sound right. Finally, this reader must confess that he had never seen before "once in a way" (pp. 164, 176) for "once in a while." But in view of the massive accomplishment of this translation, carping at this minutia is trespassing on another monument.

Andrews University

HEROLD WEISS

Filson, Floyd V., *'Yesterday': A Study of Hebrews in the Light of Chapter 13*. "Studies in Biblical Theology," Second Series, 4. Naperville, Ill.: Alec R. Allenson, 1967. 88 pp. \$ 2.35.

In this monograph, Professor Filson seeks to demonstrate that the contents of Heb 13 are not alien to the rest of the book of Heb., and that therefore, it is an integral part of the epistle. But in showing this, Filson has also presented a helpful summation of the theology of Heb.

Filson first points out the form and function of ch. 13. It is clearly different from the previous twelve chapters, and for this reason various scholars have challenged its authenticity. But Heb is an epistle intended for a group and the author in his pastoral concern concludes his letter in a similar way as other NT epistles. The fourfold structure of the chapter (varied teaching, formal benediction, personal greetings, closing brief benediction) is also found in 1 Th, 2 Th, Gal, Php, 1 Pe, and Rom. But if ch. 13 is an integral part of the book, similarity in content should also be expected. Filson's thesis is that there is such similarity, and the rest of the monograph is devoted to this.

The following key themes of ch. 13 are discussed: (1) "my word of exhortation"; (2) "yesterday"; (3) "Jesus Christ"; (4) "a sacrifice for sin"; (5) "we have an altar"; (6) "the eternal covenant"; (7) "outside the camp"; (8) "we have no lasting city"; (9) "remember your leaders . . . pray for us"; (10) "to do good and to share."

Filson seeks to show the relationship of each theme to the theology of the rest of Heb, thus demonstrating the basic unity of the chapter with the epistle. The most significant discussions are found in the theme

"yesterday" and "we have an altar." He places great emphasis on the idea expressed by "yesterday," as evident also from the title of the monograph. "Perhaps no word expresses the thought framework of Hebrews so well as does 'yesterday' (ἐχθές), no word serves better to prevent a false understanding of the author's viewpoint" (p. 30). He seeks first to relate the verse very closely to its context. The author has just mentioned the leaders of the group to whom he is writing and their faithfulness unto death. They should imitate such faithfulness in their lives. But their greatest inspiration should be Jesus "the same yesterday and today and forever" who exemplified faithfulness and unwavering loyalty in his obedience unto death. So too they must be loyal and "not be led away by diverse and strange teachings" (v. 9). While there is a semblance of connection with its surrounding verses, the cryptic and enigmatic quality of the verse still remains and one continues to wonder just what the author had in mind.

Filson relates the conception, however, more fully to the earlier part of the book. "Yesterday," "in these last days," Jesus learned obedience and became our qualified high priest. At a particular time Jesus offered himself as a sacrifice. And these events are decisive. They are "once and for all."

That Heb deals with this theme is undeniable, but whether the cryptic verse contains all these conceptions is a serious question. Whether we can say therefore that this verse on this basis alone is theologically related to the first twelve chapters of Heb is debatable.

It seems somewhat condescending for the author to write, "This may seem to us a shocking statement" (p. 33), and, "To many Christians this entire discussion may seem theologically disturbing" (p. 34) in a work of this nature. He is referring to his interpretation of "yesterday" which is contrary to the usual one which interprets the verse as emphasizing the unchanging nature of Jesus Christ.

The author's discussion on the theme "we have an altar" begins with a caveat that we should not force the author's thought into the mold of other NT writers but let him be himself. This warning is understandable, for Filson has the author saying in this verse that we who serve the tent (the heavenly sanctuary) have no right to eat continually from the heavenly altar since the sacrifice of Christ is a once-for-all offering. This surprising interpretation is in line with the theology of Heb, but this in itself is no assurance that it is correct. The objection to this view is the wording of the text itself. "We have an altar from which those who serve the tent have no right to eat" is a strange way of putting the matter, if the statement means what Filson says it means. Two distinct groups are clearly in mind, as indicated by the change of persons from the first to the third. It can only mean that the adherents of the old-covenant sanctuary, the Jews who have become Christians, do not have the right to partake of the Christian altar. It seems that Filson makes too much of the earthly-heavenly polarity in a "spatial" sense, when he conceives of the altar as in heaven. The book of Heb with its many types pointing to

the coming of Jesus Christ, deals not so much with an eternal Platonic vertical antinomy as a Hebraic horizontal antinomy. The heavenly must be understood in terms of the realities of salvation fulfilled by Jesus Christ here on earth. If this is so, the Christian altar need not be an altar in heaven any more than the offering of Christ need be a sacrifice in heaven. Again to eat from the altar need not be equated with a continual sacrifice.

There is very little, however, in the rest of the monograph that one can argue with. Filson has done his work carefully, judiciously, and well, and any who challenge the authenticity of the chapter will have to reckon more seriously with the relationship between the contents of the two parts because of Filson's work.

Andrews University

SAKAE KUBO

Grant, Robert M., *After the New Testament*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967. xxiii + 228 pp. \$ 6.00.

After the New Testament is a compilation of fifteen of Grant's essays which have appeared in various scholarly publications (mainly journals) since 1947. Some of these have been revised "for the sake of either accuracy or clarity" (p. xi). In the author's words, "They are primarily concerned with historical continuities, between the New Testament and the early church, 'orthodox' and 'heretical' alike, and between early Christianity and the Greco-Roman culture into which it was moving. This is to say that they reflect an effort to relate both the New Testament and, especially, early Christianity to their historical contexts" (*ibid.*). This publication could well carry the sub-title "Studies in Early Christian Literature and Theology" (found on the dust jacket, although not on the title-page).

According to Grant, the principal element lacking "is an emphasis upon the close relations between early Christianity and Judaism, but to some extent this relation is indicated in the essays on Ignatius (ch. 3 below), on the book of Wisdom (ch. 6), and on Theophilus of Antioch (ch. 10)" (p. xi). Is this, however, really a lack? Indeed, when we consider the nature of this book as a compilation of previously published essays, we find its coverage to be amazingly comprehensive. It has two chapters on "The Study of the Early Fathers," four chapters on "Early Christian Tradition," five chapters on "Early Christianity and Greco-Roman Culture," and four chapters on "Aspects of Christian Gnosis."

If *After the New Testament* does have a lack, I would suggest that it is to be found in the fact that various pieces of early Christian literature dealt with are at times treated without sufficient attention to their immediate historical context—the problems and concerns which gave occasion for their being written. On the other hand, the effort to relate such literature to the wider historical and literary context of the day

is superb. This, evidently, is the author's chief purpose, and he has accomplished it well.

Nevertheless, now that the author's essays have been cast into book form, would it not have been useful to add at least a small amount of further treatment along the line indicated above? In their original form, these essays hardly needed such treatment, for the scholars reading them would undoubtedly have kept the necessary background in mind. But the present book will likely reach many laymen in the field (at least, it is sincerely hoped by this reviewer that such may be the case!), and for them further detail on the historical situations presupposed in the various pieces of literature would certainly have been helpful and appropriate. This I suggest even though at the same time I would share the author's caution regarding "the evidence intended to show that the history of early Christianity consists of nothing but one crisis after another" (see p. xv).

The contributions made by Grant in these essays, both in their original form and now again here, are well known to scholars in the field and do not need elaboration. Suffice it to say that in many points Grant's work has offered valuable correctives. As just one example, we cannot but be impressed by the rather extensive list of illustrations from Irenaeus (pp. 165-168), giving evidence of this church father's rhetorical training. Grant's conclusion is most *apropos*: "Too often we are content with a picture of Irenaeus as orthodox but rather stupid. The camera needs to be refocused and the picture taken over again" (p. 169). This is, of course, by no means the only place where Grant has helped us realize the need for a new picture.

It is not always that essays produced over a number of years and published in a wide array of scholarly publications can be drawn successfully together into a useful and cohesive compilation. Particularly would this be the case when fully two decades and as many as fifteen essays are involved. And yet, this is precisely what has been accomplished here. *After the New Testament* is a well-balanced and well-integrated compilation of excellent studies, and provides a much-deserved monument to Grant's outstanding scholarship in the field. But perhaps most important is its very real value as a tool for all who are interested in early Christian literature (including the New Testament) and in the history of the ancient Christian church.

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KENNETH A. STRAND

Jenkins, David E., *The Glory of Man*. London: S. C. M. Press, 1967.
x + 117 pp. 18s.

The author starts with the "self-evident, universal and inescapable fact" of his hearers' concern for persons (these are the Bampton Lectures preached at Oxford in 1966). In view of this he has no hesitation (when the long preliminaries are over) in plunging into a discussion concerning Jesus, which can be assumed to make immediate

connection since it will prove to have "defining and validating relevance" (p. 12) *apropos* to what it means to be a person. We are invited to an exercise in experimental thinking, akin to that of other theoretical enterprises (as well as theology). So with due effort to cover his flanks in two chapters of methodological pussy-footing, we move into tactical maneuvers. The aim is to juxtapose two claims to universality—that of our concern for persons and the historical claim for the universal significance of Jesus (p. 21, repeated on p. 24).

The latter claim was made within the context of the Messianic expectations of the Jews, based as these were on the belief that history supplied the key to the cosmos. History ultimately determines reality, so there must be an attempt at uniting the realm of persons and the realm of things, and at showing that the explanation of the world lies here. This was indeed intended by the application of the *logos* concept to Jesus Christ. Likewise the *homoousios* of Athanasius points to the involvement of God in history, by bringing transcendence and immanence together and showing that "change and process are no necessary bar to absoluteness and fulfilment" (p. 48). In view of Chalcedon, we are invited to consider anthropology as theology.

In the fifth chapter we move sharply from the fifth century to the problems of modernity. Man, who can be considered non-personally in continuity with other beings, is defined by being personal. Since God manifest in Jesus Christ has desacralized the cosmos, "all other divine elements in the universe have lost their rank and power" (p. 60). The possibility for the desacralization of the universe has occurred. As secularized the universe was freed for scientific investigation. Since the Christian attempted to confine God to the sacred, and philosophy maintained a dichotomy between mind and matter, theologians accepted the Kantian ban on speaking of the existence of God. So the way was opened for the discovery that God was dead, and that Jesus was the glory of man. With the exclusion of God from purposeful participation in materiality and history he was in fact dying. Since man participates in the dichotomy also, he became an insoluble problem to himself, and without purpose in the universe had to face the problem of fragmentation. In the happening of Jesus Christ we are offered an alternative to the optimism of the scientist on too narrow a front, and the "nausea" or the "courage" of the existentialist, namely a means of giving an account for both the personal and the impersonal in the world and relationship between them.

The final chapters are a contemporary appraisal of the Chalcedonian symbol in the light of these concerns. It is on the grounds of the resurrection in spite of the presence of evil in the world that the Christian maintains hope in the future of persons within the universe. This symbol means that since Jesus Christ "endured evil and emerged from evil" (p. 89) we may hope for the fulfillment of human personalness in materiality and history. In Jesus is provided the historical example of achievement which constitutes the distinctive human existence of every man. Here is also provided the lesson that transcendence and

immanence are not contradictory. Jenkins is concerned to indicate that he is not breaking with the traditional emphasis here. Man may find fulfilment insofar as God's existence in love is independent of man's, insofar as God has "no necessary relations with anything or person other than himself" (p. 109). Such impassibility also means that nothing can make any difference to his being God, not even the suffering of God.

In order to get his enterprise started, Jenkins appeals to what he claims to be a universal datum. We are not told the range of the appeal he intends for his lectures. Without doubt it is a universal one. There is hardly any other way of reading his appeal to the universal. But is the appeal to knowledge of persons universal? It may be universal to the congregations gathered in St Mary's to hear the lectures, but that may well be because of the direct or indirect influence of a Christian tradition. We are referred to the self-authenticating value judgment of the intrinsic value of being a person. The essential issue is that of the correctness of the observation that such an awareness is universal, or that "reflection [whose reflection?] will intuitively show the strength of this claim" (p. 5). We have shifted here from the universally acknowledged to the universally acknowledgeable. If the proposed datum is not universal, then the argument becomes provincial right from the outset. For the significance of Jesus Christ for persons is dependent upon the universality of the concern with persons. Is it really possible, as is claimed, to avoid anything theoretical and do without any presupposed theory? Why should we start with this fact? A whole set of presuppositions obviously lies behind this selection. Indeed, concern for persons is a Christian concern. Thus we might say that the method amounts to the making clear of their presuppositions *for those who have them*, but a university audience can hardly be taken as representative of the mass of mankind. We seriously question the validity of the notions of universal and of the starting point which are so important in this work.

The book raises the problem of the function of natural theology in an acute way, and by the unclear method employed leaves it unresolved. Has the author escaped the Aristotelian conception of reason which he wanted to avoid? The *arche* or *archai* from which one starts, then by a process of reason establishing that which is less certain from the outset, are given and unquestioned. It is a sign of weakness to question the given than which nothing could be more certain. However, whether one takes the book as a reappraisal of ancient creeds, and so a piece of Christology proper, or as an argument against the death of God, or an unduly restricted scientism, or a piece of apologetic, or as a confession of faith, there will be found here much to stimulate.

The following erratum was noted: "depair" for "despair" (p. 88).

Lys, Daniel, *The Meaning of the Old Testament*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967. 192 pp. \$ 3.75.

Unfortunately this book has suffered the Madison Avenue treatment in its dust jacket. The title in itself is somewhat over-pretentious. But to go on and describe the book as an attempt at understanding and appropriating the OT message in today's culture is misleading. What really describes what the book is all about is the subtitle, "An Essay on Hermeneutics." Throughout the book (pp. 53, 70, 80, 83, 96, 114, 132, 134, 139, etc.) the author insists that he is looking for a method of exegesis, one that will allow him to hold on to the idea of inspiration (p. 76), that is to say, his idea of inspiration. His concern is with a question being asked often these days, namely: "How can we discover the unity of revelation which is eternal in the unity of historical development?" (p. 81). But in order to be able to put the question this way, he has to concern himself with pointing out the unity of historical development as well as the unity of revelation. The unity of revelation he cavalierly establishes by saying that "the biblical writers claim that there is a *unity* in revelation, which the word 'canon' sums up" (p. 140). This claim of Lys's should be supported by some evidence. As a general statement it becomes useless as soon as it is made, and is not elaborated further. With the unity of historical development he spends more words.

Lys tries to explicate the unity of revelation and history by pointing out its analogy to the flight of an arrow. Unlike Zeno's arrow, whose trajectory consisted of the sum of successive immobile positions, Lys's arrow does not stand still. Its flight is looked at in order to establish the dynamic tension which exists among all the points in its trajectory. The point of impact is what gives meaning to the parabolic trajectory. It "ends" the arrow's course, and gives meaning to every previous moment in it. But Lys wishes to say more about the relationship between the course and the point of impact. He sees "a dynamism" between the two, which needs to be explained. "The target is not present at each point of the trajectory and must not be considered as if it were. Nonetheless, at every moment the movement of the arrow is pregnant with the possibility of hitting the target and has no meaning aside from this" (p. 110). But then one learns that this possibility is not a contingency. "We must see Jesus Christ not as the chronological result of the Old Testament, *after* the Old Testament, but as its axiological meaning, *in* the Old Testament, where the same God of grace was revealing himself" (pp. 163, 164, italics his). Put in terms of the analogy of the arrow, this reads: "When an Old Testament text is 'ended' by its fulfilment in Jesus of Nazareth, it has something to tell us about Jesus because it represents the dynamism *rightly* aimed at the target" (p. 150, italics his).

Lys's answer to the question of the relationship of the OT to revelation and to the NT suffers from a simplistic explication of the nature of the Bible. The analogy of the arrow is overworked to the point that it becomes wearisome. It is, therefore, interesting to see that in an

unguarded moment he has to concede that there is more than one arrow in the OT and that some missed the target (pp. 154, 155). If some missed the target then not all were rightly aimed, and the fact that one, or some, were found to have hit the mark may be due, formally, to circumstances. Lys's efforts again point out the inability of one analogy to clarify every point in a matter as complicated as the relationship between the OT and the NT. He may be commended, however, for his efforts to trace a path between the *dangers* of "ethical left-wing liberalism" and "a pietist right-wing fundamentalism" (p. 156).

But the path in which one is led by him offers difficulties. Is there still room for fruitful discussion on the basis of "wrong" and "good" typology (p. 113)? James Barr (*Old and New in Interpretation*) has made clear that one's inability to do what the NT writers did, due to the desire to have methodological controls, is precisely what constitutes the problem. Lys seems to indicate, however, that in doing what the authors of the Gospel of Mt and the Epistle to the Heb did, one is fulfilling the task of "scientific exegesis" (p. 114). One also reads, "if the 'typological meaning' which is rediscovered retrospectively is 'willed by God,' it cannot differ from the results of prospective scientific research" (pp. 114-115). And what is one to make of the following statement, "Every apologetic which is founded on the comparison of biblical themes with those of the history of religions, in order to be valid, ought to be an apologetic of opposition and not of similarities" (p. 132)? Valid for whom? But what is most strange is that this statement is made in order to move to this other one: "Only in the perspective just sketched can it be said that there is inspiration of the biblical texts (so that scientifically the biblical message will appear to be different from the message of religions)" (p. 133). That scientific research by establishing similarities or differences is able to establish the will of God or inspiration is a claim that conscientious users of the scientific method do not make. Lys recognizes that the Bible does not give scientific information. He warns against a Christian cosmology or a Christian zoology. But then he wishes to confirm a dogmatic position on the unity of the Bible by means of the scientific method. This is to play loose with the word "scientific."

Pointing out his objections to the common understandings of progressive revelation, Lys makes clear (p. 94) that "God's revelation does not mean that he reveals something (science, or ethics, which could be cumulative) but that he reveals himself." To this one cannot but agree. But is the task of the Holy Spirit to reveal to faith the new meaning of a common idea (p. 141)? Are the writers of scripture making an effort to convey certain ideas as revealed and others as not revealed (p. 135)? This again emphasizes that the book's failure is due to the lack of the proper definition of some concepts basic to the discussion being proposed.

I will register my gratitude, however, for one thing Lys does. His appeal to the 20th-century preacher to demythologize his own culture

and to use it for the proclamation of God's word is most certainly timely and valid. He recognizes that in doing this "the risk of confusion or ambiguity is great. But this risk cannot be avoided, lest one shut himself up in the past in regard to the biblical message, the individual believer becomes a split personality and the church a ghetto" (p. 162). To save the Christian Gospel from this fate is undoubtedly the task of Christians today.

This is not a large book, but it could have been smaller and still have said what it says. At times it becomes repetitious. Wilbur Benware is credited with having revised the English version. On the whole the book is readable, though at times it does not read quite smoothly.

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HEROLD WEISS

Moltmann, Jürgen, *Theology of Hope*. Translated by James W. Leitch. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. 342 pp. \$ 8.50.

In reviewing this most suggestive book, one can only point to some of the major emphases and leave it to the reader to study the book for himself. For this is without doubt one of the more important publications during a decade in which books on theology have appeared in both volume and variety.

"The decisively important question is obviously that of the context in which the talk of revelation arises" (p. 43). What is at stake is an adequate conception of the kind of knowing process in which the word "God" is meaningfully employed. Knowledge of God is not mastery of a certain subject matter nor indeed a deduction from an ethical awareness, but rather it is an openness in the midst of life, openness to the future, a future that is shaped by and towards the very knowledge which revelation makes possible. Revelation is not a kind of mastery of the object by the subject. Rather it is an openness to the precariousness which the future enables and demands. The book assumes the viewpoint created by the context of revelation in order to examine that context. This context is not that of the isolated individual hoping for a lonely salvation. Moltmann wishes to avoid a subjectivistic individualism where the transcendental ego or the essential self is the subject of analysis. Thus, rather than identifying him *tout court* with the existentialist theologians, one must ask further concerning his realism of hope.

Man's possibilities are seen as patent of fulfillment only within a social context. The *eschaton*, which is not yet, will be realized only with the hopeful engagement of the Christian in the affairs of the world in a constructive, imaginative, indeed daring, fashion. The hopeful believer moves out into the unknown, confident that the promise of God embraces that unknown. It is in that *futurum absconditum* that God is hidden. For God is Yahweh, who is known by those who move ahead with Him not knowing where they go, but having heard His promise. Here is to be found the context of revelation. Over against the

secularism of much contemporary theology, Moltmann insists that God is to be known in the midst of life. The context of revelation is not secular society, any more than the norm for theology can be the secularism of such society, that is to say, purely in some kind of present. Nor must we look for revelation purely at the end of history, in some kind of utopianism or other, whether that of the fundamentalist or of the Marxist.

The future orientation of this theology is to be seen against the background of the past. That we may say anything about God at all (for example, that he is the God of promise and fulfillment) is a result of how he has come to be known as a result of this dealing in past history. If God were entirely an "eschatological" concept, we would have a blank. If eschatology were an eschatological concept, we would have nothing to say about the end time, about fulfillment. Eschatological truth is filled out with a content made available within the realm of human history, man's historical experience, the past of human history. So the nature of historical reality will have to be considered. An adequate eschatology can be produced only when the crucial questions of historical reality are appropriately addressed and answered.

This leads to a discussion of the resurrection. Indeed one's view of reality is in question as the problem of the resurrection is in question. "It is not only the nature of the reality of the resurrection that stands in question, but also the reality on the basis of which the question of the reality of the resurrection is shaped, motivated and formulated" (p. 167). Moltmann urges the shaping of a perspective which *begins with* the reality of resurrection and thereafter moves to a consideration of the nature of reality as such. The question of the reality of the resurrection should be asked on the basis of a view of reality which makes it possible, and not be tied down to the question of the "historical probability of the fact of Jesus' resurrection." Rather than to bring analogies to the resurrection and have our judgment determined by common human experience, a new concept of historical method must be developed that does not have such a "one-sided interest in the similar," but which seeks the unique in the similar. Analogies are to begin with the resurrection. If this is done, we shall speak of a new possibility for the world, indeed, of the "eschatologically new" (p. 179).

Moltmann's theology is developed in contrast to Bultmann's existentialism, which has its own way of interpreting the resurrection—as the rise of Easter faith on the part of the disciples. For Moltmann, what actually happened between the cross and burial and the Easter appearance is hidden in the hiddenness of God, the NT writers not professing to know the secret. For the resurrection is an eschatological reality. It is known as its promise finds continual fulfillment in each future. It is the beginning and foreshadowing (the perspectives ever kept in tension) of God's eternal Lordship, of God's eternal future. Here is both promise and beginning of the universality of the new creation. The resurrection is promise in fulfillment and fulfillment in promise,

and thus recapitulation and consummation of the OT's vision of Yahweh, as the God who when he fulfilled his promise left an "overspill" which could be the basis of future anticipation. Resurrection becomes a heuristic analogy of a new future.

Thus an attitude of expectation is seconded by that of mission. The openness of God's future is shared by the church, as it helps to shape that future, living in the midst of history and anticipating the unknown which has been revealed in the resurrection. To give a theological account of such revelation, dynamic categories must be employed: thus all theories of reason which depend upon an Aristotelian concept of the universal cannot be made adequate to the reality of Christian faith, for they cannot allow for the unexpected, the new, the ever-moving and ever-widening horizon which faith makes possible.

Certain questions come to mind in the examination of the theses of this book: we may put them under two classifications. The first concerns the eschatologizing of theological conceptions. Is it to be assumed that all theological conceptions are amenable to being given an eschatological reference? If the theologian's principle of economy often leads him to conservation even when transformation is necessary, do not certain theological concepts resist such an approval? Moltmann's treatment of the idea of natural theology is a case in point. If natural theology is an eschatological conception, this is rather a rejection of its traditional role than an adjustment of it. It is becoming clear that a theology that insists upon a view of history shaped by the resurrection has to rethink quite fundamentally the whole basis of theological reason, and the "root metaphors" and the analogies which shall guide it. An assumption which guided the "natural" theologians was that there was some form of universal knowledge available as a point of departure for a deductive process of apologetic. But the universal also becomes an eschatological concept and not a logical one; that is, one derived from universal *logos*.

The second kind of question concerns the *meaning* of the resultant concepts. What degree of specificity can be given to the "future" which is made the clue to all the concepts of theology? This is another way of posing the question concerning revelation. Where does revelation take place? In history? In my history? In the history of ideas? In the history of the church? of the world? or in all of these? Futuristic categories can be existentialist, or idealist or radically empirical. The talk of future may be nothing more than a manner of speaking about the present, and a stance that is taken in that present. What is involved is a philosophy of time. There hangs over the discussion a certain ambiguity in the conceiving of the future. One's expectation of the future may be based upon *a priori* considerations which turn to history for their confirmation, or for their illustration. In certain cases talk of the future may be a device for speaking about the present, a modified form of existentialism, whose interest is still in the present manner of existence, even if that existence is shaped by God's future. The futurization of the present is a matter of emphasis. But is it the

present which is then spoken of? Speech about God cannot be wholly future, for in that case there would be no speech at all. Indeed, it becomes a contradiction of terms to speak of revelation as future, if the futurity of revelation is made exclusive. The alternative left is to claim that the future is revealed in the present, but that it is not exhausted in the present. This is what Moltmann does, but the future is left open-ended. The essential clue to that future is given in the present, so the claim may be made that the future is presented there. We may learn from Moltmann, if we have the courage, that what is more important than the shape of the future is that God is Lord of it, whatever it will be. That, after all, is really what it means to be an "adventist."

Just how much Moltmann is indebted to Wolfhart Pannenberg will become clearer to the English reader as more of the latter's works are translated into English. It will no doubt be found that the implications of questions treated by Moltmann will find their fuller treatment in the system of Pannenberg.

The following errata were noted: "miad" for "mind" (p. 91, n.); "reult" for "result" (p. 203); "totaleterian" for "totalitarian" (p. 233, n. 1); "of of" for "of" (p. 272).

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EDWARD W. H. VICK

Moore, A. L., *The Parousia in the New Testament*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1966. 218 pp. fl. 42.—

In this doctoral thesis by the Anglican rector of Clevedon, Somerset, the question "What was the expectation of the early church concerning the time of the Second Advent?" is discussed. In seeking the answer to this debated question modern scholarship is first subjected to a critical analysis and then each relevant NT passage is laid under full tribute and tersely discussed.

Against the background of Hebrew prophecy and apocalyptic, Moore discusses the "consistent" eschatology of Schweitzer and Werner, and shows that their thesis, that Jesus erred in expecting a Parousia and so brought about a total and fatal crisis in the life of the early church, breaks down, in part, on the patent fact that the church instead of dying out from disillusionment continued to live and suffer, work and witness. On the other hand, the "realized" eschatology of Dodd, Glasson, and J. A. T. Robinson, which teaches that it was the early church rather than Jesus that erred in expecting an apocalyptic end, is also unsatisfactory, for although Jesus indeed taught that the kingdom had already come in his own person and work, there is no justification for excising from the gospels the clear teaching of Jesus concerning a literal resurrection, a final judgment, an actual Parousia, and a future establishment of the kingdom in a glorious manner. Further, the "demythologized" eschatology of Bultmann and Conzelmann, which builds on both Schweitzer's concept of a mistaken Jesus and

Dodd's concept of a mistaken church, is to be criticized in addition because of its radical skepticism concerning the data of the NT and because its re-interpretation of the NT in the terminology of existentialism does not do justice to the NT understanding of time.

In place of such concepts Moore stands firmly with those scholars who find the concept of salvation-history as set forth by Cullmann and his school to be fundamental to an understanding of both OT and NT, and therefore an essential factor in NT eschatology. "From the centre, Jesus Christ, the line of salvation-history runs backwards through the covenant to creation and beyond, and forwards through the church and its mission to the Parousia and beyond. . . . Although the End event is to be a different texture from the events prior to it, it will be a real presence of Christ in the context of history" (pp. 90, 91).

The introduction to the second and even more valuable part of this extremely compact study first dismisses as inadequate certain common explanations of the NT hope of a speedy Parousia. For instance, the idea that Jesus on account of his fallible humanity mistakenly thought and taught that his return would occur after only a short interval, is emptied of force by the fact that the synoptic passages in which the statements of our Lord pose the problem of an imminent expectation most acutely are introduced by the most solemn and emphatic affirmations of certainty. Nor can it be thought that Jesus encouraged faith in a speedy fulfilment simply as a pastoral expedient, for this would certainly lead to a false optimism and only create difficulties in the second generation.

What follows is the productively positive part of this volume. Two questions are examined with respect to both Jesus and the church: (1) "Did they in fact regard the Parousia as 'near' "? (2) "Did they in fact expect that it would occur within a fixed, short number of years?" For the answer to each of these questions every significant passage in the Gospels and Epistles is thoroughly examined in both context and content. Moore's deep respect for the biblical text is revealed by his painstakingly thorough and resolutely honest handling of each passage. Here is scholarly research at its best. Here is an example of the reverent use of critical methods. This is not to say that the reviewer would agree with every conclusion drawn in the detailed examination of the passages. But he has no hesitation in expressing his hearty concurrence with the main results of this investigation. What are those results? In summary these:

That the early church unanimously thought of the Parousia of their Lord not as something which would not occur for centuries, but as an open possibility for all future time. That the end had in a hidden manner already arrived in the person and work of Jesus, and was already present in the working of the Holy Spirit, who continued in a hidden manner the presence and work of Jesus among them. That therefore the open and manifest and glorious and universal presence of Jesus could not be far off, but must be "near," yet no one could say

that it would certainly come within a definite short number of years. (This glorious Parousia was in fact held back only in the grace of God to allow the church to complete its mission and call all men everywhere to repentance and faith.) That the church is thus the eschatological community, already living in "the last days" and partaking of the blessings of the Eschaton through its commitment to Christ and its reception of the Spirit, and especially called to hasten that glorious appearing by its believing witness "till He come." All this leads to the declared conviction of the author that any weakening or abandonment of the Parousia hope can only result in "a real and extensive impoverishment" of the church's life.

It seems unfortunate that such a thorough study, supported by a bibliography of over 1000 titles, should end with a superficial criticism of the British Advent Awakening of the last century and of the Seventh-day Adventist Church of today, a criticism based upon the negative evaluation of a single secondary source in each case. This is the more to be regretted because Moore's criticism of these two movements does not lie in the area of his main thesis. Moore's criticism is based upon his present view of the nature and interpretation of apocalyptic, and its patent misapplication in the course of church history. Even in this area he is to be commended for his recognition that "apocalyptic properly begins with Daniel," and that apocalyptic shares its basic presuppositions with OT prophecy (p. 18). But he appears not to have sufficiently recognized that there is a properly biblical apocalyptic and also an extra-biblical apocalyptic, and that though the second is based upon the first, the first deserves to be examined and evaluated separately, both in its relationships to OT prophecy and in its bearing on the teachings of Christ and the early church concerning the Parousia.

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Ogden, Schubert M., *The Reality of God and Other Essays*. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. xii + 237 pp. \$ 6.00.

In this book there is presented to us a theology which claims to be secular, metaphysical and empirical. The problem with which this theology is occupied and which assumes a normative role is that of the relationship between the transcendence and the immanence of God, or that of his passivity and his relatedness to the world. The relatedness of God to the world is taken as a point of departure. So certain canons of theological importance emerge: in speaking of God one must begin with human experience; within human experience man's relatedness to his fellow is a given fact, hence God must be spoken of in terms of relationship. Indeed God is the eminently related one.

Theology begins with the subject and generalizes the experience of subjects. This Ogden calls the "reformed subjectivist principle" (p. 57). By defining the self as relational we are led to a consideration of the

nature of relationship and so to process philosophy. By starting with the self we have available the existentialist analyses of selfhood, and so there opens up the possibility of a synthesis between existentialist and process philosophy.

One may in this manner reappraise the starting point and the employment of analogy in theology. By starting with the experience of being a self in relationship with other selves (since selfhood is experienced only in relationship), we may, by the *analogia entis*, speak of the concept of God's absoluteness as having ingredient within it the notion of relatedness. This is a "way of conceiving God's reality which is able to do justice to modern secularity" (p. 63).

A further theological concern is that of showing the cognitive status of theological statements. This requires nothing less than the adoption of a total metaphysic, within the terms of which particular assertions are shown to have significant meaning. What is required is a metaphysic that represents the common structure of existence. In this way the theologian can claim objectivity for his statements.

Such a theological program, it is claimed, can more adequately justify the meaning of faith than that which retains mythological elements while ostensibly seeking to demythologize. For human existence may be represented both in philosophical as well as mythological terms. The truth which myth represents can be known only as a process of translation into philosophical terms. It is Ogden's claim that process philosophy serves as the vehicle for such a translation which permits a cognitive evaluation of original content. The task of the appropriate translation of myth is to provide the "right" philosophy for the process of translation.

The implications of this methodology for the doctrine of God are worked out in further essays in the book, where the author makes quite clear that it is not for the traditional understanding of God that he is an apologist. Ogden embraces the argument of Sartre that existentialism is a humanism, and not antihumanistic (with its implication that there is no human nature since there is no God to have a conception of it), as an expression of his own brand of theism, that of the eminently related God, that of pan-en-theism. While Sartre's argument is to be judged atheistic from the point of view of supernaturalism, it is to be seen as theistic from the viewpoint of God as eminently relative, to whom each of man's choices makes an enduring difference.

That God acts in history means that he participates fully and completely, directly and immediately, in the world of creatures. God's history is eminent history. Each creature is God's act. So the statement "God acts in history" is taken by Ogden as analogy rather than myth. Analogy represents God in non-objectifying existentials. So he can write that in his self-understanding man "represents not only his understanding of God's action, but, through it, the reality of God's action itself . . . man's action actually *is* God's action" (p. 181). To say that God acts in history is to say that the transcendent action of God is represented in human deeds and words. In Jesus we are given a

transparent means of representing "a certain possibility for understanding human existence" (p. 186).

The closing essay of the book attempts to demythologize some of the traditional imagery employed in the service of eschatology. The mythological expressions concerning the end refer both to God and to man. Their meaning is to be found in terms both of "human possibility" and also of "divine actuality" (p. 216). Man's end is in God, the eminently related one. Man's end is to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, and his prerogative is to accept God's love. The promise of faith is that God is man's end. "Our final destiny . . . is . . . to be loved by the pure unbounded love of God, for whom each of us makes a difference exactly commensurate to what he is and of everlasting significance" (p. 226). God is the all-encompassing one. Even hell is God's hell.

Here we are presented with a radical existentializing of theology. All theological concepts have reference to man's present existence, in relationship with his fellows within the world. Man as an individual is set within the nexus of complex relationships, the totality of which is due for consideration by the theologian in the employment of the conception of "God." In Ogden's theology we have a juxtaposition of individual self-understanding, and the fortunes of the whole, the divine. This leads to a restriction of the concern with the individual to the present moment. Thus eschatological doctrine is concerned with the future of God, not that of the individual. Subjective survival is not an appropriate theme of such eschatology. The present is all-important. We reject this claim, and with it the suggestion for a theological direction which is based upon it. History is important, the resurrection is important as history, as having happenedness, as that which stands over against us from the past. A theory of knowledge or a theology which makes no room for the uniqueness of historical reality in the past, and allows of hope for the future is *ipso facto* disqualified by its failure to account for man's individuality, and for the uniqueness of historic occasions. Jesus' history is more than "simply" a means of representing a way of understanding human existence (p. 186). If not, we have gone the length of identifying theology with philosophy: the purported differentia of theological data become "simply" means for illustrating philosophical convictions.

On such a reading one can cast one's theological net extremely wide. Having rejected traditional atheism as atheism by redefining theism, one can find theists among philosophers who in fact think themselves atheists. So Sartre becomes an apologist for a theistic understanding of existence, by having pointed out what he has in fact overlooked—a stage in the argument which renders him, on Ogden's definition, theistic. If God is actualized in the choices of men (cf. p. 176: *that* God is necessary, but *what* God is is dependent in part upon the decision of the creatures in his world), and if the fact that there is moral truth implies the unconditioned meaningfulness of life, such confidence is made fully intelligible only in the idea of an eminently relative God,

intrinsically affected by those choices of man's freedom. Thus Sartre is brought under the wing of Christian theism. It must indeed be a permissive kind of theism that can make this move.

While agreeing that too often attempts have been made to penetrate beyond the limitations of human finitude in dealing with the future, and that the task of theology is to speak of faith, and read theological symbols in the light of faith, we dissent from the exclusive confining of theological symbol to the present existence. Indeed all eschatological symbol does represent an understanding of human existence. That existence is not in principle to be confined to the present. To do so would mean the removal of hope from Christian existence. Not enough attention has been given to this aspect of the question. It is only when exclusive attention is given to the present existence that it can be said that the question of survival is left "completely open" (p. 229). But the specificity with which one asks quite concrete questions about the meaning and expression of present existence, coupled with the fact that hope is endemic to man *qua* man, as is indicated by phenomenological studies, drives one to seek for quite specific answers to the problem of the future. The alternative would be to see in the resurrection of Jesus (to be taken seriously as a historical datum) a clue to theological reason that embraces within it the concern for answering questions regarding the future of the individual man. For such the statement that the question of the future individual is completely open is only one side of what needs to be said.

Ogden appeals to the cognitive status of statements made within the context of a process philosophy which attempts to offer an explanation of the world on the grand scale. Naturally the Christian theologian is concerned that the statements he makes be both meaningful and true. All such statements are made within contexts, the exploration of which is necessary for the understanding of the statements. But there is no *single* context which is determinative of meaningfulness for theological statements. Statements about faith, necessarily symbolic, are to be understood within the context which faith itself creates, either directly or more distantly, as in the process of translation of "mythical" statements into metaphysical statements. If we differentiate between primary and secondary contexts, we would indicate a philosophical expression of faith, in the grand scale of a metaphysics such as that of Whitehead as a secondary context. The exhibition of the cognitive status of theological statements can take place from within primary contexts, as well as from within secondary contexts. Ogden plumps for *one* such secondary context as the locus from which arguments for the cognitive status of theological statements can be made. We should not be led to think that this is the only possibility.

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW

CONSONANTS

א	=	ʾ	ב	=	ḅ	ג	=	g	ד	=	s	ה	=	r
כ	=	b	ה	=	ḥ	ו	=	k	ז	=	c	ח	=	ʃ
ל	=	ḃ	ו	=	w	ז	=	ḵ	ט	=	p	י	=	ʒ
מ	=	g	ז	=	z	ח	=	l	כ	=	p	ק	=	t
נ	=	g	ח	=	ḥ	מ	=	m	ל	=	ʃ		=	t
ס	=	ḁ	ט	=	t	נ	=	n	מ	=	q		=	

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

-	=	a	ׁ, ׃ (vocal shewa)	=	e	ׂ	=	ō
ֿ	=	ā	׃, ׄ	=	ē	ׅ	=	o
ֿֿ	=	a	׆	=	i	ׇ	=	ō
ֿֿֿ	=	e	׈	=	i	׉	=	u
ֿֿֿֿ	=	ē	׊	=	o	׋	=	ū

ABBREVIATIONS OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

<i>AAS</i>	Annales archéol. de Syrie	<i>BJPES</i>	Bulletin, Jewish Pal. Expl. Soc.
<i>AASOR</i>	Annual, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.	<i>BJRL</i>	Bulletin, John Rylands Library
<i>ADAJ</i>	Annual, Dep. of Ant. of Jordan	<i>BMB</i>	Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth
<i>AER</i>	American Ecclesiastical Review	<i>BQR</i>	Baptist Quarterly Review
<i>AfO</i>	Archiv für Orientforschung	<i>BR</i>	Biblical Research (Chicago)
<i>AfP</i>	Archiv für Papyrusforschung	<i>BRG</i>	Biblioth. Rerum Germanicarum
<i>AJA</i>	Amer. Journal of Archaeology	<i>BS</i>	Bibliotheca Sacra
<i>AJSL</i>	Amer. Journ. of Sem. Lang. and Literature	<i>BSHPPF</i>	Bulletin de la Société de l'histoire du protestantisme français
<i>ALBO</i>	Analecta Lovan. Bibl. et Orient.	<i>BT</i>	Bible Translator
<i>ANET</i>	Ancient Near Eastern Texts, J. B. Pritchard, ed., 2d ed., 1955	<i>BZ</i>	Biblische Zeitschrift
<i>ANF</i>	The Ante-Nicene Fathers	<i>CBQ</i>	Catholic Biblical Quarterly
<i>AO</i>	Acta Orientalia	<i>CC</i>	Christian Century
<i>ARG</i>	Archiv für Reformationsgesch.	<i>CdE</i>	Chronique d'Égypte
<i>ARW</i>	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft	<i>CH</i>	Church History
<i>ASAE</i>	Annales, Serv. des Ant. de l'Ég.	<i>CIG</i>	Corpus Inscript. Graecarum
<i>ASB</i>	Acta Sanctorum (ed. Bolland)	<i>CIL</i>	Corpus Inscript. Latinarum
<i>ATHR</i>	Anglican Theological Review	<i>CIS</i>	Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum
<i>AUSS</i>	Andrews Univ. Sem. Studies	<i>CJTh</i>	Canadian Journal of Theology
<i>BA</i>	Biblical Archaeologist	<i>CSEL</i>	Corpus Script. Eccl. Lat.
<i>BASOR</i>	Bulletin, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.	<i>CT</i>	Christianity Today
<i>Bib</i>	Biblica	<i>ER</i>	Ecumenical Review
<i>BIES</i>	Bulletin, Israel Expl. Soc.	<i>ETHL</i>	Ephemer. Theol. Lovanienses
<i>BIFAO</i>	Bulletin, Inst. Franç. d'Arch. Or.	<i>ET</i>	Expository Times
<i>BiOr</i>	Bibliotheca Orientalis	<i>HJ</i>	Hibbert Journal
		<i>HTHR</i>	Harvard Theological Review

<i>HUCA</i>	Hebrew Union College Annual	<i>RB</i>	Revue Biblique
<i>IEJ</i>	Israel Exploration Journal	<i>RE</i>	Review and Expositor
<i>Int</i>	Interpretation	<i>RdE</i>	Revue d'Égyptologie
<i>JACH</i>	Jahrb. für Ant. und Christentum	<i>RHE</i>	Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique
<i>JAOS</i>	Journ. of the Amer. Or. Soc.	<i>RHPP</i>	Revue d'Hist. et de Philos. Rel.
<i>JBL</i>	Journal of Biblical Literature	<i>RHR</i>	Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
<i>JBR</i>	Journal of Bible and Religion	<i>RL</i>	Religion in Life
<i>JCS</i>	Journal of Cuneiform Studies	<i>RLA</i>	Reallexikon der Assyriologie
<i>JEA</i>	Journal of Egyptian Arch.	<i>RQ</i>	Revue de Qumrân
<i>JJS</i>	Journal of Jewish Studies	<i>RSR</i>	Revue des Sciences Religieuses
<i>JNES</i>	Journal of Near Eastern Studies	<i>RSV</i>	Revised Standard Version
<i>JQR</i>	Jewish Quarterly Review	<i>SJTh</i>	Scottish Journal of Theology
<i>JR</i>	Journal of Religion	<i>STh</i>	Studia Theologica
<i>JSS</i>	Journal of Semitic Studies	<i>ThEH</i>	Theologische Existenz heute
<i>JThS</i>	Journal of Theol. Studies	<i>ThQ</i>	Theologische Quartalschrift
<i>KJV</i>	King James Version	<i>ThT</i>	Theology Today
<i>LQ</i>	Lutheran Quarterly	<i>ThLZ</i>	Theologische Literaturzeitung
<i>MGH</i>	Monumenta Germaniae Historica	<i>ThR</i>	Theologische Rundschau
<i>MPG</i>	Migne, Patrologia Graeca	<i>Trad</i>	Traditio
<i>MPL</i>	Migne, Patrologia Latina	<i>ThS</i>	Theological Studies
<i>MQR</i>	Mennonite Quarterly Review	<i>ThZ</i>	Theologische Zeitschrift
<i>NKZ</i>	Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift	<i>VC</i>	Verbum Caro
<i>NPNF</i>	Nicene and Post-Nic. Fathers	<i>VD</i>	Verbum Domini
<i>NRTh</i>	Nouvelle Revue Théologique	<i>VCh</i>	Vigiliae Christianae
<i>NT</i>	Novum Testamentum	<i>VT</i>	Vetus Testamentum
<i>NTA</i>	New Testament Abstracts	<i>WThJ</i>	Westminster Theol. Journal
<i>NTS</i>	New Testament Studies	<i>WZKM</i>	Wiener Zeitschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes
<i>Num</i>	Numen	<i>ZA</i>	Zeitschrift für Assyriologie
<i>OCh</i>	Oriens Christianus	<i>ZAS</i>	Zeitsch. für ägyptische Sprache
<i>OLZ</i>	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung	<i>ZAW</i>	Zeitsch. für die alltttes. Wiss.
<i>Or</i>	Orientalia	<i>ZDMG</i>	Zeitsch. der Deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellschaft
<i>OTS</i>	Oudtestamentische Studien	<i>ZDPV</i>	Zeitsch. des Deutsch. Pal. Ver.
<i>PEQ</i>	Palestine Exploration Quarterly	<i>ZKG</i>	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte
<i>PJB</i>	Palästina-Jahrbuch	<i>ZHTh</i>	Zeitsch. für hist. Theologie
<i>PRE</i>	Realencyklopädie für protes- tantische Theologie und Kirche	<i>ZKTh</i>	Zeitsch. für kath. Theologie
<i>QDAP</i>	Quarterly, Dep. of Ant. in Pal.	<i>ZNW</i>	Zeitsch. für die neutest. Wiss.
<i>RA</i>	Revue d'Assyr. et d'Arch. Or.	<i>ZDTh</i>	Zeitschrift für syst. Theologie
<i>RAC</i>	Rivista di Archaeologia Cristiana	<i>ZThK</i>	Zeitsch. für Theol. und Kirche