Andrews University

SEMINARY STUDIES

Volume 33 Spring 1995 Number 1



Andrews University Press

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES

The Journal of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary of Andrews University, Berrien Springs, Michigan 49104, U.S.A.

Editorial and Circulation Offices: Andrews University Seminar Studies,
Seminary Hall, Andrews University
Berrien Springs, MI 49104-1500, U.S.A.
Phone: (616) 471-6023
Fax: (616) 471-6202
Electronic Mail: auss@andrews.edu

A refereed journal, ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES provides a scholarly venue, within the context of biblical faith, for the presentation of research in the area of religious and biblical studies. *AUSS* publishes research articles and brief notes on the following topics: biblical archaeology and history of antiquity; Hebrew Bible; New Testament; church history of all periods; historical, biblical, and systematic theology; ethics; history of religions; and missions. Selected research articles on ministry and Christian education may also be included.

The opinions expressed in articles, brief notes, book reviews, etc., are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the editors nor those of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary.

Subscription Information: ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES is published in the Spring and the Autumn. The subscription rate for 1995 is as follows:

	U.S.A.	Foreign (in U.S.A. funds)
Regular Subscriber	$18.00	$21.00
Institutions (including Libraries)	24.00	27.00
Students	15.00	18.00
Retirees	15.00	18.00

(Price for Single Copy is $8.00 in U.S.A.; $9.00 Foreign (in U.S.A. funds.)

NOTE: These are net rates for prepaid orders. A handling and service fee of $1.50 will be added if orders are to be billed.

Printing by Patterson Printing, Benton Harbor, Michigan

ANDREWS UNIVERSITY SEMINARY STUDIES

Volume 33 Spring 1995 Number 1

CONTENTS

ARTICLES

* * * * * * * * * * * *

The articles in this journal are indexed, abstracted, or listed in: *Elenchus of Biblica; Internationale Zeitschriftenschau für Bibelwissenschaft und Grenzgebiete; New Testament Abstracts; Old Testament Abstracts; Orientalistische Literaturzeitung; Religion Index One; Periodicals; Religious and Theological Abstracts; Seventh-day Adventist Periodical Index; Theologische Zeitschrift; Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft.*

 ISSN 0003-2980

In the Autumn 1994 issue we reversed the transliteration of the Hebrew letters שׂ and שׁ. In fact, we did it twice: on the inside back cover and in the "*AUSS* Style Guidelines."

The correct transliterations are:

שׂ = ś and שׁ = š

Thank you for taking note of this correction.

Andrews University Seminary Studies, Spring-Summer 1995, Vol. 33, Nos. 1-2, 5-38.

REVELATION AND INSPIRATION: THE HISTORICAL-COGNITIVE MODEL

FERNANDO L. CANALE
Andrews University

This article attempts to sketch, in broad strokes, a preliminary outline of a revelation-inspiration model which, developed in faithfulness to the *sola Scriptura* principle, might yield a viable alternative to the classical and liberal models discussed in previous articles.[1] My preceding assessment has shown that in addressing the epistemological origin of Scripture the classical and liberal models do not properly integrate biblical claims with the phenomena of Scripture. Let me underline, once again, that I am not challenging the internal coherence or viability of either the classical or the liberal models. They provide coherent explanations of the epistemological origin of Scripture. Their shortcomings surface in relation to their external coherence with the fact they try to explain, namely, Scripture itself. The classical model has difficulties integrating the phenomena of Scripture, while the liberal model finds it impossible to accept the claims of Scripture on divine revelation and inspiration literally.[2] In this respect both models seem to fall short of formulating a theoretical explanation of the epistemological origin of Scripture in which the full scope of the claims of Scripture about itself—the so-called doctrine of Scripture—and the phenomena of Scripture—actual characteristics of Scriptures as they are given to us—are properly accounted for without contradiction.

Because of this and other reasons presented in the concluding remarks of my last article, it seems that in spite of the almost

[1]Fernando L. Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Ground for a New Approach," *AUSS* 31 (1993): 91-104; "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," *AUSS* 31 (1993): 171-194; "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," *AUSS* 32 (1994): 7-28; and "Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model," *AUSS* 32 (1994): 169-195.

[2]For instance, see James D. G. Dunn's critique of the evangelical understanding of the classical model which leans toward explaining the origin of Scripture on the basis of inspiration ("The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture [Part 1]," *Churchman* 99 [1982]: 104-122).

unchallenged authority that the classical and liberal models exercise today over Christian theology, there is room for yet another model. Christian theology does not need to feel imprisoned or predetermined by traditional views. A new explanation for the epistemological origin of Scripture may still be explored, developed, and evaluated. The possibility of such an alternate interpretation will be examined in this article, following the methodology delineated in my second article, beginning with the ground discovered in the first article and adopted in the analysis of the classical and liberal models. Because of the subject matter under consideration, this article will follow the style of a critical essay, appropriate to the task of theological inquiry.

1. *The Nature of the Issue*

As the exploration of an alternate model of revelation-inspiration is undertaken, it should be brought to mind that the issue under scrutiny is the epistemological origin of Scriptures and not their veracity, accuracy, inerrancy, or interpretation. The goal that an epistemological theory of revelation and inspiration strives to achieve is precise and modest. The epistemological investigation of the origin of Scripture seeks to uncover the a priori conditions under which the cognitive origin of the phenomenon under scrutiny can be properly and coherently conceived as possible.[3]

Scripture is a given fact. We have direct access to it. The question is not about the existence, veracity, or accuracy of its statements, or even the defense of the biblical claim that its words are the words of God (2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet 1:21; 1 Thess 2:13). The difficulty, rather, is whether Scripture's claim to be the concepts and words of God is possible. This is the problem to be clarified by an epistemological approach to revelation and inspiration.

Our endeavor raises, first of all, the issue of method: How should the matter be examined, and on what basis could we arrive at viable conclusions? As already argued in my second article, the method to be followed here is systematic. Thus, the answer to the question about the methodology to be followed in this probe is simple. The systematic method basically involves the identification of the subject matter to be clarified and the presuppositions required for its clarification. I have already recognized the subject matter of our inquiry as the study of the conditions of the possibility that the words of man which we find in

[3]Here I am not using the term "a priori" in the Kantian sense of independence from sensory perception, but rather in the broader analogous sense of "anteceding the fact or issue under consideration."

Scripture may be at the same time the words of God. Next, the presuppositions that condition the interpretation of the epistemological origin of Scripture need to be ascertained from the contents of Scripture, thus following the *sola Scriptura* principle. On that basis, a determination regarding whether the biblical claim is possible or not could be reached; as well, a working description of the general design of the model could be made.[4] Specifically, the conditions for the possibility of Scripture's claim that its humanly uttered words in their entirety are the words of God (2 Tim 3:16) depend on the interpretation of the presuppositional structure. In short, the possibility and the actual configuration of an alternate model of revelation and inspiration are determined at the level of the presuppositional structure.

After the Kantian epistemological revolution at the root of modernity and postmodernity, the question before us regards the possibility of conceiving the whole cognitive content of Scripture as originated in God. Is it possible to affirm that the cognitive contents of Scripture are the word of God without automatically subscribing to the classical model and its limitations vis-a-vis the *sola Scriptura* principle?[5] Or, should Christian theologians capitulate to the uncritical assumption that the only viable alternative is the acceptance of the liberal conviction, according to which the epistemological origination of Scripture stems from human imagination?[6]

[4]This methodology is not new. It is the same that Kant followed in his *Critique of Pure Reason* (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990), 12-15. By this methodology, Kant developed the study of epistemology into an independent philosophical discipline (15).

[5]A recent representative of this theological approach is Thomas Oden's consensual theology (*The Living God* [San Francisco: Harper, 1992], ix).

[6]Pannenberg's cogent and scholarly conceived theology represents a prominent example of a neoclassical systematic approach built on the conviction that Scripture and theology epistemologically originate in the human imagination, through which the religious experience of the divine has been and still is put down in writing (*Theology and the Philosophy of Science* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976], 301-310; *Systematic Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991], 1:165-187). For a comprehensive study of Pannenberg's view on the epistemological origin of Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "Scripture in the Theologies of W. Pannenberg and D. G. Bloesch: An Investigation and Assessment of Its Origin, Nature, and Use" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 1994), 107-112. See also Bruce L. McCormack, "Divine Revelation and Human Imagination: Must We Choose Between the Two?" *SJT* 37 (1984): 431-455; and David J. Bryant, *Faith and the Play of Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion* (Macon, GA.: Mercer University Press, 1989).

2. *The Presuppositional Structure*

It is impossible to address revelation and inspiration as an epistemological problem if one maintains, against the testimony of Scripture, that human beings alone are the originators of its cognitive contents. God's activity is the necessary condition that must be assumed for revelation-inspiration to become an issue in need of theological clarification. The epistemological question already pointed out consists in whether God's activity could be conceived as cognitively reaching human beings, thus making possible Scripture's claim regarding its own origination. Once God's cognitive activity is considered, the essential characteristics of the cognition involved in the origination of Scripture must also be elucidated.

The answer to the question about the possibility of cognitive revelation-inspiration receives a negative answer in the liberal model.[7] The classical model, on the contrary, gives a positive answer: Cognitive revelation is possible. A problem with the answer of the classical model lies in the way the essence of cognition is conceived. As God's activity and man's cognitive capabilities, necessary for receiving God's revelation, operate in the realm of timelessness, the practical outcome is a restricted and ambiguous theory of revelation-inspiration. The limitation can be seen in the fact that, according to the classical model of revelation, most biblical contents are originated by man, very few by God (revelation). The ambiguity can be observed in relation to inspiration, which comes to the rescue of the limited range of revelation. When the human writer puts into words contents that have not been originated by God (revelation), the classical theory maintains that God, in one way or another, through the Holy Spirit, controls the human process of writing (inspiration), miraculously turning it into his own cognitive verbal expression. God is supposed to supernaturally inspire Scripture without interfering with human freedom and initiative. So, according to the classical model, God does not originate all the contents of Scripture (revelation); but on the other hand, God through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit originates the entire content of Scripture. This is not the time to analyze these problems and the unabated attempt to answer the many ways in which the limitations and ambiguities of the classical model continue to surface. I basically agree with the answer provided by the classical model to the question about the possibility of revelation, but feel uncomfortable with the

[7]Canale, "Revelation & Inspiration: The Liberal Model," *AUSS* 32 (1994):171-173, 194.

intellectual foundation on which it is built, namely, the timelessness of God's actions and human cognition. For this reason I suggest the need to overcome this source of limitations and ambiguities. To do this requires nothing less than a foundational reinterpretation of the understanding of the presuppositional structure.

The ground for suggesting a new model, therefore, rests on the possibility that the presuppositional structure may be interpreted in a different way. Such a reinterpretation should be instrumental in yielding not only a positive answer regarding the question about the possibility of revelation-inspiration, but also a new understanding of the essence of the cognition involved in revelation-inspiration. Only then could the limitations and ambiguities of the classical model be overcome. The ground I am referring to has already been uncovered in the first article of this series. Briefly, it consists in replacing the timeless conception of God's nature and actions with a temporal-historical one.[8]

The temporal-historical conception of God's being and actions radically departs from the classical and the liberal models. In accordance with Scripture, this component of the presuppositional structure entails God's ability to relate to humankind in general, and biblical writers in particular, directly and univocally within space and time.[9] I am not implying that it is possible to conceive the being of God as univocal to our space and time.[10] Equivocity and analogy are also needed.[11] Here I

[8]This is not the place to discuss further all the theological ramifications of changing from a timeless to a historical-temporal understanding of God's being and action. Such a task would entail a total revision of traditional, modern, and postmodern traditions in the philosophical, methodological, and theological levels.

[9]A team of evangelical authors has recently explored the possibility of thinking theologically about God on the basis of biblical concepts (Clark Pinnock and others, *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God* [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994]). Generally speaking, as far as it challenges tradition and attempts to formulate the Christian doctrine of God by integrating more biblical concepts, the book moves in the right direction. Especially enlightening is John Sanders' chapter ("Historical Considerations"), in which the development of the classical philosophical-biblical synthesis of the understanding of God is clearly outlined. Unfortunately, the book falls short of harmoniously incorporating all biblical data (notably, in the case of divine foreknowledge) or grasping the radical theological implications involved in the biblical criticism of tradition.

[10]Process philosophy has been openly critical of the timeless conception of God. Alfred North Whitehead conceives God as open to the world and, therefore, to time. Whitehead's view of God assumes an univocal understanding of time specifically as he deals with the consequent nature of God (*Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology* [New York: Macmillan, 1929], 523-524). Charles Hartshorne seems to follow the same view, as he affirms that ". . . the divine awareness is concretely new each moment" (*The Logic of Perfection* [LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1962], 262). See also Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine*

am maintaining only that when, following Scripture, one conceives God to be a historical temporal transcendent being, He is *at least* able to relate to human history and cognition univocally, that is, directly within the level of reality and cognition which properly belongs to human beings, namely, to our time and space.[12] On the ground laid by this interpretation there appear to be no impediments to thinking of God along the lines presented in Scripture, as able to talk, speak, and act directly within the sphere of space and time. On this base a positive answer to the question about the possibility of revelation-inspiration can be formulated and a model for understanding the epistemological origination of Scripture built.

The second component of the presuppositional structure, namely, humanity and its cognitive capabilities, is also to be conceived temporally and historically. Thus, another fundamental condition for the possibility of revelation-inspiration is met. The divine-human process through which the contents of Scripture were generated demands that the originating and receiving minds meet and work within the same level of reality.[13] In what pertains to the human component of the presuppositional structure, the historicist interpretation of knowledge followed by most modern and postmodern scholars comes closer to the biblical way of thinking. The limitation and inadequacy of the liberal model is not due to its conception of reason, but rather to

---

Relativity: A Social Conception of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), 79; and Charles Hartshorne and Creighton Peden, *Whitehead's View of Reality* (New York: Pilgrim, 1981), 34, 73-79. An analogical conception of time in which equivocity and univocity are simultaneously integrated in the conception of the divine being seems absent in process philosophy.

[11]Pannenberg remarks that "in the history and development of the concept of analogy as an instrument for the extension of knowledge a core of univocity is thus a decisive premise even though analogous relations might be observed" (*Systematic Theology*, 1:344, n.14). In dealing with the concept of God the three modes of predication—univocity, equivocity, and analogy—have to be harmoniously utilized as they are in Scripture.

[12]According to Scripture, God's temporal-historical being is seen as acting in the lower level of human temporality. However, this scriptural conviction does not forfeit God's capability to be, to act, and to relate to human beings at other levels of temporality which would be either analogical or equivocal to human conception of time.

[13]Emilio Betti properly remarks that communication between two minds by the means of "meaning-full" forms assumes a "congenial disposition" ("Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften*," in *Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and Critique*, ed. Josef Bleicher [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980], 84-85). It is obvious that a "congenial disposition" can occur only when both minds share the same level of reality and knowledge.

its inability to get rid of the timeless conception of a God that, being unable to act historically in human history, is also incapable of acting within the cognitive and linguistic levels of humanity.[14]

Summarizing, the liberal model conceives human nature in a way that comes closer to Scriptures than the classical understanding. At the same time, liberals specifically deny the possibility of a cognitive interpretation of revelation-inspiration. This denial logically seems to follow from simultaneously adhering to a temporal-historical conception of human nature and to the classical timeless conception of God. It is not difficult to realize that if God and humanity are placed in different, incompatible levels of reality, cognitive communication between them becomes logically and ontologically impossible.

Consequently, the historicism of modernity and postmodernity allows room only for human and natural agents to work and interact within the closed continuum of history. According to this trend of thought, the basic ground of meaning and understanding is supplied by history conceived as the material expression of the formal category of tradition.[15] Recently, Delwin Brown has formulated a postmodern conception of tradition which he calls "constructive historicism," which is the process through which human traditions are transmitted and modified.[16] This position directly results from the negative answer to the possibility of revelation and inspiration upheld by the liberal model and, consequently, is incompatible with the model I am proposing.

The model grounded on the historical-temporal understanding of God's being and cognitive acts of revelation and on the temporal-historical view of the human agent as cognitive receptor of the divine activity could be designated as the "historical-cognitive model" of revelation-inspiration. The model I am suggesting is "historical" because the ontological nature of the agents involved in the generation of Scripture, namely God and man, is temporal-historical. Likewise, the essence of the knowledge produced by the revelation-inspiration process is also temporal-historical. The model I am outlining is "cognitive" because the historical interpretation of the ontological and epistemological levels of the presuppositional structure provides the

[14]Pannenberg's theology is a clear and explicit example of this kind of limitation. See *Systematic Theology*, 1:384-396.

[15]Within a Heideggerian tradition, Hans-Georg Gadamer has argued in favor of the epistemological role of history as tradition (*Truth and Method* [London: Sheed & Ward, 1975], 245-274).

[16]Delwin Brown, *Boundaries of Our Habitations: Tradition and Theological Construction* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1994), 111-150.

necessary condition for knowledge to be generated by the divine being and received by the human agent. On this account the historical-cognitive model overcomes the limitations of the liberal model, which does not allow for a divine origination of cognitive contents, and of the classical model, which allows only for a timeless origination of revealed contents. Starting at the level of the presuppositional structure, therefore, the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration decidedly departs from both the classical and the liberal models.

3. *Revelation in the Historical-cognitive Model*

Earlier in this series it has been argued that the task of interpreting the epistemological origin of Scripture involves the exploration of: (1) the process by which contents were originated in the mind of the biblical authors, and (2) the process through which these contents were expressed in either oral or written forms. It has also been asserted that, within this process, revelation corresponds to the origination of biblical contents, while inspiration corresponds to their oral and written expression.[17] However, the actual detailed configuration of a model of revelation-inspiration rests on the interpretation of revelation made possible by the interpretation of the presuppositional structure. Within this methodological context I turn now to the description of how the main features of revelation would be understood according to the historical-cognitive model.

Divine Activity

The question at this point is: How did God proceed in the origination of the cognitive contents we find today written down in Scripture? The key to the answer, resounding from Scripture, is given to us in the introduction to Hebrews: "In the past God spoke to our forefathers through the prophets at many times [πολυμερῶς] and in various ways [πολυτρόπως]" (1:1, NIV).[18] The phenomenological analysis of the phenomena of Scripture clearly confirms the variety of

[17]Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: Method for a New Approach," 186-190.

[18]All biblical quotations are from the NIV. Johann Albrecht Bengel remarks that "*in many portions* refers to the matter, *in divers manners* to the form" (*Bengel's New Testament Commentary* [Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1981], 2:574). Richard Charles Henry Lenski further specifies that "the first [adverb] refers to quantity—so rich the varied contents; the second to quality—so rich the variety of form" (*The Interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Epistle of James* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1966], 30). See also Randolph O. Yeager, *The Renaissance New Testament* (Bowling Green, KY: Renaissance, 1976-1985), 16:80-81; and *EDNT*, 3:131, 133.

biblical revelation.[19] Variety, then, is a main characteristic of the historical-cognitive model. Allow me to underline this point by way of a brief reference to the classical and liberal models in relation to their corresponding presuppositional structures. When God is conceived in a timeless way, variety in the mode of communication cannot be properly predicated of his action. Neither can the divine action be conceived as occurring "in parts," involving both division and temporal succession.[20] For this systematic reason the classical and liberal theories of revelation conceive Scripture in its entirety as produced by the *same* kind of divine activity. No variation in the divine mode of acting is contemplated, since variation is only a human reality. The same applies to the classical understanding of inspiration: God always proceeds in the same way, without variation. Unlike this conception, the temporal-historical view of God's being and actions allows the historical-cognitive model to conceive of God as acting and communicating directly throughout human history in a variety of ways, at different times. Briefly put, the variety of Scripture is not merely due to the actions of the human agent, but primarily generated by the sundry activities of the divine One. The historical-cognitive model of revelation and inspiration recognizes that God was capable of acting in various patterns as he engaged in the process of generating Scripture.

What are some of the ways, modes of action, or patterns that God used in the epistemological constitution of Scripture? The classical model recognizes only one pattern of revelation: the intellectual disclosure of knowledge. God's activity was reduced to the cognitive level, intellectually conceived according to the Platonic-Aristotelian

[19]Even from a liberal perspective this is unmistakable. Paul Ricoeur identifies five different types of biblical writings: prophetic, narrative, prescriptive, wisdom, and hymnal discourses ("Herméneutique de l'idée de révélation," in Paul Ricoeur and others, *La révélation* [Brussels: Facultés Universitaires Saint Louis, 1977], 17-34.

[20]Consider, for instance, how the timeless eternity and simplicity of God affect Augustine's conception of the Word of God: "So you call us to understand the Word, God with you, O God, which is spoken eternally, and in which all things are spoken eternally. Nor is it the case that what was spoken is ended and that another thing is said, so that all things may at length be said: all things are spoken once and forever. Elsewise, there would already be time and change, and neither true eternity nor true immortality. . . . Therefore, no part of your Word gives place to another or takes the place of another, since it is truly eternal and immortal. Therefore you say once and forever all that you say by the Word, who is coeternal with you" (*Confessions* 11.7.9). It is apparent that Augustine's conception of God's timelessness and the concurrent simplicity of his Being totally destroys the idea that the Bible is actually the word of God in its specific and direct meanings. If God speaks all things "once and forever," the historical newness of biblical revelation is displaced to the level of historically and culturally conditioned utterances.

tradition. According to this pattern of revelation, God allowed eternal, timeless truth to be intellectually grasped by biblical writers. That action constituted the ground and content of propositional revelation. This position entails the view that not all contents of Scripture were epistemologically originated by God's action. On the contrary, large portions of Scripture were generated through the normal human process of intellection. Recognizing that not all excerpts of Scripture are revealed, inspiration is needed to safeguard the divine character of Scripture as a whole. Scripture would be partially revealed and totally inspired. The liberal model also recognizes one pattern or mode of divine revelation. Revelation is the existential, noncognitive, divine-human encounter. Its content is always the same. Variety comes only from the human side. The whole content of Scripture is generated by human beings. Of course these human beings have been "supernaturally touched," yet God's divine touch happens in the existential rather than cognitive or linguistic level. God does not originate nor provide the contents of Scripture. In this specific epistemological sense, then, the liberal model recognizes that no section of Scripture is either revealed or inspired.

God's revelation, as it pertains to the cognitive origin of the contents of Scripture, belongs to the area of communication between two minds. According to Emilio Betti, the mind that originates the communication produces a variety of "meaning-full forms."[21] When the human mind initiates the origination of meaning-full forms, these may include "from fleeting speech to fixed documents and mute remainders, from writing to *chiffres* and to artistic symbol, from articulate language to figurative or musical representation, from explanation to active behaviour, from facial expression to ways of bearing and types of character."[22] Since in revelation the divine mind is capable of

[21]Emilio Betti explains that "meaning-full forms" (*sinnhaltige Formen*) are "to be understood in a wide sense as an homogeneous structure in which a number of perceptible elements are related to one another and which is suitable for preserving the character of the mind that created it or that is embodied in it" ("Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften*," 54). In his groundbreaking treatise on interpretation, Betti refers to "meaning-full forms" as "forma rappresentativa." "Forma" is understood in the most general way as "di rapporto unitario di elementi sensibili, idoneo a serbare l'impronta di chi l'ha foggiato o di chi lo incarna (es.: il viso di una persona)." While "rappresentativa" is understood "nel senso che attraverso la forma debba rendersi a noi riconoscibile, facendo appello alla nostra sensibilità e intelligenza, un *altro spirito* diverso dal nostro e tuttavia intimamente affine al nostro" (*Teoria Generale della Interpretazione* [Milano: Dott. A. Giuffrè, 1990], 62).

[22]Betti, "Hermeneutics as the General Methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften*," 53. See also Betti, *Teoria Generale della Interpretazione*, 60.

functioning not only according to the patterns proper to its own divinity, but also according to the lower ontological and epistemological levels of the intended recipient, it is logical to assume that any meaning-full form that can be produced by a human mind can also be created by the divine mind.[23] Furthermore, because of his divine nature God is able to create meaning-full forms in patterns that fall outside the range of human cognition and action. Even then, however, God produces these forms of cognitive communication within the realm in which human cognition works: historically, within space and time. Thus, revelation assumes God's condescension and his ability to work directly within the lower level of human, historical cognition.[24]

Human perception of God's activities and their patterns of meaning-full forms will always be limited, both for the original prophet[25] and for any subsequent interpreter of prophetic utterances. Thus, it is impossible to reach full awareness of all the patterns in which God is able to act or has already acted in the epistemological origination of Scripture. Likewise, any attempt to determine with precision and finality which divine actions have contributed to the generation of the contents of each portion of Scripture seems futile. However, a proper understanding of revelation-inspiration requires the acknowledgement that various different divine activities may contribute to the origination of any passage of Scripture.

The identification of the main patterns utilized by God in the generation of Scripture cannot be rationally deduced from his nature but rather described from the phenomena of Scripture.[26] Some of the meaning-full forms utilized by God in the generation of Scripture are explicit in Scripture. For instance, we discover God presenting himself in history to human beings (theophanies; Exod 3:1-15; John 1:1-14), writing (Exod 31:18; Deut 9:10), speaking (Exod 20:1; Rev 19:9; Gen

[23]The liberal model recognizes that revelation is an act "from mind to mind," yet in revelation God does not act within the human level of cognition. The mind-to-mind encounter is not "a body of information concerning certain things about which we might otherwise be ignorant" or "information about God, but the very God Himself" (Jack W. Provonsha, "Revelation and History," *AUSS* 2 [1964]: 111-112). See also Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 1:241.

[24]The concept of God's condescension is not new. For an exploration of divine condescension in the context of the doctrine of revelation-inspiration see Bernard Ramm, *Special Revelation and the Word of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961), 31-52.

[25]When employed without qualification, I use the term "prophet" as synonymous with "biblical writer," not in the specific sense of the writer of predictions.

[26]By the expression "phenomena of Scripture," I am referring to the actual cognitive-linguistic contents of Scripture as we know them.

15:1; 20:3), giving visual representations (Isa 6:1-3; Ezek 43:3; Dan 7:2; Acts 10:9-17; 16:9; Rev 9:7), historically acting in history (Isa 43:18-19; 46:11; Dan 2:21), and acting in relation to the life experience of an individual (Lam 3:1; Prov 1:7; Eccl 1:12;17).[27] All these divine activities produced, historically in history, meaning-full forms that communicated cognitive contents from the mind of God to the mind of the biblical author or prophet. These meaning-full forms are the epistemological origin of the ideas, contents, and information supplied to the mind of the biblical writer in the process of revelation, and also of the content of what he expresses in oral or written form.

From what has been described thus far it seem reasonable to infer that God's production of meaning-full forms, as depicted in Scripture, allows for at least five main patterns of revelation. In order of decreasing cognitive specificity these are: theophanic, direct writing, prophetic, historical, and existential.[28] No single pattern can, by itself, account for the richness and manifoldness of biblical revelation. Moreover, it is likely that in producing Scripture, God employed additional patterns which could be discovered through a careful phenomenological analysis of Scripture. Let me reiterate, variety in Scripture is not primarily caused by limitations in the human agent, but rather intentionally produced by the various patterns of divine revelatory activity.[29] The multiplicity of patterns utilized by God in producing meaning-full forms allows the historical-cognitive model of

[27]These biblical references are only a sample of biblical passages speaking to each divine activity.

[28]Studying the Gospel of Luke, George E. Rice came to the conviction that the Bible was produced by two patterns or models, the prophetic and the "Lucan" models of inspiration (*Luke, a Plagiarist?* [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1983], 9-16). Rice's view challenges the classical approach that recognizes only one pattern of divine activity. Moreover, since Rice was not attempting to explain the epistemological origination of Scripture as a whole, but rather to contest the idea that the Gospel of Luke was produced only by way of the prophetic pattern, his conclusion does not preclude our contention that additional patterns have been involved in the generation of Scripture.

[29]Abraham J. Heschel explores the prophetic experience from an Old Testament perspective. His study attempts to penetrate into the biblical view of the prophet's activity. Heschel, however, does not deal with the divine role in the origination of prophetic discourse with the detail, specificity, and faithfulness to biblical data I expected. In this matter, he seems to be under the influence of the liberal model. Heschel appears to be somewhat ambiguous on this facet of the prophetic experience. On one hand, he explicitly argues against the liberal idea of poetic inspiration (*The Prophets* [New York: Harper & Row, 1962], 145-169; for the poetic nature of biblical language see Ricoeur, "Herméneutique de l'idée de révélation," 41-42). On the other hand, by the end of the book, Heschel's conclusions sound very much like those of the liberal model (265-268).

revelation-inspiration to extend the divine activity of revelation to the whole range of Scripture.

Human Activity

God's generation of meaning-full patterns does not per se originate either the actual contents or the letter of Scripture. Meaning-full patterns are concrete vehicles utilized to communicate divine meaning. Communication unavoidably requires more than the divine production of meaning-full patterns. Meaning must not only be originated but also received. The reception of meaning is performed by the human nature of the biblical writer, notably involving his cognitive capabilities. For the communication of meaning to occur, both communicator and receptor must work within the same cognitive parameters. After this necessary condition for the possibility of revelation is met, the role of the human receptor in relation to the constitution of the meaning received is to be ascertained.

First, then, let us consider the requirement according to which both the originator and the recipient of the meaning-full forms must work within the same ontological and epistemological level for cognitive communication to occur. The presuppositional structure of the historical-cognitive model I am proposing understands man's capabilities to be essentially temporal and historical. There is no timeless agent intellect[30] as assumed by the classical theory. Reason is not capable of reaching the realm of timeless truths.[31] According to Scripture, human nature is not the timeless substance, commonly known as soul, in which the rational capabilities are grounded.[32] As modernism and postmodernism also reject this position, they only come to recognize what was assumed all along in Scripture. Since, as explained above, God is capable of originating and constituting the meaning-full forms and patterns of revelation historically in history, that is, within the very same realm in which human reason normally functions, the basic condition for the cognitive communication between originating and receiving minds is met.

[30]See Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," 14, 20, 22, 26.

[31]In this respect the historical-cognitive model follows the broad interpretation of human reason accepted by modernism and postmodernism. I am not suggesting, however, that the historical-cognitive model subscribes to any particular philosophical interpretation of reason. Rather, I am saying that in their interpretation of the cognitive capabilities of man, modernism and postmodernism have come closer to the scriptural position than the classical model.

[32]On this issue see, for instance, the concise but clear study by Oscar Cullmann: *Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead?* (New York: Macmillan, 1958).

From this, an important consequence follows. In the reception of the divinely originated meaning-full patterns, the reason of the receiving agent, the prophet, does not require the supernatural elevation of its powers. The historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration, then, does not require the charismatic elevation of reason's faculties by the supernatural activity of the Holy Spirit.

Even though in general terms it agrees with the liberal model on the understanding of human cognition, the historical-cognitive model differs from it even more than from the classical model because here a cognitive communication is accepted, whereas in the liberal model no cognitive communication is even possible. Departing from both the classical and liberal views, the historical-cognitive model accepts the biblical conception, according to which the communication involved in revelation-inspiration occurs not only within the cognitive but also within the temporal-historical level of reality, thereby not requiring a supernatural elevation of human reason either in revelation or inspiration.

Let us now turn briefly our attention to the role that the human receptor plays in the process of revelation. Is the process of reception totally passive, thus adding or contributing nothing to the meaning-full patterns received? Or is the reception also active, contributing to the very generation of the revealed ideas or contents? If the prophet's mind is active, not only in receiving, but also in contributing to the understand-ing of what is being transmitted, what is the nature of his contribution?

Once the historical characteristics of the human receptor are recognized, a pivotal feature of the function of human cognition comes into view, namely, the content and origination of the rational a priori. A phenomenological description of the role of human cognition reveals that the apprehension of any given object involves not only a receptive, passive function, but also a creative, active one.[33] The same dynamics are present in the reception of meaning-full forms created by another mind.[34] Both the receptive and creative operations of reason are related to the a priori categories brought by the cognitive agent to the event of

[33]This receptive-creative activity is a general characteristic of human knowledge (Nicolai Hartmann, *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntis* [Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1941], 1.5.c.6). Abraham J. Heschel perceives that "the prophet is responsive, not only receptive" (*The Prophets*, 137). Thus the general characteristic of human cognition remains the same, even in the prophetic experience.

[34]Betti, *Teoria generale della interpretazione*, 65,

revelation.[35] Without a priori categories the human mind cannot receive and process any meaning-full form. Thus, it is a matter not of whether the prophet had a priori categories, but rather of identifying their nature, origination, and content.

In the classical model, a priori categories are timeless possessions of the nature of reason.[36] They are not originated in history. Their content is formal rather than material, not provided by the life experience of the individual (*Lebenswelt*); it is rather an ensemble of general abstract principles, on the basis of which human reason is able to function.[37]

In the historical-cognitive model, however, the a priori categories are not grounded in timeless being or reason, but rather in the historical experience of the prophet with God's previous revelations in the *Lebenswelt*.[38] These previous revelations may include what other biblical prophets have said and written and even personal revelations given by

[35]It is important to draw as clearly as possible the distinction between epistemology and hermeneutics. In this article epistemology refers to the study of the way human knowledge functions. Consequently, epistemology includes both theory of knowledge and philosophy of sciences. Hermeneutics is a closely related but somehow more limited enterprise. Hermeneutics studies the way we know other human beings indirectly through their multifarious expressions (see Bleicher, 90). Hermeneutics, then, studies the way we know the productions of the human mind, while epistemology works with the human understanding in general and in relation to the objects of the world. There is a great deal of overlapping between epistemology and hermeneutics because epistemology produces human expressions which the development of any science needs to include.

[36]This is not the appropriate place to discuss the categories or their origination. Suffice it to say that, following Aristotle, the grounding of timeless categories in the classical model is ontological rather than epistemological as in Kant (*Metaphysics* 5.7; 7.1; 9.1; *Critique of Pure Reason*, 60-67).

[37]After enumerating the various nontechnical and technical connotations given to the term "category," José Ferrater Mora explains that in the traditional opinion, maintained not only by scholastic thinkers but also by modern historians of philosophy, "las categorías expresan *flexiones* o *casos* del ser y pueden, por consiguiente, ser definidas como *géneros supremos de las cosas, suprema rerum genera*" (*Diccionario de Filosofía* [Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1965], 1:265. Even though Aristotle hesitated to define the precise number of categories, he recognizes all sorts of categories, as many as the connotations we can find in the entity (οὐσία) (*Metaphysics* 5.7), yet the number of categories is not infinite (*Posterior Analytics* 1.22.15 [83b]).

[38]Even in philosophy there is an increasing recognition that categories come from previous experience in historical-natural reality (Edmund Husserl, *Logical Investigations* [New York: Humanities, 1970], 6, 8, §60).

God to the prophet in his or her past experience.[39] The a priori categories necessary for the reception and interpretation of the given object or meaning-full form come from the past into the present and future.[40] This movement corresponds to the flow of meaning in temporal reason.[41] In other words, the a priori categories that the prophet needs in order to understand what is being communicated by way of the meaning-full forms created by God originate in the past life experience of the prophet. This past experience is directly instrumental in enabling the prophet to receive the meaning God is communicating in the present by way of the meaning-full patterns of revelation.[42] However, the historical origination and content of the a priori categories, which the prophet brings to the cognitive event of revelation, are not to be identified with changing human culture, as is done in the liberal model.

Since concrete human experiences are never identical, the actual content of the a priori categories in the mind of biblical authors varied greatly. This brings up the issue of whether theological pluralism is to be recognized at the very inception of biblical contents. Were the meaning-full forms originated by God interpreted by cultural,

[39]Heschel sees the prophet as "*homo sympathetikos*" (88). The prophet has a "sympathetic solidarity with God" (91). I think that Heschel's "*homo sympathetikos*" describes the prophetic a priori, yet a complete epistemological account of the origination of Scripture requires that the prophet's "sympathetic solidarity with God" should include not only feelings but, primarily, the presuppositional structure and doctrines generated by previous revelations.

[40]Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), 9.

[41]Maurice Merleau-Ponty calls this historical conception of the cognitive a priori "thickness" (*Phenomenology of Perception* [Atlantic Highlands: New Press, 1964], 433. See also Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper, 1962), 2.5.75 and 76. Cf. William E. Reiser, "An Essay in the Development of Dogma in a Heideggerian Context: A Nontheological Explanation of Theological Heresy," *Thomist* 39 (1975): 475. Contrary to the past-to-present-and-future movement of historical reason, the historical-critical method of exegesis interprets the past in terms of the present (Ernest Troeltsch, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2, *Zur religiösen Lage, Religionphilosophie und Ethik* [Tübingen: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1922], 729-753; Gerhard von Rad, *Old Testament Theology*, 2 vols. [New York: Harper and Row, 1962], 1:107, n. 3).

[42]This dynamic was utilized by Jesus himself when after the resurrection he undertook the task of explaining the events of his crucifixion and resurrection (Luke 24:25-49).

historically conditioned categories, as maintained by the liberal model?[43] As I will return to the concept of historical conditionality of biblical writings in the next section, suffice it to say that the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration does not see the historical generation of the prophet's a priori categories as leading to either a theological pluralism or an acceptance of the historical conditionality of biblical writings.

The concrete history of the biblical author chronologically and logically precedes the process of revelation-inspiration. That history shapes both what the prophet is and the content of his or her cognitive categories. However, the historical existence and experience of the prophet is always chronologically and logically preceded by divine revelation already in possession of the community of faith either in an oral or written form.[44] In other words, the category-forming history of the prophet is not independent but rather dependent on God's previous revelation.[45] It is not by chance that Isaiah, seemingly working within the historical-cognitive model, clearly stated that in evaluating claims to supernaturally originated discourse the criteria are unmistakable: "To the law and to the testimony! If they [mediums and spiritists] do not speak according to this word, they have no light of dawn" (8:20). The assumption, very logical indeed, is that God does not contradict himself in the communication of revelation through his prophets. In other words, an accurate evidence that a prophet is introducing privately originated ideas becomes apparent when his or her spoken or written words contradict previously stated divine revelation.

A God who is able to act historically in history is, for that precise reason, also able to influence the historical development of the prophet and his or her cognitive categories without forcing freedom and independence. The prophet experiences providential, divine guidance in

[43]By "theological pluralism" I mean the idea that in Scripture we find different theologies not always compatible among themselves. A classical example of this may be Luther's difficulty to integrate James' theology with Paul's. James and Paul, it is suggested, just had incompatible views on the role works play in salvation. Hence, theological pluralism in Scripture.

[44]"The inspiration of the prophet is distinguished, not only by an awareness of its source and of a will to impart the content of inspiration, but also by the coherence of the inspired messages as a whole (with their constant implication of earlier communications), by the awareness of being a link in the chain of the prophets who preceded him, and by the continuity which links the revelations he receives one to another. The words that come to him form a coherence of closely related revelations, all reflecting the illumination and the sense of mission shed by the call. There is both a thematic and a personal unity of experience" (Heschel, 169).

[45]Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 1:206.

the development of his or her a priori cognitive categories. This divine education—a concrete, historical form of education, understood in the broadest possible meaning of the word—embraces the whole life span of the prophet. On this ground, it is possible to understand that even when no two prophets interpret the divinely originated meaning-full forms with the same a priori categories (life experience), no theological pluralism follows because the variety in the content of their a priori experiences is not systematic or doctrinal, but rather cultural and personal.[46]

A specific distinction between the kinds of a priori categories the prophet brings to the event of revelation needs to be drawn. The historical experience of any human being includes a variety of different facets which cannot be compressed into an undifferentiated whole. Among the many aspects included in the life experiences of any human being, five play a decisive role in the cognitive process. In order of importance, the five levels always present in the prophet's a priori are: presuppositional structure, doctrinal conceptions, sociocultural idiosyncrasies, personal life experiences, and individual personal traits. All of them are always present in the constitution of meaning, including the specific experience of the prophet receiving and interpreting divinely originated meaning-full forms.

Because of the logical and chronological priority of revelation over the life experiences of the prophet and the historical involvement of God in the development of the prophet's historically generated a priori categories, it is reasonable to assume that biblical writers developed,

[46]See note 41 above. Hans Küng, quoting Ernst Käsemann's view that in the New Testament "we have to confirm the presence not just of considerable tensions but often too of irreconcilable theological contradictions" (*Begründet der neutestamentliche Kanon die Einheit der Kirche? Exegetische Versuche und Besinnungen I* [1960], 218, in Hans Küng, *Theology for the Third Millennium: An Ecumenical View* [New York: Doubleday, 1988], 66), recognizes the existence of a "partially manifest incompatibility of the theological positions in the New Testament" (ibid.). James Dunn seems to come close to this same position as he concludes that a comparison of thought patterns in the New Testament reveals that they by no means "always complemented each other; on the contrary, they not infrequently clashed, sometimes fiercely" (*Unity and Diversity in the New Testament: An Inquiry Into the Character of Earliest Christianity* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977], 372; cf. ibid., *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* [London: SCM, 1975], 359). Without in any way denying the diversity that Käsemann, Küng, and Dunn perceive in Scripture, one wonders whether viewing theological contradictions and clashes in Scripture is not due to replacing the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure with philosophical and scientific principles. When theology is interpreted on the basis of the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure, it is possible to see how the diversity present in Scripture does not involve competing or contradicting theological positions.

through the divinely guided historical process of education, a common understanding of the first two facets of the a priori—the presuppositional structure and doctrinal teachings. At the same time, they differed greatly at the sociocultural and personal levels. In this way we can explain the general theological harmony throughout Scripture and at the same time the rich diversity of concepts and manners of expression present in Scripture. Thus, the a priori condition for the understanding of God's historically generated meaning-full forms was developed not in isolation from God, but rather under his direct and pervasive influence. In this way the a priori categories required for a harmonious and noncontradictory understanding of God's multifarious patterns of revelation were worked out in the life and mind of the prophet.

Awareness that the human agent was not only a passive receptor but also an active contributor in the generation of the revealed content as explained above might have been one reason for Peter's somewhat enigmatic clarification that πᾶσα προφητεία γραφῆς ἰδίας ἐπιλύσεως οὐ γίνεται (2 Pet 1:20).[47] Because the human agent is actively involved, not only receiving but also interpreting the divinely originated meaning-full form patterns of revelation, Peter makes clear that such a contribution does not involve the private, independently originated, subjective opinions of the biblical writer. As already explained, the a priori categories through which the prophet received and interpreted the meaning-full patterns generated by God are grounded in previously given and consciously accepted revealed contents.

The Essence or Nature of Revelation

According to the historical-cognitive model, the essence of revelation is cognitive. Revelation is the communication of knowledge from God to humankind through the prophet. In this general sense the historical-cognitive model agrees with the classical model, yet the former departs from the latter in the way the essence of knowledge is interpreted. According to the historical-cognitive model, the nature of the cognition involved in revelation is temporal and historical.[48]

[47]A. C. Thiselton presents a brief description of scholarly interpretations of this Petrine statement ("ἐπιλύω," *NIDNTT* 1:578-579).

[48]The temporal-historical understanding of knowledge is not restrictive but rather inclusive of all human experiences, including personal feelings and moods (see Heidegger's discussion of mood as state-of-mind [*Being and Time*, 172-179]). David Tracy describes the broad way in which I am using the word "cognition" here in reference to the concept of understanding. To know (cognition) is to understand, and to understand is to interpret. In its broad sense interpretation includes experience, understanding, deliberation, judgment, decision, and action (*Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope* [San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987], 9). Thus interpreted, human cognition is able to

The historical-cognitive conception of the essence of revelation logically follows from the preceding interpretation of the divine and human activities involved in the process of revelation outlined above. It seems clear that the essence of revelation as cognition corresponds to the essence of human rather than divine cognition. The lower is not capable of the higher but the higher is capable of the lower.

The traditional concept of God's condescension applies here. Adaptation to the parameters of human cognition is possible because, according to the historical-cognitive model, God is able to act directly within the lower level of space and time. Through his condescension, he is able to enter into and share directly in the characteristics of space and time, both ontologically and epistemologically. God's revelation, then, is produced by acquiescing to the main characteristics of human cognition, as it is interpreted historically. At the same time, this entry of God into the lower level of human cognition becomes the very ground for the essence of revelation as cognitive event. As Heidegger puts it, human cognition originates when past experience and openness to the future coalesce into a moment of vision.[49] In the case of the prophet, God, by his continuous and direct historical presence and activity within the spatial-temporal parameter of human history, sets the concrete historical content of the prophet's past recollection and future openness. Thus, in the moment of vision, the prophet, through the possession of previously originated categories, receives and interprets the meaning-full forms created by God.

It follows that the mode of cognition involved in the epistemological origination of Scripture is not divine and, therefore, absolutely perfect, but rather human, including all the limitations and imperfections of the human mode of cognition.[50] It is important to underline that here I am referring to the mode of the revealed contents and not

include the personal and existential aspects of the divine-human encounter. The sometimes-called "incarnational" understanding of revelation does not happen without, but rather within, the general realm of human experience. And human experience is never independent from knowledge.

[49]"*Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially* **futural** *so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factical 'there' by shattering itself against death—that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of* **having-been**, *can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be* **in the moment of vision** *for 'its time.' Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate—that is to say, authentic historicality*" (*Being and Time* 2.5.74, emphasis original).

[50]As an example of a partial description of the essential limitedness and incompleteness of historical cognition, see Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967), 137-138.

to the contents themselves. Neither the truth nor the divine origination of biblical contents is contradictory to the affirmation of the human mode of cognition through which biblical revelation was generated.

If one accepts that the mode in which the epistemological origination of biblical contents took place is that of human cognition as historically interpreted, a further departure from the classical and liberal models is inevitable. The process of revelation that brought Scripture into existence can no longer be conceived as historically conditioned. The essence of revelation rather resides in its historical constitution. Thus, I come back to a rather complex issue mentioned in the first article of this series. A rigorous exploration of its intricacy would lead us far beyond the purpose and limits of this essay. However, since this distinction belongs to the essence of revelation according to the historical-cognitive model, a preliminary clarification is in order.

The historical consciousness developed in Western philosophical and scientific circles since the Enlightenment has influenced Christian theology to the point that, without much technical explanation, the historical conditionality of Scripture is accepted as an irrefutable fact by both classical and liberal theologians. When the contents of Scripture are conceived as historically conditioned, the historical-critical method of biblical interpretation appears to be better suited to a scientifically sound and theologically rewarding reading of Scripture. Let us inquire briefly into the meaning of historical conditionality.

The classical and liberal models view the contents of Scripture as historically conditioned. The understanding of what "historically conditioned" means requires a clear awareness of the epistemological configuration of both models. At this point a review of my description of classical and liberal models may prove helpful.[51] On this basis a brief explanation describing the theological position encapsulated in the "historically conditioned" qualification of Scripture may suffice for comparison with the "historical constitution" of Scripture espoused by the historical-cognitive model.

A condition differs from a cause in that the latter has the positive sense of being that on the basis of which something happens or comes into being, while the former has the negative undertone of being that without which something would not come to pass.[52] This definition means that both the cause and the condition need to be present to produce a given result.

[51]See Canale, "Revelation and Inspiration: The Classical Model," and "Revelation and Inspiration: The Liberal Model."

[52]Ferrater Mora, 1:329.

Classical and liberal models of revelation-inspiration designate the temporal-historical level of reality as condition, while the timeless activity of God—cognitive or existential—is given the role of cause. The classical Platonic dualistic epistemology is at work here setting the parameters of this distinction. Plato, in a very subtle way, is still exercising his influence in classical and modern theology by imperceptibly determining the interpretation of the presuppositional framework of both models. In short, the temporal and historical do not belong to the essence of revelation-inspiration, but only to the process of its expression, which does not form part of the content of revelation.[53] Viewing Scripture in this light requires that the historical level be methodologically disregarded in order to accede to the imagined ultimate cause or meaning, which always stands beyond the historical realm.[54]

In conceiving the essence of revelation-inspiration to be historically constituted, the historical-cognitive model departs from the historical conditionality of Scripture. The historical constitution of biblical thinking and contents logically follows from the interpretation of divine and human activities. To put it briefly, meaning is constituted, generated, and originated within the parameters proper to the nature of human thought when historically interpreted. When the essence of the mode of knowledge in which the epistemological origination of biblical thinking came to pass is understood historically, exegetes and theologians do not need to look beyond the apparent historical meanings of biblical words by imagining the existence of a timeless referent beyond the text and thereby replacing interpretation with imagination.

The historical constitution of meaning came to pass as God, in his wisdom and love, making use of his power, reached into the lower level of human historical reality and cognition (divine condescension). Once

[53]Theologians such as Rudolf Bultmann think that prophets used the ideology and scientific information available to them as external vehicles for the expression of timeless, transcendent revelation. Within this frame of mind, Bultmann argues that the concept of λόγος in the prologue to the Gospel of John could not have been taken from the Old Testament, but rather from Gnosticism and its Platonic antecedent (*The Gospel of John: A Commentary* [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971], 19-36). In this view, biblical data are freely borrowed from the culture of the times, the only available historically conditioned vehicle to express in human words the revelation of the timelessly conceived God.

[54]Even in scholars committed to the exegetical discovery of truth in the text of Scripture, the acceptance of the historical conditionality of Scripture leads to its historical relativity and, consequently, to the relativity of its authority; see, for instance, James Dunn, "The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture," *Churchman* 96 (1982): 212-214.

within this level, God originated meaning-full forms that were grasped by the historical cognition of the prophet, which included his or her a priori categories. From the conjunction and contribution of both divine originator and human receptor the content of revelation came to existence in the mind of the prophet. The result was a historically constituted revelation which, through the additional process of inspiration (see below), became a historically constituted text. The referent of a historically constituted text is always found within the general parameters of space and time. All the intelligibilities captured within the historically constituted text, including the limitations and contributions of the human agents, are the content of revelation and the source of theological data.

The Content of Revelation

The historical-cognitive model of revelation maintains that the epistemological origination of biblical contents was produced by the conjunct activity of God and man. God originated various patterns of meaning-full forms within the historical parameters proper to human existence and knowledge. Chosen men and women received and simultaneously interpreted the God-given meaning-full forms by means of the necessary a priori categories which were historically generated and shaped by the prophet's willful reception of God's prior revelations. Thus conceived, *revelation is at the inception of all biblical contents. The whole content of Scripture is revealed by God.*

This affirmation is possible when the idea of God's cognitive activities is broadened from one fixed pattern to include a variety of patterns which, in their ampleness, are able to account for the divine origination of the entire Scripture. At the same time, the idea of variety in revelatory patterns entails variety in revealed contents and ideas. It is not difficult to see that the historical-cognitive model calls for a broad variety in the thought content and issues addressed in Scripture. The content of Scripture, therefore, cannot be understood in the singular but in the plural. We do not have "a content," but rather an amazingly rich "variety of contents." Likewise, the contents of Scripture do not refer to eternal timeless truths or existential encounters, but rather address the historical reality of God in direct relation to creation and sinful human history. Notably, the contents of Scripture include the multifarious aspects of the truths God conveyed in biblical revelation, including the whole historical development, unfolding from creation to new creation.

Finally, the written content of revelation, which coincides with the entire extent of Scripture from Genesis to Revelation, is to be seen as

a *brief summary of revelation.* The classical and liberal models view Scripture as an exaggerated enlargement of an otherwise very simple and succinct essential cognitive or existential content. According to these theories, much of Scripture does not directly belong to the essential content of revelation. John seems to disagree with these theories. At the end of his Gospel he states the obvious: "Jesus did many other things as well" (John 21:25). These many other things are not recorded in John's Gospel, but were known either by John or other disciples. John clearly understood that the range of meaning-full forms created by the theophanic-historical pattern of Jesus' life overflowed the capability of thinking and writing of all possible writers. John continues: "If every one of them were written down, I suppose that even the whole world would not have room for the books that would be written." Undoubtedly, these books would include both the "acts of Jesus," which constituted the meaning-full forms given to the disciples, and the interpretation unavoidably originated by their reception. Scripture is, therefore, a compact synthesis of revelation. Instead of searching for an essential meaning behind the words of Scripture, openly disregarding the compressed summary of revelation given in the whole of Scripture, theologians and believers should be attentive and submissive to its whole content as historically generated, conceived, and expressed.

4. *Inspiration in the Historical-cognitive Model*

Throughout this series of articles, inspiration has been defined as the process by means of which the contents generated by revelation were given an oral or written formulation. The fact that human authors were directly involved in the production of Scripture is uncontestable. However, Peter reminds us that ὑπὸ πνεύματος ἁγίου φερόμενοι ἐλάλησαν ἀπὸ θεοῦ ἄνθρωποι (2 Pet 1:21). Totally agreeing with Peter, Paul reaffirms the basic Christian idea that God did not leave the prophets to write by themselves. On the contrary, because πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος (2 Tim 3:16; cf. 2 Pet 1:21), God is to be recognized as directly involved in the writing of Scripture. Since the term "God-breathed" involves a general concept which "does not imply any particular mode of inspiration," the mode or pattern of divine intervention in the writing of Scripture remains open to theological inquiry.[55]

The Role of Divine Activity in Inspiration

The interpretation of the role played by the divine agency logically and methodologically depends on the previous grounding revelation

[55]"Γραφή," *NIDNTT*, 3:491.

event. In other words, according to the historical-cognitive model, the interpretation of inspiration is founded on the process of revelation rather than on a direct intervention of God in the process of writing, which would thus bypass or minimize revelation. The process of inspiration is subordinated to the process of revelation and its cognitive outcome. Thus, God's role in inspiration is never his first and sole intervention in the process of generating Scripture. The process of writing is not one through which contents are originated, but rather they are communicated to a larger audience. Inspiration releases revelation from the cognitive confines of the mind of the prophet into a new ontological realm, namely, that of the written word.[56]

Having restated this working distinction, I must point out that the process of writing simultaneously involves the process of thinking. It is impossible to write without at the same time being engaged in thinking. The thinking that occurs while one writes is not always memory-driven, but involves also the creation and generation of new ideas and contents. Consequently, it seems that it is not always possible to draw a clear line of demarcation between revelation and inspiration. In other words, sometimes revelation and inspiration may occur simultaneously. Yet, the essence of their processes is different: That of revelation is cognitive, while that of inspiration is linguistic.

Because the historical-cognitive model acknowledges God's direct involvement in the generation of the contents of Scripture as a whole, the process of writing does not need to add, modify, or upgrade what has already been constituted through the process of revelation. On the contrary, God's contributions to the process of writing may be conceived as including two main patterns: (1) a general historical supervision pattern embracing the entire Scripture and (2) an occasional, remedial, corrective, historical-intervention pattern.

Through his omniscience and omnipresence God is directly aware of everything, including the thought process and linguistic activities of the prophets. Divine awareness and specific knowledge of what is going on in the mind of the prophet and in his or her linguistic operations correspond to the general historical supervision pattern of God's inspiration. It represents a nonintrusive yet direct overview of the entire process of writing Scripture. This pattern is the necessary condition for

[56]Paul Ricoeur, *From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 106-110; José Severino Croatto, *Biblical Hermeneutics: Toward a Theory of Reading as the Production of Meaning* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1987), 16-17.

the various occurrences of the occasional direct remedial-corrective pattern.

God's specific historical interventions in the process of proclaiming divine revelation in an oral or written form are designed to ensure three things: (1) that the prophet remains God's representative, not replacing God's contents with his or her own interpretations or ideas; (2) that the prophet is assisted in finding the most fitting way to communicate revealed truth; and (3) that, on the basis of the simultaneity of writing and thinking, new ideas are originated during the actual process of writing. Only in notable circumstances did God's occasional intervention totally overrule the prophet's discourse.[57] Generally, however, God's occasional interventions had the purpose of enhancing the linguistic expressions of the prophet.

Because of the absence of biblical reflection or examples of the way biblical prophets experienced divine guidance in the moment of writing, it seems advisable that caution should be exercised in what we affirm on this issue. Because of this fact, it seems logical to conclude that any attempt to analyze the biblical text with the purpose of identifying God's historical interventions in the process of inspiration, as well as the occasions on which they took place, will render only fruitless speculative results. Additionally, it is probable that even the prophet was not specifically aware of God's occasional supernatural intervention, which might have been perceived, from the human viewpoint, as natural occurrences in the process of writing: for instance, remembering something, understanding an already-possessed information in a new light, or even coming up with a specific pivotal expression in the flow of thought.

God's occasional, direct, remedial-corrective interventions, however, should not be conceived as ways by which God overrode the essential characteristics of the human modes of cognition and language so as to eliminate their limitedness, indeterminacy, ambiguity, impreciseness, or inaccuracy. Overriding the essential characteristics of the modes of human cognition and language would render impossible God's willful condescension to communicate within human parameters.

[57]A clear, and even extreme, example of God's occasional specific intervention in which the prophet's initiative was totally overridden appears in the case of Balaam (Num 22-24). In this incident God had to override the complete discourse of the prophet because of his rebellious intention. The prophet was aware of both God's general, permanent historical supervision and his pattern of occasional interventions. Balaam knew that his purpose was so contrary to God's expressed will and intention that drastic divine intervention was unavoidable (Num 22:38).

On the basis of the grounding process through which God generated the whole contents of Scripture (2 Tim 3:16; 2 Pet 1:21) and of the two interrelated patterns of God's contributions to the process of inspiration—God's permanent historical supervision and occasional direct historical interventions—the historical-cognitive model maintains that the whole of Scripture is revealed and inspired.

As in the case of revelation, inspiration also results from God's multifarious historical activities. In proposing that God's involvement in the process of writing Scripture followed at least two major patterns, the historical-critical model departs from the classical model, which conceives inspiration under only one pattern of divine activity, a uniform, constant, and charismatic intervention intended to elevate the linguistic-cognitive capabilities of the writer.

The Role of Human Activity in Inspiration

The process of writing Scripture followed all the general modes and patterns proper to human speech and language, thus harmoniously corresponding to the cognitive essence, modes, and patterns of revelation. Additionally, the actual writing of Scripture necessarily integrated the characteristics corresponding to the specific languages employed. Not only did divine activities cover the entire scope of the literary production of Scripture; direct and constant human activity was also continuously present throughout the same process. Thus, the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration maintains that the inspiration of Scripture is, in its entirety, a divine-human process. It is possible to state, then, that Scripture is fully divine and fully human.[58]

As in the case of revelation, the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration does not require a charismatic supernatural elevation of human writing capabilities to make prophets "super writers," thus overcoming the normal limitations of human language and writing. God speaks to us directly in human language and by means of a human book. The words of the prophets, in their entirety, are the words of God; yet the words in which God speaks to us are human and, therefore, involve the limitations of the human modes of language

[58]The analogy between the incarnation of Christ in a human body and that of God in Scripture is of little help in understanding either incarnation. Affirming the analogy between Christ and Scripture as incarnations of God requires that the same interpretation of the presuppositional structure be utilized in both. In the case of Scripture the fully divine and fully human nature belong to the epistemological realm. In the case of Christ, the same affirmation corresponds to the deeper, grounding, ontological level. For a brief discussion of the way Karl Barth utilized this analogy and its repercussions for his understanding of Scripture, see Frank Hasel, "The Christological Analogy of Scripture in Karl Barth," *TZ* 50 (1994): 41-49.

and writing. God speaks to us in various ways, all of them embedded within the characteristics and limitations of human thought and language. That is precisely the only way in which he could and can speak to us. The production of Scripture required that the divine intelligence, belonging to a higher ontological level and working within a higher epistemological mode, should enter the lower level in which the recipient of the divinely originated process of communication functions. Therefore, the thought patterns of God and his divine, transcendent, perfect language are not represented in Scripture.[59] However, due to the fact that God generated Scripture through the interrelated process of revelation-inspiration, in spite of their humanly limited modes the historically originated contents of Scripture are directly, in their plain historical meaning, the word of God.

The Essence of Inspiration

The essence of inspiration consists in the historic-linguistic process by means of which the cognitive contents generated by the divine-human process of revelation were put into writing. Consequently, the essence of inspiration also involves the harmonious working together of the divine and human agencies. This "working together" of God and prophet, present in both revelation and inspiration, is to be conceived along the lines of historical interrelations or, in biblical terminology, "*κοινωνία*."[60]

This personal, historical understanding of the way in which the divine and human agents work in the inspiration of Scripture significantly departs from the supernatural charismatic conception of the classical model. It is true that by way of conceiving inspiration as the "concursive," "simultaneous," "confluent," and/or "harmonious" coming together of divine and human activities the classical model did its best to recognize and accommodate the contribution of the human agency. However, the predestinational mode in which the divine activity was understood systematically affects the claims made regarding inspiration. A timeless God who is conceived to act—inspire—according to the general pattern of predestination or primary cause unavoidably reduces

[59]Ellen G. White, *Selected Messages* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958), 1:21-22.

[60]I am referring here to *κοινωνία* in one of its basic connotations, that of sharing in a close personal relationship, understood in the sense of the related verb *κοινωνέω*—"to share, have a share in, participate in," which gives the idea of possessing together, having a share, joining oneself to someone else (J. Schattenmann, "*κοινωνία*," *NIDNTT*, 1:639, 644). This is the biblical designation for divine-human communications in their most general connotation.

the real scope of human contribution in inspiration to its minimal possible expression and, at the same time, practically eliminates the personal nature of the "working together" proposed by the historical-cognitive model.

The Content of Inspiration

According to the historical-cognitive model, inspiration is co-extensive with revelation. Since the content and information of Scripture are originated through the divine-human process of revelation, the content of inspiration corresponds to the content of revelation. The content of inspiration, therefore, involves the whole of Scripture and the words in which they are expressed. It follows, then, that all the words of Scripture are the direct result of the combined and interrelated process of revelation and inspiration. All the words of Scripture are revealed and inspired. In this way the historical-cognitive model understands Paul's conviction that πᾶσα γραφὴ θεόπνευστος (2 Tim 3:16).

5. *Implications for Theology*

The historical-cognitive model has broad consequences for the way in which Scripture should be understood as source of theological data. Some of the most salient implications relate to the nature, scope, exegetical methodology, theological interpretation, and subordinate and limited role of extrabiblical sources of theological data.

The nature of theological data is linguistic-cognitive and historical because God is understood to communicate directly within the level of general and personal history. In other words, the nature of Scripture as source of theological data is linguistic-cognitive and historical because God, acting historically in human history, has generated its cognitive content utilizing the modes, characteristics, and limitations of human cognition and language.

The first implication leads to the affirmation of the *tota Scriptura* principle as the second ramification of the historical-cognitive model. This repercussion refers to the scope of theological data vis-à-vis the total content of Scripture. Since God is directly involved in the entirety of the processes of revelation and inspiration, it follows that Scripture in its entirety becomes cognitively and linguistically the source of data for the constitution of Christian theology. Besides, the historical-cognitive model provides no foundation for any attempt to differentiate between levels, hierarchies, or degrees of inspiration or revelation within Scripture. There are no privileged or "more authoritative" sections of Scripture. Consequently, no canon within the canon is to be allowed to

produce an a priori dogmatic selection of relevant theological data. Any canon within the canon directly violates the *tota* as well as the *sola Scriptura* principles.[61] Variety of content and literary form becomes an integral part of the biblical data on which theology is to be built.

The first two consequences require the formulation of an exegetical methodology that would allow Christian theologians to access the historically constituted meaning of the whole Scripture. The historical-grammatical and historical-critical methodologies depend on the same interpretations of the presuppositional structure that are at the foundation of the classical and liberal models, respectively. Therefore they are ill-prepared to process the entirety of scriptural data in their historically constituted essence.[62] A new exegetical methodology should be conceived in harmony with the presuppositional structure of the historical-cognitive model. Therefore, it should be built along the lines of a historical, phenomenological approach to the text of Scripture.[63]

[61]Thus, even the suspicion that Paul had some sort of unconsciously formulated canon within the canon for the Old Testament, as E. P. Sanders suggests, seems hasty and motivated by a classical Protestant interpretation, not properly canceled out before approaching the text (*Paul, the Lay, and the Jewish People* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983], 161-162).

[62]In this regard a distinction between methodology and procedure is to be drawn. The historical-grammatical and historical-critical methods are demoted from methods to procedures because the presuppositional structure on which they traditionally functioned has been reinterpreted. As procedures they are necessary to reach the meaning of the text but do not determine it by themselves. Due to the reinterpretation of the presuppositional structure from a timeless to a temporal-historical ground, the historical-critical method is not only demoted to the lower level of procedure, but it also suffers a reinterpretation of its reach and purpose. In dealing with history the guiding ground is the historical activities of God in history as interpreted by Scripture and not the scientific hypothetical reconstruction of the cultural milieu. Thus the method turns into procedure. And as the procedure works on a different interpretation of the intellectual ground, the secular study of history does not become the criterion for the historical interpretation of Scripture. It is probable, then, that it would be best to talk about a historical-scholarly procedure rather than historical-critical procedure.

[63]This methodology needs careful discussion. It necessarily includes going to the facts on which theology is to be built. Edmund Husserl calls these facts "things." Among the various facts that are given to us, he includes human products which involve hermeneutics (*The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970], 138). In the case of theology, the facts are the products of revelation-inspiration, namely, all the words and meanings of Scripture. Besides going to the facts themselves—Scripture, exegesis, and theology—we have to take a second step: philosophical-scientific ἐποχή (ibid., 135). In this phase exegetes and theologians cancel out all previously inherited theories interpreting the data which could prove to be hindrances to the understanding of Scripture. This second facet leads to a third, which allows the exegete and theologian to discover and describe the general

This is not the place to formulate or even sketch this necessary alternate exegetical methodology. Suffice it to say that to recognize or even accept the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration will make no noticeable change in Christian theology if the exegetical methodology is not reformulated.

The development of Christian theology necessitates not only the possession of revealed and inspired data and the appropriate exegetical methodology to interpret them, but also the formulation and utilization of a priori categories, which in this series of articles I have identified as presuppositional structure. Inner coherence should drive Christian theology to conceive and formulate its presuppositional structure, employing a biblical rather than philosophical or scientific interpretation.[64] If biblical authors utilized a biblically originated interpretation of the presuppositional structure, rather than depending on extrabiblical religious, philosophical, or scientific conceptions, why should we do otherwise? In determining the general hermeneutical patterns for the interpretation of Scripture (exegesis and biblical theology) and the system for the development of Christian teachings (systematic theology), it would be advisable to employ the same biblical presuppositional structure. The paradigmatic shift from a philosophical or scientific interpretation to a biblically grounded interpretation of the presuppositional structure entailed in the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration makes possible the development of Christian theology on the basis of the *sola Scriptura* principle.[65]

Finally, an additional implication of the historical-cognitive model affects the roles that related sciences—such as philosophy, factual and human sciences, and tradition—may be called to play in Christian theology. A secondary, subordinated role is directly called for by the *sola* and *tota Scriptura* principles and can be designated as the *prima Scriptura* principle. Briefly stated, philosophy, science, and tradition are not to be conceived as data on which Christian theology should be built

---

presuppositional structure assumed by the biblical writers (ibid., 139). This third step is needed for the development of exegesis and theology as sciences.

[64]The basic contents of the biblical presuppositional structure have been identified and utilized in the conception and formulation of the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration suggested in this article.

[65]Only this paradigmatic shift at the presuppositional-structure level can answer or even reverse Pannenberg's assessment that the Scripture principle is in crisis, and that a theology "concerned only with the special aspects of revelation and thus only with the interpretation of Scripture, regardless of the results attained by other sciences from their presuppositions," is an "illusion" ("The Crisis of the Scripture-Principle in Protestant Theology," *Dialog* 2 (1963): 308.

or its methodologies and presuppositional structure determined. Extrabiblical sources are to be approached critically.[66] Aristotle expressed the need to be critical of tradition by politely stating that "piety requires us to honour truth above our friends."[67] In a secondary sense, however, there may be times and opportunities in which some facts resulting from the activities of philosophy, science, and tradition might become useful for the theological task. Yet, the utilization of such information must always be subordinated to a criticism and reinterpretation of its meaning by way of the application of the *sola* and *tota Scriptura* principles. In the development of Christian theology, then, extrabiblical materials can be incorporated only on the basis of the *prima Scriptura* principle.

6. *Conclusion*

In this series of articles exploring the epistemological origin of Scripture I have purposely attempted to be concise. Consequently, I could not address all the related issues in the length and detail that a full development of the revelation-inspiration doctrine requires. My purpose has been to probe the main characteristics involved in the principal models of revelation-inspiration developed throughout the history of Christian theology in order to explore the possibility for and profile of an alternate approach.

Two models, very carefully and technically developed, have been already formulated. Generally speaking, Christian theology seems satisfied with these generally accepted models. At the same time, these divide Christian theology into classical and liberal camps. Our brief consideration of each model pointed out that neither is able to coherently and completely reconcile and include the basic data for any doctrine of revelation-inspiration, namely, the claims of Scripture about its divine origin and its obvious humanness, as revealed by the phenomena of Scripture.

I initiated this series designed to explore the issue of revelation and inspiration from an epistemological perspective by asking whether theological scholarship should be satisfied with already-existing theories about revelation and inspiration, or whether there would be room for the development of a new understanding of the way in which the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures were originated.

[66]In other words, additional sources are integrated by first being canceled out (philosophical-theoretical ἐποχή); then, by reinterpreting their meaning made to fit the new presuppositional structure present in the facts (Scripture) themselves.

[67]*Ethica Nicomachea*, 1, 6, 1096a, 10.

Our probing into the issue seems to provide the following answer: Besides the already-existent classical and liberal models of revelation and inspiration, there is room for an alternate model, namely, the historical-cognitive model. The possibility and framework of an alternate model reside in what had already made possible the existence of the other two competing models: the fact that the presuppositional structure on which theological models are constructed can be interpreted in different ways. The classical and liberal models differ in the philosophical bases chosen for the interpretation of their respective presuppositional structures. The historical-cognitive model, departing from the classical and liberal, defines the interpretation of its presuppositional structure from biblical thought. This step leads to a viable integration of the various patterns of biblical revelation and inspiration.[68]

As the specific contour of the historical-cognitive model was roughly depicted in this article, some readers may be wondering what is "new" in it. They may find themselves thinking that what has been presented as a "new approach" is only the old traditionally held belief. I am not claiming originality in suggesting a historical-cognitive model. I have not created the model but only recognized it in Scripture. Many others might also have recognized it simply because it is there. I hope, however, that a careful reading of this series might have led such sympathetic readers to the realization that there is a broad theological difference between what many believe when they read Scripture and go to church, and the technically conceived and formulated content of the classical and liberal models. The historical-cognitive model, in faithfulness to Scripture, basically tries to express in the technical realm of epistemology the belief that follows from a consistent phenomenological, prescientific reading of Scripture.

The succinct presentation of the epistemological possibility and characteristics of the historical-cognitive model does not suffice to draw viable conclusions regarding the issue of inerrancy or accuracy of Scripture. Unfortunately, recent emphasis on the issue of scriptural inerrancy has taken precedence over the investigation of issues that need prior clarification. For instance, additional development of the model—as well as grounding reflection on the nature of truth, error, accuracy, and exactness— is required before any attempt at even exploring this issue can be undertaken.[69] After

[68]See Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, 1:229.

[69]The issue of inerrancy of Scripture is epistemological. It questions the truth and accuracy of Scriptures. Dismissing inerrancy on the perfunctory basis that it requires the harmonization of Scripture (thereby conflicting with exegesis), that it carries with it the danger of bibliolatry, that it is pastorally disastrous (James Dunn, "The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture [Part 1]," 116-117), and that it is not a biblical teaching (Dunn, "The Authority of Scripture According to Scripture [Part 2]," 221) seems

this is done, the full revelation-inspiration doctrine needs to be developed from an analysis of the claims and phenomena of Scripture. Certainly the historical-cognitive model would depart from the way this issue has been understood by either the classical or liberal model. I suggest that this longer, more painful route be taken before hasty conclusions on the accuracy of Scripture are drawn.

Through a brief but careful exploration of the classical, liberal, and historical-cognitive models, two basic facts have become apparent. In the actual task of doing theology it is not possible to adopt the three models at the same time. Theologians must choose. Besides, it has become apparent that each model will generate and justify widely differing theologies.

Which model should Christian theology adopt? From a rational viewpoint it is impossible to make an absolute choice. Many choose on the basis of tradition or philosophical considerations. In my opinion, Christian theology should seriously consider switching from the classical and liberal models to the historical-cognitive because the latter flows directly from the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure and, in so doing, is able to harmoniously integrate both the claims and phenomena of Scripture. Having said that, let me assure Christian theologians sharing different views that, from a rational perspective, I consider the historical-cognitive model to represent a viable alternative to the classical and liberal models. Yet, by the same token, I hope those subscribing to the classical and liberal models could come to the point of realizing that, from a rational perspective, their positions are, likewise, viable alternatives to the historical-cognitive approach. If scholars and theologians presently working under the classical and liberal models are willing to concede this first step, it is possible that they may also come to the point of perceiving the way in which the historical-cognitive model is able to overcome the limitations of the classical and liberal models. The overcoming takes place by finding and systematically utilizing the biblical interpretation of the presuppositional structure of the revelation-inspiration doctrine. Thus, the cognitive aspect of the classical model is kept but reinterpreted according to a historical understanding of reality and cognition emphasized by the liberal model. As a result the historical-cognitive model not only exhibits inner rational coherence, but also grounds external coherence with the claims and phenomena of Scripture.

---

insufficient. A grounding epistemology, developed within the parameters of the presuppositional structure of the historical-cognitive model, is required before any judgment on the accuracy of Scripture could be made.

Andrews University Seminary Studies, Spring 1995, Vol. 33, No. 1, 39-54.

A TRINITARIAN FOUNDATION FOR SELF-ESTEEM

PAUL A. FISHER
1310 Third Avenue
Beaver Falls, PA 15010

Introduction

The importance of self-esteem as a necessary component of the psyche of a healthy and functional individual is generally recognized. As such, self-esteem undergirds appropriate behaviors and positive social interactions.

The purpose of this article is to identify and explain aspects of the trinitarian foundation for the maintenance of self-esteem. The study also has implications for the remediation of self-esteem problems in the context of pastoral counseling. In particular, self-esteem will be analyzed in relation to the doctrines of God, of Christ, and of the Holy Spirit.

Definition of Self-esteem

In order to effectively integrate self-esteem and specific religious beliefs, it is necessary to define the concept. This represents no easy task because of the great body of literature dealing with the topic.[1] Although there is no universally accepted definition of self-esteem, there is a generally accepted understanding of it. James Coopersmith has expressed it well:

> By self-esteem we refer to the evaluation which the individual makes and customarily maintains with regard to himself: it expresses an attitude of approval or disapproval and indicates the extent to which the individual believes himself to be capable, significant, successful, and worthy.[2]

In this perspective self-esteem is an internal process of self-evaluation as well as the resulting orientation, either negative or positive. Self-esteem

[1]For excellent surveys of studies on self-esteem, see Roy F. Baumeister, ed., *Self-esteem: The Puzzle of Low Self-Regard* (New York: Plenum, 1993); R. C. Wylie, *The Self-Concept* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1961); L. Edward Wells and Gerald Marwell, *Self-esteem: Its Conceptualization and Measurement*, Sage Library of Social Research, vol. 20 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976).

[2]Stanley Coopersmith, *The Antecedents of Self-esteem* (San Francisco: Freeman, 1967), 4-5.

represents the extent to which the individual experiences the self as capable, significant, successful, and worthy.

Self-esteem includes both thoughts (cognitions) and feelings (affections) toward the "self" as an object. In a healthy person these interact to form "a subjective and enduring sense of realistic self-approval."[3] This state of mind is possible for all normally self-conscious individuals regardless of age, race, gender, or religion.

Self-Esteem in a Psychological Context

In much of the psychological literature self-esteem is explained in terms of intrapsychic (mental) and interpersonal (social) factors. This means that self-esteem is understood exclusively in terms of mental processes and social interactions. The parameters for exploration consist of the self and its immediate interpersonal environment (significant others). In much of the research in this area the idea of a transcendent source of self-esteem is ignored. In this respect psychology reveals its strong scientific moorings. Modern science understands that all reality is comprehended entirely in the nexus of physical, empirical, cause-effect relationships.[4] In this system of thought, self-esteem is rooted firmly in the objective human condition and situation. Nathaniel Branden stated this view succinctly:

> Since man is the motor of his own actions, since his concept of himself, of the person he has created, plays a cardinal role in his motivation—he desires and needs the fullest possible experience of the reality and objectivity of that person, of his self.[5]

Psychologically, self-esteem is interpreted only in reference to the human sphere with no mention of the divine.

The psychological focus on human agency and experience, intrapsychic process, and interpersonal environment has created a situation in which expressions of dependence on God and confessions of personal sinfulness are often viewed as antithetical to self-esteem.[6] Thus some self-esteem measurement instruments are so "humanistically" biased as to result in negative assessments of believers.[7] This criticism should not be

[3]Richard L. Bednar, M. Gawain Wells, and Scott R. Peterson, *Self-esteem: Paradoxes and Innovations in Clinical Theory and Practice* (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 1989), 4.

[4]Roger A Johnson, ed., *Rudolph Bultmann: Interpreting Faith for the Modern Era* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1991), 300-301.

[5]Nathaniel Branden, *The Psychology of Self-esteem* (Los Angeles: Nash, 1969), 213.

[6]P. J. Watson, R. J. Morris, and R. W. Hood, "Antireligious Humanistic Values, Guilt, and Self-Esteem," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 26 (1987): 535-546.

[7]Ibid.

interpreted as an indictment of the ideas generated by psychology relating to self-esteem, but it does underscore the limits of psychology and the need for a complementary theological approach.

Self-esteem in a Theological Context

In much of the theological literature self-esteem is problematic because there is no integration of psychological concept and theological context.[8] A concept conditioned by the presuppositions of modern science can hardly be harmoniously integrated into a theocentric faith structure. If self-esteem is determined exclusively by intrapsychic processes and interpersonal relationships, where does God fit in?

The idea that self-esteem is rooted solely in the soil of human experience is theologically problematic.[9] True, human experience does provide the context for the satisfaction of self-esteem. However, this does not mean that experience is a closed universe with only intrapsychic and interpersonal realities. Theologically, the human experience is inexplicable apart from reference to the divine (Deut 6:5; Matt 22:37). Therefore, human experience should be interpreted with reference to the divine presence.

The Doctrine of God

The doctrine of God can be correlated with self-esteem in a number of ways. Specific aspects of these various correlations will be dealt with in the following sections.

The Transcendence of God

The affirmation of the existence of God as a transcendent, infinite divine being has implications for self-esteem (Ps 8:3-8; 2 Tim 1:7). It suggests that the ground of human worth is not contained within the

[8]The integration of psychology and Christianity is problematic in that the broad perspectives of each field appear to be diametrically opposed. See Paul C. Vitz, *Psychology as Religion: The Cult of Self-Worship* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). The difficulty of integrating self-esteem and Christian beliefs is that it attempts to correlate a concept conditioned by materialistic humanism with a theistic belief structure. The "problem is entangled in questions of semantics involving humanistic and theistic language structures" (P. J. Watson, R. W. Hood, Jr., R. J. Morris, and J. R. Hall, "Religiosity, Sin and Self-Esteem," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 13 [1985]: 126).

[9]"For if we first allow the legitimacy of the natural man's assumption of himself as the ultimate reference point in interpretation in any dimension we cannot deny his right to interpret Christianity itself in naturalistic terms" (Cornelius Van Til, "The Reformed Position," in *The Living God: Readings in Christian Theology*, ed. Millard J. Erickson (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1973), 62.

sphere of observable phenomena. Browning has expressed this idea clearly:

> It has been my contention that this inner datum of experiencing oneself as an object of primary value cannot be reducible to the totality of interpersonal sources of positive regard and empathy. Instead, it is the consistent witness of life that there is a source of human affirmation which transcends and constitutes the ground of all its specific and interpersonal origins.[10]

In the trinitarian framework, human factors in the maintenance of self-esteem are only part of the total picture. From this perspective the scientific worldview, although distinguishing human from animal and attributing high value to the human, cannot morally and logically establish a satisfactory basis for human worth.[11] The Christian worldview, however, establishes human worth on a transcendent basis. It does so through the belief that above all human sources in the maintenance of self-esteem is a God who is infinite, omnipotent, and personally involved with the individual.

An Alternative System of Self-valuing

A major process in the development of self-esteem is the comparison of the "ideal" and the "perceived" self.[12] The ideal self is an "internalization of values transmitted by significant others and the culture."[13] The value system thus formed is used to evaluate the perceived self. It has been suggested that these internalized social values can create uncertainty about self-value because the self has only relative value, based on relative social norms.[14] The trinitarian view identifies a source of self-esteem independent of social norms (Gal 2:6). In such a context human worth is not bound to particular cultural, social, or personal standards but is fixed by God and established by the divine evaluation. In Christianity the value is attributed to each individual apart from the social reference group or external criterion (Gal 3:28; Col 3:11).[15]

[10]Don S. Browning, *Atonement and Psychotherapy* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 261-262.

[11]William M. Counts, "The Nature of Man and the Christian's Self-Esteem," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 1 (1973): 39.

[12]Craig W. Ellison, *Your Better Self* (New York: Harper and Row, 1983), 3.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Gerd Theissen, *Psychological Aspects of Pauline Theology*, trans. John P. Calvin (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), 37.

[15]Ibid., 38.

Modern industrial cultures tend to measure worth in terms of superiority and success while denigrating such human limitations as weakness, inadequacy, and ordinariness.[16] This can lead to a self-esteem problem for individuals unable to measure up to such criteria.[17] In contrast to the modern value system is the value system based on the doctrine of God, as expressed in 1 Cor. 1:26, 29 (NIV):

> Brothers, think of what you were when you were called. Not many of you were wise by human standards; not many were influential; not many were of noble birth. But God chose the foolish things of the world to shame the wise; God chose the weak things of the world to shame the strong. He chose the lowly things of this world and the despised things—and the things that are not—to nullify the things that are, so that no one may boast before him.

E. L. Johnson has suggested that God actually "reverses the values of the world."[18] This reversal provides an alternative source of self-esteem for those who are not at the top of the social, moral, intellectual, or even spiritual ladder. The idea that God values the weak and sinful suggests the possibility that self-esteem is a gift of God's grace (Eph 2:8-9). In the trinitarian view, superior traits, talents, and achievements are not prerequisites to a healthy sense of self-esteem. Belief in the existence of a transcendent God and the divine affirmation of the value of every individual is sufficient.

The Person as Creature

Inherent in the doctrine of God is the distinction between the creator and the creature (Gen 1:26-27; Rom 1:25). This fundamental tenet of Christian belief, at the very heart of monotheistic religion,[19] affirms that there is only one God, the creator of the universe (Deut 6:4; 1 Chr 16:26), and all other beings are created by and subservient to the divine being (Rev 4:11, 13-14; 14:7).

The biblical creation account has profound implications for self-esteem. W. M. Counts explains that significance: "The biblical view of creation is that in every way man is a planned, purposeful, significant,

[16]V. M. Bilotta, "Pride: An Obstacle Along the Formative Journey," *Studies in Formative Spirituality* 4 (1983): 315, 318.

[17]Ibid., 321.

[18]E. L. Johnson, "Self-esteem in the Presence of God," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 13 (1985): 233.

[19]*Seventh-day Adventists Believe: A Biblical Exposition of 27 Fundamental Doctrines* (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1988), 28-35.

valuable creature."[20] The implication of this insight is that in the account of the origin of the human race a sufficient ground for self-esteem is given. Cognitive and affective components of self-esteem may be rooted in the divine creation.[21] In any case the perception of the self as the product of divine activity fixes its worth independently of achievements, attributes, and relationships.

The idea of God as creator relates to self-esteem in another way. Ernst Käsemann, reflecting on the creation account, concluded that "man cannot be defined from within his own limits."[22] In the Christian tradition the transcendent quality of human nature is emphasized.[23] However, much of the psychological literature defines the self in purely natural categories with no reference to any transcendent qualities. Theologically these transcendent aspects of the self constitute its deepest value (Matt 16:26).

Sustained reflection on the creation account might also foster a consciousness of limitation and dependence which is essential to self-esteem. In a modern technological culture which tends toward over-achievement this is a needed emphasis. Bilotta has analyzed the modern tendency: "In our culture our ordinary actual selves are not valued. Competing to win success becomes a way to become more than who we actually are. Our culture fosters the striving to develop an unreal vision of who we are."[24]

The high value placed on superiority and success might explain the well documented tendency, in both high- and low-esteem individuals, to overestimate the self.[25] The doctrine of creation might remedy this

[20]Counts, 41.

[21]In the creation account human worth is fixed by the creative activity of a transcendent God. Scientifically, this is a problematic assertion but not without precedent. In philosophy the possibility of self-esteem apart from interpersonal and intrapsychic factors has been suggested. John Deigh identified class and cultural attributions of worth in which human value is "fixed independently of one's conduct" (John Deigh, "Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique," *Ethics: An International Journal of Social, Political, and Legal Philosophy* 93 [1983]: 241).

[22]Ernst Käsemann, *Perspectives on Paul*, trans. Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 31.

[23]Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man: A Christian Interpretation* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), 1:12-18.

[24]Bilotta, 318. In the media human experience and nature are depicted in their most polished and practiced form, thus fostering an "unreal vision" of the self.

[25]R. F. Baumeister, Dianne M. Tice, and Debra G. Hutton, "Self-Presentational Motivations and Personality Differences in Self-Esteem," *Journal of Personality* 57 (1989): 547-579; B. R. Schlenker, M. F. Weigold, and J. R. Hallam, "Self-Serving Attributions in

tendency by placing emphasis on the finite and dependent nature of the self (Gen 6:3; Job 14:1-2). In this way personal limitation and deficiency could be faced and handled without denial and exaggeration.

In the trinitarian view, the transcendent ground of self-esteem is the creator God and the divine creative activity. As a creature, the self derives cognitive and affective satisfaction from a source outside the framework of experience and achievement. The biblical creation account undergirds the experience of the self as an object of primary value.

The Doctrine of Christ

The second component of the trinitarian foundation of self-esteem is the doctrine of Christ. In the trinitarian perspective the person and work of Christ are potentially significant sources of self-esteem.

The centrality and priority of the person of Jesus Christ in the context of Christian faith is usually recognized. Evangelical faith is often interpreted in christocentric terms. From this perspective the Christian life is understood as a personal relationship with Christ in which the self is subordinated to Jesus' divine authority (Matt 16:24; 1 John 5:11-12; Acts 4:12). The relevance of this idea for self-esteem is noteworthy. In the evangelical tradition, Dave Hunt and T. A. McMahon have explained that relevance: "The victorious Christian neither exalts nor downgrades himself. His interests have shifted from self to Christ."[26] This perceptual shift is significant, for the self is no longer the central value, at least ideally. This means that self-esteem is no longer derived exclusively from direct self-relevant factors. For the Christian, the person of Jesus is central in the self-esteem process.

Another aspect of Christology that is relevant for self-esteem is the affirmation of the saving work of Christ. Ellen White perceived this connection and explained: "In vain are men's dreams of progress, in vain all efforts for the uplifting of humanity, if they neglect the one source of hope and help for the fallen race."[27] From this perspective any effort to uplift humanity, in thought (self-esteem) and deed, is only temporal

---

Social Context: Effects of Self-Esteem and Social Pressure," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 58 (1990): 862; D. M. Tice and R. F. Baumeister, "Self-Esteem, Self-Handicapping, and Self-Presentation: The Strategy of Inadequate Practice," *Journal of Personality* 58 (1990): 461; David Myers, "A New Look at Pride," in *Your Better Self*, ed. Craig W. Ellison (San Francisco, CA: Harper and Row, 1983), 82-97.

[26]Dave Hunt and T. A. McMahon, *The Seduction of Christianity* (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 1985), 202.

[27]Ellen G. White, *Steps to Christ* (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1908), 21.

and insignificant apart from the saving work of Christ.[28] Following this line of reasoning, the endeavor to ground self-esteem on an exclusively humanistic basis is not sufficient. The humanistic basis consists primarily of the attributes and achievements of the self and the immediate interpersonal environment. The believer does not reject the humanistic basis of self-esteem but subjects it to a thorough christocentric critique. In this way the estimation of the self occurs only in reference to the person and work of Christ.

Incarnation

The theology of the incarnation can be correlated to self-esteem in a variety of ways. For example, it has been suggested that the incarnation provides a theological foundation for an emphasis on the self (Matt 1:18; John 1:14).[29] The significance of this idea is that human value is not secondary, but rather a primary concern for theology. The implication is that human concerns and needs are not trivial but vital (Phil 4:19). In the doctrine of the incarnation human need is connected with divine sufficiency (Matt 1:23; John 1:14). Theologically, the incarnation undergirds the endeavor to satisfy the self-esteem need. However, self-esteem is satisfied, not in a way of the individual's own devising, but through the action of God to fulfill a legitimate human need.

A second way that the incarnation is related to self-esteem is that it highlights the important status of humanity in the universal order (Gen 1:27; 2:7; Eph 3:10). Karl Barth explored this idea in his treatise on Christ's human nature: "It is only in the human and not in any other creaturely sphere that the creaturely correspondence, image and representation of the uniqueness and transcendence of God has been actualized as an event."[30] Neo-orthodox faith thus affirms the uniqueness and divinity of Christ in the human sphere. This incarnation of God marks the human as a creature of immeasurable worth and value.[31] In this view the self derives value from an event which is unrepeatable and unchangeable, the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

[28]Ellen White understood the development of self-esteem (self-respect) as a part of the work of Jesus Christ in the restoration of fallen humanity. See Ellen White, *Mind, Character, and Personality* (Nashville: Southern Publishing Association, 1977), 1:28.

[29]Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Anthropology in Theological Perspective*, trans. M. J. O'Connell (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 12.

[30]Clifford Green, ed., *Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 233-234.

[31]Oscar Cullmann considered the worth of the individual person as the chief distinguishing mark of the Christian proclamation in contrast to Judaism (*Christ and Time*, trans. Floyd V. Filson [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1950], 217.

In theological terms the incarnation establishes the value of every individual apart from any human factors. Barth reflected on this idea:

> A decision has been made concerning the being and nature of every person by the mere fact that among all other people he [Jesus] too has been a human being. No matter who or what or where they may be, they cannot alter the fact that this One is also human. And because this One is also human, all people in their places and times are changed, i.e., they are something other than they would have been if this One had not been human too.[32]

Admittedly, such an observation is not without difficulty. However, the mystery and complexity of the theology of the incarnation is not our main concern here. The Christian faith affirms that the birth of Jesus into the human race elevates the value of every individual. The value of the individual is thus established on a christological basis. It might be that the contemplation of this amazing and mysterious event could instill a sense of self-esteem not subject to social norms and personal inadequacies.

The incarnation of Christ is related to self-esteem in yet another way. The incarnation sets the standard of evaluation for that which is valuable in the human. In the Christian tradition the ideal of human perfection is embodied in Christ (John 1:14). Thus, in the person of Christ an understanding of what it means to be human, according to the divine design, is possible.[33] The perfection of human character is actualized in the character of Jesus Christ (Matt 5:17). For the believer all personal and social ideals are subordinated to and critiqued by this ultimate standard. This means that the attributes and achievements which constitute the intrapsychic and interpersonal foundation of self-esteem are embodied in the person of Christ.

Crucifixion

The documents of the New Testament and the history of the Christian church are witnesses to the centrality of the cross of Christ.[34] Therefore, it is not surprising to discover that the work of Christ on the cross is central to the theological assessment of self-esteem. Browning has suggested that the cross provides a "new ground of worth" for the self.[35] Ellen White expressed a similar idea: "It is through the cross alone that we can estimate the worth of the human soul. . . .

[32]Green, 228.

[33]Ibid., 233-234.

[34]John R. W. Stott, *The Cross of Christ* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 17-46.

[35]Browning, 262.

The worth of man is known only by going to Calvary. In the mystery of the cross of Christ we can place an estimate upon man."[36] From this perspective the value of the individual self is established without reference to any personal or social norms (John 3:16; Rom 5:8). The cross event alone is the great argument for human worth, since Christ would not have suffered death by crucifixion if it were not for the immense worth of the human creature. Thus, the worth of the human is as great as the mystery of the cross.

The work of Christ on the cross is often described theologically in terms of justification by faith (Rom 3:24-25; 5:18). The relevance of this doctrine for self-esteem is twofold. First, justification by faith provides a way to deal with the consciousness of sin which might inhibit a healthy sense of self-esteem (Heb 9:14). This process is traditionally understood in terms of Christ's bearing human sin vicariously on the cross (1 Pet 2:24). Gerd Theissen, using psychological exegesis of selected Pauline texts, offers the following analysis: "The cognitive restructuring of the self-image takes place through changed causal attribution of sin. Sin is attributed to . . . the one who vicariously took on flesh."[37] The biblical language of vicarious substitution is interpreted psychologically in terms of causal attribution. Such a comparison should not be accepted uncritically, for it would be unfortunate to allow psychological language to obscure biblical meaning. However, the analysis does suggest a potentially significant insight. The substitutionary death of Christ on the cross (the attribution of personal sins to Christ) releases the believing individual from guilt (sustained negative self-attributions) and its effects (Rom 6:11).

Second, justification by faith is relevant to self-esteem in that it provides a source of positive self-attributions. This idea is traditionally expressed in terms of the imputation of Christ's righteousness (Rom 4:22-24).[38] In this way the attributes and achievements of Christ are credited to the individual and provide a new basis for self-esteem.

Justification by faith opposes the strong achievement orientation of certain psychological perspectives relating to self-esteem enhancement. Human accomplishment, in the Christian view, is not the ultimate foundation for self-esteem (Acts 13:39; Eph 2:8-9). Martin Luther explained the significance of achievement in the Christian life:

[36]Ellen G. White, *Testimonies for the Church* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1937), 2:634-635.

[37]Theissen, 264-265.

[38]White, *Steps to Christ*, 63.

> The works of a believer are like this. Through his faith he has been restored to Paradise and created anew, has no need of works that he may become or be righteous . . . but that . . . he may provide for and keep his body, he must do such works freely only to please God.[39]

Thus human achievement is significant but not central; important but not paramount. Extending this insight to the mental domain means that human works are not the central source of self-esteem for a believer in Christ. The theology of the cross affirms that the achievements of Christ overshadow the achievements of the self as the ultimate reference point for human worth, value, and significance.

New Creation

The concept of the new creation is intimately related to the incarnation and cross, which make it possible (Eph 2:10, 15-16).[40] Through faith in Christ the individual participates in this new creation (2 Cor 5:17). Theissen explains the significance of this understanding for self-esteem: "We need no longer understand ourselves according to the role of Adam but can rather orient ourselves on the role of Christ and judge and assess ourselves anew in its light."[41] This orientation of the believer to the role of Christ is a faith orientation. One of the distinct characteristics of biblical faith is that it is not dependent on physical, observable reality (Heb 11:1). Faith apprehends the invisible and hears the inaudible; it grasps what is not internal and present but only external and potential, in the form of promise (Rom 4:18). Martin Luther explained the dynamic impact of such faith:

> The third incomparable benefit of faith is that it unites the soul with Christ as a bride is united with her bridegroom. . . . Accordingly the believing soul can boast of and glory in whatever Christ has as though it were its own . . . . If he gives her his body and self, how shall he not give her all that he is?[42]

Understood in this way, a faith orientation is such a close identification with Christ that the self benefits from all that he is and does.[43] The

[39]John Dillenberger, ed., *Martin Luther: Selections from His Writings* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969), 69.

[40]Werner G. Kummel, *Man in the New Testament*, rev. ed., trans. John J. Vincent (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963), 95.

[41]Theissen, 264-265.

[42]Dillenberger, 60.

[43]Cullmann referred to this complete identification in the following terms: "One can even say that the main points of the second article of the later creed are here [referring to Col 3:1-4] connected with the life of the individual: with Christ he dies, with Christ

radical nature of this concept is almost psychologically inexplicable. It is an assertion of faith that self-esteem can be derived not only from the experienced self but also from an "alien self," the perfect self of Christ.

The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit

The doctrine of the Holy Spirit is the third component in the trinitarian foundation of self-esteem. The work of the Holy Spirit relates particularly to the human factors in the maintenance of self-esteem.

The Christian understanding of the Holy Spirit is relevant to self-esteem issues in two significant ways. First, the divine Spirit is perceived as the agent of conviction of personal sinfulness (John 16:8), a perception often criticized on the ground that it tends to foster low self-esteem.[44] Second, the Holy Spirit is perceived as the agent which restores the individual to the image of God (Gal 5:22-23; Col 3:10). In the development of positive self-attributes, significant achievements, and meaningful relationships, the intrapsychic and interpersonal basis of self-esteem is strengthened. These two insights appear to be contradictory, yet in the trinitarian context they are explicable.

Sanctification

In the Christian tradition the work of the Holy Spirit is generally referred to as sanctification. Sanctification is understood as the process by which the believer is restored to the image of God (Col 3:10; 2 Thess 2:13). Conviction of sin is an indispensable part of this process (1 John 1:8-10). Restoration is accomplished as the human agent turns away from self-generated efforts of renewal and toward the power of the Holy Spirit (Rom 8:26; Phil 2:13). Thus the Spirit works within the life of the individual to restore the sin-damaged person to the divinely created state of perfection.

In the context of the Holy Spirit's work the present condition of the believer in Christ is important. This is a complicated matter, not to be settled here. The following remarks are not intended to solve the issues but only to suggest the significance of the complexity of the present human condition for self-esteem.

---

he rises, with the Christ who sits at the right hand of God he makes his home 'above.' With Christ he takes part in the present hidden state of glory upon earth" (Cullmann, 218).

[44]However, some researchers do take issue with this prevalent idea. See Watson, 116-128.

The classic theological expression of the paradoxical nature of Christian experience is *simul justus et peccator*,[45] simultaneously righteous and sinful. The concept is illogical and paradoxical, and yet Scripture (Isa 64:6; Rom 3:10-12; 6:11-12; 8:3-11) and Christian experience support it. Anthony Hoekema emphasizes the relevance of this idea for self-esteem: "In Christ we are now justified sinners, sinners who have the Holy Spirit dwelling within, sinners who are being progressively renewed. Our way of looking at ourselves must not deny this newness but affirm it."[46] Self-esteem is derived from the new view of the self based on the new situation: justified (positionally new), sanctified (relationally new), and renewed (experientially new). Much of the Christian literature on the topic highlights this "newness" as a means to enhance self-esteem. However, this emphasis ignores that at the same time a human being is sinful. It would seem more consistent to relate self-esteem to both perspectives of the Christian experience embodied in *simul justus et peccator*. Theologically, this concept undergirds the affirmation that two divergent yet simultaneous self-attitudes should coexist in the individual; self-denial (low self-esteem), and self-acceptance (high self-esteem).

Another important way the paradoxical nature of Christian experience is interpreted is through the theology of the "already" and the "not yet." Oscar Cullmann offers a classic expression of the concept:

> In Christ we already have redemption from the power of sin; this means that now as never before we must battle against sin. This apparently contradictory joining of imperative and indicative is nothing else than the application to ethics of the complexity . . . of the present situation in redemptive history. We are dealing with the working out of what we have called the "tension between the already fulfilled and the not yet fulfilled."[47]

Hoekema explains the importance of this theology for self-esteem issues:

> We are in Christ, to be sure, and therefore we share in His decisive victory over the powers of evil. But, since we are still on this side of His Second Coming, we do not yet enjoy the totality of Christ's victory. Our self-image must leave room for eschatology—for the fact that we are not yet what we shall be.[48]

[45]See Bernard M. G. Reardon, *Religious Thought in the Reformation* (New York: Longman House, 1981), 59, 125, 228.

[46]Anthony A. Hoekema, *The Christian Looks at Himself* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 55.

[47]Cullmann, 225.

[48]Hoekema, 72.

From the perspective of biblical eschatology, the present condition of the self is not a sufficient basis for total self-affirmation.

Larry Crabb affirms that this side of heaven the human condition is imperfect and therefore subject to pain and frustration.[49] The significance of this view is the observation that the self-esteem need is not completely satisfied in the present experience. However, the Christian eschatological expectation helps to alleviate the frustration of an unfulfilled present need (Rom 8:18). At the resurrection and glorification the individual will be fully and completely perfect and free from sin (Rom 8:22-25; 1 Cor 15:51-53). Until then the ideas relating to the future perfection of the self are vital in the present maintenance of self-esteem.[50] In the trinitarian view the internal basis for self-esteem will be fully established only at the eschaton. Only then will the self-attitudes be consistently positive because there will be no sin to distort the perception of self-worth.

Conviction of Sin

Gospel faith affirms that the Holy Spirit operates in the life of the individual in order to bring about a consciousness of personal sinfulness (John 16:8). This operation might be similar to a psychological process discussed by Theissen:

> There remains within the individual an obscure region that, just like the behavior of one's fellows, remains withdrawn from the individual's judicial competence. And this too is an humane characteristic: the human being is not God. One is not fully transparent to oneself. Even when one, as *homo religiosus*, has experienced an enormous expansion of consciousness with regard to oneself and others, even when the "Spirit of God" has been conferred on one, even then, yes, precisely then, does one become conscious that this does not exhaust matters.[51]

If the operation of the Holy Spirit can be interpreted in terms of an "expansion of consciousness" and increased self-knowledge, self-esteem issues are relevant. In this view the individual's self-knowledge will be ever expanding. Hidden aspects of the self will be brought to consciousness to be evaluated by the "individual's judicial competence." This means that the cognitive structure on which self-esteem is based is

[49]Larry Crabb, *Inside Out* (Colorado Springs: Navpress, 1988), 13-20.

[50]Deigh mentions the possibility of the person's identifying, "for the purpose of self-assessment, with the person he will become" (Deigh, 241). Ellen White expresses a similar concept in the context of a helping relationship with another person: "Our advancing ideas of what he may become are a help we cannot ourselves fully appreciate" (*Mind, Character, and Personality*, 1:255).

[51]Theissen, 106.

not static but subject to change. In consequence, as negative aspects of the self are disclosed by the Holy Spirit, self-esteem might also decrease. However, this is not problematic because in the trinitarian perspective a double self-attitude, consisting simultaneously of elements of high and low self-esteem, is entirely consistent with the paradoxical nature of the present human condition and experience.[52]

Restoration of the Image of God

In Scripture the work of the Holy Spirit is described as a restoration of the human into the image of the divine (2 Thess 2:13; Col 3:10). David Clark comments on this process: "Our truest selves are enhanced and enriched when tendencies to egocentricity are overcome by the Spirit's power. Then we make progress toward our full potential as real humans—we become like Christ."[53] As positive attributes, significant achievements, and meaningful relationships are more fully realized in the individual life, corresponding self-esteeming attitudes will develop. In the trinitarian perspective the restorative work of the Holy Spirit is understood as providing a stronger intrapsychic and interpersonal basis for self-esteem.

Implications for Pastoral Counseling

Pastoral counseling, from the trinitarian perspective, will primarily involve the remediation of extremes on the self-esteem continuum.[54] Ellen White provided the basic insight for this approach:

> If you form too high an opinion of yourself, you will think that your labors are of more real consequence than they are. . . . If you go to the other extreme and form too low an opinion of yourself, you will feel inferior and will leave an impression of inferiority which will greatly limit the influence that you might have for good. You should avoid either extreme. . . . You may form a correct estimate of yourself, one which will prove a safeguard from both extremes.[55]

[52]Stott, 278-285.

[53]David Clark, "Interpreting the Biblical Words for the Self," *Journal of Psychology and Theology* 18 (Winter 1990), 317.

[54]This is in marked contrast to the usual approach in the theological literature on the enhancement of self-esteem. Pastoral counseling is often based on the faulty assumption that low self-esteem is always negative and high self-esteem is always positive. For extended treatment of this issue, see Paul A. Fisher, "The Relationship of the Self-Esteem Variable to Specific Christian Doctrines" (M.Div. thesis, Andrews University, 1992), 32-38.

[55]White, *Testimonies*, 3:506.

A correct estimate of the self will require a sensitivity to the complexities of the human condition. The pastoral counselor must help the counselee to recognize personal worth in the context of personal sinfulness.

Extremely high or low self-estimations should be explored by the pastoral counselor and counselee. Intrapsychic and interpersonal sources of self-esteem should be identified and explained. However, focused attention should be given to the relevance of specific Christian doctrines to self-esteem. Above all, the counselee should be helped to perceive that God has fixed human worth independently of all social or personal criteria. The christological basis (incarnation and cross) of self-esteem should be especially emphasized. The operative assumption in this process is that belief in these theological truths, by providing an alternative source of self-esteem, can remediate the negative aspects associated with high and low esteem.

The pastoral counselor's perception of the individual is also significant, for the counselor is a significant interpersonal source of self-esteem.[56] Furthermore, as a minister of the gospel, the counselor mediates the presence of the divine (2 Cor 5:20). It is as if the divine attitude were present in the counselor's perception.

The power and promise of pastoral counseling for self-esteem issues is tremendous. Through a combination of theological and psychological insights self-esteem can be maintained. Perceptual inaccuracies can be regulated, and individuals can function more effectively.

Summary and Conclusion

The doctrines of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit comprise the trinitarian foundation of self-esteem. This theological perspective enhances the psychological insights relating to the maintenance of self-esteem.

In much of the psychological literature self-esteem is perceived to be rooted entirely in human experience, in intrapsychic (mental), and interpersonal (social) sources. In a theological context these factors are important but do not constitute the entire ground of self-esteem.

The most significant contribution of theology to self-esteem is that it identifies a transcendent source of self-esteem. In this trinitarian view personal and social norms are not the central criteria of self-assessment. Apart from all relative human measurements is a God who has fixed the value of the self independently of all personal attributes, achievements, and social relationships.

[56]Ellen G. White, *Fundamentals of Christian Education* (Nashville, TN: Southern Publishing, 1923), 281.

Andrews University Studies, Spring-Summer 1995, Vol. 33, Nos. 1-2, 55-75.

RECENT MODELS OF BIBLICAL THEOLOGY: THREE MAJOR PERSPECTIVES

GERHARD F. HASEL
Andrews University

This study of the most recent developments of biblical theology as practiced in the 1990s relates to the investigation of three major models of biblical theology. The first is that of John J. Collins, now of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. It is presented as a proposal which has not yet been translated into the form of a book. The second is that of Brevard S. Childs, the foremost proponent of biblical theology in the twentieth century, who has laid out his views in a massive tome. The third is that of Hans Hübner, who has presented his model in a multivolume biblical theology of the NT. The approach followed in this article consists of: (1) descriptions of each model, and (2) evaluations in terms of how each one relates to certain major concerns in the present debate on biblical theology.

1. *Collins's Model of a "Critical Biblical Theology"*

John J. Collins has developed a "critical biblical theology."[1] His model is in some sense related to the earlier "synthetic modern biblical theology" of James Barr,[2] but should not be confused with it. Both

[1]This is the designation used in the title and throughout the article by John J. Collins, "Is a Critical Biblical Theology Possible?" in *The Hebrew Bible and Its Interpreters*, Biblical and Judaic Studies, vol. 1, ed. W. H. Propp, B. Halpern, and D. N. Freedman (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 1-17.

[2]See Gerhard F. Hasel, *Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate* (4th rev. ed.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 94-98; James Barr, *Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1983); idem, "Trends and Prospects in Biblical Theology," *JTS* 25 (1974): 265-282; idem, "Story and History in Biblical Theology," *JR* 56 (1976): 1-17; idem, "Biblical Theology," *IDBSup* (1976): 104-111; idem, "Biblische Theologie," *Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon* 1/2 (1985): 488-494; idem, "The Theological Case against Biblical Theology," in *Canon, Theology and Old Testament Interpretation: Essays in Honor of Brevard S. Childs*, ed. G. M. Tucker, D. L. Petersen, and R. R. Wilson (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 3-19.

Collins and Barr continue to argue that biblical theology is a singularly historical enterprise.

Collins belongs to those scholars (along with G. Strecker[3] and Heikki Räisänen[4]) who base their conceptions of biblical theology on a strict use of the historical-critical method. Collins explicitly endorses the three foundational principles of the historical-critical method: (1) the principle of criticism, (2) the principle of analogy, and (3) the principle of correlation as defined by Ernst Troeltsch.[5] He also explicitly affirms Troeltsch's claim that "the historical method, once it is applied to biblical science, . . . is a leaven which transforms everything and finally explodes the whole form of theological methods."[6]

The suggested fourth principle posited by Peter Stuhlmacher, designed to enlarge the three principles of the historical-critical method, "the principle of consent [*Einverständnis*]," which is intended to allow the scholar to be "open to transcendence,"[7] Collins forcefully rejects. Instead of "a 'hermeneutic of consent,' . . . we need," states Collins, "a model of theology that provides for critical correlation between the various traditions in which we stand. . . . It cannot be a mere recital of sacred history or submission to a canonical text."[8] The "recital of sacred history" is an oblique reference to the proposal of G. Ernest Wright[9] and the denial of a "submission to a canonical context" is hardly anything other than a rejection of the proposal for which Brevard S. Childs has become famous, which will receive attention later.

[3]Georg Strecker, ed., *Das Problem der Theologie des Neuen Testaments* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1975); idem, "'Biblische Theologie?' Kritische Bemerkungen zu den Entwürfen von Hartmut Gese und Peter Stuhlmacher," in *Kirche: Festschrift für Günter Bornkamm zum 75. Geburtstag*, ed. D. Lührmann and G. Strecker (Tübingen: Kohlhammer, 1980), 425-445.

[4]Heikki Räisänen, *Beyond New Testament Theology: A Story and a Programme* (Philadelphia: Trinity, 1990).

[5]Collins, 2-3.

[6]Ernst Troeltsch, "Über historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie," *Gesammelte Schriften*, vol. 2 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1913), 730, as cited and translated by Collins, 9.

[7]Peter Stuhlmacher, *Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation of Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977), 84.

[8]Collins, 8.

[9]G. Ernest Wright, *The Old Testament and Theology* ((New York: Harper & Row, 1969); idem, *God Who Acts: Biblical Theology as Recital*, Studies in Biblical Theology 8 (London: SCM, 1952).

Collins insists, as have other scholars of earlier times, that historical criticism as practiced with the historical-critical method does not produce facts, but only probabilities. Here too he remains fully indebted to Ernst Troeltsch and his view of modern historiography. Collins attempts to solve the problem of "facticity" in history through a shift to the literary notion of "story," along lines similar to those of Robert Alter and Meir Sternberg. For Alter the sacred history of the Bible is to be read as "prose fiction,"[10] while Sternberg understands the Bible to contain fiction from the literary point of view.[11] The "story" notion in the view of biblical theology, as Collins sees it, suggests that there is a move from an interest in facticity in history to poetic imagination.[12] But what about the "literal reading" of biblical narrative?[13]

Collins gives evidence of supporting a functional approach to Scripture,[14] claiming "that the assertions about God or the supernatural [in Scripture] are most easily explained as rhetorical devices to motivate behavior."[15] These assertions have nothing to do with normative truth in any traditional sense. It seems that Collins understands Scripture as

[10]Robert Alter, *The Art of Biblical Narrative* (New York: Basic, 1980), 23-40.

[11]M. Sternberg, *The Poetics of Biblical Narrative* (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1985), 25.

[12]Collins, 10-12.

[13]Hans Frei, "The 'Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition," in *The Bible and the Narrative Tradition*, ed. F. McConnell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). See George Lindbeck, "Scripture, Consensus, and Community," in *Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: The Ratzinger Conference on Bible and Church,* ed. Richard John Neuhaus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), 82, n. 3.

[14]For an elucidation of the functional approach of Scripture, see David H. Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975).

[15]Collins, 14.

some form of nonnormative poetry[16] or as fictional history[17] which could have a core of facts.

The major elements of the Collins model of a "critical biblical theology" as he outlines it appear to be as follows:

(1) It is grounded in historical criticism's presuppositions of the principles of criticism, analogy, and correlation as specified by E. Troeltsch.

(2) It is devoid of any confessional aspect or theological interest. It is a historical enterprise from start to finish.

(3) It is a subdiscipline of "historical theology"[18] (similar to that suggested by William Wrede nearly one hundred years ago).[19]

(4) It is also part of "narrative theology" or "symbolic theology."[20] "The significance of the paradigm shift from history to story is that it abandons the claim of biblical theology to certain knowledge of objective reality."[21]

(5) It is a functional theology, clarifying "what claims are being made, the basis on which they are made, and the various functions they serve."[22]

(6) It is based on "some canon of scripture" without any "qualitative difference over against other ancient literature but only a

[16]In this regard Collins seems to be closely related to various modern forms of literary approaches to the Bible, such as those found in Western literary theories. If past generations of scholars superimposed a Western historical model on the Bible, could not today's scholars superimpose other Western forms of literary theories on the biblical text? In either case one wonders whether the biblical text can be read on its own terms.

[17]This position is largely adopted by Gösta W. Ahlström, *The History of Ancient Palestine* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 19-55; Philip R. Davies, *In Search of 'Ancient Israel'* (Sheffield: JSOT, 1992); Thomas L. Thompson, *The Early History of the Israelite People* (Leiden: Brill, 1992); R. B. Coote, *Early Israel: A New Horizon* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990).

[18]Collins, 9.

[19]William Wrede published his influential essay, "Über Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten Neutestamentlichen Theologie," in 1897. It was reprinted in Strecker, *Das Problem der Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 81-154, and is translated by Robert Morgan, *The Nature of New Testament Theology* (Naperville, IL: Allenson, 1973), 68-116.

[20]Collins, 12.

[21]Ibid., 11.

[22]Ibid., 13.

recognition of the historical importance of these texts within the tradition."[23]

Collins's "critical biblical theology" model raises significant issues. As it is not possible to engage in all of its ramifications, we limit ourselves to a few essential points.

First, if this model uses "some canon of scripture," then one needs to ask, Which one is used? Is it the Roman Catholic canon, which includes the deuterocanonical books? Could it be the Jewish-Protestant canon of the Hebrew Bible? Is it a so-called Alexandrian canon allegedly reflected in the Septuagint? Or, is it a canon made up on the basis of the scholar's own modern post-Enlightenment understanding?

Why stay within the framework of any canon, for that matter, since there is no "qualitative difference" between canonical Scripture and other ancient literatures? For Collins the "canon" can only be one in harmony with the presuppositions of historical criticism and the tradition acceptable within a given academic community. The matter of the canon highlights the issue of the authority of Scripture in Collins's "critical biblical theology" proposal. Collins has not adequately explained why he should have "some canon of scripture" and how it should function in his model.

Second, if there is any "historical importance of these texts within the tradition," why should there be an appeal to that tradition in the first place? If any such appeal were granted, it would seem to follow that a "confessional" or "dogmatic" aspect, which is highly eschewed in Collins's model, is reintroduced on historical grounds. The question remains unresolved as to why one tradition, in this case the Enlightenment tradition of historical criticism, should have preference over any other, such as the tradition of a particular theology or the tradition of a given community of faith. In the end, the issue of which tradition has priority and why it should have authority is left open.

Third, Collins's model admittedly goes beyond the proposal of Johann P. Gabler (1787) but stops short of that of William Wrede of 1897, who suggested a history-of-religions theology. The word "critical" in this proposal reveals its indebtedness to the classical form of the Troeltschian definition of the historical-critical method. Historical criticism, however, has many "unexamined commitments" which reveal that "the very value-neutrality of this [historical-critical] method of study puts its practitioners at a loss to defend the *value* of the enterprise

[23]Ibid., 8.

itself," writes Jon D. Levenson insightfully.[24] Collins's model completely ignores increasing reservations and criticisms leveled against historical criticism by major contemporary scholars.[25]

It is pointed out by a growing number of scholars that (a) the "what it meant"/"what it means" dichotomy is no longer adequate, (b) theological dimensions can no longer be suppressed or pushed aside, and (c) "historical-critical work on the Bible cannot simply be the friend of biblical theology."[26] Biblical theology has to take the "servant" role. Scripture is more than a collection of human documents of the past, because it is "the address of God"[27] still in the present.

Fourth, Collins himself points out that the "critical" model is not value-neutral nor neutral from an ideological perspective. He admits that historical criticism does not provide uninterpreted facts, because, as he points out, historical criticism "too is a tradition, with its own values and assumptions, derived in large part from the Enlightenment and western humanism."[28] About this Levenson notes,

> This concession is vastly more devastating to Collins' argument than he seems to recognize, for the Enlightenment method to which he refers sought to *replace* tradition with reason and science and not simply to stand beside them as another option. When the legacy of the Enlightenment becomes just another *tradition,* it inevitably suffers the same deflation that Marxism suffers when it becomes another ideology. We are left with the discomforting question, why this tradition and not another? Why follow Troeltsch's three axioms, augmented by Collins' principle of autonomy, if they are not intrinsic to human rationality but themselves partake of historical and cultural particularity?[29]

[24]Jon D. Levenson, "The Bible: Unexamined Commitments of Criticism," *First Things* 30 (1993): 26.

[25]See Jon D. Levenson, *The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism* (Louisville: John Knox, 1993), 106-126; David R. Hall, *The Seven Pillories of Wisdom* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1990); Thomas C. Oden, *Agenda for Theology* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979).

[26]Ulrich Mauser, "Historical Criticism: Liberator or Foe of Biblical Theology?" in *The Promise and Practice of Biblical Theology,* ed. John Reumann (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 111.

[27]Robert Bornemann, "Toward a Biblical Theology," in *The Promise and Practice of Biblical Theology*, 127.

[28]Collins, 7.

[29]Levenson, "The Bible: Unexamined Commitments of Criticism," 30, 31; see also idem, *The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism*, 119-120.

These searching questions reveal the need for biblical theology to free itself from the grip of an "unqualified historicism"[30] evident in Collins's model for a "critical biblical theology." George Lindbeck recently noted a general hermeneutical dilemma:

> Theologians start with historical reconstructions of the biblical message which are inescapably diverse, tentative, and changing; and then seek to translate the reconstructions into contemporary conceptualities which are also diverse and variable. Not surprisingly, the results are often mutually unintelligible. There is no single overarching universe of biblical discourse within which differences can be discussed.[31]

It appears that the model of a "critical Biblical Theology" as presented by Collins does not seem to give evidence of overcoming the issue of unintelligibility of which Lindbeck speaks. Nevertheless, he has provided one of the most recent elaborate defenses for a "critical biblical theology."

2. *Childs's Model of a "Canonical Approach to Biblical Theology"*

Brevard S. Childs's *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments* carries the subtitle *Theological Reflection on the Christian Bible.*[32] Our focus cannot be on all aspects of the proposals of Childs. Our interest is in what ways his model relates the Testaments to each other. What is its contribution to the issue of a "center" and the unity of the OT and NT in biblical theology as a discipline?

Childs's voice is to be contrasted with voices such as those of theologian David Kelsey,[33] who is known as the chief proponent of a functional approach to Scripture. The functional approach argues that the authority of Scripture does not derive "in the first instance from their 'content,'" or the property of the text itself, but in the way Scripture is employed "to empower new human identities"[34] within the Christian community. As is evident to the reader knowledgeable in

[30]This charge is made against Collins by Levenson, *The Hebrew Bible, the Old Testament, and Historical Criticism,* 120.

[31]George Lindbeck, "Scripture, Consensus, and Community," in *Biblical Interpretation in Crisis: The Ratzinger Conference on Bible and Church,* 88.

[32]Brevard S. Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments: Theological Reflections on the Christian Bible* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993).

[33]Kelsey, *The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology.*

[34]David H. Kelsey, "The Bible and Christian Theology," *JAAR* 48 (1980): 396.

theology, the functional approach to Scripture is used and promoted by a significant number of contemporary theologians.[35]

Childs is opposed to any notion or idea which does not hold Christology as the key to the interrelationship and unifying concept of the Testaments. Ben C. Ollenburger seems to consider biblical theology's major task as "guarding, enabling and critiquing the church's self-conscious reflection on its praxis."[36] He holds that "biblical theology [could be seen] . . . as an activity helping the church in critical reflection on its praxis through a self-critical reading of its canonical texts. . . ."[37] Here ecclesiology in praxis seems to be the driving force for reading the text. Childs, however, is "highly critical of any theological position in which ecclesiology takes precedence over Christology."[38] The claim of the importance of "Christology" over ecclesiology is significant, because it gives us the first hint of a center and unifying principle for biblical theology in Childs's new tome. He goes on to maintain that "both testaments make a discrete witness to Jesus Christ which must be heard, both separately and in concert."[39] He affirms that "the challenge of Biblical Theology is to engage in the continual activity of theological reflection which studies the canonical text in detailed exegesis, and seeks to do justice to the witness of both testaments in the light of its subject matter who is Jesus Christ."[40]

The christological focus of Childs's *Biblical Theology* comes to the fore in full force in his concluding chapter, "The Holistic Reading of Christian Scripture."[41] Rolf Rendtorff also speaks of a "holistic

[35]George A. Lindbeck, "The Bible as Realistic Narrative," in *Consensus in Theology?* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), 81-85; idem, *The Nature of Doctrine* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984); idem, "Barth and Textuality," *Today* 43 (1986/87): 361-377; E. Farley and Peter C. Hodgson, "Scripture and Tradition," *Christian Theology*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 35-61; and others.

[36]Ben C. Ollenburger, "Biblical Theology: Situating the Discipline," in *Understanding the Word: Essays in Honor of Bernhard W. Anderson*, ed. James T. Butler, Edgar W. Conrad, and Ben C. Ollenburger (Sheffield: JSOT, 1985), 53.

[37]Ibid., 51.

[38]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 23.

[39]Ibid., 78.

[40]Ibid., 78, 79. This runs counter to the attempts of Rolf Rendtorff, who argues against the writing of OT theology as a first volume of biblical theology (*Kanon und Theologie: Vorarbeiten zu einer Theologie des Alten Testaments* [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1991], 46-48).

[41]Childs, 719-727.

interpretation."[42] But Rendtorff's idea of "holistic interpretation" is quite different from that of Childs, to whom he is heavily indebted on many points. Rendtorff means by "holistic interpretation" a contextual interpretation of an individual text within the total canonical context. While for Rendtorff the "canonical context" is the Hebrew Bible, for Childs's "canonical approach to Biblical Theology," the "canonical context" is both Testaments of the Christian Bible.

We read of a "theocentric centre of scripture"[43] and learn that "the task of theological reflection of Biblical Theology arises from its confession of one Lord and Saviour, but as testified to in the differing notes sounded by Israel and the church."[44] This could give the impression that the center of a biblical theology is indeed theocentric and not christocentric.

For Childs the "theocentric" aspect has its focus in Jesus Christ, so that theocentric really means christocentric. He does not wish us to understand the unity of Scripture in theocentric terms. He speaks of "the essential unity of scripture as a witness to a living Lord"[45] and affirms that "there is a single, unified voice in scripture,"[46] that of Jesus Christ.[47]

Childs does not wish to use the typical categories of unity and diversity when describing the multiple voices that are heard in both Testaments. He goes back to Matthias Flacius (1520-1575) of the sixteenth century and the idea of the "scope of scripture": "The recognition of the one scope of scripture," writes Childs, "which is Jesus Christ, does not function to restrict the full range of biblical voices."[48]

Such an approach is unique in our time when there is much emphasis on the alleged twofold direction left open by the OT,[49] the development of Judaism and that of Christianity. In a recent article,

[42]Rendtorff, *Kanon und Theologie*, 23-28.

[43]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 723.

[44]Ibid., 722.

[45]Ibid., 724.

[46]Ibid., 725.

[47]Ibid.

[48]Ibid.

[49]See Klaus Koch, "Der doppelte Ausgang des Alten Testamentes in Judentum und Christentum," in *Altes Testament und christlicher Glaube*, ed. Ingo Baldermann et al. Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie, Band 6 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1991), 215-242; Rendtorff, *Kanon und Theologie*, 40-53.

"Notes Concerning the Topic of Biblical Theology," Peter Höffken argues against Gerhard von Rad that the Old Testament does not have a "center"[50] and that, therefore, the Old Testament has found its center outside itself in Jesus Christ.[51] For Höffken this is based on the Pauline novelty of replacing the Torah with a new reality, Jesus Christ. Höffken finds that in and of itself the OT does not witness to Jesus Christ; this is a reading of Paul superimposed on the OT.

Not so Childs. He maintains steadfastly that the "oneness of scripture's scope" of both Testaments is Jesus Christ. Did Childs have a precursor in Otto Procksch, who opened his massive *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (1950) with the programmatic sentence, "Every theology is christology"?[52]

Childs opposes an interpretation of the OT by the NT. He sees the flow or movement in only one direction, that is, from the OT to the NT. This is particularly significant because "the focus of Biblical Theology lies in the relationship between the two testaments in respect to the messianic hope, ..."[53] But "to speak of a 'messianic hope' seems to impose a unity and a systematization which is not reflected in the sources themselves."[54] More precisely stated, "There is widespread agreement among Christian theologians that the centre of Biblical Theology, in some sense, must be christology, the biblical witness to the person and work of Jesus Christ."[55] Childs admits that in this claim there are hosts of literary, historical, and theological problems which "reach to the heart of the biblical theological enterprise."[56]

It appears that Childs claims more for the current scholarly opinion than can be substantiated. It is hardly correct to state that most Christian theologians perceive the "center" of biblical theology as christology. It is entirely correct that most NT scholars see the "center"

[50]Peter Höffken, "Anmerkungen zum Thema Biblische Theologie," *Altes Testament und christliche Verkündigung: Festschrift für Antonius H. J. Gunneweg zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. Manfred Oeming und Axel Graupner (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1987), 21, 22.

[51]Ibid., p. 22.

[52]Otto Procksch, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1950), 1.

[53]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 453.

[54]Ibid., 455.

[55]Ibid., 452.

[56]Ibid.

of the NT in christology, or Jesus Christ,[57] but this is not the case in models of biblical theology of both Testaments.

Childs cuts the Gordian knot with the claim that "the entire New Testament centres its faith in the confession of Jesus Christ. His name unites indissolubly the New Testament with the Old Testament."[58] Does Childs in his model read the OT from the perspective of the NT or, to say the least, from the perspective of christology? Is this not something he eschews?

The theological and historical question that arises at this crucial juncture of Childs's approach to biblical theology, which has its center in christology, is whether the NT is correct in its claim that the predicted Messiah of the OT is indeed the Christ of the NT. Is the schema of prediction and fulfillment evident? For Childs this question does not seem to have the importance it had for other scholars,[59] because his lines of connection are different. He affirms that "all New Testament writers came to the Old Testament from the perspective of faith in Jesus Christ. The Old Testament was consistently read as a witness to the Christian faith."[60]

Childs does not support a direct promise-fulfillment line of connection, not even in Luke-Acts. He affirms that the goal of the OT promises "was made known in Jesus Christ."[61] Thus, there is a goal but no direct line of promise leading to a specific fulfillment. To the contrary, the OT is read from the perspective of the Christ event. The faith of the NT writers becomes the key for the understanding of the OT.

Evidently Childs does not support or recognize messianic promise/prediction as proof of prophecy fulfilled in Jesus Christ. Jesus is the Christ only "from the perspective of faith" and from the view that the OT is "a witness to the Christian faith." In his view the faith event comes first, and then the OT is read from the perspective of that faith event.[62]

[57]So among others, H. Schlier, H. U. von Balthasar, A. Vögtle, K. H. Schelkle, W. Marxsen, G. E. Ladd, E. Lohse, K. Haacker. See especially Alfons Weiser, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments II: Theologie der Evangelien* (Stuttgart; Kohlhammer, 1993), 217-226.

[58]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 459.

[59]Ibid., 220, 226-229.

[60]Ibid.

[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid., 220-229.

If this position were the one which the NT portrays, could an early Christian believer demonstrate to a Jew that Jesus of Nazareth was truly and irrefutably the predicted Messiah of the Hebrew Bible, in whose life, mission, death, and resurrection the OT messianic predictions found their fulfillment?[63] If Childs is correctly understood on this vital point, and he can hardly be misunderstood, since he has restated his position time and again throughout his tome, a person in NT times needed to experience first of all faith in Jesus Christ, and only subsequent to this experience would the OT be a "witness" to the Christ of faith.[64]

The "witness" nature of Scripture emerges as a core issue in the exposition of Childs. Thus, the "essential unity of scripture," in the view of Childs, is its function "as a witness to the Living Lord."[65] Does Childs remain indebted to neoorthodoxy and its "witness" model of Scripture which characterized the older biblical theology of the Biblical Theology Movement? He seems to remain steeped in the neoorthodox model of modern theology and its views of revelation as well as its understanding of Scripture. If this is the case, then we need to ask whether the starting point of his model of biblical theology is not indeed in systematic theology and not the canonical text of Scripture, for which he argues so intently.

Another issue relates to the recovery of the meaning of the text of Scripture. Childs's emphasis on the "canonical approach" does not make him deny any aspect of the historical-critical method. He insists on the reconstruction of biblical texts by means of submethods of historical criticism. Based on these reconstructions, most of the traditionally messianic passages of the OT are interpreted in nonmessianic ways.[66] The NT writers, on the other hand, quote the OT messianically. From the perspective of historical criticism, these are conditioned quotations, dependent on the methods and approaches of the NT writers, which are not identical with those of modern scientific methods (viz., the methods of historical criticism). To quote John Reumann, "No one would propose Matthew's development of 'formula quotations' or Paul's

[63]This is precisely the argument presented in Matthew. See Weiser, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments II*, 87-90.

[64]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 460, with reference to Luke 24:25ff.

[65]Ibid., 724.

[66]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 453-456.

application of the Septuagint as 'what was written for our admonition' as the way to do exegesis today."[67]

The question relates to how we get from this modern reading of the text to the real meaning of Scripture. And how do we get from the ancient text to our time and situation in the community of faith? Thus, the earlier issue of the Biblical Theology Movement with regard to where the meaning of the text is to be sought is still with us. Is the meaning *in* the text, *behind* the text, or *above* the text?[68] It has been pointed out quite correctly that the Reformation principle of *sola scriptura* and its ancillary principle, *scriptura sui ipsius interpres,* are in conflict with modern scientific methods of reading the biblical text.[69] In other words, the reading of the Bible is determined by an Enlightenment tradition, at least in the scholarly world of the academy and through it in a broader public.

The Reformation had freed the Bible from the widely accepted reading of the text through tradition, a reading of a different structure of authority. Another authority based in tradition, the Western Enlightenment tradition, has replaced the earlier ecclesiastical authority which the Reformation had rejected.

The problem of tradition encountered in the model proposed by Collins emerges here as a problem for Childs as well. It is the issue of which "tradition" the biblical scholar is to work with or function in. If the biblical theologian is to function in more than one tradition, how will these relate to each other and which should have priority? Or should the biblical theologian function within the biblical model itself?

At this point the "canonical approach" of Childs could have a significant bearing. Childs argues time and again that a "canonical approach" to biblical theology is a theological undertaking.[70] He holds that Paul is not as much in discontinuity with the OT as is often claimed and should not be measured "by the norms of post-Enlightenment historical-critical standards."[71] The Christ event "has

[67]John Reumann, "Whither Biblical Theology?" in *The Promise and Practice of Biblical Theology*, 12.

[68]See the discussion by Robert B. Robinson, "Narrative Theology and Biblical Theology," *The Promise and Practice of Biblical Theology,* 129-142.

[69]Peter Stuhlmacher, *Schriftauslegung auf dem Wege zur biblischen Theologie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), 59-127.

[70]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 85-88.

[71]Ibid., 240.

provided him [Paul] with a radically new starting point";[72] thus he draws the text of the OT into his present without "recognizing the Old Testament as having a voice separate from that of the New Testament." In this sense Paul is "actualizing" the past "through the living voice of scripture."[73] The matter of "actualizing" is a key hermeneutical concept in the model presented by Childs.[74] "Paul's approach to scripture as one controlled by the freedom of the Spirit apart from tradition remains an attractive modern option."[75] This "freedom of the Spirit" is essential to Childs's own theological approach.[76] Does the "freedom of the Spirit" allow the biblical theologian/scholar to depart from the literal meaning of the text? This question remains at the heart of the matter.

At the very end of his stimulating book Childs addresses once more "the church's continual struggle in understanding the literal sense of the text as providing the biblical grounds for its testimony. . . ." He distinguishes between the linguistic meaning of the text, "the textual meaning," and "the actual content of the biblical texts which are being interpreted by communities of faith and practice."[77] The tension between these "two dimensions of scripture," that is, the "textual meaning" and the actualization of the content by the community of faith, is resolved by Childs's appeal to the "multiple senses" of Scripture.[78]

[72]Ibid., 240, 241.

[73]Ibid., 241, 242.

[74]See the dissertation written under Childs by Joseph W. Groves, *Actualization and Interpretation in the Old Testament,* SBLDS 86 (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1987).

[75]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 243.

[76]The essay by the neoevangelical systematician Clark H. Pinnock, "The Role of the Spirit in Interpretation," *JETS* 36 (1993): 491-497, is here relevant. Pinnock warns of the reader's "interest in transforming the text rather than being transformed by it" (494).

[77]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 724.

[78]Childs and Barr have debated the issue. Using Childs's model of the "canonical approach" as a foil, Barr ("The Literal, the Allegorical, and Modern Biblical Scholarship," *JSOT* 44 [1989]: 3-17) argued that historical-critical scholarship did not work with "total commitment to the 'literal sense'" of Scripture (7). Thus, events such as the resurrection of Jesus and his ascension to heaven are reinterpreted to mean something different from what "really happened" as the NT text portrays it. He concludes that "theology *does* stand 'behind' the text" (14). Furthermore, in historical-critical study, allegory has always been a part of the interpretation (16). Childs responded in "Critical Reflections on James Barr's Understanding of the Literal and the Allegorical," *JSOT* 46 (1990): 3-9. He argues that Barr has "blurred" the "distinction between the historical-critical and the allegorical approach" (8).

> When the figurative sense is grounded on the literal and is a faithful rendering of both the content and witness of the written word, there is no theological reason for denying the legitimacy of multiple senses within the ongoing life of the church.[79]

This proposal of "multiple senses" of Scripture in Childs's attempt to pull together the verbal/literal sense and the figurative/interpreted sense, on which theology is based, is rather problematical. He agrees that there is an unresolved problem here: ". . . I would argue that the crucial problem of biblical theology remains largely unresolved, namely, the challenge of employing the common historical-critical tools of our age in the study of the Bible while at the same time doing full justice to the unique theological subject matter of Scripture as the self-revelation of God."[80] The unresolved issue in the Biblical Theology Movement, its attempt to seek theological meaning elsewhere than in the literal sense, was rightfully declared suspect. But why would Childs's attempt to seek theological meaning in the "figurative sense," which is open to "multiple senses within the ongoing life of the church," be less suspect? Who determines which "figurative sense" is correct and how is it arrived at? Who and what determine when the "figurative sense" is "a faithful rendering of both the content and witness of the written word"? In the view of Childs, this seems to be the task of each community of faith. If that is the case, and in view of the fact that there are a variety of Christian communities of faith, would this not imply that each of the varieties of communities of faith may find its own meaning and identity in one or more of the "multiple senses" of Scripture? Each sense would in the end be nothing more than each community of faith's reading of Scripture through the glasses of its own traditions.

In the biblical theology model of Childs the community of faith seems to have the role of theological Scripture legitimation. This means that Scripure legitimation has its locus in ecclesiastical tradition. This is exactly what the Protestant Reformation rejected. It guarded Scripture legitimation by the proposition of *scriptura sui ipsius interpres*. In view of this issue, would it not be proper to suggest that a model for a biblical theology needs renewed reflection on Scripture legitimation so as to let Scripture speak within the framework of Scripture as canon?[81] Would not the focus on Scripture as canon open new doors of canonical interpretation as the legitimate form of its total meaning?

[79]Ibid., 725.

[80]Childs, "Critical Reflections," 8.

[81]Childs, *Biblical Theology of the Old and New Testaments*, 70-73.

We are indebted to Childs for providing an unusually rich and rewarding work. His proposal of a "canonical approach of Biblical Theology" will continue to stimulate further reflection and discussion, assisting in the ongoing quest for an adequate biblical theology which can and will bring renewed life to the church.

3. *Hübner's Model of a "Restricted Biblical Theology"*

The publication of the first two of the three announced volumes of Hans Hübner's *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments* was an important publishing event for biblical theology.[82] The author is an internationally recognized NT scholar at the University of Göttingen who has published several earlier articles[83] in preparation for his three-volume biblical theology of the New Testament. The entire first volume is devoted to methodological issues and, therefore, claims our special attention.

Hübner's biblical theology goes far beyond the theology of the NT. He is quite conversant with church history and systematic theology. As a matter of fact, he intentionally incorporates reflections of systematic theology into his biblical theology. He engages in what modern systematic theology considers to be part of fundamental theology.

His lengthy chapter on revelation contains two systematic-theological reflections. The first, "Systematic-Theological Thoughts on Revelation in the Old Testament," comes at the end of his presentation of the concept of revelation in the OT.[84] The second appears at the end of the chapter with the heading, "Systematic-Theological Considerations Concerning Revelation in Holy Scripture."[85] He concludes with considerations on the question of the relationship of the OT and NT, specifically the relationship of God's revelation in both Testaments. Hübner maintains that the revelation of God in the OT is so differentiated even within the OT that it is hardly possible to unify it.

[82]Vol. 1, *Prolegomena*; vol. 2, *Die Theologie des Paulus* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht), 1990, 1993.

[83]Hans Hübner, "Das Gesetz als elementares Thema einer Biblischen Theologie," *KD* 22 (1976): 250-276; idem, "Pauli theologiae proprium," *NTS* 26 (1979/80): 445-473; idem, "Biblische Theologie und Theologie des Neuen Testaments: Eine programmatische Skizze," *KD* 27 (1981): 2-19; idem, "Methodologie und Theologie: Zu neuen methodischen Ansätzen in der Paulusforschung," *KD* 36 (1990): 181-208.

[84]Hübner, 1:149-171.

[85]Ibid., 1:203-239.

"Only a few aspects of the Old Testament manifestation of God are able, in the way they were originally meant, to be incorporated into the theological system of coordination with the New Testament."[86]

The question of the unity of the OT and NT is heightened in Hübner's presentation as hardly in any other work in our time. In his concluding chapter, "The One God and the Two Testaments," Hübner raises "the truly final question, which is ultimately the decisive question, *whether* indeed the Yahweh of Israel, the national God of this people, is indeed identical with the Father of Jesus Christ, the God of all humanity."[87]

This radical differentiation of the pictures of God by Hübner is reminiscent of earlier German theologians. Emmanuel Hirsch, and before him at the turn of the century, Adolf von Harnack, are major figures to whom Hübner refers. Hübner reaches the conclusion that "the pre-Israelite Yahweh is not the Israelite Yahweh." In his perspective the two pictures of Yahweh cannot be reconciled with each other. Hübner's view is based on the understanding of religio-historical reconstructions which claim that "the redactional final form of the Old Testament with its monotheism offers a theological view which is incompatible with the original Old Testament traditions."[88] He does not investigate the canonical text as it stands but reconstructs it on the basis of standard religio-historical models along the lines of an evolutionary development.

Hübner speaks also of the "one God" of the OT and NT. He does so on the basis of an "emphasized reflection of the relationship of continuity and discontinuity."[89] Joined to this emphasis on continuity and discontinuity is his emphasis on the NT authors' use of the OT, because "the argumentation with the Old Testament belongs to the nature of the theological reflection of most New Testament authors." This brings Hübner to his understanding of biblical theology, which is "the presentation of the theological use of New Testament authors of the Old Testament. . . ."[90]

The foundational definition of what is "biblical" in this conception of biblical theology is not the entire Bible of both Testaments but the

[86]Ibid., 1:237.

[87]Ibid., 1:240.

[88]Ibid., 1:243.

[89]Ibid., 7.

[90]Ibid., 1:28.

theological use of the OT by NT writers. This approach involves the exclusion of large parts of the OT from Hübner's biblical theology enterprise. It rests on the fact that "almost all of the New Testament is included [in this conception of biblical theology], but not the entire Old Testament, and that this rests in the basic theological statement of the New Testament, and not in the methodology."[91] For Hübner only those parts of the OT are included which are cited in the NT or to which the NT has allusions.[92] In short, Hübner's biblical theology has a limited base, that is, the NT's reception of the OT. Furthermore, for Hübner the OT is that of the Septuagint, since this is what the NT authors most often cited.[93]

Major points of this biblical theology model deserve consideration. The citation and allusion approach advocated by Hübner is reminiscent of, if not influenced by, an earlier proposal of Brevard S. Childs presented in 1970.[94] On this point, however, Childs has radically modified his earlier view[95] and maintains at present that "the function of the Old Testament in Biblical Theology cannot be restricted to the use which the New Testament makes [of the OT]."[96] The contrast between Childs's model of biblical theology and that of Hübner could not be more pronounced. Thus, Hübner presents a limited biblical theology model while Childs presents an inclusive one.

Hübner reacts strongly against the inclusive proposal of Childs, charging him with an "external form of an authoritative canon as a solution for the problem of the canon [which] seems to have failed."[97] Childs, in turn, has responded to this criticism, an essential criticism of Childs's entire "canonical approach of Biblical Theology," in an article published in 1992.[98] Childs does not accept the hypothesis that the canon of the OT was still open until the end of the first century A.D.

[91]Ibid., 1:29.

[92]Ibid., 1:30.

[93]Ibid., 1:64.

[94]Childs, *Biblical Theology in Crisis*, 114-118.

[95]Brevard S. Childs, "Biblische Theologie und christlicher Kanon," *Zum Problem des biblischen Kanons*, ed. Ingo Baldermann et al., Jahrbuch für Biblische Theologie (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1988), 13-27.

[96]Ibid., 23.

[97]Hübner, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments*, 1:76.

[98]Brevard S. Childs, "Die Bedeutung der hebräischen Bibel für die biblische Theologie," *ThZ* 48 (1992): 382-390.

He follows the conclusions of recent studies by S. Z. Leiman and others,[99] for the closing of the OT canon in pre-Christian times.

On the theological level Childs seems to be correct in his claim that the early Christian church recognized the OT as its authoritative Scripture, not because of piety for tradition and not even to glean some interesting background material, but because Christians believed that it contained a witness to Jesus Christ.[100] Childs insists that "the true identity of Jesus Christ cannot be understood alone from the New Testament and outside of the Old Testament."[101]

Childs does not hesitate to charge Hübner with "the serious theological mistake" of attempting to understand Jesus merely from the NT.[102] Childs sees the necessity of the entire OT for a true biblical theology. Any reductionism to mere NT citations and allusions of the OT is wrong. The OT was the only Bible of Christians in NT times, and thus the Bible of the early Christians must be considered in its entirety.

A second major issue in Hübner's model is the issue of the "one God" of both Testaments. How does the NT answer the question whether the God of the OT is the same God of the NT? Do we find evidence in the NT that Christians worshiped another God than the God known from the only Bible, the Hebrew Bible?

Peter Stuhlmacher also raises the question of the early Christian perception of God.

> The question whether and how far the one God, who is the Creator of the world and the One who has elected Israel as his own people, is also the Father of Jesus Christ, is answered with a Yes through Jesus who called him *Abba* (cf. Lk 10:21-22/Mt 11:25-27), who presented Him in the opening of the Lord's Prayer (cf. Lk 11:2/Mt

[99]S. Z. Leiman, *The Canonization of Hebrew Scripture* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1976); Roger Beckwith, *The Old Testament Canon of the New Testament Church* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985); cf. S. Talmon, "Holy Writings and Canonical Books in Jewish Perspective—Considerations Concerning the Formation of the Entity 'Scripture' in Judaism," in *Mitte der Schrift?* ed. M. Klopfenstein et al. (Bern: Lang, 1987), 45-79; David Noel Freedman, "How the Hebrew Bible and the Christian OT Differ," *BibRev* 9 (1993): 28-39, esp. 39.

[100]Childs, "Die Bedeutung der hebräischen Bibel für die Biblische Theologie," 387.

[101]Ibid., 388.

[102]Ibid., 387.

6:9-10) and in his teaching of the twofold commandment to love God and fellow human beings (cf. Mk 12:28-34).[103]

He goes on to say that "the New Testament affirms the question raised by Hübner,"[104] regardless of the latter's denial. Stuhlmacher also notes that the scholar "who allows to let the contents and the questions of a Biblical theology derive from the New Testament itself, will hesitate to follow H. Hübner in his risky path of locking oneself into reconstruction and critical theological interpretation (after the example of Bultmann)."[105]

A limited or restricted OT, one based on the Septuagint[106] and used only in citations and allusions,[107] hardly comprises the Bible the early Christians knew and used. Citations and allusions in the NT are in many cases reflective of and conditioned by certain circumstances and situations which confronted Jesus,[108] the disciples and apostles,[109] and other early Christians. They cannot be understood to reflect the complete Bible that was at the disposal of Jesus and the early Christians and whose message they followed.

In addition, according to each of the four Gospels, Jesus Christ affirmed the identity of the Father as the God revealed in the OT. The depreciation of one picture of Yahweh in the OT, and then the entire

[103]Peter Stuhlmacher, *Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testaments,* vol. 1, *Grundlegung: Von Jesus bis Paulus* (Göttingen; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 37.

[104]Ibid.

[105]Ibid.

[106]It is widely acknowledged that the predominant use of quotations comes from the LXX. However, there are many other texts or translations which have been used, and not simply the LXX. On that basis it would be precarious to refer to the LXX as the singular version for the wording of the NT citations or quotations of the NT from the OT. See Gleason L. Archer and Gregory Chirichigno, *Old Testament Quotations in the New Testament* (Chicago: Moody, 1983), ix-x; E. Earle Ellis, *Paul's Use of the Old Testament,* 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991); idem, *The Old Testament in Early Christianity* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1991).

[107]A major difficulty is the definition of a citation or quotation as well as an allusion. See R. T. France, *Jesus and the Old Testament: His Application of Old Testament Passages to Himself and His Mission* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1971), 25-37, 259-623.

[108]France (*Jesus and the Old Testament,* 259-263) provides 144 verbatim quotations or verbal allusions from 24 of the 39 books in the OT attributed to Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels. This does not include the prediction of "the third day" or of the resurrection in general (p. 53, notes 47-50).

[109]See Ellis, *Paul's Use of the Old Testament,* 150-187.

picture of Yahweh in the OT, followed by a different NT picture of God, was first drawn by Marcion in the second century and has been painted by his followers over the centuries.[110] This dichotomy has never been inherent in Scripture in its canonical form, but comes from religio-historical reconstruction. It would seem best for the biblical theologian to be informed on how Jesus and the apostles presented canonical Scripture, and not adopt religio-historical reconstructions and theologically charged interpretations of post-NT times which have been rejected by normative Christianity.

There is no doubt that the reader of these innovative models of biblical theology will be constantly stimulated to reflection on the subject. While much effort and serious thought have been devoted to the development of these models, it is evident at the same time that biblical theology is by no means close to a consensus or major direction. This allows much room for further reflection and development of thought on the foundations, concepts, nature, and purpose of biblical theology.

Three models of Biblical theology were surveyed above, and they provide major stimuli for the development of an alternative model. In the next essay we will attempt to make foundational proposals toward what may be properly designated a "canonical biblical theology."

[110]There are a number of major studies on Marcion and his subsequent influence in Christianity into the present. The definitive treatment on Marcion is that of Adolf von Harnack, *Marcion: Das Evangelium vom fremden Gott,* 2d ed. (Leipzig: Hinrichs Verlag, 1924; reprinted in Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960). See also John Knox, *Marcion and the New Testament* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942); E. C. Blackman, *Marcion and His Influence* (London: SPCK, 1948); R. J. Hoffmann, *Marcion: On the Restitution of Christianity* (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1984); John Bright, *The Authority of the Old Testament* (Nashville: Press, 1967), 60-72; John J. Clabeaux, "Marcion," *ABD,* 4:514-516.

Andrews University Seminary Studies, Spring 1995, Vol. 33, No. 1, 77-84.

THE ARAMAIC OSTRACON FROM LACHISH: A NEW READING AND INTERPRETATION[1]

GERALD A. KLINGBEIL
Somerset West 7130
South Africa

1. *Introduction*

In the course of my research of Aramaic epigraphical material of Syria-Palestine during the Persian period, I noted the Aramaic ostracon unearthed during the 1932-1938 Wellcome-Marston excavations at the site of Tell ed-Duweir,[2] under the leadership of the late J. L. Starkey. The ostracon was published in 1953 by O. Tufnell, who described it as "illegible."[3] Thus, the temptation was strong to pass over the inscription and concentrate on other material with published readings. But after studying the Arad Aramaic material from the Persian period, I noticed several similarities and undertook a reading of some words and phrases. Because of the fragmentary nature of the ostracon only some words could be read, but these proved worthy of consideration. The following study consists of the general information and drawing of the ostracon, a paleographical analysis, and a word-by-word discussion of the evidence, followed by a conclusion which seeks to link epigraphical and historical evidence.

[1]The article is based on my M.A. thesis, "The Aramaic Epigraphical Material of Syria-Palestine during the Persian Period with Reference to the History of the Jews." I would like to express my gratitude for financial support from both the Centre for Science Development of the Human Science Research Council and the Research Unit for Computer Applications to the Language and Text of the Old Testament at the Department of Semitic Languages and Cultures of the University of Stellenbosch. The scope of the study included the collection, organization, translation, and analysis of all relevant inscriptions on hard surfaces.

[2]According to K. Kenyon, *Archaeology in the Holy Land*, 4th ed. (New York: Ernest Benn, 1979), 323, the "identification [of Tell Ed-Duweir] as the site of Lachish is generally accepted."

[3]O. Tufnell, *Lachish III (Tell ed-Duweir: The Iron Age. Text and Plates* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1953); pl. 49:2; 68. Other sources were: O. Tufnell, "Lachish," and E. Stern, *Material Culture of the Land of the Bible in the Persian Period* (Warminster, England: Aris and Phillip, 1982), 42.

2. *General Information and Drawing*

Name: Lachish ostracon, Locus G. 12/13:7
Place: Tell ed-Duweir
Country: Israel
Region: The hills of Cis-Jordan-
The hill country of Judah
Language: Aramaic
Appr. Date: Fifth century B.C.

Type: Ostracon
Method: Ink on pottery fragment
Find: Stratified find; level I, locus G. 12/13:7[4]
Measures/mm: 62 x 80[5]
Purpose: Ration order or receipt
Genre: Administrative or business transaction



Fig. 1: Drawing of Aramaic ostracon from Lachish

3. *Paleographical Information*

The approach taken here to analyze the paleography of the ostracon could be described as an "inner-typological approach,"[6] namely

[4]On the stratification of Tell ed-Duweir, see Tufnell 71-76. The ostracon was found in a house in grid square G. 12/13, some 40 m due west of the residence (ibid., 145-146).

[5]Measurements were taken from the photograph published by Tufnell.

[6]As recently proposed by J. F. Drinkard, "Epigraphy as a Dating Method," in *Benchmarks in Time and Culture: An Introduction to Palestine Archaeology,* ed. J. F. Drinkard, G. L. Mattingly, and J. M. Miller (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 417-439. He suggested that "consonants in an inscription would be analyzed by epigraphic forms into types. These type forms could then be put into a relative chronology. By a comparison with inscriptions of known date (or approximate date) a more exact dating could be proposed" (417-418).

that every single letter is to be examined on its own merits.[7] This is especially helpful when analyzing larger bodies of texts, though it is also beneficial for smaller texts, since it provides for certain typological developments (or variations) within a single inscription.

The following comparative inscriptions corresponded in specific letter shapes to the Aramaic ostracon from Lachish:

Cowley, no. 1 — 495 B.C.
Source: A. Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1923), no. 1. See J. Naveh, "The Development of the Aramaic Script," in *Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities* (Jerusalem: Ahva Press, 1970), fig. 4:1.

Cowley, no. 5 — 471 B.C.
Source: Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri*, no. 5. See Naveh, "Development," fig. 4:3.

Cowley, no. 6 — 465 B.C.
Source: Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri*, no. 6. See Naveh, "Development," fig. 4:4.

Meissner papyrus — 515 B.C.
Source: H. Bauer and B. Meissner, "Ein aramäischer Pachtvertrag aus dem 7. Jahr Darius I," *Sitzungsberichte der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* (Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1936), 414-424. See Naveh, "Development," fig. 2:3.

Papyrus Luparensis — 375-350 B.C.
Source: *CIS*, 1:1, table 17. See also F. M. Cross, "The Development of the Jewish Scripts," in *The Bible and the Ancient Near East. Essays in Honor of William Foxwell Albright*, ed. G. E. Wright, 1979 (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1961), fig. 1:1.

[7]This should be understood in the light of the suggestions put forward by Drinkard as described in the previous footnote. While both Cross and Naveh have implemented a typological approach in their respective paleographical studies, they appear to concentrate upon specific features of the inscription or specific shapes that could be used as markers. Especially regarding large inscriptions, this method could lead to distortions in the final analysis. Therefore it is suggested to evaluate *every individual letter shape* in order to discover the overall pattern of the inscription and provide a statistical evaluation of the evidence thus gained. This would be expressed in tabular form as demonstrated below in the paleographical discussion of the Aramaic Lachish ostracon.

Letter	Comparable to	Letter	Comparable to	Letter	Comparable to
א no:		ב no:		ג no:	
ד no:		ה no:		ו no:1	Meissner papyrus
ז no:		ח no: 1	Cowley, no.1	ט no:	
י no: 1	Cowley, no. 1	כ no:		ל no:	
מ no: 1	Papyrus Luparensis	נ no:		ס no:	
ע no:		פ no:		צ no:	
ק no: 1	Cowley, no. 6	ר no: 1	Cowley, no.6	ש no:2	Cowley, no. 5
ת no:					

Total Number of letters: 8

Predominant option	Letters	Percentage	Date
Cowley, no. 1	2	25	495 B.C.
Cowley, no. 5	2	25	471 B.C.
Cowley, no. 6	2	25	465 B.C.
Meissner papyrus	1	12.5	515 B.C.
Papyrus Luparensis	1	12.5	375-350 B.C.

It is interesting to note that 75 percent of the letters can be ascribed to the first half of the fifth century B.C., i.e., ca. 495-465 B.C. Since the מ is the only letter that falls outside of this pattern (the ו could also be ascribed to Cowley, no. 1 besides the little leftwards slant), it seems obvious that the deviation has to be attributed to the faded nature of the script.

4. *Text and Translation*

Text:	Translation:
20 חמר . . . .[8]	. . . . . 20 donkeys[9]
10 שק . . . ושי	ושי . . . . barley: 10 qabs[10]

5. *Word-by-Word Analysis*

20 חמר The first two entities comprise the noun sing. m. abs. חמר plus the numeral "twenty." חמר can mean either donkey or wine,[11] but in the present context and also in the light of the similarities to the Arad ostraca it seems more appropriate to translate it as "donkey."[12] The word is also used in Palmyrene inscriptions.

ושי The following word most probably comprises a proper name. The letters are badly faded; the word may be incomplete and some of its letters erased during the course

[8]The sign used here to denote the numeral "twenty" can also be found on some fifth-century B.C. papyri from Saqqâra in Egypt. See J. B. Segal, *Aramaic Texts from North Saqqâra with Some Fragments in Phoenician* (London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1983), nos. 42a, 106 and VXI.

[9]One problematic aspect of reading 20 חמר is the fact that the plural should read חמרן when combined with the numeral "twenty." Since the same idiosyncrasy can also be found among the Aramaic ostraca from Arad (e.g., Arad nos. 12:3; 23; 24; 31; 37), it might possibly be explained in terms of either a scribal abbreviation to save space or—as suggested by Naveh—an "internal plural form" (J. Naveh, "The Aramaic Ostraca from Tel Arad," *Arad Inscriptions,* ed. Y. Aharoni (Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1981), 162, n.42.

[10]The numeral 10 seems to be problematic, since the author of the ostracon could have well written "1 seah 4 qabs" (1 *seah* being 6 *qabs*). It could be possible that the sign/letter following the ק has a different meaning or is the beginning of a new word.

[11]C. F. Jean and J. Hoftijzer, *Dictionaire des Inscriptions Sémitiques de l'Ouest* (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 91.

[12]Because the noun is followed immediately by a numeral, I would opt to understand the term as "donkey," since a measure—normally connected with חמר "wine"—cannot be found.

of time. The origin of the onomasticon could be Arabic, from the root *wšyt* "to cure, become rich." [13]

10 שק The abbreviation שק represents שערן קב "barley: 10 qabs." This structure can be found among the Aramaic ostraca from Arad and Beer-Sheba.[14] See also three fifth-century B.C. Aramaic tablets from Assur which contain credit documents.[15] The abbreviation ש can also be found at Elephantine,[16] as well as in the Tell el-Far'ah (Beth-Pelet) ostracon.[17] ק representing the measure *qab* occurs also at Elephantine.[18] It is interesting to note that in none of the Arad ostraca does the number succeeding the ק exceed four; in most of the cases it is three, which is half a *seah*.[19]

6. *Evaluation*

Because of the lacunae and faded letters of the inscription, it is not possible to determine the exact content of the ostracon. As already suggested by Tufnell's team in their original publication, the script of the ostracon favors a fifth century B.C. dating of the sherd. However, one must note the similarity of the מ to the early fourth-century

[13]In the OT the forms ושני and ושתי are known (1 Chr 6:13 and Esth 1:9ff.). The name *wšyt* is known from Safaitic inscriptions. Compare G. L. Harding, *An Index and Concordance of Pre-Islamic Arabian Names and Inscriptions*, Near and Middle East Series 8 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971), 643.

[14]Naveh, "Aramaic Ostraca," *Arad*, 153.

[15]H. Donner and W. Röllig, eds., *Kanaanäische und Aramäische Inschriften*, 3 vols. (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1964), nos. 234:1; 235:1: 236:3.

[16]Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri*, no. 24 passim; 63:2. See also E. G. Kraeling, *The Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri: New Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. from the Jewish Colony at Elephantine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), no. 17:3-5.

[17]J. Naveh, "The Aramaic Inscriptions," *Beer-Sheba I: Excavations at Tel-Beer-Sheba 1969-1971 Seasons*, ed. Y. Aharoni (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1973), 79, especially n. 5.

[18]Cowley, *Aramaic Papyri*, no. 45:8.

[19]According to Josephus one *seah* contained ca. 13 liters (taking the *bath* containing 39 liters as point of departure). This is also supported by an intact jar from Qumran which was marked to contain "two seah and seven log". The *bath* volume inferred from this jar would be ca. 43-45 liters. On the other hand a *bath* of approximately 22 liters has been suggested, based upon the estimated capacities of jar sherds marked with בת or בת למלך in the Lachish (Tufnell, *Lachish III*, 356) and Tell Beit Mirsim excavations, which would suggest a 7.3 liters *seah*. For a detailed discussion of weights and measures see E. M. Cook, "Weights and Measures," *ISBE*, 4:1046-1055.

Papyrus Luparensis, possibly suggesting a development of the letter to its fourth-century shape already during the fifth century B.C.

If one accepts the structural similarities between the Aramaic ostraca from Arad and the Lachish ostracon it might even be possible to gain a better understanding of the content of the sherd, since the syntactic structure of the Arad ostraca contains an ellipsed imperative מהב "give to," plus the preposition ל followed by a personal name.[20] This could be translated as "give to XY" and was succeeded by specifications regarding either ש, abbreviation of שערן "barley," דקיר "crushed [barley]" (Arad ostraca nos. 7-11), or ח, abbreviation of חנטין "wheat." The ostraca also contained regularly exact numbers of חמר, סוסה or גמל, which often seemed to account for the amount of food supplies handed out.

Taking all these considerations into perspective, it is important to notice the possible connection between the two sites, Arad and Lachish, during the Persian period. This would corroborate the archaeological data which suggest that Lachish was an important center in the administration of Judah during the Persian period.[21] Both sites seem to have functioned as garrison posts with a mixed population, possibly including foreign mercenaries.[22] While this might be explained in terms of the geographical location and the political realities of Arad, the evidence at Lachish could possibly suggest more activity in the Judean heartland than commonly accepted. In this context it might be appropriate to mention Arad ostracon no. 12, which alludes to "ten donkeys ... מדנית ש מן, "from the state/province of ש" (after which the ostracon is broken off), presumably referring to the province Samaria. In the light of this ostracon, one could even argue for understanding 20 חמר as "twenty donkey-drivers."

[20]This syntactic structure can be found on Arad ostraca nos. 5:1 and possibly on 9:1 as well, where the structure is written out in full. Most of the other ostraca from Arad contain only the shortened form.

[21]For a concise discussion of the archaeological data of Lachish during the Persian period see Stern, 41-44. He summarizes the evidence as follows: "In the first phase, i.e. from the end of the sixth and beginning of the fifth century B.C., the gatehouse and building G. 12/13 were erected and some of the pits were dug. Later the Residency was built (450-350 B.C.), more pits cut, and the fortification near the gate was constructed" (ibid, 44).

[22]See my thesis regarding the onomastic evidence of the Aramaic epigraphical material during the Persian period. The data for Arad is as follows: Ammonite names: 11.9%; Arabic names: 11.9%; Aramaic names: 2.3%; Babylonian names: 2.3%; Edomite names: 14.2%; Egyptian names: 2.3%; Hebrew names: 50%; Phoenician names: 4.7% (Klingbeil, 85).

7. *Conclusion*

On the basis of the evidence presented, the following remarks regarding the Judean heartland during the fifth century B.C. can be made. First, both economic and official activity can be ascribed to the area around Lachish. Since the paleographic evidence of the script points to a date during the first half of the fifth century, the time of the ostracon might correspond to that of Ezra and Nehemiah, providing a historical backdrop for the events described in these Biblical books.[23] Second, the parallelism to the Arad ostraca from the fourth century B.C. suggests that Lachish was an important garrison or way-station in the province of Judah during the Persian period. This is congruent with the archaeological evidence. Third, in the light of these observations one has at least to question the historical picture that is often drawn of Judah during the Persian period as an insignificant, poorly inhabited, and badly organized (and administered) province. Maybe it is time to shed some new light on a period that Albright long ago called "the most obscure in the history of the Hebrew people."[24]

[23]I am aware of the discussion regarding the historicity and sequence of the missions of Ezra and Nehemiah, but do not question the authenticity of either. For an overview of the relevant studies and an evaluation, see L. L. Grabbe, *Judaism from Cyrus to Hadrian*, 2 vols. (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 1:88-98. Compare also C. E. Areding, "Ezra, Book of," *ISBE* 2:264-266. In this context one should mention O. Margalith, "The Political Role of Ezra as Persian Governor," *ZAW* 98 (1986: 110-112). Margalith favors Ezra's mission in 458 B.C. (the seventh year of Artaxerxes I) in the light of the attack of the confederation of the Attic-Delic League, which sent a fleet of 200 war galleys against Persia in 460 B.C., capturing Memphis in autumn 459 and possibly controlling the Phoenician coast (ibid., 459). Writes Margalith: "It was in 458, immediately after the fall of Memphis to the Greeks, that Ezra the Judean courtier was sent to Judea . . . to reorganize and strengthen this traditional enemy of the Philistines. From the point of view of the Persian king a strong pro-Persian Judea was a major threat to the Greek coastal lifeline" (ibid.). This would underline the strategic position of Judah for the Persian king and help to explain the apparently "illogical" mission of Ezra and Nehemiah.

[24]W. F. Albright, "Light on the Jewish State in Persian Times," *BASOR* 53 (1934): 20.

Andrews University Seminary Studies, Spring 1995, Vol. 33, No. 1, 85-101.

FROM "APPLIED THEOLOGY" TO "PRACTICAL THEOLOGY"

A. G. VAN WYK
University of South Africa
Pretoria, Republic of South Africa

This article, which places its emphasis on "practical theology" rather than "applied theology," was prompted by my experience in observing a considerable amount of sermon delivery in both South Africa and North America. Although my focus is directed mainly toward concerns and developments (the "cutting edges," as it were) in the South African scene, the data which I present should have significance and application also in North America and elsewhere, where gospel preaching is an important element in the religio-sociological structure.

1. *Introduction and Orientation*

Terminology

In my use of the term "practical theology" rather than "applied theology," or even, to some extent, "pastoral theology," I am making a conscious and definite distinction between practical theology as a science and the training and technical equipping of pastors for the gospel ministry. For the best results, a proper understanding and use of the latter should—perhaps, *must*—be undergirded by the former.

At this juncture I should make evident my definitions of "method" and "methodology," two terms that are frequently confused with each other (and thus wrongly used). By and large, a "method" refers to the way or the procedure by which certain aims and objectives are attained. "Methodology," on the other hand, denotes the scientific study of methods or procedures undertaken in the cause of research.

Objectives

In preparing this article I have had several objectives or goals in mind. First of all, I wish to set forth a bird's-eye view of some of the approaches in practical theology that are especially relevant to the situation in Southern Africa. Second, I briefly discuss some of the

characteristics of practical theology as a communicative theological operational science. And third, I call attention to some problems relating to applied theology, my purpose being to address these problems, not for negative criticism, but so as to construct a practical-theology approach that may assist the church in an essential area of its work.

The Rise of Practical-Theology Models in South Africa

In the mid-1960s there was, especially in Germany, an intense discussion of fundamental questions in the discipline of practical theology—so much so, in fact, that this discipline suddenly took on an amazing new lease on life. The outcome in South Africa was the rise of numerous models of practical theology. Theologians such as H. D. Bastian reacted against Karl Barth's view that the "what" of theology is the determining factor while the "how" is of no real importance. Bastian appealed to practical theologians to shake off the chains of dogma and to stand on their own two feet.[1] The normative-deductive approach was rejected, and the need for praxis to correct and critically evaluate theory was stressed. Practical theology must follow the example of the modern operational sciences and adopt an empirical method. J. A. Wolfaardt, a colleague in the Department of Practical Theology at the University of South Africa, introduced practical theology as a communicative operational science, both to the University and to South Africa.

2. *Three Basic Approaches to Practical Theology as a Theological Operational Science*

Three different approaches pertaining to practical theology as an operational science can be distinguished: (1) The empirical-analytical approach of H. D. Bastian and K. W. Dahm; (2) the approach of Gert Otto (and also N. Greinacher and Y. Spiegel), based on dialectics and the criticism of ideology; and (3) a hybrid or intermediate approach fostered by C. Bäumler, R. Zerfass, and D. Stollberg.

Bastian's empirical-analytical approach (and also Dahm's) is explicitly associated with concepts from the critical rationalism of K. Popper and H. Albert. Theories based on this approach are characterized by their attempt to render the actions of the church scientifically verifiable. Methodological questioning is important, because every path to praxis originates in some theory or other. Bastian demands that theory and praxis, plus a scientific account of their interrelationship, be the chief motifs and bases for further theories in practical theology.

[1]H. D. Bastian, "Vom Wort zu den Wörtern," *Evangelische Theologie* 28 (1968): 25-55.

Facts and theory do not exist independently; they interact and modify each other. Although Bastian draws a sharp distinction between practical theology and systematic theology, he does not want to dispense with the latter, for it has a part to play in deciding on the normative aspect of empirical research.[2]

Otto's approach is closely linked to the *critical theory* developed by Frankfurt School's M. Horkheimer, T. W. Adorno, and Jürgen Habermas. Otto differs from Bastian by rejecting empirical-analytical theories. In fact, he accuses modern theology of so gross a neglect of practice as to render it incapable of influencing the latter. According to him, theologians have been so busy with their own theological traditions that they have had no time to address contemporary society or the contemporary church. This produced a void in reflection on the relationship between theory and praxis. Further outcomes were a blind emphasis on action, a contentless pastoral praxis, and the establishment of practical theology as an applied science. To overcome these errors, practical theology should take up the premise of its wide social relevance and be redefined in terms of the interrelationship of religion, the church, society, and theology. Practical theology must be a critical theory of religiously influenced praxis in society.

The third approach occupies an intermediate position between the critical-analytical and the position set forth by Otto. C. Baümler believes in a combination of functionalism and critical theory, because this presents, in his view, the best solution toward the formulation of theories for practical theology. He believes that practical theology cannot take the whole of social praxis as its field of study. On the other hand, he wishes to do away with the dichotomous relationship between church and society that has governed the formation of practical- theological theories in the past, and which has given rise to a one-sided concentration on the church and its practice. Since social processes have a definite influence on the church, and vice versa, the object of practical theology is a Christian-churchly communicative operation in which social factors and processes play an important part. The principle that should govern practical theology is that of ideal communication as developed by K. O. Apel and Jürgen Habermas. The task of practical theology, according to Baümler, is to analyze the disrupted communication process and to design successful communication.[3] This is the approach adopted by most of the practical theologians at the University of South Africa.

[2]See N. Mette, *Theorie der Praxis* (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1978), 173-174.

[3]See C. Baümler, "Praktische Theologie: Ein notwendiges Element der wissenschaftlichen Theologie?" *Theologia Practica* 9 (1974): 72-84.

In addition to the three approaches just described, there are some others, as well, in South Africa. According to Coenie Burger, two such additional approaches to practical theology characterize the South African scene: the "confessional" and the "contextual."[4] Most South African Universities have been heavily influenced by the former, which is essentially a "Dutch-Reformed" approach to practical theology. The University of Potchefstroom is probably the most conservative school that holds this "confessional" approach, which may be briefly characterized as follows: (1) The study of the Bible is central, and it is the only norm and source of practical theology; W. D. Jonker suggests that practical theology stands in the service of the Word of God.[5] (2) Guidelines for the service of the church are deductively derived from a theological theory based on Reformed theology. (3) The church and the service of the church are central. And (4) the training of ministers is the most important task of practical theology. J. A. Wolfaardt suggests that C. Trimp of the Netherlands and J. E. Adams in the United States may be included (up to a point) as representing this approach.[6]

The "contextual" approach, according to Burger, is characterized by the following: (1) The context and situational analysis of praxis is important. (2) There is a world orientation rather than a church orientation. (3) The task of practical theology is to bring about social change and a reconstruction of society. (4) The use of Scripture varies from a fundamentalist approach to a selective use of Scripture. (5) The community of believers takes precedence over individuals. (6) The major concern is not with the training of ministers but rather with equipping the community of believers. (7) The approach is ecumenical.[7] Although D. Tracy is not a practical theologian, he could very well be classified under this heading.[8]

3. *Some Characteristics of Practical Theology as Communicative Operational Science*

Up to the present time, no real agreement has been reached on what practical theology actually is. The arena is almost a battlefield of opposing models that utilize, or are based upon, different philosophical

[4]Coenie Burger, *Praktiese Teologie in Suid Afrika* (Pretoria: HSRC, 1991), 59.

[5]W. D. Jonker, *In Diens van die Woord* (Pretoria: NG Kerkboekhandel,1981).

[6]J. A. Wolfaardt, *Introduction to Practical Theology: Study Guide PTA200-W* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1992), 4.

[7]Ibid., 61.

[8]See Wolfaardt, 8.

and theological presuppositions. I will therefore resist the temptation of offering "a recipe in three easy steps" for the construction of a practical theology model that will solve all the problems. Instead, I propose to give an overview of some of the main determinants of practical theology in South Africa.

The Role of Faith and Theology

I have to admit that one of the weightiest topics in the recent scientific dialogue regarding practical theology relates to the time-honored question, What, precisely, is "theology"? Any discussion of this question must, of course, revolve around the methodology of the particular theologian. Although we may agree with Daniel Augsburger on the need for the minister to be a theologian, theology is not the functional handmaid of the church, or for that matter of the minister. It is not simply a device to improve the minister's preaching or to find pragmatic ways of getting more members into the church.[9] Theology studies statements of faith critically (in the sense of being analytical and synthetic).

Faith and theology are sometimes seen as incompatible, or else theology is viewed as a peculiar mixture of scientific statements and certain confessional and unevaluated intersubjective beliefs. According to P.J.R. Abbing, a distinction must be made between theology and mere statements of faith.[10] For one thing, theological statements are more open to discussion and critical evaluation than are statements of faith. The diaconological (confessional) approach to practical theology combines theological arguments and statements of faith, and therefore it is almost impossible to subject it to intersubjective evaluation. On the one hand, diaconology does not accept rationality as a criterion for practical-theological statements. On the other hand, theology is concerned, not so much with answering people's questions, but with knowing the Word of God—and this, not as rational beings but as sinners.[11]

In contrast to Abbing, E. Van Niekerk maintains that "theology is theoretical thought which, from the perspective of faith, pronounces and constructs models" in terms of three limiting (or defining) concepts:

[9]See Daniel Augsburger, "The Minister as a Theologian," *Ministry*, May 1990, 4-6.

[10]For a further discussion of Abbing's point of view on theology and statements of faith, see A. G. Van Wyk, "'n Evaluering van die grondslae van die Diakoniologiese benadering vanuit 'n Prakties-teologiese Perspektief" (D.Th. dissertation, University of South Africa, 1989), 42-43.

[11]Ibid., 44.

God, humanity, and the world.[12] And "faith," he points out, is a concrete, nonscientific experience in which all, clergy and laity, theologian and nontheologian, have equal claims to the perception of truth. Theology, then, is the theory of faith, the theological-theoretical reflection on faith. It is on a par with, but unlike, nontheological experience.[13]

Theology as a Science

Theology as a science involves analysis of a field of research that emerges from the context of a specific reality, but it is also a synthesis of that field with the overall context. In nonscientific experience, the reality of existence is treated as being in itself integral and total. Events, objects, social and theological factors, etc., are not dissected but left intact.[14] J.W.V. Van Huyssteen states that a theology which chooses to see itself as a science must have at least some intersubjective control; it must attempt a self-critical scrutiny of its own premises. It cannot simply and unquestioningly present its own statements of faith on an authoritarian basis.[15] Theology, as a human endeavor and within my own paradigm, does not lay claim to total, absolute truth; it does not endeavor to formulate dogmas, but testifies to a partial truth only.

Practical Theology as a Theological Science

An important objection with which the practical-theological enterprise is constantly confronted is this: Does practical theology have a distinctively theological character? Could it not be grouped with psychology, sociology, and/or communication? In regard to this question, I distinguish three approaches: the diaconological, the empirical-scientific, and the empirical-confessional. The last of these may be considered as a "hybrid" approach that utilizes certain concepts and procedures of the other two, without falling victim to the "one-sidedness" of either of them.[16]

[12]E. Van Niekerk, *Systematic Theology: Only Guide for STH401-R* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1988), 153.

[13]Ibid., 94-95.

[14]Ibid., 81.

[15]J.W.V. Van Huyssteen, "Systematic Theology and the Philosophy of Science," *Journal of Theology of Southern Africa* 34 (1981): 3-4.

[16]See A. G. Van Wyk, "'n Verkennende Gesprek rondom die Begrip Teologie in Verskillende Prakties-teologiese Benaderinge," *Praktiese Teologie in Suid-Afrika* 6 (1991): 76-85.

The diaconological approach is very much concerned with the fact that practical theology must retain its theological modality. This is only possible if practical theology centers upon "knowledge about God," and hence upon knowledge of the Word of God. Revelation (in the sense of "Scripture") is the only norm and source of practical-theological research. Human experience is classified as subjective.

Wolfaardt's approach to practical theology as an operational science, on the other hand, is concerned with human acts of faith as an object of study. Faith is regarded as something essentially human. Theology, as the theory of faith, is seen as the perspective of faith from which one can speak about God, humanity, and the world. It does not assume a confessional view of revelation, nor does the Bible function as its norm.

The hybrid stance considers the diaconological approach as being a one-sided and deductive approach. But although this hybrid approach as an operational science is concerned with praxis and with empirical research, it still operates in terms of certain confessional presuppositions. From its perspective, theology is seen as the study of people's statements about God and about faith in God. Because God cannot be objectivized, He cannot be the object of theology. In fact, this approach subscribes to Barth's "theanthropological" view of theology. And thus, theology is not only the science of knowledge about God, but it is also the science of knowing God. The theological field of study includes both that which happens between human beings and God and that which happens among human beings when they come to know God. The Bible is still the norm and source of study, though a knowledge of other sciences is also very important.

Practical Theology as an Empirical Science

Traditionally, the other theological disciplines formulate theological theories, while practical theology's task is that of applying or actualizing those theories in practice. In the Christian tradition, the church practices its theology from an OT, NT, systematic-theology, and, to a lesser degree, ecclesiological perspective. In its dialogues, practical theology is never invited to take part. This was not only the fault of the institution itself in being afraid of the empirical methodology of practical theology, but also the result of practical theology's being quite satisfied to be an applied theology.

Thus, practical theology was the builder of bridges between the theological theories of the other theological disciplines and the practice of the church. It became a technical subject (*theologia applicata*): The question of how to preach or teach, and how to reconcile theoretical

knowledge with the practice of faith, became the working area for practical theology, which in this model makes no contribution to the church's epistemology and theology. Those who attribute this kind of role to practical theology have all too often left the impression that practical theology needs not to concern itself with the *content* of what is to be preached. Biblical studies and systematic theology have assumed the sole right to ask basic questions about sermon content, with the only concern of practical theology being the preacher's delivery system (i.e., the technique) used in preaching and in other aspects of gospel ministry. Thus, practical theology has had the task of equipping people with the skills needed for a successful ministry, the adjective "practical" indicating the *application* of theology.

This concept, however, unleashed numerous problems. Traditionally, practical theology was seen as an applied science with no independent field of inquiry; it belonged rather in a training center than in a university. Applied theology and the confessional approach to practical theology (diaconology) came to be accused of duplicating the fields of OT, NT, and systematic theology.[17] The question may even be asked whether it is not merely a reductionistic approach to systematic theology. In fact, today applied theology and diaconology are becoming increasingly viewed as making no epistemological contri-bution to the field of theology.[18]

However, practical theology is at present also being increasingly seen as a science. Although practical theologians would admit that it is a "how-science," the current trend among them is not the search for rules on how to preach, but rather a *scientific* description of certain events, processes, or actions. Let us take an example: The minister prepares a sermon about the atonement, a topic which is accepted *a priori* as relevant for the congregation. But he observes, to his amazement, that no one is really listening. Why not? Did he fail to provide enough striking illustrations? Did he lack enthusiasm? Did he stumble in his delivery? Perhaps so. But it is equally or even more likely that he was not addressing or connecting this message with the congregation's *Sitz im Leben,* the specific and total life situation of the listeners. Persons listening to a sermon are not merely a receiving set; their own situation contributes to the preaching event. That event is, in its very nature, a dynamic encounter between people and the "Word of God." Therefore, any pastoral action is not merely a form (treated by

[17]See J. A. Wolfaardt, *Praktiese Teologie: Inleiding in die Teologie* (Pretoria: NG Kerkboekhandel, 1978), 279-280.

[18]See A. G. Van Wyk, "'n Evaluering van die grondslae van die Diakoniologiese benadering vanuit 'n Prakties-teologiese perspektief," 43.

practical theology), plus a dogmatic content (formulated by biblical studies and/or systematic theology). Quite the contrary: It is a dynamic event which is in turn a product of both the message and the situation.

Practical Theology as an Operational Science

Practical theology is the science describing the structure and the functioning of certain events in the sphere of interpersonal relations within a religious context. For Christians, this context is the Christian church and its Judaeo-Christian heritage and nature.[19] Thus, practical theology includes a concern with content and norms. It is, however, that part of theology which focuses on praxis, and therefore many practical theologians see it as an operational science. From its particular vantage point, it studies the religious faith of people and statements about God. It is an operational science because people's religious beliefs and actions and the operational fields that are created by them—such as worship, celebration, service (*diakonia*), and instruction—are the objects of scientific study.

Practical Theology as a Communicative Theological Operational Science

Most of the practical theologians at the University of South Africa regard practical theology as a communicative theological operational science. According to H.J.C. Pieterse, anyone who has "ever engaged in Christian religious praxis will know that Christians are continually communicating with each other, with their Lord, and with people outside their religious community."[20] He thus views as communication the basic action performed constantly by all believers. From the perspective of the Christian faith, God is the initiator of communication. Throughout the Bible, He communicates in words and actions. Jesus Christ is God's supreme communication with His people.[21] Accordingly, practical theology as a communicative science is active in explaining, understanding, and theorizing about these communicative words and actions. J. Firet maintains that communicative actions in service of the gospel are the fundamental concern of practical theology.[22]

[19]See J. Symington and J. A. Wolfaardt, *Practical Theology: Only Study Guide for PTH400-5* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press, 1989), 9.

[20]H. L. Heyns and H.J.C. Pieterse, *A Primer in Practical Theology* (Pretoria: Gnosis, 1990), 46.

[21]Ibid., 48-52.

[22]J. Firet, "Kroniek van de Praktische Theologie," *Praktische Theologie* 14 (1987): 260.

Hence, on a metatheoretical level, practical theology links up with the philosophy of Jürgen Habermas.

Pieterse states further that the cornerstone of this approach, the ideal of free people living in true communication without any domination, is not in conflict with the ideals of the Christian church.[23] And according to Wolfaardt, the most searching criticism of practical theology as an operational science comes from Wolfhart Pannenberg, as formulated by the latter's student W. Grieve: namely, that practical theology as an operational science functions with an operational theory. Grieve states that praxis theory, as it is developed under the pressure of contemporary interests and demands, implies an intentional theory of meaning as its operational theory.[24] The indissoluble link between meaning and action may be overlooked, and this has implications for the unity of theology.

How can the unity of theology be guaranteed if part of it is "constituted as theory of meaning and the rest as operational theory"?[25] According to Wolfaardt, it is important that practical theology should not be concerned only with a structural-functional approach, but that its field of research should be extended to communicative operations. From H. Peukert's research into developments in the area of scientific and operational theory and theology, the conclusion has emerged that the point at which these activities intersect is communication.[26] Wolfaardt indicates that this establishes a link between theology and other sciences, each from its own perspective.[27] The basic elements of this communicative experience are the following: (1) There is intentional action on the part of agents or subjects, who direct and orient themselves by the acts of other agents and subjects; (2) such action is mediated by historically and socially defined systems of symbols and signs and is used to explain and purposefully alter the communal situation; (3) the reciprocal acts constitute a communal world, the reality of which is related to the specific acts in question; (4) acts are time-bound, and therefore the identity of subjects is molded by their biographical backgrounds; (5) the reciprocal and reflexive acts of the participants are further influenced by socially and historically determined orientations which these participants have internalized;

[23]See Heyns and Pieterse, 52.

[24]See W. Grieve, "Praxis und Theologie" (Munich: Kaiser, 1975), 29-41.

[25]Ibid., 137.

[26]H. Peukert, *Wissenschaftstheorie, Handlungstheorie, Fundamentale Theologie* (Dusseldorf: Patmos, 1976), 321.

[27]Ibid., 7.

(6) the time-bound nature of communicative acts implies the possibility of reflection on, and revision of, internalized orientations and social processes; (7) the reflexivity and reciprocity of communicative acts achieve their ultimate potential in a mutual renewal of possibilities; and (8) the agents, by freedom mutually recognized and granted in their relationship, accept one another as free subjects in solidarity.[28]

Wolfaardt indicates, further, that against this background there are abundant interfaces between the empirical sciences and theology, and even more so between the operational sciences and practical theology. For a proper grasp of communicative acts in the theological perspective, cooperation with all the other theological disciplines is essential.[29] Such a delineation also distinguishes practical theology from, for example, ethics. Not all the acts of faith can be studied, but only those which are intended to transmit faith, either verbally or by means of symbols. This cancels the risk of a dilettantish approach to ethics. For instance, the question of abortion will not be discussed in depth in practical theology, though such a discussion is an act of faith. On the other hand, practical theology is perfectly entitled to ask what is communicated when the church makes a pronouncement on such a subject.

A practical theology that concerns itself with the theory of communicative acts has the effect of breaching the traditional divisions within the subject area. The communication of the faith is not limited to official activities of the church, nor even to the very form of the church, for communication that mediates the faith outside the church is also a valid object of study. In these terms, practical theology cannot lapse into a praxeology that has a merely technical interest in preserving the *status quo*.[30]

Furthermore, practical theology as a communicative operational science takes an ideal communicative situation as a normative assumption. The normative core of a nonpreconceived act, innocent of coercion or deceit, is opposed to any tendency to deceive either oneself or the other, or to turn the other into a mere object. Peukert develops his theological theory of communicative acts in terms of this point of view and from the vantage point of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. To him, communicative acts in which the other is recognized, and at the same time is defended against humiliation and destruction, are the primary research area of a theory of theological interaction.[31]

[28]Symington and Wolfaardt, 137.

[29]Ibid., 8.

[30]Ibid., 9-10.

[31]See Peukert, 320-321.

A very important issue in practical-theological communication theory is whether Christian actions (verbal, symbolic, or semiotic) promote or impair the recognition and freedom that God has given us toward one another. Within a theoretical framework, the question is not simply, How do we preach?; it is also, Is our preaching really mediating God's liberating power, or is it just a covert legitimation of either existing or would-be power structures?

Empirical Methods

Bastian's suggestion that practical theology should be an operational science with an empirical methodology has elicited strong opposition. Theologians such as Jonker, from the perspective of the diaconological approach, strongly oppose the empirical methods of practical theology.[32] Jonker thinks that theology must be seen as theological hermeneutics in a practical context. The question which he and others have raised is this: How can practical theology as an operational science be considered theological if its methods do not involve biblical hermeneutics?

According to Pieterse, "every theological subject has its own field of study and its own methodological access to that field."[33] He argues that the exegetical approach studies a book (the Bible), making use of such sciences as linguistics and literature theory; church history studies the church by means of historical methods; and systematic theology studies the doctrines of the church in terms of hermeneutical and philosophical methodologies. He indicates, further, that a discipline cannot be identified as a theological subject because of the use of traditionally nontheological methods. Since practical theology is mainly concerned with communicative actions, the question may be asked, Why should practical theology not use a methodology appropriate for it and still be seen as a theological discipline? Pieterse's conclusion is that communicative actions can be studied only by means of empirical methodology.[34]

Paul Tillich wrote that empirical theology as a theological discipline could never succeed for two reasons: (1) God as the object of theology belongs to a different order from that of scientific observation, and (2) it is impossible to verify assertions about God. J. A. Van der Ven's reply to this is that not God, but the religious relationship to God (religious praxis), is the object of study. According to him, only

[32]See Jonker, 36-37.

[33]See Heyns and Pieterse, 68.

[34]Ibid., 69.

through the study of religious praxis does theology have access to God, for it is only man's response, reception, and reaction to God's revelation that can be the object of theological research. In view of Van der Ven's empirical theology, experience plays a regulative role. It functions, not on the level of statements of faith; rather, it verifies or falsifies theological statements. Empirical research tries to determine whether theological statements really correspond to human experience.[35] The difference between a theology of experience and practical theology ("empirical theology," as Van der Ven prefers to name it) is that the former is concerned with integrating experience into its theology, whereas the latter endeavors to determine to what extent this really happens.[36]

The accusation that practical theology uses a positivistic methodology is thus strongly rejected. Empirical studies are inseparably linked with theological theories, so that when practical theology measures certain phenomena and explains or describes these phenomena, it always does so in the light of a specific theological theory (or, perhaps, even on the basis of what is only a hypothesis). Therefore it rejects empiricism.

4. *Practical Theology in Theory and Practice Methods in Practical Theology*

Practical theology makes use of different empirical methods, one of these being the Zerfass model. This model, like any model, can be compared to a map in the sense that it reduces a vast, all-but-incomprehensible matter to intelligible dimensions. Thus we can, as it were, hold an entire country in the hollow of our hand, survey it, examine it, and understand it. A model is also a vital link between theory and praxis, since it permits intensive interaction between them by bringing them closer together. According to Heyns, the Zerfass model is indeed a useful one.[37] It functions as follows: (1) Starting out from a particular praxis, (2) it makes a situational analysis; then (3) in integration with tradition and Scripture, it forms a new theory; and (4) this process leads, in turn, to a new praxis. It is thus a model that moves full circle, and it does so repeatedly in an ongoing and ever-relevant progression.

[35]See J. A. Van der Ven, "Ervaring en Empirie in de Theologie," *Tijdschrift voor Theologie* 27 (1987): 7, 157.

[36]Ibid., 158.

[37]For a critical evaluation of Zerfass' model see Mette, 319-320. According to Mette the model of Zerfass is too static and cannot confront all the problems regarding praxis.

The Zerfass Model Illustrated

We may now illustrate by an example how the Zerfass model functions. Let us assume that a certain congregation suffers a severe drop in church attendance—a drop which generates a need for action. Our first question is, Why do people fail to come to church, and what causes them to do so? Since we assume that the members come to church because of a certain theological tradition, we review the church's faith commitments, its doctrines, its history, and so forth. This procedure helps us to clarify what is at issue.

However, at some point or other the answers that we have elicited may prove inadequate. Because we are not using an authoritative theological model, we cannot overcome the problem by simply declaring that church attendance is an imperative. The problem demands that we make an empirical situation-analysis, which will use well-prepared questionnaires, interviews, etc., to help determine why the level of church attendance has become unsatisfactory. Also required is the help of sciences whose concern is with the study of modern men and women, present-day society, etc.

Such considerations on the history of our worship service, the Bible, relevant theological subjects, and the confessions of the church cannot be disregarded. They must, however, be critically evaluated in the light of praxis. But on the other hand, they must also critically evaluate the praxis itself. This means that the two partners—the tradition and the situation (i.e., what the situation is *really* like)—must be in dialogue until some consensus is reached. From this dialogue we develop, in turn, a practical-theological theory. This theory then needs to be critically integrated into practice. Finally, the resulting new praxis has to be in dialogue with both the theological tradition and the situation, a dialogue which may well lead to a new theory and a new praxis.

The Theory-praxis Relationship in Practical Theology

According to Bastian, theory represents a synthesis between experience and understanding, rather than being a replica or mere reflection of it.[38] Therefore empirical research is not concerned with experience as such, but with experience interpreted in the light of theory. This is a concern which transcends experience and which makes an essential interpretation possible.

[38]Bastian, 37.

The Importance of Theory for Practical Theology

According to Van Niekerk, there are two different approaches to the importance of theory. The first of these, he feels, tends to "absolutise theoretical thinking." It refuses to admit that people are more than their theoretical ideas. The second is naive, for it refuses to see that "praxis is codetermined by theory."[39]

Pieterse maintains that theory is indispensable to the practice of science. In theory, the researchers' outlook on life and reality, their values and norms, their confessional traditions, and the perspectives from which they make their decisions play a part.[40] Concerning the praxis-theory relationship, Wolfaardt points out that pastors are often "under pressure to act, they either do not have, or do not take time to explicate their theory. The danger now develops that nonreflected theory can become ideology."[41]

Most of the time, the person who deals with the practical situation will revert to theoretical rules of thumb, such as, for instance, that a gospel minister can preach on any topic provided that the sermon does not take longer that twenty minutes. Wolfaardt feels that "undoubtedly the practical situation" requires much more; it includes, for example, insight into "group-dynamics or therapeutic relationships."[42] There is a desperate need for a practical-theological theory that embraces factors that are involved in the communication of the message. Van Niekerk argues that evangelical theologians in particular are opposed to anything that remotely smacks of theory. According to him, this opposition stems from the notion that theories are simply a hodgepodge of ideas arbitrarily thrown together, or that they treat only the abstract.[43]

Often practitioners dislike theory because of the fact that theory questions their ideological praxis. And although there is a danger of overestimating theory, practical theology, as Wolfaardt points out, can hardly be "theoretical" enough.[44] It must discover trends in opinions and in restrictions that are so often taken for granted.

[39]See Van Nierkerk, 85.

[40]H. J. C. Pieterse, "Praktiese Teologie Mondig?" *Skrif en Kerk* 7 (1986): 64.

[41]J. A. Wolfaardt, "Approaches to the Subject Called Practical Theology," *Journal of Theology for Southern Africa* 51 (1985): 60.

[42]Ibid.

[43]See Van Nierkerk, 85.

[44]See Symington and Wolfaardt, 177.

In short, the theorist is a critic in the constructive sense. From the vantage point of a certain theory, he or she is constantly reconsidering praxis and questioning its established practices, so as to enable it to introduce improvements.

The Bipolar Tension of the Theory-praxis Relationship

The theory-praxis relationship is the central question of practical theology. Van der Ven calls it the "*crux theologica practica.*"[45] N. Greinacher maintains that the relationship between praxis and theory is one of bipolar tension.[46] This means that theory and praxis should be neither identical nor totally separate. The transition from theory to practice involves qualitative change. Whereas theory requires a constant critical evaluation from praxis, praxis must be transcended by theory.[47] The two have to be related like two poles influencing one another (a bipolar stress). This concept may best be illustrated by an ellipse. An ellipse has, of course, two centers or poles, and between them there is a tension which is in perfect equilibrium. If the tension relaxes completely, the poles move together, so that we have a circle with only one pole. If the tension becomes too great, the poles move too far apart, so that the result is two circles.

Traditionally, theory has been given priority over praxis. W. J. Janson feels that this has resulted in a platonic alienation between the Christian message and reality.[48] If we believe that God is active in the praxis of our church, then the praxis of our church must be of *fundamental* importance to our theology. In the past, practical theology was usually dominated by theories. These theories related to preaching, Christian education, pastoral care, and the like, were evolved from dogmatics, OT studies, or NT studies by means of a deductive normative approach. Liberation theology is a cry in the wilderness against a theology that operates only with theoretical utopian ideas.

Praxis must not, on the other hand, take priority over theory. An unbalanced emphasis on praxis has often been used by administrators to stabilize the *status quo* in the congregation and/or in the church

[45]J. A. Van der Ven, "Practical Theology: From Applied to Empirical Theology," *Journal of Empirical Theology* 1 (1988): 7.

[46]N. Greinacher, "Das Theorie-Praxis-Verhältnis in der praktischen Theologie," *Praktische Theologie Heute*, ed. F. Klostermann and R. Zerfass (Munich: Kaiser, 1974), 110.

[47]W. J. Janson and J. A. Wolfaardt, *Practical Theology: Only Guide for PTA100-T* (Pretoria: University of South Africa Press), n.d., 120.

[48]Ibid., 118.

denomination. When "new" concepts or practices are introduced, a distress cry goes forth: "What will happen to the numerical growth of our church?" Or there may be a number of other similar clichés that emerge either from fear or from authoritarianism, rather than from rational study and intelligent consideration.

A real interaction between critical theological theory and critical praxis can take place only if practitioners drop their antipathy to theory and if theorists get rid of their claims to absolutism. Janson states rightly, in my opinion, that practical theology grows from dialogue among individuals and groups within the church, a dialogue which is devoid of any authoritarian compulsion.[49]

Although the task of practical theology is to develop a theory of practice, it is not concerned merely with current praxis in the church. While it transcends the *status quo* of theory and ideological praxis in the life of the church, it is also concerned with anticipating, reflecting on, and embodying the church's future. Firet prefers to use the term "futurology." Practical theology does not want to remain a "counseling father"; it wants to become a "systematic prognostician." Thus, when practical theologians observe the preaching event, their concern would be whether the requirements of real communication are being met. Their question would be, Is this event structured in such a way as to provide an efficient and creative space where God, the individual human being, and the world in general can be involved?

5. *Conclusion*

Practical theology is intent on being part of the theological sciences. Although practical theologians would admit that it is a "how-science," its role is not that of searching for techniques or for rules on how to conduct religious meetings, etc. It is a procedure which involves scientific researching and description of certain events and communicative actions.

Practical theology cannot accept the claims sometimes made by other theological disciplines to the effect that they produce universal theories which can open up reality in its entirety and which are capable of interpreting all phenomena. According to this view, practical theology makes no contribution to the epistemology of the theological disciplines. Rather, practical theology is intent on being the theory of practice. It is intimately concerned with praxis in worship and faith. However, its approach to praxis is not pragmatic, but critical-analytical.

[49]See Janson and Wolfaardt, 123.

Alden, Robert. *Job*. New American Commentary, vol. 11. Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1993. 464 pp. $27.99.

Robert Alden's *Job* in the New American Commentary series continues the series' unapologetic affirmation of biblical inerrancy and authority. Alden, professor of OT at Denver Seminary, argues for Job's "theological unity" and provides for laypersons a "practical, applicable exposition" of its truths. *Job* portrays a personal, intimate, and caring God, whose power assures the fulfillment of the divine will whether on earth or in heaven. Further, Alden finds in Job's experience comfort for others who suffer as he did. Alden's fundamental faith in the goodness of the God of the book helps explain his merely passing reference to the work of scholars such as J. B. Curtis, whose cynicism on that account certainly surpasses even the sophisticated skepticism of James Crenshaw, who was entirely excluded from the commentary's reference. On interpretation, Alden's "best advice" to students of the first divine speech is to mentally transfer to the era and locus of the book, and "be poetic as you read" (370). The poetry of his work still astonishes by its intellectual power, artistic mastery, emotional range, and social relevance after millennia of scrutiny and appreciation.

As to Job's history, Alden locates the story in a patriarchal setting while eschewing dogmatism on the date of composition. His faith in Job's infallibility precludes his criticizing it from a post-Enlightenment scientific standpoint. He defends the author's right to speak in prescientific terms (370, on chap. 38:6). His treatment discusses the geographical location of the drama and the geographical origins of Job's friends. He argues that Job's friends are mouthpieces for theological/philosophical argumentation, rather than historically actual characters. He prefers to see them as "three of" Job's friends who actually came, whatever the significance of the numbers three and seven in the prologue. His attitude toward these numbers suggests a discontinuity between faith in biblical infallibility and a hermeneutic of biblical literalism. Philologically, Alden wisely disconnects the name Job from the term "enemy" [אוֹיֵב/אִיּוֹב].

Alden's unhappiness with the versions produces paradox. The JB, he pronounces, is reliable but often takes "unwarranted liberties with the text" (33). The NIV, his preferred version, is seen as "a compromise between reliability and readability" (34). The NASB's "wooden Hebraic-sounding" phrases make it unacceptable (32). And the inquiring layman for whom he writes will surely ask "why?" of Alden's unqualified declaration that the LXX is about four hundred lines shorter than the MT (32). One sentence more would have served better than an obscure footnote to remove the mysterious "why?" by explaining that the Greek translator, perhaps because of the difficulty of the Hebrew of Job, left some lines untranslated.

While Alden invites to poetic reading he offers precious little exposition on the benefits of such reading beyond the labeling of metaphors or the isolation of archetypes. Alden's total effort to communicate poetic discovery occurs in the formulaic/programmatic line "verse x is a perfect chiasmus" (94, n. 35, on chap. 5:13; 111 on chap. 7:14, 15; 136, on chap. 10:6; 146, on chap. 11:14; 180, on chap. 15:33—where he identifies "a perfectly matched pair of parallel lines"; etc.). One such identification, on 24:13-17 (249, n. 61) shows how Alden clearly recognizes the point of the passage but fails to demonstrate the significance of the poetic technique. He notes the interplay (in 24:13-17) of terms for light and darkness, and how this provides commentary on the nature of the criminal mentality. He might have exposed the conspicuous feature of this unit as being the enshrouding of the wicked in the darkness of their own schemes through the inclusio designed with the verb נכר (hiphil). The poet opens the pericope with the wicked's rejection of the way of light and closes it with their embrace of the ways of darkness—"They do not appreciate [לא־הכירו] the ways of light (v. 13), for they chum up [כי־יכיר] with the terrors of darkness" (v. 17). Furthermore, at the epicenter of this unit of interplay on light and darkness [6 cola preceding, 6 following], employing an inner envelope structure, the poet reflects on the paradox of light being equal to darkness. Cola a, b, of v. 15, encompassed with the term [עין—eye], highlights the irony of the eye of the adulterer watching for the dusk while thinking 'no eye sees me.' As 15c ironically concludes: "he puts on something to hide his face." In the end the author explicitly confirms his purpose of emphasizing the contradiction between the attitude of the schemers and light, declaring, "To them, morning is darkness"—בקר למו צלמות (v. 17a).

Both the devil and Satan make trouble in Alden's commentary. The devil is the Hebrew printer's devil, (who gives שׂוך for "hedge," which should be שׂוך [55, n. 19]; כשׂדים for "Chaldeans," which should be כשׂדים [60, n. 31]; and יעור for "meet," which should be יעד [69, n. 57]). Satan is God's cabinet scoundrel (53, on chap. 1:6), an unargued, unsupported affirmation, certainly finding no basis in the text cited (1 Kgs 22:20-23). The citation of 1 Cor 5:5 (56, n. 21) somewhat resembles the comment on Job 1:6 (53) about the composition of God's cabinet. According to Alden, God's retinue includes both good and not-so-good members. It is a strange suggestion for one who finds in *Job* a God of supreme goodness and absolute power. But then, Alden may well be twice mistaken. For the Job prologue offers a Satan who is *sui generis* in the OT, the only manifestation of this character which includes a dialogue of confrontation with the Deity who must yield before the adversary's shrewd challenge, thus making room for the drama of the book. These interpretations notwithstanding, Alden's work provides a useful contribution to the literature and theology of Job.

Montemorelos University
Montemorelos, NL, Mexico

LAEL CAESAR

Baird, William. *History of New Testament Research.* Vol. 1, *From Deism to Tübingen.* Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. xxii + 450 pp. $42.00.

This book is a welcome addition to the world of NT scholarship. As Baird aptly states, "the study of the history and criticism of the Bible is a crucial feature of the history of Christianity . . . Biblical scholars neglect this history at their own peril. Failure to know one's history is a failure to understand one's identity, a failure that destines one to repeat old mistakes and neglect venerable solutions" (xxii). Certainly one comes from reading Baird with the conviction that there is little (if anything) new under the sun. Most of the questions and issues that ever occurred in NT research were raised, as Baird notes, during the period covered by this volume. Yet there has not been a full scale treatment of the history of NT study since Werner George Kümmel's monumental *Introduction to the New Testament* in 1975.

After a brief introductory section dealing with "New Testament Research before the Enlightenment" and methodology, Baird divides the work into two parts. The first part, on "Early Developments," contains six chapters: (1) "Backgrounds and Beginnings" (H. Grotius, J. Lightfoot, R. Simon as "precursors" and J. Mill and R. Bentley for "text criticism"); (2) the English Deists' attack on revealed religion (D. Whitby as an advocate of revealed religion, J. Locke as a precursor to the Deists, and the Deists: J. Toland, M. Tindal, A. Collins, T. Woolston, P. Annet, T. Morgan, and T. Chubb); (3) the Pietists (P. J. Spener, A. H. Francke, J. A. Bengel, and J. Wesley); (4) the development of the historical method (J. A. Turretin, J. J. Wettstein, and J. A. Ernesti); (5) the refinement of the historical method (J. S. Semler, J. D. Michaelis, and their students J. J. Griesbach and J. G. Eichhorn), and (6) a chapter discussing conservative alternatives (A. Calmet and N. Lardner), literary approaches (G. E. Lessing and J. G. Herder) and the rise of NT Theology (J. P. Gabler and G. L. Bauer).

The second part, "New Testament Research in an Era of Philosophical Ferment," treats the impact of philosophical ideologies on the new "historical" method. It includes five chapters. Chapter 7 treats "The Rise of Liberalism" (H.E.G. Paulus, F.D.E. Schleiermacher, the followers of the latter, W.M.L. de Wette and F. Lücke, and A. Neander as a "mediating alternative"). Chapter 8 describes the philosophical idealism (D. F. Strauss, F. C. Baur and the Tübingen school [E. Zeller and A. Hilgenfeld], and "alternatives" to that school, E. W. Hengstenberg, A. Tholuck, and H. Ewald). Chapter 9 traces trends outside and after Tübingen (the Synoptic Problem: J.C.L. Gieseler, H. Marsh, C. G. Wilke, C. H. Weisse, and H. U. Meijboom; the authenticity of John: K. G. Bretscheider and J. J. Tayler; and Text Criticism: K. Lachmann and C. von Tischendorf). Chapter 10 deals with mediating critics (J. L. Hug and Roman Catholic scholarship; and English scholars influenced by romanticism: S. T. Coleridge, T. Arnold, A. P. Stanley, and B. Jowett. A final chapter on "Synthesizing Accomplishments" discusses the commentary series developed by H. Olshausen, H.A.W. Meyer, J. P. Lange, and F. L. Godet and efforts to reconstruct the life of Jesus by E. Renan and T. Keim). Baird concludes with an epilogue in which he presents his observations on the implications of this history.

Since Baird is certain to replace Kümmel as the standard text, it would be worthwhile to briefly compare the two. Kümmel gives much more information on the pre-Enlightenment period (two chapters covering 27 pages rather than the 5-page section in the introduction allowed by Baird). Kümmel treats a considerably larger number of individual scholars but more briefly. Baird gives detailed discussions of only 64 individuals. Some of these figures Baird mentions in passing (e.g., G. C. Storr, G. T. Zachariä, and Albrecht Ritschl) and others he will treat in the second volume (e.g., H. J. Holtzmann and B. F. Westcott), but it is clear that his selection is rather limited. But this is not necessarily a weakness; discussing representative figures helps one see the forest, and an attempt to be more comprehensive and encyclopedic could lead one to lose sight of the forest for the trees. Kümmel is also helpful in that he very frequently cites extensive materials from the author's works themselves. Baird, on the other hand provides more historical context and treats each author in one place (the single exception is J. S. Semler) rather than in several places as Kümmel sometimes does. Baird includes some conservative figures often overlooked (e.g., Neander and Hengstenberg), but his emphasis is clearly on figures important in the rise and development of the historical-critical method.

This represents, in my estimate, something of a weakness on Baird's part. Maybe it is inherent in the genre, but there is a decided historicist and positivist bias. This is reflected in the treatment of the Renaissance and Reformation as the background of NT research, the reference to "conservative" approaches as "alternatives," and the title of part 1. While it is commendable that Baird does include a treatment of Roman Catholic scholars, their inclusion along with other conservative approaches, serves to raise "important questions about methodology" (338). Baird says of Hug that "conservative premises have predetermined his results" (338). But such a statement reflects the positivist myth that objective, presuppositionless research is possible. Similar statements could (and should) be made of the other figures discussed. Conservatives will want to be wary in reading Baird.

Despite such criticism, Baird's book is must reading for NT scholars and will be valuable for students of theology in general. Baird is certainly to be commended for including historical and political background information. It was interesting to learn that Napoleon's invasion of Prussia in 1806 led to the closing of the University of Halle, Schleiermacher's move to Berlin, and the founding of the University of Berlin. Such details help to make what would be dull reading enjoyable.

Berrien Springs, MI 49103 MATTHEW M. KENT

Blumhofer, Edith L. *Restoring the Faith: The Assemblies of God, Pentecostalism, and American Culture.* Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1993. x + 320 pp. Cloth, $42.50; paper, $19.95.

Restoring the Faith examines the impact of restorationism on Pentecostalism through the study of the history of the largest Pentecostal

denomination—The Assemblies of God. Following on the train of scholars working in the broader field of Protestant restorationism, such as Richard T. Hughes and C. Leonard Allen in their *Illusions of Innocence: Protestant Primitivism in America, 1630-1875* (University of Chicago Press, 1988), Edith Blumhofer views early Pentecostalism as "most basically the expression of a yearning to recapture in the last moments of time the pristine purity of a long-gone era" (3). Accordingly, Pentecostalism's agenda was the restoration of the faith of the apostles in the end time. As a result, the reinstitution of the Pentecostal gifts in latter-rain power was central to the early believers, as was simplicity in daily life, and an otherworldly way of living and thinking. The renewal of the gift of tongues was a sign that they were in the last days. Jesus was soon to come and the history of the present world would be concluded.

But Jesus didn't come. As a result, the once clear-cut faith and identity of the Pentecostals became obscured as the need for doctrinal formulation and some sort of church organization became necessary during the interim. That organizational impulse, as Blumhofer points out, was one of several factors that began to obscure the original restorationist insight. And that obscurification brought its own tensions into the ranks of the Assemblies of God.

Blumhofer points out that restorationism in the Assemblies of God denomination has expressed itself differently as the movement has improved its economic and social position. As a result, the denomination's history, she indicates, elucidates what happens when the restorationist dynamic clashes with cultural norms. The book documents how that clash has refocused the restorationist dream for the central core of the denomination as it has accommodated to culture across time. But that very accommodation, Blumhofer also demonstrates, has repeatedly provided opportunity for more radical Pentecostals at the fringes of the Assemblies of God or even outside of it to restate the original restorationist insights in a manner that creates tension between the independents and the denomination.

Restoring the Faith puts forth four stages through which the Assemblies of God denomination has moved as it has related its belief system to the larger culture. First, a primitive restorationism marked its early years. Second, a perception of likeness with the fundamentalists in the 1920s led the Assemblies of God to view themselves as "fundamentalists with a difference." Third, the post-World War II charismatic renewal led them to see themselves as a "third force" in Christianity with potential for renewal of the church at large. And fourth, the denomination has shown since the 1970s a predilection for popular culture.

All four of those historic expressions, argues Blumhofer, find their place in the contemporary Assemblies of God. Thus "today one can find restorationist, fundamentalist, middle class 'third force' impulses, and pop expressions of Pentecostalism coexisting in the denomination at large, in local congregations, and among individual leaders" (4).

The volume presents the current Assemblies of God as a blending of legacies from its four historical stages. Thus *Restoring the Faith* is at the same time a history of the Assemblies of God, an overview of the denominational

constituency's beliefs, and an examination of how the Pentecostals have related to American culture.

Blumhofer's volume (the published version of a Harvard dissertation) undertakes with fair success a rather complex analysis of a major movement in twentieth-century American religious history. In the process, it is the dynamic of the ever-changing approach to restorationism and the conflict between the primitivists and the accomodationists that takes center stage rather than the history of the Assemblies of God. But that is as it should be, since the author's focus is on restorationism as illustrated in Assemblies of God history rather that on a denominational history itself.

Blumhofer has given us an insightful volume that will stand alongside Donald Dayton's *Theological Roots of Pentecostalism* (Zondervan, 1987), Vinson Syan's *Holiness-Pentecostal Movement in the United States* (Eerdmans, 1971) and Robert M. Anderson's *Vision of the Disinherited* (Oxford, 1979) as a necessary interpretive contribution to the history of one of America's most dynamic religious movements.

Andrews University GEORGE KNIGHT

Brueggemann, Walter. *Biblical Perspectives on Evangelism: Living in a Three-Storied Universe.* Nashville: Abingdon, 1993. 160 pp. Paper, $12.95.

In this work, Brueggemann, professor of OT at Columbia Theological Seminary in Decatur, Georgia, attempts to develop a theological framework for evangelism today. He attempts to accomplish this through the biblical text itself rather than from a sociological perspective. His thesis revolves around evangelism in a "three-storied universe," referring to the "promise made to the ancestors, the deliverance from slavery, and the gift of the land" (9).

Brueggemann argues that each of these three stories must be told and retold through successive generations, and that the retelling of these stories and their acceptance by successive generations constitutes the heart of the evangelistic mandate. He then devotes three chapters to defining three groups that should be the object of evangelism: "outsiders who become insiders" (chap. 2), "forgetters who are made rememberers" (chap. 3), and "beloved children who become belief-ful adults" (chap. 4). In Brueggemann's view these three groups (non-members, inactives, and children) become the prime targets of the evangelistic message according to the biblical text.

While Brueggemann attempts to construct his theology of evangelism from the biblical text, he seems selective in the texts which he has chosen to develop his evangelistic theology. At times he seems to strain a text to make it conform to his thesis. Nowhere in the book does he declare that he is attempting to construct from the OT a theology of evangelism for the church today, yet that is precisely what he has done. That is understandable since his major field is the OT. However, it would have been helpful to the reader to understand that from the beginning.

To arrive at a theology of evangelism from the OT while ignoring the great commission texts of the NT results in a distorted understanding of evangelism. As a result, Brueggemann sees evangelism as merely the changing of a person's life focus to one of social consciousness. When this is done, one can be admitted into the community of faith because that community exists for the purpose of accomplishing a social agenda, especially in the political process.

This reviewer questions whether Brueggemann has truly constructed even an OT understanding of evangelism. God's purpose for ancient Israel evangelistically was to bring the knowledge of the true God to the nations, yet one searches in vain to discover any hint of that in Brueggemann's work. It seems, at times, as if belief in God was not even a part of the evangelistic agenda. Certain passages in the book also cause this reviewer to question whether Brueggemann, who claims to be an evangelical, really believes in the truthfulness of Scripture. "God is not a being 'out there,' but a character in a textual drama to which we are witnesses and potentially participants" (112). "The Genesis stories haunt us . . . not because we take them as 'factual'" (108).

When one questions the historicity of the scriptural story, it is understandable how one can construct a theology of evangelism that basically revolves around accomplishing a social agenda through the political process. Brueggemann basically fails to accomplish what he sets out to do in the beginning of his book: to create a theology of evangelism based on the biblical text itself. He selectively uses texts primarily from the OT, ignoring the great evangelistic passages and historical evidence for evangelism in the NT which attempt to help people individually to accept the Lordship of Christ in their lives. The result is a distorted concept of evangelism, making social consciousness the end product of evangelization.

While true conversion will result in social consciousness, it is not the ultimate task of evangelization. While this reviewer has a difficult time accepting Brueggemann's basic thesis, yet the book does help raise one's social awareness. Christian mission has erred in two extremes: an emphasis on personal salvation while ignoring social responsibility, and acceptance of a social gospel while ignoring personal salvation. Brueggemann has gone to the latter extreme. To his credit he has attempted to justify his social gospel evangelism from the biblical text, even if he has had to strain certain texts to accomplish this task. One clear example of this "straining" is chapter 2, which is based on Josh 24. Brueggemann attempts to apply this concept to Canaanites, the outsiders who were becoming insiders. Yet Josh 24:1 clearly references this passage to the tribes of Israel.

Christians who are committed to the historicity of Scripture and the proclamation of a clear evangelistic message to all nations will find little in this work to help them in their evangelistic mandate. Those who are more comfortable with a social-gospel approach to evangelism will find food for thought in this book, but must carefully weigh its limited scriptural base with the more complete understanding of evangelism enshrined in the entire Bible, especially the NT.

Andrews University RUSSELL BURRILL

Christensen, Duane L., ed. *A Song of Power and the Power of Song: Essays on the Book of Deuteronomy.* Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993. xiv + 428 pp. $32.50.

This book is a compilation of essays previously published in various periodicals from 1951 through 1988. Two of them appear for the first time in English. The book is edited as volume 3 in the series Sources for Biblical and Theological Study by Duane L. Christensen, Professor of Old Testament Languages and Literature at the American Baptist Seminary of the West.

After an introduction in which Christensen describes the criteria by which the essays were selected, he gives a short summary of each work included in the five-part volume. The first part includes essays that deal with basic issues in the study of Deuteronomy: Moshe Weinfeld, "Deuteronomy: The Present State of Inquiry" (1967); Norbert Lohfink, "Recent Discussions on 2 Kings 22-23: The State of the Question" (1985); S. Dean McBride, Jr., "Polity of the Covenant People: The Book of Deuteronomy" (1987); E. W. Nicholson, "Covenant in a Century of Study since Wellhausen" (1986); Gordon J. Wenham, "Deuteronomy and the Central Sanctuary" (1971); Peter C. Craigie, "Deuteronomy and Ugaritic Studies" (1977); and C. Brekelmans, "Wisdom Influence in Deuteronomy" (1978).

The second part, named "The Outer Frame," includes articles that deal with Deuteronomy 1-3 and 31-34: Timo Veijola, "Principal Observations of the Basic Story in Deuteronomy 1-3" (1988); William L. Moran, "The End of the Unholy War and the Anti-Exodus" (1963); Patrick W. Skehan, "The Structure of the Song of Moses in Deuteronomy (32:1-43)" (1951); George E. Mendenhall, "Samuel's 'Broken Rib': Deuteronomy 32" (1975); and George W. Coats, "Legendary Motifs in the Moses Death Reports" (1977).

The third part, termed "The Inner Frame," includes essays touching on the themes of Deuteronomy 4-11 and 27-30: A. D. H. Mayes, "Deuteronomy 4 and the Literary Criticism of Deuteronomy" (1981); Anthony Phillips, "The Decalogue: Ancient Israel's Criminal Law" (1983); F. Charles Fensham, "Malediction and Benediction in Ancient Near Eastern Vassal-Treaties and the Old Testament" (1962); Elizabeth Bellefontaine, "Curses of Deuteronomy 27: Their Relationship to the Prohibitives" (1975); and Alexander Rofé, "The Covenant in the Land of Moab (Deuteronomy 28:69-30:20): Historico-Literary, Comparative, and Formcritical Considerations (1985)."

The fourth part, titled "The Central Core," presents four articles dealing with Deuteronomy 12-26: Moshe Greenberg, "Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law" (1960); Patrick D. Miller, "'Moses My Servant': The Deuteronomic Portrait of Moses" (1987); George Braulik, "The Sequence of the Laws in Deuteronomy 12-26 and in the Decalogue" (1985); Norbert Lohfink, "Distribution of the Functions of Power: The Laws Concerning Public Offices in Deuteronomy 16:18-18:22" (1981).

The fifth and final part gives limited attention to new directions and approaches concerning the structure of the book of Deuteronomy. This section is represented by three authors: Robert Pozlin, "Reporting Speech in the Book

of Deuteronomy: Toward a Compositional Analysis of the Deuteronomic History" (1981); Casper J. Labuschange, "Divine Speech in Deuteronomy" (1985); Duane L. Christensen, "The *Numeruswechsel* in Deuteronomy 12" (1986).

The partition of the book (parts 2, 3, and 4) is in harmony with the editor's views concerning the composition and structure of the book of Deuteronomy (expressed in more detail in his commentary on Deuteronomy, WBC, vol. 6a). Although it is obvious that such a compilation as this cannot include every authority in the field, nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the works of several giants in OT scholarship (A. Alt, M. Noth, R. E. Clements, O. Eissfeldt, S. Mittmann, J. J. Stamm, S. R. Driver, G. E. Wright, and G. von Rad) have not been included. The book is further limited by the exclusion of John M. Wiebe's article, "The Form, Setting and Meaning of the Song of Moses," published in *Studia et Theologica* 17 (1989), where the literature in regard to Deut 32 is well represented, and an interesting structure for the chapter is skillfully proposed.

Regarding book design, a subject index would have been much appreciated. Nevertheless, the index of authorities and of scripture references is of great benefit to the reader. Christensen deserves praise for compiling this valuable material in a one-volume reference. The book will be valuable as a primary or supplementary resource for graduate students and scholars of Deuteronomy and of the Pentateuch in general.

Berrien Springs, MI 49103 ZELJKO GREGOR

Clouse, Bonidell. *Teaching for Moral Growth: A Guide for the Christian Community—Teachers, Parents, and Pastors.* Wheaton, IL: Victor Books/Scripture Press Publishers, 1993. 401 pp. $14.99.

Teaching for Moral Growth represents a professional and courageous attempt to weave concepts from three major disciplines—theology, psychology, and education—into a single resource volume for teachers, parents, and pastors. Bonidell Clouse, Professor of Educational and School Psychology at Indiana State University, argues that these three disciplines find "common ground" in the field of moral values and uses contributions from each to build her toolbox for moral growth.

The book is divided into three sections of unequal length. Part I (59 pp.) traces three "Traditional Approaches to Moral Growth." This section describes "The Role of Stories," "A Biblical Approach," and "Character Education," sketching in broad strokes a historical overview of each approach as it has affected moral education.

Part II (287 pp.) presents "Psychological Approaches to Moral Growth." The author supplies the reader with engaging summary sketches of four major schools of psychology: Freudian psychoanalysis, behaviorism, cognitive psychology, and humanist psychology. In each summary the author first presents brief readable biographies of the school's chief proponents, then gives

a reasonably objective review of their interpretation of humans and how they learn. She then draws inferences regarding the specific school's teachings on moral growth. Each summary sketch is followed by "Guidelines . . . for Teachers, Parents and Pastors," in which the major learning premises are projected into strategies for teaching moral growth—spotlighting key concepts for Christian education use.

Part III (40 pp.) constitutes the conceptual core of the volume. Here the author compares and contrasts the various psychological schools with biblical teaching and contemporary Christian viewpoints. The section closes with a concise summary of the points made in the study and applies them to the knotty problems of moral education in today's society.

As a religious educator, the reviewer found this book vaguely frustrating until he realized that it represents the personal resolution of a Christian scholar's career pilgrimage through the mazes of educational psychology in search of tools for facilitating moral growth in children and youth. Viewed as such, the book becomes an effective and ambitious overview of a crisis issue—solidly anchored moral growth amid violence and social flux. The total impression of the study is one of a valiant attempt to create an effective condensation of a conceptual field too vast and complex for even four hundred pages. The designated readership of teachers, parents and pastors also probably sets too diverse a target for a single volume.

The tightly knit reasoning of the book can pose difficulty. For example, the author perceives the central theme of the Bible to be " . . . the greatness, magnitude, and righteousness of God. . . . One so holy that sin cannot be tolerated in any form. . . . It is a revelation that the distance between where we are and where God is, is so vast there is no way to reach Him, that He must come to us if we are to know what He is like" (31). Biblical illustrations from the book of Job, supplemented by other biblical passages, are then used to adduce strategies for moral and spiritual growth education.

If the reader, while not denying the presence of these Bible themes, views the central theme of the Bible differently, other educational conclusions would be reached. The reviewer, for instance, perceives Scripture rather to be the revelation of a holy God grieving over the alienation of relationship caused by the rebellion of mankind and the plan by which redemptive love strives to restore that broken relationship, closing the gap at incredible cost. As a result, the reviewer found himself projecting moral growth strategies other than the author suggests.

The reviews of major schools of psychological thought are objectively written. The biographical sketches of the main leaders in each field proved especially insightful and enjoyable reading. The conservative Christian educator, pastor, and parent, however, will find themselves among such strange ideological bedfellows as Sigmund Freud, Bruno Bettelheim, John B. Watson, B. F. Skinner, and John Locke. The author carefully cites the negative attitude these prominent figures took toward religion in general and Christianity in particular, but feels that these attitudes do not negate the usefulness of their psychological insights to moral growth. The reviewer is forced, however, to wonder how

systems which interpret human behavior in a matrix of thought rejecting both Christian religion and its Christ, sometimes bitterly, can effectively contribute to the growth of moral values in Christian education. The reader must, of course, make his own judgment.

The author seems to find cognitive (or Gestalt) learning psychology an especially rich mine of practical moral-growth tools. Significant time is devoted to the contributions of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, whose research seems to offer valuable insights and strategies for Christian moral-growth planning.

To Christian readers who feel that the term "Christian humanism" is an oxymoron, Clouse's survey of humanist psychology's contributions to moral-growth concepts and tools will be enlightening. The reviewer found this section to be refreshingly objective and convincingly fair. The traditional Christian shock-reflex toward "humanism" can well afford an unbiased review of the insights that literature from this school of psychology can supply.

The last section of the book represents the author's final synthesis of her presentation into a single usable overview. To the extent they have followed the author's arguments, inferences, and projections, readers will experience satisfaction with the presentation. To the extent the readers did not, they will probably experience restlessness and a sense of incomplete closure.

The book is engagingly written and a comprehensive attempt to review a field which Christians must confront in order to be relevant to society. The sense of frustration the reviewer felt early in the book was never fully resolved but, by the last page, it was balanced by a sense of stimulation gained through the author's open willingness to tap all the resources presently available, examine them from a biblical perspective, and harness them together in a usable format.

The author may or may not have succeeded in her stated purpose. But her book throws a clear challenge to theologians, psychologists, and educators to review their comfortable premises and marshal the best contributions their disciplines offer to solve the problems that moral growth and values education present to contemporary Christianity. That challenge, once taken, may result in some warm debate, but we must thank Bonidell Clouse for laying out the issues and indicating solutions for developing sound moral-growth principles and strategies for Christian youth and the churches that serve them.

Andrews University WINSTON FERRIS

Collins, John J. *Daniel: A Commentary on the Book of Daniel*, Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1993. xxxvi + 499 pp. Cloth, $46.00; paper, $34.95.

John J. Collins' *Daniel* utilizes the standard arrangement of a detailed introduction to the book followed by a verse-by-verse commentary. The commentary is characterized by translations with extensive textual notes. Some

chapters have an excursus of up to six pages inserted into the detailed commentary. The introduction includes a section by A. Y. Collins on the influence of Daniel on the NT (90-123). This commentary not only treats the MT version of Daniel, but has an appendix to chapter 3 on the Prayer of Azariah and the Song of the Three as well as separate chapters at the end of the commentary on Bel and the Serpent and Susanna. There are two bibliographies (xxi-xxiv, 443-456) and three indexes.

This work is especially valuable for its treatment of Daniel's first six chapters. The variations between the Old Greek version and the MT are finally given full play in a major commentary. For chapters 4, 5, and 6 the MT and OG are translated in parallel. For Susanna the OG is paralleled with Theodotion (there is no MT, of course), and variations between the OG and Theodotion are also noted in the translation of Bel and the Serpent. No doubt this emphasis on the witness of the Old Greek is due to dissertations on the subject at Notre Dame, where Collins did most of the work on this commentary.

Also refreshing is Collins' critique of a facile identification of the Nabonidus fragment (4QPrNab) as a version of Daniel 4 (218). Though he does not engage the entire body of literature on the first six chapters, Collins is free enough with these stories to engage them critically without forcing the text into the mold of a particular scholarly dogma.

Less enlightened is the commentary on chapters 7-12. For the latter half of Daniel this commentary is a doctrinaire presentation of the Hasmonean hypothesis, including its less critical aspects, which are glossed over or ignored. An example from chapter 8 will serve to illustrate. For Daniel 8:14 both the OG and Theodotion specify 2300 days, which makes these versions our earliest commentary on the text. However, Collins refuses to engage the versions on this point and shows no interest in why the Greek translators would specify the time period. The Hasmonean hypothesis requires 1150 days, and so the versions are described as mistaken and thus are ignored (336). Here Collins may be contrasted to Goldingay (WBC, 30), who also accepts the Hasmonean hypothesis yet is able to engage the versions on this point.

Chapter 8 is itself a commentary and expansion of chapter 7. The obvious reuse of images makes this conclusion apparent to any who do not begin with the Hasmonean hypothesis. However, Collins, barricaded by his presuppositions, is unable to engage chapter 8 as our earliest commentary on chapter 7. This is interesting because in his commentary on chapter 7 he does not confine the text to a Hasmonean setting. Collins is free in his interpretation of chapter 7, but not free enough to engage chapter 8 as a resource for understanding chapter 7.

The Son of Man of 7:13 receives special attention in this commentary, for it is examined in detail in two sections of the introduction (79-84, 90-105) in addition to an excursus within chapter 7 (304-310). These sections examine the Son of Man figure both within Daniel 7 and in later works. As the Son of Man is a phrase which Jesus used of himself, the background and usage of this motif is of particular interest to Christian readers of Daniel.

As a whole, this commentary is a valuable resource for scholars and an important addition to the Hermeneia series. It is particularly good in dealing with the first half of Daniel. However, for the second half of Daniel those interested in the Hasmonean hypothesis would be better served by Goldingay's commentary.

Madison, WI 53713 JAMES E. MILLER

Dobbs-Allsopp, F. W. *Weep, O Daughter of Zion: A Study of the City-Lament Genre in the Hebrew Bible.* Biblica et Orientalia, no. 44. Rome: Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1993. 228 pp.

This revised dissertation sets forth a hypothesis about ancient Near Eastern literary influences on the Hebrew Scriptures. Specifically, Dobbs-Allsopp concentrates on the genre known as the poetic lament over the destruction of a city, such as one finds in Lamentations. Dobbs-Allsopp's work is the first of its kind to examine in detail the several components of the lament over the fallen city. His method involves a careful description of the thematic elements which occur in nonbiblical Mesopotamian laments, followed by a comparison with the biblical genres—primarily the oracles against the nations ("OAN")— which contain many of the same elements. The fact that several important lament-type elements occur in this totally different biblical prophetic genre leads Dobbs-Allsopp to conclude that the city lament developed as an independent indigenous form in Israel. Since the earliest of these OAN date from the late eighth century B.C.E., this period probably indicates the beginning of this genre in Israel.

Some of the important thematic categories which the author identifies (for both the Mesopotamian laments and the OAN) are structural and poetic technique, divine abandonment, assignment of responsibility, divine agency, and the detailed nature of societal collapse and destruction. Though the author never so states, the eighth to sixth centuries B.C.E. are certainly a reasonable period for such a genre to be developed and expressed in Israel. For it was during this time that great empires systematically brought to an end the separate kingdoms of Israel and Judah, and destroyed their temples and major cities.

However, one cannot help but perceive here a kind of scholarly "tunnel vision." For instance, many of the motifs of the city-lament also occur in other kinds of ancient Near Eastern literature which Dobbs-Allsopp never considers. One such is the Egyptian "Tradition of Seven Lean Years" (*ANET*, 31-32). Of more importance are the Egyptian didactic essays from the Middle Kingdom period and later (e.g., see Lichtheim, I: 145-169). Dobbs-Allsopp does include in Appendix II (176) a collation of the various city-lament features as found in the ancient sources, including the Hebrew Bible.

Moreover the theme of the people's pathos over the loss of city and sanctuary and the general disruption of "normal times" is also found in other kinds of biblical literature not considered by the author (e.g., the victory hymn

of Judg 5 mentions unsafe highways (v. 6); and the theophany hymn of Hab 3 mentions the destruction of a sanctuary (v. 7).

But the most serious problem of all in the author's otherwise careful work is the ivory-tower mentality which characterizes it from start to finish. Absent is any sense of the comprehension of (or sympathy with) the terrible, violent times that peoples of the Near East endured (as his title implies). Only once does Dobbs-Allsopp step out of his sterile study to approach the agony of that ancient world; he suggests in his conclusions that the ancient poets wrote "about actual destructions" as opposed to "imaginatively creating situations for which the city-lament genre would be appropriate" (162). But these "actual destructions" and the sense of social loss that they created is what the lamentations about fallen cities are all about! This is the reason such poems were written and preserved. This is the reason such literature has meaning for us in these present violent times.

United Methodist Church
Kermit, TX 79745

PAUL D. DUERKSEN

Epp, Eldon Jay, and Gordon D. Fee. *Studies in the Theory and Method of New Testament Textual Criticism.* Studies and Documents No. 45. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1993. xiv + 414 pp. Hardcover, $39.99.

In the field of NT textual criticism, modern scholarship suffers from an abundance of materials and methods. If the first task of text criticism is the establishment of an original reading by sorting through and comparing the ancient manuscripts, then that task is complicated by the plethora of documents from over twelve centuries of church history, from different Mediterranean, European, and Middle Eastern source-locational subregions, with differing values of MS evidence as witness to an original text! Eldon Epp and Gordon Fee perform a genuine service by offering a set of "best-of-all" essays to guide the modern student through this very real maze.

From two senior scholars who have for years been at the cutting edge of their discipline, this is a welcome and informative addition. Their gift to the scholarly world stems from their deep knowledge of the history of the discipline, their original ideas about how to organize and assess the textual evidence, and certainly their demonstrated ability in presenting that research in a lucid and readable way.

Contrary to the suggestion of the publisher, this collection of critical essays is not for the novice in Greek exegesis or for first-time students of critical introduction. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently well laid out to enable one with limited facility in the field to proceed in an orderly way to a more informed understanding of the discipline. For the practiced scholar also, here is as good an assessment of the current research as one can find anywhere.

The first four essays provide the needed orientation for the more general reader: In essays one and two Epp and Fee explore the history of research in

NT textual criticism. Next, each author presents his views on the definition of a textual variant. Fee (62-79) illustrates textual variation by page-size charts for several passages from Luke and John. This kind of historical diagram of all the MS evidence (easily performed today with computer graphics) provides an important aid for assessing the value of the different textual traditions and of the separate witnesses within each tradition. It also shows why it is difficult to determine today what really is a "significant variant," and reveals the difficulty in deciding what is to be the precise textual unit for consideration.

In the next set of essays, the authors weigh the pros and cons of modern views and procedures for NT textual criticism. The last three sections of the book (a total of seven essays) attempt to answer the question, How does one today perform the task of using ancient MSS to determine the original text? Contained in this section are current guidelines for establishing textual relationships, the use and relative significance of the papyri in text-critical method, and the use of Patristic quotations (and paraphrases). Since most of these essays are recent (or recently revised), they show where the authors themselves are today in their application of method, while they also serve to encourage students of the next generation to solve the remaining unsolved problems by way of these tried-and-true guidelines, exploratory methods, and trial-and-error findings.

Typical of these collected essays is Epp's on the value of the "eclectic method" (141-173). Epp's historical survey of the different "critical canons" from the modern period for the determination of the originality of variant readings in a textual tradition reveals contradictions, prejudices, and oversights when one canon is compared with another. Moreover, there is no consensus about what the "eclectic method" is or how it should be applied by modern practitioners. For instance, Tischenforf (1849) maintained rightly that "readings should be studiously retained that are in accord with the Greek language and style of the individual authors of the NT." But was he correct in reducing the priority of this criterion compared with other internal and external considerations? Epp stresses the importance of this same criterion today, and helpfully defines it with much more rigor (163). Nevertheless, there remains the question of how to reconcile conflicts between internal and external evidence. What is one to do when one arrives at a decision, based on the systematic application of internal evidence, that is in conflict with the conclusion of criteria related to the external (MS) evidence? This is only one of many ambiguities the eclectic method still contains, despite all of its refinements.

Studies would be useful for a graduate or seminary course on NT textual criticism as a supplement to a more basic sourcebook (such as Metzger, *The Text of the New Testament*, 1993).

Kermit, TX 79745 PAUL DEAN DUERKSEN

Erickson, Millard J. *The Evangelical Mind and Heart: Perspectives on Theological and Practical Issues.* Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1993. 240 pp. $14.99.

This work consists of occasional pieces produced over the past few years. For those who have come to appreciate the moderate but firm Reformed perspective of Erickson and his even-handed, analytical style, these pieces will be cordially greeted. For the uninitiated, they can serve as an excellent introduction to Millard Erickson.

The book's ten chapters cover a variety of issues arranged in five "parts." The subjects addressed include evangelicalism and society (part 1), evangelicalism and environmental concerns (part 2), evangelical Christology (part 3), issues dealing with salvation and Christian mission (part 4), and the future of evangelicalism (part 5). The essays in part 5 are must reading for all seminary applied-theology teachers and church-growth devotees.

While the parts on "Evangelicalism and Society" and environmental issues are solid (though somewhat prophetically timid), one gets the distinct impression that Erickson's evangelical theological juices do not really begin to flow until the last three sections.

Erickson's comments on "Contemporary Evangelical Christology" are informative (chap. 5), but chapters 6 and 7 on contemporary debates on soteriology reveal more forcibly his mind and heart. In his analysis and critiques of these issues Erickson is at the top of his theological form. This is especially true of his handling of the "free grace" versus "Lordship salvation" controversy. For those not familiar with this debate, the central issue deals with the relationship between the experience of saving grace and subsequent developments in Christian experience. This dispute has been primarily carried on within the confines of the dispensationalist wing of Reformed Evangelicalism (the main disputants being Zane Hodges and John MacArthur).

The so called "free grace" advocates strongly contend that salvation is by faith in the "free grace" of Christ alone—plus absolutely nothing having to do with character change and gospel obedience. For them, any other view perverts "the pure grace of the gospel" (108). In strident opposition, the "Lordship" advocates describe the "free grace" position as a "cheap grace" compromise of the true gospel.

While Erickson appeals for a lowered theological temperature in this heated debate and patiently lays out the pros and cons of each position, he does essentially come down on the side of the "lordship" proponents—but not without dishing out a few well-placed critiques of the "Lordship" position's lack of logical consistency.

Arminians might let out an "I told you so" yawn in the face of such dispensational Reformed internecine warfare (possibly wishing a plague on both houses), but the critiques and insights of Erickson should prove quite helpful and stimulating to both Reformed and Arminian students of soteriology. His response is basically that both sides have been too abstract and have not been true enough to the "union with Christ" concept of the NT view of salvation. Forgiveness and obedient discipleship are not things that Christ gives apart from

being "in Him," but are inseparable, personal parts of the total package of salvation (121-122).

The same even-handed analytical and critical restraint is also deftly applied in his treatment of the so-called "signs and wonders" movement (chap. 8). Here again Erickson is rewarding in his analysis and charitable in criticism. But one wishes that the same could be said of chapter 6 which deals with debates about the identity and final destiny of the lost. This chapter could be appropriately entitled "My Gripe with Clark Pinnock's Disturbing Developments." While Erickson is typically fair in laying out the positions of Pinnock and calm in his reply, one senses a thinly veiled impatience with Pinnock, especially in the discussion of "annihilationism." This seems to contribute to a very impoverished biblical response with almost no acknowledgement of the severity of the theological implications involved.

It seems to this reviewer that with the enormity of the theological implications involved (such as: How can the electing God be just and yet damn souls to eternal torment whom He has consciously not elected to salvation?), and the growing number of evangelicals attracted to annihilationism (Pinnock, John Stott, P. E. Hughes, E. W. Fudge), one wonders if a more astute biblical and theological response to Pinnock is not called for. This chapter is the low point of an otherwise rewarding and stimulating book.

Andrews University WOODROW WHIDDEN

Farris, T. V. *Mighty to Save: A Study in Old Testament Soteriology.* Nashville: Broadman Press, 1993. 301 pp. $19.99.

Finding a dearth of works on OT soteriology, T. V. Farris has sought to fill this lack with *Mighty to Save.* The book consists of 15 chapters which analyze various key texts. In addition to the numbered chapters are a preface, an introduction, a conclusion, an excursus on covenant, and an addendum on penal judgment. Farris has chosen to do exegesis of representative passages rather than to give merely a broad overview or a systematic analysis by category. Due to the uneven and episodic nature of the book, a detailed description of the contents is not practical.

The book is very uneven. Some footnotes are unassimilated into the discussion in the text. Discussing Ezekiel 28, Farris ignores the alternative interpretation of the text found in note 11 (31). Within exegetical passages an inordinate amount of space is often given to exegetical methodology. Over half of the study of Exodus 34:6-7 is a general discussion of the principles of lexicography (121-129). More than a third of the study on Joel 2:21-32 analyzes the elusive nature of the waw consecutive (203-208). These studies in exegetical methodology may be helpful to the student, but they are not the stated topic of the book. This is as much a textbook of hermeneutic methodology as a finished study on soteriology.

If it seems that a study on OT soteriology must deal with the full range of OT theology, this book confirms that idea. The book differs from other OT theologies primarily in emphasis. It is also highly selective in the passages chosen for exegesis. Though the passages chosen cover a wide array of concerns, one major omission leaves this study exceptionally incomplete. Farris has chosen to leave out the Psalms because a study of soteriology in the Psalms would constitute a major work by itself (17, n. 11). Other major passages were omitted as well, though they are briefly discussed in the conclusion (290-294). Thus *Mighty to Save* is a rather incomplete study in OT soteriology.

The primary methodological difficulty of *Mighty to Save* is that Farris assumes "the superiority of the New Testament revelation over the Old" (13). As with other canon-within-the-canon paradigms, the "superior" canon is even smaller than stated and consists of a few favored authors and passages. For instance, when discussing Abraham's faith in Genesis 15:6, Paul is quoted and James 2:23 is pointedly ignored (78-79). Also, when forcing OT constructs into NT molds, Farris is sometimes rather unbelievable. For instance, he imposes the dichotomy between faith and works on the concept of listen/obey, and finds the OT terminology completely on the side of "faith," in effect dismissing the dichotomy which he imported into the text.

Farris also imports his own theological biases into the texts and terms under study. For instance, he rejects "cleanse" as a definition for *kipper* because he cannot accept the concept that the mercy seat and altar may be polluted and thus need cleansing (144, n. 19). Perhaps Hebrews 9:22-23 lies outside of the "superior revelation" which he finds in the NT. One bias which may be felt throughout the book, but which is not stated until pages 219-220, is that Farris assumes Lindsell's plenary-verbal inspiration model for Scripture. Apparently Farris assumes that his readership works from this model, because he does not bring up the topic to defend verbal inspiration, but rather to discuss how exegesis works within the model.

Overall, Farris' book is not a work designed for the scholar or graduate student, but rather the advanced undergraduate. As a study on soteriology it is severely compromised by the author's biases. However, the excurses on exegetical methods may recommend the book for undergraduate use. Balanced with other works on OT theology, this book could be an asset in the classroom.

Madison, WI 53713 JAMES E. MILLER

Ferguson, Everett, ed. *Early Christianity and Judaism.* Studies in Early Christianity, no. 6. New York and London: Garland Publishing, 1993. xvi + 377 pp. $64.00.

In this volume, Everett Ferguson has assembled nineteen previously published essays on the general topic of early Christianity and Judaism. Five articles seek to define the Jewish element in early Christianity: R. A. Kraft, "In Search of 'Jewish Christianity' and Its 'Theology': Problems of Definition and

Methodology" (1-12); Marcel Simon, "Problèmes du Judéo-Christianisme" (13-29); Georg Strecker, "On the Problem of Jewish Christianity" (31-75); Robert Murray, "'Disaffected Judaism' and Early Christianity: Some Predisposing Factors" (77-95); and A.F.J. Klijn, "The Study of Jewish Christianity" (97-109).

Two articles consider the phenomenon of Jewish Christianity: J. Munck, "Jewish Christianity in Post-Apostolic Times" (111-124); and H. J. Schoeps, "Ebionite Christianity" (125-130).

Five articles explore the influence of Judaism on early Christianity: Halvor Moxnes, "God and His Angel in the Shepherd of Hermas" (131-138); W. Rordorf, "Un chapitre d'éthique judéo-chrétienne: les deux voies" (139-158); F. Gavin, "Rabbinic Parallels in Early Church Orders" (159-171); O. S. Rankin, "The Extent of the Influence of the Synagogue Service upon Christian Worship" (173-178); and Joseph Gutmann, "Early Synagogue and Jewish Catacomb Art and Its Relation to Christian Art" (179-216).

The final set of articles deals with relations between Jews and Christians: S. Krauss, "The Jews in the Works of the Church Fathers" (218-271); Demetrios J. Constantelos, "Jews and Judaism in the Early Greek Fathers (100 A.D.-500 A.D.)" (273-284); W.H.C. Frend, "The Persecutions: Some Links between Judaism and the Early Church" (285-302); S. Lowy, "The Confutation of Judaism in the Epistle of Barnabas" (303-335); A. J. Philippou, "Origen and the Early Jewish-Christian Debate" (336-348); Han J. W. Drijvers, "Jews and Christians at Edessa" (350-364); and Jacob Neusner, "The Jewish-Christian Argument in Fourth-Century Iran: Aphrahat on Circumcision, the Sabbath, and the Dietary Laws" (366-374).

In discussing the reason for this book, Ferguson refers to an earlier work by Jacob Neusner—*Judaism and Christianity in the First Century* (1990)—and says, "the present volume extends the story of those relationships into the fourth and fifth centuries."

The merit of this volume lies mainly in the convenience it provides to anyone studying the issue of early Christianity and Judaism. One can find here a variety of essays on the topic. However, Ferguson has contributed little to the endeavor beyond selecting the ingredients. His introduction of two-and-one-half pages and ten reference notes mainly introduces the broad categories into which the articles fall and contributes little or nothing to the discussion. The articles themselves were merely photo-reproduced from the journals or volumes in which they first appeared. Of course, the original page numbers, margins, fonts, and type sizes are retained. This gives the volume an unevenness and inconsistency that may disturb some readers. The inclusion of a set of running page numbers for the book itself potentially adds to the confusion.

Of greater concern may be the content of this collection. Rather than containing a set of commissioned essays on the present state of the discussion, this volume represents something of a history of that discussion. It seems to be more of a museum than a laboratory. The earliest of the pieces was originally published in 1893 (Krause). The most recent come from 1985 (Murray, Drijvers). The rest are scattered between 1929 and 1984, with eight articles from the 1970s.

Because serious researchers in this area will usually have access to the original essays, this volume will be most useful to others who want to gain an overview of the discussion of early Christianity and Judaism during the last one hundred years.

Canadian Union College
College Heights, Alberta T0C 0Z0

WARREN C. TRENCHARD

Hawthorne, Gerald F., and Ralph P. Martin, eds. *Dictionary of Paul and His Letters.* Downers Grove, IL, and Leicester, England: InterVarsity Press, 1993. xxx + 1038. $37.99.

This is a companion volume to the previously published *Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels.* Both of these works are Evangelical and conservative in orientation. This means that the editors of this volume have selected writers who share this viewpoint and base their articles on conservative presuppositions. This does not mean, however, that the topics are not treated comprehensively or objectively or that liberal points of view are immediately set aside.

The rationale given by the editors for the publication at this time is that it provides for those interested in Paul and his letters a reference source through which they can interact with the "new look" on Paul. The "new look" arises from the reappraisal of Paul and his theology necessitated by the publication of E. P. Sanders's *Paul and Palestinian Judaism* (1977). The traditional view that Paul was attacking a Judaism characterized by legalism and that the term "works of the law" is thus pejorative is challenged by Sanders. After more than fifteen years of debate, critique, evaluation, and reflection over this issue, the scholars who contributed to this volume present an evangelical reaction, "whether positive or cautious," (ix) to Sander's proposals.

Reading selected articles I found that the authors generally had a good grasp of their topics, dealt with the major issues involved, and treated different points of view objectively but critically. I mention particularly the articles on "Paul and His Interpreters," by S. J. Hafeman; "Works of the Law," by T. R. Schreiner; "Christology," by B. Witherington, III; "Theology of the Cross" and "Justification," by A. E. McGrath; "Hermeneutics/Interpreting Paul," by G. R. Osborne; and "Law," by F. Thielman. Not all the articles are of the same quality, but this is not surprising with so many contributors. Unexpected, but in some sense unavoidable, is the duplication of material; e.g., "Center of Paul's Theology" is a main topic that is also treated as a subtopic in the articles "Hermeneutics/Interpreting Paul," and "Paul and His Interpreters."

In reading the article on "Center of Paul's Theology," I expected a careful treatment of the various proposals set forth with their pros and cons, but found instead a somewhat cursory discussion of the different views. S. J. Hafemann in his article on "Paul and His Interpreters" gives a much more satisfactory treatment of this topic though this is only a subtopic under the larger heading. I also was disappointed that Ralph Martin, who wrote the article, injudiciously

set forth his own view of the "center" without giving equal space to others. An article which sets forth differing views should not be written by a person who represents one of these views. Or if the author is a protagonist for one of the views under discussion, he or she should at least avoid setting forth his/her own view as unquestionably the best.

In light of the editors' remarks in the preface, it is difficult to understand how P. W. Barnett could write his article on the "Opponents of Paul" without any reference to Sanders's view. Sanders is neither mentioned in the article nor listed in the bibliography. Whether Sanders is correct or not is not the issue. There is nothing wrong with Barnett's view that most of Paul's opponents were Judaizers, but at least he should state why he takes this position in light of Sanders's challenge to this view.

The cross-referencing of all the articles is a welcome feature that considerably heightens the volume's usefulness. The work also includes a Pauline letter index, a subject index, and an article index. On format, it would have been much easier to locate the end of each article if the word BIBLIOGRAPHY had been placed in bold print with space between it and the cross references. A few typographical errors were noted. The word "human" is repeated (877, col. 2, para. 1), and "Moreover" (673) and "condemns" (942) are misspelled.

Especially because of the timeliness of the volume it will serve as a handy reference to check where evangelicals stand with regard to recent Pauline studies. It also saves time to be able to go to just one source on Paul to find the most up-to-date information.

Chico, CA 95926 SAKAE KUBO

Honderich, Ted. *How Free Are You? The Determinism Problem.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 160 pp. Cloth, $24.00; Paper, $8.95.

This book is, in the words of Ted Honderich, Grote Professor of Mind and Logic at University College, London, "a kind of precis" of his 644-page *A Theory of Determinism: The Mind, Neuroscience, and Life-Hopes.* The first six chapters examine two of the rival theories that explain human behavior as either a result of cause and effect or originated by free will. The final four chapters explore the implications of the position he himself holds, that of determinism. An extensive glossary defines the terms.

Honderich's concept of determinism is that human behavior is the product of biochemical and neurological activity within the human brain. Although he does not say it explicitly, he seems to view free will as a free-floating consciousness at least partially independent of neurological activity. That is, the human mind can make decisions and initiate actions undetermined and not limited by the structure, stored data, and neurological activity of the nervous system.

Honderich approaches the determinism/free will controversy strictly from a philosophical perspective. Although he may in his larger work touch upon the

growing body of data on how the nervous system works at a biochemical and structural level to produce what we call the mind, here he makes only passing reference to the scientific findings. However, brain studies demonstrate the intricate relationship between thought and all other conscious activity and thus support his position that human behavior and thought are a consequence of cause and effect.

Although Honderich argues from a determinist perspective, that does not mean that he believes that we are nothing more than preprogrammed machines. He feels that determinism can and does go together with voluntary behavior (86). "It does not at all follow from determinism that man does not really know what he is doing or is compelled to do a thing" (89). Thus while our behavior is a result or product of what is in our brain, we do have real (though necessarily limited, of course) control over that behavior and a real range of options as to how we can respond to that causation.

The author sees the question of determinism as affecting four things: life hopes, personal feelings, knowledge, and moral responsibility. His final chapter concentrates on an aspect of the fourth category, that of punishment and its relationship to determinism and moral responsibility.

The author believes that while acknowledging that the kind of determinism he is arguing for does require us to give up certain kinds of hopes and possibilities, it can also have positive benefits. If we recognize that we cannot really have or do something, we will stop wasting time and effort in seeking it, time and effort that can be channeled into what we actually can get or accomplish. Thus we can still have a "celebratory" life (118).

While Honderich grants that most people do not really believe in determinism, he argues that only "true belief" in it will enable us really to succeed in "affirming" life. Otherwise we are doomed to frustration as we seek to do the impossible.

Against Honderich's thesis, modern science is increasingly showing the weakness of the philosophical concept of a free-floating free will and at the same time undermining the related theological concept of a soul independent of the body. All human mental activity has an inseparable neurological activity, leaving no room for a will or self independent of the mind-body unity. While we are products of cause and effect, these factors are so complex that we do not run on autopilot but can really decide within the parameters of the cause-and-effect correlation. One would like to see Honderich or someone else explore the ramifications of this very complexity of causation on decision-making behavior.

Theology needs to take into account the kind of determinism Honderich presents. For example, what could theology tell us about the role of the Holy Spirit in overcoming deterministic causation? When the Apostle Paul laments his spiritual struggles in Romans 7, could the cause-and-effect role of the mind-body unit help us to see more clearly both the limitations of human will and the necessity for the Holy Spirit to be active in salvation? And how do the conditions of the body itself, the world around it, and past life experiences affect the response to the Spirit?

Hagerstown, MD 21740 GERALD WHEELER

Korsak, Mary Phil. *At the Start: Genesis Made New.* New York/London: Doubleday, 1993. 237 pp. $22.00.

Mrs. Korsak spent "the better part of nine years" producing this literal, "fresh, primitive," jarringly raw translation of the first book of the Bible. Its title is a literal translation of the first word in Hebrew, which gives the book its title in the original language.

She explains her method as following German and French translators Buber and Rosenzweig, Fleg and Chouraqui, in choosing only one English word to translate one Hebrew word in every context, and finding or making cognate words. The result gives the English reader the flavor of the original, indeed, but produces some strange and most unidiomatic translations. The facts are that in every language words have more than one meaning each, according to context, and that idioms are not parallel from one language to another. In addition, the root system of vocabulary in all the Semitic languages builds nouns, adjectives, etc., on mainly three-letter root verbs (a small minority of "denominative" verbs are, on the contrary, derived from substantives), while English and other Indo-European languages characteristically show no spelling relationship whatever among word groups related in meaning. Thus, to impose the one pattern on the other produces often weird or absurd results. This procedure may give non-Hebrew readers a raw beauty of text and an insight into the Hebrew language structure and vocabulary, but to anyone who can read the original language, it can be constantly irritating with its lack of idiomatic nuances.

In Gen 1, etc., for example, the literal "call to" is simply the Hebrew expression for to "name" something or someone. For the *kî ṭôb* refrain she uses "How good!" whereas later she has to violate her own rule by translating *kî* as quite consistently "yes," and even, as it really means, "when" and "because/for" and "that" as a relative pronoun. In 28:15, 29:32, 30:30, 33, 31:36, etc., she was forced to choose one of these more appropriate senses of *kî*; thus her method at times breaks down.

She always translates *bānîm* as "sons," even when the context clearly or possibly includes females; the interjection *hinnēh* is always "Here!" which is often fine, but could be "Look!" "Asphalt" in 6:14 is anachronistic, coming before the story of the great Flood when bitumen would have first been produced. In 4:10 the disjunctive accent and lack of grammatical agreement in number are ignored by the translation "The voice of your brother's blood"; the original is more dramatic: "A voice! [or, Hark! or Listen!] Your brother's blood. . . ."

It is jarring to find *'ishshah* always translated "woman," never "wife." Equally jarring is the constant use of "bred," "breeding," etc., instead of "bearing" so-and-so, or "fathering" him/her. As she states in her "Translator's Postscript," this method "enables the reader to perceive patterns and associations in the text that remain hidden in other translations," but it makes the translation seem crude in a language not built on the root system of the Semitic languages. The root base thus makes for her translation "These are the breedings of the skies and the earth at their creation" (2:4), instead of "history," or even

the older "generations." Other oddities due to this method are "the one of the month" (for "first," 8:13); "childling" (11:30); "kings who kinged" (36:31); "dooms" (8:21, 12:3), though that root produces "was less" in 16:4, 5—a needed violation of her method. Another obliged violation is her idiomatic translation of *lipne* as "before" (in time or space) in many places, as well as the literal "facing" in 11:28, etc. The literal "heavy" should often be "wealthy" or "honored" in various contexts, thus sounding clumsy in the literal translation.

One nice point is that Korsak's translation shows the relation between Man/Adam (or humanity) and earth, *'Ā/ādām* and *'ădāmāh*, but to do so it uses "groundling" as well as, of course, "ground." So in 4:1 we read: "The groundling knew his woman Eve."

One of the most bothersome literalisms is her handling of the Hebrew infinitive absolute construction, which denotes emphasis (sometimes the idea of continuation, if it follows instead of preceding the verb of the same root). As did the translators of the LXX, which led to the literal Greek translations of the idiom in the NT (with an infinitive preceding a cognate verb), she simply translates literally, as in 43:3, 7: "The man witnessed! he witnessed against us," and "Did we know, know that he was to say . . .," and dozens of other occurrences, instead of: "Did the man indeed witness against us," and "Did we really know that he was to say . . ."

The literal translation as simple future of imperfect-tense verbs with waw conjunctive instead of waw consecutive (which would mean past tense) completely misses the delicate nuance of the subjunctive, as in 42:2: "Go down there, supply us from there / We shall live and not die!" The purpose-subjunctive, if recognized, would make a meaningful translation—"so that we may live and not die." Cf. 43:8; 44:21, 28; 47:19, among many others.

The comparative use of the preposition *min* is ignored in 27:1, 32:11, and other places, where "too" or in some contexts "more than" would convey the meaning more accurately. The copulative force of the pronoun without any verb is lost in 27:13 and many other places by a literal translation, such as "Myself, YHWH the Elohim of your father Abraham," instead of what it really means, "I am YWHH the God of. . . ." In 17:21 and other texts, I doubt that anything would be lost by correctly writing "whom" instead of "who": "But my pact I will set up with Isaac / who Sarah shall breed for you at the set time."

According to Korsak, Rebekah "fell off the camel" in 24:64, instead of "dismounted from the camel." (I used to tell my Hebrew students that she "fell for him at first sight.")

Many other translations could be cited that missed the real meaning or else were forced to violate her method because the one translation simply could not be made to fit the context. What has been mentioned doubtless reflects one Hebrew teacher's frustrations with this rigid translation; no doubt there are readers who are entranced instead of repelled by this work, which, according to the blurb, is "already causing a stir in Biblical and scholarly circles."

Andrews University LEONA GLIDDEN RUNNING

Kubo, Sakae. *The God of Relationships: How the gospel helps us reach across barriers such as race, culture, and gender.* Human Relations Series, ed. Rosa Taylor Banks. Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald Publishing Assn., 1993. 159 pp. $9.95.

Dr. Sakae Kubo has written a book that is a delight to read. His broad-mindedness and compassion shine through in every chapter. A list of the chapter titles will show its broad, inclusive sweep. There are 21 chapters organized in six parts. Part I, "The God of All Nations," contains (after the Introduction) chapters 2-6: "The Meaning of Prejudice;" "You Shall Love Your Neighbor;" "Seventh-day Adventists and Race Relations;" "That the World May Know;" and "Anti-Semitism."

Part II, "The God of Both Sexes," comprises chapters 7-12: "Introduction," "Patriarchy," "Jesus' View of Women," "'You Shall Not Make for Yourself a Graven Image,'" "The Role of Women," and "Conclusion." In Part III, "The God of All Classes," there are chapters 13 and 14: "The Rich and the Poor," and "Relationships Between the Educated and the Uneducated." Part IV, "The God of All Worshipers," includes chapters 15-17: "Within the Same Denomination," "With Members of Other Christian Churches," and "With Members of Other Religions. Part V, "The God of the Entire Church," contains chapters 18-20: "Introduction," "The Priesthood of Believers," and "A Theology of the Laity." Part VI: "Conclusion" has only the final chapter, 21, "The Rainbow Church."

Dr. Kubo has had broad experience. He was a professor of religion for many years at Andrews University (undergraduate College of Arts and Sciences, then the Seminary, and finally Director of the Seminary Library). He then became dean of the School of Theology at Walla Walla College, Washington; President of Newbold College in England; and vice-president for academic affairs at Atlantic Union College, Massachusetts. He and his wife, Hatsumi, now live in retirement in Chico, California, but he is still active in speaking and writing. This important book deserves wide readership. Kubo's eminence as a biblical scholar is attested by his prolific and appropriate use of biblical passages—happily from the New Revised Standard Version, which, because of its gender-inclusive language, better translates the original languages in many places.

Andrews University LEONA GLIDDEN RUNNING

Kyle, Richard. *The Religious Fringe: A History of Alternative Religions in America.* Downers Grove, Il: InterVarsity, 1993. 467 pp. Paper, $17.99.

The Religious Fringe, as its title indicates, seeks to trace the historical origins and impact of the most notable sectarian, cultic, and occultic groups and movements in American history. The focus, however, is on groups that arose or still persist in the twentieth century.

The book is divided into six rather clearly defined parts, with parts I, II, and the first part of III largely dealing with the methodology of classifying fringe groups and their historical antecedents. The rest (from p. 107 onward) deals with specific groups and movements.

Kyle writes quite well, but after the early sections, the book takes on a rather encyclopedic, handbookish tone. The author gives no evidence of having done any primary research and is almost totally dependent on secondary sources.

While the book is somewhat encyclopedic, it makes no claim to exhaustiveness. Kyle's main purposes are threefold: to (1) demonstrate the historical antecedents of current fringe groups; (2) classify them theologically and sociologically; and (3) inform the reader about their major beliefs, practices, organizational distinctives (or lack thereof), and current vitality in American society.

While the book claims to be mainly historical, and Kyle promises not to use the term "cult in a pejorative sense," the reader should be aware that the writer does, on occasion, allow his theological presuppositions (which are clearly evangelical) to surface in his appraisal of the truth claims of certain groups. The book is clearly not in the genre of textbooks which seek objective and sympathetic survey.

A prime example is his patronizing treatment of Seventh-day Adventism (150-151). What is disconcerting about his appraisal is that while he justifiably classifies Seventh-day Adventism as "sectarian," he then goes on to claim that "they possess some cultic characteristics." But any justification for this claim seems to arise mainly from the fact that Adventism does not match up with Kyle's evangelical presuppositions. One is then tempted to wonder if some other groups (less familiar to the reader) have been given the same prejudicial treatment. But again, Kyle was at least honest enough to alert us to his intent to use theological criteria to define "a religious cult" (23).

Another weakness is that while Kyle has used excellent, recognized secondary sources in most instances (J. Gordon Melton, Sydney Ahlstrom, and Catherine Albanese—to name just three), he sometimes neglects more recent and authoritative researchers who have worked in the primary documents. For instance, his treatment of John Humphrey Noyes and his Oneida Communitarians, the Mormons, and the Shakers has completely ignored the outstanding work of Lawrence Foster (*Religion and Sexuality: The Shakers, the Mormons, and the Oneida Community* [Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984]). One wonders if the reason for this neglect is that Foster is a bit too sympathetic and objective for Kyle's polemical taste.

From a scholarly perspective, the most helpful part of the book is the author's struggle with the whole issue of how scholars should define and classify different religious manifestations. Probably his most helpful contributions deal with ways to differentiate between a sect and a cult. While his theological criteria can lead to some disconcerting results, his sociological suggestions are insightful (24).

This work will probably find some success as a textbook for classes in evangelical undergraduate and seminary courses dealing with alternative religions and as a "handbook" for conservative Protestant pastors and laypersons.

Andrews University WOODROW W. WHIDDEN

Land, Richard D., and Louis A. Moore, eds. *Citizen Christians: The Rights and Responsibilities of Dual Citizenship.* Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1994. 176 pp. $12.99.

Citizen Christians is a collection of essays from the 25th Annual Seminar of the Southern Baptist Christian Life Commission held in Washington, DC, in March 1992. The purpose of the book is to help Christians understand what it means to be citizens of two realms—the earthly and the spiritual. According to the authors, the spiritual realm includes the Church and the Kingdom of God, while the earthly realm refers to the sociopolitical, economic, and cultural context of the United States of America. The essays are grouped into four sections that address issues such as: What does it mean for Christians to be citizens of both America and the Church? What does the term "separation of church and state" mean in contemporary American culture? What is the appropriate relationship between American culture and the Church? How can Christians, both as individuals and as a collective force, shape the moral fabric of culture and influence government?

This book is worth reading if you want to understand how fundamentalists and conservative evangelicals define the Church and its mission. There are three important issues that the authors bring to our attention. First, they emphasize that the moral fabric of American culture is disintegrating, and Christians have a responsibility to help make repairs. Second, they argue against the notion that Christians ought to remain silent on public issues due to the private nature of religious convictions. In fact, the authors, especially Richard Land and Carl F. H. Henry, contend that the mission of the Church makes it impossible for Christians to ignore public issues and government. For the mission of the Church is public as it struggles to usher in the Kingdom of God, whose border extends beyond the Church and includes all humanity. The third important issue that Beverly LaHaye, H. Robert Showers, Jr., and Jay Strack emphasize is the need for an increase in Christian involvement in local communities and the democratic process.

Despite the importance of these three issues, the authors make the general mistake of basing their understanding of the Church and its mission on three faulty presuppositions. All of these presuppositions fall under the general claim that America was and should be a Christian nation, at least in terms of its moral values and principles. The introduction claims that "we believe many of the guiding principles on which our nation was formed were derived from the Bible . . . the *Declaration of Independence* particularly reflects an understanding of God's principles found in the Bible" (2). The authors argue that secular

humanism has been allowed to permeate American culture, replacing the traditional Christian values and principles upon which our authors assume America was founded. The decay of American sociopolitical, economic, and cultural life is blamed on this loss (78-85). Though there may be some truth to this interpretation of American history, it should by no means be thought of as the best or only interpretation. For example, those Christians who take the Anabaptist tradition seriously might argue that the idea of a Christian nation of any sort distorts the nature of the Church. From the Anabaptist perspective there is a big difference between the Church's attempt to influence culture and the attempt to control or oversee culture. The Church must never mistake itself for a nation-state, government, or social club.

A second questionable presupposition is the idea that those who seek to engage public issues must agree to a universal set of values. Of course, this book assumes that traditional Christian values provide the best context for a public forum. If people agree to abide by these values, then it allows us to speak the same moral language and reach practical conclusions. The authors, however, do not discuss the fact that Christian values are not for everybody. Non-Christians cannot and should not subscribe to Christian values, because they do not have any commitment to follow Jesus Christ. Furthermore, the authors do not recognize that within the Christian community there are a number of different faithful positions on moral issues. In fact, the modern idea of a "Christian value" ought to be challenged. Christians do not find "values" in the Bible, but a way of life. The Christian life is one of discipleship maintained within a community of fellow believers—the Church.

A third questionable presupposition is the idea that the Bible underwrites a particular sociopolitical and economic theory. Since this book focuses on the Church in the American context, the authors tend to confuse the mission of the Church—the Kingdom of God—with Western democracy and free-market capitalism. As Carl F. H. Henry claims, "the evangelical mainstream defends a free market and private property in the context of biblical principles, including divine stewardship and the propriety of legitimate profit" (52). The careful student, however, knows that the Bible does not advocate the philosophies of free-market capitalism or democracy. Such notions are modern conceptions, completely foreign to the Bible. The authors seem to identify the Kingdom of God with American democracy too readily. They seem to forget that the Church is called to exist under any state or government. Therefore, in the American context the Church represents at best one community among many communities that struggle to be heard in the public square. If Western democracy fails, it does not signal the demise of the Kingdom of God, as our authors sometimes inadvertently suggest. The Church, under the power of the Spirit of God, will continue to pursue its mission to usher in the Kingdom of God under whatever sociopolitical or economic theory dominates in America or other parts of the world.

Baylor University
Waco, Texas

BRIAN W. HARPER

Levine, Baruch. *Numbers 1-20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary.* The Anchor Bible, vol. 4a. New York: Doubleday, 1993. 528 pp. $40.00.

Numbers 1-20 by Baruch Levine is the most recent translation, introduction, and commentary on the biblical book of Numbers. Levine is well known for his publications in biblical and comparative studies, especially in the area of Israelite cult. Other books by Levine are *In the Presence of the Lord* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974) and *Leviticus* (The JPS Torah Commentary. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989).

The present volume begins with Levine's translation of Num 1-20, a text which consists of Israelite narratives and laws set in the period of wilderness wandering. The translation flows well in idiomatic English and precisely reflects the interpretive conclusions reached in the commentary portion of the volume.

Following the translation, an introduction to the book of Numbers deals with topics such as the names and content of the book, texts, translations, and prior commentaries, and above all, source criticism: the literary nature and historical context of the book and its sources. As a believer in the commonly accepted "JEDP" form of the documentary hypothesis, Levine continues the tradition of critical commentaries such as that of G. B. Gray (*Numbers*, International Critical Commentary [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1903]). Levine insists on the importance of "identifying significantly different perceptions of the wilderness experience" (49) by reconstructing phases of literary development in which originally separate sources (JE = 9th-8th-century B.C. Jahwist—Judean source + Elohist—northern Israelite source, including a possible "Transjordanian archive," and P = exilic/postexilic priestly source) were brought together into the book of Numbers as we know it. The implications of this approach, especially the late dating of "P," for the historicity of the Israelite sanctuary and its services are clear: "the historicity of the Tabernacle traditions is highly questionable to start with" (172).

As Levine is aware, the source-critical approach, which requires the student of a biblical book "to disassemble and reassemble its sources in a chronological sequence" (49), has been challenged recently by J. Milgrom (*Numbers*, The JPS Torah Commentary [Philadelphia and New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1989]). While Milgrom holds that some literary growth of the text is likely and at times discernible, he eschews diachronic theories which "virtually ignore the present text except as a base from which to probe into its origins," preferring to assume "that the preserved text is an organic unit" (Milgrom, xii). Furthermore, while Milgrom allows for the existence of a discrete priestly source ("P"), he argues for a preexilic date for the composition of this material (*Leviticus 1-16*, The Anchor Bible [New York: Doubleday, 1991], pp. 3-13).

In the commentary portion of *Numbers 1-20*, Levine makes impressive use of linguistic, archaeological, geographical, and comparative textual data to illuminate the biblical text. He presents simple, convincing solutions to several notable exegetical problems. For example, in Num 18:19 he renders *berît melaḥ ʿôlām* (lit. "eternal covenant of salt") as "the permanent rule [requiring

use] of salt," interpreting the terminology in light of Lev 2:13, which requires the salting of sacrifices (449).

Levine labels a number of ritual activities, e.g. the ordeal of the suspected adulteress prescribed in Num 5:11-31, as "magical" (205, 208; cp. 422, 471, 490). However, nowhere in this volume does he define "magical." Such a definition would help the reader and would facilitate scholarly discussion as to whether or not the designation is appropriate in these and other instances. If "magic" is a kind of ritual dynamic, and if dynamics of a given ritual should be understood within its (the ritual's) ritual culture (including the conceptual system of that culture), it follows that comparative conclusions must proceed cautiously. For example: The fact that there are certain similarities between the ordeal of the suspected adulteress and activities outlined in the Assyrian *Maqlû* series, usually regarded as magical (208), does not by itself require the conclusion that the Israelite ritual is also magical.

The commentary is generally rich in precise detail and clarity. An exception could be pointed out in the discussion of Num 5:15, where Levine refers to "the Deuteronomic interpretation that the only basis for divorce was adultery or serious sexual misconduct (Deut 24:1)" (193). It is true that the basis for divorce in Deut 24:1 is a kind of sexual misconduct, perhaps "indecent exposure," but according to Deut 22:22, adultery results in death, not divorce.

Among the most important problems discussed in the commentary are those which concern Israelite history. Levine's approach to some of these is to answer a given question in a late historical context and then to regard the Numbers text which deals with the same issue as a late priestly invention intended to support the priestly agenda by retrojection into the wilderness period. For example, when did the internal stratification of the tribe of Levi occur? Interpreting Ezek 44:9-14 in light of 2 Kgs 23:8-9, Levine concludes that "the Levites of whom Numbers speaks in detail, as a group distinct from priests and subservient to them, ultimately owe their existence to the edicts of Josiah, subsequently endorsed in Ezek 44:9-14" (289). So Num 8, describing the dedication of the Levites during the wilderness period, is viewed as reflecting the near-exilic reorganization of the Judean priesthood. This kind of reconstruction is based upon the questionable assumption that the historicity of the cultic portions of Numbers is not to be taken seriously.

Levine may be commended for an outstanding contribution to the study of Numbers. Much of this work will undoubtedly stand the test of time, but hypothetical historical reconstructions are only as solid as the theories upon which they are based, no matter how carefully such theories are applied.

Andrews University ROY GANE

Mack, Burton L. *The Lost Gospel: The Book of Q and Christian Origins.* San Francisco: Harper, 1993. 275 pp. $22.00.

This book advances the following thesis: Distinguishable within Q are three strands, Q1, Q2, and Q3. Each of these strands corresponds to a different

stage in the historical development of the Q community. Q1 is built on a series of sayings of Jesus, which are very much like what one would expect of a Cynic Philosopher. Neither is this surprising, given the very cosmopolitan and Hellenized environment of Galilee. In Q1, though, these aphorisms, originally coined as a protest against conventional values and oppressive forms of government, are transformed into normative attitudes of a group of followers of Jesus.

With Q2 the Jesus movement takes on a prophetic voice, pronouncing judgment on a recalcitrant world, a world that has rejected them. Q3 marks a new phase of the community's existence, and is to be dated after the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem. Surprisingly, at this stage there is a growing accommodation to Judaism, rather like the accommodation offered by the Jewish-Christian Gospel of Matthew.

Mack begins his book by warning the reader that this understanding of Q "upsets the conventional picture of the origins of Christianity" (5), and if his thesis is correct, that is certainly so. As he is at pains to point out, in his reconstruction the Q community is the earliest group of the followers of Jesus visible to us, and they could not really be called Christian. They have no concept of the salvific import of the death of Christ. Indeed, in Q1 there is no evidence that Jesus was understood in terms of the supramundane. It is only as the Q community and other first-century groups developed their mythologies to explain their social world, that these elements were introduced (at Q2); and even then, the community is really better described as belonging to a Jesus movement, rather than as a community of early Christians. "Myths" such as the cosmic importance of the death of Jesus are associated with groups of followers of the Christ cult, developed elsewhere, and represented in the NT by Paul's letters. Thus, according to Mack, the Christian myth's claim to represent history is a fabrication.

There are several matters which will naturally occur to most readers of this book. First is a question as to the nature of the intended audience, which appears to be a wider audience than the scholarly community. The book is written in a semipopular style. There is an easy flow of words in the text, which does not eschew colloquial expressions. For example, the attitude to wider society implicit in the instructions in Q1 is summed up as follows: "It is a jungle out there and the behavior enjoined is risky" (113). The garb and possessions of Cynic philosophers are described thus: "Their props were a setup for a little game of gotcha with the citizens of the town" (116). None of this distracts from the flow of the argument of the book. Indeed, it goes a long way to make it more readable. Furthermore, the book is lightly referenced, using an in-text method. Again, like the style, this is perfectly appropriate for a book aimed at a broader readership. There are some places, though, which just cry out for a little more scholarly justification. His assumption of a second-century date for Luke (186) would hardly go unchallenged in NT circles. Neither would his assumption that Mark used Q (172, 177-79), or the thought that the canonical order of the OT adopted by Christians was attributable to Christian bishops, and not to the translators of the LXX (243).

Second, this book embodies an emphatically liberal approach to the Gospels. This is evident from the very first words in the book: "Once upon a time . . ." (1). It continuously uses the term "myth" in both its technical sense—something which communities develop to make sense of the cosmos—and its popular sense, as something which is historically untrue. For Mack, the myths of Christianity are the products of the early Christian communities, and have only the slightest historical base. As he says, ". . . authorship was not understood as we moderns understand it. In the modern sense of the term, the Jesus people were the authors of the sayings they attributed to Jesus" (202; cf. the reference to "collective thinking" on 163). He describes the "myth" of the accounts in the four Gospels as "fantastic" (225), and the later elaboration of it such as is found in the book of Hebrews as "an even more preposterous elaboration of the Christ myth" (221). The Gospel of Mark achieved a very successful "fiction" by joining the Jesus of Q with the Christ Myth (178). These "fictions" and "myths" include such Gospel accounts as the baptism of Jesus, his conflict with the Jewish authorities and their desire to kill him, Jesus' transfiguration, the last supper, his trial and crucifixion as king of the Jews, and the resurrection (247).

A third issue which will occur to most readers is that of methodology. The book is based on the assumption that the contents of Q are known well enough to distinguish within them a literary history embodied in three distinct strata. These are revealed by such features as "seams" and "thematic shifts" (107). Even laying aside the vehement debate current in scholarly circles as to the very existence of Q, it is to be wondered how confident it is possible to be about the exact extent of Q and about the "seams." Q has been reconstructed out of Matthew and Luke, which are assumed to have quoted from it, but how exact is that reconstruction? Q appears to begin with an account of the baptism of Jesus, but how can any modern reader know whether it included an account of the death of Jesus? Moreover, if Mark used Q, as Mack thinks, on what basis is the triple tradition excluded from Q? If either the crucifixion or parts of the triple tradition were in fact in Q, then much of what Mack says about its theology would need radical revision.

Mack has attempted to push back the frontiers of theoretical possibility on the basis of conclusions that have been reached in the research associated with the SBL Q seminar. One should not dismiss this attempt, but neither should one expect all his readers to share his conclusions.

Avondale College
Cooranbong, NSW 2265, Australia

ROBERT K. McIVER

Mandell, Sara, and David Noel Freedman. *The Relationship Between Herodotus' History and Primary History.* South Florida Studies in the History of Judaism, no. 60. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1993. xiii + 204 pp. $44.95.

Cicero called Herodotus the "father of history," and indeed his *Histories* was the primary exemplar for classical historians. The term Primary History

(PH) refers to the Torah and Former Prophets of the Hebrew Scriptures (Genesis-2 Kings). Mandell and Freedman found the two works to be surprisingly similar in size, scope, layout, and method. In this book they attempt to show intertextuality between the two works, finding that Herodotus is dependent either on PH itself or on the social and literary environment which produced PH in its present form. The book has two introductions and four chapters. The first introduction outlines the aims and methods; the second, techniques and methodology. The first chapter is a detailed analysis of the textual history and critical work done on Herodotus. The second chapter is a similar analysis of PH. In chapter three and the conclusion (chap. 4) the results are drawn together to synthesize how Herodotus is dependent on PH. There is a bibliography but no index.

Much of this work discusses issues of real author vs. implied narrator and implied reader vs. expected reader. Repeatedly the authors insist that the readers (ancient and modern) of Herodotus and PH who accept the narrators at face value are being deceived. These issues take up so much space in the book that soon the reader may find himself musing about what differences may lie between the real Mandell and Freedman and the scholarly personae they present in the book. Likewise one wonders what sort of scholars they actually expect to read this study and how this may differ from the readership they wish to imply. The heavy emphasis on these issues is distracting, if not deconstructive, and will turn away all but the most determined reader.

The strong-minded reader willing to reconstruct usable material from this book will find that in the third chapter the authors finally produce the analysis promised by the title. Less patient readers are advised to begin the book with chapter 3, perhaps skimming through chapters 1 and 2 if unfamiliar with recent scholarly activity in Herodotus and PH.

The authors follow somewhat traditional paradigms for the formation of PH, including such familiar figures as J, E, P, D, Dtr (1 & 2) and Ezra. The division of the conglomerate work into nine books is presumed to have occurred just prior to Ezra. Herodotus is believed to have redacted his work repeatedly during the writing, but its division into nine books is attributed to Hellenistic grammarians of the third to first centuries BCE.

Less traditional is the authors' refusal to accept either work as "history." Their method is rather anachronistic, applying modern definitions to ancient genres. The greatest anachronism is their use of Aristotle, who defined history and used Herodotus as an example. Mandell and Freedman approve of Aristotle's definition but not Herodotus as an example (66, 148). For Mandell and Freedman, Aristotle was inconsistent, but it is more likely they misunderstood Aristotle.

The basic parallels between Herodotus and PH are listed on pp. 160-161. They include a fifth-century date, parallel techniques and motifs, and east-west movement. In both works the first book prepares for a focus on Egypt, the second book focuses on Egypt, the fourth book occurs in a "never-never land," and the fifth book is a transition to the homeland events of the sixth to eighth books. The works then conclude with a sense of (impending) doom. The last

point is questionable. Mandell and Freedman read into Herodotus the coming Peloponnesian wars, though the book ends with the Greek victories over Persia. This is hardly equivalent to the Babylonian exile of Judah.

Both works are characterized by vividness which, apparently, is not compatible with true history (70). Both works treat the gods or God as real and involved in human events, rewarding and punishing nations and leaders (155-157), another "unhistorical" element. Divine fate, dreams, and other revelations are very important in both works. Herodotus and PH are treated as Greek-style tragedies with *hybris* playing an important role in the tragic flaw of the characters. In spite of a possible misuse of parallels, the relationship between the two works does seem to exist. In fact, this study may have contributed inadvertently to our understanding of ancient historiography. The common elements which Mandell and Freedman describe as *not* history may help define history as known in ancient Greek and Jewish cultures.

Most of the parallels are attributed to influences on Herodotus himself, who was born under Persian rule and may have traveled almost as much as his narrator persona claims. Included in his travels is a trip up the Nile as far as Elephantine (home of a Jewish-Persian garrison) and a trip through the Levant. However, the nine-book division of Herodotus was done by later grammarians influenced by PH in translation, either in a hypothetical Aramaic targum or in the Septuagint. This is an astounding claim for the influence of Jewish historiography on classical culture, and only time will tell how much of this influence the scholarly world will accept.

Madison, WI 53713 JAMES E. MILLER

Mather, George A., and Larry A. Nichols. *Dictionary of Cults, Sects, Religions, and the Occult.* Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1993. xii + 384 pp. $24.99.

This popular but well-researched book examines the larger, better-known religious movements which originated—mainly in the nineteenth century—outside of mainstream American Christianity, as well as lesser-known fringe groups of more exotic and/or recent vintage. Without attempting to be complete, it contains comprehensive articles with relatively detailed sections about the history, beliefs, practices, and demographics of important groups. But it also offers a substantial number of shorter cross-referenced articles with brief definitions. The descriptions of the various movements and groups are followed by evaluations from an evangelical Protestant perspective. In their effort to avoid a specific denominational bias in these criticisms, the degree of adherence to and conformity with the ecumenical creeds of early Christianity has been used as the main criterion.

The authors have also included articles about the world religions. They correctly argue that the newer religious movements are usually related to or derived from these religions. As might be expected, they also incorporated a major article on Christianity. In addition to this there are numerous entries

about early and medieval heresies, the important divisions in Christianity, and important theological terms. One looks in vain, however, for articles on the important subdivisions of Protestantism and for more recent currents in Christianity. There are, for example, entries about Albigenses, Waldenses, Puritans, and Pietists, but not about Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, or Pentecostals. Although the Millerites and the Great Disappointment each merit a short article, Seventh-day Adventists do not. Likewise there is no comprehensive article on the Roman Catholic Church, while there are separate entries for a number of Catholic orders.

Checking which sects and cults are included in this dictionary brought few surprises. The work mentions most major groups that evolved from Christian origins, the syncretistic movements imported to the United States, and movements characterized as occult. The (extremely critical) attention given to Mormonism is somewhat disproportionate; the main article is supported by dozens of shorter articles scattered throughout the book. On the other hand, I looked in vain for an entry on the Black Muslims. Later I found them under their official name: World Community of Ali Islam in the West. The omission of the Universal Peace Mission of Father Divine was likewise a surprise. More serious, perhaps, is the fact that Freemasonry remains unmentioned. For some organizations the headquarters office address is given; for others it is not.

The book offers a lengthy bibliography of relevant literature for many of the groups covered in the text. The inclusion of a section on "gay theology" may have been caused by some irrepressible dislike on the part of the evangelical authors for gays and their culture, but is not required, considering the content of the book.

Any one-volume dictionary of a few hundred pages obviously has its limitations; and a listing and description of religions, cults, and sects cannot escape some form of bias. This book is no exception. But in spite of its limitations and presuppositions, it offers a wealth of excellently organized information and is well worth its price.

St. Albans, Herts., England REINDER BRUINSMA

McGrath, Alister E., ed. *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993. 720 pp. $94.95.

The publication of *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Modern Christian Thought* (hereafter referred to as BEMCT), composed under the accomplished editorial workmanship of Alister E. McGrath, signals the genesis of a new generation of reference works that provide needed orientation in the changed theological terrain. One year after the publication of *A New Handbook of Christian Theology*, edited by Donald W. Musser and Joseph L. Price (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1992), the BEMCT has set new standards for one-volume encyclopedias that will make it a much-sought-after reference work well into the next century.

The BEMCT seeks to provide informed and comprehensive overviews of the main features and central themes of modern Christian thought. "Modern" is taken to mean the period in Western culture which began with the Enlightment in the eighteenth century, whereas "Christian thought" is used in a broad sense, embracing the economic, social, political, aesthetic, and cultural outlooks of Christianity in the modern world, thus extending its scope well beyond the concerns of theology, narrowly defined (xi). The BEMCT aims not only to inform and stimulate the reader but also to direct attention to other sources for further information. This is usually done through selected bibliographies at the end of each essay. The bibliographies quite often include recent publications that reflect current scholarship as well as useful cross-references to articles of related interest. A helpful glossary of theological terms and an index ensure ease of use to a wide range of readers. Generally the book seems to have been carefully edited, although the page heading "Evangelism" (193-198) should read "Evil, Problem of."

Many of the essays provide excellent concise overviews and summaries of recent developments (see "Doctrine and Dogma," by Alister E. McGrath; "Ethics," by Nigel Biggar; "Feminist Theology," by Anne Carr; "God," by Robert W. Jenson; "Postliberalism," by Sheila Greeve Davaney and Delwin Brown; and "Postmodernism," by Robert Detweiler). Their generally balanced tone makes stimulating reading.

A unique feature of the BEMCT is its detailed survey of regional developments during the modern period. It contains extensive articles on the development of Christian thought in Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Holland, India, Japan, Korea, Scandinavia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It also deals with Arab Christian thought and relationships between Judaism and Christianity. In other words, it seeks to reflect the increasingly multicultural and worldwide penetration and variation of Christianity.

Despite its aim to adopt a nonadvocational stance, avoiding a pre-commitment to conservative or liberal attitudes, thereby trying to ensure a balanced appraisal of the situation (xi), certain trends in its orientation are clearly perceivable. For one thing, a strong majority of its contributors come from the United Kingdom, giving the work a distinctly British flavor. The rest of the contributors are mostly North American scholars, leaving barely any room for representatives from Continental Europe, or from South America, Africa, or Asia. The selective orientation is evident, for instance, when under the entry "Liberalism" one finds the subheadings "Britain" and "USA," but misses "Germany," which certainly played its part in the development of modern liberal theological thought. The theological orientation of BEMCT does not always live up to its proclaimed neutrality, either (ix). For example, the entries that deal with creation and biological science do not even mention alternate conservative interpretations, thereby omitting without comment a significant sector of contemporary Christian scholarship. One also wonders why, although there are entries for "Tradition" and "Revelation," articles on "Scripture" and "Inspiration" are missing. Also lacking are treatments of the

topics of "Sin" and "Systematic Theology," to name but a few of the more significant subjects that have been omitted even though they have received considerable discussion in recent debates.

Despite the above-mentioned limitations, the BEMCT surpasses all others in its field and will be useful to anyone interested in the contemporary discussion of Christian theology.

68766 Hockenheim
Germany

FRANK M. HASEL

Minor, Mark. *Literary-Critical Approaches to the Bible: An Annotated Bibliography*. West Cornwall, CT: Locust Hill Press, 1992. xxxi + 520 pp. $50.00.

Minor's *Literary-Critical Approaches to the Bible: An Annotated Bibliography* is a compilation of books and articles published in English that are related to the topic of literary criticism. Commentaries and dissertations, as well as articles in dictionaries, are excluded from this compilation. With a few exceptions, book reviews also have been omitted.

Minor introduces his book with a definition and brief history of the literary criticism of the Bible. With skill and concision he describes the different schools of interpretation that have influenced the development of literary criticism. Indeed, the author shows himself to be not only a thorough compiler, but an able analyst and synthesist of the material.

Minor's definition of the literary-critical approach is captioned by three principles: First, the biblical language should be regarded as a "mirror" (rather than a "window," which would be seen as capable of describing what is behind or beyond the text). Second, form and content are inseparable; when trying to find the meaning of a text, one should rely on both form and content. Third, the final form of the present text should constitute the foundation of any study or analysis (xx). The selection of bibliographical material is organized along the lines of the definition given above. The work also includes items that rely on "Composition Criticism" (which implies that the author's theology dictates the content of his work), since this approach uses some assumptions found in the literary-critical approach. Material based on traditional historical-critical methods has been excluded from this book. However, sources that use "New Criticism" (which gives importance to structure, diction, genre, style, etc.) have been retained. Likewise, the book retains material from other disciplines that literary critics use, such as structuralism and post-structuralism, feminism, folklore and myth criticism, etc. Obviously, the choice of materials has not been easy, since there is often a fine line between what relates to traditional historical criticism and what does not. But, as the author himself asserts, a delimitation should be established somewhere, subjective as it may be (xxiv).

The book is subdivided into three logical sections: (1) the Bible (3-44), covering the OT and NT; (2) the Hebrew Bible (45-151), with three subsections: the Law, the Prophets, and the Writings; and (3) the NT (331-500).

Each bibliographical reference is numbered (thus allowing cross-referencing) and is followed by a brief annotation. These annotations, which usually summarize the content of the book or article, represent a real asset to biblical research. When two or more articles are interrelated or respond to each other, the fact has been noted whenever possible (see, for instance, #1422, p. 317; #1241, p. 280; #2234, p. 496). The author index at the end adds to the practicality and usefulness of the book.

Minor does not claim that this compilation is a comprehensive one. And there is indeed omitted material that corresponds to the author's criteria. To mention just a few items, one can cite S. G. Brown, "The Structure of Ecclesiastes," *Evangelical Review of Theology* 14 (1990): 195-208; L. J. de Regt, *A Parametric Model for Syntactic Studies of a Textual Corpus, Demonstrated on the Hebrew of Deuteronomy 1-30* (Assen/Maastricht, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1988); and T. E. Boomershine, "The Structure of Narrative Rhetoric in Gen 2-3" *Semeia* 18 (1980), 113-129. However, these omissions do not alter the quality of this book, since its intent is to provide not a complete bibliographical reference (if such a thing is possible) but a reference tool on books of the Bible and topics related to literary criticism.

Scholars from all persuasions who have an interest in biblical hermeneutic, literary criticism and related studies, and biblical exegesis, will benefit from this compilation, which sheds light on the relationship between biblical and literary studies. Unique in its field, Minor's work is indeed a valuable tool that biblical scholars should include in their libraries.

Berrien Springs, MI 49103 MIARY ANDRIAMIARISOA

Neusner, Jacob. *Israel's Love Affair with God: Song of Songs.* The Bible of Judaism Library. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1992. 152 pp. Paper, $14.95.

The title of Neusner's latest interpretive work is misleading, but the scholarly effort represented here is successful and valuable. The book is not a commentary or theological exposition of Canticles itself, nor is it a full commentary on the Song of Songs Rabbah. It is instead a short treatise which introduces this midrashic Rabbah and teaches the modern (especially non-Jewish) reader how to comprehend and appreciate this literature of Talmudic Judaism. Neusner is right to select only a few passages from the Rabbah for comment, as these are sufficient to illustrate how Judaism of the sixth-century (C.E.) dual Torah was reading its treasure of Scripture.

Because so much of this midrashic literature is a closed book to the modern scholar of religion, the author helpfully makes his first expositional chapter (chap. 2) the longest; it is an extensive, careful commentary on the

midrash of Song of Songs 1:2. With Neusner's assistance the reader will indeed see that there is an order and a method to the rabbinic interpretation of this postclassical work. Because this chapter is so successful, Neusner is able in the succeeding ones to guide the reader through the apparent maze of stored-up traditional interpretation with considerable brevity. What one finds here is the product of a serious and devout group of Bible students who desired over the decades to leave nothing to chance in their understanding of God's law for the new Israel.

The non-Jewish historian of Christian antiquity may find a genuine fascination with the ways that this ancient community thought and argued about its privileged relationship to a loving God. Beyond this, the careful Christian reader will also find the use of an allegorical and "quasilogical" style which, in antiquity, resembled the interpretation and preaching of contemporary Christians. But because this is Jewish devotional literature, one will also be reminded of similar patterns of thought and expression in those earlier Christian documents which share some common features with Mishnaic (and pre-Mishnaic) Judaism, namely the four canonical Gospels and some of Paul's digressive, "hit and run" exposition.

Major points of concern are as follows: first, the last chapter ("Symbolism and Theology in Judaism") contains general explanatory content (with examples taken from the Genesis Rabbah) and thus would serve much better as the book's introductory chapter. In its present position it spoils the sense of "homeness" which the rest of Neusner's exposition creates, and one may sense (with the reviewer) an abrupt and unfortunate change of subject. Likewise, chapter one, which really offers a better summary of the Rabbah's main theological contributions, should be placed last.

The really unsatisfactory thing about his last chapter, however, is that Neusner's simple and correct definition of symbolism does not suffice to explain the source or the "why" of all the diverse but scriptural "contact points" which the "Rabbah" finds. It is one thing to recognize from this distance that the rabbis saw many connections between the words or phrases within their text and the historic events and institutions of ancient Israel. But this understanding of symbolism (that one thing may stand for many more different things) simply does not account for all of these "guesses" about what those words and textual ideas mean. Nor does it begin to answer the most obvious questions: why did the rabbis come to see such things in the Bible, and *how* did they arrive at the various meanings for each word-symbol? Neusner does not attempt to answer this question; which his chosen text begs of any non-Jewish scholar of religion. Nevertheless, we owe him a real debt in once again opening wide the door to this treasury of ancient biblical interpretation.

United Methodist Church
Kermit, TX 79745

PAUL D. DUERKSEN

Peterson, David. *Engaging with God: A Biblical Theology of Worship.* Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans, 1993. 317 pp. $16.99.

Engaging with God is not a "how-to-book" on the preparation and conduct of a Christian order of worship. It is, as the subtitle indicates, a biblical theology of worship. The author is not at all pleased with the common understanding of the word "worship." Too often it refers simply to what is done in church on Sunday morning—singing hymns, saying prayers, listening to sermons, or celebrating the Lord's Supper. Nor is he pleased with the more contemporary concern that in a worship service the worshiper should be "stirred and challenged, or comforted and consoled, at an individual level" (16). While genuine worship will have a private and public dimension, he holds that "something is seriously wrong when people equate spiritual self-gratification with worship" (17).

Peterson's thesis, which he supports by a quite comprehensive analysis of the biblical text, is: "that the worship of the living and true God is essentially an engagement with him on the terms that he proposes and in the way that he alone makes possible" (20). "It involves honoring, serving and respecting him, abandoning any loyalty or devotion that hinders an exclusive relationship with him. Although some of Scripture's terms for worship may refer to specific gestures of homage, rituals or priestly ministrations, worship is more fundamentally faith expressing itself in obedience and adoration. Consequently, in both Testaments it is often shown to be a personal and moral fellowship with God relevant to every sphere of life" (283).

After considering the cult, the sacrificial system, the Jerusalem temple, and God's design for the future of Israel, he finds that the OT theology of worship includes God's self-revelation and the redemption of his people so that they can engage with him. "Obedience to God in cultic observances was to go hand in hand with obedience in matters of everyday life" (49).

His study of the words for worship in the OT focuses on the LXX. He justifies this by the contention that the New Testament writers were strongly influenced by the Greek translation of the OT. *Proskunein* signifies homage or grateful submission, *latreuein* and *doulos* signify service, and *sebomai* signifies reverence. These terms represent a crucial attitude of heart. Acceptable worship in the OT is not simply a matter of gesturing or posture but an orientation to God in the whole of life.

While Peterson sees a continuity between OT and NT with respect to engagement, he sees a radical discontinuity in traditional categories and patterns of worship. In chapters 3 and 4, "Jesus and the New Temple," and "Jesus and the New Covenant," Peterson examines passages in Matthew and John which stress that "God's presence and God's glory, so intimately connected with the . . . temple under the Mosaic covenant," are "fully and finally experienced in Jesus Christ," who replaced the temple as the worship center (101), inaugurated a new covenant (108), and established his own life of obedience as "the perfect pattern or model of acceptable worship" (110). While he accepted the sacrificial

system and the cult associated with it, his teaching is more concerned with the ethical than the cultic.

Peterson's denial of a prescribed cult in the NT includes the institution of the Lord's supper. He does not believe that Jesus intended it to be a new cult even though the writings of Paul show that the supper was part of an early tradition in the church. Peterson sees it as an expression of unity which is appropriate to worship, but not required. "The New Testament shows the emergence of a 'religion' without any earthly cult in the traditional Jewish or Greco-Roman sense" (129).

He does not mean that corporate worship is of no importance in the New Testament or that it is always void of cultic elements. What he does argue is that such elements are not formally prescribed and that corporate worship is always to be located in the larger context of engagement with God in everyday life.

For instance, in the Book of Acts, God removed cultic regulations so that people of all nations could unite in his service. The irreducible minimum is the preached word. "Preaching about Christ must be at the heart of a Christian theology of worship," because "the word of the Lord is central to a genuine encounter with God" (144). But Peterson denies that the worship practices of the earliest churches are automatically a norm for today.

In the Pauline epistles, the basis for a worship theology is found in the death of Jesus as the means of reconciliation with God. Peterson translates Romans 12:1: "Therefore, I urge you, brothers, in view of God's mercies, to offer your bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God, which is your understanding worship" (p. 174).

In the NT, God's temple on earth is the people of God—Christians in fellowship with Christ. Paul speaks of upbuilding or edification as the purpose of Christians gathered together. This is an "important criterion for assessing the helpfulness of testimonies, choruses, and various other elements that might go to make up a congregational meeting today" (212). "Edification and worship are different sides of the same coin" (215).

The book of Hebrews presents "the most complete and fully integrated theology of worship in the NT. All the important categories of OT thinking on the subject—sanctuary, sacrifice, altar, priesthood and covenant—are taken up and related to the person and work of Jesus Christ" (228). Hebrews shows what Christian worship means in the context of life—entertaining strangers, visiting prisoners, faithfulness in marriage, and trusting God to provide for spiritual needs.

A major theme in John's Revelation is the distinction between the true worship of God and idolatry. The great controversy between God and Satan is historical as it relates to the conflict of allegiances revealed in worship. In the worship of the beast there is a life-orientation as well as participation in the cult. The hymnic material in Revelation suggests criteria for evaluating modern singing. "Do our hymns and songs concentrate on praising God for his character and his mighty acts in history in our behalf? Do they focus sufficiently on the great truths of the gospel? . . . Do they challenge us to take a firm stand against

every manifestation of Satan's power and to bear faithful witness to the truth of the gospel in our society? It is not good enough to sing certain items merely because they make the congregation feel good" (278).

Through a responsible exposition of the OT and NT, David Peterson has, indeed, produced a biblical theology of worship. Because of the many texts of Scripture examined in each chapter, *Engaging with God* reads like a research thesis (which it is). The many conclusions along the way, the conclusions at the end of each chapter, and the summary chapter at the end of the book give the message clarity and coherence.

The book does raise some interesting questions, however. To say on the same page that "Formality and informality are not theological categories," but "There are certain theological considerations, however, that must challenge and inform our thinking on this issue" (160), seems paradoxical if not contradictory. Quite obviously the answer to the question, "What shall Christians do when they meet together for worship?" is not "Whatever pleases them." No doubt that is why, in spite of the author's denial of a prescribed cult in Christian worship, he offers an "imaginary" service of worship in the epilogue (289-292). Theology does inform practice.

In rejecting a prescribed cult, does the author also reject sacrament? If so, is there nothing sacramental in Christian worship? Over and beyond the issue of the frequency of its celebration, and the Protestant rejection of "merit" and the "real presence," isn't there something sacramental in the Lord's Supper? And didn't the early church do it because Jesus said, "Do this in remembrance of me" (Luke 22:19, RSV)? Regarding baptism, the author mentions it only in passing, but isn't it both cultic and sacramental in nature? And isn't there something prescriptive about it when Jesus said, "He who believes and is baptized will be saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned" (Mark 16:16, RSV)? And when baptism occurs, is it not a part of Christian worship? Some would raise a question about the washing of feet since Jesus said, "If I then, your Lord and Teacher, have washed your feet, you also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that you should also do as I have done to you. . . . If you know these things, blessed are you if you do them" (John 13:14,15,17, RSV).

While the author has made a solid case for flexibility and against an orthodox "formalism," not everything is negotiable. His thesis that worship "in church" must be part and parcel of worship in the whole of everyday living is informed by good biblical theology. Wholehearted obedience *is* the homage, adoration, and praise worshipers offer to God.

The book, *Engaging with God* is unique. It is a *must* read for all pastors and leaders of worship.

Andrews University STEVEN P. VITRANO

Rainer, Thom S. *The Book of Church Growth: History, Theology, and Principles.* Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1993. 349 pp. $19.99.

The church-growth movement has taken its share of criticism from evangelical circles, but it can be thankful for defenders like Thom Rainer. In expounding the history and theology of the church-growth movement, Rainer has, for all practical purposes, written a polemic for it. "In the pages that follow," he writes, "I hope to 'clear the air,'" (19) which shows the apologetic nature of his work. As a practitioner of church-growth principles (his own church, Green Valley Baptist, has grown to over 1,700), Rainer writes from a practical and pastoral point of view.

The book is divided into three sections: I. "The History of the Church Growth Movement"; II. "A Theology of Church Growth"; III. "Principles of Church Growth." In the first section, on the history of the movement, Rainer spends what appears to be a disproportionate amount of time on the life of Donald McGavran, its founder. Perhaps this was necessary because of the large part McGavran played in the development of the movement. In any event, Rainer traces the history well. The second section was the weakest one. It was certainly comprehensive, but it read like a systematic theology, leaving the impression that the doctrine of spiritual gifts occupies a relatively minor place in church-growth theology. My experience with the church-growth movement suggests that the topic of spiritual gifts is pivotal, not peripheral, to the theology of the church-growth movement. Rainer could have devoted more space to investigating and explaining the theology of spiritual gifts. In his third section, he does an excellent job of harmonizing and crystallizing the principles of the church-growth movement.

Rainer's happy combination of simple language, short chapters, and concision makes a very readable church-growth textbook. While Rainier is clearly a church-growth advocate, his book is a relatively objective and much-needed reference work on this movement that has had such a profound impact on modern Christianity. Not only teachers of applied theology, but pastors as well, should own and read this book.

Southwestern Adventist College
Keene, TX 76059

ROLAND J. HILL

Roozen, David A., and C. Kirk Hadaway, eds. *Church and Denominational Growth: What Does (and Does Not) Cause Growth or Decline.* Nashville: Abingdon, 1993. 400 pp. $21.95.

More often than not, research-data reports are about as exciting as a night spent reading the Yellow Pages. I found this book a refreshing exception. The authors infuse life into statistical studies. They take the scholar's tools and apply them to practical purposes. Intuitive insight brightens the chapters. Educated prognostications raise concern and hope.

Lyle Schaller's "hunches" on why churches grow are the hypothesis the book sets about to test (49). Research verifies that his hunches are on the right

track. Newer denominations do grow faster than old ones. Denominations that grow develop new congregations, and the average size of the congregations increases. There is an advantage to having 20 percent of the churches under twenty-five years old. Having 200 or more members at the first service of a new church is a growth enhancement. A high population area with rapid immigration has high potential for church growth.

Sixteen sociologists of religion dissect what ails mainline American and Canadian denominations. Their conclusions, while not based on a postmortem examination, come precariously close. The evidence collected from statistics supplied by denominational headquarters, interviews, and surveys demonstrates what even casual observers intuitively know: American mainline denominations are in trouble. By and large, they are in a downward spiral which, if not checked, may, for some, prove fatal.

Building on the earlier work from Hoge and Roozen, *Understanding Church Growth and Decline: 1950-1978,* researchers present data that shows how people's attitudes and practices affect mainline denominations in the United States and Canada. Like the earlier work, this book is an invaluable resource for denominational administrators, scholars, pastors, and others who seek insight into the fast-changing American church scene.

The chapters progress in a logical and ordered way. The authors affirm certain preconceptions, challenge others, and slay their share of sacred cows on the altar of research. They affirm that people come back to church when they have an inner need. What a congregation does to encourage their return has little effect (246). Data demonstrate that actions taken by denominational leaders do affect local congregations (37). A quota system for appointment to denominational leadership, boards, and commissions is a trade-off of competence for inclusiveness (107). Religious hype that is part of revivals and evangelistic meetings causes sudden spikes in church attendance, but the positive effects do not last (133).

Sacrificial cows: *Church consultants can turn a church around.* Data suggest this is a temporary turn (151). *Pastors make growth happen.* Sorry, colleagues, research suggests that church growth is largely in the hands of the congregation. We clergy are most effective in blocking growth (231). *Conservative churches grow, and liberal churches do not.* Conservatism is not the issue. The title to Kelly's book *Why Conservative Churches Are Growing* would more accurately reflect the data reported in this study by rewording the title to read, "Why Churches Who Strongly Believe Something Are Growing" (132).

The book offers no quick fix for trouble-plagued denominations. There are, however, numerous suggestions presented to guide denominational leaders toward developing strategies to encourage growth. Rapid response to changing situations is essential. Traditions will likely inhibit growth. Restructuring and establishing priorities keep a congregation centered on its task. A clear understanding and articulation of purpose are essential. Patience is vital. The slowdown and decline in church growth did not happen overnight; they started back in the 1950s. Changing direction will take time (17). The good news is the

convincing evidence that Americans and Canadians still have a strong spiritual core. The trick is to direct this support toward the local church.

Information from five denominations, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), United Methodist, Southern Baptist Convention, Assembly of God, and Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, provides the core data for the book. Abundant tables and easy-to-read charts included in most of the articles succinctly display what the words convey. Additional statistical information from the United Church of Christ, Evangelical Lutheran Church, American Baptist Church, Roman Catholic, and Black churches affords a broad view. A section each is devoted to the Black Church in America, the Roman Catholic Church, the Church in Canada, and the Baby Boomers.

The study is not all-inclusive, but the principles presented are generally applicable to all denominations. To believe otherwise is to enter Fool's Paradise.

An excellent reference section concludes the book, but the absence of an index is unfortunate.

Anaheim, CA 92806 LAWRENCE G. DOWNING

Scroggs, Robin. *The Text and the Times: New Testament Essays for Today.* Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1993. xii + 292 pp. $18.00.

The Text and the Times argues the importance and relevance of Scripture for the present. Every one of its 15 essays (ranging from social scientific criticism of the NT to gender issues to matters of language and reality) returns to two basic themes: (a) what it means to live as a person of faith, and (b) what a modern person is to make of the ancient texts called NT Scripture. Although Scroggs claims to sit in the position of a liberal, he has the heart of a conservative, or so it seems when one reads his book. He certainly does not value the triumphalism of fundamentalism, nor the self-assured rightness of much of conservative scholarship, but he is a conservative in his special regard for the importance of the text of scripture.

Chapter 6, "How We Understand Scripture When It Speaks with Forked Tongue," approaches gender issues in the New Testament within the problem of hermeneutics. Scroggs frames the problem of hermeneutics with brief descriptions of the approaches taken by "literalists" and by "radicals." Literalists claim their approach is entirely objective, while radicals claim their approach is entirely subjective. Scroggs objects that both fail on the same points. They dispense with discussion of the text by a simplistic yes/no dichotomy, and neither is willing to struggle with the tensions in the text, in terms either of gender issues or of subjective/objective approaches. To oversimplify Scroggs, the literalist denies the role of experience; the radical, the role of tradition. Scroggs maintains that those who are uncomfortable with either end of the spectrum must be satisfied with more complex and uncertain results. Scroggs finds egalitarianism portrayed in the historical Jesus, in the author of the fourth gospel, and in Paul, but notes that issues of hierarchy are prominent in the

deutero-Pauline works, where the subordination of women is coupled with a reduction of the understanding of faith to a synonym for doctrinal formulation.

Conservative Christians may object to the application of modern methodologies to the study of Scripture, while liberals will object to Scroggs's high regard for the importance of scripture and the urgency of taking it seriously. Both might elect to read the entire book if they were to begin with the last chapter. There Scroggs concisely summarizes two basic problems involved in taking Scripture seriously. The first, probably more a topic of discussion among conservatives, discusses what to do with the "then-ness" of the text in the "now-ness" of living. Scroggs defines this as the problem of analogy—what constitutes a situation in the modern world analogous to the situation in the NT to which its teaching is to be applied? The second, perhaps more an assumption than a topic of discussion among liberals, is the relationship of the prescientific world dualism of the NT and the modern world's monistic view of reality. Scroggs finds a way out in transformation (conversion), a new worldview which, however scary, demands a high level of responsibility.

While the book is a collection of addresses and essays written in the 1970s and 1980s, one of the enjoyable features of the book is a prefatory statement to each chapter describing the situation in which the chapter was written.

Chapters (and their year of original presentation or publication) include: "The Education of the Interpreter" (1993); "Tradition, Freedom, and the Abyss" (1970); "The Earliest Christian Communities as Sectarian Movements" (1975); "The Sociological Interpretation of the New Testament: The Present State of Research" (1979-80); "Paul and the Eschatological Woman" (1972, 1974); "The Next Step: A Common Humanity" (1978); "How We Understand Scripture When It Speaks with Forked Tongue" (1979); "The Heuristic Value of a Psychoanalytic Model in the Interpretation of Pauline Theology" (1978); "Eros and Agape in Paul" (1972); "New Being: Renewed Mind: New Perception. Paul's View of the Source of Ethical Insight" (1982); "The Theocentrism of Paul" (1986); "The New Testament and Ethics: How Do We Get from There to Here?" (1984); "Can New Testament Theology Be Saved? The Threat of Contextualisms" (1988); "Eschatological Existence in Matthew and Paul: Coincidentia Oppositorum" (1989); "Beyond Criticism to Encounter: The Bible in the Postcritical Age" (1978); "Can the New Testament Be Relevant for the Twenty-first Century?" (1991); plus an "Index of Ancient Texts" and an "Index of Modern Authors."

This reviewer welcomes the publication of these important essays dealing with a matter of urgent concern to Christians, regardless of orientation or denomination.

Walla Walla College
College Place, WA 99324

RONALD L. JOLLIFFE

Seitz, Christopher R. *Isaiah 1-39.* Interpretation Commentary Series. Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993. xvi + 271 pp. $22.00.

Interpretation is a commentary series dedicated to integrating technical scholarship with the practical needs of the pastor and teacher. In theory the series aims at providing commentaries which speak to the issues of contemporary literary theory. Thus the commentaries tend to deal with the final form of the text and reader response, rather than more traditional categories such as textual history or applied hermeneutics. However, contemporary literary theory is not a unified discipline, and thus a great deal of diversity in approach may be expected in this commentary series.

Seitz's commentary on Isaiah 1-39 is interested in the text of Isaiah in its final form, the received text. This does not mean that the commentary treats Isaiah as a simple unity or ignores the theories of a Deutero-Isaiah and a Trito-Isaiah. In fact, the commentary presupposes these later authors as writers of most of the text of chapters 40-66. However, Seitz explains, later redactors assembled the unified text as we have it. These redactors recognized unifying themes between the texts and enhanced these unifiers when they pulled this text together. As a result, the present book of Isaiah is far more unified than traditional scholarship has allowed for. For over a century conservative scholars have attacked the division of Isaiah with vigor and demonstrated that there are real unifying themes which bind the book together. Just as vigorously, liberal scholars ignored these unifiers. Now, as conservative scholarship moves in the direction of accepting the division of Isaiah, liberal scholarship has been discovering the unifying factors which underlie the book as we have it.

Scholarship plays an important role in this commentary. The redactional layers of Isaiah are constantly presented to the reader as vital to understanding and using the text. However, whatever might be theorized concerning the redaction of Isaiah, the text as we have it is what this commentary regards as most important. Seitz wishes the reader to understand the present text, and redactional study is merely a means to this end.

For Seitz one important factor in understanding Isaiah is the minimal role biography plays in the prophet's message (21-22). Other prophets such as Hosea, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, begin with autobiographical call narratives; and much of the text interacts with the personal life of the prophet. However, in Isaiah the call narrative is delayed (if Isaiah 6 is indeed a call narrative), and overall the book retains only peripheral interest in the prophet's life.

For the most part, Seitz's commentary is unremarkable when consulted for a treatment of a small passage. The value of this commentary lies chiefly in its treatment of larger blocks of text. Even when Seitz's comments are unremarkable compared with those of other commentaries, the value lies in his ability to outline the larger context in which the text resides.

Madison, WI 53713 JAMES E. MILLER

Smith, Ralph L. *Old Testament Theology: Its History, Method, and Message.* Nashville: Broadman & Holman Publishers, 1993. 528 pp. $32.99.

Biblical scholars have long sought to reduce the Hebrew Scriptures to one overarching theme—such as that of covenant—for convenient study. But the OT resists such thematic reduction. It is just too varied and complex to fit into any single concept. Ralph L. Smith, Distinguished Professor of OT, Emeritus, at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary is among those who resist the reductionist approach.

Instead, Smith breaks the OT into nine major topics: "The Knowledge of God"; "I Shall Be Your God; You Shall Be My People"; "Who Is a God Like Yahweh?"; "What Is Mankind?"; "Sin and Redemption"; "Worship"; "The Good Life"; "Death and Beyond"; and "In That Day." Then under each large topic he divides the biblical material into more narrow and specific teachings or themes. For example, under the topic of sin and redemption, he examines what OT Scripture has to say about sin's nature, source, effects, and removal.

The book begins with chapters on the history, nature, and methodology of OT theology. An excursus explores Jewish-Christian relationships and their impact on OT theology.

In his study of the biblical material, Smith first presents what Scripture says or teaches, then cites a wide range of scholars. He does not restrict himself to quoting only conservative scholars.

In the chapter on the OT teaching on death, he does not force it into the modern, popular concepts of heaven and hell. He acknowledges that the OT has no systematic or organized presentation of life after death and presents the totality of biblical evidence without forcing it to conform to his own tradition. Whenever possible he also correlates and compares biblical material with what archaeology has discovered about the beliefs of the surrounding biblical world. He has woven in archaeological background material in a number of places (such as his excursus "Asherah, Consort of Yahweh?").

In the chapter on eschatology ("In That Day") he avoids interpreting the biblical material within the framework of dispensationalism or any other eschatological theory. The sections on the Suffering Servant and the Messiah present the biblical material in its OT context without reading in christological allusions from a NT perspective.

Smith makes his OT theology even more useful by providing an extensive bibliography and including subject, author, text, early literature, and Hebrew indexes.

The book is both an objective examination of what the OT teaches on a wide range of topics, and of how scholars have approached and understood the biblical text. Smith's stated goal was "to provide university and seminary students a textbook that gives a partial report of what others have said and done about OT theology and then suggest ways the theological materials in the OT may be organized, interpreted, and appropriated." Both teachers and students should find that he has accomplished much of that goal.

Hagerstown, MD 21740 . GERALD WHEELER

Stenger, Werner. *Introduction to New Testament Exegesis.* Translated by D. W. Stott. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1993. 240 pp. $15.99.

Werner Stenger's book, *Introduction to New Testament Exegesis,* is an English translation and adaptation of the original German *Biblische Methodenlehre.* Its introductory character is seen in that, despite its focus on NT exegesis, no references to the Greek text have been made.

The book has an introduction and two main divisions. The introduction lays a hermeneutical foundation for the entire work and outlines the objectives and methods of exegesis. Stenger argues that the historical distance of the NT is best brought to the modern reader's attention through the historical-critical method.

The first part of the book deals with the fundamentals of New Testament exegesis. Stenger subdivides this part into three sections. In the first he discusses textual criticism and illustrates it from some NT passages. Next he considers textual structure, which involves the explanation of what constitutes narrative, prose, poetry, parallelism, and chiasm. Next, he explains "synchronism" and "diachronism" as exegetical methods. Subsection two takes up a detailed discussion of the "synchronic" approach, which Stenger identifies with form criticism. He discusses the identification of texts and their segmentation for exegesis. Subsection three is dedicated to "diachronic" methods. This entails the explanation of tradition, source, redaction, and genre criticism. Stenger believes the goal of these exegetical methods is to enable the exegete to move about freely and to feel at home in the NT.

The second main division of the book offers the reader some concrete examples of NT exegesis. The author focuses on 15 passages representing selected NT genres to illustrate his methodology, and handles his material with great erudition. It is particularly interesting to observe the theological insights that redaction criticism affords. In dealing with the pericope involving the call of Levi (Mk 2:13-17; Matt 9:9-13; Luke 5:27-32), he provides an insight into the discipline of discipleship and the necessity of choosing to leave the past behind for the sake of forging the links of a new relationship with Christ. He identifies the story of the disciples picking grain on the Sabbath as a controversy-dialogue genre and uses its argument as a good example of a *minore ad majus* case (Mk 2:23-28; Matt 12:1-8). He compares the Marcan and Matthean accounts of the storm on the sea (Mk 4:35-41; Matt 8:18-27) and argues that the position of this story in the Marcan account is a deliberate design to confirm Jesus' teaching authority with a demonstration of the power of his words, whereas in the Matthean version the focus is on the meaning of discipleship. He compares the Synoptic and Johannine accounts of the healing of the centurion's servant and brings out the theological concerns of each writer (Matt 8:5-13; Luke 7:1-10; John 4:46c-54). Matthew uplifts the centurion as an example of true faith. Luke shifts the story's accent to the centurion's personality as a Gentile who comes to faith. But John demonstrates that faith arises whenever a person believes the divine word.

In his analysis of two Christological hymns (Phil 2:6-11 and 1 Tim 3:16) Stenger first discusses their *Sitz im Leben* and then focuses on theological insights. He draws attention to particular words in the hymn recorded in 1 Timothy to show how these terms point not to an antithetical relationship but rather to a polar relationship; i.e., the contrasting elements are conceived as the two poles of a single reality. He asserts that Paul's purpose in quoting a hymn in Philippians is to ground the ethical imperative in the christological indicative.

Stenger attributes the Beatitudes in Matthew and Luke to the Q source, since they are absent from Mark. He notes the differences between the two accounts and concludes that the Lucan version is closer to the original source. His remarkable exegetical analysis of Paul's letter to Philemon emphasizes his claim that Paul was a master of NT letter-writing.

The salient features of this work are its orientation to the historical-critical method and its consistent "introductory" level of discourse (i.e., it does not presuppose any knowledge of Greek and is careful to explain all the technical terms it uses). For exegesis courses needing these characteristics, it will be a valuable textbook. Stenger completes the work by providing a very useful bibliography representing the whole range of NT exegesis.

Berrien Springs, MI 49103 HERMANN V. A. KUMA

Stern, Ephraim, ed. *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land.* 4 vols. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993. xxii + 1552 pp. $355.00.

One of the most helpful aids in archaeological library research has been the four-volume *Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land* published in 1975 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. The Prentice-Hall edition was an updated version of a two-volume Hebrew-language edition, with an additional 20 archaeological sites included. This first English edition has been out of print for some time, and with the many new projects started since its 1971 ending date for projects, a new edition was certainly needed. In this *New Encyclopedia*, Ephraim Stern has not merely updated the first edition but completely re-created it.

While the first English edition was wellmade and helpful, Stern's new edition, published by Simon and Schuster, has brought this work to the standards of any encyclopedia. The 315 additional pages in the new edition, plus a smaller typeface that yields 50 percent more words per page, makes the four volumes of the new edition approximately 120 percent larger than the previous edition (based on the tabulations of the reviewer). The 365 sites treated in the new edition represent an increase of about 50 percent over the first English edition. The number of illustrations has significantly increased as well. For example, volume 1 of the first edition contained 350 black-and-white pictures, 95 drawings, and 10 color pictures; volume 1 of the new edition contains 635

black-and-white pictures, 180 drawings, and 30 color pictures. Especially pleasing is the better quality of the illustrations. Gone are the brown tones of the first edition's black-and-white pictures; as a result, the pictures in the new edition have much sharper resolution. Even the layout of the new edition is more professional and compact (e.g., gone are the blank half-pages and half-page color photographs of the first edition, cp. 54, 71, 123, 396, etc.).

New features of Stern's second edition include a table of contents, an "Introduction to the English Edition" (a summary of Syro-Palestinian archaeology), a "Users' Guide" (explaining abbreviations, map references, site-survey numbering, the location of the glossary, index to places, and bibliographical references), an editor's foreword, an "Alphabetical List of Authors," and an "Alphabetical List of Entries." The three pages of "Chronological Tables" in the older edition have been improved graphically, while subtle changes have also been made (e.g., the addition of the "low chronology" dates to the "high chronology" for the Egyptian dynasties; and clearer charts designating the western and eastern seats of the coreigning Roman emperors). Even a "Chronological Chart of the Alphabet" is included for easy reference!

With so many new features and expanded text, I was personally pleased to see that a touch of the past continued. In many cases, the now-deceased pioneers of archaeology are allowed to contribute to this project. For example, Kathleen Kenyon describes her work at Jericho and Yigael Yadin writes about Hazor and Masada. To these discussions are added the more recent findings and interpretations. This feature allows those with a casual archaeological interest (and a limited library) to meet the earlier (and more famous) archaeologists on their own turf.

With the outstanding improvements found in *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*, it is awkward to criticize Stern's excellent work. There is one omission, however, that should be remedied before the next edition. This review is being written just after the historic meeting in Washington, DC, between PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Izhak Rabin. The whole world thrilled at the possibility that the Palestinians and Israelis would finally become more friendly neighbors. The next edition of these volumes would be that much better if a Jordanian (and, one would hope, a Syrian and a Lebanese) served as associate editor(s). Such an addition would not only help assure that Transjordanian and northern Levant sites are not excluded (e.g., the Jordanian sites of Tell el-ᶜUmeiri and Iktanu), but would also provide archaeologists with a much broader picture of the Levant. The "Holy Land" of these volumes is just too small a region to adequately evaluate the evidence presented. In addition, such cooperation among academics just might help produce a "Holy Land," which the title claims and continued hostilities deny.

As for the volumes themselves, one can hardly imagine a better, easier, more complete resource for the region they cover than *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land*. Given the widespread interest in the history of Palestine, it should be in every library in the English-speaking world. In addition, no serious Bible student, historian of the region, or

archaeologist can afford not to consult its articles. *The New Encyclopedia of Archaeological Excavations in the Holy Land* is *the* reference tool for archaeological research.

Andrews University DAVID MERLING

Van Dijk-Hemmes, Fokkelien, and Athalya Brenner. *On Gendering Texts: Female and Male Voices in the Hebrew Bible.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1993. xiii + 211 pp. $65.75.

Fokkelien Van Dijk-Hemmes searched the Hebrew Bible for "traces of women's culture"; Athalya Brenner searched for "(presumably male) biblical literary paradigms of women and their [underlying] social stereotypes." When they realized that their projects overlapped and complemented each other, they began collaborating, and this book was the result. From their different starting points as a Christian woman educated in the Netherlands and a Jewish woman educated in Israel, they sought to identify "women's texts within the Hebrew canon, and the means for differentiating them from men's texts" (Introduction, by Brenner, 1).

Labeling the voices they heard in the texts M(ale) and F(emale), they identified "double voices" and women's "muted voices" as well as F voices in various biblical texts. Sometimes the F voice was found in an M-authored text and therefore was distorted or misunderstood—"not a reproduction of *genuine F voices* but a filtered image, mirrored through the literary convention of an M voice and delivered through the filters of M perspectives and perception of woman" (ibid., 10-11).

Part I is authored by Van Dijk-Hemmes: "Traces of Women's Texts in the Hebrew Bible," and includes, after "Methodological Considerations," discussion of: "Victory Songs and Mockery Songs"; "Wisdom and Warning Discourse"; "Prophecy and Soothsaying"; "Love Songs and Songs of Harlots"; "Laments and Rituals of Lament"; "Vows and Prayers"; and "Birth Songs and Naming Speeches."

Parts II and III are by Brenner: "Proverbs 1-9: An F Voice?" and "M Text Authority in Biblical Love Lyrics: The Case of Qoheleth 3:1-9 and Its Textual Relatives." Her discussion in Part III also includes Eccl 12:1-7, by the same M voice, and Samson's riddles in Judges 14, Hosea 2, and sections from the Song of Songs (Canticles). In Part II she finds the strong possibility of an F voice in Proverbs 1-9 and the book as a whole—admonishments from a mother to her son as an alternative reading to the traditionally thought father.

Part IV is by both authors. Van Dijk-Hemmes wrote "Divine Love and Prophetic Pornography," discussing Ezekiel 23 (and 16). Brenner wrote "On 'Jeremiah' and the Poetics of (Prophetic?) Pornography." She especially discusses Jeremiah 2 and considers that misogyny is a feature of "the dehumanizing animalization of female sexuality, even when done in jest, as 'just a metaphor,'" and that "the *function* of pornography is the maintenance of male domination

through the denial of female experience" (184). One way to accomplish this function is to represent "female objectification as universal human experience rather than male experience of femaleness" (ibid.). The result in Jeremiah 2 and 3 is that the voice of the woman who represents Israel as well as Judah and Jerusalem is never heard—she never has an opportunity to defend herself. "Pornography preserves and asserts male social domination through the control of female sexuality. . . . the ultimate *causes* of pornography, . . . hark back to male insecurity and need to affirm and reaffirm gender control in the face of change" (186).

This book gives both women and men much to ponder. While not every identification and discussion is completely persuasive, much is, and one who has read the book carefully will never again read those texts in the same old way, without hearing the M, F, "muted F," and "double" voices that have come to one's awareness by the work of these creative coauthors.

Following the brief Afterword there are 8 pages of "References and Additional Bibliography" and an "Index of Ancient Sources," which is a list of "Biblical Passages Cited."

In a book devoted to making the reader aware of the hidden, muted F voices in texts, it is astonishing that in most of the footnotes and the bibliography the women authors are *invisible*, hidden behind initials like the men! I recognized some male and a few female authors, and finally resorted to writing in the women's first names when I found them given in the first or any reference, but only a few could be thus recovered; the rest remain locked in ambiguity. There are a number of misspellings and a persistent misuse of "like" for "as," probably because English is not the first language of either author or of the editor, but in general the material is very readable. This is a valuable addition to biblical studies from a feminist point of view, a stimulating corrective to traditional reading with a male-dominated and -filtered viewpoint.

Andrews University LEONA GLIDDEN RUNNING

Wood, Bryant G. *The Sociology of Pottery in Ancient Palestine: The Ceramic Industry and the Diffusion of Ceramic Style in the Bronze and Iron Ages.* Sheffield, England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990. 148 pp. Hardcover, $42.50.

The Sociology of Pottery in Ancient Palestine by Bryant G. Wood is Monograph 4 in the JSOT/ASOR series. It is divided into two parts, one on the manufacture and the other on the distribution of pottery.

In Part I, Wood discusses a fullrange of items associated with potters and their products, including potter's workshops, wheels, kilns, other equipment, distinctive marks, and guilds. He concludes that during the Bronze and Iron Ages, pottery types were mass-produced (16, 34) by men (23-24) who considered themselves in a low-status occupation (38). These craftsmen worked in shops

clustered together (44) at the edge of larger towns (33) and formed guilds (48) to guide their collective concerns.

Part II explains the implications of the commonality of pottery forms from different geographic areas. Wood argues that the near identity of many ancient Palestinian pottery forms implies mass-production and trade (58-59). Basing his explanations on ethnographic evidence from North Cameroon, Guatemala, Peru, etc., Wood theorizes that ancient Near Eastern pottery was made in urban centers and sold by the potters in areas close to the point of manufacture, while itinerant merchants sold the potter's wares in outlying regions (71).

It is surprising, given the fundamental importance of ceramics to Near Eastern archaeology, that more studies like Wood's are not available. That he was forced to seek ethnographic data from outside the Near East, when pottery continues to be used there, highlights the paucity of interest by students of that region. No matter how successfully Wood has brought together ethnographic sources from around the world, they cannot serve as well as similar studies of the Near East would. It is unfortunate that the historical concerns of the early twentieth century set the research agenda of scholars when the societies of that region were and remained largely agrarian. Still, even with the social changes of modern times, future ethnographic studies focused on ceramic use and distribution would not be wasted.

Wood has performed a helpful task by bringing to light a new dimension for interpreting ceramics. For example, he notes ethnographic studies which conclude that smaller pots used close to the ground (like cooking pots) are broken most frequently, thereby resulting in a life expectancy of about a year (91), while larger pots (e.g., store jars) and more expensive pieces are often used for decades or longer (93). Such information confirms cooking pots as a primary source for chronological purposes. At the same time, this research suggests that large store jars would be less helpful as detailed chronological indicators. Their longevity (due to their large size and the probability that they were seldom moved) might give them decades of use. Such an insight has broad implications. For example, collared-rim store jars are widely seen as indicative of Iron I settlements especially associated with Israelite occupation. It has been suggested by W. Rast (*Taanach I: Studies in the Iron Age Pottery* [Cambridge: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1978], 9-10) that the long-necked versions of the collared-rim store jars are earlier features of this form, while shorter-necked versions are later. Wood's conclusions would suggest that such chronological features, even if true, might not be perceivable at every site. One could expect that newer shorter-necked collared-rim jars were placed side by side with older longer-necked styles still in use, which would answer I. Finkelstein's dilemma (*The Archaeology of the Israelite Settlement*, Jerusalem: Israel Exploration Society, 1988, pp. 276-277).

Wood's use of ethnographic data highly recommends this study for serious consideration. Besides being well-written and articulate, *The Sociology of Pottery in Ancient Palestine* is on a topic that affects the interpretive process of every archaeological project. Wood's new interpretive model and the information that

this book provides about pottery production and distribution will allow excavators to do more than speculate about the meaning of ceramics. *The Sociology of Pottery in Ancient Palestine* will certainly necessitate changes in the way ceramics and their distribution are discussed.

Andrews University DAVID MERLING

Yonge, C. D., trans. *The Works of Philo.* Peabody, MS: Hendrickson Publishers, 1993. 944 pp. $29.95.

Finally the unabridged works of Philo are widely available in English, in one volume, and at an affordable price. The only other existing English translation (which also includes the Greek text) is the expensive ten volumes plus two supplementary volumes of the Loeb Classical Library, published jointly by Harvard University Press and William Heinemann in London (1929-1953). The LCL is very valuable for the scholarly community, but not easily accessible to many students of Jewish and Christian antiquity. Most of the other available works of Philo are only selections of his writings. Three English anthologies have appeared in the last two decades, those by N. N. Glatzer (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), D. Winston (Paulist Press, 1981), and R. Williamson (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

The unabridged one-volume *Works of Philo* includes his forty known works in Greek with their titles in English and in Latin as they appear in the Loeb Classical Library, plus one not found in LCL—*A Treatise Concerning the World.* Of Philo's works extant only in Armenian, this book includes only *Questions and Answers on Genesis I, II, III.* Under the title *Fragments,* Yonge includes fragments of Philo's *Questions and Answers on Exodus* extracted from the parallels of John of Damascus. Not included is Philo's work *On Animals,* recently translated for the first time into a modern language (English—see Abraham Terian, *Philonis Alexandirini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary,* Studies in Hellenistic Judaism, Supplements to Studia Philonica 1 [Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981]).

Even though the order of the works follows the usual three categories into which Philo's works have been divided—(1) about the writings of Moses, (2) philosophical writings, and (3) historical-apologetical writings—they are not clearly classified in this helpful way. The book has forty-three works of Philo plus two appendixes, a very helpful subject index, an index of the Old Testament Scriptures cited in Yonge's notes, and six maps. Appendix 1 is Philo's *Treatise Concerning the World* and Appendix 2 contains his *Fragments.*

Philo of Alexandria lived from ca. 20 B.C. to ca. 50 A.D., a contemporary of Jesus and Paul. A descendant of the sacerdotal tribe of Levi and an adherent of the Phariseean persuasion, he was, according to Josephus, the most eminent of his contemporaries. The importance of Philo comes mainly from his philosophical endeavors. He has been referred to as the "first of the Neo-Platonists," the school that attempted to reconcile the teachings of Greek philosophy,

particularly Platonism, with the revelation of the Bible. But Philo also engaged himself with Pythagorean, Stoicism and Eastern philosophies, the writings of Moses, and Judaism. Because of this he has been considered important for the study of Hellenistic philosophy and Hellenistic Judaism, for the understanding of the NT and the early church, and for the study of some of the early church fathers, particularly Clement of Alexandria (ca. A.D. 160-215) and Origen (ca. A.D. 185-251).

In Philo's works about the writings of Moses, two subjects seem to be of the highest importance—the decalogue and circumcision. The Ten Commandments he calls "heads of laws" (*Decalogue*, 6.19, p. 519). First he gives four reasons why the Decalogue was given in the desert: to avoid the pride of the cities, to provide for the cleansing and purification of the soul as preparation to receive the laws, to give the laws prior to the formation of the nation that they were to govern, and to implant a conviction in the mind that these laws came from God. Then he develops a philosophical description of the excellencies of the Decalogue, and finally, follows Moses' writings with personal explanations stressing the fact that "it was the Father of the universe who delivered these ten maxims" (*Decalogue* 9.32, p. 520). About the fourth commandment Philo says that human beings must follow God's example. He completed (created) the world in six days and rested on the seventh day. Humanity must apply itself to work six days, but the seventh day should be for philosophizing, for contemplating the things of nature, for scrutinizing the things done during the six days, and for the thinking that in all circumstances contributes to happiness (*Decalogue* 20.96, pp. 526-527).

The Works of Philo should be in the library of every seminary and in the hands of all those who are interested in New Testament studies, Jewish studies, and philosophical studies. This one volume provides the opportunity of reading entire books of Philo to appreciate his incisive logic, to catch his clear way of thinking, to observe his persistent effort to harmonize Jewish thinking with Greek philosophy, and to understand the mindset of Alexandrian Jews (who composed about half their city's population) during the time when Jesus lived and worked in Palestine.

Silver Spring, MD 20904 MARIO VELOSO

Carson, D. A. *The Cross and Christian Ministry: An Exposition of Passages from 1 Corinthians.* Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1993. 137 pp. $9.99.

Carson shows that the cross is not only central to salvation, but also to ministry, as set forth by Paul.

Charlesworth, James H. *The Dead Sea Scrolls: Hebrew, Aramaic, and Greek Texts with English Translations.* Vol. 1, *Rule of the Community and Related Documents.* Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck); and Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1994. 185 pp. $75 to those who subscribe to the 10-volume series; $99 to nonsubscribers.

The Princeton Theological Seminary Dead Sea Scrolls Project (which began in 1985 and published the *Graphic Concordance to the Dead Sea Scrolls* in 1991) was established to publish "texts, translations, and introductions to all the Dead Sea Scrolls that are not copies of books in *Biblia Hebraica*" (xi). The list of contributors includes 45 scholars; vols. 2-10 are forthcoming.

Clendenden, E. Ray, gen. ed. *The New American Commentary.* Nashville: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1993. Vol. 10, *Ezra, Nehemiah, Esther*, by Mervin Breneman, 383 pp.; vol. 14, *Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs*, by Duane A. Garrett, 447 pp.; vol. 16, *Jeremiah, Lamentations*, by F. B. Huey, Jr.; 512 pp. $27.99 each.

Three more volumes in a commentary that "honors the Scriptures, represents the finest in contemporary evangelical scholarship, and lends itself to the practical work of preaching and teaching." The NIV is printed in the text but the commentary is based on the Heb.

Golka, Friedmann W. *The Leopard's Spots: Biblical and African Wisdom in Proverbs.* Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1993. 150 pp. Cloth, $34.95.

Golka, a student of Claus Westermann at Heidelberg, argues from analogy to African proverbs that biblical proverbs belong to the genre of "indigenous folk proverbs," not to that of literary works of art. Hundreds of African proverbs are cited.

Howard, David M., Jr. *An Introduction to the Old Testament Historical Books.* Chicago: Moody Press, 1993. 394 pp. $21.99.

A major section on historical narrative is followed by a conservative introduction to each of the OT historical books. An extensive bibliography closes the book.

Hunt, Josh. *Let It Grow! Changing to Multi-Congregation Churches.* Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1993. 199 pp. $10.99.

Hunt presents a carefully thought out, well-documented guidebook for developing many groups and congregations within one church, thus leading to greater participation and growth.

Lederach, Paul M. *Daniel.* Believer's Church Bible Commentary. Scottdale, PA: Herald Press, 1994. 304 pp. $17.95.

The BCBC series is a joint effort of six Mennonite and Brethren denominations. Paul M. Lederach is a Mennonite pastor and teacher.

McKinney, William, ed. *The Responsibility People: Eighteen Senior Leaders of Protestant Churches and National Ecumenical Agencies Reflect on Church Leadership.* Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1994. xi + 377 pp. Paper, $24.99.

This book features Hartford Seminary interviews with 18 senior Protestant leaders and their honest and often self-critical reflections on American church life in the post-war period.

Richards, Lawrence O. *The Victor Bible Background Commentary: New Testament.* Wheaton, IL: Victor Books, 1994. 635 pp. $27.99.

With information on historical, archaeological, and cultural background—as well as data on key terms and phrases, and the interpretation of passages, this volume is intended to enrich biblical teaching and preaching.

Rotelle, John E. ed. *The Complete Works of St. Augustine.* Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1993-. 43 vols., many forthcoming. 1-800-462-5980.

For the first time, all of Augustine's surviving works will be available in English. When finished, the series will include 23 volumes of his books, 3 volumes of his letters, and 17 volumes of his sermons, homilies, and expositions of the Psalms.

Stubblefield, Jerry M. *The Effective Minister of Education: A Comprehensive Handbook.* Nashville: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1993. 253 pp. $17.99.

Stubblefield carefully discusses the calling, qualifications, roles, responsibilities, relationships, and rewards of the minister of education. Chapter endnotes provide further bibliography.

Thistlewaite, Susan B., and George F. Cairns. *Beyond Theological Tourism: Mentoring as a Grassroots Approach to Theological Education.* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1994. viii + 174 pp. $19.95.

A group of Chicago-based theological teacher-mentors and their students develop a pattern for pastoral formation by participation in ministries to marginalized people in North America, including ethnic minorities, recent immigrants, persons in prostitution, and the homeless.

Wiseman, Donald J. *1 & 2 Kings: An Introduction and Commentary.* Tyndale Old Testament Commentaries. Leicester, England; Downers Grove, IL: Inter-Varsity Press, 1993. 318 pp. Cloth, $17.99; Paper, $11.99.

D. J. Wiseman, Emeritus Professor of Assyriology, University of London, is also the general editor for the TOTC, which are based on the NIV. The volume includes 45 pp. of introduction and "additional notes" on high places, wisdom, the man of God, Jehoshaphat's reforms, and Hazael.

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW AND ARAMAIC

CONSONANTS

א = ʾ	ה = h	ט = ṭ	מ = m	פ = p	שׁ = š
ב = b	ו = w	י = y	נ = n	צ = ṣ	שׂ = ś
ג = g	ז = z	כ = k	ס = s	ק = q	ת = t
ד = d	ח = ḥ	ל = l	ע = ʿ	ר = r	

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

◌ַ = a	◌ֶ = e	◌ֵ ◌ֶי = ê	◌ֹ = ō	◌ֹו = ô
◌ָ = ā	◌ֵ = ē	◌ִ = i	◌ָו = o	◌וּ = û
◌ַ = a	◌ְ (vocal shewa) = e	◌ִי = î	◌ָו = o	◌ֻ = u

No distinction is made between soft and hard begad-kepat letters; dāgēš forte is indicated by doubling the consonant.

ABBREVIATIONS OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

AASOR	*Annual Amer. Sch. Or. Res.*	*CH*	*Church History*
AB	Anchor Bible	*CHR*	*Catholic Historical Review*
ABD	*Anchor Bible Dictionary*	*CIG*	*Corpus inscriptionum graecarum*
AcOr	*Acta orientalia*	*CIJ*	*Corpus inscriptionum iudaicarum*
ADAJ	*Annual Dept. Ant. Jordan*	*CIL*	*Corpus inscriptionum latinarum*
AHR	*American Historical Review*	*CIS*	*Corpus inscriptionum semiticarum*
AJA	*American Journal of Archaeology*	*CJT*	*Canadian Journal of Theology*
AJT	*American Journal of Theology*	*CQ*	*Church Quarterly*
ANEP	*Anc. Near East in Pictures*	*CQR*	*Church Quarterly Review*
ANET	*Ancient Near Eastern Texts*	*CT*	*Christianity Today*
ANF	The Ante-Nicene Fathers	*CTJ*	*Calvin Theological Journal*
AnOr	Analecta orientalia	*CTM*	*Concordia Theological Monthly*
ANRW	*Auf. und Nieder. der römischen Welt*	*CurTM*	*Currents in Theol. and Mission*
ARG	*Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte*	*DOTT*	*Doc. from OT Times*, Thomas, ed.
ATR	*Anglican Theological Review*	*EDNT*	*Exegetical Dict. of the NT*
AusBR	*Australian Biblical Review*	*EKL*	*Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon*
AUSS	*Andrews University Seminary Studies*	*EncIs*	*Encyclopedia of Islam*
BA	*Biblical Archaeologist*	*EncJud*	*Encyclopedia Judaica*
BAR	*Biblical Archaeology Review*	*ER*	*Ecumenical Review*
BASOR	*Bulletin Amer. Sch. Oriental Research*	*EvQ*	*Evangelical Quarterly*
BCSR	*Bull. Council on the Study of Religion*	*EvT*	*Evangelische Theologie*
BHS	*Biblia hebraica stuttgartensia*	*ExpTim*	*Expository Times*
Bib	*Biblica*	*GRBS*	*Greek, Roman, and Byz. Studies*
BibB	Biblische Beiträge	*GTJ*	*Grace Theological Journal*
BIES	*Bulletin of the Israel Expl. Society*	*HeyJ*	*Heythrop Journal*
BJRL	*Bulletin, John Rylands University*	*HR*	*History of Religions*
BK	*Bibel und Kirche*	*HTR*	*Harvard Theological Review*
BKAT	Bibl. Kommentar: Altes Testament	*HUCA*	*Hebrew Union College Annual*
BO	*Bibliotheca orientalis*	*IB*	*Interpreter's Bible*
BR	*Biblical Research*	ICC	International Critical Commentary
BSac	*Bibliotheca Sacra*	*IDB*	*Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible*
BT	*The Bible Translator*	*IEJ*	*Israel Exploration Journal*
BTB	*Biblical Theology Bulletin*	*Int*	*Interpretation*
BZ	*Biblische Zeitschrift*	*ISBE*	*International Standard Bible Dict.*
BZAW	Beihefte zur *ZAW*	*JAAR*	*Journ. American Academy of Religion*
BZNW	Beihefte zur *ZNW*	*JAOS*	*Journ. of the Amer. Or. Society*
CAD	*Chicago Assyrian Dictionary*	*JAS*	*Journ. of Asian Studies*
CBQ	*Catholic Biblical Quarterly*	*JBL*	*Journal of Biblical Literature*

Abbreviations (cont.)

JBR	*Journal of Bible and Religion*
JCS	*Journal of Cuneiform Studies*
JEA	*Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*
JETS	*Journal of the Evangel. Theol. Soc.*
JEH	*Journal of Ecclesiastical History*
JES	*Journal of Ecumenical Studies*
JJS	*Journal of Jewish Studies*
JMeH	*Journal of Medieval History*
JMES	*Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*
JMH	*Journal of Modern History*
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JPOS	*Journal of Palest. Orient. Soc.*
JQR	*Jewish Quarterly Review*
JR	*Journal of Religion*
JRAS	*Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*
JRE	*Journal of Religious Ethics*
JRelS	*Journal of Religious Studies*
JSNT	*Journal for the Study of the NT*
JRH	*Journal of Religious History*
JRT	*Journal of Religions Thought*
JSJ	*Journal for the Study of Judaism*
JSOT	*Journal for the Study of the OT*
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies*
JSSR	*Journal for the Scien. Study of Religion*
JTC	*Journal for Theol. and Church*
JTS	*Journal of Theological Studies*
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LW	Luther's Works, American Ed.
LQ	*Lutheran Quarterly*
MQR	*Mennonite Quarterly Review*
Neot	*Neotestamentica*
NHS	Nag Hammadi Studies
NICNT	New Internl. Commentary, NT
NICOT	New Internl. Commentary, OT
NIDNTT	*New Inter. Dict. of NT Theol.*
NIGTC	New Internl. Greek Test. Comm.
NKZ	*Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*
NovT	*Novum Testamentum*
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
NRT	*La nouvelle revue théologique*
NTA	*New Testament Abstracts*
NTAp	*NT Apocrypha,* Schneemelcher
NTS	*New Testament Studies*
ODCC	*Oxford Dict. of Christian Church*
OLZ	*Orientalische Literaturzeitung*
Or	*Orientalia* (Rome)
OrChr	*Oriens christianus*
OTP	*OT Pseudepigrapha,* Charlesworth
OTS	Oudtestamentische Studien
PEQ	*Palestine Exploration Quarterly*
PG	*Patrologia Graeca,* Migne
PL	*Patrologia Latina,* Migne
PW	Pauly-Wissowa, *Real Encyclopädie*
QDAP	*Quart. Dept. of Ant. in Palestine*
RA	*Revue d'assyriologie et d'arch.*
RAC	*Reallexikon für Antike und Chr.*
RB	*Revue biblique*
RechSR	*Recherches de science religieuse*
REg	*Revue d'égyptologie*
RelS	*Religious Studies*
RelSoc	*Religion and Society*
RelSRev	*Religious Studies Review*
RevExp	*Review and Expositor*
RevQ	*Revue de Qumran*
RevScRel	*Revue des sciences religieuses*
RevSém	*Revue sémitique*
RHE	*Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*
RHPR	*Revue d'hist. et de phil. religieuses*
RHR	*Revue de l'histoire des religions*
RL	*Religion in Life*
RLA	*Reallexikon der Assyriologie*
RR	*Review of Religion*
RRR	*Review of Religious Research*
RSPT	*Revue des sc. phil. et théol.*
RTP	*Revue de théol. et de phil.*
SA	*Sociological Analysis*
SB	Sources bibliques
SBLDS	SBL Dissertation Series
SBLMS	SBL Monograph Series
SBLSBS	SBL Sources for Biblical Study
SBLTT	SBL Texts and Translations
SBT	Studies in Biblical Theology
SCJ	*Sixteenth Century Journal*
SCR	*Studies in Comparative Religion*
Sem	*Semitica*
SJT	*Scottish Journal of Theology*
SMRT	*Studies in Med. and Ref. Thought*
SOr	Studia Orientalia
SPB	Studia Postbiblica
SSS	Semitic Studies Series
ST	*Studia Theologica*
TD	*Theology Digest*
TDNT	*Theol. Dict. of the NT*
TDOT	*Theol. Dict. of the OT*
TEH	*Theologische Existenz Heute*
TGl	*Theologie und Glaube*
TJ	*Trinity Journal*
TLZ	*Theologische Literaturzeitung*
TP	*Theologie und Philosophie*
TQ	*Theologische Quartalschrift*
TRev	*Theologische Revue*
TRu	*Theologische Rundschau*
TS	*Theological Studies*
TT	*Teologisk Tidsskrift*
TToday	*Theology Today*
TU	Texte und Untersuchungen
TWOT	*Theol. Wordbook of the OT*
TZ	*Theologische Zeitschrift*
UF	*Ugarit-Forschungen*
USQR	*Union Seminary Quarterly Review*
VC	*Vigiliae christianae*
VT	*Vetus Testamentum*
VTSup	Vetus Testamentum, Supplements
WA	Luther's Works, Weimarer Ausgabe
WBC	Word Biblical Commentary
WTJ	*Westminster Theological Journal*
ZA	*Zeitschrift für Assyriologie*
ZAW	*Zeitsch. für die alttest. Wissen.*
ZDMG	*Zeitsch. des deutsch. morgen. Gesell.*
ZDPV	*Zeitsch. des deutsch. Pal.-Vereins*
ZEE	*Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik*
ZHT	*Zeitsch. für historische Theologie*
ZKG	*Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte*
ZKT	*Zeitsch. für katholische Theologie*
ZMR	*Zeitsch. für Mission. und Religion.*
ZNW	*Zeitsch. für die neutest. Wissen.*
ZRGG	*Zeitsch. für Rel. u. Geistegeschichte*
ZST	*Zeitsch. für systematische Theologie*
ZTK	*Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*
ZWT	*Zeitschrift für wissen. Theologie*