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
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CONTENTS

<i>Allen, Sidney</i> , On Schedl's Attempt to Count the Days of Daniel	105
<i>Guy, Fritz</i> , Comments on a Recent Whiteheadian Doctrine of God	107
<i>Running, Leona G.</i> , An Investigation of the Syriac Version of Isaiah: III	135
<i>Shea, William H.</i> , The Sabbath in the Epistle of Barnabas . .	149
<i>Tuland, C. G.</i> , Josephus, <i>Antiquities</i> , Book XI	176
<i>Vaucher, Alfred-Félix</i> , The History of Conditionalism	193
<i>Vick, Edward W. H.</i> , John Wesley's Teaching Concerning Per- fection	201



ANDREWS UNIVERSITY, BERRIEN SPRINGS, MICHIGAN, USA

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SIEGFRIED H. HORN

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<i>Allen, Sidney</i> , On Schedl's Attempt to Count the Days of Daniel	105
<i>Guy, Fritz</i> , Comments on a Recent Whiteheadian Doctrine of God	107
<i>Horn, Siegfried H.</i> , Did Sennacherib Campaign Once or Twice Against Hezekiah?	I
<i>Read, W. E.</i> , Further Observations on <i>Ṣādaq</i>	29
<i>Running, Leona G.</i> , An Investigation of the Syriac Version of Isaiah: II, III	37, 135
<i>Shea, William H.</i> , The Sabbath in the Epistle of Barnabas	149
<i>Strand, Kenneth A.</i> , The Rise of the Monarchical Episcopate.	65
<i>Tuland, C. G.</i> , Josephus, <i>Antiquities</i> , Book XI	176
<i>Vaucher, Alfred-Félix</i> , The History of Conditionalism	193
<i>Vick, Edward W. H.</i> , John Wesley's Teaching Concerning Perfection	201
<i>Zurcher, Jean R.</i> , The Christian View of Man: III.	89

ON SCHEDL'S ATTEMPT
TO COUNT THE DAYS OF DANIEL

SYDNEY ALLEN

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Claus Schedl has recently published an attempt to correlate the 2300 evenings/mornings, the 1290 days, and the 1335 days of the book of Daniel with certain events during the times of Judas Maccabaeus.¹ He seems confident that he has succeeded where others have failed, "Ich habe nun Schaumberger's Daterungen zugrundegelegt und die danielschen Tage ausgezählt."² For the Chronology of the Maccabees his paper makes use of a recently discovered cuneiform tablet which contains information concerning the succession and regnal dates of several Seleucid kings.³

Schedl asserts that the 2300 mornings/evenings of Dan 8 : 14 extend from Dec. 6, 167 B.C., when Antiochus IV Epiphanes defiled the Jerusalem Temple, to Jan. 31, 163 B.C. This latter date was marked, according to Schedl, by the completion of a fortification around Jerusalem designed to prevent future desecrations. He does not, however, produce any evidence for the completion of the fortification on this precise date. Neither the two books of the Maccabees nor Josephus, practically our only sources for the Jewish history of this period, give such a date. This terminal point is therefore speculative. One wonders whether the two months between the consecration of the Temple (Dec. 4, 164 B.C.) and its fortification would be sufficient time to complete such a large task.

¹ Claus Schedl, "Mystische Arithmetik oder geschichtliche Zahlen?," *BZ*, VIII (1964), 101-105.

² *Ibid*, p. 102. The reference to J. Schaumberger's work is "Die neue Seleukidon-Liste BM 35603 und die Makkabäische Chronologie," *Bib*, XXXVI (1955), 423-435.

³ A. J. Sachs and D. J. Wiseman, "A Babylonian King List of the Hellenistic Period," *Iraq*, XVI (1954), 202-211.

Schedl believes that the 1290 days of Dan 12 : 4 extend also from the desecration of the Temple by Antiochus IV on Dec. 6, 167 B.C. to June 19, 163. This latter date marked the beginning of the Feast of Weeks in that year. 2 Maccabees 12 : 31 says that Judas' triumphal homecoming occurred as the Feast of Weeks approached. But what occurrence does Dan 12 : 11 say would take place at the end of the 1290 days? It says that the abomination of desolation would then be formed. The terminal date in Schedl's interpretation of Dan 12 : 4 is not only inexact (since the interval between Judas' homecoming and the beginning of the Feast of Weeks is not known), but it is also irrelevant, since it is difficult to see how that triumphant return could constitute the forming of an abomination of desolation.

The 1335 days of Dan 12 : 12, 13 are said by Schedl to reach back from the day of Nicanor's death (March 27, 160 B.C.) to July 31, 164 B.C., when Judas made his victorious march on Zion. There is, however, no evidence that Judas' march occurred precisely on July 31, 164 B.C., although it probably occurred on a day near to that date. Neither is it clear how either of these events fulfills Dan 12 : 12, 13.

Schedl makes other hypothetical assumptions which should be labeled as such. He presents them, however, as though they were far more certain than they are. For example, in order to make the 2300 evenings/mornings fit the formula of Dan 7 : 25 he mystifyingly asserts that a "part of a time" is one *quarter* of a lunar year. Why not a half or a third? In order to make the 1290 days fit the formula of Dan 12 : 7, he quite unaccountably adds one week to half a leap year. In order to make the 1335 days fit the formula he simply asserts that a "remnant" of time equals exactly 243 days. Schedl's calculations are partly based on sound information and should re-open the question he discusses. He has, however, left the problem of the precise historical significance of Daniel's numerical formulae about where he found it.

COMMENTS ON A RECENT
WHITEHEADIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD

FRITZ GUY

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Alfred North Whitehead offered to the twentieth century a metaphysical system purporting to transcend the impasse of materialism and idealism, synthesize the quantum- and wave-theories of the transmission of energy, establish a non-empirical basis for all geometry, and account for human freedom, cosmic evolution, and Einsteinian physics. The sheer virtuosity of such a performance is staggering; and it is hardly surprising that Whitehead includes in his system an explanation for God and his relationship to the world.

Nor is it surprising, in a generation that is not entirely satisfied with classical, liberal, or neo-Reformation ideas of God,¹ that there should be a serious attempt to use Whitehead's thought as a philosophical framework for a modern Christian understanding of deity. To this task John B. Cobb, Jr. implicitly committed himself in 1962,² and *A Christian Natural Theology*³ is the first major result of his constructive effort. The present article offers a brief, highly condensed summary of Whitehead's idea of God, a short exposition of Cobb's develop-

¹ This dissatisfaction is most clearly seen in the so-called "God is dead" emphasis of several younger American theologians—notably Paul Van Buren, Thomas J. J. Altizer, and William Hamilton—deriving from such sources as Bultmann, Bonhoeffer, and contemporary analytic philosophy. Hamilton has described this viewpoint in "The Death of God Theology," *The Christian Scholar*, XLVIII (1965), 27-48. Cf. statements by Van Buren, Altizer, and Hamilton in the series "How I Am Making Up My Mind," CC, LXXXII (1965), 428-30, 864-67, 1219-22.

² Cf. his *Living Options in Protestant Theology: A Survey of Methods* (Philadelphia, 1962), pp. 14-15, 315-16.

³ *A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead* (Philadelphia, 1965).

ment and revision of this idea, and some critical comments on both method and result.

I

For Whitehead, philosophy is the ultimate generalization of relationships, including all relationships of all entities that can in any sense be said to exist. This means that if there is the entity "God," it too must come within the domain of metaphysical rationalization. The following paragraphs are based ⁴ on Whitehead's explication of his idea of God in *Science and the Modern World* (originally published in 1925), ⁵ *Religion in the Making* (1926), ⁶ *Process and Reality* (1929), ⁷ and *Adventures of Ideas* (1933), ⁸ with supplementary reference to *Modes of Thought* (1938). ⁹

The ultimate metaphysical principle in Whitehead's system is not God but "creativity" (PR 11); in the formal statement of the categorial scheme (PR 30-42) "God" does not appear at all, either specifically or by implication. Thus "God" is a

⁴ Whitehead's own vocabulary has been used wherever possible, with the first occurrence of each technical term enclosed in quotation marks. More detailed introduction to Whitehead's idea of God may be found in Cobb's summary in *A Christian Natural Theology*, pp. 135-75; Ivor Leclercq, *Whitehead's Metaphysics: An Introductory Exposition* (London, 1958), pp. 195-208; and William A. Christian, *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics* (New Haven, 1959), pp. 283-413. The basic interpretative statement is Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (Evanston, Ill., 1941), pp. 515-59.

⁵ Hereafter cited as "SMW." Page references are to the New American Library (Mentor) edition (New York, 1948).

⁶ Hereafter cited as "RM." Page references are to the World Publishing Co. (Meridian/Living Age) edition (Cleveland, 1960).

⁷ Hereafter cited as "PR." Page references are to the Harper Torchbooks (The Academy Library) edition (New York, 1960), and are identical to the Macmillan edition (New York, 1929).

⁸ Hereafter cited as "AI." Page references are to the New American Library (Mentor) edition (New York, 1955).

⁹ Hereafter cited as "MT." Page references are to the Capricorn edition (New York, 1958), and are identical to the Macmillan edition (New York, 1938).

derivative notion,¹⁰ a thoroughly comprehensible element (AI 171-72) in the philosophical explanation of the world as we know it.

By itself creativity is pure, abstract actuality, "without a character of its own" (PR 47). It is the function of God, as the "principle of concretion" (PR 374), to give form to actuality; that is, he¹¹ is the ultimate limitation of actualization in the sense that he determines "(i) the special logical relationships which all events conform to, (ii) the selection of relationships to which the events do conform, and (iii) the particularity which infects the course even within these general relationships of logic and causation" (SMW 160). In terms of directionality, the function of God is "to sustain the aim at vivid experience" (MT 128). But this is not determinism; rather, "the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom" (RM 88). Yet it is precisely these limitations that establish the difference between good and evil (SMW 161).

God is at once both the primordial qualification of actuality and its non-derivative, unconditioned actualization (RM 99; PR 48, 522). Since there is in the universe "only one genus of actual entities" (PR 168), God is, like all other beings, a "creature" and part of the world (PR 102), "a factor in the universe" (RM 71). Among the characteristics which God shares with other actual entities are these: the basic function of decision amid potentiality (PR 68); "dipolarity," which is the combination of "mental" (though not always conscious) and "physical"

¹⁰ Cf. Christian, "The Concept of God as a Derivative Notion," in *Process and Divinity: The Hartshorne Festschrift*, ed. William L. Reese and Eugene Freeman (La Salle, Ill., 1964), pp. 182-89.

¹¹ Whitehead regularly used the pronoun "he" in referring to God, but this was merely following convention and not an indication of "personality" in God (cf. RM 60-64) as in traditional Christian thought. Had Whitehead used a different proper noun to refer to God (such as "Eros," which occurs occasionally in AI), he would certainly have used "it" rather than "he" where such a pronoun was required. His reason for using "God" was that "the contemplation of our natures, as enjoining real feelings derived from the timeless source of all order, acquires that 'subjective form' of refreshment and companionship at which religions aim" (PR 47).

relationships with other entities (PR 54); a threefold nature, namely, "primordial," "consequent," and "superjective" (PR 134); transcendence over—that is, a certain freedom from the causal influence of—all other entities (PR 136, 339) in the sense of self-creation or self-causation (RM 99; PR 339); and a capacity to function as instruments of novelty for other entities (PR 529).

On the other hand, there is a certain uniqueness in God in terms of both nature and function. He alone is non-temporal (PR 73; RM 88) and transcends any finite cosmic epoch (PR 143; MT 128); he alone has no character "given" by the past (PR 134). He is further distinguished by the fact that he originates from the mental rather than the physical "pole" of his being (PR 54, 528); he is the ground of all mentality (PR 529) and the ultimate referent of truth (PR 19). He is characterized by the priority of permanence rather than flux in his nature, and unity rather than multiplicity (PR 529). To maintain an awareness of this singularity, Whitehead excludes God from the meaning of "actual occasions," a term which designates all other actual entities (PR 135).

God is related to the rest of the world through his primordial and consequent natures. The primordial nature is an abstraction, deficient in actuality (PR 50), but not therefore devoid of efficacy (PR 530). It is this aspect of God that functions as the principle of concretion (PR 374, 523); his primordial nature consists in conceptualizing and valuating all the "eternal objects" or categories of possibility in the universe (SMW 88, 99-100; PR 46, 70, 134, 382, 392) and then relating them to each "concurrent" (this term functions as a present-participial form of "concrete") occasion as its "subjective aim," that is, its ideal of actualization in harmony with its actual situation in the world (RM 91, 146-48; PR 134, 248, 343). In other words, it is the primordial nature of God that makes pure potentiality into real potentiality for an actual entity (PR 69-73). And it is by means of his primordial nature that God is immanent in the world as the ground of the relationship between physical and

mental "prehensions" (PR 78), the contacts between actualities by means of which one appropriates (and thus is affected by) another as a component of its own essence. Thus God is the "supreme Eros" (AI 201), the "eternal urge of desire" (PR 522) that guides the ongoing advance of novelty at every stage so that it moves toward the realization of the ultimate perfection which is his own ultimate satisfaction as the fulfillment of his own subjective aim (PR 134; AI 251, 274-76). This fulfillment constitutes God's superjective nature.

In this way the primordial nature of God is the ground of both novelty and order. Without his conceptualization and organization of eternal objects as possibilities for actualization, there would be no progress toward the deeper reality, the intensification of experience that is the goal of the creative process; for eternal objects apart from God are without influence, and without his structuring of the totality of eternal objects, novelty itself would result in sheer chaos in the universe (RM 151-53; PR 46, 73, 75, 161, 164, 248, 377, 523; MT 128). While the efficacy of the primordial nature does not eliminate the creative freedom of actual occasions, its envisagement of relationships is so complete that it is "not added to, or disturbed by" any actualization of creativity (RM 147).

Complementing the primordial nature of God is his consequent nature, which is (or results from) his own physical prehension of the actualities of the evolving universe (PR 134, 527, 530). In contrast to the primordial nature, the consequent nature of God is described as conscious, incomplete, conditioned, actual, and everlasting (PR 524). Having "prehended" the self-creating entities of the world into its own developing wholeness, the consequent nature of God is in turn prehended by new occasions, of whose world it is always a part. Thus God again (in addition to the "objectification" of his primordial nature for conceptual prehension by concrescent occasions) becomes a constitutive factor in the world,¹² and perishing

¹² Cf. Daniel Day Williams, "How Does God Act? An Essay in Whitehead's Metaphysics," in *Process and Divinity*, pp. 178-80.

occasions are granted the fulfillment of their yearning for immortality (PR 533). Moreover, God's everlasting consequent nature may be related to the human "soul" in such a way that the latter "may be freed from its complete dependence on bodily organization" (AI 209), since the mental poles of occasions are not subject to measurable time and space (AI 247). Finally, here God may be understood in terms of a tender care that nothing of value be lost, as well as in terms of wisdom, patience, and love for the world (PR 525, 527, 532). But the "power" of God is not anything like intervention; it is the worship he inspires (SMW 172).

It is clearly the primordial rather than the consequent nature of God that fundamentally distinguishes him from the rest of the world and involves him in the creative process. Although God may be described as "Creator" because of his objectification for actual occasions as the ground for advance into novelty, this designation has unfortunate and misleading connotations of priority, ultimacy, volition, sovereignty, omnipotence, and personality (PR 343-44, 520). These elements of the Semitic concept of God (RM 66) have remained in Christian thought and are mischievous theologically as well as philosophically (AI 171-74); on one hand they make God the source of evil (SMW 161) and on the other they put him beyond metaphysical conceptualization (RM 68). It is better therefore to say not that God is *before* all creation but that he is *with* all creation (PR 521), and to say not that he creates the world but that he saves it (PR 526). God and the world require each other; they are mutually interdependent (PR 528; AI 173).¹⁸

Whitehead insists that he is not, like Descartes and Leibniz, introducing God into his system as an emergency measure to save the metaphysical principles from collapse (PR 78, 219, 289), because for him God is not an exception to these princi-

¹⁸ Hartshorne, p. 521, offers this interpretative modification: "The world could... have been different from what it is, but some sort of world must have been 'there,' that is, must have been the content to the divine knower and the effect of the divine cause."

ples but rather their chief exemplification (PR 521). God is therefore intentionally secularized and rationalized (PR 515-16; AI 171-72). The rationalization is almost complete—but not quite: for *why* the relationships among the entities of the universe are what they are is a mystery of God's nature. No other reason can be given for them because that nature is the ground of rationality itself (SMW 160-61); they can only be discovered as they are. Finally, "the concept of 'God' is the way in which we understand this incredible fact—that what cannot be [namely, the correlation of opposites in actualization], yet is" (PR 531).

This then is Whitehead's God: a combination of creatureliness and primordality, dependence and transcendence, conceptualization and actualization, mentality and physicality, novelty and order, conditionedness and freedom, objectification and prehension, rationality and irrationality, abstraction and concrecence. It must be admitted that in some ways such a God seems more impressive as a Supreme Being than is the God of classical Christian theism.¹⁴

II

Cobb emphasizes that his intention in *A Christian Natural Theology* is not to diverge from Whitehead's own basic viewpoint, approach, and objective; rather he is attempting to understand God's being and relationships entirely in terms of the principles that characterize Whitehead's system¹⁵—a goal which, according to Cobb, Whitehead himself failed to achieve. The program of revision involves five points.

¹⁴ Cf. Hartshorne, p. 523.

¹⁵ In the dedication of his book to Hartshorne, Cobb acknowledges the importance of the latter's influence. Cf. the evaluation Cobb gives in " 'Perfection Exists': A Critique of Charles Hartshorne," *RL*, XXXII (1962-63), p. 302: "In my personal view Hartshorne's greatest achievement is not his brilliant revival of certain arguments for the existence of God but his development of a concept of God fully compatible with all that we know about the world, self-consistent within itself, and of profound religious significance."

(1) Cobb disagrees first with Whitehead's dichotomizing of God's nature,¹⁶ observing that "too often he deals with the two natures as if they were genuinely separable. Further, he frequently writes as though God were simply the addition of these two natures. Thus God's primordial nature performs certain functions and his consequent nature others" (p. 178). This systematic disjunction not only neglects the fundamental unity of God as an actual entity, but also involves a misunderstanding of the functions of the two natures in relation to the world,¹⁷ making it impossible to explain "how the eternally unchanging primordial nature of God can provide different initial aims to every occasion" (pp. 179-80).

Cobb would solve this problem by suggesting that God's own subjective aim at intensity of feeling involves (a) a propositional prehension concerning the satisfaction of each becoming occasion within its peculiar situation in the world, and (b) the actualization of himself in such a way that it maximizes the possibility of that satisfaction. The concrescent occasion then prehends this prehension, which in turn forms part of the initial phase of the occasion's own subjective aim. Thus the initial aim for the new occasion is included in its "initial data" and is not a distinct element as Whitehead describes it; and it comes from the totality of God's nature and not from the primordial nature only. Moreover, Cobb holds that the initial aim may derive in part from other (preceding) actual occasions which, like God, can have propositional prehensions concerning the satisfactions of the new occasion (although the role of God remains decisive). And Cobb also suggests that there are other prehensions of God quite similar to those involved in the provision of the initial aim. In short, the reception of the initial

¹⁶ It is characteristic of Whitehead's thought that in PR the primordial nature of God is discussed in almost complete separation from the consequent nature; the former is almost wholly missing from the final chapter, "God and the World," and the latter appears hardly anywhere else.

¹⁷ Williams, pp. 161-180, notes the need to emphasize the unity of God, but maintains a distinction in the functions of the two natures.

aim from God is not unlike an occasion's other prehensions of God or its prehensions of other entities.

(2) Another proposed revision concerns the relation of time and personness in God. Whitehead repeatedly refers to God as "an actual entity," but he also asserts that in distinction from all other entities God is non-temporal (that is, eternal) in regard to his primordial nature and everlasting (that is, cumulative of all elements of process without loss) in regard to his consequent nature. Cobb concludes that these latter assertions about God and time "compel us to assimilate God more closely to the conception of a living person than to that of *an* actual entity" (p. 188), so that he should be understood as "a succession of moments of experience with a special continuity" (p. 188; cf. pp. 71-79).

Now Whitehead recognizes two kinds of time: (a) time as transition between occasions, the time of the efficacy of causal sequence, or "physical time"; and (2) time within occasions, the non-divided time of internal process. If God is an actual entity, then his time is the latter kind and process in him is to be understood as the internal process of concrescence. But in that case the question of his efficacy in the world becomes acute; for efficacy is understood by Whitehead only in terms of succession; efficacy always means non-contemporaneity, and if God has no past he cannot be objectified for (that is, affect) the world. But Whitehead himself insists on the efficacy of God's consequent nature; and on the basis of the unity of God's nature (as Cobb argues) even the provision of the initial aim for each occasion involves efficacy. Furthermore, God's experience of his own satisfaction—an experience that comes at the completion of an entity—implies that as a continuing existent he is something other or at least more than *an* entity.¹⁸

So Cobb understands God as in important respects similar to what we know as personness. But this idea has its own problems, for in Whitehead's thought persons lack complete

¹⁸ Hartshorne, pp. 544-50, moves in the same direction.

self-identity through time and experience loss of what is past. Cobb therefore suggests that God "vividly and consciously remembers in every new occasion all the occasions of the past" (p. 191); since all the occasions of the past are included in his own past, he thus maintains his identity and loses nothing of value in spite of the real pastness of his past. Finally, the idea of God as a living person requires that his conceptualization of the totality of eternal objects be conceived as a succession of acts, just as Whitehead understands a succession of occasions in the single "experience" of looking at a picture for, say, a minute. God is thus a personal succession of unimaginably rapid occasions.¹⁹ Cobb maintains "that the chief reasons for insisting that God is *an* actual entity can be satisfied by the view that he is a living person, that this view makes the doctrine of God more coherent, and that no serious new difficulties are raised" (p. 192).

(3) Yet another problem is the relation of God to space. Although Whitehead does not attend specifically to this question, his system allows three possibilities: God may be local, or nonspatial, or omnispatial. Of these, the first is ruled out by the fact that God is related with equal immediacy to occasions everywhere in space. The second was probably the position tacitly assumed by Whitehead, thinking of God primarily in terms of his primordial nature and its conceptual prehension by actual occasions apart from spatial relations. In fact, his system admits the theoretical possibility that "physical experience may also be prehended apart from contiguity" (p. 194).

But the idea of God as nonspatial creates an essential difference between God and other actual entities, all of which have regional standpoints; and it is Cobb's aim to reduce such differences wherever possible. So he suggests that God

¹⁹ These must be rapid enough to enable God to discriminate between non-synchronous electronic occasions. In contrast, human personal occasions succeed each other at a rate of approximately 10 per second, according to Cobb.

too is spatial, and since his standpoint "could not be such as to favor one part of the universe over others, it must be all-inclusive" (p. 195). The only problem is the question of the possibility of the inclusion of the region of one occasion within the region of another. Having already argued in favor of this possibility in regard to the relationship of human experience to the brain (pp. 82-91), Cobb easily draws an analogous conclusion here. At the same time he recognizes that there is no real issue here except metaphysical consistency. If God is nonspatial, he is equally related to all regions and occasions, and it is *as if* he were omnispatial; thus it seems more logical to affirm that he *is* omnispatial.

(4) Next Cobb turns to the uniqueness of God's function in relating eternal objects to actual occasions, and here he sees another element of incoherence: Whitehead seems to introduce God in order to explain the efficacy of eternal objects in the concrescence of actual occasions, without relating this function to the other elements of the system or explaining it in terms of the system. The resulting problem is two-fold: "First, it seems that God renders eternal objects effective for actual occasions in a way *radically* different from that in which temporal occasions make them effective for each other. Second, God seems to envisage eternal objects in a way for which the conceptual prehensions of actual occasions provide no analogy" (p. 198).

The first part of the problem is partially resolved by Cobb's previous idea that the subjective aim of an occasion derives initially not only from God but also from past occasions which, like God, include propositional prehensions of novelty—that is, possibilities of actualization—for the new occasion. In other words, the uniqueness of God is not radical; he "envisages and orders *all* eternal objects, whereas temporal occasions can order only an infinitesimal selection of eternal objects" (p. 201). This argument brings us to the second part of the problem, for it suggests that, in principle, actual occasions canprehend eternal objects directly and that, as

is the case in regard to God, "their own decisions can be explanatory of the conceptual prehensions not derived from physical prehensions" (p. 202).²⁰ Cobb does not insist that this in fact happens, only that it is not categorically impossible. And again there remains a vast difference in degree; the point is simply that "a temporal occasion may have toward some eternal object the kind of relationship God has toward all" (p. 203). If this does happen, Cobb thinks that its occurrence may well be connected with the highly reflective consciousness of human occasions.

Thus Cobb would replace the formulation in *Process and Reality* of a unique relationship of God to eternal objects with Whitehead's earlier but presumably more adequate statement that "the forms belong no more to God than to any one occasion" (RM 157).

(5) Finally, Cobb offers a clarification of the role of God in creation. For Whitehead, God's creative function consists of contributing the initial phase of the subjective aim of each new occasion, thereby determining which preceding occasions it willprehend and how they will be objectified for it. Thus God in effect selects the causal factors in each occasion. But his responsibility is not absolute, for it is qualified by (a) the givenness of the situation, (b) the freedom of each occasion to adjust its own aim,²¹ (c) the presupposition of eternal objects which God does not create, and (d) the temporal and

²⁰ The two aspects of the problem seem more closely related than Cobb's separate discussion of them suggests. For the argument for the partial derivation of the subjective aim from preceding occasions presupposes the possibility in them of some genuine novelty not derived from God. Otherwise it is only a matter of the directness or indirectness of God's own provision of the subjective aim, a function that is not paralleled in any other actual entities; and if this is so, Cobb's whole point of increased coherence is lost.

²¹ How this might occur—that is, on what basis and according to what criteria a concrescent occasion might adjust itself—Whitehead does not explain. Presumably this is the Whiteheadian approach to the mystery of self-determination, which he does not limit to personal occasions but extends to all actual entities. This is ultimately the source of evil (cf. *infra*, section V).

ontological equiprimordiality of the world (or conversely, the absence of any original *creatio ex nihilo*). Thus God is not, in Whitehead's thought, the ultimate reason why there is anything at all instead of nothing.

It is the function of God to give efficacy to creativity, which is itself not an actual entity and does not "exist," and therefore cannot function as the "creator" of anything. On the other hand, however, creativity is not merely one of the totality of eternal objects; for eternal objects express pure possibilities indeterminate to any one occasion, and creativity is necessary if there is to be any occasion at all. Therefore creativity is neither abstract in the usual sense, nor actual or concrete. But, Cobb observes, it is still far from clear why there is anything, for the idea of creativity itself does not explain why creativity continues to be actualized: "It seems just as possible that it will simply stop, that there will be then just nothing. . . . If occasions ceased to occur, then there would be no creativity. Creativity can explain only *ex post facto*" (p. 211). The conclusion is that God is not only the limitation of the form of existence but also the "reason" (whatever that is) why anything exists, so that "God's role in creation is more radical and fundamental than Whitehead's language usually suggests" (pp. 211-12). Once more this is not intended as a departure from the essential Whitehead, but a closer adherence to his own definitions and principles in order to increase the coherence of the system as a whole. Like Whitehead, Cobb refuses to claim for God "either eminent reality or necessary existence" (p. 213);²² God is simply an infinite series of occasions, but since he exists he will continue to exist everlastingly because he aims to do so and has the power to do so.

In concluding his proposed clarification of Whitehead's doctrine of God, Cobb reiterates his contention that although the function of God is not radically different from that of

²² This of course reflects a refusal to follow Hartshorne's revival of the ontological argument for the existence of God.

other actual entities, it is decisive. Without him, neither creativity nor the past nor both together could provide a future. "God always (and some temporal occasions sometimes) is the reason *that* each new occasion becomes. God, past occasions, and the new occasion are conjointly the reason for *what* it becomes. Whatever it becomes, it will always, necessarily, be a new embodiment of creativity" (p. 214).

III

Cobb asks (p. 269) to be judged according to the soundness of his philosophy. In general he seems successful in raising significant questions by identifying important elements of incoherence in Whitehead's doctrine of God. But he seems somewhat less successful in providing answers in terms of acceptable alternative formulations.

Whitehead's dichotomized and mostly abstract God is clearly unsatisfactory. Although he insists that God is an actual entity, he generally ignores just those elements of his being (namely, his consequent nature) that are necessary for him to be *actual*. The fact that Whitehead finds it hardly necessary to mention the consequent nature of God at all until it appears as the subject of the final chapter of *Process and Reality* makes a certain feeling of incoherence inescapable.²³ Nor is the situation improved by Whitehead's reference to the peculiarly religious involvement of God's consequent nature (for example, the idea of God as love, patience, and companionship) at the end of an intentionally secularized system of metaphysics. If God is really to be understood as an actual entity, the system requires some such adjustment as Cobb offers. And his suggestions toward an understanding of the unity of God's nature and function are

²³ The greatest of several difficulties encountered by readers of PR lies in the fact that every argument seems to presuppose everything that follows it, so that the beginning is just as unintelligible without the end as the end is without the beginning. The notion of the consequent nature of God is a remarkable exemption from this circularity.

in harmony with the overall system, in which actual entities regularly function and are prehended as unities.

The crucial question which arises at this point is whether this unitary functioning of God implies a pastness in God parallel to the pastness of prehended actual occasions. In order to accommodate the fact that God influences the world (that is, is efficacious in the provision of the initial phase of the subjective aim of occasions by the objectification of his primordial nature, and in the influence of his consequent nature—or better, in Cobb's view, in both together), one must concur with Cobb's rejection of the view that God is *an* actual entity; and understanding God in some sort of analogy to "a living person" is an attractive suggestion, especially in the light of the Biblical picture of a "living God." But in the framework of Whiteheadian thought this idea is not as free of systematic difficulties as Cobb assumes.

What is a "person"? For Whitehead "an enduring person-ality" is "a route of occasions in which the successors with some completeness sum up their predecessors" (PR 531); Cobb applies this description to God, appropriately revising "some completeness" to "absolute completeness." But he neglects to seek for the *ground* of the route of occasions. In the temporal world, that ground is God, whose unitary primordial nature provides the initial aim for each occasion and thus furnishes order in successive occasions, in enduring objects, in living persons, and in the totality of the universe. As long as God is *an* actual entity there is no problem, for everything is held together by the unity of that one non-temporal, transepochal entity. If, however, God is not *an* entity but a series of ontologically discrete actualizations, the question of the ground of *his* unity becomes impossible to answer within the system.²⁴ Now Cobb is not unaware of this problem, but

²⁴ This weakness was first brought to my attention in conversation with Langdon Gilkey. Subsequent to the preparation of the present article, Gilkey has published an extensive review of *A Christian Natural Theology* in *ThT*, XXII (1965-66), 530-545, in which he takes

his proposed solution in terms of the completeness of God's prehension of his own past as well as all pastness of all occasions seems to fall short. For "‘life’ means novelty" (PR 159), and thus to say that God's total prehension of the past is the ground of his self-identity through time is of dubious meaning. And simply to affirm this self-identity and continuity is of course just the kind of arbitrariness that Cobb intends to avoid.

In view of the persuasiveness of Cobb's argument concerning the difference between the role of actual entities and role of God in Whitehead's system, not to mention the formidable set of distinctions indicated by Whitehead himself (cf. *supra*, p. 3), it would seem possible and perhaps more satisfactory to follow the master's lead in the direction opposite to that in which Cobb moves, and admit God as one of the categorial ultimates in the system, with no more need to assimilate him either to actual entities or to persons than there is to assimilate creativity to eternal objects. It is interesting that Cobb himself enumerates "the four ultimate elements" as "actual occasions, God, eternal objects, and creativity" (p. 177). He rightly objects to "arbitrary disconnection," but the disconnection here seems more essential than arbitrary. Of course the disconnection need not be absolute; there is no reason why these ultimate elements may not show some similarities to each other such as Cobb notes between creativity and eternal objects. Thus the important emphasis Cobb gives to the fundamental unity of God and his relationships to the world need not be lost.

On the other hand, if God is affirmed as a fourth ultimate rather than an entity within the category of actual entities, some of Cobb's arguments seem unnecessary or at least unimportant. In the first place, the incentive for maintaining the omnispatiality of God is considerably weakened. Since creativity and eternal objects are nonspatial, there seems no issue with Cobb on some of the problems mentioned here in sections III-V.

intrinsic reason to favor the notion of God's spatiality (and hence omnispatiality) just because of the spatiality of actual entities. As Cobb recognizes, the question makes no difference for the actualization of any occasion, and may therefore be argued on other grounds (if any) or left open. In the second place, if God is in a category separate from actual entities, there is no essential reason to argue for the capacity of actual occasions either to have propositional prehensions of novelty for subsequent occasions or to prehend eternal objects directly; God can hold this capacity uniquely. Of course, if Cobb is in fact correct in his affirmation of this capacity for all actual entities, his denial of the eminent reality and necessary being of God is readily understandable; but in that case it would be difficult to see on what ground he also affirms the "radical decisiveness" of God's role in creation.

A final reason for taking a path opposite from Cobb's assimilation of God to actual entities is the very cogency of his argument for giving God a more fundamental role in creation than does Whitehead. He demonstrates convincingly that pure creativity is even less adequate an explanation for the existence of actualities than was Aristotle's "prime matter," and that God "must be conceived as being the reason that entities occur at all as well as determining the limits within which they can achieve their own forms" (p. 211). But if God is in some sense the ground of being of actual entities (in precisely *what* sense, he does not spell out), it is surely creating confusion to understand God either as an actual entity or as a series of actual entities with a special continuity. Cobb's revision of Whitehead thus seems to be moving in two different directions. In contrast, a redefinition of God in the context of an ultimate quaternity of elements (Creativity, Creative Forms, Creator, and Creature, each presupposing the other three), while attributing to God a reality and necessity denied by both Whitehead and Cobb, would nevertheless avoid the problems that Cobb has encountered in his development of a Whiteheadian view of God.

But incorporating into Whiteheadian thought the idea of God as *sui generis* is perhaps impossible. At least it would raise for the Whiteheadians the same perplexing question that has harassed Christian theology for centuries and has been sharply reemphasized by the impact of analytic philosophy: on what basis is any language about God meaningful? If God cannot be understood in terms of the category of actual entities, can he be understood at all? Or must he remain essentially an unknown quantity? While Christian theology might be willing to live permanently with these questions, Whiteheadian metaphysics can hardly do so; for the whole thrust of its doctrine of God has been toward complete intelligibility. Therefore, although Whitehead's own view (God as *an* actual entity) is quite unacceptable, both Cobb's alternative (God as a "living person") and the one suggested here (God as categorially unique) seem to engender more difficulties for Whiteheadian thought than they resolve.

IV

Another and no less crucial problem in *A Christian Natural Theology* concerns methodology. Now there is a certain irony in suggesting that methodology is a problem for John Cobb; for he is acutely aware, and has done much to make others aware, of the place of method in the understanding and evaluation of theological systems. His *Living Options in Protestant Theology* is aptly subtitled "A Survey of Methods," and he has concluded the presentation of his own philosophical theology with a 32-page explanation of the way in which the theological task in general and philosophical theology in particular should be undertaken. And he has said the right things. He has noted the similarities as well as the differences between theology and philosophy, and he has pointed out that philosophical theology overlaps both of these disciplines while being identical with neither. Therefore "natural theology" is not the old and hopeless endeavor to ground Christian thought on neutral, universally acknowledged rational

principles; it is rather the systematic explication of the presuppositions of Christian thought—presuppositions which are inevitably subject to critical evaluation from non-theological viewpoints, that is, in the context of more general reflection. Cobb establishes the necessity of this kind of enterprise by showing that if it is not taken seriously the result is not *no* natural theology but an unconscious, uncriticized—and therefore probably poor and possibly alien—natural theology, with the consequence that the whole theological structure is weakened. He cites Augustine and Thomas Aquinas as classical examples of natural theology in its most practical form: the adaptation and development of an available philosophy so that it can serve as a “Christian natural theology.” Cobb intends his own work on Whitehead to be a similar endeavor.

He explains why he has chosen Whitehead’s philosophy to revise and use as a framework for Christian theology: (a) it is intrinsically excellent as a philosophical system; (b) its vision of reality is compatible with that of the Christian faith; and (c) it corresponds with his own fundamental vision of reality. Now about (a) there is no argument, and about (c) Cobb himself is the only competent judge. But it seems strange that (b) is so quickly assumed—and on the curiously inadequate basis that Whitehead’s own environment was culturally influenced by Christianity (in a way the environment of Aristotle or even Plotinus was not). Since the compatibility of Whitehead’s philosophy and Christian faith is widely disputed, it would seem that Cobb should endeavor to demonstrate its reality.²⁵

Cobb’s inattention to this problem is reflected also in his neglect of an essential difference between the theological enterprise of Augustine and Thomas (as he himself describes it)

²⁵ A short step in this direction is taken by Norman Pittenger, “A Contemporary Trend in North American Theology: Process-Thought and Christian Faith,” *RL*, XXXIV (1964-65), 502-03. But this necessarily brief statement is hardly convincing.

and his own endeavor. For them the objective was to adapt philosophical categories for the elucidation of a Christian theological perspective; for him the objective is quite different (p. 269):

At no point... have I intended to replace philosophical argument by dogmatic assertion or to distort Whitehead so as to render him more amenable to Christian use. My attempt has been to make the philosophical doctrines conform to the philosophical norms... A Christian natural theology must not be a hybrid of philosophy and Christian convictions. It must be philosophically responsible throughout.

It is remarkable that Cobb apparently fails to recognize how different his stance is from that of Augustine and Thomas; his allegiance to Whitehead's philosophical principles is in sharp contrast to their willingness to "distort" the philosophical systems they adopted in order to make them "more amenable to Christian use."

I am not here contending that Cobb's enterprise is wrong-headed; the point is that to label it "Christian natural theology" and to imply a parallel to the work of Augustine and Thomas is an unfortunate source of confusion if his principal interest is philosophical—and this seems certainly the case. Nor is the confusion eliminated by reference to his singularly broad definition of theology as "any coherent statement about matters of ultimate concern that recognizes that the perspective by which it is governed is received from a community of faith" (p. 252). This definition merely re-introduces the question of the immediate identification of Whiteheadian philosophy, which is clearly "the perspective by which [Cobb's "Christian natural theology"] is governed," as the perspective which can be reasonably understood to be "received from a [Christian] community of faith."

If Cobb is in fact writing "Christian natural theology," his work is subject to *two* sets of critical criteria; this is the price that is always required of those who would carry on an interdisciplinary project. To the extent that natural theology is philosophical, he is correct to observe that it must be judged

qua philosophical, and not hopefully received just because of its Christian convictions. But to the extent that natural theology is theological and Christian, there ought to be an equal openness to criticism in these terms. Yet this latter element is missing; why? Perhaps because of an epistemological assumption that quite naturally accompanies Whiteheadian philosophy: the susceptibility of all truth, including theological truth, to metaphysical rationalization. In other words, there is here an undiscussed question of theological authority which, so long as it remains undiscussed, is just as subversive of sound theology as is the undiscussed ontological assumptions against which Cobb properly warns.

It is instructive to recall that whenever philosophical categories have become, intentionally or by default, authoritative in a system of Christian theology (as in Gnosticism and Deism), the system has become heretical. This is the historical part of the reason why some theologians have been so skeptical of any kind of philosophical theology that they have (unfortunately) denied its usefulness altogether.

Just as theological affirmations are never completely neutral ontologically, so metaphysical systems are never completely neutral theologically. Therefore any philosophy not consciously constructed in terms of specifically Christian thought—and no important philosophy has been originally constructed in this way—will probably carry implications that are hostile to Christian theology. So long as Cobb intends to write Christian theology he ought to recognize that the “community of faith” provides not only its context but also, in an important sense, the criteria for its validity—in the form of scripture or tradition or present experience or some combination of these. Where the implications of these criteria conflict with his philosophical conclusions, he has only two theologically sound options: he can either subordinate the philosophical interests to the theological, or he can learn to live with the tension between them. To ignore the necessity of rigorous criticism in the light of theological norms, as he

has apparently done, is to create a "natural theology" that is not genuine theology at all, and may well go the way—ultimately—of Gnosticism and Deism. As it stands, his work might more appropriately be called *A Whiteheadian Philosophy of Religion*.²⁶

V

Although it has just been suggested that Cobb's presentation is incomplete as it stands, it may be assumed that a fuller discussion in the future will tend to clarify rather than modify the conception of God he has expressed. The following paragraphs are therefore intended as a brief discussion of this conception when considered from the context of Christian theology.²⁷ That is to say, I am here attempting to indicate the kind of questions that Cobb needs to examine very thoroughly if his doctrine of God is to be received (in spite of the methodological impediments) as theologically acceptable.²⁸

(1) A basic question is whether or not Christian theology can accommodate a metaphysical rationalization of God.

²⁶ It is possible that the two issues raised in this section—the assumption of the fundamental compatibility of Whiteheadian philosophy and Christian theology, and the neglect of theological norms as valid criteria for philosophical theology—were intentionally excluded from the initial presentation of *A Christian Natural Theology*. Thus the present complaint may be merely a reflection of unwarranted irritation over (a) a misjudgment of the book's objective, resulting from a literalistic reading of its title and an accompanying failure to take the subtitle seriously enough, and/or (b) the fact that Cobb did not write the book that this reader wanted and expected him to write. But he does imply (p. 252) that he has now said what he believes needs to be said on the subject, and that his future writing is likely to move to other areas, such as Christology and soteriology (p. 12).

²⁷ "Christian theology" may be defined, for the purposes of this discussion, as the central understanding of God, man, and the world shared generally by classical, Reformation, and (to a lesser extent) contemporary Christian thought.

²⁸ Christian, *An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, pp. 382-413, shows an awareness of the importance of this task, although he himself does not really attempt it.

Here the divergence seems radical in both meanings of the word—degree and depth. For Christian thought has always maintained, even in its most rationalistic forms, a final incomprehensibility as part of its basic understanding of deity. There is, to be sure, much less conflict between Whiteheadian thought and popular piety, which has always tended to forget that it knows God only by means of symbols, and that the symbols are necessarily anthropomorphic. And it is also to be noted that neither the Whiteheadian God nor the popular Christian God is *wholly* open to human understanding: the reasons why things are what they are, and happen as they do, are veiled in the mystery of the divine nature. Nevertheless the general “feeling” about God is that he is rational and regular.

But theology is not so easily satisfied as is popular piety, especially in regard to the assumption of regularity (which is the ground of rationality)—the assumption that all things are what they are because that is what they must be. Thus theology denies what piety tends to accept, namely, the idea of “God . . . in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground” (PR 529). Theology insists that God’s aseity (or, as Whitehead liked to put it, the fact that God is *causa sui*) means that he is transcendent not only in the Whiteheadian sense of the freedom of self-creativity but also in the sense of freedom from all other entities and principles—rational, metaphysical, or whatever—encompassed by human thought. Whitehead himself points in this direction when he identifies God as the ground of rationality; yet he does not really mean ultimate ground, but only proximate ground.

This problem has afflicted most philosophers’ Gods, who are what the various metaphysical systems let them be and cannot be anything else. But in such cases “God” seems an inappropriate word, for what the philosophers too often describe seems more like a cosmic functionary, obediently performing his duties. The idea of a “rationalized God” is simply a more sophisticated formulation of the self-contra-

dictory notion of a "conditioned God." The question is whether a meaningful concept of God requires—or, on the other hand, allows—his nature and function to be conditioned by the rational categories of a fully consistent ontology.²⁹ Again, it is not the point of this article to show that the Whiteheadian assumption ought not to be made; the point is that the question of a "rationalized God" involves a fundamental vision of reality, and that here Whiteheadian metaphysics and Christian theology do not seem compatible. The latter insists that ontology is an expression of God's nature and/or being; the former insists that God is an instance of metaphysical principles. The question is: is God within the system or outside it? Can philosophy include God or only point to him?

(2) Besides the formal question of the relation of God to the philosophical system, there is also the material question of the relation of God to cosmic process itself, that is, the relation of God to the world by means of creation. Cobb takes two important steps toward the theological affirmation of God

²⁹ It may be objected that this whole argument is based on a confusion of the order of being with the order of knowing, and that neither Whitehead nor Cobb nor any other metaphysician is really "imprisoning God within a metaphysical system" as is here implied, but that each is describing ultimate reality on the basis of the evidence he encounters. In other words, just as the statement, "I see a green patch; therefore there is grass beneath my window," does not mean that the patch of green I see is the ontological cause of the grass, but only the ground of my knowing that the grass is there, so also the statement, "I see an orderly world; therefore God functions within a metaphysical order," does not mean that what I see (and subsequently formulate logically into a metaphysical system) is the cause of ultimate reality but only the ground of my knowing what ultimate reality is like. But both statements presuppose (a) the comprehensibility of that to which the evidence points (for example, grass *qua* grass is knowable), and (b) an ontological correspondence between the evidence itself and that reality to which it points (grass is in fact green). In the case of the grass, these presuppositions may be verified to the point of practical certainty; in the case of ultimate reality, they remain fundamental assumptions upon which the Whiteheadian and other philosophical concepts of God rest.

as Creator. First, by emphasizing the unity of the primordial and consequent natures of God he makes possible an understanding of causal efficacy in a way that Whitehead did not clearly establish: God's role in creation becomes "actual" or "concrete." Secondly, Cobb makes God the reason for the existence of anything as well as the primary factor in its particular form. But he is still far from affirming God as a Creator who creates *ex nihilo*, for not only do creativity and eternal objects (which are not actual entities) remain equiprimordial with God, but so does the world. To use a clumsy metaphor: God pushes the button that lets creativity flow into actual entities, and at the same time regulates the amperage, voltage, and alternation of the current; but he is not the source of the current. God is an element in the process, indeed its supreme element; but he is not its ground.

The subordination of God to process brings other, derivative difficulties. In the first place, it effectively removes God from the definition of evil, and so empties that concept of theological meaning. As a corollary to the argument that if God is "the foundation of the metaphysical system with its ultimate activity" he must be the source of evil, Whitehead says that "it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from the Evil" (SMW 161). Although Whitehead does not elaborate his meaning, it can have no connection with any kind of divine "will," for God is not to be understood in terms of volition. Presumably the idea is that the initial aim which God supplies to every occasion is the Good, since it derives from God's subjective aim for his own satisfaction and is thus a part of the creative advance that is the goal of eternal process. A creative decision in each concrescent occasion can adjust this initial aim in the light of (a) aims inherited from other occasions and (b) its own immediate prehension of eternal objects (these two are Cobb's suggestions), as well as (c) its own "subjective form" or "effective feeling"; but this hardly corresponds to the Christian idea of radical disobedience, rebellion, or sin. In the Whiteheadian system

evil is incoherence, a conflict of cross-purposes; and in the nature of things it "promotes its own elimination" (RM 94). It is not by oversight that Cobb omits the idea of evil from his chapter on the nature of religion; there is no real connection between the two ideas.³⁰

In the second place, if God is only part of creative process and not its ultimate ground, the concept of worship is considerably weakened. Even if Cobb is right in saying that "one does not worship in order to achieve some good. One worships because that which he dimly apprehends evokes worship" (pp. 216-17), the question remains whether a finite God—who is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground" (PR 529) and who is as ontologically dependent on the world as the world is dependent on him—does in fact evoke worship in the Christian sense. If he is not really Creator he can hardly be Saviour, except in the sense of stimulating an awareness of meaning in a function analogous to that of a great philosopher or prophet or poet, whose insight lights up some aspect of reality for others. If that is all that exists to be worshipped, it is difficult to see how the act of worship can retain any essential meaning for a Christian.

Whether a doctrine of God that (a) limits his function and being to a prescribed place in a metaphysical construction, (b) expands the category of ultimacy to include the world of actual entities as well as God, (c) divorces God from the concept of evil, and (d) eliminates the primary ground for worship, can serve as an expression of Christian belief is a question that Cobb and his fellow Whiteheadians ought not to evade.

³⁰ The underlying optimism about the upward direction of the eternal process seems axiomatic with Cobb as well as with Whitehead, and provides a significant point of contact between them and Teilhard de Chardin. Cf. Cobb, "Christian Natural Theology and Christian Existence," *CC*, LXXXII (1965), 266.

VI

The predominantly negative tone of the second half of this article tends to obscure the possibility that Whiteheadian thought may yet furnish (or point to) ways of thinking useful to a formulation of a theologically valid and intellectually meaningful doctrine of God.

Certainly the idea of primordial and consequent natures, especially as revised and unified by Cobb, is a suggestive way of understanding the relationship of God's transcendence, absoluteness, and eternity on the one hand and his relatedness and responsiveness to history on the other. It seems to make less difficult—though of course not more true—the simultaneous affirmations that God is ontologically unconditioned and that what he experiences is in a certain sense dependent on human response, so that how human beings use their creaturely freedom does make a difference *to him*. However much the idea of the love of God is interpreted as disinterested *agape*, it must retain the idea that the world *matters* to God, and this must mean that he is in some way experientially conditioned by it. And the "two natures" concept also facilitates the affirmation of a real pastness in God, an affirmation that is closely related to the possibility of directionality and meaning in time. That is, for God as well as for man, Creation, Incarnation, and Redemption must be an order of events; at least it is impossible to conceive of them as significant without such an order.

Another possible contribution is the indirect suggestion of Creativity, Creative Agency, and Creative Forms as aspects of the creative process. These three elements can be assimilated to the idea of a transcendent, sovereign God; whether they form some sort of analogy to the Trinity is another (and interesting) question. In any case, their combination may offer a useful way of understanding the function of God in relation to the world.

Finally, the idea of "initial aim" may point to a way of

understanding providence and/or the operation of the Holy Spirit. It is interesting that even though Calvin was unattracted to this kind of speculation, his doctrine of particular providence may be explicated metaphysically in such a way that it too involves God as selecting the causal factors operative in each occasion. At the same time, aspects of Whiteheadian thought may make it possible to maintain—in contrast to Calvin—human freedom and moral responsibility.³¹ This philosophical correlation of God's universal efficacy and man's self-determination may well be a theologically important development.

³¹ Cf. Cobb, "The Philosophical Grounds of Moral Responsibility: A Comment on Matson and Niebuhr," *The Journal of Philosophy*, LVI (1959), 619-21.

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE SYRIAC VERSION OF ISAIAH: III ¹

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Part I included a brief history of the study of the Syriac version; an outline of the procedures followed in our investigation; a list of abbreviations and symbols used; and a list of MSS used, with their sigla and brief descriptions.

Part II presented the evaluations of 101 variants selected from the 3049 variants found in our manuscript study and the 290 found in our patristic study, together with several summary tables.

Part III presents a few comparisons and conclusions concerning our study of the MSS and of NT quotations from Is, and, finally, a summary and our conclusions concerning the whole investigation.

Diettrich's F o y Group

Diettrich found that his later West Syrian MSS o y (R⁶ P³) of the 17th cent., written in Italy, had strong affinities with his F (F¹) of the 9th cent.² The present investigation has added R² and R³, also of the 17th cent., to this cluster. The group of five together, with no other MSS, supports 101 variants, or 3.3% of the 3049. The Hebrew text agrees with 21 (20.8%), the Targum, with 14 (13.9%), the Greek, with 19 (18.8%), and the Syrohexapla likewise with 19. All four together support 8 (7.9%); Hebrew and Targum together, 5, and Greek and Syrohexapla together, 9 (8.9%). The Syrohexapla margin agrees with 1, as do the Targum

¹ Part I was published in *AUSS*, III (1965), 138-157; Part II in *AUSS*, IV (1966), 37-64.

² Gustav Diettrich, *Ein Apparatus criticus zur Pešitto zum Propheten Jesaia* ("Beihefte zur *ZAW*," vol. VIII; Giessen, 1905), pp. xxiv, xxv.

alone, the Greek alone, and the Syrohexapla alone. The Hebrew solely supports 6 (5.9%). Ten of the 101 have the agreement of Ephraim (9.9%), while 1 is supported by Aphrahat and 1 by other patristic sources, as well as 1 by the NT.

Considering this small group when it is joined by a 'few at a time of the other MSS, 66 more variants are added, or 2.2% of 3049, a total of 167, or 5.5% of the 3049 due to this group plus a few more. L⁴ supports 23, L⁵ 27, M¹ 35, and P⁶ 16, or a total of 101 instances of support from the older MSS (59.1% of the total of 171 instances of additional support). The group of later MSS and the funerary fragment add 28 (16.4% of the 171), the Lectionaries add 36 (21.1% of the 171), and the Massora correction MSS add 6 (3.5% of the 171 instances of support of this group). It is seen that the oldest MSS are most often the ones supporting the readings of this group. Aphrahat agrees with 3 of the 66 variants added by enlarging the group; Ephraim, with 8, and other patristic writers, with 2. Totaling the data for this coherent group including the additional supporting MSS, there are 167 readings so supported, or 5.5% of the 3049. Ephraim's 18 are 10.8% of the 167; Aphrahat's 4 are 2.4%; the other writers' 3 are 1.8%; and the 1 of the NT is .6%.

Diettrich's B

Goshen-Gottstein's studies in the Psalms led him to make the following comments on Diettrich's MS B (C¹), the "Buchanan Bible":

There is, however, one later manuscript which deserves special attention: the famous Buchanan Bible (= B). In the Psalms we count 16 additional variants—nine of which seem *prima facie* to be of value. On closer inspection, however, it turns out—and this is a most important result—that most of these unique readings crept in either from parallel verses or else from the Syrohexapla.³

³ M. H. Goshen-Gottstein, "Prolegomena to a Critical Edition of the Peshitta," in *Text and Language in Bible and Qumran* (Jerusalem, 1960), p. 171.

It is not very likely that any variant contained in B only, will prove "original" as against the readings of the earlier manuscripts, since the variations in B seem to be a mixture of woolgathering on the part of the scribe and extra-Peshitta influences.⁴

The findings of the present investigator agree with Goshen-Gottstein's evaluation of B (C¹) as of negligible value, for the text of Is. Only 1 of its readings appears in the group evaluated in Part II, and it is not singular, but would have been included anyway (60: 5^b, supported by Ephraim and in the second hand of L³, perhaps an Old Syriac form). Of its 35 singular readings, 5 could have come from the Syrohexapla; 17 are of the categories included in the evaluations in Part II but were not important enough to be listed; the other 18 are not of the categories included there.

Diettrich's u

In his remarks on the wretchedly written MS u (O²), Diettrich says that the worth of the branch of text tradition it represents is very small and that "Codex u ist der denkbar schlechteste Repräsentant seines Traditionszweiges. . . ." ⁵ He mentions in passing that many errors of u are confirmed by v (R⁴), which shows that many errors are due, not to the scribe of u, but to the tradition it represents. (This statement is also true of others of the later MSS.) But Diettrich took the trouble, he says, to compare u with the Hebrew, the Targum, and the Greek, hoping thus to find at least the possibility of an original Peshitta reading. The result was that u goes 4 times with Hebrew, 6 times with Targum, and 30 times with Greek. Seven times it is supported by Hebrew and Targum, 5 times by Hebrew and Greek, twice by Targum and Greek, and 9 times by Hebrew, Greek, and Targum. But Diettrich points out that in the cases in which it goes with these texts and various combinations of them, it is "höchst wahrscheinlich von der syrohexaplarischen oder einer anderen Septuaginta-Version kontaminiert," and thus there remain only "17 Fälle, in denen die Möglichkeit, aber

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 171-172.

⁵ Diettrich, *op. cit.*, p. xxii.

auch nur die Möglichkeit, zugegeben werden muss, dass wir es hier mit einer ursprünglichen Pešittolesart zu tun haben könnten. Autant de bruit pour une omelette!"⁶

The present investigator came to a general conclusion very similar to that of Diettrich regarding this MS, u.

Where in the above-quoted statement Diettrich had the words "Septuaginta-Version," he added a footnote quoting the following two sentences from Barnes:

The Syriac transcribers . . . were . . . [ignorant of Hebrew] and ready to introduce readings found in a Greek version or recommended by a Greek Father. So the Peshitta in its later text has more of the LXX than in its earlier form.⁷

This idea is not entirely borne out, however, in the percentages resulting from the present study, as will be seen in the next section.

General Comparisons

The Hebrew agreement is very high in J¹ (51.3%) and low in O² (the wretched u manuscript referred to above), with 14.8%; it is about as low in most of the Massora correction MSS and the Lectionaries from Mt. Sinai, but rather high in the earliest MSS, especially P⁶, L⁵ (=D), and M¹ (=A), with 42.9, 41.8, and 39.7%, respectively; but B (=S) has 39.6%, and L⁴ has 36.9%, while F¹ (=F) is the lowest of the older group in this investigation, with 33.4%. (Diettrich counted many variants that have been excluded from the present study as being merely orthographic differences and obvious scribal errors.)

Looking at the agreement with the Targum, the situation is almost the same; the above paragraph could be used to describe this comparison, substituting figures that remain in the same ranges and about the same relative positions. Again the earliest MSS show higher percentages than do many of the later MSS. J¹ is again at the top of the list, and O² at the bottom.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. xxii, xxiv.

⁷ W. E. Barnes, "On the Influence of the Septuagint on the Pešitta," *JThS*, II (1901), 197.

When one checks the percentages of agreement with the Greek and the Syrohexapla, they are seen to be about the same too. The most noticeable difference is that the percentages for the Syrohexapla agreements are, in the Massora MSS and the Mt. Sinai Lectionaries, the highest of the four texts' percentages, and the Greek also shows an increase. For the older MSS, the percentages for the Greek and the Syrohexapla are about alike and somewhat lower than those for the Hebrew and the Targum. For the later MSS, the percentages for the Greek and the Syrohexapla are close together and, again, somewhat lower than those for Hebrew and Targum, throughout the period.

Looking at the percentages for Hebrew-Targum joint support, and for Greek-Syrohexapla joint support, there is confirmation of the above conclusions, that the Massora and Lectionary MSS have more of the Greek-Syrohexapla agreement (sometimes much more), and the older ones (except B) have more of the Hebrew-Targum agreement; while the later group is mixed, and a number of the very latest show slightly more Hebrew-Targum agreement. In other words, the variants are already in the earliest MSS extant, to a very great extent; the influences of the four texts are already at work at the earliest recoverable stage. The labor spent on the later MSS is virtually entirely wasted.

Detailed Comparisons

It is helpful to check the various groups of MSS in detail to see which MS in each group has the highest and which has the lowest percentage of support from each of the four texts. In the group of older MSS, P⁶ has the highest Hebrew support, 42.9%; F¹ the lowest, 33.4%. L⁵ has the highest Targum support, 39.3%; F¹, again, the lowest, 29.8%. L⁵ also has the highest Greek support, 34.7%; F¹ again has the lowest, 24.0%. L⁵ again has the highest Syrohexapla support, 34.3%; L⁴ has the lowest, 24.3%. Of the combined support, P⁶ is highest with all four texts, 21.9%; F¹ is lowest, with 14.4%; L⁵ and

F¹ tie for the highest with Hebrew-Targum support for their variants, having 8.8%; B is lowest, with 6.6%. B, on the other hand, is highest with Greek-Syrohexapla support, having 8.8%; F¹ is also reversed, now the lowest, with 5.0%.

In the group of later MSS, J¹ has the highest Hebrew support, 51.3%; O², the lowest, 14.8%. J¹ again has the highest Targum support, 47.4%; O² again has the lowest, 15.1%. L⁶ has the highest Greek support, 33.4%; O² once more has the lowest, 16.3%. J¹ has the highest Syrohexapla support, 34.6%; R⁴, the lowest, 15.7%. Naturally J¹ has the highest support from all four texts together, 24.4%; and of course O² has the lowest, 5.5%. P⁵ has the highest combined Hebrew and Targum support, 9.2%; O², the lowest, 4.7%. L⁶ has the highest Greek and Syrohexapla combined support in its first hand, with 12.7%; J¹ is reversed, having here the lowest, 2.6%, though it is highest with Syrohexapla agreement.

Among the Massora correction MSS, L^{8-m} has the highest support of each text; of Hebrew support it has 26.8%; L^{7-m} has the lowest, 12.2%; of Targum support, L^{8-m} has 25.0%; R^{7-m}, the lowest, 13.0%; of Greek support, L^{8-m} has 26.8%; L^{7-m}, the lowest again, with 6.1%; of Syrohexapla support, L^{8-m} has, again, 28.6%, the top; L^{7-m} is lowest again, with 12.2%. L^{8-m} has to be the highest in support from all four texts, with 16.1%; L^{7-m} is lowest, with 2.0%. On the other hand, L^{7-m} is highest in Hebrew-Targum support, having 6.1%; R^{7-m}, lowest, with 1.2%. But R^{7-m} is highest with Greek-Syrohexapla, 11.8%; L^{11-m}, lowest, with 4.4%.

Among the Lectionaries, L¹²⁻¹ has the highest percentage of support from all the texts. It has 28.8% with Hebrew, while S⁴⁻¹ is lowest, with 15.9%; it has 33.7% with Targum, while S⁴⁻¹ again is lowest, with 17.2%; it has 31.2% with Greek, while S⁴⁻¹ and S⁵⁻¹ are tied for the lowest position, with 20.9%; it has 32.5% with Syrohexapla, while S⁵⁻¹ has the lowest, 21.8%. Of the combined support, R⁶⁻¹ is highest with all four texts, having 17.6%; S⁴⁻¹ and S⁵⁻¹ tie for the lowest position, with 8.2%. R⁶⁻¹ is also highest with Hebrew-Targum,

having 5.5%; S⁵⁻¹ is lowest, with 2.8%. S¹⁻¹ is highest in Greek-Syrohexapla support, having 8.9%; S³⁻¹ is lowest, with 4.5%.

The Canticles (Psalter and Biblical Odes) MSS are not brought into these comparisons, because the sections of Is which they involve are too small to be statistically significant. The same thing is true of the manuscript fragments.

It is also useful to compare the mean percentages of support by the four texts, as summarized in Table 3, Part II. In the group of 6 older MSS, the average support given to the variants by the Hebrew is 39.0%; by the Targum, 35.0%; by the Greek, 29.8%; and by the Syrohexapla, 29.5%. For the 23 later MSS the averages are: for Hebrew, 30.9%; for Targum, 29.1%; for Greek 26.4%; and for Syrohexapla, 26.6%. For the 9 Massora correction MSS, the average percentages are: for Hebrew, 16.8%; for Targum, 17.1%; for Greek, 18.0%; and for Syrohexapla, 21.8%. For the 7 Lectionaries, not including the fragmentary L¹³⁻¹ and L¹⁴⁻¹, the average percentages are: for Hebrew, 21.2%; for Targum, 23.3%; for Greek, 24.7%; and for Syrohexapla, 26.6%. Comparing the combined support, the averages for the older MSS are: for all four texts, 18.4%; for Hebrew and Targum, 8.2%; for Greek and Syrohexapla, 6.3%. For the later MSS, they are: for all four, 15.0%; for Hebrew and Targum, 6.8%; for Greek and Syrohexapla, 7.2%. For the Massora MSS, the averages are: for all four, 8.3%; for Hebrew and Targum, 3.4%; for Greek and Syrohexapla, 6.0%. For the Lectionaries, the averages are: for all four, 11.5%; for Hebrew and Targum, 3.8%; for Greek and Syrohexapla, 7.2%. (The usual order has been changed and the later MSS are listed after the older instead of after the Massora MSS, in order to facilitate the comparison of the later with the older.)

This comparison reveals that the later MSS average a smaller percentage of each of the four texts agreeing with their variants than do the earlier MSS; there is evidently a greater proportion of scribal corruptions. These figures give a negative answer to the question whether the Greek-Syro-

hexapla influence would be found to increase in the later MSS; likewise they contradict (concerning Is) Barnes' sentences quoted above. But they confirm the impression received in working on the Mt. Sinai Lectionaries and the Massora MSS, that these contain greater influence from the Greek and the Syrohexapla than from the Hebrew and the Targum. It is not the Greek and Syrohexapla influences that increase in the Biblical MSS as time goes on, but simply scribal corruptions. This finding raises another question: How much likelihood is there of finding genuine ancient readings in manuscripts so heavily influenced by the Greek version and the Syrohexapla, even at the earliest stage, and especially among the Massora and the Lectionary MSS? This problem received attention in Part II, the evaluations; see also the final section of Part III.

If we had selected for presentation only the variants that had the support of *Targum alone* of the four basic texts, we would have had only 62 variants from Biblical MSS, of which 14 would have been usable under our self-imposed limitations of significant categories, and we would have had 33 from the patristic quotations, of which 26 would have been acceptable under our limitations (and did appear in the evaluations along with 7 having only early patristic support). This method would have produced a thinly-drawn "targumic profile" of Is such as the one exhibited by A. Vööbus in *Peschitta und Targumim des Pentateuchs*, in which he presented 99 Targum traces, as follows (the numbers in parentheses are those we would have accepted with our limitations on the categories considered significant):

	Ex 15: 1-21	Dt 32: 1-43
Biblical MSS	6 (1)	15 (6)
Liturgical MSS	6 (4)	29 (11)
Patristic quotations	16 (15)	27 (22)
Totals	28 (20)	71 (39)
Grand total	99 (59)	

Twelve per cent of his 99, however, consisted of nothing more than addition or omission of the *waw* conjunction, which is

completely non-significant, as has been emphasized by Goshen-Gottstein (see discussion in the article "Syriac Variants in Isaiah 26" to follow this three-part article in the next issue).

Corroborating Studies

The findings of the present investigation are supported by those of studies made by Goshen-Gottstein, as shown in the following summaries and brief quotations:

Examination of the MSS "leads us to distinguish between those written before the tenth century approximately and those written after it," for in the 10th cent. occurred "the final fixation of the Syriac Biblical *Massorah*." The "fairly rigid standardization of the text by that time" was "characterized by the two authoritative *Massorah* manuscripts, B.M. Add. 12178 (Jacobite) [L^{9-m}] and 12138 (Nestorian) [L^{8-m}]." Studying the Psalms, he compared all the MSS before the 10th cent. with the printed texts and A (M¹), and found that "they contain 135 readings not known either from A or the prints." But comparing "the apparatus built on all the early manuscripts with those manuscripts later than the tenth century," he found that "practically no additional variant of any 'value' can be elicited."⁸

In studying *Eze*, he states,

Taking all the early manuscripts together, we find that the Massora manuscripts J and N contain no reading which is not known from some earlier manuscript. In Po [O¹] we find 47 and in Ush [O²] 29 cases of new *corruptions*, apart from those deviations from the prints in which these manuscripts agree with the earlier ones. But there is not a single reading not contained in earlier manuscripts which may be said to be noteworthy.⁹

His investigation of *Eze* confirmed the result of his pilot studies, that "there are no 'recensions' but rather manuscripts deviating more or less from a statistical mean." However,

none of the manuscripts can be said, on the whole, to be "superior" to any other, and the relation between those cases in which such a *hapax*-variant in a manuscript is a corruption and those in which it

⁸ Goshen-Gottstein, *op. cit.*, p. 170. ⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

may be important is about the same for all the manuscripts. We may assume, therefore, that any additional early manuscript which could be found would furnish us with a certain number of new variants, of which a few could be expected to be of real importance.¹⁰

In answer to the possible objection that he had examined in detail "only relatively few late manuscripts" in the Biblical books he had investigated, he stated that "the earlier collations as well as the history of the Peshitta text until its final Massoretic fixation (as shown by J and N)" would indicate a great likelihood that "the outcome of a complete study of all the hundreds of manuscripts would yield similar results." It is, naturally, "possible that a very few early, important readings otherwise unknown have survived only in later manuscripts." But, as he had abundant reason to conclude, "the effort spent in eliciting these out of the mass of later material would never be justified by the meagre foreseeable outcome of such a study." Thus he considered himself amply justified in putting forward his "contention that the proposed *editio minor* would answer our needs."¹¹ "It should be borne in mind," he added in a footnote, "that most readings not known from the MSS written before the tenth century will probably become known through B [C¹]."¹²

Concerning Diettrich's *Apparatus*, he appropriately protests, "If there were still need for evidence against an *editio major*, Diettrich's collection would provide it." Although he made "repeated efforts," he did not succeed in finding his "way through the wealth of useless material assembled by Diettrich," and he "could not attain the same degree of exactness in evaluating his material as in the other books." However, he considered it safe to judge that in Is "the use of the eighteen late manuscripts as opposed to A F D and N [L³] will hardly add more than 2 per cent to the 'valuable' material in the apparatus." Of these additional readings none is "of any real value."¹³

The overawing 3000 "variants" from Isaiah collected by Diettrich

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 185.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 187.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 187, note 112.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 173-174.

yield no more than 13 cases in which the use of A would not suffice, only half of these being of any possible importance.¹⁴

Goshen-Gottstein's view of the early state of the text and the worth of the later MSS concurs with ours completely. "In the light of all the early Peshitta MSS together, the textual development of the Syriac O.T. turns out to be not dissimilar to that of the MT and other versions," he concluded. Namely, "the earliest manuscripts in existence generally show the same corruptions and exhibit on the whole the same text." The explanation of this may be "either on the assumption of *one* 'archetypal' translation, or else by some early unknown editorial activity before the fifth century," which should not "be confused with the final Massoretic standardization in the ninth to tenth century."¹⁵

"In order to evaluate the 'post-Massoretic' material more correctly," he referred to the "Law of Scribes," according to which "the same textual change may creep into the text again and again, mostly for purely linguistic reasons." One must realize that "not every corruption is a 'variant,'" and it is necessary "to evaluate the 'post-Massoretic' material as a whole in order to determine whether it is worth our while to expend our efforts on it." Naturally, it was "inevitable, that a few 'important' readings should escape the final standardization of the Massorettes." However, "under the circumstances we cannot but ask ourselves the 'practical' question, *i.e.* whether these readings would be of any 'value' for our edition of the text."¹⁶

He found that the material he had examined "indicated that it is imperative to base an edition on the manuscripts written prior to the final Massoretic standardization (of the tenth century)"; it was clear that "examining later MSS (apart from B) would hardly justify the effort."¹⁷

While Goshen-Gottstein's studies were carried out to determine whether a critical edition of the OT Peshitta

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 182-183.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

would need to be an "*editio major*" or could acceptably be an "*editio minor*," something vastly more practicable,¹⁸ his comments also fit the problems involved in our present study and consistently support our findings.

NT Quotations of Isaiah

The Syrian authors' quotations of Is are sometimes influenced by the wording of the verses in their NT Peshitta form. One would imagine, before investigating, that the codices of the Curetonian and Sinaitic Old Syriac Gospels would be fruitful sources of the OT *Vetus Syra* where they contain quotations from the OT.

However, the investigation of the NT quotations of Is demonstrated that the citations lean heavily on the Greek text of either the OT or the NT. The Greek OT supports the variant 2 times, or 2.6%, of the 85 total; the Greek NT supports it 33 times, or 38.8%; both together support it 37 times, or 43.5%. In 10 instances (11.8%) the situation is inconclusive, since synonyms are involved, and the Greek of OT and NT could be translated by either Syriac form, that of the Peshitta OT or that of the variant. In 3 cases (3.5%) there is no support of any kind for the variant, and it is probably merely a scribal error or caprice; at least none of the 3 has any significance.

It is interesting to note that no patristic quotation is found agreeing with the Curetonian or Sinaitic Old Syriac form of the wording unless the NT Peshitta also has that same wording.

In 4 variants (5.9% of the 85 total), the Peshitta OT form is without any support whatever, yet is attested in the majority or all of the MSS, and may well represent the Old Syriac text form, hiding in the Peshitta as do those of this kind mentioned in Part II.

Summary

The investigation of the Syriac version of Is resulted in 3049 variants from the Is MSS, 290 variants from the Syrian

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-170, 187, 201.

Fathers' quotations of Is, and 85 variants involving the NT. Nearly half of the 3049 variants in the Biblical MSS are singular readings, but many of these are scribal errors or inconsequential.

Of the evaluations in Part II concerning whether a reading is Old Syriac or a Targum trace, or a scribal error, or may be either of these, or where the Old Syriac may lie hidden in the Peshitta, the following summary can be given (see Table 4, Part II): There were 101 variants discussed all together; 20 (19.9%) could be either Old Syriac text form or scribal error; 11 (10.9%) may be Old Syriac hiding in the Peshitta; 23 (22.8%) are most likely scribal errors; 47 (46.5%) are probably genuine traces of the older text form, and about half of these, 24 (23.8% of the 101 total) are really traces of the Targum. These 101 that were worth discussing are only 3.0% of the total number of 3339 variants presented—3049 in the MSS and 290 more from the patristic quotations. Of this 3.0%, nearly half (47 of the 101), or 1.4% of the 3339 total, can rather safely be designated as traces of the archaic text. Of course, some of the variants in other categories not selected as substantial enough to discuss may also be genuine traces of the oldest text type.

The study of the NT quotations of Is shows clearly that the Old Syriac Gospels, the codices of the Curetonian and the Sinaitic Syriac, are not good hunting-grounds for Old Syriac forms of the text of Is, since they lean heavily on the Greek text of either the OT or the NT. The Greek NT text supports the variant 33 times, or 38.8% of the 85 total, and both the Greek OT and NT texts support it 37 times, or 43.5%. Twice the Greek OT text supports the NT reading, and in 3 cases there is no support of any kind for it; in 10 (11.8%), because of the use of synonyms, no conclusion can be drawn. In 5, the Old Syriac Text forms may be hiding in the Peshitta OT.

Conclusions

Where support for a variant can be found in the Targum, and in that alone, it is quite surely a genuine trace of the original stratum underlying the Syriac OT text. Of the 24 that were thus located, plus 23 others, those that had Targum underlying them were from patristic sources; of the other 23, 15, or 65.2%, were from the older MSS, 4 of these having the sole support of the Targum; 6 were supported by Ephraim, twice with the Targum, and 4 by Aphrahat, likewise twice with the Targum. Only 1 such was found in the Massora MSS (45: 16²), supported by Targum; only 1 in the later MSS (60: 5^b), supported by Ephraim; only 4 in the Lectionaries (1: 3^b, 1: 3^{d2}, 6: 6², and 10: 18^{a2}), 2 supported by Targum and 2 by Ephraim and Jacob of Edessa; only 2 were found in the Canticles (Psalter and Biblical Odes) MSS (26: 15^{h2} and 26: 19^{g1}), both supported by Targum, the latter also by Greek and Syrohexapla, beyond those in these groups that were also found in the oldest group. Thus it is clear that only the oldest MSS, before the Massora period, are worth the time spent. Anything genuine that will be found in the later ones will almost invariably also be in those earlier ones. This independent conclusion is amply corroborated by the findings of Goshen-Gottstein which have been cited.

Ephraim, and secondly, Aphrahat, are the most helpful patristic sources, but even in their writings the Greek influence is heavy, and it is not safe to call their variants Old Syriac text forms unless the Targum alone supports them.

Vööbus often cites the experience of Madame Curie, as mentioned in an article of his concerning his *Vetus Syra* project:

In the fascinating biography of her mother, Eve Curie describes how the discoverer of radium year after year stood in her workroom analysing wagonloads of pitchblende until she gathered from the tons of brown mass a decigram of the priceless stuff.

The situation is no different for the textual student. . . .¹⁹

¹⁹ Arthur Vööbus, "Completion of the *Vetus Syra* Project," *BR*, VI (1962), 55-56.

THE SABBATH IN THE EPISTLE OF BARNABAS

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The Epistle of Barnabas contains the earliest definite statement on the teaching and use of Sabbath and Sunday in the literature of the early Church written after the end of the New Testament era.¹ Justin Martyr's First Apology also gives a very early and definite statement on this subject, but it is to be dated after the Epistle of Barnabas.²

Although the early Church Fathers who cited this work believed it was written by Paul's companion, internal evidence demonstrates that the author was not the Barnabas of the Book of Acts. As the writer nowhere in the epistle named himself, he remains anonymous. Apparently Church tradition sometime in the 2d century applied the name of Barnabas

¹ For a reference which is very likely earlier, but also more obscure see Ignatius' *Epistle to the Magnesians*, 8, 9. A recent study on the textual criticism of this passage concludes with the comment, "The statement remains ambiguous." Fritz Guy, " 'The Lord's Day' in the letter of Ignatius to the Magnesians," *AUSS*, II (1964), 17.

² The Epistle of Barnabas is dated mainly by the internal evidence from ch. 16, by which it can be placed between the destruction of the Temple in 70, and the second destruction of Jerusalem in the Bar Cochba rebellion of 132-135. The book dates most logically to the first third of the 2d century. In this the majority of scholars agree, including such authorities as Tischendorf, Goodspeed (130), and Harnack (130-131). No valid reason has been advanced to assign a later date to the work.

Lightfoot leads a minority in the more extreme view placing it in the late 1st century, nearer the destruction of the Temple. Although he overstates the evidence, it is interesting that a non-Sabbatarian scholar such as Westcott denies this view on the basis of the anti-Sabbatarian 15th chapter, "the letter . . . also affirms the abrogation of the Sabbath, and the general celebration of the Lord's day, which seems to shew that it could not have been written before the beginning of the second century." B. F. Westcott, *A General Survey of the History of the Canon of the New Testament* (7th ed.; London, 1896), pp. 41, 42.

to the letter for one of several reasons.³ In all likelihood the epistle was written in the environs of Alexandria. On this point scholarly opinion is essentially unanimous. The two main reasons for this are: (1) Among the Ante-Nicene Church Fathers, it is at Alexandria that the epistle received its earliest and best acceptance (especially by Clement), and (2) the author's extensive use of allegory, which was so typical of Alexandrian thought.

Gnosticism

The author's extensive use of allegory along with his frequent reference to and respect for "knowledge" (gnosis)⁴ has led some to conclude that the author was a Gnostic, or at least under considerable Gnostic influence.⁵ This conclusion is not warranted by the evidence. The author urged the rational study and comprehension of the facts of faith, referred to by him as "knowledge." This principle stands in sharp contrast with the Gnostic idea of salvation through esoteric knowledge.⁶

In this letter there are some fifty passages where the writer employed the allegorical type of teaching. Some of these are

³ 1. Because it was written by another Barnabas.

2. Because of the tradition that Alexandria was one of the places where the Apostolic Barnabas worked.

3. From the similarity of subjects treated with the Book of Hebrews, which some of the Church Fathers believed was written by Barnabas.

⁴ Barnabas 1 : 5 ; 2 : 1-3, 9, 10 ; 4 : 1, 6 ; 5 : 3 ; 6 : 5, 10 ; 7 : 1 ; 9 : 7 ; 10 : 11, 12.

⁵ A. H. Newman, *A Manual of Church History* (Philadelphia, 1899), pp. 221-222. Walter E. Straw, *Origin of Sunday Observance in the Christian Church* (Washington, D. C., 1939), p. 48. Frank H. Yost, *The Early Christian Sabbath* (Mountain View, Calif., 1947), p. 33. Richard Hammill, "The Sabbath or the Lord's Day?" *Doctrinal Discussions*, ed. R. A. Anderson, (Washington, D. C., 1961), p. 82.

⁶ "For the Gnostics, however, 'gnosis' or higher knowledge was the channel of salvation. This 'gnosis' did not mean a mere intellectual knowledge acquired by mental processes, but rather a supernatural knowledge which came from divine revelation and enlightenment." J. L. Neve, *History of Christian Thought*, I (Philadelphia, 1946), p. 53.

rather Biblical, ⁷ but many are quite strained by any Biblical standard, and some reach the heights of absurdity. ⁸ The Gnostics made much use of allegorization also. However, the use of allegory does not *ipso facto* designate a writer as following Gnostic thought, and the author's time and place must be considered,

Their [Hebrew Christians'] own habits of allegorizing, and their Oriental tastes, must be borne in mind, if we are readily disgusted with our author's [Barnabas] fancies and refinements. ⁹

The only adequate basis on which the degree of the presence or absence of Gnosticism in this epistle can be judged is on doctrinal content. The end-point teachings must be uncovered from all overlying allegories and examined to see what the tenets of the writer's faith were. When this is done a surprisingly large amount of evangelical doctrine is encountered in this book. On many of the cardinal beliefs of Christendom the author is quite orthodox. ¹⁰ Two doctrinal points should

⁷ The covenantal allegory in 13 : 1-4, 7 has many similarities to Paul's in Gal 4 : 22-31 in spite of the fact that the basic covenantal theology is quite different.

⁸ One classic example of this is found in ch. 10 where about a dozen of the clean and unclean animals of the Levitical Law are interpreted in terms of the spiritual classes of men in the world. Aside from the strained allegory involved in this passage, the author cites an animal not contained in the Law *i.e.*, the hyena (v. 7), and accepts several pure myths as biological statements of fact (10 : 7, 8). See also below under note 18.

⁹ A. C. Coxe, *ANF*, I, 133.

¹⁰ For example:

1. God's creatorship is viewed as it is found in the Genesis account.
2. Sin entered the world with the fall of man through the serpent's temptation in Eden.

3. Man, originally made in the image of God, has through the fall acquired a nature that is corrupt, weak, in darkness, and contrary to God.

4. The nature, work and fate of a personal devil are in harmony with the Biblical references on the subject.

5. Jesus Christ: was pre-existent, became incarnate, performed miracles, suffered, died atoning for sin, was bodily resurrected, ascended to heaven, and will soon return to judge the world.

6. The dead will be resurrected and the saints will receive a future eternal kingdom.

receive special mention. The statements of this letter on the human aspect of Christ's nature are emphatically anti-Docetic. Over and over again Christ is referred to as having come in the "flesh" and truly "suffered."¹¹ The doctrine of the vicarious death of Christ on the cross as an atonement for sin is also unqualified and clear.¹² These and many other doctrinal views of the epistle are directly opposite those of the Gnostic movement.

Anti-Judaism

This is not to say that the book is without errors, for such is far from the case. Opposition to the Sabbath and utilization of the "eighth day" are not necessarily the greatest errors in the epistle. The author's false Sabbatarian theology in turn rests upon his view of the essence of the Old Testament, and his view of the covenant that God had with Israel. Old Testament history and religion he viewed essentially as one vast type, and this only. He also denied that God ever had a covenant with Israel after it was broken by idolatry at Mt. Sinai.

It is evident then that the anti-Sabbatarian 15th chapter cannot be viewed apart from the rest of the book, but must

7. Man is forgiven, cleansed and purified through the blood of Christ, God's sacrifice for sin.

8. Faith and repentance are gifts from God.

9. The new birth: God re-creates and renews man, giving him a heart of flesh and the soul of a child.

10. God dwells within the individual Christian and he becomes a member of Christ's present spiritual kingdom.

11. A fall from grace and eternal loss are possible.

12. Good works are the fruit of faith.

13. Baptism is by immersion.

¹¹ 5 : 1, 5, 6, 10-13; 6 : 3, 7, 9, 13, 14; 7 : 2, 3, 5, 9, 11; 12 : 5, 10; 14 : 5.

¹² 2 : 6; 5 : 1, 10; 6 : 11; 7 : 2, 3, 5, 11; 8 : 2, 3, 5; 9 : 8; 11 : 8, 11; 12 : 2, 3, 7; 14 : 5; 16 : 10. "The main idea is Pauline, and the apostle's doctrine of atonement is more faithfully reproduced in this epistle than in any other postapostolic writing." A. Harnack, "Barnabas," *Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia of Religious Knowledge* (New York, 1908), I, 487.

be taken in its context, and that context is one of unrelenting anti-Judaism.¹³ The Epistle of Barnabas contains the strongest anti-Judaistic statement to be found among the Apostolic Fathers.¹⁴

The motivation for this strongly anti-Judaistic position was a desire to demonstrate the total rejection of Judaism by God as His true religion. That this sprang, at least in part, from conflicts in which the author was involved¹⁵ is evident in two passages in the epistle,

Moreover I ask you this one thing besides, as being one of yourselves and loving you all in particular more than my own soul, to give heed to yourselves now, and not liken yourselves to certain persons who pile up sin upon sin, saying that our covenant remains to them also. Ours it is; but they lost it in this way for ever . . . (4 : 6, 7)

Moreover I will tell you likewise concerning the temple, how these wretched men being led astray set their hope on the building, . . . For like the Gentiles almost they consecrated Him in the temple. . . . Ye perceive that their hope is in vain. (16 : 1, 2)

The first quotation prefaces the writer's initial statement on the covenant. One can see the author's deep involvement in the problem here by the earnestness of his appeal to his readers. The second passage introduces his discussion of the Temple.

Who were these "certain persons," "these wretched men"? Were they Jews or Judaizing Christians? As the epistle's readers were intimately involved in the controversy it was

¹³ "The writer is an uncompromising antagonist of Judaism, but beyond this antagonism he has nothing in common with the Antijudaic heresies of the second century." J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers* (London, 1926), p. 239. The quotations from the epistle used in this paper are from Lightfoot's translation.

¹⁴ "His polemics are, above all, directed against Judaizing Christians. In no other writing of that early time is the separation of Gentile Christians from the patriotic Jews so clearly brought out. . . . He is a thorough anti-Judaist, but by no means antinomist." Harnack, *ibid.*

¹⁵ "The picture too which it presents of feuds between Jews and Christians is in keeping with the state of the population of that city (Alexandria), the various elements of which were continually in conflict." Lightfoot, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

not necessary for the writer to give a complete identification of his opposition, unfortunately for us. However, he did point out several of their characteristics. His antagonists believed that God's covenant remained to the Jews also, and they had their hopes set on the Temple in Jerusalem, as cited above. They also practiced circumcision (9: 4). Some commentators favor the view that they were Judaizing Christians. The extensive treatment of so many major points of Judaism and the fact that they were contrasted with "the Gentiles" implies more strongly that they were non-Christian Jews.

Regardless of the identification of the opposition party, the many anti-Judaistic features of the epistle were undoubtedly directed against them, and the force of the epistle is clear. It was directed to Christians who were tempted to retain or return to Judaistic beliefs and practices in their faith.¹⁶ It is an appeal for a complete Judaeo-Christian dissociation,¹⁷ especially in the points outlined below.

The thoroughness of the author's treatment of Judaism may be seen in the fact that he dealt with many of the major tenets of the Jewish faith, as demonstrated by the following abbreviated outline:

1. The Sacrificial System: The sacrifices along with other

¹⁶ "It is addressed to those Christians who, coming out of Judaism, desired to retain, under the New Testament, certain peculiarities of the Old—in the same way that Judaizing teachers among the Galatians had acted." Constantin von Tischendorf, *Codex Sinaiticus* (8th ed.; London, [n.d.]), p. 66. "Hilgenfeld, who has devoted much attention to this Epistle, holds that 'it was written . . . with the view of winning back, or guarding from a Judaic form of Christianity, those Christians belonging to the same class as himself.'" Coxe, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

¹⁷ "It marks however an important stage in the relations of Judaism and Christianity. The author of the Epistle to the Hebrews hints that the time is coming when Christians must part company with the Jews, and in *Barnabas* we see that this has come to pass." F. J. Foakes-Jackson, *The History of the Christian Church* (New York, 1933), p. 100. "The Epistle introduces us into a new religious atmosphere. The burning question of the relation of Christianity to Judaism was in the air, and the author is at pains to vindicate the right of Christianity to stand alone." E. H. Hall, *Papias and His Contemporaries* (Boston, 1899), p. 40.

types, prophecies, and allegorically interpreted Scriptures find their fulfillment in the life, death, and work of Christ. (Chs. 2, 5, 7, 8, 12)

2. The Covenant: The covenant made by God with the Jews at Mt. Sinai was broken by their idolatry there, and it was never reoffered to them. (Chs. 4, 13, 14)

3. The Promised Land: "The land of milk and honey" does not apply to the possession of a literal Canaan by the Hebrews, but to the Christian's present spiritual experience and his future reward. (Ch. 6)

4. Circumcision: The true circumcision is that of the ears and heart of the Christian. Circumcision of the Jews is abolished and when first given to Abraham was to look forward to Jesus on the cross.¹⁸ (Ch. 9)

5. The Levitical Laws: The clean and unclean animals are interpreted as representing the spiritual classes of men in the world.¹⁹ "Moses spake it in spirit. . . with this intent." (Ch. 10)

6. The Sabbath: The Fourth Commandment does not apply to a weekly holy day, but to a future seventh millennium. (Ch. 15)

7. The Temple: The literal Temple in Jerusalem was destroyed and abolished. The true temple is the Christian in whom God dwells. (Ch. 16)

The fact that the Sabbath was one of the main features of Judaism provided the writer's antagonism with reason to dissociate from it also, along with the other pillars of the

¹⁸ The writer arrived at this conclusion because Abraham circumcised 318 men of his household, and the numerical values for the Greek letters in the name of Jesus equal 18 and the cross (T) equals 300 (9 : 7, 8). The author seemed quite proud of this lesson for he added, "no man hath ever learnt from me a more genuine word; but I know that ye are worthy" (9 : 9). One writer wittily adds, "If he could only have known that the first general council at Nice [Nicaea] two hundred years later was going to be attended by three hundred and eighteen Fathers, his happiness would certainly have been much greater." C. R. Gregory, *Canon and Text of the New Testament* (New York, 1907), p. 78.

¹⁹ See above note 8.

Hebrew religion. It is important to note that almost all of these items of the faith receive their fulfillment in the present Christian era. Only the Sabbath is exclusively future in application. It is logical to assume that if the author had seen in the Sabbath a shadowy Jewish ceremonial that met its antitype in some present feature of Christianity he would have applied it as such, but he did not. Instead he allegorized it into a future millennium.

The Covenant

The author's doctrine of the covenant is one of his most important and central teachings. This is the theological basis upon which he allegorized away various of the pillars of Judaism. If there was a valid covenant between God and Israel from Moses to Christ then these items had a greater sacramental and spiritual value and historical significance in their time than the writer was willing to grant them.²⁰ Because he denied that such a covenant existed he felt free to use these features of the Jewish faith almost exclusively in an allegorical or typical manner.²¹

The importance the author placed upon the doctrine of the covenant is demonstrated by the fact that he devoted three of seventeen chapters to it.²² In ch. 4 he gave his first statement on the broken covenant. In ch. 13 he justified his covenantal position through allegory. Ch. 14 is a restatement and re-emphasis of his position on the subject, and this is

²⁰ In the Epistle of Barnabas Old Testament religion is "without any significance for the actual surroundings of its earlier day." H. S. Holland, *The Apostolic Fathers* (London, 1893), p. 204.

²¹ "Judaism is made a mere riddle, of which Christianity is the answer." Westcott, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

²² The first 17 chapters constitute the major part of the book original with the author. Three of the last four chapters (18-20) are an appended early form of the Teachings of the Apostles, and ch. 21 is an epilogue. The transition between the two sections of the epistle is shown by the abrupt change in style and content, and is illustrated by textual criticism, particularly in the Latin version. See especially E. J. Goodspeed, *A History of Early Christian Literature* (Chicago, 1942), pp. 31-33, 158-160.

followed by his discussion of the Sabbath. A denial of the historic relations of the Sabbath gave the author a freedom also to dispose of its current obligation by allegorizing it into the future. In the 2d century, anti-Sabbatarianism is found associated with errors in covenantal theology.

The writer's position on the covenant is clear. God gave the Jews a covenant at Sinai, "But they lost it by turning to idols" (4: 8). This was shown by the breaking of the tables of the Law. "They themselves were not found worthy" (14: 4), and the covenant was not reoffered. "Ours it is; but they lost it in this way for ever, when Moses had just received it" (4: 7). This covenant is now transmitted to Christians by Christ (14: 5).

The question the author left unanswered is, what status did the Jewish religion have toward God in the interval between Moses and Christ? If there was no binding covenant in existence then, what validity did Sabbath observance (etc.) have in that age? The author probably omitted comment on this because he felt that any recognition shown these items in a past era might weaken his argument in the time and situation in which he was writing. He was only interested in denying the current literal application of Jewish beliefs and practices and drawing out of them allegorical or typical meaning. The Epistle of Barnabas presents a thoroughly non-Pauline interpretation of the Sinai covenant.²³

The Law

A subject related to the doctrine of the covenant is the position of the Law in the epistle. In some passages the author used the term "law" to refer to the Pentateuch or its religious

²³ "*The Epistle of Barnabas*, whenever it may have been written, is a striking example of what the Apostolic teaching about the old Covenant was *not*. Ignoring the progressive method of God's dealings with mankind, it treats the Jewish practices and beliefs of old time as having always been mere errors, and thus makes the Old Testament no more than a fantastic forestatement of the New Testament." F. J. A. Hort, quoted in Foakes-Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

teachings, but when one looks for specific references to the Ten Commandments, there are few to be found. Three out of the ten are referred to in the last section of the book, but this lies outside of the realm of the present discussion. ²⁴ There is a very important statement which concerns the Law, however, in the last chapter on the covenant,

And Moses took *them* [the tables of the Law], and brought *them* down to give *them* to the people. . . . Moses received *them*, but they themselves were not found worthy. But how did we receive *them*? Mark this. Moses received *them* being a servant, but the Lord himself gave *them* to us to be the people of His inheritance, . . . and we might receive the covenant through Him who inherited it, even the Lord Jesus, . . . and thus establish the covenant in us through the word. (14 : 3-5, italics mine)

In the above quotation, the antecedant of "them" is always the tables of the Law. Therefore the Ten Commandments form the basis of both the covenant that God had with Israel until it was broken, and the covenant that God has now with Christians. The author upheld the binding obligation of the Law upon Christians. As Harnack states, the author of Barnabas was no antinomian. ²⁵

This fact is also demonstrated in the anti-Sabbatarian 15th chapter. The writer cited the Fourth Commandment from the Law and considered the Sabbath as still in effect. But the Sabbath he accepted was not the literal seventh day of the week, rather it was a future seventh millennium as determined by symbolically interpreting the creation week in conjunction with the rule of a day for 1,000 years. If this millennial ages scheme as outlined in the epistle is to be valid, it is mandatory that the Sabbath be in effect. The Fourth Commandment is not fulfilled and done away with, it is unfulfilled and yet future.

Millennial Ages Theory

Jewish Apocalyptic. The Epistle of Barnabas interprets

²⁴ II (19 : 5), VII (19 : 4), X (19 : 6). See above, note 21.

²⁵ See above, note 14.

the six creation days as representing 1,000 years each, "He meaneth this, that in six thousand years the Lord shall bring all things to an end" (15: 4). These six days are followed by the Sabbath, which apparently represents another millennium commencing "when His Son shall come" (15: 5). Then comes the eighth day, "which is the beginning of another world" (15: 8). This millennial ages idea was not original with the author, for it is found in the intertestamental Jewish literature. The earliest reference to it is found in the Book of Jubilees, which dates from well before Christian times.²⁶ The day-millennium equation is stated there as follows,

And he [Adam] lacked seventy years of one thousand years; for one thousand years are as one day in the testimony of the heavens and therefore was it written concerning the tree of knowledge: "On the day that ye eat thereof ye shall die." For this reason he did not complete the years of this day; for he died during it.²⁷

It remained for a later work to expand this principle into a complete system, as it is in the Epistle of Barnabas. This next step is found in the Book of the Secrets of Enoch (Slavonic),

And I blessed the seventh day, which is the Sabbath, on which he rested from all his works. And I appointed the eighth day also, that the eighth day should be the first-created after my work, that *the first seven* revolve in the form of the seven thousand, and that at the beginning of the eighth thousand there should be a time of not-counting, endless, with neither years nor months nor weeks nor days nor hours.²⁸

²⁶ "The oldest extra-biblical Jewish work is almost certainly the book of Jubilees, if we bear in mind that its historical and geographical point of view is essentially pre-Hellenistic, . . . we may attribute it to the early third century B.C. (possibly even to the late fourth century)." W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (2nd rev. ed.; Baltimore, 1957), pp. 346, 347.

²⁷ Jubilees 4 : 30, 31. "It is hence obvious that already before the Christian era 1,000 years had come to be regarded as one world-day." R. H. Charles, *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament* (Oxford, 1913), II, 451.

²⁸ II Enoch 32 : 1, 2. This book has been treated as a composition written by an Alexandrian Jew in the period A.D. 30-70; Charles, *op. cit.*, II, 425. Subsequent studies have assigned it a later date, well into the Christian era. H. H. Rowley, *The Relevance of Apocalyptic*

The familiarity of the writer of Barnabas with the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature is demonstrated elsewhere in the epistle. He quotes Enoch by name.²⁹ There are six quotations cited as Scripture that are not Biblical and have not yet been located in extracanonical writings.³⁰ An important relationship is that between Barnabas and IV Ezra (II Esdras). A quotation from IV Ezra has been noted in Barnabas 12 : 1.³¹ A further parallel between these two works may be seen by comparing the following passages, "For thus shall the Day of Judgement be whereon is neither sun, nor moon, nor stars,..."³² A phrase in Barnabas' (London, 1947), pp. 95, 96. If this later view on II Enoch is correct it would of course preclude the idea that Barnabas derived the millennial ages system from that source. It is not vital to embark upon a study of the date of II Enoch here. Suffice it to say that if II Enoch (or a similar work) does not bridge the gap in the development of this idea between Jubilees and Barnabas, then the writer of the latter work must be credited with much more theological ingenuity than he probably deserves.

²⁹ Barnabas 4 : 3. The passage in Enoch has not been definitely located, but may be from I Enoch 89 or 90. Barnabas was not very exact in his quotations of Biblical or extrabiblical sources. He freely paraphrased and combined passages to suit his purposes.

³⁰ 6 : 13; 7 : 4; 7 : 8; 10 : 7; 16 : 6 where the quotations are introduced with such phrases as, "the Lord says," "in the Prophet," and "it is written." These passages are apparently taken from extracanonical works no longer extant. In 7 : 11 there is a quotation from Jesus not recorded in the gospels which was probably one of the sayings of Jesus that circulated in Egypt in the post-Apostolic era, such as are found in the Oxyrhynchus papyri.

³¹ Barnabas: "Concerning the cross in another prophet, who saith: 'And when shall these things be accomplished? saith the Lord. Whensoever... blood shall drop from a tree.'" IV Ezra 4 : 33; 5 : 5; "How long and when shall this be?"... "Blood shall trickle out of wood."

³² IV Ezra 7 : 39 (This verse is missing in the Vulgate and in the Authorized Version). The dating and textual criticism of IV Ezra also has its complexities. The passages from this work related to Barnabas (4 : 33; 5 : 5; 7 : 39) come from a section of IV Ezra (3-14) believed to have been written originally in Hebrew before the end of the 1st century A.D.; "Apocrypha," S. H. Horn *et al.*, *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Dictionary* (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 50, 51. II Enoch 32 : 2 quoted above may contain a concept astronomically related to this verse in IV Ezra.

anti-Sabbatarian chapter apparently refers to an extension of this celestial activity, "when His Son shall come, . . . and shall change the sun and moon and the stars, then shall He truly rest on the seventh day."³³ The similarity between these two passages lies in more than just phraseology. They both come out of the context of a chapter that deals with the "millennium" and the future age.³⁴

Numerical imagery in Jewish apocalyptic is admittedly a complex subject which cannot be thoroughly explored here, but it is of interest to note that in another location IV Ezra divided the present world age not into six epochs as Barnabas did, but into twelve (a multiple).³⁵ Another work which contains this division of the present world age into twelve time periods is the Apocalypse of (Syriac or II) Baruch. This is one of various parallels between IV Ezra and II Baruch, which was written in the last half of the 1st century A.D. In II Baruch these twelve ages are dualistically alternated between light and darkness, good and evil.³⁶

Persian Influence. The twelve-age outline of IV Ezra and II Baruch in turn strongly resembles the ages system of

³³ Barnabas 15 : 5. Other writers of Jewish apocalyptic also mention this. At the end of the Jubilees, "all the luminaries (shall) be renewed" Jubilees 1 : 29. In I Enoch 91 : 15-17 after the "great eternal judgement," "The powers of the heavens shall be given seven-fold light." This resembles the Zoroastrian idea of the final renovation of all the universe. (See below.)

³⁴ IV Ezra 7 describes a 400-year "millennium" which begins with the coming of the Messiah, and ends with His death along with all humanity. Seven days after this all those in the grave will be resurrected along with the Messiah, to stand before the "Most High . . . on his judgement seat." On this "Day of Judgement," quoted above from 7 : 39, the "heathen" are assigned to the "lake of torment . . . the furnace of the Pit" and the righteous to the "paradise of joy."

³⁵ IV Ezra 14 : 11, 12: "For the world-age is divided into twelve parts; nine (parts) are passed already, and the half of the tenth part; and there remain of it two (parts) besides the half of the tenth part." 5 : 49: "So have I also disposed the world which I have created by defined periods of time."

³⁶ II Baruch 26-28; 53; 68, 69.

Zoroastrianism, in which the battle between the forces of light and darkness (the good led by Ahura Mazda against the evil headed by Ahriman) is pursued to its close at the end of a 12,000-year course, which is divided into four aeons of 3,000 years each.³⁷

Various points of correspondence have been noted between Zoroastrian doctrine and Jewish thought.³⁸ It is possible that this interchange of ideas began as early as the Exile when these two currents of thought were most directly in confrontation, though evidence for a relationship is not remarkable until the last few centuries B.C.³⁹ Even in areas where an exchange of ideas appears evident, it is not necessarily certain in which direction the transmission of thought occurred.⁴⁰

³⁷ In the first aeon Ahura Mazda made preparations for the battle with Ahriman and laid out the number of years necessary to accomplish the final triumph of righteousness. This period of time was agreed upon by both of the protagonists. The warfare began in the second aeon. The third aeon culminated in the advent of the great prophet Zoroaster. The final aeon is divided into three millenniums, each of which is ruled over by a virgin-born son of Zoroaster. This last aeon ends with the ultimate victory of righteousness, a resurrection and judgement, rewards to the wicked and righteous, and the renovation of the world and the universe. IV Ezra even parallels the Zoroastrian system roughly with respect to time schedule. The Iranian outline left a balance of 3,000 of the total 12,000 years from the time of Zoroaster (sometime in the first half of the last millennium B.C. historically) to the end. Of the total of 12 world periods (of unspecified duration) in IV Ezra, the author left a remainder of two and a half periods from his time in the 1st century A.D.

³⁸ The main points of similarity are:

1. The nature and origin of evil.
2. A personal antagonist of God.
3. The doctrine of angels, especially with respect to their organized hierarchy.
4. A tendency toward dualism.
5. A bodily resurrection with individual afterlife.
6. A last judgement with its rewards and punishments.

³⁹ "There is no clear trace of Iranian influence on Judaism before the second century B.C., though the beginnings of this influence may well go back a century or two earlier." Albright, *op. cit.*, p. 361.

⁴⁰ "We cannot say with any certainty whether the Jews borrowed from the Zoroastrians or the Zoroastrians borrowed from the Jews

This relationship is especially difficult to demonstrate in the realm of eschatology.⁴¹ The reason for this is that the Jewish apocalyptic cited above antedates by several centuries the Pahlavi books, which contain the more elaborate Zoroastrian eschatologic statement with its ages outline. However, the details of Zoroastrian literary chronology are obscure and their interpretation is a perplexing problem to scholars working in that field,⁴² and the earlier teachings of this religion were probably transmitted orally for a long period of time.⁴³ Zoroastrian tradition holds that the original Avesta was destroyed by Alexander the Great and that only a third of it remained in the memories of men. This is "almost certainly pure legend, but legend, as usual, probably enshrines some grain of truth."⁴⁴ It remains a distinct though as yet unproved possibility that the division of the present world

or whether either in fact borrowed from the other." R. C. Zaehner, *The Dawn and Twilight of Zoroastrianism* (New York, 1961), pp. 57, 58.

⁴¹ "The case for a Judaeo-Christian dependence on Zoroastrianism in its purely eschatological thinking is quite different and not at all convincing, for apart from a few hints in the *Gāthās* . . . and a short passage in *Yasht* . . . we have no evidence as to what eschatological ideas the Zoroastrians had in the last four centuries before Christ." Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

⁴² "The whole question is immensely complicated by the fact that the data for the history of Mazdayasnanism (the religion of Zoroaster) are very obscure and conflicting. In fact no two specialists agree in their interpretation of the evidence, as is particularly clear if we compare the views of the latest competent writers on the subject." "The apocalyptic picture of the end of the world (e.g., Rev. 8 ff.) calls to mind many Iranian parallels, though in view of the obscurity of Zoroastrian literary chronology, it cannot be definitely shown that they antedate Sassanian times (third-seventh centuries A.D)." Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 358, 363.

⁴³ "Zoroaster . . . preached a new gospel, the general nature of which is clear from the Gathas of the Avesta . . . Judging from linguistic and paleographic evidence, they [concepts of the Avesta] were transmitted orally for not less than 800, and perhaps for more than 1100 years." Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 359, 360. Between the 1st and 2d editions of this work Albright moved his date for Zoroaster three centuries farther, consequently his estimated period for this oral transmission became 300 years longer.

⁴⁴ Zaehner, *op. cit.*, p. 25.

age into epochs as found in the Jewish apocalyptic cited above (which Barnabas draws from) had its original basis, in one form or another, in Iranian thought of the era before Christ.

Greek Philosophy. Some of the presuppositions underlying Barnabas' ages system also harmonized with ideas from Greek philosophy, especially as they are found fused with the Hebrew religion in the works of Philo. This Jewish philosopher, also a resident of Alexandria and a great allegorist, antedated the Epistle of Barnabas by about a century. While he accepted and observed the Sabbath (he believed that it was a day for philosophic meditation and a mystical experience), his teachings undermined the foundation upon which it rested. Because he accepted the Platonic concept that time was based upon motion, Philo did not believe that the record of Gn 1 referred to literal days. He interpreted the six days of creation as meaning "not a quantity of days, but a perfect number" and he adds, "It is quite foolish to think that the world was created in six days or in a space of time at all."⁴⁵

The fact that this type of thinking was current in Barnabas' place and time certainly could have enhanced the acceptance of his millennial ages scheme, but in the matter of interpretation the writer stands closer to the apocrypha, pseudepigrapha, and Rabbinic teaching.⁴⁶

Christian Acceptance. The millennial ages system with its 6,000 years of present world history appeared in Christian literature for the first time in the Epistle of Barnabas.

⁴⁵ Quoted in H. A. Wolfson, *Philo* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947), I, 120.

⁴⁶ Barnabas "gives no sign of being motivated by such philosophical objections as Philo felt, but justifies it [the 1 day = 1,000 year rule] by means of Ps. lxxxix. (xc.) 4. . . . In this point also Barnabas rests on Jewish tradition." C. K. Barrett, "The Eschatology of the Epistle to the Hebrews," *The Background of the New Testament and its Eschatology: Studies in Honour of C. H. Dodd* (Cambridge, Engl., 1956), pp. 369, 370. See also below note 63.

Subsequently the idea received a fairly wide circulation in the early Church. At least a dozen of the early Church Fathers⁴⁷ from Justin Martyr⁴⁸ to Augustine accepted the theory to a greater or lesser extent. Hippolytus (d. ca. 236) is particularly noteworthy in the development of this idea as he carried the system to its logical conclusion. If the present world age terminates with Christ's second advent at the end of 6,000 years, then the date for that event can be computed if the date of creation is known. Using the LXX text he arrived at the date of 5,500 B.C. for creation and therefore believed that Christ would return about A.D. 500. Thus Hippolytus became the first Church Father known to us who set a specific date for the second advent by calculation,⁴⁹ and it was based upon the millennial ages theory. Lactantius later arrived at the same date by the same method of calculation.

Needless to say, these Church Fathers were in error theologically if not chronologically, and the failure of their forecast undoubtedly reinforced the movement away from the 6,000 year system to a less exact interpretation as found in the teachings of Augustine. Augustine accepted the millennial ages outline at face value in his earlier career,⁵⁰ but later, as he

⁴⁷ Justin, Irenaeus, Tertullian (probably), Hippolytus, Julius Africanus, Cyprian, Commodian, Victorinus of Pettau, Methodius, Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome and Augustine. Space prohibits a full documentation and discussion of these sources, but see especially L. E. Froom, *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers*, (Washington, D.C., 1946-54), vol. I, under the appropriate sections, in conjunction with the writings of the Fathers.

⁴⁸ Justin mentions the 1 day = 1,000 year principle in the same terms used in Jubilees 4 : 30, 31 which refers to Adam's unfulfilled day; *Dialogue with Trypho*, 81. The millennial-ages system in its more complete form is not found in his extant works, but there is a lost fragment of Justin referred to by Anastasius who says, "Justin the martyr and philosopher, who, commenting with exceeding wisdom on the number six of the sixth day, . . . Whence also, having discoursed at length on the number six, he declares that all things which have been framed by God are divided into six classes, . . ." *ANF*, I, 302.

⁴⁹ Froom, *op. cit.*, p. 278.

⁵⁰ "I myself, too, once held this opinion." Augustine, *De civitate Dei*, xx. 7.

became the great proponent of Amillennialism, he shifted away from the idea and its natural premillennial implications. Though he retained the idea of dividing the present world age into six periods, Augustine based his divisions on periods of Biblical history, none of which were 1,000 years in length.⁵¹ With other features of Augustinian theology this idea received acceptance in the Middle Ages, and also in later eras. This concept of a "world week" with its "septiform periodicity," whether held in its earlier more precise millennial outline or in its later generalized form, has continued to exert an influence even down to modern times.⁵²

Millennialism

The question has been raised in regard to Christian theology, under what category of millennial doctrine does the Epistle of Barnabas belong? It certainly does not support Post-millennialism.⁵³ The epistle is generally understood as presenting the premillennial view, but it has been claimed for Amillennialism.⁵⁴ The basic assumption that must be made

⁵¹ Augustine's ages are: (1) Adam to Noah, (2) Noah to Abraham, (3) Abraham to David, (4) David to the Captivity, (5) the Captivity to Christ, (6) Christ to the end, (7) the second advent and the eternal rest. *De genesi contra Manichaeos*, i. 23. With his amillennial view the period from Christ to the end becomes his "millennium." Though he did not necessarily mean for this 6th period to be understood as a literal 1,000 years, his teaching later came to be interpreted that way, and another disappointment of the end of the world hope was experienced around A.D. 1,000.

⁵² William Miller, leader of the 1844 Advent Movement, criticized the day-age theory in connection with his opposition to a temporal millennium, "He then alludes to the 'mystical meaning' deduced from the six days of creation week, and avers that the prevalent false millennial theory 'has led mankind into more delusion than any other thing or manner of explaining Scripture ever did.'" Froom, *op. cit.*, IV, 480.

⁵³ "It is clear that Barnabas' real view was that he and his contemporaries stood within the 6000 years, still waiting for the Son of God to usher in the millennial period with heavenly signs and portents." Barrett, *op. cit.*, p. 371.

⁵⁴ D. H. Kromminga, *The Millennium in the Church* (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1945), pp. 31ff.

in order to classify Barnabas as amillennialist is that the 15th chapter of the epistle makes the future symbolic seventh and eighth days identical with respect to commencement and duration.⁵⁵ If they are not identical then Barnabas is premillennialist. The problem arises because the author did not clearly differentiate between the two days and thus has left room for some confusion.⁵⁶

In spite of his lack of clarity on this point, the premillennial view is certainly the simplest and most reasonable way to understand the writer.⁵⁷ There are some minor reasons for

⁵⁵ "He seems to be of the opinion that there will be a seventh world period all right, but that period will be identical with the perfection of the eternal state. There can be no doubt about the identity of his seventh and his eighth day." Kromminga, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁵⁶ There are actually two problems that contribute to the confusion:

1. The author did not specifically state that the 1,000 year rule applied to the seventh day as it did to the other six (15 : 5). "In 15 : 5-7, however, the writer of this Epistle does not develop logically the thought with regard to the seventh day; for the seventh day on which God rested from His works should in accordance with the same principle of interpretation as in 15 : 4 have been taken as a symbol of a thousand years of rest, *i.e.*, the millennium." Charles, *op. cit.*, II, 427.

2. The author did not clearly state whether the eighth day starts at the beginning, during, or at the end of the future seventh day (15 : 8). "But this leads him to include the explicit statement that the eighth day is the beginning of a new world, and if by this he means the eighth millennium what he says here is inconsistent with what he says in xv. 5-7, where the Sabbatical millennium in which sin is overcome is the seventh." Barrett, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

Is it possible that this obscurity in Barnabas is reflected in the writings of Clement of Alexandria? He writes, "The eighth may possibly turn out to be properly the seventh, and the seventh manifestly the sixth, and the latter properly the Sabbath, and the seventh a day of work. For the creation of the world was concluded in six days." *Stromata*, vi. 16.

⁵⁷ As does one Catholic writer who diagrams Barnabas' system for his readers, "Days: 1|2|3|4|5|6-the present|7 Millennium|8 eternity"
the past

and he adds, "His seventh era begins when the world *ends*, and will *end* with the dawn of 'another world,'—not another millennium, but the day of eternity, 'the eighth day.'" J. A. Kleist, *The Epistle of Barnabas* ("Ancient Christian Writers," vol. VI; Westminster, Md., 1948), p. 179.

drawing a distinction between the seventh and eighth days in this passage. The logical progression of the chapter indicates a difference,⁵⁸ and the mere fact that the author uses a different name or number at all implies a distinction. But the greatest reason against making the two days identical is the basic purpose of the chapter. If the future seventh and eighth days begin together (at the end of the sixth day) then so do the week days in this present age, and that leaves Christians keeping the seventh-day Sabbath which is exactly what the writer did not want, and against which he was writing. A distinction between the seventh and eighth days both present and future is vital to the author's anti-Sabbatarian cause. It should be kept in mind that this chapter was not meant to be a treatise on the millennium, but that the millennium and the ages scheme are present here because they are useful in supporting the writer's basic purpose in the chapter, *i.e.*, opposition to the Sabbath.⁵⁹

The Sabbath

The Epistle of Barnabas was not written simply as a tract to dispose of the Sabbath, although that was the author's purpose in the 15th chapter. The writer's anti-Sabbatarianism was just one of the many features of his overall anti-Judaism. The Sabbath had become so intimately connected with the fabric of Judaism, indeed one of the hallmarks of it, in the thinking of the writer (and many of his age) that he was unable to make a separation between the continuing Sabbath and other features of the Hebrew religion no longer to be perpetuated in Christianity.

The main argument used in the epistle against the Sabbath was the millennial ages outline by which the writer transferred

⁵⁸ vv. 1-4—first 6 days; vv. 5-8a—the 7th day; vv. 8b-9—the 8th day.

⁵⁹ "The only point that is really clear here is perhaps the only point that Barnabas really wished to make: the Jews with their Sabbaths are in the wrong, the Christians with their Sundays are in the right." Barrett, *op cit.*, p. 370.

it to a future age. To arrive at this conclusion three assumptions were required:

1. The days of creation could not be interpreted entirely as literal days, but were wholly or in part symbolic in nature.
2. These "days" were to extend into the future from the time of creation for their accomplishment.⁶⁰
3. The length of time occupied by each "day" was to be determined by the equation that one day equals 1,000 years.

In regard to the first assumption, the Genesis record of creation when taken in its most logical sense is simply the ancient Hebrew writer's account of origins, and was a natural place for him to begin the history of mankind and redemption. There is nothing in Gn 1 and 2 to indicate that the writer of these chapters in any way felt that they were mythologic, legendary, symbolic, prophetic, or to be interpreted allegorically. To interpret this account of creation in such a manner is to apply an external presupposition to it that violates the basic principle that the Scriptures should be interpreted according to their most literal and obvious meaning, unless the contents or the context of the passage dictate otherwise.⁶¹ The second assumption Barnabas established by transposing the original verb forms of the LXX,⁶² and the third rests on his faulty exegesis of Ps 90 : 4.⁶³

⁶⁰ As opposed to the geologic-ages theory or Philo's interpretation for example, which place the supposed symbolism in the past.

⁶¹ For a discussion of allegorization and its relation to Seventh-day Adventist principles of interpretation see Royal Sage, "Does Seventh-day Adventist Theology Owe a Debt to Theodore of Mopsuestia?" *AUSS*, I (1963), 81-90.

⁶² "In this interpretation two points are involved: the expansion of 'days' into millennia, and the change of the past tense (*συντέλεσεν*) into the future (*συντέλεσει*). The latter change Barnabas makes no attempt to justify.

"The universe will thus be completed in 6,000 years. Gen ii. 2 continues that on the seventh day God rested (*κατέπαυσεν*). This aorist also is changed into a future." Barrett, *op. cit.*, p. 370.

⁶³ "Clearly he is applying a ready-made set of canons of interpretation. In making the former he... justifies it by means of Ps. lxxxix. (xc.) 4. This piece of eschatological mathematics, though very service-

The only other argument Barnabas used against the Sabbath besides the millennial ages scheme is found in 15: 6, 7. Not until that future age represented by the Sabbath will man be hallowed enough to keep it, "we shall be able to hallow it then, because we ourselves shall have been hallowed first" (v. 7). But as for this present age, even the best of men are unable to achieve that state of purity and holiness.⁶⁴ For a brief answer to this in passing it should be remembered, that which God commands He also supplies strength sufficient to perform.

Why should the author of Barnabas believe that Christians were unable to attain sufficient sanctity to hallow the Sabbath in this present age? The answer to this may possibly be found in the kind of Sabbath observed by the Jews in Barnabas' era. One of the reasons for opposition to the Sabbath in the early Church was the Jewish legalistic misuse of it, and it is possible that Barnabas' statement here reflects the same reaction against the burdensome restrictions the Sabbath had been weighed down with in the intertestamental period.

As the Epistle of Barnabas is the witness closest to the

able to Christians perplexed by the parousia, seems to have been Jewish in origin. . . . The rabbinic evidence can be traced back to the first century, and supplemented by Jub. iv. 30, where, however, there is no explicit reference to Ps. xc. In this point also Barnabas rests on Jewish tradition.

"Thus in all his calculations Barnabas has simply adopted and transposed Jewish methods and results. We have already seen that the equation of one day with a thousand years was Jewish; so also was the connection between the Sabbath and the age to come." Barrett, *op cit.*, pp. 369-371.

⁶⁴ "If therefore a man is able now to hallow the day which God hallowed, though he be pure in heart, we have gone utterly astray" (15 : 6). "And in our sinful inability thus to sanctify it he finds the reason for its abolition." Kromminga, *op. cit.*, p. 35. The same reasoning applies to Sunday. If Christians cannot become sufficiently holy now to hallow the Sabbath day, neither can they become such to hallow any other weekly holy day such as the "eighth day." Therefore it could not have been necessary, in the author's thinking, to hallow the 8th day in the sense of a strict religious observance the way the Sabbath had been kept, but it was "for rejoicing" (15 : 9).

New Testament on this subject, it is important to consider not only the reasons the writer did give for voiding the Sabbath, but also the reasons he did not give:

1. He did not cite any teaching of Christ to discontinue Sabbathkeeping.

2. He did not cite any command or example of the Apostles to discontinue Sabbathkeeping.

3. He did not cite any change in or abolition of the Law as a reason for discontinuing Sabbathkeeping.

4. He made no mention of the Sabbath as being a ceremonial type that was fulfilled and terminated at the cross.

Does opposition to the Sabbath in this epistle imply that it was being kept in the author's time and place? Certainly. But the question is, by whom? If the party the writer opposed was composed of Christians then they were Judaizers of the rankest type. As has been mentioned earlier, Barnabas' antagonists were more likely non-Christian Jews. The epistle was directed against the Jews and various features of their faith and practice to prevent his Christian readers from becoming Judaizing Christians (or returning to Judaism itself).⁶⁵

The epistle gives no direct evidence that evangelical Christians in the New Testament tradition were keeping the Sabbath there and then, nor does it say that they were not. The most that can be said on this point is that the Christian readers of this letter were in "danger" of observing the Sabbath, and that there was a strong enough appeal in Sabbathkeeping for them that the author wrote his 15th chapter against it, with the warning that anyone so doing has "gone utterly astray" (15: 6). The strongest evidence in support of the Sabbath from this epistle is not found in the reverse implication that Christians of that time were keeping the Sabbath, but rather in the clear demonstration of the fact that the anti-Sabbatarianism of so early a witness rests upon such a thoroughly unbiblical basis.

⁶⁵ "Barnabas' 'sons and daughters' were face to face with the temptation to fall back into Judaism." Kleist, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

The Eighth Day

Again it should be pointed out that the author's main objective in the 15th chapter of the epistle was to void the Sabbath. His principal thrust in this passage was to oppose the obligation of Sabbath observance, and not necessarily to enjoin Sundaykeeping as such, although this was a logical byproduct of his attack. The introduction of Sunday in this chapter was of far less importance to the author than was the elimination of the Sabbath. Sunday was brought in at the end of his anti-Sabbatarian statement almost as a postscript, and only the last three of 32 lines of text in the chapter are concerned with it. The author's comment on his keeping of the eighth day did not place it in the same category that Sabbath observance previously occupied (and which Sundaykeeping later came to occupy), with its mandatory obligation as a sanctified weekly holyday.⁶⁶

It may be asked, why did the author always refer to the day we commonly call Sunday as the "eighth day"? Several reasons for this have been proposed:

1. Because he was citing that phrase from II Enoch.⁶⁷
2. Because he was drawing a parallel with Jewish circumcision which was assigned to the eighth day after birth.⁶⁸
3. Because the name was in common use in his time, perhaps

⁶⁶ See above, note 64.

⁶⁷ "In xv. 8, however, this writer [Barnabas] shows his return to our text [II Enoch 32 : 1, 2] by his use of the peculiar phrase, 'the eighth day.'" Charles, *op. cit.*, II, 427. This is quite reasonable, but of course depends on where one dates II Enoch (see note 28).

⁶⁸ Yost, *ibid.*; Hammill, *ibid.* Barnabas did not mention that circumcision took place on the 8th day, nor did he make any connection between that rite and the Sabbath. The first time this idea appeared in Christian literature was in Justin Martyr, *Dialogue with Trypho*, ch. 41. Justin also used the eight people in Noah's ark as a symbol for the 8th day. *Ibid.*, 138. While it is not impossible that circumcision was the basis for Barnabas' use of the eighth day, he did not say so, and the only reason supplied in the epistle for it was the millennial-ages theory. It is more likely that these varying reasons employed by Barnabas and Justin represent independent attempts to justify the same thing—use of the eighth day.

due to the old Roman eight-day market-day cycle, or some such similar custom.⁶⁹

Once more it is important to view the negative aspect of the problem, and look at the reasons that the writer did not give for his use of Sunday:

1. He cited no command or inference from Christ for Sunday observance.

2. He cited no instruction or practice of the Apostles for Sunday observance.

3. He did not cite any Scripture in support of Sunday observance (other than the verses used in the millennial ages theory).

⁶⁹ It is a basic question whether "the eighth day" was a special coined Christian term or one that was in general use. It is significant that the eighth day appears most strongly in Sabbath/Sunday literature in the 2d century (early—Barnabas; middle—Justin; late—Clement). Thereafter it assumed much less importance, although it did not completely disappear, *i.e.*, the Venerable Bede in his book "Concerning Times," 4, mentioned, "The week consists of seven days, and the eighth day is the same as the first; to which it returns and in which the week begins again." Quoted by Yost, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

These 2d century statements were written in the period when the old eight-day market-day cycle (*nundinae*) was giving way to the newer seven-day astrologic week which spread through the empire with Mithraism. "The astrologic week, used unofficially in Italy as early as Augustus, . . . was 1st given legal recognition in the Roman civil calendar when Constantine, . . . made laws enforcing rest on Sunday, 'the venerable day of the Sun.'" Horn, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 1140, 1141.

Justin Martyr used the astrologic weekday names when he wrote to the emperor, referring to the first and seventh days as "the day of the sun," and "the day of Saturn," respectively (*First Apology*, 67). These names were known and used by the emperor, and by not referring to the Sabbath Justin avoided arousing his anti-Jewish antagonism. However, when he wrote against Trypho the Jew he used the Judaeo-Christian terminology of the Sabbath, the first day, and the seventh day, along with the added eighth day feature. (*Dial.*, 41, 138). Had Justin spoken of "the day of the sun" (or Saturn) to Trypho he would very likely have been further accused of paganism. The fact that Justin used the eighth day in converse with the non-Christian Trypho shows that he was acquainted with it and that it was not just a coined Christian phrase.

4. He did not cite the resurrection as a reason for Sunday observance.

5. He did not enjoin Sunday observance because that day was called "the Lord's day."

The one and only reason the author gave for his employment of Sunday was the millennial ages theory in which the eighth day was symbolic of a future age "which is the beginning of another world" (15: 8). His conclusion based on this, and the only direct comment about his use of Sunday was, "Wherefore also we keep the eighth day for rejoicing" (15: 9). Only after having established this thesis did he also add esteem to the eighth day by referring to the fact that Christ's resurrection occurred on that day, "in the which also Jesus rose from the dead" (15: 9).⁷⁰ This subordinate clause does not give the resurrection or a commemoration of it as the reason for keeping Sunday, but that event on the eighth day was mentioned here to lend its influence to the conclusion already finalized on the basis of the millennial ages outline. It is logical then that the author did not refer to the first (eighth) day of the week as the "Lord's day."⁷¹

Brief mention might be made here of the use to which this work has been put by some advocates of Sunday observance, and the extravagant claims that on occasion have been made for it, such as, "It expressly mentions *the universal celebration by the Church of the eighth day as a holy day*, in place of the former seventh day."⁷² Another dominical advocate has

⁷⁰ Barnabas 15 : 9: Διὸ καὶ ἄγομεν τὴν ἡμέραν τὴν ὀγδόην εἰς εὐφροσύνην, ἐν ᾗ καὶ ὁ Ἰησοῦς ἀνέστη ἐκ νεκρῶν καὶ φανερωθεὶς ἀνέβη εἰς οὐρανούς.

⁷¹ Justin took the next step after Barnabas and did give the resurrection as one of the reasons for Sunday observance, along with his 8th-day allegorisms (circumcision, eight people in the Ark), and the commemoration of the first day of creation. However, not until Clement of Alexandria (shortly after the reference in the apocryphal Gospel According to Peter) did "the Lord's day" appear in the bona-fide writings of the Church Fathers definitely connected with the first day of the week. Clement finds it allegorically in the 10th book of Plato's Republic, again on the basis of the 8th day. *Stromata*, v. 14.

⁷² J. Gilfillan cited in Robert Cox, *The Literature of the Sabbath*

given a far more objective and acceptable statement to the effect that the Epistle of Barnabas,

certainly is admissible evidence to show that in the time of the writer of the Epistle the first day of the week was by some Christians,—somewhere or other, and after some fashion or other,—observed and distinguished from the other days of the week. ⁷³

In conclusion, we may note that the two earliest clear statements in the literature of the early Church relating to the Sabbath/Sunday controversy are found in the writings of Justin Martyr and in the Epistle of Barnabas, which date from the middle and early 2d century respectively. Both of these works are anti-Judaistic and anti-Sabbatarian, and they both cite the use of Sunday in their localities. These writings originated from the first and second cities of the empire, Rome and Alexandria. It is interesting to view these works and their relation to the Sabbath in their place and time through the information supplied to us in the two oft-quoted but still striking statements from the 5th century Church historians Socrates and Sozomen:

Almost all churches throughout the world celebrate the sacred mysteries [the Lord's supper] on the Sabbath of every week, yet the Christians at Alexandria and at Rome, on account of some ancient tradition, have ceased to do this. ⁷⁴

The people of Constantinople, and almost everywhere, assemble together on the Sabbath, as well as on the first day of the week, which custom is never observed at Rome or at Alexandria. ⁷⁵

Question (Edinburgh, 1865), I, 316. See also the comment of Westcott under note 2.

⁷³ W. Domville quoted in Cox, *op. cit.*

⁷⁴ Socrates Scholasticus, *Ecclesiastical History*, v. 22.

⁷⁵ Sozomen, *Ecclesiastical History*, vii. 19.

JOSEPHUS, *ANTIQUITIES*, BOOK XI
CORRECTION OR CONFIRMATION
OF BIBLICAL POST-EXILIC RECORDS?

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Josephus and his Sources

The writings of Josephus furnish important source material for the history of the Jewish people, and thus also for the post-exilic period. Among scholars, however, Josephus, in common with other ancient writers, has never enjoyed the reputation of being a fully reliable or accurate historian. This applies particularly to his records describing the return of the Jews from their Babylonian exile, as presented in the eleventh book of *Antiquities*. Yet, opinions as to the degree of accuracy of some parts of these records are widely divergent. There is certainly no need of either outright rejection or unconditional acceptance of the whole book. While Josephus transmitted in some instances incorrect or doubtful information, there has been an increasing confirmation through archaeological findings of certain events presented by him, which formerly were thought to be of a doubtful nature.

Discussing the battle of Carchemish between Nebuchadnezzar and Neco, D. N. Freedman observed: "Noteworthy is the striking agreement between Josephus and the Babylonian Chronicle."¹ In another instance Josephus, quoting Hecataeus, mentions a Jewish high priest Ezekias at the beginning of the Hellenistic period. The discovery at Beth-zur of a Jewish coin bearing the inscription *Yehûd* (Judah) and *Yehazqîyah* (Hezekiah) confirms the existence of that high

¹ D. N. Freedman, "The Babylonian Chronicle," *BA*, XIX (1956), 53, note 11.

priest in the period indicated by Josephus.² Even more impressive is the recent discovery of the Samaria papyri, establishing the historicity of a second Sanballat, who lived in the middle of the 4th century B.C. Though it does not solve all the problems posed by *Ant.*, xi, this discovery disproves the views of those historians who denied the existence of another Sanballat besides the one who was a contemporary of Nehemiah.³

Inasmuch as it has been demonstrated that Josephus' writings contain both truth and error, the only way to arrive at a just conclusion is to judge each case on its own merits. This investigation attempts to show evidence and reasons for several inaccuracies, *e.g.*, a preconceived historical pattern, incorrect use of his sources, and a pronounced confusion of persons, events, and thus of chronology. Fortunately, for Josephus and other ancient historians alike, a number of incorrect statements in *Ant.*, xi can be checked and corrected quite easily, an advantage of which few scholars seem to have availed themselves. But it is also apparent that Josephus had access to sources not available to the modern student of history, thus enhancing the value of his writings in some respects. Therefore, while some scholars have taken a sceptical attitude toward the reliability of that ancient historian, others have accepted some of his records in preference to the Biblical account.⁴

The specific purpose of the first part of this investigation is to establish the relationship of the eleventh book of *Antiquities* with the source material used by Josephus (especially with I Esdras), the way he utilized his sources, and what effect the use of the same has in regard to Biblical data.

² Josephus, *Contra Apionem*, i. 22 (§§ 187-189); O. R. Sellers, *The Citadel of Beth-zur* (Philadelphia, 1933), pp. 73, 74.

³ F. M. Cross, Jr., "The Discovery of the Samaria Papyri," *BA*, XXVI (1963), 119-121.

⁴ R. A. Bowman, "Ezra and Nehemiah," *The Interpreter's Bible* (New York, 1954), III, 561, 598; Ralph Marcus, *Josephus*, VI (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 324, 325; W. F. Albright, *The Biblical Period From Abraham to Ezra* (New York, 1963), p. 111, note 185.

One of the first errors is Josephus' incorrect identification of Sheshbazzar with Zerubbabel. According to *Ant.*, xi. 1.3, the treasurer Mithridates was associated with Abassaros (Sheshbazzar) in guarding the temple vessels. This refers to I Esdras 2 : 11, 12 and Ezr 1 : 8, and has to be dated shortly after 538 B.C., under Cyrus. However, due to a transposition of sources to be discussed below, Josephus incorrectly identifies the associate of Mithridates with Zerubbabel. But in I Esdras 6 : 17, 18 as well as in Ezr 5 : 15 Sheshbazzar is clearly distinguished from Zerubbabel.

Other mistakes stem from the exchange or confusion of names of several Persian kings as found in xi. 2.1 and 5.1 ff. Following I Esdras, Josephus apparently did not understand why two important kings were ignored and the chronological continuity thus interrupted. He supplied these "missing links" in different ways. In the first place he inserted the name of Cambyses into the account (I Esdras 2 : 16), by changing the name of Artaxerxes to Cambyses, which caused a chronological disturbance. Secondly, finding that a parallel text to Ezr 4 : 6, which mentions Xerxes (Ahasuerus), is missing between I Esdras 2 : 15 and 16, he assigned another event from the reign of Artaxerxes I to that of Xerxes (I Esdras 8 : 1; Ezr 7 : 1). Thus we face the strange situation that Josephus did not only disregard the Hebrew text of Ezra, but also used his actual source, the Greek text of I Esdras, in a very arbitrary manner.

Can it still be argued that such an exchange of names contrary to the existing sources has valid historical support? In *Ant.*, xi. 5.1 Josephus places both Ezra and Nehemiah in the reign of Xerxes, which would fix the activities of these Jewish leaders between the years 486 and 465. But it is now generally accepted on the evidence of the Aramaic papyri from Elephantine that at least Nehemiah belongs to the time of Artaxerxes I (465-423).⁵ As for Ezra, contrary to the

⁵ S. H. Horn and L. H. Wood, *The Chronology of Ezra 7* (Washington D.C., 1953), p. 90; H. H. Rowley, "Nehemiah's Mission and Its Background," *BJRL*, XXXVII (1955), 552.

obsolete theory of A. van Hoonacker, every evidence seems to support the traditional position, according to which he was commissioned in the seventh year of Artaxerxes I.⁶ That Josephus was mistaken in his identification of Artaxerxes with Xerxes is also obvious from *Ant.*, xi. 5.7. According to this passage Nehemiah arrived at Jerusalem in the 25th year of the reign of Xerxes. But Xerxes reigned only twenty-one years, and here as well as in xi. 5.8. his name must be replaced by Artaxerxes, as the name is correctly found in I Esdras and Ezra. However, the views of other scholars regarding these changes of names and data by Josephus will be discussed in the second part of this article.

Just as with every Bible translation, so also I Esdras and Josephus' *Ant.*, xi require clarification in order to be correctly understood. Josephus apparently paid little attention to the philological aspects of his sources. He uncritically copied names from his Greek MSS without checking the corresponding Hebrew text. Thus in I Esdras and consequently in *Ant.*, xi there appear words which are either titles of Persian officials, or convey ideas whose meaning escaped the translators. Such words from an Aramaic or Hebrew original were transliterated, Grecized, and "translated" into personal names. The following instance may serve as an example.

In *Ant.*, xi. 2.2 there appears a certain "Beelzemos" as one of the Persian envoys investigating the building activities of the Jews. This name is Josephus' Grecized form of "Beeltethmus" of I Esdras 2 : 16, 25 which in turn is a transliteration of an original *be'el-ṭe'em*, the Aramaic equivalent of Persian *formān kara*, the title of a high royal official.⁷

When Josephus wrote the history of his people he did not limit himself to the Bible as source material. He used canonical

⁶ See for references Rowley, *The Servant of the Lord and Other Essays on the Old Testament* (London, 1952), p. 135, notes 1-17; E. Kalt says in his *Biblisches Realexikon* (2d ed.; Paderborn, 1938), I, 503, 504; "... die durch van Hoonacker aufgestellte These ... wird jetzt fast allgemein abgelehnt."

⁷ Bowman, *op. cit.*, pp. 599, 600; Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 327, note c.

Biblical books, tradition, and extra-Biblical sources, but also incorporated a miscellaneous mass of traditional lore (Midrash, Haggadah, Jubilees, and Halakah) in his writings. He also employed Philo, Berossus, Manetho, and a number of other authors of the ancient gentile world.⁸ Even when using Biblical material, he did not always follow his text verbally but treated it rather freely. S. A. Cook makes the same observation with regard to his use of I Esdras: "Unfortunately, Jos. is often extremely paraphrastic, and is therefore no safe guide for the restoring of the original of [I] *E[sdras]*."⁹

It is obvious that in general Josephus used I Esdras in preference to the book Ezra-Nehemia in writing the post-exilic history of Judah. In part this may be due to its relationship to the canonical literature of that time. I Esdras was not only used by this orthodox Jewish historian, "the book was found important enough to find a place in the Greek Bible, it was known to early Christian writers, and is referred to in terms which indicate that its canonicity and value were not doubtful."¹⁰ Of course, Josephus could have been influenced by the elegant and idiomatic language of I Esdras in contrast to the Greek of Ezra-Nehemiah, which was "un-Greek, literal and mechanical."¹¹ It is often supposed that I Esdras "is a self-contained work, written and compiled for some specific purpose, e.g., to influence Gentiles in favour of the Jews."¹²

It hardly can be assumed that Josephus made his choice for text-critical reasons. Even though Ezra and Nehemiah present numerous problems, there are many more in I Esdras, for which reason Cook calls it a "confused and self-contradictory book."¹³

⁸ H. St. J. Thackeray, *Josephus*, IV (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), pp. xii, xiii.

⁹ A. S. Cook, "I Esdras," in R. H. Charles, ed., *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament*, I (Oxford, 1913), 5.

¹⁰ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹¹ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

¹² Cook, *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 2.

¹³ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

The fact remains, however, that while Josephus used a Hebrew text or an Aramaic Targum as authority for the early part of his Jewish history, "for the later historical books the position is reversed: from I Samuel to I Maccabees the basis of his text is a Greek Bible, and the Semitic text becomes a subsidiary source."¹⁴ Why? Josephus probably had several reasons for choosing the Greek text of I Esdras as a basis for his eleventh book. The sequence of events as offered there, which differs from that of the canonical books, may have appealed to him. Furthermore, I Esdras does not close with the story of the tenth chapter of Ezra, but continues by bringing in the events recorded in the eighth chapter of Nehemiah. This sequence of textual material, which forms a controversial topic even among modern scholars, has a definite bearing on the question whether Ezra and Nehemiah held office at the same time, and it could have been an additional and deciding factor in Josephus' choice.

According to several passages found in the book of Nehemiah, the two leaders Ezra and Nehemiah appeared repeatedly together at official functions after 444. Since the name of one or the other is missing or added either in some Hebrew or Greek MSS, most of these references are subject to textual criticism. By following I Esdras Josephus presents a totally different sequence of events, including the relationship of Ezra with Nehemiah. Josephus, correctly, makes Ezra, who had come to Jerusalem in 457 B.C., a contemporary of the high priest Joiakim. He then has Ezra, and shortly thereafter also Joiakim, die, the latter leaving the high priestly office to his son Eliashib.¹⁵ These events must have taken place not long after 457, and certainly before the coming of Nehemiah to Jerusalem in 444. That Ezra is made a contemporary of the high priest Joiakim, and Nehemiah of the high priest Eliashib supports the traditional Ezra-Nehemiah sequence. Cook makes the following observations

¹⁴ Thackeray, *op. cit.*, IV, p. xii.

¹⁵ *Ant.*, xi. 5.5.

concerning Josephus' views: "It is very noteworthy that Josephus finishes his account of Ezra before his introduction of Nehemiah."¹⁶ Later he says: "Jos., whose treatment of the story of E[zra] is free and summary, proceeds to refer to the feast of tabernacles (N[eh] viii. 16 seqq.), the return of the people to their homes, the death of the aged E[zra], and his burial in Jerusalem contemporary with the death of the high priest Joiakim and the succession of Eliashib (cf. N[eh] xii. 10)."¹⁷ And again he emphasizes: Josephus "treats the life of E[zra] independently of and before that of N[ehemiah], and his points of agreement with the MT make his divergences the more significant."¹⁸

Since the chronological sequence seems to have been one of the main concerns of Josephus as he wrote the post-exilic history of Judah, it is reasonable to assume that in his judgment I Esdras offered the best source material for this purpose. That his concern was well founded is seen from the fact that the chronological sequence in Ezra and Nehemiah is still one of the major problems facing Biblical scholars. Though Josephus made some mistakes, especially through arbitrary use of his sources, he must be given credit for certain contributions toward the clarification of issues. The above-mentioned information about Ezra's association with the high priest Joiakim and his reading of the law in the first year after coming to Jerusalem—not thirteen years later as the MT has it—may well lead to a more correct understanding of some problems involved in reconstructing the history of that time.

As already mentioned, Josephus apparently had at his disposal sources not found in Biblical records but which provided him with additional valuable information. His mention of Ezra's association with the high priest Joiakim is one of these instances. It has been stated by Cook that

¹⁶ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 2.

¹⁷ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

¹⁸ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

Josephus "presents singular divergences or additions which do not appear to be arbitrary."¹⁹

Marcus likewise confirms this fact. Referring to the conflicts between the high priest Johanan and his brother Jeshua, and between the high priest Jaddua and his brother Manasseh, he says, "From § 297 on Josephus makes use of extra-biblical sources and relates two incidents otherwise unknown to us."²⁰ It seems, however, that there are other bits of information that add to our knowledge of that period. For example, his statement that Cyrus died shortly after the Samaritan conflict with the Jews had caused the interruption of the building operations, supports the date 530/529 for the incident reported in *Ezr* 4 : 1-5 and *I Esdras* 5 : 47-73.²¹ It also indicates that after Sheshbazzar it was Zerubbabel who had attempted the building of the Temple under Cyrus, thus confirming that he was already in office under that monarch. Bowman accepts a first abortive attempt under Cyrus, but limits it to Sheshbazzar.²² It is of equal importance to learn from Josephus that there was an interval of nine years from 529 to 520, between the first attempt to rebuild the Temple and the resumption of the building activities in the 2d year of Darius.²³ This period is long enough to account for the reign of Cambyses, whose name is not mentioned either in *Ezra* or in *Nehemiah*. The observation that Zerubbabel came to Persia *from* Jerusalem when Darius came to the throne, again seems to support the view that Zerubbabel had been commissioned by Cyrus before 530, and re-appointed as governor by Darius.²⁴

Josephus and the Rebuilding of the Temple

Not least among the matters disputed has been Josephus'

¹⁹ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

²⁰ Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 499.

²¹ *Ant.*, xi. 2.1.

²² Bowman, *op. cit.*, p. 592.

²³ *Ant.*, xi. 2.2.

²⁴ *Ant.*, xi. 3.1.

narrative of the events connected with the building of the Second Temple. Here the problem is mainly one of text-sequence and chronology. The historical outline of that period as conceived by Josephus is as follows:

The *first* section (*Ant.*, xi. 1.1.1-3 = §§ 1-18) describes the first phase of the return, from *ca.* 537 B.C.

The *second* section (*Ant.*, xi. 2.1 = §§ 19-20) refers to the first abortive attempt to build the Temple, including the interference of the Samaritans, about 530/529 B.C.

The *third* section (*Ant.*, xi. 2.1.2 = §§ 21-30) deals with the building of the Temple, the city walls and the city proper. This part is assigned by Josephus to the time of Cambyses between the years 529 and 522 B.C.

The *fourth* section (*Ant.*, xi. 3.1-10 = §§ 31-74) contains the story of the three youths, which according to Josephus occurred under the reign of Darius, shortly before 520 B.C.

The *fifth* section (*Ant.*, xi. 4.1-8 = §§ 75-113) has to be divided into two parts (§§ 75-88 and 89-113), these portions being designed to cover the actual building of the Temple and its dedication, 520-515 B.C.

It still appears tempting to consider such a seemingly flawless historical sequence as reliable evidence in preference to the Biblical record. In fact, it sounds so convincing that several outstanding scholars have accepted Josephus' account as an improvement and correction of the traditional chronology. Marcus makes the following observations on *Ant.*, xi. 2.1:

Here Josephus quietly corrects the bibl. chronology of the Persian kings. According to Scripture, the letter which follows (the first letter quoted in the book of Ezra) was written to Artaxerxes. The bibl. account, moreover, makes it appear that Xerxes (Heb. ^{אחשורוש} *Aḥašwērōš*) and Artaxerxes preceded Darius, and passes over Cambyses entirely. Josephus's corrections here and elsewhere result in presenting the proper historical sequence, Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius (*cf.* § 30), Xerxes (*cf.* § 120) and Artaxerxes (*cf.* § 184).²⁵

He continues: "Bibl. Artaxerxes. By omitting the name Josephus avoids the awkwardness of openly correcting

²⁵ Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 324, note *b.*

Scripture.”²⁶ These statements indicate that Marcus based his conclusions on the assumption that the Chronicler, like Josephus, followed a strict chronological sequence in Ezra. Hence his note to *Ant.*, xi. 5.1: “Here again Josephus corrects the chronological order of Scripture, in which Artaxerxes follows Darius.”²⁷ Bowman, too, favors Josephus’ interpretation. “He [Josephus] corrects the impossible order of the Persian kings in I Esdras, which actually reverses the historical sequence, and he puts them in their proper relationship.”²⁸ But such a viewpoint cannot be supported in view of Ezr 4 : 5-7, where the following sequence of the Persian kings is established: Cyrus—Darius—gap—Xerxes—Artaxerxes (I). If we follow Josephus who in *Ant.*, xi. 2.2 reports an interruption of nine years in the Temple building, then the gap mentioned in Ezr 4 : 5 between Cyrus and Darius comfortably accommodates Cambyses (529-522). Thus the Scriptural account stands vindicated: Cyrus—Cambyses (during the nine-year interval)—Darius—Xerxes—Artaxerxes (I). W. Rudolph finds no contradiction between Biblical and secular historical records.²⁹ The theory of Josephus’ having corrected Scripture is based on a misunderstanding of the Biblical narrative. A better explanation is to be found in the different purposes of the Chronicler and of Josephus, and is thus comparatively simple: Josephus intentionally wrote a continuous historical narrative, while the Chronicler wrote this part of Jewish history according to subject matter.

Josephus’ sources for the post-exilic period consisted mainly of an early text of I Esdras, and some extra-Biblical material, as pointed out by Thackeray, Cook, Marcus and others. It can safely be maintained that the chronological sequence of that assumed original or earlier text of I Esdras

²⁶ Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 325, note *c*.

²⁷ Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 372, note *a*.

²⁸ Bowman, *op. cit.*, III, 561.

²⁹ Wilhelm Rudolph, *Esra und Nehemia* (Tübingen, 1949), p. XIII.

did not differ chronologically from the present version, which presents the following order:

I Esdras 1	Josiah and Jehoahaz	622 and 609
I Esdras 2 : 1-15	Decree of Cyrus	ca. 538
I Esdras 2 : 16-30	Artaxerxes; building of Jerusalem and the Temple	ca. 457
I Esdras 3-4; 5 : 1-6	The legend of the three youths	ca. 521
I Esdras 5 : 7-45	The list of those who returned	ca. 536
I Esdras 5 : 47-73	First attempt to build the Temple	ca. 530
I Esdras 6 : 1-22	Temple building; Tattenai's investigation	ca. 520
I Esdras 6 : 23 to 7 : 15	Temple dedication	March 12, 515
I Esdras 8 : 1 to 9 : 5	Ezra's mission	457

This table shows that I Esdras does not present a perfect chronological continuity, for besides other irregularities it contains two insertions: (1) the so-called *Tāb'ēl* document, to be dated after 457 B.C.,³⁰ and (2) the legend of the three youths, to be placed in the year 521.³¹ Josephus apparently considered the events recorded uniformly in I Esdras 2 : 16-30 and in Ezr 4 : 6-23 as belonging to the reign of Cambyses and not to that of Artaxerxes I, since they were contrary to his idea that they must fit into a continuous historical account and pattern. This became the reason for a major chronological discrepancy between Josephus and his sources, which unanimously contradict and refute his narrative. The subsequent analysis of the five periods or phases covered by this discussion will illustrate our point.

Phase I, ca. 536/530 B.C. (*Ant.*, xi. 1.1-3 = §§ 1-18). The presence of Tattenai and Shethar-boznai together with Jeshua and Zerubbabel in 538 B.C. poses a problem.³² Although it

³⁰ I Esdras 2 : 16-30a; Ezr 4 : 6-23.

³¹ I Esdras 3-4; 5 : 1.

³² *Ant.*, xi. 1.3; 4.4; Ezr 5 : 3-17; 6 : 1-22; I Esdras 6 : 3-7 : 1.

is not impossible that these men were in office from 538 to 520 B.C., the first two as envoys of the Persian king, the latter as leaders of the *gólāh*, it is evident that Josephus, as the result of an incorrect use of his sources, placed them together in two completely unrelated events. The solution is rather simple. When Josephus related the events of 538, he needed the decree of Cyrus which he found in I Esdras 6 : 24 ff., but instead of copying only the decree, he took over the whole narrative dealing with the events of the year 520 with all the details of Tattenai's investigation, thus transferring it all to the days of Cyrus when the decree was issued. If this mistake of Josephus is taken into account and if the two events are separated, the confusion created by him is removed and the whole problem disappears.

Phase II, ca. 530/522 B.C. (*Ant.*, xi. 2.1 = §§ 19, 20). This phase seems to pose no problems, since Josephus apparently uses I Esdras 5 : 72, 73 (Ezr 4 : 4) and marks the interim between the reigns of Cyrus and Darius. The first attempt of the Jews under Cyrus to rebuild the Temple did not go beyond the laying of the foundation (Ezr 3 : 8-13; I Esdras 5 : 56-65).³³ It failed on account of the hostile actions of the Chuthaeans (= Samaritans, *Ant.*, xi. 4.4) with the result that no work was done during the reign of Cambyses (529-522).

Phase III, ca. 529-522 B.C. according to Josephus (*Ant.*, xi. 2.1,2 = §§ 21-30), but 457 B.C. according to I Esdras and Ezra. Here Josephus is again at odds with his sources, although they themselves also contain conflicting elements.³⁴ By substituting the name of Cambyses for that of Artaxerxes, Josephus caused a chronological displacement of events amounting to some eighty years.³⁵ This arbitrary transfer also raises other serious objections. The relationship of Cambyses with the Jews, as represented by Josephus, does

³³ C. G. Tuland, "Uššayyā' and 'Uššarnā," *JNES*, XVII (1958), 269-275.

³⁴ I Esdras 2 : 16-30a; Ezr 4 : 6-23.

³⁵ Cook, *op. cit.*, p. 27, note 15 (a).

not agree with what other sources indicate, for we know from the Elephantine papyri that Cambyses spared the Jewish temple at Elephantine when he destroyed Egyptian temples. It is therefore highly improbable that Cambyses would have rescinded the decree of his famous father a few years after it was issued, the more so since it was concerned with a religious cult and a temple.

Furthermore, there appear several contradictions in Josephus' narrative, as compared with *Ezr 4*, which in part can be explained by assuming that Josephus used *I Esdras* as his source. While Rehum's report in *Ezr 4* refers exclusively to the rebuilding of the city of Jerusalem, *I Esdras 2* mentions walls, market places and the Temple. And even though the king of *Ezr 4* and *I Esdras 2* forbids only the rebuilding of the city, Josephus extends this prohibition also to the Temple. Thus his attempt to streamline history by interjecting Cambyses into the records results in a complete distortion of the historical picture. There had been no laying of the Temple foundation under Cambyses. The actual reason for Josephus' placing *Ezr 4* in the time of Cambyses instead of Artaxerxes, may be found in his interpretation of *Ezr 4 : 24* (*I Esdras 2 : 30*). But this verse may be understood and explained in different ways, for it can be regarded as a repetition of *Ezr 4 : 5*, an emendation, a gloss, or a displacement of a passage from elsewhere.³⁶ Josephus evidently believed that *I Esdras* (or *Ezra*) presented an uninterrupted historical account following an exact chronological sequence. Therefore he changed the name of Artaxerxes into Cambyses, who never appears in the Biblical narrative.

Ezra's report reveals an entirely different objective. In relating the history of the restoration he sought to justify the Jews' rejection of the Samaritans, beginning with their opposition even before 530 B.C., from the time of Cyrus until Darius. Apparently he wished to show that they did not cease their hostilities with the completion of the Temple, but

³⁶ Rudolph, *op. cit.*, pp. XII, XIII, 45-47.

continued their intrigues against Judah under Xerxes and Artaxerxes. Ezra evidently sought to demonstrate by historical records that the Samaritans had always been the religious and political enemies of the Jews, offering as examples the events narrated in I Esdras 5 : 66-73 and 2 : 16-30 (Ezr 4 : 1-5; 4 : 6-24). His arguments were also directed against the pro-Samaritan liberal Jews in the province. In addition, his narrative provided the historical background to justify the religious reforms he was about to introduce. To the historian it also indicates the struggle for hegemony between the Jews of Babylon and those of Jerusalem. Thus Ezra presented the history of Judah's relationship with Samaria to justify their rejection, by which the Jews became a united national and religious body. Josephus, on the other hand, fitted his sources into the pattern of a continual chronological sequence.

Phase IV (*Ant.*, xi. 3.1-10 = §§ 31-74). This is the legend of the three youths. Opinion is divided, whether it occurred under Cyrus, Darius I, Darius III, or whether it ever happened at all.³⁷ The story has no direct bearing on our problem.

Phase V, 520/515 B.C. (*Ant.*, xi. 4 : 1-8 = §§ 75-113). Here a comparison of Josephus' narrative with I Esdras and Ezra indicates that he continued to use his sources either arbitrarily or mistakenly through lack of understanding the text.

His records in *Ant.*, xi. 4.1 run parallel with I Esdras 5 : 47-55 and Ezr 3 : 1-7. However, the Esdras and Ezra passages refer to the erection of the altar and the preparation of building material during the reign of Cyrus, approximately 535 B.C., while Josephus places this event in the time of Darius. Obviously aware of this contradiction, he added an explanatory note: "This had first been ordered by Cyrus but was now being carried out at the order of Darius."³⁸

The next section, xi. 4.2, corresponding to I Esdras 5 : 56-65

³⁷ I Esdras 3 : 1 to 5 : 6.

³⁸ *Ant.*, xi. 4. 1.

and Ezr 3 : 8-13, describes further preparations and the "laying of the foundation" (as בָּנִי and $\text{\textcircled{\scriptsize\theta}}\mu\epsilon\lambda\iota\acute{o}\omega$ are properly translated) and belongs likewise to the time shortly before 530 B.C. The Scriptural references do not go beyond this point. But Josephus understood the texts referring to the rebuilding of the Temple differently. It is perhaps not justified to put all the blame on him, since there are some divergences between I Esdras and the MT. While Ezr 3 : 10-13 consistently describes the reaction of the people at the laying of the cornerstone or the foundation of the Temple, *i.e.*, a gathering during a holiday, the parallel-text of I Esdras 5 : 55 (English v. 58) can be interpreted as speaking of another phase of the building process: "So the builders builded the temple of the Lord." In *Ant.*, xi. 4.2 he expanded the term "to build" into "finishing" the Temple, which resulted in another contradiction with his later narrative. This indicates that Josephus not only ignored the Hebrew text, but also failed to make critical use of I Esdras, for he confuses two events and describes the emotional reaction of the people at the laying of the foundation in 530 as a consequence of the dedication of the Temple completed on the 3d of Adar (March 12), 515.³⁹

In the next part, xi. 4.3-8 (I Esdras 5 : 66-73; 6 : 1-7 : 15; Ezr 4 : 1-5, 24; 6 : 1-7 : 22) Josephus uses again the same text which he had incorrectly employed already as a documentation for his Phase I (*ca.* 536-530), and now applies it to the events which occurred under Darius, shortly before 520. The result is an even more hopeless confusion. Sisinēs and Sarabazanēs (Tattenai and Shethar-boznai) who in 536 had allegedly been the recipients of Cyrus' decree for the rebuilding of Jerusalem's Temple (xi. 1.3), in 520 seem to be ignorant of the royal order given earlier (xi. 4.4).

The organization of Levites and Priests for the building program in the 2d year after the return (*ca.* 536/535 B.C.; *Ant.*, xi. 4.2; I Esdras 5 : 57-58; Ezr 3 : 8-9), now takes place in the 2d year of Darius, about 520 B.C. Josephus again

³⁹ *Ant.*, xi. 4.2.

feels compelled to provide an explanation for this apparent difficulty by saying, "They had been commanded to build the Temple, the first time by Cyrus and now by Darius."⁴⁰

It has already been demonstrated that through an erroneous use of his source material Josephus confused the celebration of laying the Temple foundation, before 530, with the actual completion of the building in 515 B.C. This, however, caused another predicament for the ancient historian: "On hearing the sound of the trumpets, the Samaritans, who were, as it happened, hostile to the tribes of Judah and Benjamin, came running there, for they wished to learn the reason for the disturbance."⁴¹ According to this, the Samaritans would have been unaware of the Temple building for approximately six years while it had been taking place before their very eyes. To make the confusion complete, the Samaritans now offer to help in the construction of an already completed Temple!⁴²

It is hoped that this analysis has explained the errors in the eleventh book of *Antiquities* and has elucidated Josephus' understanding of his sources. If we have been successful, a conclusion results: The traditional account of the building of the Jerusalem Temple is primarily a defense for the rejection of the Samaritans by the Jews. Furthermore, the claim that Josephus corrected the Biblical sequence of the Persian kings and thus improved the narrative is without valid foundation. The Biblical records furnish the correct historical information, and they were misinterpreted by the Jewish historian.

Nevertheless, Josephus' narrative given in the eleventh book of *Antiquities*, correctly understood constitutes a material and useful contribution to our understanding of Judah's post-exilic period. However, this is not true with regard to the last sections of his eleventh book, because it contains names and events which can neither be reconciled among themselves, nor brought into agreement with other available historical

⁴⁰ *Ant.*, xi. 4.3.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

data.⁴³ Some of these apparent inconsistencies or contradictions nevertheless may turn out to be historical facts not yet fully understood because of the paucity of historical sources for this comparatively dark period of Jewish history. The recent discovery of the "Samaria Papyri" in a cave north of Jericho points in this direction. They show that a reappraisal of former views with regard to information presented by Josephus is necessary. The editor of these papyri probably reflects the reaction of scholars generally to the fact of a second Sanballat when he says, "Previously I had shared the scepticism of those who have thought that this Sanballat was a creature of Josephus. The appearance of Sanballat II, oddly enough, puts the question of the Sanballat of Josephus in quite a new light."⁴⁴ This acknowledgment can be added to the growing list of data contained in Josephus' *Antiquities*, which formerly have been contested but are now confirmed as historical facts. Though Josephus' theory that the Biblical narrative followed a continuous chronology resulted in numerous errors, we may have to allow that it was an attempt to find a solution for the complicated chronological problems of the post-exilic period.

⁴³ See Adolphe Büchler, "La relation de Josèphe concernant Alexandre le Grand," *Revue des Études Juives*, XXXVI (1898), 1-26; V. Tcherikover, *Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews* (Philadelphia, 1959), pp. 42-49; Marcus, *op. cit.*, VI, 507, 510-511.

⁴⁴ Cross, *op. cit.*, p. 121, note 27.

THE HISTORY OF CONDITIONALISM ¹

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The first chapters of Genesis present us with two contradictory declarations. In ch. 2 : 16, 17, God gives a commandment to Adam; in case of disobedience the penalty would be: "Thou shalt surely die," a threat later recalled by Eve (ch. 3 : 3). Our first parents were to abstain from the forbidden fruit under pain of death. To this ominous word is opposed the false promise of Satan: "Thou shalt not surely die" (ch. 3 : 4).

From that moment these two doctrines have not ceased battle. One affirms that man possesses in himself, by his very nature, an incorruptible principle that assures him of immortality, whatever his relation with God may be. Advanced by brilliant philosophers, this doctrine ultimately infiltrated into the teaching of the Christian church. The other doctrine makes immortality depend upon the communion of the creature with his Creator and his obedience to divine law. This latter teaching is based on biblical revelation; it has maintained itself throughout the centuries and in our day has made remarkable advances.

LeRoy Edwin Froom, Professor Emeritus of Historical Theology at Andrews University, has undertaken to set forth the vicissitudes of this biblical truth. *The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, the Conflict of the Ages Over the Nature and Destiny of Man* is the title of this monumental work, of which Volume II has just appeared. Its sub-title is "Revival

¹ A book review of LeRoy Edwin Froom, *The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers, the Conflict of the Ages Over the Nature and Destiny of Man* (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1965), vol. II, 1344 pages.

and Restoration of Trampled Conditionalism (A.D. 600 to 1963)."

It is difficult to appreciate the real value of a work when its first part has not yet seen the light of day. Here we shall concern ourselves only with what is suggested by a reading of Volume II, which thus far is all that has appeared. This volume is the fruit of long labor recounted by the author in a pamphlet, *Finding the Lost Conditionalist Witnesses*.²

Froom has already shown vast erudition in his main previous work, *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers* (Washington, 1946-54), 4 vols. Here again he offers extremely rich documentation. With consummate art he has known how to use the results of his own research and that of his collaborators. He has employed documents collected in Great Britain as well as in America. The writings of the principal Conditionalist authors in the English language have been analyzed conscientiously, and their ideas have been set forth with the greatest of care. Less important authors have simply been mentioned with the titles of their writings. Eleven well constructed tables permit us to follow the development of the doctrine across the ages. The names of the protagonists of Conditionalism are given with their dates, their countries of origin, their religious affiliations, their ecclesiastical positions, and their attitudes in regard to three problems: a) the nature of the soul, b) the intermediate state, c) the fate of the wicked.

By accepting the philosophical thesis of the natural immortality of the soul, Catholic theologians have fallen into two errors: that of conscious survival after the dissolution of the physical organism, and the horrible dogma of eternal torment prepared for the wicked, concerning which someone has said that if such tortures existed it would be fitting to reserve them for the one who invented the idea and attributed it to God.

In all times there have been generous spirits incapable of

² Froom, *Finding the Lost Conditionalist Witnesses* (Washington, D.C., 1965), 32 pages.

accepting the doctrine of eternal punishment. Held, however, by their philosophical presuppositions to maintaining the idea of the immortality of the soul, they have been able to liberate themselves from this nightmare only by advancing the hypothesis of universal salvation. Thus they found themselves sacrificing the justice of God to His love, while others were sacrificing His love to His justice.

The biblical doctrine of conditional immortality re-establishes an equilibrium between these divine attributes in postulating the destruction of those beings who have set themselves definitively in a state of revolt against their Creator, who willed also to be their Saviour.

Concerning the question of the intermediate state, Conditionalists remain divided. Some have preserved the idea of a conscious survival, a view that is really inconsistent. Others have accepted the biblical but unpopular teaching of the unconsciousness of the dead. It is surprising to find how large a number of theologians in Great Britain and the United States have professed this doctrine.

In such a voluminous work we may expect to discover certain weak points. Particularly the pages devoted to the Waldenses (pp. 26-35, 44, 48) are deserving of review. While without doubt these people had forerunners, their existence cannot be proved before the 12th century. Before the Reformation, the Waldenses rejected the Catholic doctrines of purgatory and the invocation of saints, as they did not find these in the Scriptures, their rule of faith. However, when they say in their *Catechism* that one must not believe that the saints, now in possession of paradise, should be invoked, this denial bears only on the question of their invocation and not on their presence in heaven. Indeed, in his *Liber sententiarum inquisitionis tholosanae*, which is a continuation of his *Historia inquisitionis* (Amstelodami, 1692), Philippus van Limborch (1633-1712), a Dutch Reformed theologian, presents the following testimony made to an inquisitor:

The said Waldenses believe and hold that in this present life

alone there is penitence and purgation for sins, and that when the soul leaves the body, it goes either to paradise or to hell, and therefore the said Waldenses make neither prayers nor other supplications for the dead, because they say that those who are in paradise do not need them, and those who are in hell do not come forth.³

We should add that the Waldensian *Catechism*, mentioned by Froom (p. 31) as existing already in the 12th century, and the treatise on *Antichrist*, mentioned (p. 32) as existing already in 1120 (thus before Waldo), are actually of more recent date. For the *Catechism*, preserved at Dublin (Ms. 22), see Édouard Montet, professor at the University of Geneva, *Histoire littéraire des Vaudois du Piémont* (Paris, 1885, p. 175), where its Hussite origin is demonstrated. For the treatise on *Antichrist*, see *ibid.*, p. 173; this writing is taken from the *Barka* of Lucas of Prague, composed in 1491. The Waldensian recension is preserved at Geneva (Ms. 208) and was published by Jean-Paul Perrin, *Histoire des Vaudois*, II (Genève, 1618, pp. 253-295; Eng. tr., *History of the Old Waldenses* [Philadelphia, 1847], pp. 242-251); by Jean Léger, *Histoire générale des églises évangéliques des vallées de Piémont*, I (Leyde, 1669, pp. 71-83), by Samuel Morland, *The History of the Evangelical Churches of the Valleys of Piémont* (London, 1658), pp. 142-160, with an English translation, and by Antoine Monastier, *Histoire de l'église vaudoise* (Lausanne, 1847, II, 324-363). The Waldensian treatises on *Purgatory* and the *Invocation of Saints*, preserved at Geneva in the same manuscript, are likewise of Hussite origin.⁴ These texts were also published in the above-mentioned works of Perrin, Léger, Morland, and partially by Monastier.

It is entirely too optimistic to classify the Waldenses as Conditionalists (p. 63) simply because their *Catechism* defines

³ Fol. 201, paragraph 93: "Dicti Valdenses credunt et tenent quod in ista presenti vita solum sit penitencia et sit purgatorium pro peccatis, et quando anima recedit a corpore vadit ad paradysum vel ad infernum, et ex tunc dicti Valdenses non faciunt orationes nec alia suffragia pro defunctis, quia dicunt quod illi qui sunt in paradiso non indigent, et illi qui sunt in inferno non prodessent."

⁴ See Montet, *op. cit.*, pp. 169, 171.

man as a mortal creature; the truth of the matter is that the partisans of the immortality of the soul give to the word "mortal," which they regularly employ to designate man, quite another sense from that adopted by Conditionalists, in accordance with the Bible.

It would be difficult indeed to prove (p. 63) that the Waldenses professed the unconsciousness of the dead. Quite like the Catholics, the early Waldenses believed in eternal punishment, as is proved by the following passages in *The Noble Lesson*:⁵

The good will go to glory and the evil to torment (l. 21).
 Heaven and earth will burn, all the living will die,
 Then all will rise again to everlasting life (ll. 463, 464).
 "Go to the fire of hell which never will have an end;
 There you will be placed under three hard conditions:
 A multitude of punishments, violent torment,
 And damnation without remedy" (ll. 469-472).

This Waldensian poem, the composition of which Froom places (p. 32) about the year 1100, is in reality more recent. Montet is mistaken in indicating the date as the 15th century or the end of the 14th, although he was followed by Antonio De Stefano, who produced a critical edition of its text (Paris, 1909). Charles Schmidt and Alexandre Lombard have suggested the end of the 12th century; Jean Jalla, the end of the 13th. The most probable date is that proposed by Emilio Comba, the beginning of the 13th.⁶

Since the work of Froom has been destined above all for English readers, it is understandable that he has given preference to Conditionalists of Great Britain and America,

⁵ See the edition by Monastier, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-269:
 Li bon iren en gloria e li mal en torment (l. 21).
 Lo ciel e la terra ardren, e murren tuit li vivent,
 Pois rexucitarent tuit en vita permanent (ll. 463, 464).
 "Ana al foc infernel que mays non aura fin;
 "Per trey greos condicions sere constreit aqui,
 "Per mouteca de penas e per aspre torment,
 "E car sare dampna sencza defalhiment" (ll. 469-472).

⁶ Emilio Comba, *History of the Waldenses of Italy* (London, 1889), pp. 231ff.

with the one exception of the Swiss, Emmanuel Petavel-Olliff (not Oliff, as on p. 602), who has received the attention he deserves.

Another Swiss, Aloys Berthoud (1845-1932; not Bertoud, as pp. 1018, 1022, 1336), was one of the rare theologians writing in French who taught the unconsciousness of the dead at a time when this idea appeared unthinkable. His book, *L'état des morts d'après la Bible* (Lausanne, 1910, 302 pp.), contains a first part giving a critique of the opinions then dominant, a second part concerning the unconsciousness of the dead, and a third dealing with theoretical and practical results. Early in his career he had published a thesis, *La doctrine du rétablissement final est-elle dans l'évangile?* (Lausanne, 1868, 132 pp.), in which he maintained the traditional doctrine of eternal torment. Much later in an article he taught the sleep of the dead in an intermediate state.⁷

Charles Byse (died 1925, not 1885, as p. 625), who finally became a Swedenborgian, published *Notre durée* (Paris, 1885, 70 pp.). In one of his books devoted to Swedenborg, *Le prophète du nord* (Paris, 1901), pp. 314-317, Byse showed himself a partisan of conditional immortality.

Oscar Cocorda, from the Waldensian valleys of Piedmont (mentioned pp. 419, 420, 456, 459, 610, 1337), figures in the table on p. 538 (No. 21). He must be classed among those few theologians of continental Europe who remained faithful to the biblical doctrine of the sleep of the dead. In addition to his great work on conditional immortality, which would have been useful to analyze, Cocorda published several other books.⁸

One might add that the sleep of the dead was affirmed by the Hungarian reformer, Matyas-Biró Dévay (*ca.* 1500 - *ca.*

⁷ *Revue de théologie et de philosophie*, XIV (1926), 262-286.

⁸ *Il soggiorno dei morti secondo le Sacre Scritture* (Torre Pellice, 1883), 23 pp.; *Beffe e Calunnie contro la Dottrina della Vita in Cristo* (Torre Pellice, 1885), 42 pp.; *La résurrection de vie est-elle nécessaire au salut?* (Pignerol, 1886), 60 pp.; *La Discesa di Gesù agl' Inferni* (Venezia, 1907), 79 pp.

1545). He was author of a *Disputatio de statu in quo sint beatorum animae, post hanc vitam, ante ultimum judicii diem*; a copy of the first edition (Basel, 1535) may be found in the National Library at Vienna, and two copies of the second edition (Nuremberg, 1537) are in the possession of the university libraries of Marburg and Göttingen.

The sleep of the dead was taught by the Neapolitan historian Pietro Giannone d'Ischitello (1676-1748), a victim of the papal inquisition. In a large work of three volumes entitled *Il Tirregno*, composed 1725-34 but not printed until 1895, in Rome, he shows that there is no immediate translation of the soul at the moment when the believer dies and that there is no future life without the resurrection.

The unconsciousness of the dead was also set forth by the Swiss pastor Louis Burnier (1795-1873), *Études élémentaires et progressives de la parole de Dieu* (Lausanne, 1847-1852), 7 vols.⁹

Louis Gaussen, whom Fromm mentions on p. 252 with respect to premillennialism, and on p. 602 in connection with Petavel-Olliff, may be remembered almost as an apostle of the biblical doctrine concerning the state of the dead. In a thesis entitled *Louis Gaussen et l'époque du réveil* (Montauban, 1897), p. 68, F.-C. Hugon says of Gaussen: "During his studies he conceived his theory of the sleep of the dead. It is striking to see how this idea became more and more settled with this theologian."¹⁰ The library of the Theological Faculty of the Free Church of the Canton of Vaud at Lausanne possesses a manuscript of Gaussen entitled, *État des âmes après la mort*, where, among others, one reads these declarations:

The doctrines of the resurrection, of the second coming of Christ, and of the universal judgment have been killed. - The dead are

⁹ Revised edition in four volumes by Theodore Naville and James-Alfred Porret (Lyon, 1900).

¹⁰ "Pendant ses études il conçut sa théorie du sommeil des morts. Il est frappant de constater comment cette idée s'est de plus en plus affermie chez ce théologien."

always spoken of as being in a state of sleep. - The Scriptures refer all hope, all consolation, all thoughts, all recompense, all joys, all rewards of the faithful, all sufferings, all shame, all opprobrium, all tribulations, all weeping and gnashing of teeth to the day of Christ, to the day of the resurrection of the righteous when the Son of Man shall appear. ¹¹

According to a copy of an unpublished letter addressed to Adolphe Monod, February 6, 1855, he wrote: "The dead will not ascend to heaven until after the resurrection. - The dead sleep until the coming of Christ." ¹²

Presumably American readers will appreciate the presence in Froom's volume of five paintings in color by Harry Anderson and other artists. Granted its mentality, the cultivated European public will rather regret these illustrations, which one is not accustomed to see in a work of scientific interest.

One might mention in Froom's work a few rare printing errors, such as the following (p. 625): Nesmes, instead of Nîmes; Englise Cretinenne, instead of Église Chrétienne. At the same time, we are astonished that of such a voluminous work touching so many different subjects and presenting the thought of such a great number of authors, we can speak with so few reservations. Such as it is, with the imperfections inherent in every human work, which may indeed be corrected in the volume to follow, Froom's book will be of the greatest use both to theologians and to simple readers who desire an initiation into the history of theology. We await impatiently the first volume, "Origin, Development, and Penetration of Innate Immortality (900 B.C. to A.D. 600)."

¹¹ "On a tué les doctrines de la résurrection, du second avènement de Christ et du jugement universel. - Les morts sont toujours dits dans un état de sommeil. - L'Écriture ramène toutes les espérances, toutes les consolations, toutes les pensées, toutes les compensations, toutes les joies, toutes les récompenses du fidèle, toutes les douleurs, toute la honte, tout l'opprobre, toutes les tribulations, tous les pleurs et les grincements de dents à la journée de Christ, au jour de la résurrection des justes, où le Fils de l'homme paraîtra."

¹² "Les morts ne montent au ciel qu'après la résurrection. - Les morts dorment jusqu'à l'avènement de Christ."

JOHN WESLEY'S
TEACHING CONCERNING PERFECTION

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I

Wesley has often been characterized as Arminian rather than as Calvinistic. The fact that he continuously called for repentance from sin, published a journal called the *Arminian Magazine*, was severe in his strictures against predestination and unconditional election, engaged in controversial correspondence with Whitefield over the matter of election, perfection and perseverance seem to indicate a great gulf between his teaching and that of Calvin. Gulf there may be, but it need not be made to appear wider at certain points than can justly be claimed. The fact is that exclusive attention to his opposition to predestination may lead to neglect of his teaching on the relationship between faith and grace.

This is not to deny that Wesley was opposed to important Calvinistic tenets. In his sermon on Free Grace,¹ delivered in 1740, he states why he is opposed to the doctrine of predestination:

- (1) it makes preaching vain, needless for the elect and useless for the non-elect;
- (2) it takes away motives for following after holiness;
- (3) it tends to increase sharpness of temper and contempt for those considered to be outsiders;
- (4) it tends to destroy the comfort of religion;
- (5) it destroys zeal for good works;
- (6) it makes the whole Christian revelation unnecessary and
- (7) self-contradictory;
- (8) it represents the Lord as saying one thing and meaning

¹ J. Wesley, *Sermons on Several Occasions*, I (New York, 1827), 13-19.

another: God becomes more cruel and unjust than the devil.

In Wesley's correspondence with Whitefield, both men stood firm for their point of view. Now and again an overtone of predestinationism creeps into Wesley's expressions to Whitefield as in the following: "But when his time is come, God will do what man cannot; namely make us of one mind."²

But it is not entirely appropriate to speak of Wesley as "this noble English Arminian" and his doctrine as "true Arminianism" as has been done.³ If Calvinism be equated with the doctrine of predestination this is possible; it is significant that these designations are taken from a work which defines Arminianism in its subtitle as "A Revolt from Predestinationism."

But Wesley also contended against teaching the necessary inherence of sin in the redeemed, the denial of which was a tenet of Calvinism as well. This led to his doctrine of sanctification. The current orthodoxy not only limited the number of the elect but also the degree to which the salvation of Christ might be attained. Wesley's teaching of free salvation meant that "whosoever will" might come, and having come, might be freed from all conscious sin, and thus know a state of "entire sanctification." It was, for Wesley, a matter of making God's grace freely available that led to such a doctrine, a grace first made known to him through being experienced. Because the effect of such preaching was to promote revival, the term "Arminian" was attached to Methodist revivalism, as the following citation, written in 1899, illustrates:

At the present time, Arminian is a term associated with Methodism, and so with religious zeal, pointed preachings and revivals, but there was no Methodism at that time [*i.e.* before the Great Awakening] in this country, [*i.e.* the U.S.] and the term

² Letter, August 9, 1740. John Telford, ed., *The Letters of the Rev. John Wesley* (London, 1931), I, 351. Henceforth referred to as *Letters*.

³ Cf. George L. Curtiss, *Arminianism in History* (Cincinnati, 1894), pp. 172, 165.

seems to have been used to designate any kind of laxity and indifference in Christian life.⁴

When put to such usage a term becomes a theological swear word, a symbol to express hostile feeling toward an opponent. Thus it is robbed of clear meaning and becomes useless for accurate description.

Wesley's affinity to and divergence from Arminian teaching may be seen by examining their respective accounts of faith in the experience of conversion. Calvin had made the sovereignty of God a key-category of his thought. As this related to conversion it meant that to the sinner who could not choose God, since his will was corrupt and since he did not possess the capacity to choose between good and evil, it must be granted that God find him and he be given the divine grace. Thus there was no human control of salvation (as in Catholicism) nor an independent remaking of the self (as in humanism). It was all of God. Thus saving faith is related only to the divine causation. If man believes, it is a work of divine grace: faith is not a virtue which man has independently and which he can give to God to gain special favor. In contrast, faith came to be regarded by the Arminians as a kind of imperfect righteousness, a lesser work, which was regarded by God as obedience and through which means the sinner could receive acceptance.

Wesley was opposed both to extreme Calvinism and also to the humanistic tendencies of the eighteenth century. In reference to the former it is instructive to set two statements side by side. The first is contained in a letter to John Newton:

You have admirably well expressed what I mean by an opinion contradistinguished from an essential doctrine. Whatever is "compatible with a love to Christ and a work of grace" I term an opinion. And certainly the holding Particular Election and Final Perseverance is compatible with these. "Yet what fundamental error," you ask, "have you opposed with half that frequency and *vehemence* as

⁴ G. N. Boardman, *A History of New England Theology* (New York, 1899), p. 31.

you have these opinions?" So doubtless you have heard. But it is not true. I have printed near fifty sermons, and only one of these opposes them at all. I preach about eight hundred sermons in a year; and, taking one year with another, for twenty years past I have not preached eight sermons in a year upon the subject. But "How many of your best preachers have been thrust out because they dissented from you in these particulars?" Not one, best or worst, good or bad, was ever *thrust out* on this account.⁵

The second is taken from the minutes of the second of the conferences which Wesley held with his assistants, 1745:⁶

- Q. 22: Does not the *truth of the Gospel* lie very near both to Calvinism and Antinomianism?
- A. *Indeed it does, as it were within hair's breadth*, so that it is altogether foolish and sinful, because we do not *quite agree* either with one or the other, to run from them as far as ever we can.
- Q. 23: Wherein may we come to *the very edge of Calvinism*?
- A. (1) In ascribing all good to free grace, (2) in denying all natural free will, and all power antecedent to grace, and (3) in excluding all merit from man even for what he has or does by the grace of God.⁷

These passages indicate that:

1. Wesley's intention in denying the doctrines of Calvinism mentioned was not polemic.
2. These doctrines were not denied because they were Calvinistic: this is obvious since on the question of free will and grace he was prepared to come to "the very edge of Calvinism."
3. A denial of Predestination and Election was not a main emphasis; it formed a very small part of his preaching.
4. Disagreement over one issue does not mean an abandonment of the whole system: thus Wesley agreed with the doctrine of conversion as a work of grace, but disagreed over the question of its universal availability. For Wesley, faith was not a unique human work. God requires faith as a condi-

⁵ Letter, May 14, 1765, in *Letters*, IV, 297. Italics in text.

⁶ Wesley held conferences with his assistants periodically in which doctrinal questions were the chief subjects of discussion.

⁷ Quoted in G. C. Cell, *Rediscovery of John Wesley* (New York, 1935), p. 249. Italics in Cell's text.

tion of salvation, but the requirement is itself a gift. Grace gives what God requires. Wesley made plain that the salvation of man is "by grace through faith" in his sermon delivered at Oxford, June 18, 1738, entitled, "Salvation by Faith." Note the following excerpts:

If sinful men find favour with God, it is "grace upon grace! "... Grace is the source, faith the condition, of salvation.

Of yourselves cometh neither your faith nor your salvation: "It is the gift of God;" the free, undeserved gift; the faith through which ye are saved, as well as the salvation which he of his own good pleasure, his mere favour, annexes thereto. That ye believe is one instance of his grace; that, believing, ye are saved, another.⁸

While the salvation is *sola gratia*, it is universally available:

"Whosoever believeth on Him shall be saved," is, and must be, the foundation of all our preaching; that is, must be preached first.... Whom shall we except?⁹

The free gift is for all without exception. While a Bishop Butler may propose the dilemma that unless there were some prior merit, God would be unjust in justifying only those He does, Wesley relies "on the experiential confirmations of the Word of God and not on any rational consistencies or inconsistencies."¹⁰ Thus it is that a synthesis is possible. The unity is an experienced one, not a logical one. In the moment of freedom from sin's guilt or its power, man knows it is none of his doing. That Wesley gives primacy to the free grace of God springs from a recognition of this fact. In this he is in agreement with Calvin. But the fact that this grace is not limited unconditionally is Wesley's point of divergence from Calvinism.

Wesley was not attempting to establish the absoluteness of human freedom. The basis of his teaching is not the natural ability of man but the grace of God. Man is unable to produce faith. It must be given him by God; this being so, salvation

⁸ *The Works of John Wesley*, V (Grand Rapids, n.d.), 7-16. Excerpts form pp. 8, 13, 15. Henceforth referred to as *Works*.

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ Cell, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

is by grace alone. But does not faith presuppose itself? On Wesley's terms no man can be saved, but men are saved.

II

Wesley defined the object of Methodism as being to "spread Scriptural holiness throughout the land." An examination of the sermons, articles and hymns of the Wesleyan movement amply bears this out. The work which treats of this most comprehensively is the "Plain Account of Christian Perfection." In the following exposition this is our main source. Wesley's thesis is: "In conformity, therefore, both to the doctrine of St. John and the whole tenor of the New Testament, we fix this conclusion: A Christian is so far perfect as not to commit sin."¹¹

The doctrine was a biblical one, based on New Testament teaching, in which grace had superseded law. Wesley denied that any Old Testament personalities had attained holiness; the regimen of law was not sufficient for this: Wesley here laid stress upon divine grace as the source of enabling power. It will be remembered that one of the points upon which Coelestius, companion of Pelagius, was condemned at the council of Carthage and subsequently, was that among other things he taught "that before the coming of Christ there were persons without sin."¹²

Augustine was willing to admit that holiness is possible. Indeed, he strongly asserted the fact. However, it is only by means of grace, and so could not be attained under a dispensation of law. Accordingly, he commended Pelagius for "rightly replying that a man by God's help and grace is able to live ἀναμάρτητος, that is to say, without sin."¹³ Between Pelagius' attenuated misunderstanding of grace and Augustine's misconception of it as almost a physical force, Wesley did

¹¹ Wesley, *A Plain Account of Christian Perfection* (London, 1952), p. 19.

¹² Augustine, *De Peccato Originale*, XI (NPNF, V, 240, 241).

¹³ *Ibid.*

not have to choose. He linked his doctrine of perfection through grace to personal categories. He defined perfection in terms of love, love to God and man. Perfection was to "love nothing, but for his sake,"¹⁴ to please God, not self.

Wesley's doctrine was based on passages of Scripture (for example Mt 5 : 48; Jn 17 : 20-23; 1 Th 5 : 23; Gal 2 : 20; 1 Jn 4 : 17; 1 : 7, 9). He used 1 Jn 1 : 7, 9 to indicate that the experience of perfection is one to be expected here and now and not to be awaited at the moment of death. "Cleanseth," he points out, is the present, not the future tense; thus cleansing, and that means perfection, is to be expected here and now after the experience of justification. Note his propositions,

That this faith, and consequently the salvation which it brings is spoken of as given in an instant. That it is supposed that instant may be now; that we need not stay another moment; that "now," the very "now is the accepted time; now is the day of this full salvation."¹⁵

The reason why it is not given as soon as it might be is that it is not expected. To those who do not expect it sooner, it is given a short while before death. This delay is not necessary however. Ideally it should follow justification. Wesley believed and taught that, in an instant, perfection was "wrought in the soul" by a simple act of faith. The two experiences of conversion and perfection are to be distinguished. The former is preparatory to the latter. He denies that they are simultaneous, stating that he is not aware of a single such case.

In defining his understanding of the believer's experience of holiness, Wesley specifies particular sins from which he would be free. Such are pride, desire, self-will, anger, evil thinking.¹⁶ These are things which can and should be recog-

¹⁴ Wesley, *Plain Account of Christian Perfection*, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 27 (cf. p. 41).

¹⁶ It was a matter of controversy between the "extinction" group and the "suspension" group whether a person would have to battle against an evil will in order to suppress it or whether it was so sanctified as not to make its sinful demands. Wesley preferred to say that the evil desires and thoughts did not come into expression. "The expulsive

nized and of these in himself the sanctified person has no knowledge. Perfection is defined on a deeper level as being in effect nothing "contrary to pure love."¹⁷ This oscillation in the significance given to the term "sin" tends somewhat to confusion. He did not like the term "sinless perfection" because it is not scriptural, although later he wrote that while not contending for the term "sinless" he did not raise objections against it. He appears to mean that the actual adjective "sinless" is not used in the New Testament in reference to perfection, therefore he would avoid using it. However he did use the expression, but its lack of consistently sharp edges is undoubtedly due to the press of the controversies on the topic, in which he was engaged. A later Methodist leader contended that "only *recognized* sins are sins to Wesley,"¹⁸ and that Wesley was concerned to teach that it is possible to be free of conscious sin here and now. Flew summarises Wesley's position in the following words:

Evidently Wesley is using the word sin in two distinct senses. Sin means either any falling short of the divine ideal for humanity, or it means a voluntary transgression of a known law of God which it was within our power to obey. It was only in the latter sense that Wesley maintained we could be free from sin.¹⁹

A person could be sinless and yet make mistakes of various kinds. "Omissions... are all deviations from the perfect law... Yet they are not properly sins," "a person filled with the love of God is still liable to these involuntary transgressions." Then there is the curious statement made that even although these are not sins, they still need the atoning blood of Christ for their cleansing. An omission or a mistaken opinion, even a mistaken word or action, provided that it "power of a new affection" had eradicated them. Note the following: "Aforetime when an evil thought came in, they looked up, and it vanished away. But now it does not come in, there being no room for this in a soul which is full of God." *Ibid.* p. 23.

¹⁷ Letter to Mrs. Maitland, May 12, 1763, in *Works*, XII, 257.

¹⁸ W. E. Sangster, *The Pure in Heart* (Nashville, 1954), p. 80.

¹⁹ R. N. Flew, *The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology* (London, 1934), p. 326.

spring from love, is not a sin. "However it cannot bear the rigour of God's justice, but needs the atoning blood."²⁰

Is there any sure way of knowing that one has this experience of perfection and if so should one claim to have it and speak of having it? It is an interesting fact that while Wesley was so certain of the possibility, he never claimed the attainment of perfection himself. He urged his preachers to declare the doctrine, noting that as it was preached the spiritual health of the church was improved: he was willing to consider sympathetically the claim of others who were assured of this perfect love. While one could not infallibly know if another had the experience, there were certain indications that provided "reasonable proof." These were: (1) clear evidence of exemplary behaviour, (2) an account of the time and manner of the change, (3) unblameableness in words and actions.²¹

The individual himself could be assured not by any feeling but by "the testimony of the Spirit witnessing his entire sanctification as clearly as his justification." He is thus to have an entire renewal plus a consciousness of this renewal: this gives assurance of the validity of the experience. He is no longer conscious of anything but love as the animating power of the life. This consciousness being present "he is not only happy, but safe."²² Here the proof of the experience is made to rest upon the testimony of the subject, which is based upon an inner certainty. To this test of the validity of a Christian life may be compared that of Jonathan Edwards:

Many have taken it as "an inward immediate suggestion..." not observing the manner in which the word "witness" or "testimony" is often used in the New Testament where such terms signify, not a mere declaring and asserting a thing to be true, but holding forth evidence from where a thing may be argued and proved to be true.²³

²⁰ Wesley, *Plain Account of Christian Perfection*, p. 43.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 57.

²³ J. Edwards in J. E. Smith, ed., *A Treatise on the Religious Affections* (New Haven, 1959), p. 231.

"The seal of the Spirit is grace itself in the soul."²⁴ Another point at which the two revival preachers might be compared is on the question of the activity of God in the process of producing Christian experience. The title of one of Edwards' treatises, "A Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Work of God," indicates amply his point of view: Wesley also always gave the activity of God the primary role. While a pattern could be discerned in this activity, it was not a stereotyped one: God does not always act through the same procedures or stages. He dispenses His gifts as He pleases:

God's usual method is one thing, but His sovereign pleasure is another. He has wise reasons both for hastening and retarding His work. Sometimes He comes suddenly and unexpected; sometimes not till we have long looked for Him.²⁵

Thus the experience of perfection is not to be limited only to one who has been a believer for a long period of time. What is important is not length of time but attitude. The above statement is a rebuke for the "coldness, negligence and unbelief" of believers. The reason why the experience of perfection is not obtained is because it is not expected, or because it is not adequately understood. It is no attainment to be worked up. It is not a product of works. Because it is a product of faith it may be had instantaneously. John Fletcher, who followed Wesley's doctrine closely, wrote a small work entitled "Christian Perfection." Fletcher, quoting Wesley profusely in the course of a less redundant and better arranged treatise than Wesley's *Plain Account*, is in entire agreement on this point.

Certainly you may look for it now, if you believe it is by faith. And by this token, you may surely know whether you seek it by faith or by works. If by works, you want something to be done first, before you are sanctified. . . . If you seek it by faith, you may expect it as you are; and if as you are, then expect it now.²⁶

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

²⁵ Wesley, *Plain Account of Christian Perfection*, p. 60.

²⁶ J. Fletcher, *Christian Perfection* (Barbee, 1796), pp. 77, 78. "The attainableness of Christian perfection is one of the cornerstones in the grand structure of Christian doctrine as presented in the gospel of Christ." *Ibid.*, (American ed.; Nashville, 1860), p. 83.

The key points in Fletcher's treatment of the topic are as follows:

1. The doctrine of perfection rests solidly upon the precepts and promises of Scripture. The injunctions are made in the light of a possibility for which the promises received supply the power.

2. It is necessary to have clear ideas of this perfection, setting the ideals neither too high in an angelic perfection, nor too low in the morality of a good-natured heathen.

3. While free grace is primary and is passively received by the believer's faith "the way to perfection is by the due combination of prevenient assisting free grace and of submissive assisted free will." Thus the believer is saved on the one hand from Pharisaism and on the other from Antinomianism.

4. Instantaneous sanctification is possible but not inevitable; since it is possible it is to be sought here and now by faith and by the works of faith. Thus will the believer avoid Pharisaic works and "solifidian sloth."

5. Resolutions are to be made, in an acknowledgement of personal weakness but divine strength, indwelling sin is to be repented of, self-denial to be practised.

Neither Wesley nor Fletcher held that such a condition was unchangeably permanent. Both strongly denied it in fact. The latter's "Address to Perfect Christians" is an attempt to prevent the sanctified one from falling. Certainly there is to be no assumption that the state is now fixed. Fletcher roundly declares: "The doctrine of the absolute perseverance of the saints is the first card which the devil played against man."²⁷ And one he is still playing. Suffering, contradiction and opposition are not to cause surprise to the believer; they are to be accepted and to promote humble love, self-denial and modesty.

While Wesley did not claim holiness, Fletcher did, as well as many other less worthy claimants. Wesley was prepared

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

to put the best construction upon the reports he heard. "But the claimants of perfection were not all Fletchers and, as Wesley himself admitted, some who professed it 'made the very name of Perfection stink in the nostrils.' " ²⁸

III

In criticism it may be pointed out that the distinction Wesley made between "involuntary transgressions" and wilful sins is a tenuous one, and one which it is not possible consistently to carry through. A mistake in judgment may cause one's love to be misdirected and this is then not a deliverance from "all tempers contrary to pure love." Why too, if an error of judgment or ignorance is not sin is it necessary to be cleansed by the atoning work of Christ? It is expressly stated that "involuntary transgressions" are not sins. Is the criterion for what is sin the individual consciousness of it as such? Of course there is culpable ignorance: but quite apart from the wider dimensions, the definitions of sin given by Wesley in different places do not completely harmonize with one another. Wesley taught emphatically the doctrine of total depravity with no attempt to soften its asperity, remove its sting. Like Augustine he was in great earnest with reference to the doctrine of Original Sin. "The Wesleyan representation... goes the limit with Augustine." ²⁹ The important matter for Wesley was to state with no diminution the seriousness of man's sinful *condition*. Wesley's statements concerning the sinful condition of man are not in complete harmony with his statements concerning holiness. For the one who is perfect, there is no conscious knowledge of wrong, he is no longer cognizant of dispositions toward evil. But he may still make errors of judgment.

In body and mind the perfect Christian is still finite; he makes mistakes in judgment as long as he lives; these mistakes in judgment

²⁸ Sangster, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

²⁹ G. C. Cell, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

occasion mistakes in practice, and mistakes in practice often have bad moral consequences. Thus perfection in the sense of infallibility does not exist on the face of the earth.³⁰

The problem is to speak in such a way that there is no conflict between the definition of original sin, and the definition of the state of the sanctified believer. For Wesley there is no conscious sinning after the moment of sanctification: there may be ignorance and mistaken judgment but, in the state of sanctification, there is no consciousness of sin. In this state there is progression. If this is so, there is progress in holiness. Wesley did not teach that holiness was a static condition.

The confusion lies in the failure to make explicit the relation between original sin and sanctification. If man is only holy when there is no consciousness of sin, why is it important to speak of a moment when sanctification takes place? What is this "now" of sanctification? How is it to be related to the experience of conversion? Moreover, if there is progress in the light of what had not yet been attained, for that is what progress means, is this not progress in a state of sinfulness? The relationship between original sin and sanctification has not been presented as clearly as it might. He even admits that it is the lack of consciousness of sin that is the evidence for sanctification. He says that he does not know whether sin is *in fact* present or not. So he writes:

But is there no sin in those who are perfect in love? I believe not: but be that as it may, they feel none. . . . And whether sin is suspended, or extinguished, I will not dispute: It is enough that they feel nothing but love.³¹

We ask in the light of this profession of ignorance: about what is Wesley in doubt here? If the identification of sin with the consciousness of violated law is the only meaning of sin, there should be no doubt as to its absence. Wesley had

³⁰ William R. Cannon, *The Theology of John Wesley* (New York, 1946), p. 242.

³¹ Letter to Mrs. Maitland, May 12, 1763, in *Works*, XII, 257, 258.

another meaning of the term "sin" in mind as he evinced the skepticism of this letter. For Wesley there is sin which is not known sin. There are two possibilities for interpreting Wesley on this point. He is (1) either referring to original sin which he took so seriously, and is not willing to decide whether it is eradicated or not even when it does not come to expression in sinful act; or (2) he has a more subtle distinction in mind: namely, the commission of an act which, were it recognized as a violation of law, would be a sinful act. It is not sinful because it is unrecognized. But this seems too artificial and subtle a distinction for Wesley. We shall not therefore consider it further. Rather we shall propose that the relating of original sin to the process-state of sanctification had not been carried out by Wesley as it might have been.³²

This perfection of which Wesley speaks does not allow

³² The judgment that Wesley's doctrine of original sin was a means of emphasizing the need for repentance and that he had not related the doctrine of original sin with that of sanctification is clear from such paragraphs as the following.

"God does produce the Foetus of Man, as He does of Trees, empowering the one and the other to propagate each after its kind. And a *sinful man* propagates after his kind, another *sinful man*. Yet God *produces*, in the sense above mentioned, the man, but not the sin." Wesley, *The Doctrine of Original Sin According to Scripture, Reason, and Experience* (Bristol, 1757), p. 171. (Italics ours.)

"For I testify unto you, there is no peace with God, no Pardon, no Heaven for you in this state. There is but a step betwixt you and eternal destruction from the presence of the Lord. If the brittle thread of life, which may be broken with a touch, in a moment, or ever you are aware, be broken *while you are in this state*, you are ruined for ever and without remedy. But come ye speedily to Jesus Christ. He hath cleansed as vile souls as yours. Confess your sins and He will both forgive your sins and cleanse you from all unrighteousness." *Ibid.*, p. 52. (Italics ours.)

This judgment is clearly correct in spite of the very striking and emphatic descriptions of the corruption of man's actions and thoughts (cf. e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 514-515). He is concerned here to set forth as sharply as possible the indispensability of repentance—hence it is presented as the solution to the state of man's corruption. But when he turns to deal with the state of man after conversion the tone becomes different and the question of original sin is not given the emphasis which it has received in reference to the pre-conversion state.

the individual to be independent of Jesus Christ: it is not a perfection which fulfils the whole law. What, we may ask, is it then? Is Christian perfection a consciousness that he does not need to be forgiven? But Wesley says that one who is sanctified makes mistakes. Is it another name for justification? But Wesley distinguishes between that and perfection. Is it a way of saying that original sin is eradicated? But Wesley would not commit himself on that question. Is the doctrine of perfection a way of restating the meaning of Christian assurance? If that is so, why did not Wesley claim it himself? But then, if one is saved, the assurance should come at conversion? Or is there a progress toward a conviction of security that presses doubts, which are initially present and continue for a time to persist, out of the consciousness? Is the feeling that there is no known sin a development in the life of the believer later than the experience of conversion? Do we have here a two-stage doctrine of conversion, where at the second stage we reach the plateau level, after having vanquished known sin from the life and so from the consciousness? Beyond this level there may still be progress to be made. But it is made in the knowledge that the vanquishing of conscious sin lies in the past. Wesley wishes to retain the decisiveness of the change from a life of sin and the progressive character of the post-conversion life. There is progression both before and after conversion: after conversion when the certainty of forgiveness is given there is the attainment of certainty that known sin has been disposed of. That Wesley was concerned to allow for flexibility and change in the Christian life is obvious from his denial of the necessary permanence of this experience of perfection. Though man was perfect he could fall from this condition. If there is fluctuation there may, on the one hand, be a falling away, there may, on the other hand, be progress. There is a kind of "fixation" of such progress on two levels, at two points as there is both forgiveness and conquest of known sin.

We might find a parallel to the phenomenon to which Wesley is here pointing, by the use of his terminology, with that to which Friedrich Schleiermacher is pointing by the

employment of a different terminology. An interesting similarity is the employment of the same illustration: that of birth. In each case this is used to indicate, in slightly different contexts, the continuity of the preceding life with the new that comes to be. Schleiermacher points out that a period of hidden life precedes the new birth,³³ so that conversion is not to be distinguished from the effects of preparatory grace.³⁴ He conceives of sanctification as a progress, a process of becoming. The turning point from the life of sin is called "regeneration," the growing continuity of the new life is called "sanctification."³⁵ Sanctification means severance from participation in the common sinful life.³⁶ It is "an essential tendency of being" precisely opposite from that in the common life of sin.³⁷ "It is chiefly by this fact, that *sin can win no new ground*, that the state of sanctification is most definitely distinguished from all that went before;"³⁸ "... in spite of all fluctuations an increasing sway of the life of Christ over the flesh marks out the state of sanctification."³⁹ There is one brief sentence in which Schleiermacher treats of the problem with which Wesley is concerned. It is the following:

To sin with knowledge and with will . . . belongs to that fluctuating less or more found in everyone who is in the state of sanctification, where even the imperfection of a good work is often enough known and willed . . ."⁴⁰

It is by faith that, even in the state of sanctification, one can say that even after sin, he is still the child of God.⁴¹

While both writers admit the possibility of defectibility of

³³ Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith* (Edinburgh, 1960), p. 486.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 476, 477.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 505.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 507.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 512.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 514.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 517.

progress within the life of sanctification, Schleiermacher's assertion of the conscious committal of sin after conversion in the state of sanctification is a more adequate one than Wesley's. The latter appears to be creating an abstract ideal which does not take into full consideration the presence and the intermittent manifestation of original sin. That he virtually but vaguely recognizes this is evident in his saying that the faults of the sanctified man, while not sins, still require the blood of the Saviour to atone for them. What can these faults be but the coming to expression of the original sin which Wesley has desired to take so seriously?

Finally, it is difficult to see that Wesley has carried through to the last his thematic contention that it is only through the faith of the believer that salvation is possible. Would it not immediately need to be added to the assertion of the sanctified, "we know that we have no known sin," the assertion, "but this does not mean we are not sinners. Even if we are not conscious of sin, we are nevertheless accepted in faith." The very claim to be thus sanctified might in itself be an example of an unconscious sin—for there are certainly those who would stumble when such a claim would be made. It certainly seems closer to experience, and thus more realistic, to assert, drawing on Luther, that where there is faith there is also acknowledgement of the fact that, with all the progress that one has made, and with all the consciousness that one does not commit this or that sin any more, in being sanctified one is *simul justus et peccator*, and therefore is sanctified by faith, as he is justified by faith; even ultimately that sanctification is a way of describing the life of faith in which one has been and continues to be justified. The only claims that one can then make are that one is reconciled to God as faith is granted to him in his response to the revelation of God. God is revealed to the man of faith, as gracious and forgiving. To continue in this condition of faith in spite of conscious sin—a conscious sin which is a diminishing quantity—is sanctification.

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW

CONSONANTS

א = 'a	ד = d	י = y	ס = s	ר = r
ב = b	ה = h	כ = k	שׁ = 's	שׂ = s̄
ג = g	ו = w	ק = k̄	פּ = p	שׁ = s̄
ד = g	ז = z	ל = l	פּ = p̄	תּ = t
ה = g	ח = h	מ = m	צ = s̄	תּ = t̄
ו = d	ט = t̄	נ = n	ק = q	

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

- = a	וּ, וֹ (vocal shewa) = °	וּ = ô
וּ = ā	וּ, וֹ = ê	וּ = °
וּ = °	וּ = i	וּ = ô
וּ = e	וּ = î	וּ = u
וּ = ē	וּ = o	וּ = ū

ABBREVIATIONS OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

<i>AAS</i>	Annales archéol. de Syrie	<i>BMB</i>	Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth
<i>AASOR</i>	Annual, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.	<i>BQR</i>	Baptist Quarterly Review
<i>ADAJ</i>	Annual, Dep. of Ant. of Jordan	<i>BR</i>	Biblical Research (Chicago)
<i>AER</i>	American Ecclesiastical Review	<i>BRG</i>	Biblioth. Rerum Germanicarum
<i>Afo</i>	Archiv für Orientforschung	<i>BS</i>	Bibliotheca Sacra
<i>AfP</i>	Archiv für Papyrusforschung	<i>BT</i>	Bible Translator
<i>AJA</i>	Amer. Journal of Archaeology	<i>BZ</i>	Biblische Zeitschrift
<i>AJSL</i>	Amer. Journ. of Sem. Lang. and Literature	<i>CBQ</i>	Catholic Biblical Quarterly
<i>ALBO</i>	Analecta Lovan. Bibl. et Orient.	<i>CC</i>	Christian Century
<i>ANF</i>	The Ante-Nicene Fathers	<i>CdE</i>	Chronique d'Égypte
<i>AO</i>	Acta Orientalia	<i>CH</i>	Church History
<i>ARG</i>	Archiv für Reformationsgesch.	<i>CIG</i>	Corpus Inscript. Graecarum
<i>ARW</i>	Archiv für Religionswissenschaft	<i>CIL</i>	Corpus Inscript. Latinarum
<i>ASAE</i>	Annales, Serv. des Ant. de l'Ég.	<i>CIS</i>	Corpus Inscript. Semiticarum
<i>ASB</i>	Acta Sanctorum (ed. Bolland)	<i>CJTh</i>	Canadian Journal of Theology
<i>AThR</i>	Anglican Theological Review	<i>CSEL</i>	Corpus Script. Eccl. Lat.
<i>AUSS</i>	Andrews Univ. Sem. Studies	<i>CT</i>	Christianity Today
<i>BA</i>	Biblical Archaeologist	<i>ER</i>	Ecumenical Review
<i>BASOR</i>	Bulletin, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.	<i>ETHL</i>	Ephemer. Theol. Lovanienses
<i>Bib</i>	Biblica	<i>ET</i>	Expository Times
<i>BIES</i>	Bulletin, Israel Expl. Soc.	<i>HJ</i>	Hibbert Journal
<i>BIFAO</i>	Bulletin, Inst. Franç. d'Arch. Or.	<i>HThR</i>	Harvard Theological Review
<i>BiOr</i>	Bibliotheca Orientalis	<i>HUCA</i>	Hebrew Union College Annual
<i>BJPES</i>	Bulletin, Jewish Pal. Expl. Soc.	<i>IEJ</i>	Israel Exploration Journal
<i>BJRL</i>	Bulletin, John Rylands Library	<i>Int</i>	Interpretation
		<i>JACH</i>	Jahrb. für Ant. und Christentum

<i>JAOS</i>	Journ. of the Amer. Or. Soc.	<i>RHR</i>	Revue de l'Histoire des Religions
<i>JBL</i>	Journal of Biblical Literature	<i>RL</i>	Religion in Life
<i>JBR</i>	Journal of Bible and Religion	<i>RLA</i>	Reallexikon der Assyriologie
<i>JCS</i>	Journal of Cuneiform Studies	<i>RQ</i>	Revue de Qumrân
<i>JEA</i>	Journal of Egyptian Arch.	<i>RSR</i>	Revue des Sciences Religieuses
<i>JJS</i>	Journal of Jewish Studies	<i>SJTh</i>	Scottish Journal of Theology
<i>JNES</i>	Journal of Near Eastern Studies	<i>STh</i>	Studia Theologica
<i>JQR</i>	Jewish Quarterly Review	<i>ThEH</i>	Theologische Existenz heute
<i>JR</i>	Journal of Religion	<i>ThQ</i>	Theologische Quartalschrift
<i>JSS</i>	Journal of Semitic Studies	<i>ThT</i>	Theology Today
<i>JThS</i>	Journal of Theol. Studies	<i>ThLZ</i>	Theologische Literaturzeitung
<i>LQ</i>	Lutheran Quarterly	<i>ThR</i>	Theologische Rundschau
<i>MGH</i>	Monumenta Germaniae Historica	<i>Trad</i>	Traditio
<i>MQR</i>	Mennonite Quarterly Review	<i>ThS</i>	Theological Studies
<i>NKZ</i>	Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift	<i>ThZ</i>	Theologische Zeitschrift
<i>NPNF</i>	Nicene and Post Nic. Fathers	<i>VC</i>	Verbum Caro
<i>NRTh</i>	Nouvelle Revue Théologique	<i>VD</i>	Verbum Domini
<i>NT</i>	Novum Testamentum	<i>VCh</i>	Vigiliae Christianae
<i>NTA</i>	New Testament Abstracts	<i>VT</i>	Vetus Testamentum
<i>NTS</i>	New Testament Studies	<i>WThJ</i>	Westminster Theol. Journal
<i>Num</i>	Numen	<i>WZKM</i>	Wiener Zeitschr. f. d. Kunde d. Morgenlandes
<i>OCh</i>	Oriens Christianus	<i>ZA</i>	Zeitschrift für Assyriologie
<i>OLZ</i>	Orientalistische Literaturzeitung	<i>ZAS</i>	Zeitsch. für ägyptische Sprache
<i>Or</i>	Orientalia	<i>ZAW</i>	Zeitsch. für die alttes. Wiss.
<i>OTS</i>	Oudtestamentische Studiën	<i>ZDMG</i>	Zeitsch. der Deutsch. Morgenl. Gesellschaft
<i>PEQ</i>	Palestine Exploration Quarterly	<i>ZDPV</i>	Zeitsch. des Deutsch. Pal. Ver.
<i>QDAP</i>	Quarterly, Dep. of Ant in Pal.	<i>ZKG</i>	Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte
<i>RA</i>	Revue d'Assyr. et d'Arch. Or.	<i>ZHTh</i>	Zeitsch für hist. Theologie
<i>RAC</i>	Rivista di Archaeologia Cristiana	<i>ZKTh</i>	Zeitsch. für kath. Theologie
<i>RB</i>	Revue Biblique	<i>ZNW</i>	Zeitsch. für die neutest. Wiss.
<i>RE</i>	Review and Expositor	<i>ZSTh</i>	Zeitschrift für syst. Theologie
<i>RdE</i>	Revue d'Égyptologie	<i>ZThK</i>	Zeitsch. für Theol. und Kirche
<i>RHE</i>	Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique		
<i>RHPR</i>	Revue d'Hist. et de Philos. Rel.		