


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THE USE OF *MIŠKĀN* AND *ʿOHEL MÔʿĒḏ* IN EXODUS 25-40

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The previous study¹ in this series on *miškān* and *ʿohel mōʿēḏ* in Exod 25-40 concluded that *miškān* means "dwelling place," that it concerns a "place" or "site" (similar to the modern noun "camp"), and that it carries connotations of transience. It should not be limited to a specific form or kind of "dwelling" (particularly not what is implied by the English word "tent" and by the Latin *tabernaculum*), since such a usage leads to confusion with *ʿohel*. Regarding the phrase *ʿohel mōʿēḏ* we found that it is a genitival construct which means "tent of assembly" or "tent of encounter," that this was the name of the structure in which the Divine and the human met, and that the term emphasizes the event rather than the structure.

The previous study further revealed that Ugaritic parallels to these two Hebrew terms provide no additional helpful information beyond what is already known from the Hebrew itself, except possibly that the Hebrew differentiation between nonsedentary and sedentary connotations of the words seems to be lost in the Ugaritic. I suggested that the reason for this difference in usage could be the fact that Ugarit was sedentary and urban at the time the literature we examined was written (MB III [II C] to LB I), whereas Israel was nonsedentary during the period depicted in the book of Exodus.

¹Ralph E. Hendrix, "*Miškān* and *ʿOHEL Mōʿēḏ*: Etymology, Lexical Definitions, and Extra-biblical Usage," *AUSS* 29/3 (1991):213-224. The author here wishes to express appreciation to J. Bjørnar Storfjell, Richard M. Davidson, and Randall W. Younker, members of the faculty of the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University, for their patience in overseeing the preparation of this and related studies.

Finally, we found that by translating both *miškān* (dwelling place) and *ʾohel* (tent) as *skēnē* (tent), the LXX has obscured the difference between the two Hebrew terms, as does the Vulgate in its use of *tabernaculum*. I suggested that perhaps the two terms were considered to be synonyms by the time of the translation of the LXX, and that if so, this may be another example of sedentarization obscuring the terms.

Building upon this initial etymological analysis, subsequent study of the MT of Exod 25-40 has revealed that the expressions *miškān* and *ʾohel mōʿēd* are discrete and specific; they are not interchangeable. The term selected in each case depends on the literary context in which the term appears. *Miškān* is the biblical writer's expression of choice when the construction or assembling of the dwelling place is the subject, while *ʾohel mōʿēd* is the expression of choice when the context is cultic. Thus the habitation of YHWH may properly be called the "Cultic Dwelling Place," a phrase which conveys both aspects of this duality.

Both past and contemporary structural analyses of Exod 25-40 lack sensitivity to the distinctions between *miškān* and *ʾohel mōʿēd*.² This may be due to the application of an external methodology

²Brevard S. Childs, *Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press), 73, cf. 100; John I. Durham, *Exodus*, Word Biblical Commentary, vol. 3 (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 353, 371 (for examples of scholarly analyses, see pp. 350-499); and George V. Pixley, *On Exodus: A Liberation Perspective*, trans. Robert R. Barr (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1987), xvii. On terminological insensitivity, see (chronologically): Julius Wellhausen, *Prolegomena to the History of Ancient Israel*, trans. J. Sutherland Black and Allan Menzies (Edinburgh: Adam & Charles Black, 1885), 44; Baruch A. Levine, "The Descriptive Tabernacle Texts of the Pentateuch," *JAOS* 85 (1965): 307-318; U. Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Exodus*, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1967), 346, 370; R. Alan Cole, *Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary*, vol. 2, *Tyndale Old Testament Commentary* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1973), 52; Charles L. Feinberg, "Tabernacle," *Zondervan Pictorial Encyclopedia of the Bible*, ed. Merrill C. Tenney (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975), 5:572-573; P. J. Kearney, "Creation and Liturgy: The P Redaction of Ex 25-40," *ZAW* 89 (1977): 386; Joe O. Lewis, "The Ark and the Tent," *RevExp* 74 (1977): 537; Victor (Avigdor) Hurowitz, "The Priestly Account of Building the Tabernacle," *JAOS* 105 (1985): 22; John J. Davis, *Moses and the Gods of Egypt: Studies in Exodus*, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 255; Durham, ix-x; Pixley, 195; W. Johnstone, *Exodus*, Old Testament Guides (Sheffield, England: JSOT Press, 1990), *passim*; Terence E. Fretheim, *Exodus*, Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Louisville: John Knox Press, 1991), esp. 263-316; and Nahum M. Sarna, *The JPS Torah Commentary: Exodus* (New York: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), esp. 49, 158, 176.

rather than making use of a literary-structural analysis.³ Under these circumstances, a terminologically sensitive analysis of Exod 25-40 is timely. The present study is an endeavor to fill this vacuum for Exod 25-40. A third (and concluding) article will present an overview of the literary structure of Exod 25-40, through which this terminological pattern weaves.⁴

1. Occurrences of the Terms

Statistical Analysis

Miškān and *ʾohel* (most often in the phrase *ʾohel mōʿēd*) are names of YHWH's habitation which the text of Exod 25-40 indicates Moses was commanded to construct, equip, and ceremonially prepare for service. Other appellative expressions for this habitation either do not occur in chapters 25-40 or occur only once, whereas *miškān* and *ʾohel* occur in reference to the habitation some fifty-eight times each.⁵ The present study will be limited to the contextual usage of these two denominatives.

³By "external methodology" is meant the type popularized by Julius Wellhausen in his *Prolegomena*, and summarized by Edgar Krentz, *The Historical-Critical Method* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), 55-61. This method has mutated through time (see Douglas A. Knight, "The Pentateuch," in *The Bible and Its Modern Interpreters*, ed. Douglas A. Knight and Gene M. Tucker [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985], 265-287), but still retains at least one essential Wellhausian theme: namely, the etiological nature of the Cultic Dwelling Place of YHWH (Wellhausen, 37: "For the truth is, that the tabernacle is the copy, not the prototype, of the temple in Jerusalem"). On this matter, see also (chronologically): J. Coert Rylaarsdam, "Introduction to the Book of Exodus," *IB* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1952) 1:845; idem, "Exegesis of the Book of Exodus," *IB* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1952), 1:1027; James Muilenberg, "The History of the Religion of Israel," *IDB*, ed. G. A. Buttrick (New York: Abingdon Press, 1962), 308-309; Martin Noth, *Exodus: A Commentary*, trans. J. S. Bowden (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962), 211; Jack P. Lewis, "Moʿed," *Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament*, ed. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr., and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 1:389; Durham, 352; and Johnstone, 63.

⁴Ralph E. Hendrix, "A Literary-Structural Overview of Exod 25-40," *AUSS* (forthcoming).

⁵All statistical data are derived from Gerhard Lisowsky and Leonhard Rost, *Konkordanz zum Hebräischen Alten Testament* (Stuttgart: Württembergische Bibelanstalt, 1958). *Hēkāl* (palace, temple) does not occur in Exod 25-40. *Miqdāš* (holy precinct), and *Bayit* (house) in reference to the divine dwelling, each occurs only once, in Exod 25:8 and 34:26 respectively.

The word *miškān* (dwelling place) occurs 139 times in the OT. Of these occurrences, 104 (74.8%) are found in the Pentateuch as follows: fifty-eight (55.8%) in Exodus, four (3.9%) in Leviticus, and forty-two (40.4%) in Numbers, with none in Genesis and Deuteronomy. Every occurrence of *miškān* in Exodus (41.7% of all OT occurrences) are found in Exod 25-40.

The word *ʾhel* (tent) occurs 344 times in the OT. In the Pentateuch it is found 214 times in one or another of the expressions *ʾhel* (tent), *ʾhel mōʿēd* (tent of meeting), *ʾhel ʾal-hāmiškān* (tent over the dwelling place), and *ʾhel hāʿēduṭ* (tent of the testimony). It is used in the Pentateuch to refer to a personal tent forty-seven times (13.7%), with all twenty-three occurrences in Genesis (6.7%) being of this nature. It occurs forty-four times in Leviticus, forty-three (97.7%) of which are in the phrase *ʾhel mōʿēd*. In Numbers, it occurs seventy-six times, of which fifty-six (73.7%) are in the phrase *ʾhel mōʿēd*. Deuteronomy has nine occurrences, four times (45.4%) either in the phrase *ʾhel mōʿēd* or with this phrase as its antecedent.

In Exodus *ʾhel* without an antecedent appears four times (6.5%). It occurs in the phrase *ʾhel mōʿēd* thirty-four times, plus three more times with *ʾhel mōʿēd* as its antecedent, for a total of thirty-seven occurrences (59.7% of its Exodus occurrences). It is found in the phrase *ʾhel ʾal-hāmiškān* two times, but with twelve more occurrences with *ʾhel* in reference to *ʾhel ʾal-hāmiškān*, for a total of fourteen times (22.5% of the total Exodus occurrences). In Exod 33 it is found seven times as the *ʾhel* of Moses (11.3% of the Exodus occurrences). *ʾHel haʿēduṭ* (tent of the testimony) does not occur in Exodus. Thus, in one form or another *ʾhel* occurs a total of sixty-two times in Exod 25-40 (29.1% of its OT occurrences). There are fifty-eight times in Exod 25-40 wherein some form of *ʾhel* refers to the habitation of YHWH, the most common being thirty-four occurrences in the phrase *ʾhel mōʿēd*.

The Patterning of the Occurrences

A sequential listing of the occurrences of *miškān* and *ʾhel mōʿēd* in Exod 25-40 reveals a terminological pattern.⁶ The data in

⁶This is S. Bar-Efrat's "verbal level," as suggested in "Some Observations on the Analysis of Structure in Biblical Narrative," VT 30 (1980): 157.

the Table on page 8 (derived from Lisowsky and Rost)⁷ make it apparent that the use of *miškān* continues uninterrupted (nineteen times) from Exod 25:9 through 27:19. Then in Exod 27:20, the beginning of a second terminological unit is evidenced by an abrupt shift to *ṣhel mō'ēḏ*, a term which continues through to Exod 33:7 (seventeen occurrences in all).⁸ In Exod 35:1-39:43 we find a third terminological unit, one that is "predominantly *miškān*." In it, *miškān* occurs twenty-two times while *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* occurs five times. Finally, a fourth terminological unit constitutes a "mixed" *miškān* and *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* passage encompassing Exod 40:1-38. Here *miškān* occurs seventeen times and *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* twelve times.

The terminological structure of *miškān* and *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* in Exod 25-40 consists therefore of four compositional units: *miškān* only, *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* only, predominantly *miškān*, and mixed *miškān* and *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* expressions. Why is this so?

2. Explanations and Solutions

Among the scholarly analyses noted, only that of G. V. Pixley acknowledges a terminological aspect of the text. He does so, however, only once and without explanation.⁹ I suggest that it is the literary context in which each of these expressions is used that provides the key to understanding the terminological structure. A broad study of the literary structure of Exod 25-40 will be presented in a forthcoming article; however, the overview that will be given therein is not necessary in order for us to analyze here the contextual usages of *miškān* and *ṣhel mō'ēḏ*.¹⁰

"*Miškān Only*" Terminological Unit (Exod 25:9-27:19)

Miškān (occurring nineteen times) is the only term used to name the habitation of YHWH in the text of Exod 25:9-27:19. This

⁷Lisowsky and Rost, 30-33, 873-874.

⁸Pixley, 199.

⁹See specific references in Cole, Durham, Fretheim, Hurowitz, Johnstone, Kearney, Joe O. Lewis, Noth, and Rylaarsdam mentioned in n. 2, above. See also Pixley, 199, and Sarna, 176, regarding the shift from *miškān* to *ṣhel mō'ēḏ* in Exod 27:19-20.

¹⁰This article is scheduled for publication in the next issue of *AUSS*.

Occurrences of *Miškān* and ^ʔ*Ohel Mō^cēd* in Exodus 25-40

<i>Miškān</i>	^ʔ <i>Ohel Mō^cēd</i>	<i>Miškān</i>	^ʔ <i>Ohel Mō^cēd</i>
"<i>Miškān</i> Only"		"Predominantly <i>Miškān</i>"	
25:9		35:11	
26:1		:15	
:6		:18	35:21
:7		36:8	
:12		:13	
:13		:14	
:15		:20	
:17		:22	
:18		:23	
:20		:25	
:22		:27	
:23		:28	
:26		:31	
:27		:32	
:27		:32	
:30			38:8
:35		38:20	
27:9		:21	
:19		:21	
			:30
		:31	
		39:32	:32
		:33	
		:40	:40
^ʔ<i>Ohel Mō^cēd</i> Only"		Mixed Terminology	
27:21		40:2	:2
28:43		:5	
29:4		:6	:6
:10			:7
:11		:9	
:30			:12
:32		:17	
:42		:18	
:44		:19	
30:16		:21	
:18		:22	:22
:20		:24	:24
:26			:26
:36		:28	
31:7		:29	:29
33:7			:30
:7			:32
		:33	
		:34	:34
		:35	:35
		:36	
		:38	

passage is part of a slightly larger section (Exod 25:1-27:19), the content of which consists of commands for constructing the dwelling: its size, pattern, and materials. This section also details the physical arrangements of the dwelling: an ark (throne), a table (for eating), a lampstand (for light), an audience chamber and private compartment, an altar (kitchen), and a courtyard (public area). All of these elements were common to dwellings in general, and thus the writer's use of *miškān* is not surprising.

"*ʾOHEL MÔʿĒD Only*" *Terminological Unit*
(Exod 27:20-34:35)

In Exod 27:20, there is a change of context which witnesses an abrupt shift in denominatives. Exod 27:21 contains the first instance of the use of the term *ʾohel môʿēd*. This phrase, which occurs seventeen times, is used exclusively for the divine habitation in Exod 21:20-33:7.

Whereas the literary context of *miškān* was about construction, the literary context of *ʾohel môʿēd* appears to involve the function of the cult of YHWH. Exod 27:20-21 concerns the cultic function and use of oil in the liturgy. Exod 28:1-43 concerns the priests, their garments (ephod, breastpiece, robe, turban, tunic, and undergarments), along with the time and manner of their function in the cult. Exod 29:1-46 describes the process of consecrating and dressing the priests. It also speaks of offerings (sin, burnt, and wave); ordination; and the continuous, "daily" burnt offering. Exod 30:1-10 concerns the incense altar: its placement, use, and perpetuity, but these verses do not give evidence of either name for YHWH's habitation. Exod 30:11-31:18 concerns atonement money, the priests' wash basin, the anointing oil, incense, the providential provision of craftsmen, and the sabbath(s). Where an expression naming the habitation of YHWH is found in each of these literary subsections of Exod 27:20-33:7, the term is exclusively *ʾohel môʿēd*. In this cult-functional context, the biblical writer chose *ʾohel môʿēd* rather than the previously used *miškān*.

Because of the cult-functional use of *ʾohel môʿēd*, this phrase continues into the four narratives of Exod 32-34. It occurs twice in Exod 33:7, in the narrative of the Theophany in Moses' Tent. In the preceding narrative about the Golden Calf and in the subsequent two narratives about the Theophany on the Mountain and the Episode of the Second Tablets, the phrase does not occur. Thus, although the phrase is used only twice, and this in conjunction

with only the second narrative, all four narratives are apparently cultic and may be considered as being in a cult-functional context.

Predominantly Miškān Terminological Unit
(Exod 35:1-39:43)

The suggested term-context association seen in the first two terminological units appears straightforward. Individual expressions are used in clearly definable literary contexts. However, the two mixed terminological units found in Exod 35:1-39:43 and 40:1-38 provide both a challenge to, and vindication of, the term-context relationship suggested in this study. We find within the literary structure of Exod 35:1-39:43 that *miškān* occurs twenty-two times, while *ṯhel mō'ēd* occurs five times. For convenience, it is designated as a "predominantly *miškān*" terminological unit.

Exod 35:1-36:7 relates to the construction of the equipment of the habitation (which explains the presence *miškān*), but it also includes the mention of the cult function (hence the presence of *ṯhel mō'ēd* in Exod 35:21). *Miškān* is used three times in the construction context; *ṯhel mō'ēd* occurs once, in a cult-function context.

Exod 36:8-38:20 is an "assembly" passage which parallels the "command" passage in Exod 25:8-31:18. It primarily concerns construction. Thus the writer uses *miškān*, except in Exod 38:8, where the concern is cult-functional (necessitating the use of *ṯhel mō'ēd*). *Miškān* is used thirteen times, in construction contexts; and *ṯhel mō'ēd* is used once, in a cult-function context.

Exod 38:21-31 concerns the metal used in constructing components of the habitation. Here *miškān* occurs three times in construction contexts, and *ṯhel mō'ēd* occurs once in the context of the bronze altar. This is the altar of burnt offering (the incense altar was gold) and may be considered as cult-functional.

Finally, Exod 39:1-43, the "assembly" parallel to the Exod 28:1-43 "command" section, concerns the priestly garments, ephod, stones, breastpiece, robe, tunic, and plate/turban. Here, however, the emphasis is not on the cultic function of this equipment, but on its construction.

Apparent exceptions to this construction context are Exod 39:32 and 39:40, where both *miškān* and *ṯhel mō'ēd* are found in the same literary phrase. The two verses are worded in the Hebrew in such a way as to be rendered in English as "the dwelling place of

the Tent of Assembly."¹¹ Here the context is still construction: namely, the construction of the dwelling place of the Tent of Meeting. Up to this point, *miškān* has been used solely in reference to YHWH's Dwelling Place. But just as *ʾohel* can refer to other tents besides YHWH's, so too can *miškān* simply mean a "dwelling place." Here it is consistent with the previous differentiation of terms for *miškān* to mean "dwelling place" as a reference to the dwelling place of the *ʾohel mōʿēḏ*.

The Combined Miškān and ʾOHEL MÔʿĒḏ Context
(Exod 40:1-38)

The fourth unit, Exod 40:1-38, exemplifies the combined *miškān* and *ʾohel mōʿēḏ* context. Here *miškān* occurs seventeen times and *ʾohel mōʿēḏ* twelve times. The terminological distinction is much more narrow (as an "assembly" context might require); however, the same constructional and cult-functional usages are detectable.

Exod 40:1-8 concerns the assembling of the whole Cult-Dwelling from component parts. Although the cult articles are mentioned, this is in the context of construction. Hence *miškān* occurs once as the Dwelling Place of YHWH, and it also occurs twice as the "dwelling place" of the Tent of Meeting (in genitival construct). *ʾOHEL MÔʿĒḏ* occurs alone only in Exod 40:7, in the context of the placement of the priests' wash basin—clearly a cultic object that pertains to cult-function.

Exod 40:9-16 concerns the command to anoint the *miškān*, its furnishings, the altar of burnt offerings and its utensils, and the wash basin and stand, as well as the priests. That this is clearly cult-functional (as the term "anoint" suggests) is verified by the presence of *ʾohel mōʿēḏ*. Here the command to anoint the *miškān* may seem troublesome unless one allows for its generic meaning "dwelling place." The apparent problem is resolved, however, if one reads *miškān* as the "dwelling place" of the Tent of Assembly, rather than as the "Dwelling Place" of YHWH.

Exod 40:17-33 concerns the placement of certain objects. *Miškān* is the primary term of the passage where it refers to the Dwelling

¹¹My translation. Exod 39:32 is simply a genitival construct wherein *miškān* is in the construct state and *ʾohel mōʿēḏ* is its genitive: "dwelling place of the Tent of Assembly." Exod 39:40 is not a genitival construct, but *ʾohel mōʿēḏ* is preceded by the dative prefix *ʔ*, which may carry the genitival idea "of" and therefore retains the same meaning and translation in Exod 39:40 as in Exod 39:32.

Place of YHWH (v. 17) and the typical dwelling furniture therein (vv. 18-21). In vv. 22-24, a very close association of *miškān* and *ʾohel* is witnessed; however, this is not in actual or effective genitival construct as before, but rather in a literary association with theological import: YHWH's dwelling furniture (table and lampstand) are placed in the structure that is called by its cult-functional name! This suggests that the act of placing the furniture was considered by the biblical writer to be cultic, not constructional. In other words, there is more to the placing of this particular furniture than merely mimicking what is done with household furniture. The text, in mid-sentence, explicitly unites the constructional and cult-functional aspects of the Cult-Dwelling: YHWH both dwells and conducts cultic placement of furniture in a single physical structure. Thus there is one structure with two aspects.

In v. 29, the same genitival construct relationship is witnessed as before: "the dwelling place of the Tent of Meeting," a construction context. In vv. 30-32, straightforward cult-functional contexts (concerning the washing of the priests) use *ʾohel mō'ēd* without difficulty for the reader. Finally, in v. 33, the writer switches back to *miškān* in the constructional context of putting up the curtain around the courtyard.

Exod 40:34-38, the final passage of Exod 25-40, exhibits the closest literary relationship between *miškān* and *ʾohel mō'ēd* found in this study up to this point. Here the subject is the indwelling of YHWH in the Cult-Dwelling. As one might expect in the light of YHWH's roles, the indwelling occurs simultaneously in the *miškān* and the *ʾohel mō'ēd*, since both are dual aspects of one single physical entity. The terms remain connotatively distinct while referring to the same physical structure. The Glory of YHWH resides inside the *miškān*, while the Cloud hovers above the entrance of the *ʾohel mō'ēd*.

3. Summary and Conclusions

Four terminological units occur within the basic literary structure of Exod 25-40. This terminological "axis" has generally been overlooked by scholars, resulting in an insensitivity to the discrete and separate connotations of *miškān* and *ʾohel mō'ēd*. By tracing the terms along the terminological axis through the literary structure, this study has suggested that *miškān* is used in constructional contexts, primarily associated with commands to

manufacture and assemble the Dwelling Place of YHWH, but secondarily in its generic sense as simply "dwelling place." The phrase *ʾohel mōʿēd* appears in literary contexts where the cultic function of the habitation is the concern.

This relationship between the context and the precise term that is used suggests intentionality: i.e., particular terms are used in particular contexts. Specifically, what is suggested by the usage is that the biblical writer wished to associate *miškān* with construction contexts and *ʾohel mōʿēd* with liturgical, cult-functional contexts. When writing about the command to construct a dwelling and to establish the cult, the writer could easily use the discrete terms separately. The writer dealt first with one subject (construction), and used an appropriately "constructional" name for the structure. In dealing with the second subject (cult-function), the writer used a totally distinct, but equally appropriate expression. We must realize that the writer was distinguishing dual, yet discrete, aspects of a single physical reality.

When describing the assembly process, these discrete denominatives are used in close association, but not necessarily synonymously. Even though the two terms occur at times in a single paragraph or sentence, it is always with discrete connotations. This is evident in the two terminological units where *miškān* and *ʾohel mōʿēd* occur separately, and it is discernibly consistent in the latter two terminological units, where, in tightly-worded texts, the terms are in close association.

Thus, in all contexts within Exod 25-40 the biblical writer has masterfully controlled the use of *miškān* and *ʾohel mōʿēd* in order to clarify the dual nature of YHWH's habitation. That habitation was to be understood as a transient dwelling place, such as was consistent with the dwelling places of nomadic peoples; therefore the choice of *miškān*. But yet, that habitation also had the continuing function of fostering the cultic relationship, and this aspect was best expressed by the choice of *ʾohel mōʿēd*.

MORAL RULES AND EXCEPTIONS

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In a moral system, rules are often confronted by exceptions. In fact, an exception presupposes the existence of a rule, for logical necessity calls for a context of requirement before one can speak meaningfully about an exception. But the reverse statement, that a rule presupposes an exception, is more problematic. Christian ethical theorists have long struggled with this latter proposition and with related questions. Can rules and exceptions, for instance, coexist in some sort of friendly competition? Or are they mutually exclusive? And is there a possibility of having "exceptionless" moral rules?

The task of this essay, which explores this basic area of ethical concern, is twofold. First, I look at moral discourse from the angle of the relation between moral rules and their exceptions. In this connection I suggest four possible alternative relations between the two. My purpose is not to discover one best relationship, but rather to identify conditions as well as reasons for setting up exceptions and for accepting or rejecting the use of them.

Second, I provide rationale for the thesis that the admission of, and resistance to, exceptions has an impact (good or bad) on the rule, at least on the level of the attitude of the moral agent. L. G. Miller indicates that rules are not affected by exceptions inasmuch as exceptions are not directed at rules but rather at moral judgments.¹ However, if moral judgments are affected, the result with respect to rules is very significant indeed, since moral rules and moral judgments can be kept completely separated only in theory, not in factual reality and practice.

¹L. G. Miller, "Rules and Exceptions," *Ethics* 46 (July, 1956): 269.

1. *Some Preliminary Considerations*

Before we consider alternative answers to our basis query, a few preliminary considerations are in order. First of all I define my use of the terms "rules" and "moral rules." Next I deal with the contrast between "exceptions" and "excuses." And then, as the final preliminary consideration, I describe the dynamic and relationships that are involved in connection with rules and exceptions to them.

Moral Rules

In ethical literature the term "rule" is used in a variety of ways. It sometimes signifies a general and generic category in distinction from, but also often inclusive of, such more limited or specific concepts as "action," "value," "ends," etc. When ethicists speak of rule-utilitarianism and act-utilitarianism or of rule ethics versus situation ethics, the word "rule" includes all rules, whether these are general principles or whether they are specific rules of action.

On the other hand, the word "rule" may have reference to something very specific, as when it signifies a direct and specific requirement which enjoins more-or-less concrete action or inaction. In this case, a "rule" is a subspecies of a "principle" or "norm." It is what Paul Ramsey calls a "direct rule," or "defined-action rules" belonging to the more general "defined-action principle".² In the present essay, I use the term "moral rule" in the sense of the direct rule that enjoins a specific and concrete action.

Infrequent use and a somewhat ambiguous understanding of the word "exception" necessitates some clarification of this word as well. In general terms, an "exception" is defined as an instance or a judgment that does not conform to an established rule. It is "a particular case which comes within the terms of a rule, but to which the rule is not applicable."³

"Exceptions" and "Excuses"

Some distinctions between "exceptions" and "excuses" may also prove helpful here. Whereas an "exception" refers to a rule in the

²Paul Ramsey and G. H. Outka, eds., "The Case of the Curious Exception," *Norm and Context in Christian Ethics* (New York: Scribner, 1969), 93.

³*The Oxford English Dictionary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1933), 3:373.

context of a moral judgment, decision, or dilemma, the most frequent antecedent for "excuse" is a specific action. If nothing is done, no excuses are in order. In fact, to seek for excuses at the level of decision-making or in confrontation with dilemmas prior to the consummation of an act is to open one's motives to suspicion. In other words, if I think of excuses before I act, this very fact may indicate my knowledge of the blameworthiness of the course of action I contemplate taking, and my desire to perform the act without being blamed. In short, excuses presuppose an ascription of responsibility.⁴

Moreover, whereas the opposite of an exception is conformity, the opposite of an excuse is an accusation. If I am accused for having done action A, my alternatives are: (a) to admit having done the action, taking the consequences; (b) to deny the action; or (c) to seek excuses for the action. Alternative "(a)" is the opposite of alternative "(c)," for by admission of the action I do not seek to avoid the blame and consequences that are inherent in the accusation. The best solution here is simply to ask for forgiveness. By doing it, I do not need to put forth an excuse or even to present attenuating evidences; rather, I rest my case on mercy and compassion. With denial (alternative "b") on the other hand, I seek to show that the accusation itself is a mistake. This also contrasts with alternative "c," for when I resort to excuses I do not deny having done action A. Instead, I either (i) seek to justify the action and thus dismiss the blame, or (ii) plead for mitigation of responsibility on the basis of extenuating circumstances and thus diminish or even totally deny the blame.

The call for an exception differs from all the above. When asking for it, not only do I admit the action which appears to conflict with the rule but prior to my taking that action also claim to have insights, arguments, and/or evidences on the basis of which I should be allowed either to circumvent the requirement of the rule or to modify the rule so as to fit my own unique case. In using this procedure, I assume responsibility for the action and for its consequences.

⁴For helpful treatise on excuses, see David Holdcroft, "A Plea for Excuses," *Philosophy* 44 (Oct. 1969): 314-330.

The Dynamic of Conformity and Nonconformity

In the case of conformity to the rule, the responsibility for my action and for my status is not entirely mine. My situation rests on the authority standing behind the requirement. In view of this (1) the validity and trustworthiness of that authority is tested every time an action is performed in conformity to the rule, with future obedience also being either encouraged or discouraged; (2) my *loyalty* and the *manner* in which I conform become exposed to scrutiny; and (3) the validity and relevancy of the rule are put to trial, as well. If there are some features present or absent during my action, or as a consequence of it, these features indicate a flaw in either (1), (2), or (3), which may cause me to doubt the goodness or rightness of my action. Such features, insights, and/or evidences will alert me to a need for "exceptions to the rule" in my future behavior, or to the necessity for improving my moral reasoning, or to the need for rejecting the rule itself.

Looking back at my action or my decision, I may choose to do nothing about my future conduct and simply rely on excuses. I would adopt the alternative (c) mentioned earlier, suppress the warnings, and resign myself to the rule (or its authority) without questioning. The danger I face with (c) is that (i) or (ii)—namely, seeking justification for the action, or pleading mitigation of responsibility for the action—could turn out to be merely an act of cowardice which stifles moral growth. If I opt for (a), the door is open for improvement, growth, and perhaps brave failures. If careful analysis of both (1) and (2)—the validity and trustworthiness of the authority behind the rule, and my own loyalty and manner of conformity to the rule—inspires confidence, the validity or relevancy of option (3) must be tested, for exceptions might be in order. Unlike the search for excuses, the endeavor to establish an exception may prove extremely challenging and helpful. Several factors could complicate my assignment, however. Among them are the consequences of modification, extreme hardship, threat to life, extreme conflict or ambiguity of norms with regard to them, my personal convictions or special theological insights, covenants, etc.

2. Concepts Involved in the Call for Exceptions

Some further pertinent concepts involved in a call for exceptions should be noted:

1. An exception always refers to a rule that applies to the particular case. If a rule does not apply, what is needed is not an exception, but rather another rule.

2. Exceptions are sometimes called on the basis of some *exempting conditions* external to the rule.⁵ For instance, a rule which enjoins returning what is borrowed may be excepted if the borrower should suffer sudden tragedy and therefore is in no condition to return the borrowed item now or ever. The tragedy could not be anticipated and for that reason is outside of the rule. Thus it may be considered as a condition justifying an exception.

3. At times exceptions are justified by so-called *qualifying conditions*.⁶ In this case, qualifying conditions claim the power to produce modifications, enlargements, and perhaps enrichment of the original rule. For example, the rule which prohibits taking produce from my garden without my permission (this would be an act of stealing) can be modified under certain conditions. If my neighbor needs to feed her hungry family, and there are no other options other than to take some of my tomatoes, she may choose to help herself without telling me. As the owner of the produces, I have several options in such a case. I can prosecute this neighbor (the option is legally justified). Or I can interpret her poverty as an exempting condition and tolerate her act. Or, finally, I can come to realize my own failure to know of, or be sensitive to, my neighbor's destitution (and possibly to the needs of many other neighbors); thus modifying my rule of action by saying, "Do not steal my tomatoes, unless you must feed your hungry children"; thus the concept of Christian stewardship and obedience to the law of loving one's neighbor may urge me to justify an exception to the rule. The basic purpose of the rule has remained, but its meaning has been enriched.⁷

Moral situations are, however, never simple. Although an owner may call exception to the rule protecting his or her property, a needy neighbor should take care not to assume overly much. Stealing is, of course, a forgivable action, but a request or explanation may gain access to much more than a few tomatoes, and may do so at a lesser risk for all concerned. We may note in passing, that in this procedure the call for exceptions may at times

⁵Ramsey and Outka, 87.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Ibid., 89.

stave off more difficult, but also more responsible, alternatives of action. In other words, in view of exempting conditions, it may be easier to take what is not mine and simply expecting the owner to be tolerant than to communicate the conditions and thus act with mutual agreement.

4. At least one more reason for exceptions is often presented. Paul Ramsey calls it "*faithfulness claims*."⁸ It is evident that a moral agent brings such claims into the moral decision. We all have our promises to keep and thus our God, our family, and our neighbors have laid claims on us. These claims can serve as the basis for a call for exceptions. For instance, it is conceivable that during World War II some military guards resisted even seemingly innocent gestures towards female prisoners of war due to the claims of their marriage covenant or to the requirements of the military code. The same would be true in the reverse direction too, of course, and undoubtedly in many other similar situations as well.

3. *The Relationship between Rule and Exception*

We are now ready to turn our attention to the alternative answers that may be given to our original questions concerning the relationship between rule and exception, and concerning the status of a rule which admits an exception. In exploring such answers, we must take note of the fact that it is possible to group the use of exceptions in moral decisions into four categories. These are: (A) exclusion of the rule, (B) exceptions in the rule, (C) exceptions to the rule, and (D) exclusion of exceptions.

A. Exclusion of the Rule

There are views which hold that exceptions are not made to a rule, but rather that rules themselves should be excepted. This, of course, poses a challenge to my earlier statement to the effect that an exception presupposes a rule.

The existentialist approach, for instance, avoids rules as a basis for moral conduct. Instead, human creativity, freedom, and resourcefulness are trusted to inspire the moral agent, revealing the specific need in the situation and thus orienting the decision. In this approach, conformity to a rule is viewed as an inferior stance because it looks back at the rule for orientation. As C. Michalson

⁸Ibid., 92.

points out: "The future is a more reliable guide simply because it does not tell us what to do, but appeals to us to invent or create in the light of the emerging situation."⁹ Thus, D. Bonhoeffer could say that a Christian should not be fettered by principle because, bound by the love of God, the Christian has been set free from the problems and conflicts of ethical decisions. The emphasis in the foregoing is obviously on the uniqueness of each individual and each situation. As a consequence, not one single rule can be found to prescribe or predict the direction or decision.

The situationalism of Joseph Fletcher is not far, either, from this attitude towards rules. Although situationalists claim an unexceptionable norm as a foundation for their system, they deem that *agapē* love is this absolute norm, whose task it is to correct legalism in ethics. Yet, while Joseph Fletcher carefully separates *agapē* from sentimentalism and partiality,¹⁰ the very absoluteness of this love as a single matchless norm opens opportunities for exceptions. *Agapē* is inevitably both general in nature and remote from the rule of action, and thus it becomes very flexible as a norm.

Two additional principles are utilized in justifying the call for exceptions in situationalism, and these bring it closer to the existentialist camp. The first declares that love's decision is made situationally, not prescriptively.¹¹ Fletcher believes that in the heat of the situation the fears, pressures, hopes, guilts, and limitations will not cloud the mind of the moral agent. We can wonder whether the absence of particular commitments to some foreseeable sort of action in a foreseeable kind of situation would not provide a more secure and consistent moral conduct.

The main problem with this is that love itself may be excepted. On the other hand, as experience seems to show, when love becomes a commitment in terms of action, when it is safeguarded within specific covenants of relationship with God and humans, then the risk of love itself being excepted is greatly reduced. In this case, the action born out of a love which has planned ahead provides a firmer ground, especially if the situation takes the form of temptation.

⁹C. Michalson, "Existentialist Ethics," in *Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. J. F. Childers and J. MacQuarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1986), 218.

¹⁰Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics: the New Morality* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 113.

¹¹*Ibid.*, 136.

The second principle is exemplified by Fletcher's urging us to let love justify anything.¹² This brings in another set of problems, for means must be considered even when love is the end of an action. In his excellent critique of Fletcher's point in this regard, Paul Ramsey shows that there are other criteria for justifying the means besides their usefulness in achieving ends. For example, means must conform to natural rights or natural justice. Cruel forms of punishment must never be used for the sake of any end, no matter how good that end.¹³ He warns that the price paid by consequentialism is "the reduction of the moral life and the very *humanum* of men to the possibility of being used as instruments only."¹⁴

It is this reduction of humanness, of relationships, and of covenants to mere instrumentalism that threatens *agapē* and ushers in exceptions. Unarmed, uncommitted, and unprepared in terms of a particular action of love, the moral agent is totally absorbed and fascinated by the end, often forgetting the means to that end. The rules which safeguard marriage or property rights, for example, may then be excepted if an end requires it. Any rule or any right is a potential candidate for being overruled and replaced by an exception. The example of the rule regulating marriage and divorce as interpreted by the school of Hillel is a possible illustration of this approach to exceptions. In this interpretation, the rule of fidelity could be set aside by the husband for even trivial reasons, so that in effect it was not the rule that guided, but rather that exceptions regulated the conduct.

B. Exceptions in the Rule

In distinction from the previous position, which hesitates to prescribe moral conduct, the approach of "exceptions within the Rule" gives rules a more fundamental role. The relationship between rule and exception is not that of dominance of one over the other, but rather that of synthesis that is to say, the exception modifies, alters, broadens, or enriches the rule.

The first concern in this case is what to do with qualifying conditions. Extreme hardship (such as suffering), direct conflict of

¹²Ibid., 121.

¹³Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics* (New York: University Press of America, 1983), 185.

¹⁴Ibid.

norms or values, utility, *prima facie* conviction that one's duty to God and man stand at variance with the usual conformity to a particular rule, and so on, may create a dilemma. As stated by L. G. Miller, "If it is the case that each rule is usually to be followed but not always and that there is no way of telling when the questions about exceptions will arise and how they are to be resolved, then morality itself is left in a rather disorganized and confused state."¹⁵

In order to bring coherence to ethical theory, a utilitarian suggests the prioritization of rules. If rule X normally applies and is now faced with qualifying conditions which generate exception Y, the first thing to do is to calculate which of the two—either X or XY—would result in the greatest good. If tomorrow rule X meets exception Z, then "calculus" must decide whether either X, XY, or XZ or even XYZ would bring the greatest good. Thus we end up with a hierarchy of rules that are all subordinated to and ranked by the general criterion of utility. The original rule X is modified or supplemented by rules XY, XZ, or XYZ.

In such a situation the moral agent is faced with several challenges. For example, on what basis is a person to know whether X or XY will produce the greatest amount of good? How do we identify priority among such "good" things as intellectual development, spiritual growth, one's duty to keep promises, etc.? The criterion of utility is too vague and also too vulnerable to human finiteness and weakness to give it endorsement. In addition to that, as L. G. Miller reminds us, it is just not the case that where there are two rules one will always take precedence over the other.¹⁶

Finally, how do we stop exceptions from recurring? If Y is the exception to X and if Y refers to some qualifying conditions (like suffering), Y can have its own exception, and this in turn can have its own, and so on *ad infinitum*.

H. Sidwick suggests that the solution to the problem of ever-emerging exceptions can be resolved by listing all possible future exceptions.¹⁷ But how can we decide upon these, and how do we know that we have constructed a complete list? Without a new

¹⁵Miller, 263.

¹⁶Ibid., 264.

¹⁷H. Sidwick, *The Methods of Ethics* (London: Macmillan, 1884), 311.

criterion, the criterion of completeness, no one can be sure that any rule will remain secure and reliable.

Furthermore, even an exhaustive listing of exceptions, were it possible, would neither provide an infallible criterion of ranking nor produce a series of rules. At best, what it would produce is a conjunction of rules. Such a conjunction or "joint assertion of a number of rules will not be a rule that can be used to resolve conflicts between the component rules."¹⁸

Utilitarianism with calculus and the utility criteria, together with *prima facie* principle, and other forms of hierarchialism wherein the rules are ranked as amended by exception, cast doubts on the reliability of the rule in its synthetic relations with exceptions.¹⁹ Solutions of this kind, even if inevitable, are not always reliable. We cannot always determine whether our original rule retains enough of its originality so as not to overly alter its applications and consequences, or whether the rule is modified to the extent that it becomes in reality another rule alongside the original one, perhaps even taking the front seat.

Another way of limiting the proliferation of exceptions is to confine them to a family of rules. If X is the basic original rule of action and if exception y is applied to it, then we endeavor to limit the exception's influence only to Xy and not XY. If exception z is applied, the result is Xz. In that case, Xy and Xz are different rules, but both of them belong to the same genus X.²⁰ In this construct, modification of the rule is only partial, and only those exceptions are admitted which relate to that particular rule of action. And yet, even in this case we have no way of knowing whether we can predict or list all exceptions exhaustively, nor do we know how or why to prefer y to z.

The difficulties of synthesis between rules and exceptions are reduced when qualifying conditions can be predicted with regularity. The case of the law concerning divorce as interpreted by the school of Shammai serves as an illustration. It is possible to affirm the rule of faithfulness to marriage vows and at the same time encompass the qualifying condition of "unchastity." The rule, then, is conditionally binding because unchastity is *ipso facto* a

¹⁸Miller, 265.

¹⁹For further insights, see Miller's article.

²⁰M. J. Erickson, *Relativism in Contemporary Christian Ethics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1974), 140.

justification for exception. The concept of faithfulness implies this caveat.

But why should this be so? One might imagine that unchastity might be encouraged or even somehow caused by the "innocent" partner. Should we then be more careful so as to say that even when an exception of this kind is present, divorce is conditional on the total innocence of the other marriage partner? Here again we discover that the old problem of recurring exceptions emerges. The original rule is open to modification by means of exceptions, and thus that rule becomes conditionally binding, modified by ever-recurring exceptions.

C. *Exceptions to the Rule*

Many Christians believe that human life, moral life included, stands within the authority of God. His will for humans is the very definition of moral good and moral duty. "He has shown you, O man, what is good; and what does the Lord require of you" (Mic 6:8). This "showing" of the moral good and moral duty occurs primarily in Scripture. The words of wisdom (Proverbs, Ecclesiastes), of advice (Deut 30:15-29, Mat 5-7), of special commands (Isa 1:11-18, Eph 5:25-32, Exod 20:1-17), and of examples (Heb 11:1-39, 12:1-1), all show God's will for human moral conduct. The most reliable and clear revelation of moral good and moral duty is revealed in the life of Jesus Christ (1 Pet 2:21-25, John 13:1-17, Phil 2:5-11).

The effort of God's love to meet the human need for moral guidance motivates Christians to follow God's will gladly. As a result, God's wish or will becomes a rule for the Christian, and that rule enjoys preeminence over exceptions. Moral rules thus are not subject to abrogation or modification by an exception.

Some characteristic features of this third alternative way of relating exceptions to rules should be noted:

1. *Exceptions are Accidental.* True exceptions to a rule cannot be predicted nor regulated. A predictable exception (if in harmony with God's will) is just another rule. Even the exempting condition of unchastity in marriage is not a predictable event, otherwise no Christian would enter into a marriage covenant where adultery is foreseeable. And when it does occur, it should not be an *ipso facto* justification for the exception, i.e. divorce. Repentance and forgiveness can save the marriage, and the commitment to the

covenant of faithfulness is affirmed above the exception. Moreover, each exception must be decided at face value in every case.

2. *Exceptions are Unique.* M. J. Erickson states that there "is something about the particular case under consideration that lifts it above the general rule. The case itself is so unique, however, that the exception-making rule cannot be generalized or extended to other cases. It applies to this case, and to it alone."²¹

"Thou shalt not kill" is a rule which calls for respect for human life. It is also an expression of God's will. In 1 Sam 15:3, however, the same God gives another command. This time his will is that the Israelites kill the Amalekites. Herein the decalogue commandment prohibiting murder seems to be modified so as to include this exception.

There are, however, two other possibilities. Keeping in mind that the command to kill the Amalekites is "accidental" (that is, no one could have predicted nor expected such an order), we may consider that this command becomes separate from the decalogue commandment. It stands, not on the authority or validity of the decalogue commandment, but rather on God's expressed order. Thus, there is no relationship between the two commands, either contradictory or complementary.

A second point of view would be to consider the command to kill the Amalekites as a unique command. It concerns this one situation and time, and it is given to Israel alone. The requirement is unique and very specific, and therefore it is an exception to the decalogue commandment.

But if an exception must be so focused, specific, and accidental in order to qualify as an exception, how is it still an exception to the rule in question? Why not simply consider it as a totally new rule? Looking further at the characteristics of exceptions may provide an answer.

3. *Both the Rule and the Exception Refer to Some Related Value.* Two rules which regulate two unrelated values cannot establish an exceptional relation. The sixth commandment and the command to kill the Amalekites both refer to the same value of human life, but they demand contrary actions. Recognition of one of the rules as specific and relative to a unique circumstance resolves the conflict and safeguards the proper validity of both requirements. The specific rule becomes an exception to the general rule whose function is to regulate the usual relation to that value.

²¹Erickson, 139-140.

4. *One of the Rules Should be a General Rule.* Two specific and unique rules do not usually establish an exceptional relation. The order to kill the Amalekites is not an exception, nor is it related, for instance, to the command not to kill Cain (Gen 4:15). The two commands are very specific and both of them can independently entertain an exception or be related to a more general rule.

5. *The Rule and Its Exception Proceed from the Same Authority.* In the case of two requirements if one of them is according to divine will and the other comes from society or some other human authority, no call for exceptions is possible. The obligation to God takes precedence over one's duty to human beings (Acts 4:19), because the Christian's best behavior in inter-human relationships is contained in the will of God.

6. *Exceptions Require Extraordinary Situations.* Sin and its tragic consequence of evil often bring overwhelming challenges to human will, faith, wisdom, and commitments. These are circumstances of conflicting ultimates (life-boat), or times when conformity requires non-existing resources (as in the advanced pregnancy of a young incest victim), to mention just a few. If an exception to the rule is introduced, it will be because, humanly speaking, this is the very last alternative. Rules in this approach are "virtually exceptionless."²²

This approach must deal with several problems. For example, the moral agent is faced with uncertainty as to when the personal plight is extraordinary enough to justify an exception. God's will often leads human lives through unusual hardships. Was not this Job's experience? His wife and his friends judged his condition more than sufficiently tragic to require an exception.

But, is the counsel of humans an adequate guide in moral matters? Some churches provide dogmas, canons, and even authoritative advice which indicate when and if an exception is warranted. If the church is perceived as God's infallible mouthpiece, such a solution makes sense. Yet, Job remained in agony in spite of the input he received. We see him stand as an individual responsible for his decisions and actions; the human input can only advise and react, it cannot decide for others.

Experience seems to show that the extremity of a tragedy is a very hostile context for prescriptivism. Heroism and extraordinary courage defy requirement. Christians who relate rules and

²²Richard Gula, *What Are They Saying about Moral Norms?* (New York: Paulist Press, 1982), 77-79.

exceptions according to approach #3 must deal with the uncertainty of knowing when an exception is warranted, and this is in part what human freedom and responsibility mean.

The danger, of course, is to consider only what is possible as required, what is unpleasant as exceptional, and what is challenging as unique. The threat of a "slippery slope" is a constant reality as soon as one tolerates exceptions.

D. The Exclusion of Exceptions

We finally turn our attention to a fourth way of relating rules to exceptions. Here, conformity to rules is so rigorous that it excludes all exceptions in every circumstance and at any place or time. This approach is based on several presuppositions.

First of all, God is sovereign. The Scriptures teach that no other authority can successfully challenge his authority, no wisdom or power can equal his wisdom and power, and no will should take precedence over his will (Isa 40:26). The extremity of moral hardship cannot outdistance him, nor can the uniqueness of a moral dilemma surprise him to the point where humans must go it alone and claim exceptions.

Second, God's will is perfectly good for humans; exceptions can add nothing good. Any system of ethics that presents a notion of good outside of the divine will as expressed in God's grace towards human beings "coincides exactly with the conception of sin. . . ." ²³ There can be no question of a positive recognition of Christian ethics by other systems or of an attachment of Christian ethics to them, because Christian ethics stands under the "final word of the original chairman." ²⁴

A third postulate affirms that God has claimed all human life. "No one has a claim on a man, or on a people, save God alone, and this claim permeates all relationships of life. It is the only valid norm." God and man are bound by a mutual covenant and for that reason their actions must reflect mutual loyalty. ²⁵

But obedience, it is claimed, is not a natural response to God's will. Since man wants above all to be like God, his way is "the war-path on which he has entered in opposition to God. Between God,

²³Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1957), vol. 2, part 2, 518.

²⁴*Ibid.*, 519.

²⁵Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1937), 54.

the eternally good, and man, the relationship might easily be one of scorn on the part of God and envy on the part of man. But it cannot be one of claim on the part of God and obedience on the part of man."²⁶ Obedience which does not come from divine grace will certainly fail and seek for exceptions in order to accommodate human weakness.

Therefore, obedience is not a matter of preference, choice, or convenience, rather, it is a matter of faith.²⁷ It is a response "to the God in whom we may believe;" God "who calls us in such a way that we must not only hear, but obey; who orders us in such a way that in all freedom we must recognize the force of His order"²⁸

The fourth postulate is that God's command is both urgent and stringent. It is urgent because it is the precondition of life itself.²⁹ Humans cannot be indifferent to it without jeopardizing their destiny. It is stringent because, being above man's spiritual life and beyond the realization of human reason or achievement, it gives no room for maneuvering.³⁰ Human action can be either that of obedience or disobedience. The decision of good and evil has been settled once and for all in the decree of God, in the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.³¹ By that divine choice, all human choices must be measured. "What right conduct is for man is determined absolutely in the right conduct of God."³² Christians cannot change it, nor should they go back on it and seek exceptions.

The fifth premise concerns the nature of moral obligation. Barth insists that humans are *destined* to obedience to God's command of grace. Therefore, humans should not endeavor to *give* an answer to the moral question of what is good and what is right, but rather they are called to *be* that answer. The multifarious systems of ethics which seek to *give* answers to moral dilemmas are just a prolongation of our fallenness, because they presuppose the

²⁶Barth, 555.

²⁷Karl Barth, *Ethics* (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 102.

²⁸Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, 556.

²⁹Ibid., 555.

³⁰Ibid., 522.

³¹Ibid., 536.

³²Ibid., 538.

possibility of an abstract and external knowledge of good and right. For Barth, obligation proceeds from a concrete divine command which confronts the moral agent directly. It is the work of sanctifying grace in Christ Jesus. Following Jesus, a Christian does not crave good conduct of and for himself or herself, but rather seeks to be the subject to God's grace, will, and command.³³

Here we touch a critical point of this approach to exceptions. Two questions are: How do we apprehend the command? And how do we know it is a divine command that we are considering? A personal encounter with God who confronts us is Barth's answer to the first question. The sense of obligation, the choice of action, the motivation for acting on that choice happen in the intimacy of the human self.³⁴ External prescriptions are only relative orientations even if they are found in the Bible. "Obviously neither the totality nor a selection of the biblical imperatives, nor any one of them *is* in itself the unconditioned concrete command that comes to you and me today." This is true for the Ten Commandments, Jesus' Sermon on the Mount, "or imperatives of the admonitory chapters of the epistles."³⁵

But how do we discern between divine voice and the urges stemming from our human heart? Carl F. H. Henry argues that Barth's rejection of general revelation and the Bible as propositional communication of divine will opens the door for subjectivism and relativism.³⁶ He advocates a Christian ethic that comes from objectively revealed propositions,³⁷ in addition to the ministry of the Holy Spirit.³⁸ Such propositions are known rationally as the divine "ought" which encompasses human moral life and gives it specific and practical direction.³⁹ In this way the danger of the subjectivist's vulnerability to exceptions is averted.

It must be admitted, however, that either on the basis of direct divine encounter or by the mediation of rational revelation to human reason and will, the exception of all exceptions remains a

³³Ibid., 517.

³⁴Ibid., 556, 557.

³⁵Barth, *Ethics*, 81, 82.

³⁶Carl F. H. Henry, *Christian Personal Ethics* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), 196.

³⁷Ibid., 257.

³⁸Ibid., 259.

³⁹Ibid., 168-171.

challenge for Christian moral life. If the former carries the threat of subjectivism, the latter is haunted by fallible human reason and by corrupted human will. To be a Christian means to listen, discern, search, and follow. It means to be watchful of assuming too much and believing too little. Discipleship is costly, as Bonhoeffer demonstrated. Total commitment and loyalty to God's will cannot be legislated, earned, or experienced passively. Exceptionless, loving conformity is the promise given by the One who is well able to bring it to completion.

4. Conclusion

The four approaches of relating exceptions to moral rules suggested here represent only four foci in the spectrum of alternatives. It is possible and even necessary to consider all available factors in order to create the most circumspect response to a moral requirement (either a rule or its exception). Identification and evaluation of conditions and reasons for opting for or against a rule or its exception is a necessary part of this process.

In approach 1, the conditions which foster exceptions are human creativity, autonomy, freedom, relativity to the situation, and the ends sought. The reasons for calling for exceptions are the radical uniqueness of each situation and each individual, along with fear of legalism, together with rejection of it.

Approach 2 views extreme hardship, conflict of norms and values, utility, and *prima facie* duties as some conditions under which exceptions may arise. One of the main reasons for excepting a rule may be the concept of the greatest good for the greatest number of persons, as in utilitarianism.

In approach 3, exceptions are admitted only under the most stringent, singularly unique, and unpredictably new conditions. Therefore, it is hard to identify any consistent reason which could always justify an exception to a rule.

Finally, approach 4 admits no conditions for exception. The basic reason for this absolute exclusion of exceptions is found in the origin and nature of moral rules. The origin of moral rules is in the perfectly good will of a sovereign God who has claim on all of human life. In this context, moral rules are both urgent and stringent in nature. They compel the moral agent to *be* the answer to the question of what is good and morally right.

The foregoing survey of the various rule-exception correlations seems to confirm the claim that the concept of moral exceptions

varies with the way in which moral rules are viewed. In approaches 1 and 2, moral rules are either rejected or given a relative or conditional validity. It is here that exceptions enjoy legitimacy. In approach 3, on the other hand, as the concept of moral rules enjoys greater authority and universality, not only are exceptions more uncommon, they become more unusual and extraordinary.

Furthermore, it appears that not all exceptions are conceived as identical. In approaches 1 and 2, exceptions may come dangerously close to being excuses. This is the case because the principle of utility and situational decision-making without any prior preparation and commitment proves too weak for affirming and maintaining the validity of a rule. As shown above in approach 3, exceptions are unusual and very extraordinary.

All of this leads us to raise the question as to whether the admission of any exception (particularly if exception borders on the notion of excuse) leaves rules intact. Is not the introduction of an exception into moral discourse as significant as is the affirmation of a rule? Why would a moral rule be affected less by introduction of an exception than an exception would be weakened through affirmation of a rule?

It appears that a rule which repeatedly resists an exception and an exception which persists against a rule become dominant at least on the level of the moral agent's attitude. I can see at least two reasons for this. First, human behavior is habit-forming. Resistance to something strengthens resistance, and compliance makes future compliance easier. Second, the moral conduct is open to influence and prompting from the outside. So, for example, the affirmation of the rule of loyalty to one's belief by John Huss (contrary to approach 1) in the face of extreme hardship (in divergence from approach 2), even if his case could be classified as singularly unique and thus justify an exception (approach 3), has inspired many to affirm the same rule. On the other hand, the denial by Jerome of Prague on September 11, 1415, had an opposite impact on Christians that was not fully overcome by Jerome's affirmation of loyalty at the price of martyrdom one year later.

Finally, we should be reluctant to declare where any individual stands on the rule-exception issue. An attempt to define this displays either ignorance or arrogance or both. Only God can accurately judge performance and preference. Sometimes in our attempt to elaborate a classification of moral conduct or moral reasoning with the purpose of bringing a better understanding of

that conduct and reasoning, we succumb to a temptation to classify people. James Gustafson has shown how extremely difficult and needless such an activity really is.⁴⁰

For instance, it is not necessarily true that approaches 1 and 4 stand in mutual contradiction. It is possible to believe that a perfect Moral Agent brings them together. If God's will (including revealed propositional scriptural statements) is internalized (Ps 40:9) so that autonomy and theonomy coincide perfectly, then no exceptions are needed or possible. Short of this, loving and exceptionless conformity to God's will is a promise realized only in Jesus Christ and through his grace realizable in us (Phil 1:6).

⁴⁰James Gustafson, "Context Versus Principle, a Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," *Harvard Theological Review* 58 (1965): 171-202.

SOME MISSING COREGENCIES IN THIELE'S CHRONOLOGY

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Chronological schemes for the Divided Monarchy period of Israelite history can be classified into two incompatible approaches. On the one hand are those interpreters who regard the synchronisms and lengths of reign recorded in the books of Kings and Chronicles as conveying genuine historical data. For this group, the MT text ranges from total accuracy (or virtually so) to widespread corruption of the numbers given. On the other hand are those interpreters who display an attitude of irreconcilability of the numerical data, exploring instead the possibility that these data in Kings and Chronicles conceal some numerico-theological meaning.¹

In 1944 Edwin R. Thiele published a breakthrough study with regard to the chronology of the kingdoms of Judah and Israel.² In this he provided a consistent and rational chronology revealing the basic accuracy of the royal lengths of reign and synchronisms given in Kings and Chronicles. In fact, since the publication of an expanded version of Thiele's findings in 1951 in the first edition of

¹See K. Stenring, *The Enclosed Garden* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1966), and G. Larsson, *The Secret System: A Study in the Chronology of the Old Testament* (Leiden: Brill, 1973); idem, "Is Biblical Chronology Systematic or Not?" *RQ* 24 (1969): 499-517; idem, "The Documentary Hypothesis and the Chronological Structure of the Old Testament," *ZAW* 97 (1985): 316-333. These have been followed by F. H. Cryer, "To the One of Fictive Music: OT Chronology and History," *Scandinavian Journal of the Old Testament* 2 (1987): 1-27, a particularly disappointing work inasmuch as most of Cryer's "problem texts" have been dealt with in an exemplary manner by many reputable scholars.

²Edwin R. Thiele, "The Chronology of the Kings of Judah and Israel," *JNES* 3 (1944): 137-186.

his *Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings*,³ there has been, in my view, no serious contender to rival his dates.

Thiele's system has become the biblical scholar's first preference, because it has stood the test of time under the scrutiny of a host of able scholars. The recent attempt by J. H. Hayes and P. K. Hooker⁴ to put forward a new chronology is unlikely to succeed due to its reversion to the old "tried-and-failed" method of changing the text.⁵ These scholars have resorted to a number of textual emendations, including a reduction of 12 to 11 years for Omri's rule, altering 22 to 15 for Ahab's reign, and changing 28 to 18 for Jehu's rule, plus many other similar alterations. Where the biblical figures do not fit in with the scheme of these authors, royal abdications are invented. Thus Baasha's reign is reduced to 22 years (MT, 24 years) and the last two years are considered as "abdication years." Likewise, Asa's reign is reduced to 29 years (MT, 41), with the last 12 years being "abdication years."

Thus, in place of coregencies, Hayes and Hooker postulate abdications, counting the years after each abdication as part of the king's reign. The question naturally arises, What is the material difference chronologically between coregencies and these abdications since the period of abdication is counted twice, once for the old king and once for his successor? Hayes and Hooker dismiss coregencies with the argument that "the weakness" in assuming them "is the fact that the hypothesis of coregencies is without biblical warrant."⁶ As Thiele had already shown, the occurrence of coregencies during the Divided Monarchy is by no means without

³Edwin R. Thiele, *The Mysterious Numbers of the Hebrew Kings* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press; and Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1951). The 2d and 3d editions were published in Grand Rapids, MI, by Zondervan in 1965 and 1983. Throughout the present article the references to Thiele will generally be from the 3d ed.

⁴J. H. Hayes and P. K. Hooker, *A New Chronology for the Kings of Israel and Judah* (Atlanta, GA: John Knox Press, 1988).

⁵See J. M. Miller, "Another Look at the Chronology of the Early Divided Monarchy," *JBL* 86 (1967): 276-288, for older works advocating unavoidable textual emendations. Miller, 286, states that he cannot avoid textual emendations to the MT if harmony is to be achieved.

⁶Hayes and Hooker, 11.

biblical warrant.⁷ And in any case, even if the statement by Hayes and Hooker were true, their own theory of abdications would fall victim to it too.

Thiele's work opened up a new chapter in the chronological study of the Divided Monarchy, in that he abandoned a methodological mistake that had characterized the work of earlier researchers: that of emending the text whenever any seemingly "contradictory" data appeared. However, in my opinion his work can be improved upon, and certain scholars, such as Siegfried H. Horn, have already taken a step or two in this direction.⁸ I propose in this article to add to their findings by expanding the number of coregencies recognized by Thiele, as well as by looking more closely at the ones already noted by other scholars.

Thiele has made a good case for seven coregencies among the monarchs of Israel (the northern kingdom), and of Judah (the southern kingdom). According to Thiele, one such coregency occurred in Israel—namely, that of Jeroboam II with Jehoash; and six occurred in Judah—Jehoshaphat with Asa, Jehoram with Jehoshaphat, Azariah (Uzziah) with Amaziah, Jotham with Azariah, Ahaz with Jotham, and Manasseh with Hezekiah.⁹ Using the same set of basic factors that Thiele uncovered during the course of his work on the chronology of the Hebrew kings, I believe I can show four further coregencies that he overlooked—one for Israel and three for Judah.¹⁰

⁷For example, Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 1st ed., 17, 35-36, and 3d ed., 61-65; and Thiele, "Coregencies and Overlapping Reigns among the Hebrew Kings," *JBL* 93 (1974): 174-200.

⁸See Siegfried H. Horn, "The Chronology of King Hezekiah's Reign," *AUSS* 1 (1969): 40-52.

⁹Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 61, lists these, plus two "overlapping reigns" in Israel—Omri and Tibni, and Menahem and Pekah. A century or so before Thiele's work, only two coregencies had been widely recognized, those of Uzziah with Amaziah and of Jotham with Uzziah (see D. Kerr, "Chronology of the Kingdoms of Israel and Judah," *JSL* 4 [Oct. 1849]: 241-257); and this was still the situation in 1895 (see E. L. Curtiss, "The Old Testament Reckoning of Regnal Years," *JBL* 14 [1895]: 125-130).

¹⁰For a comprehensive review of Thiele's chronology, see Leslie McFall, "A Translation Guide to the Chronological Data in Kings and Chronicles," *BibSac* 148 (1991): 3-45. I believe it is possible to make out a case for a fifth additional coregency (for Ahaziah of Israel) if the biblical material should so require (*ibid.*, p. 19, text no. 21).

Five Basic Factors

Five simple factors taken into account by Thiele are basic for the emergence of a harmonious chronology for the Hebrew kings. These are as follows: (1) two alternatives for the New-Year's day; (2) two methods for counting the first year of a king's reign; (3) the freedom to switch from one system of counting to the other; (4) two source documents; and (5) the existence of coregencies.

Two New-Year's Days

During the reign of Solomon the regnal year began on the first day of the seventh month, Tishri (our Sept/Oct).¹¹ This date continued to be used in Judah after the division of Solomon's kingdom and was retained there, as far as we can tell, all throughout Judah's 345-year history. The ten northern tribes, referred to as "Israel," immediately under Jeroboam switched the beginning of their year to the first day of the first month Nisan (our March/April); and as far as the evidence goes, that day remained the New-Year's day in the northern kingdom until the end of that kingdom's 208-year existence. Occasionally this difference in the official beginning of the year would result in a discrepancy of one year in reckoning synchronisms between the years of the monarchs of Judah and of Israel. The small amount of evidence available suggests that in both kingdoms Nisan was the first month of the cultic year, and that the months of the year were numbered consecutively from it, irrespective of when the New Year's day was observed.¹²

Two Systems for Counting Regnal Years

Two systems were in use in Judah and Israel for reckoning the beginning of the monarch's reign: the accession-year system (or

¹¹See Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 51-52.

¹²See D. J. A. Clines, "The Evidence for an Autumnal New Year in Pre-exilic Israel Reconsidered," *JBL* 93 (1974): 22-40, for a discussion of the issue. Cf. E. Greswell, *Dissertations upon the Principles and Arrangement of a Harmony of the Gospels*, 3 vols. (Oxford, 1837), vol. 3, Appendix Dissertation XII, "On the Chronology of the Kingdoms of Judah and of Israel," 484, for the evidence concerning the common assumption that Nisan was the regnal month for both Israel and Judah. See also Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 52, n. 11.

"single-counting") and the nonaccession-year system (or "double-counting").

In the single-counting (or accession-year) system the new king's years were counted from the New Year's day *after* the old king died, but under the double-counting (or nonaccession-year) system the new king's years were counted from the New Year's day *before* the old king died. This difference will often account for the synchronisms between Judah and Israel being one year out.

Switches between the Counting Systems

Thiele's research has shown that the nonaccession-year system was used for the first 133 years of Israel's 208-year existence, and the accession-year system was used for the last 75 years (from 798-723 B.C.).¹³ On the other hand, the accession-year system was used by Judah throughout its 345-year existence, except for a 52-year period (from 848-796 B.C.). During that period Judah adopted Israel's nonaccession-year system following the marriage of Jezebel's daughter to Jehoram. This meant in fact that Judah switched systems twice.¹⁴

Two Source Documents and Scribal Use of Them

The writers of Kings and Chronicles refer to two documents from which they abstracted their information: the "Chronicles of the Kings of Judah" and the "Chronicles of the Kings of Israel."¹⁵ Thiele has shown that the scribe(s) of the "Chronicles of the Kings of Judah" wrote up both Judah's and Israel's history in terms of Judah's method of reckoning regnal years, and that the scribe(s) of the "Chronicles of the Kings of Israel" wrote up both Israel's and

¹³A. E. Steinmann, "The Chronology of 2 Kings 15-18," *JETS* 30 (1987): 391, misunderstood Thiele's position when he wrote that "only the nonaccession-year method was used in Israel." See Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 110, regarding the introduction of the accession-year system in Israel.

¹⁴Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 57-60, 98, 104, 113. In contrast to the demonstrated switches as indicated by Thiele, W. F. Albright, "The Chronology of the Divided Monarchy of Israel," *BASOR* 100 (1945): 16-22 (esp. 22, n. 29), has held that Judah and Israel followed the nonaccession-year system throughout their histories; so also Miller, 288.

¹⁵As is well known, references to these occur repeatedly throughout the books of Kings and Chronicles (normally in connection with the close of royal reigns).

Judah's history in terms of Israel's method of counting regnal years.¹⁶

Coregencies

As indicated earlier, Thiele recognized correctly the existence of coregencies, but in my view he has missed four coregencies. These omissions would account for the few places where Thiele was unable to bring absolute harmony to the biblical data.

Absolute Dating

In addition to the attention given above to the basic factors involved in deriving a sound chronology of the Hebrew kings during the Divided Monarchy, a word must be said concerning absolute dating. In view of the complex interaction of several of the independent factors, it is clear that such factors could never have been discovered (or uncovered) if it had not been for extrabiblical evidence which established certain key absolute dates for events in Israel and Judah, such as 853, 841, 723, 701, 605, 597, and 586 B.C. It was as a result of trial and error in fitting the biblical data around these absolute dates that previous chronologists (and more recently Thiele) brought to light the factors outlined above.¹⁷

2. Four Missing Coregencies

I propose in the remainder of this article to set out the case for four missing coregencies in Thiele's reconstruction of the chronology of the Divided Monarchy. In the case of two of the proposed new coregencies—those involving Hezekiah and Jehoiachin—Thiele

¹⁶Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 1st ed., 34.

¹⁷The earliest date for which we have extrabiblical confirmation is 853, according to Alberto R. Green, "Regnal Formulas in the Hebrew and Greek Texts of the Books of Kings," *JNES* 42 (1983): 167. Shalmaneser III's reference to Ahab was first published by Henry Rawlinson in *The Cuneiform Inscriptions from Western Asia* (London, 1861-84), vol. 3, pls. 7 and 8. The 21-year rule of the Egyptian king Shishak (Shoshenq I) has been dated c. 945-924 B.C. independently of the biblical data (K. A. Kitchen, *The Third Intermediate Period in Egypt [1100-650 B.C.]*, 2d ed. with Supplement [Warminster, Eng., 1986], 544, 575). Rehoboam's 5th year ran from Sept 926 to Sept 925, which means that Shishak's invasion of Judah occurred toward the end of his 21-year reign according to Alberto R. Green, "Solomon and Siamun: A Synchronism between Early Dynastic Israel and the Twenty-first Dynasty of Egypt," *JBL* 97 (1978): 358. If this is so, Albright's date of 922 B.C. for the division of the Kingdom would be ruled out.

overlooked them because he departed from his characteristic conviction that none of the numbers given for the Hebrew kings was corrupt. In the case of the other two coregencies, I will show that he missed these because he applied an unusual interpretation to their numbers and consequently had to view their synchronisms as exceptions to the normal practice of the biblical writers.

Jehoiachin's Coregency

Thiele apparently regarded the statements of 2 Kings 24:8 and 2 Chr 36:9 as being irreconcilable. He remarks, "Jehoiachin was eighteen years of age at his accession and the beginning of his captivity in Babylon (2 Kings 24:8; cf. 2 Chr 36:9 where his age is given as eight in most Hebrew manuscripts)."¹⁸ The discrepancy in these two texts also troubled older commentators, with four solutions put forward to try to resolve the difficulty.

First, the suggestion has been made that there was either a corruption of the number "eighteen" that resulted in the "eight" of 2 Chr 36:9,¹⁹ or a corruption of "eight" which resulted in the "eighteen" of 2 Kings 24:8.²⁰ The suggestion that "ten" had

¹⁸Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 189.

¹⁹Numerous titles from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could be cited, such as Francis Fawkes, ed., *The Complete Family Bible*, 2 vols. (London, 1761); Thomas Haweis, *The Evangelical Expositor: or, a Commentary on the Holy Bible*, 2 vols. (London, 1765-66); William Dodd, *A Commentary on the Books of the Old and New Testament*, 3 vols. (London, 1770); John Hewlett, *The Holy Bible, Containing the Old and New Testament and Apocrypha*, 3 vols. (London, 1811-12); John Kitto, *The Pictorial Bible*, 3 vols. (London, 1836-38), who has noted that the Syriac, Arabic, Houbigant, and Hales support "eighteen"; Greswell, 3:502; Thomas John Hussey, *The Holy Bible*, 3 vols. (London, 1844-45); et al. More recently, the following provide further examples of this approach: R. J. Coggins, *The First and Second Books of the Chronicles*, The Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 305, where it is noted that "2 Kings 24:8 has 'eighteen,' a much more likely figure; *eight* here may simply be due to scribal error"; J. M. Myers, *2 Chronicles*, AB (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 218; and R. B. Dillard, *2 Chronicles*, Word Biblical Commentary (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1987), 296. See also Alberto R. Green, "The Fate of Jehoiakim," *AUSS* 20 (1982): 103-109.

The NIV alters 2 Chr 36:9 to read "eighteen"; thus Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 189, is not alone in following the view that the Hebrew number "eight" is corrupt at 2 Chr 36:9. The REB (Oxford and Cambridge, 1989), however, retains "eight" at 2 Chr 36:9.

²⁰E.g., John Henry Blunt, *A Companion to the New Testament* (London, 1881), 26. Joseph Temple and W. Hickman Smith, *The Graphic Family Bible* (London, 1873), have commented that 2 Chr 36:9 and 1 Esdr 1:43 state that "Jehoiachin was eight not eighteen. This agrees best with Mt 1:11 which fixes the time of his birth during his

dropped out of (or was inserted into) the Hebrew text somewhere along the line of transmission is not as simple a solution as it might appear. The two texts read:

2 Kings 24:8 בן־שמונה עשרה שנה "Son-of-eighteen year . . ."

2 Chr 36:9 בן־שמונה שנים "Son-of-eight years . . ."

Since in Hebrew the word for "years" is singular in form when used with numbers greater than ten but plural in form when used with numbers lower than ten, if עשרה ("ten") did drop out of the text by accident it must have been followed by a deliberate alteration of שנה to שנים in order to obtain the correct grammatical agreement. A number of older commentators held the view that the discrepancy was an obvious case of scribal error and consequently concurred with the sentiment of William Wall: "It is in my opinion a pity, that the translators [of the KJV] have not mended such apparent errata of the scribe of the present Heb. out of Kings; 2 Kings xxiv.8. or out of ó [the LXX]; or out of common sense."²¹

A second solution that has been suggested is that Jehoiachin was eight years old when Jehoiakim began to rule. Hence adherents of this view proposed a retranslation of 2 Chr 36:9 as follows: "Jehoiachin was eight years old when he [Jehoiakim] began to reign."²² While such an interpretation might be possible if we

father's captivity."

²¹William Wall, *Critical Notes on the Old Testament*, 2 vols. (London, 1734), 2:354. This work discusses the differences in the chronological data between the LXX and the MT. It is interesting that for 1 Kgs 22:51 the LXX evidence is split between three readings, each of which is correct. Thus MS Alexandrinus reads the 17th of Jehoshaphat, MS Vaticanus reads the 18th, and the Aldine text reads the 21st. These are just three ways of stating the year 853 B.C. Alexandrinus (=MT) uses the accession-year system; Vaticanus employs the nonaccession-year system; and the Aldine prefers to use Jehoshaphat's coregency years. For modern treatments of the value of the LXX data, see J. D. Shenkel, *Chronology and Recensional Development in the Greek Text of Kings* (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1968), and W. R. Wifall, "The Chronology of the Divided Monarchy of Israel," *ZAW* 80 (1968): 319-337.

²²W. Gouge, Th. Gataker, et al., *Annotations upon all the Books of the Old and New Testament*, 2 vols. (London, 1651); and Samuel Clark, *The Holy Bible . . . with Annotations and Parallel Scriptures* (London, 1690). A similar solution was proposed by Immanuel Tremellius (fl. ca. 1628) for 2 Kgs 16:2: "twenty years old was Ahaz

were dealing with English grammar, it is not permissible in Hebrew. The MT employs a suffixed infinitive (במלכו) here, and wherever a suffixed infinitive is used of royal accessions in Kings and Chronicles, it always refers to the immediate antecedent. The word order of the Hebrew is: "Son-of-eight years—Jehoiachin—when he began to reign (במלכו)."

An examination of the formula "N was X years old when he began to reign (במלכו)" shows no discrimination between coregencies and kingships. The formula is used to introduce the coregencies of Jehoash of Israel (2 Kings 11:21), and of Azariah (2 Kings 15:2), Jotham (2 Kings 15:33), Ahaz (2 Kings 16:2), Hezekiah (2 Kings 18:2), Manasseh (2 Kings 21:1), and Jehoiachin (2 Chr 36:9) of Judah; also the kingships of Jehoshaphat (1 Kings 22:41), Jehoram (2 Kings 8:16), Ahaziah (2 Kings 8:26), and Jehoiachin (2 Kings 24:8) of Judah, and Jeroboam II of Israel (2 Kings 14:23), each of whom had a period as coregent.

The third solution that has been proposed is that the phrase "a son of eight years" does not relate to the age of Jehoiachin but to the era of the Babylonian Captivity, which is said to have begun in the fourth year of Jehoiakim (Jer 25:1). Matthew Poole, for instance, put forward this theory, pointing also to other eras, such as Saul's being "a son of a year" (1 Sam 13:1);²³ Ahaziah's being a "son of forty-two years," which in the latter instance would have made Azariah older than his father by two years; and to Ezekiel's era of the Captivity (33:21, 40:1).²⁴

It is fortuitous that Jehoiachin did begin his reign in the eighth year of the Captivity. The 8th year of Nebuchadnezzar (on a non-accession-year reckoning, which was not used in Babylon) also marked the beginning of Jehoiachin's kingship (2 Kgs 24:12).

when he [Jotham, Ahaz's father] began to reign." This reading was proposed in order to avoid the difficulty that Jotham would have been only 11 years of age when he begat Ahaz. The unforeseen difficulty with this solution was that Jotham would be only 25 years of age when he began to rule (cf. 2 Kgs 15:33), which would make him the father of Ahaz at five years of age! (Cf. Wall, 2:258.)

²³For this era see Leslie McFall, "Was Nehemiah Contemporary with Ezra in 458 B.C.?" *WTJ* 53 (1991): 263-293.

²⁴Matthew Poole, *Annotations upon the Holy Bible*, 2 vols. (London, 1700); cf. Anthony Purver, *A New and Literal Translation of all the Books of the Old and New Testament*, 2 vols. (London, 1764), 1:559. For the dates of Ezekiel, see K. S. Freedy and D. B. Redford, "The Dates in Ezekiel in Relation to Biblical, Babylonian and Egyptian Sources," *JAOS* 90 (1970): 462-485.

A fourth solution that has been advanced is that there was a coregency for Jehoiachin: For example, at 2 Chr 36:9 the Geneva Version has the marginal note, "That is, he began his reign at eight yere olde, and reigned ten yeres when his father was alive, and after his fathers death, which was the eightente yere of his age, he reigned alone thre moneths and ten dayes."²⁵ This note was retained right through to the 1609 edition of the Geneva Bible printed in London by Robert Barker.²⁶

If there is no corruption of the text, then either solution three or four becomes possible. Solution three recedes in possibility with the observation that 2 Chr 36:9 is preceded (v. 5) and followed (v. 11) by the same formula: "A son of X years is N in his reigning, and Y years he reigned in Jerusalem, and he did the evil thing in the eyes of Yahweh." In each case the reference is to the named individual, thus leaving open the coregency option. Indeed, on Thiele's principles of interpreting such data it becomes a distinct probability that there was such a coregency. Thiele has demonstrated that coregencies were quite normal in Judah, and we have noted above that *בְּמַלְכוֹ* is just as frequently used to introduce a coregency as it is to introduce a kingship.

If we postulate an eleven-year coregency for Jehoiachin on the basis of the four texts given below and insert their information into **Chart 1**, it will be seen how neatly the coregency fits into Judah's

²⁵*The Bible and Holy Scriptures conteyned in the olde and newe testament . . . with most profitable annotations upon all the hard places . . .* (Geneva: Rouland Hall, 1560).

²⁶Other early works which supported the coregency solution were R.F. Herrey, *The Bible . . . with most profitable annotations upon all the hard places . . .* (London: Robert Barker, 1608 [=Geneva Version]); Theodore Haak, *The Dutch Annotations upon the whole Bible*, 2 vols. (London, 1657). This judicious work was commissioned by the Synod of Dort in 1618 and published in 1637. It was published in England by decree of Westminster Parliament, 30 March 1648. This work and that of Simon Patrick are the most useful 17th- and 18th-century commentaries on the chronological difficulties of the Hebrew kings. The works of A. Purver and Wm. Wall are also helpful; as is John Edwards, *A Discourse concerning the Authority, Stile, and Perfection of the Books of the Old and New Testament*, 3 vols. (London, 1694). Matthew Poole, (1700) mentions this solution, as does Simon Patrick, (1727, 1822); cf. also Jean Frédéric Ostervald, *The Holy Bible . . . illustrated with annotations*, 3 vols. (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1787-88); Robert Jamieson & E. H. Bickersteth, *The Holy Bible, with a Devotional and Practical Commentary* (London, 1861); and Matthew Henry, *An Exposition of the Old and New Testaments*, 6 vols. (London, 1842; originally published in 1706).

history at this point. The relevant texts surrounding the appointment of Jehoiachin as coregent are as follows:²⁷

No 1, 2 Kings 23:31: "Jehoahaz was twenty-three years old when he began to reign, and he reigned three months in Jerusalem." Thiele calculated that Jehoahaz became king in Tammuz (25 June-23 July) of 609 B.C. and ended his rule three months later in Tishri (Sept./ Oct.).²⁸ Because Jehoahaz's rule spilled over into the next regnal year, Jehoiakim had an accession year of about eleven months.




CHART 1. THE COREGENCY OF JEHOIACHIN.

No. 2, 2 Kings 23:36: "Jehoiakim was twenty-five years old when he began to reign, and he reigned eleven years in Jerusalem" (cf. the parallel in 2 Chr 36:5). Jehoiakim became king about October 609 and he died on 21 Marheshwan (=9 Dec.) 598 B.C., according to Thiele.²⁹

No. 3, 2 Chr 36:9: "Jehoiachin was eight years old when he began to reign [i.e., when he became coregent], and he reigned three months and ten days [as sole ruler] in Jerusalem." Jehoiachin became coregent in Tishri 608 B.C. and was king from 21 Marheshwan to 10 Nisan (=9 December 598 to 22 April 597 B.C.).³⁰ The date 21 Marheshwan

²⁷The text of the RSV is used throughout this article for Bible quotations in English, unless otherwise indicated or implied.

²⁸Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 182.

²⁹Ibid., 187.

³⁰April 22 is the date when Jehoiachim departed from Jerusalem as a captive. His reign terminated a month or so before this date.

marked the end of Jehoiakim's rule. This was the middle of winter (cf. the mention of "cold" in Jer 36:30).

No. 4, *2 Kings 24:8*: "Jehoiachin was eighteen years old when he became king, and he reigned three months in Jerusalem."

No. 5, *2 Kings 24:17*: "And the king of Babylon made Mattaniah, Jehoiachin's uncle, king in his place and changed his name to Zedekiah."

If Jehoiachin had already passed his eighth birthday before he was made coregent in Tishri of 608 B.C. and had passed his eighteenth birthday before he was make king, then his birthday fell sometime between 22 Marheshwan and 1 Tishri.

For Jehoiakim to be credited with a rule of eleven years on the accession-year system, his first regnal year and Jehoiachin's first year as coregent must have begun on the same New Year's day (Tishri) in 608 B.C. Thus father and son were inducted into their respective offices at the same time.

In the ninth month of Jehoiakim's fifth year (Kislev, 603 B.C.), when Jehoiachin was thirteen years of age, his father cut up and burnt Jeremiah's scroll (Jer 36:9, 22-23). As a result of this action, his dynasty was cursed with the words: "He shall have none to sit upon the throne of David" (36:30). Yet, in *2 Kings 24:6* it is recorded, that "Jehoiachin his son reigned in his stead," or "succeeded him as king." For the words of Jeremiah's prophecy to be fulfilled, it must have been publicly and/or legally recorded in Jeremiah's day that Jehoiakim's son, Jehoiachin, was not his legal son, as far as inheritance to David's throne was concerned.³¹

There may be a direct reference to the result of the curse on Jehoiakim in the omission of his name in the genealogy of Joseph in Matt 1:11, "And Josiah begat Jechoniah and his brethren" (RV). What appears to have happened is that because of Yahweh's curse on Jehoiakim, Jehoiachin knew that he could not inherit David's throne *as a son of Jehoiakim*, but if he were moved back one

³¹Zedekiah is said to be the "son" of Jehoiachin (1 Chr 3:16) because he succeeded him on the throne; in reality, Zedekiah may have been Jehoiachin's uncle.

generation into his father's place, he could inherit David's throne *as the son of Josiah*.³²

By this legal device Jehoiachin was able to succeed Jehoiakim, but not as his legal son. He derived his legitimacy to the throne of David through Josiah, his (grand-)father. If this suggestion should prove to be correct, then the genealogy of Matthew takes on the character of representing a spiritual or divinely approved list of legitimate sons of David, a list in which Yahweh excluded Jehoiakim, as indicated above. Another exclusion from Matthew's genealogy—that of the three Judean kings who were united through marriage to the house of Ahab—would seem to support this view of Matthew's list.

Jehoiachin's arrogance and contempt for Yahweh eventually led to a curse being placed on him and on his seed: "Write this man down as childless, . . . for none of his offspring shall succeed in sitting on the throne of David, and ruling again in Judah" (Jer 22:30). The terms of this curse appear at first to renege on the "everlasting covenant" made with David. One solution is to suppose that Jehoiachin's son Shealtiel, who was directly affected by the curse from succeeding his father *as his son*, saw a way of continuing the Davidic dynasty by disowning his father. If he did so, then Shealtiel had himself grafted into the family of Neri. In this way he provided himself with a righteous branch which ascended to David through Nathan.

It was no loss to Shealtiel to graft himself into a nonroyal branch, because the terms of the curse excluded any Davidite from ever sitting upon the earthly throne of David (this curse would apply to the Messiah, whose kingdom would now revert to the purely spiritual dimension it had before David was born). By this legal device Shealtiel would have cut himself off from a cursed branch of the House of David. The element that links David to the future Messianic King is that the progenitors of the Messiah would continue to emerge from the *royal branch* which Shealtiel represented.

If this interpretation is correct, then Luke 3:27 may be a confirmation of Shealtiel's action, for there Shealtiel is called the "son of Neri," not the "son of Jehoiachin." The fulfillment of the

³²A precedent was set for this possibility when Jacob moved Joseph's sons, Ephraim and Manasseh, back one generation so that their uncles became their brothers; the same may apply in the case of Jehoiachin, in which his uncles are called "his brethren" in Matt 1:11. Jehoiachin was seven years old when Josiah died.

command to Jeremiah to write down Jehoiachin as "childless" is given concrete expression in Luke's genealogy of Joseph; there, in Luke 3 Jehoiachin is deprived of his fatherhood of Shealtiel, though the Solomonic line is nevertheless continued without interruption.

What may have made the displacement of Jehoiakim's name in Matthew's genealogy possible was the fact that Jehoiachin began to rule at the same time as his father, and so it was quite a simple matter to delete Jehoiakim's name and substitute that of his son as ruler for the eleven years of the former's reign. It may be that the Chronicler was aware of how Jehoiachin circumvented the curse on his father's dynasty by becoming the "son of Josiah" (which Matthew's genealogy appears to endorse), and realized that the descent had to be traced from Josiah to Jehoiachin, thus bypassing Jehoiakim. This would also account for the Chronicler's interest in giving the *younger age* at which Jehoiachin began to rule.

The curses on Jehoiakim and Jehoiachin may also explain the missing generation in Matthew's second series of fourteen generations. Scholars have assumed that Jehoiakim's name has dropped out of Matthew's text by mistake. However, the inclusion of Jehoiachin *as a king* among the kings in the second series is justified, because he made up the 14th generation in that series. The inclusion of Jehoiachin *as the first commoner* in a line of commoners is justified, because he constituted the first generation of Solomonic kings without a throne in Matthew's third series.

Hezekiah's Coregency

The omission of Hezekiah's coregency in Thiele's scheme is, in my view, an inexplicable deviation within what is basically an exemplary approach to the problems of Hebrew chronology. As far as can be determined from Thiele's published materials, he has refused to open up to the possibility of a coregency for Hezekiah, even in the face of his reviewers' criticisms and Horn's cogent suggestion of such.³³ I have elsewhere put forward the case for a coregency for Hezekiah.³⁴

³³Horn, "Chronology of King Hezekiah's Reign," 40-42. See also the reviews by S. H. Horn in *AUSS* 5 (1967): 213; by Gleason L. Archer in *Christianity Today* 10 (April 15, 1966): 34-36; and by F. D. Kidner in *Churchman* 8 (1967): 68.

³⁴Leslie McFall, "Did Thiele Overlook Hezekiah's Coregency?" *BibSac* 146 (1989): 393-404. S. H. Horn had already come to the same solution, of course, in his "Chronology of King Hezekiah's Reign," 40-52.

Older commentators found great difficulty in resolving the difficulties relating to the figures for Hezekiah's reign. The main stumbling block was the synchronism in 2 Kings 17:1, "In the twelfth year of Ahaz king of Judah Hoshea the son of Elah began to reign in Samaria over Israel, and he reigned nine years." This was an unfortunate translation, in that the clause "and he reigned" does not have any Hebrew text behind it. It was introduced by the translators of the RV and the RSV. Hoshea did not *begin* his reign in the 12th year of Ahaz's *sole reign*; he *ended* his reign in the 12th year of Ahaz's *coregency*. The Hebrew text reads:

בשנת שתים עשרה לאחז מלך יהודה מלך הושע בן-אלה
בשמרון על-ישראל השע שנים:

The LXX follows the Hebrew word order slavishly at this point. The Hebrew would yield this English rendition: "In the twelfth year of Ahaz king of Israel ruled Hoshea son of Elah in Samaria over Israel nine years." Given such a translation, and its obvious implications once the intrusive words "began to reign" are deleted, it was not surprising that no commentator could make sense of the synchronisms in 2 Kings 17 and 18 in the older, faulty translations.³⁵

To clear up the difficulties inherent in this and the other relevant texts, it might be better to paraphrase them as follows (if ambiguity—not to mention inaccuracy—is to be avoided). See also **Chart 2** on page 51, which graphically portrays the relevant data from these texts.

No. 1, 2 Kings 18:9: "In the fourth year from the coregency of King Hezekiah, which was the seventh year of Hoshea son of Elah, king of Israel, Shalmaneser king of Assyria came up against Samaria and besieged it."

³⁵Among early valiant attempts to make sense of the synchronisms of 2 Kgs 17-18 are A. Purver (1764); S. Patrick (1727); Th. Haak (1657); and Wall (1734), 1:257. Greswell, 3:493-498, understood there to be an interregnum of nine years between the 4th year of Ahaz and the accession of Hoshea. *The Revised English Bible* (1989) is no better than the *NIV* in that it too uses the 12th year of Ahaz as the *beginning* of Hoshea's nine-year reign. In general, chronologists have assumed that Hezekiah's reign began in the 3d (or 4th) year of Hoshea (cf. Kerr, 241-257) and have numbered his 29-year reign from that point. However, upon the discovery that the 14th year of Hezekiah must be dated to 701 B.C.—the year of Sennacherib's invasion—this position soon became untenable.

No. 2, *2 Kings 15:30:* "Then Hoshea the son of Elah made a conspiracy . . . in the twentieth year *from the coregency* of Jotham the son of Uzziah."

No. 3, *2 Kings 18:1-2:* "In the third year of Hoshea son of Elah, king of Israel, Hezekiah the son of Ahaz, king of Judah, *became coregent*. He was twenty-five years old when he *became king*, and he reigned twenty-nine years *as king* in Jerusalem." (He was coregent from Tishri 729 to about Adar 715 B.C., and from the latter date to 687/6 B.C. he was king.)

No. 4, *2 Kings 17:1:* "In the twelfth year *from the coregency* of Ahaz king of Judah Hoshea the son of Elah had reigned nine years in Samaria over Israel."³⁶

No. 5, *2 Kings 17:6:* "In the ninth year of Hoshea the king of Assyria captured Samaria" (i.e., between Nisan and Tishri 723 B.C.).

No. 6, *2 Kings 18:10:* "In the sixth year *from the coregency* of Hezekiah, which was the ninth year of Hoshea king of Israel, Samaria was taken."

No. 7, *2 Chr 29:3:* "In the first [pre-regnal] year *of his kingship*, in the first month, he [Hezekiah] opened the doors of the house of the Lord." Hezekiah's "first year" was the remainder of Ahaz's 20th year (Tishri 716-Tishri 715 B.C.).

No. 8, *2 Kings 18:13:* "In the fourteenth year *of the kingship* of King Hezekiah Sennacherib king of Assyria came up against all the fortified cities of Judah and took them" (i.e., between Tishri 702 and Tishri 701 B.C.).

It may be noted here that A. E. Steinmann's defense³⁷ of Thiele's treatment of 2 Kings 17 and 18 against K. A. Kitchen and T. C. Mitchell (both of whom postulated a coregency for Hezekiah) is based in part on a mistake in their *NBD* article, which otherwise keeps very close to Thiele's chronology. They state: "732/31-816/15:Ahaz (Coregent from 744/43; senior partner from 735) and

³⁶The LXX here uses the aorist indicative to translate the Hebrew "had reigned." An English version that comes close to the Hebrew is that of Robert Young, *The Holy Bible, Consisting of the Old and New Covenants* (Edinburgh, 1862), which reads: "In the twelfth year of Ahaz king of Judah reigned hath Hoshea son of Elah in Samaria, over Israel—nine years."

³⁷Steinmann, 393.






CHART 2. COREGENCY AND SOLE REIGN OF HEZEKIAH.

"716/15-687/86: Hezekiah (Coregent from 729)."³⁸ This is hardly correct inasmuch as it would mean that there were two coregents and a king ruling at the same time (from 744 to 739 B.C.).³⁹

Coregency of Jehoash of Israel

Before examining Thiele's explanation for the apparent discrepancy in the numbers relating to the accession of Jehoash, we should take note of the fact that both Judah and Israel were using the nonaccession-year system before Amaziah of Judah and Jehoash of Israel became sole rulers. It is this fact that establishes an alternative case for Jehoash having had a two-year coregency in opposition to the view put forward by Thiele, whose reconstruction cannot be proved or disproved conclusively, as is also the case with regard to the alternative one I am setting forth here. The point I wish to make is that the data are open to two interpretations: one which permits a coregency and another which excludes it. My view is that the first of these alternatives not only deserves attention, but also is the preferable one. Chart 3 sets out the relevant data.




CHART 3. THE COREGENCY OF JEHOASH OF ISRAEL

³⁸K. A. Kitchen and T. C. Mitchell in *New Bible Dictionary* (1967), 220. This article has mistakenly omitted the name and reign of Ahaziah of Judah in the same table which shows no changes from Thiele's chronology for the kings of Israel but which has seven minor changes (presumably deliberate) in the case of dates relating to Judah's kings. *The Illustrated Bible Dictionary*, revision ed. N. Hillier (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 1980), Part 1, 269-277, has corrected only the omission of the details pertaining to Ahaziah.

³⁹See Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., chart on p. 217.

No. 1, 2 Kings 13:10: "In the thirty-seventh [nonaccession] year of Joash king of Judah Jehoash the son of Jehoahaz *became coregent* over Israel in Samaria, and he reigned sixteen years *as king*."

No. 2, 2 Kings 14:1-2: "In the second [accession] year *of the kingship* of Joash [or: Jehoash] the son of Joahaz, king of Israel, Amaziah the son of Joash, king of Judah, became king."

We noted earlier that the fourth factor affecting the chronology of the kings of Judah and Israel was the existence of two chronicles, each of which was written up using the court scribe's own dating system rather than the dating system employed in the other kingdom. It so happens that in this case both kingdoms were using the same nonaccession-year system, according to Thiele,⁴⁰ and consequently the court scribes in Israel and Judah were using the same dating procedure. Since this assumption is not in dispute, the 37th year of Joash of Judah cannot be interpreted as the 37th *accession-year* of Joash from the standpoint of the scribe living in the 37th year of Joash and recording the commencement of the coregency of Jehoash of Israel. That much is clear if we are to be consistent in our understanding of the fourth factor.

If we were to put ourselves in the place of the scribe who was writing the "Chronicles of the Kings of Israel" and had to record a coregency for Jehoash of Israel which began in Nisan in the 16th year of Jehoahaz, how would it be worded? The first item that would affect the court entry would be that the synchronism must be in terms of Israel's dating system operative at that time. That system, Thiele states, was the nonaccession-year system (and the total of 17 nonaccession years for Jehoahaz's reign confirms it); consequently, the synchronism must be in terms of nonaccession-year reckoning. Thus the court entry would be exactly as it is recorded in 2 Kings 13:10, where the first year of Jehoash and the 37th year of Joash are thus correlated. As confirmation of this procedure compare the entry for the accession of Jehoahaz to the throne "in the twenty-third [nonaccession] year of Joash" (2 Kings 13:1).⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., 56-57.

⁴¹Ibid., 105. On the basis of the Rimah stela, which appeared to place Jehoash in 805 B.C., William H. Shea moved the commencement of Jehoash's reign back seven years by reducing Jehoahaz's 17-year rule to 10 years ("Adad-nirari III and Jehoash of Israel," *JCS* 30 [1978]: 101-113). A. Cody tried to solve the problem by

It would appear that because the date of Jehoash's coregency was so close to the date of his kingship, Thiele assumed that 2 Kings 13:10 referred to the kingship of Jehoash and that it should be translated, "In the thirty-seventh year of Joash [accession-year system]."⁴² Thus, in order to accommodate 2 Kings 14:1, which Thiele has read (and I would not disagree), "In the second year [accession-year system] of the kingship of Joash the son of Joahaz, king of Israel, Amaziah the son of Joash, king of Judah, became king,"⁴³ Thiele noted that if he interpreted the 37th year of Joash as based on accession-year reckoning, this would push the numbering of Joash's regnal years forward by one year so that the last six months of Joash's 38th year would overlap with the first six months of the 17th (and last) year of Jehoahaz.⁴⁴ There is no difficulty with this as a possibility, but it is not the most natural interpretation to which the data are open under Thiele's own method of interpretation.

Thiele's case rests on the assumption that the court scribe was inconsistent when he recorded the synchronism with the 37th year of Joash; the case being presented here is that the scribe was not acting inconsistently and consequently the onus lies on Thiele to prove his case. My opinion in the matter is that Thiele overlooked the presence of a two-year coregency for Jehoash because of its proximity to the year when he became sole king.

If, in contrast to Thiele's reconstruction, the scribe understood the 37th year of Joash as a regnal year under the nonaccession-year system, then we have in 2 Kings 13:10 the first recorded instance of a coregency in the Northern Kingdom. This is not surprising, given the fact that it occurs in Jehu's dynasty. This was a dynasty guaranteed to last for four generations and thus to terminate with

postulating a coregency for Jehoash which went back to 806 B.C. ("A New Inscription from Tell al-Rimah and King Jehoash of Israel," *CBQ* 32 [1970]: 325-340). If the biblical evidence points to a coregency for Jehoash beginning in Nisan 799 B.C. at the earliest (as I think it does), then this rules out Cody's longer coregency, which does not pretend to have any biblical support. Shea observes that there is a nine-year discrepancy between the Assyrian and biblical chronology for the 45 years between Jehu's 1st year and Jehoahaz's 17th year. If this could be cleared up it might remove the difficulty.

⁴²See *ibid.*, 111.

⁴³See *ibid.*, 113.

⁴⁴See *ibid.*, 109.

Jeroboam II. Jehoash had made his son Jeroboam II coregent with himself in 793 B.C.

If, on the other hand, the scribe interpreted the 37th year of Joash under the accession-year system, this would mean that on this occasion he had departed from the actual state of affairs. What he had done was to use a system of dating that was not in use in the 37th year of Joash.

Coregency of Ahaziah of Judah

The relevant texts for the time of Ahaziah are paraphrased below. These give evidence for a one-year coregency for Ahaziah of Judah.⁴⁵ See also Chart 4.

No. 1. 2 Kings 9:29: "In the eleventh [nonaccession] year of Joram the son of Ahab, Ahaziah became coregent over Judah."

No. 2. 2 Chr 22:2: "Ahaziah became king forty-two years from the time Omri became king over Israel, and he reigned one [non-accession] year as coregent and king." 2 Kings 8:26 records that Ahaziah was 22 years old when he became king.

No. 3. 2 Kings 8:25: "In the twelfth [nonaccession] year of Joram the son of Ahab, king of Israel, Ahaziah the son of Jehoram, king of Judah, became king."




CHART 4. THE COREGENCY OF AHAZIAH OF JUDAH

⁴⁵Wall, 1:251, was aware of the possibility of a one-year coregency here, but he dismissed it with the remark that the scriptural record is not pedantically accurate for parts of a year and that 11 or 12 is essentially the same.

Thiele understood Judah and Israel to be using the non-accession-year system at this time, and this conclusion is assumed to be correct for the purpose of the following discussion.

Thiele approached the data relating to Ahaziah in the same manner as he did Jehoshaphat's details: namely, because the date for Ahaziah's coregency and his kingship were so close together, Thiele assumed that only one accession was in view and that this was a kingship and not a coregency. If the gap between Ahaziah's coregency and his kingship had been much wider (say, three or four years distant), Thiele would undoubtedly have fallen back on his normal procedure for dealing with two systems of numbering in the life of the same king, namely, that one was used for dating coregency years and the other for years as king.

The fault in Thiele's approach was that instead of keeping to the discovered fact that both kingdoms were using the non-accession-year system at this time, he imposed a new idea on the data—namely, that the account of Ahaziah's reign was written up twice, once using the accession-year system (an ideal history) and once using the nonaccession-year system (the actual history), with the scribe who composed the canonical record inadvertently copying the synchronism for Ahaziah's accession according to both systems.⁴⁶

The formulation of Thiele's duplicate-record theory was, I believe, a pragmatic reaction on his part to the problem that these two texts created for his system if (as he assumed) they referred to the same event, the accession of Ahaziah to kingship. It would make havoc of Thiele's whole system if such a theory were applied to other sets of data. Given the consistent nature of the biblical record and the practice of creating coregencies in Judah, why should we depart from the natural interpretation in this case? There is no textual or other evidence, only Thiele's conjecture, that an ideal record was kept, using the accession-year system throughout the period when Judah began to use Israel's non-accession-year system.

There is some internal evidence which might support a one-year coregency for Ahaziah. First, Jehoram, the father of Ahaziah, developed a fatal bowel disease two years before his death (2 Chr 21:18-19). This would have put pressure on him to appoint a successor. Second, all of Jehoram's sons (including the heir apparent) except Ahaziah (the youngest) were killed by Arab

⁴⁶Thiele, *Mysterious Numbers*, 3d ed., 58, 99.

raiders just before Jehoram developed his fatal disease. This left only Ahaziah to become Jehoram's successor (2 Chr 21:7; 22:1). Third, Jehoram suffered great pain and passed away "with no one's regret" (2 Chr 21:20), indicating that he was not a popular king. The people of Jerusalem took it upon themselves to appoint Ahaziah as Jehoram's successor (2 Chr 22:1). This appointment may well have taken place during the last few months of Jehoram's debilitating disease, a disease which would have prevented him from carrying out his royal duties as well as making him ceremonially unclean.⁴⁷

Ahaziah's coregency began in Tishri 842 B.C. (the regnal first month). Some months later he was made king, a position he held for only a few months before he was slain, and Athaliah succeeded him in the same regnal year (i.e., between Tishri 842 and Tishri 841). Consequently we ought to translate 2 Kings 8:26 as follows: "Ahaziah was twenty-two years old when he *became king* [or coregent], and he reigned one year [nonaccession-year system] *as coregent and king* in Jerusalem."

3. Conclusion

In conclusion, it must be noted that the establishment of four new coregencies does not affect the basic validity of the chronology that Thiele has given because his chronology is based in these cases on the sole rule of the Hebrew kings. Claims for corruption of the Hebrew text are a characteristic feature of ancient and modern treatments of Hebrew chronology, and each case must be examined on its own merits.⁴⁸ Thiele has done more to reestablish trust in the accuracy of the numbers in Kings and Chronicles than any scholar before him. He has whittled down the number of alleged corruptions to only the chronological data relating to Hezekiah and Jehoiachin. This was quite an achievement. If, however, a closer examination of these data (in addition to the data for the other two kings covered in this article) leads to the discovery of coregencies

⁴⁷Medical opinion has identified Jehoram's disease as an intussusception caused by a polyp, tumor, regional enteritis, or parasites. This condition would have led to gangrene of the bowels (cf. Green, "Regnal Formulas," 176, n. 31).

⁴⁸For an older and unfortunate demonstration of a purely mathematical approach which ignores coregencies, see Julius Oppert, "A Mathematical Demonstration of the Exactness of Biblical Chronology," *Proceedings of the Society of Biblical Archaeology* 20 (1898): 24-47.

for them, then the last remaining evidence for corrupt numbers in Kings and Chronicles is gone.

The four coregencies being suggested in this paper are consistent with a larger issue, namely, that when the editors of Kings and Chronicles abstracted material from the "Chronicles" of Israel and Judah, they did so without interfering with the chronological data in their sources. A further consideration that has been mentioned in this study is that the data in Kings and Chronicles were not given primarily for chronological purposes, so that the fact that we can construct a chronology for Israel and Judah from these data is purely fortuitous—a bonus. The editors had a higher interest in mind than seeking to provide a continuous chronological history of the Hebrew Kingdom to satisfy the insatiable desire of twentieth-century scholars for this type of material. The writer of the book of Judges incorporated chronological data into his work, but in this case we cannot reconstruct a continuous chronological history for that period.

GOVERNANCE IN THE FIRST-CENTURY CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN ROME: WAS IT COLLEGIAL?

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My previous essay in this series¹ drew attention to three main areas of inquiry concerning church governance in the first-century church in Rome: (1) an ancient Roman political governance pattern which may have furnished a background for the type of ecclesiastical governance used in that first-century Christian community, (2) pertinent contemporary Christian documents, and (3) ancient non-contemporary information from Roman episcopal succession lists. In addition, we observed that certain crucial issues emerged from the data of the different succession lists, particularly the question of the sequential placement of Clement of Rome in the postapostolic succession and the dates for his episcopal tenure.

With regard to the Roman system of governance, we found that the collegiality pattern of the magistracies in the Roman Republic (508-27 B.C.) was carried over into the Principate (the form of government established in 27 B.C.) and that it continued to be held in high esteem in Rome itself and in the West during the first century A.D. This was so in spite of the fact that the *princeps*, or "first citizen," had become the leading figure in the Roman government. We noted, for example, that Octavian (Augustus),² the founder of the Principate, ruled by means of offices and authorities carried over or derived from the Roman Republic; that he declined several offers of offices that would have given him autocratic power; and that among his first-century successors the ones who ruled autocratically received at death the official execra-

¹Kenneth A. Strand, "Church Organization in First-Century Rome: A New Look at the Basic Data," *AUSS* 29 (1991): 139-160.

²"Augustus" is a title (corresponding to the Greek term *sebastos*) which Octavian, the adopted son of Julius Caesar, was granted by the Roman Senate in 27 B.C. Common practice from that time onward has made it the designation of preference for him.

FIGURE 1
CHURCH ORGANIZATIONAL PATTERNS AS EVIDENCED IN THE EARLIEST APOSTOLIC FATHERS

<i>Rome, and Elsewhere West of the Aegean Sea (Not Monepiscopal)</i>	<i>Regions East of the Aegean Sea (Monepiscopal)</i>
<p>1 Clement (Ep. to Corinthians), ca. A.D. 95: <i>Presbyterial</i> organization in Corinth (see chaps. 42, 44, 47, 54, 57) <i>No mention of church polity in Rome</i></p> <p>Hermas, <i>Shepherd</i>, ca. A.D. 95 (?) - 140(?):* <i>Reference to twofold ministry</i> ("elders" in <i>Vis.</i> 2.4.3 and 3.1.8, and "bishops" and "deacons" in <i>Vis.</i> 3.5.1 and <i>Sim.</i> 9 [deacons in 9.26, and bishops in 9.27])</p> <p>Ignatius of Antioch (Ep. to Romans), ca. A.D. 110 or 115 (no later than A.D. 117): <i>No hint of monepiscopacy</i> in Rome, although in this letter he refers to himself as the bishop of Syria and in his six other letters (directed to the Roman province of Asia, east of the Aegean) his references to monepiscopacy abound (see the next column)</p> <p>Polycarp of Smyrna (Ep. to Philippians), ca. A.D. 110 or 115 (shortly after letters of Ignatius):** <i>Presbyterial</i> organization in Philippi (see especially 5:2, 6:1, and 11:1)</p>	<p><i>Didache</i>, probably 1st cent. A.D. and Syrian "rural" provenance (cf., e.g., Jean-Paul Audet, <i>La didaché: instructions des apôtres</i> [Paris, 1958], and Robert A. Kraft, <i>The Apostolic Fathers</i>, 3 [New York, 1965]: 72-77. A <i>twofold</i> settled ministry is apparently depicted in 15:1,2; but the context of the work is, of course, cultic (the reference is to "bishops and deacons" as honorable persons along with "prophets and teachers")</p> <p>Ignatius of Antioch, ca. A.D. 110 or 115 (no later than A.D. 117): Calls himself <i>bishop of Syria</i>, and requests that the Roman Christians pray for the church in Syria, which "has God for its shepherd" in place of Ignatius (Rom 2:2; 9:1) Makes <i>numerous references to monepiscopacy</i> in the Roman province of Asia (in addition to his mention of several bishops by name, cf., e.g., Eph 2:2; 3:2; 4:1; 5:3; 6:1; 20:2; Magn 3:1; 6:1; 7:1; Trall 2:2; 3:1; 7:2; 12:2; 13:2; Phld 7:1,2; 10:2; Smyrn 8:1,2; 9:1; 12:2; Polyc 6:1)</p> <p>Polycarp of Smyrna (Ep. to Philippians), ca. A.D. 110 or 115 (shortly after letters of Ignatius):** Identifies himself as <i>bishop of Smyrna</i> (Intro. to the Epistle)</p>
<p>Notes:</p> <p>*The dating of this source is questionable. Visions 1-4 could be as early as between A.D. 95 and 110. However, from vision 5 onward (the <i>Shepherd</i> proper) the material may be of a date considerably later than ca. A.D. 95. The <i>Muratorian Canon</i> states that the <i>Shepherd</i> was written by Hermas while "his brother Pius, the bishop" (accession ca. A.D. 140) occupied the chair of the Roman church. The <i>Muratorian Canon</i> is not especially reliable, of course; but it is possible that Hermas' work was composed over a fairly lengthy period of time (or at two widely separated times), with the final editing being done ca. A.D. 140.</p> <p>**P.N. Harrison, <i>Polycarp's Two Epistles to the Philippians</i> (Cambridge, Eng., 1936), has argued for a later date for chaps. 1-12 than for 13 and possibly 14; but even should he be correct, we would simply have to defer still further the <i>terminus non ante quem</i> for establishment of monepiscopacy in Philippi.</p>	

tion of the Roman Senate in contrast to the *apotheosis* granted to Augustus himself and to several other "good emperors" of that period. We also took cognizance of the practice in western municipalities of having the top magistracy held either by *duovirs* (who normally had two *aediles* as assistants) or by *quattuorvirs*. This type of municipal civil administration is exemplified by the extant formal charters of Salpensa issued in A.D. 81 and of Malaca issued in A.D. 84.

Regarding the relevant Christian documents of the first century and early second century which might have a bearing on the governance of the Roman church of that time, we found that these *contemporary* documents give no indication whatsoever of the presence of moniscopacy in the Roman church, but that they instead weigh heavily against the likelihood of that modality's being in use in that church at that time. (Figure 1 indicates the main patristic sources and their pertinent data.)

On the other hand, we found that certain *non-contemporary* ancient sources, especially several groupings of succession lists of Roman bishops, indicate that after the martyrdom of the apostles Peter and Paul (probably in A.D. 66 or 67) the Roman church immediately began a succession of *sole* bishops. These groupings of succession lists reveal, however, some serious conflicts.³ (For convenient reference, figure 2 on page 68 provides the pertinent data represented by these various succession lists.)

In the present essay, we continue our investigation concerning the modality of church governance which existed in the Roman church of the first century. We begin by examining some additional relevant non-contemporary ancient sources that bear upon our topic. After this, we analyze somewhat further the main issues raised by the succession lists and by these other non-contemporary pertinent materials. Finally, we endeavor to find a solution that does the most justice to our various and varied source materials.

1. *Some Further Notations concerning the Origin of the Roman Episcopate*

In addition to the succession-list materials, there are five sources that deserve notice here because of the information they provide about Peter and Paul in Rome and about the particular

³Conflicts that are much more significant than the simple scribal errors that also occur in various manuscripts.

individuals who succeeded them in the administration of the Christian church in that city. These are (1) the pseudo-Clementine literature, (2) Rufinus' prefatory letter to the pseudo-Clementine literature, (3) Tertullian, (4) the *Apostolic Constitutions*, and (5) a conjecture set forth by Epiphanius.

The Pseudo-Clementines and Rufinus' Preface

The first two of the aforementioned sources, the pseudo-Clementines and Rufinus' preface to this literature, may be considered together. The portion of the former that is of primary interest to us here is the so-called letter of Clement of Rome to James in Jerusalem, wherein it is specifically stated that Peter ordained Clement to be that apostle's immediate successor in governing the Roman church.⁴ In fact, the whole document is devoted to this matter, with a considerable part of it detailing instructions that Peter purportedly gave to Clement. The date of this pseudo-Clementine letter is uncertain, but it probably originated no earlier than the latter part of the second century, and possibly even later.

The prefatory remarks by Rufinus (fl. ca. 410) represent an effort to harmonize this supposedly Clementine information with the tradition common to the earliest of the extant succession lists, the list as given by Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Epiphanius:

Linus and Cletus [or, Anencletus⁵] were Bishops of the city of Rome before Clement. How then, some men ask, can Clement in his letter to James say that Peter passed over to him his position as a church-teacher [*cathedram docendi*]? The explanation of this point, as I understand, is as follows. Linus and Cletus were, no doubt, Bishops in the city of Rome before Clement, but this was in Peter's life-time; that is, they took

⁴See the "Epistle of Clement to James" (prefixed to the "Clementine Homilies"), especially chaps. 2 and 19 (ANF 8:218, 221-222).

⁵"Cletus" here is obviously simply an abbreviated form of the name "Anencletus" given by Irenaeus and Eusebius. In the Roman lists, the name has been duplicated into "Cletus" and "Anacletus." "Anencletus," which means "The Blameless," is undoubtedly the proper form. (Actually, a profusion of different spellings occur in the manuscripts and editions of the ancient source materials; e.g., "Anenclitus," "Anincletus," "Anecletus," "Aneclitus," and "Anicletus.")

charge of the episcopal work, while he discharged the duties of the apostolate.⁶

Rufinus continues by referring to another instance wherein Peter had done likewise: "He [Peter] is known to have done the same thing at Caesarea," where "though he was himself on the spot, yet he had at his side Zacchaeus whom he had ordained as Bishop."⁷ Rufinus then sets forth the following conclusion:

Thus we may see how both things may be true; namely how they [Linus and Cletus] stand as predecessors of Clement in the list of Bishops, and yet how Clement after the death of Peter became his successor in the teacher's chair.⁸

Whether these two junior administrators served concurrently or whether they served consecutively in the role attributed to them by Rufinus is not clear, but in any case the arrangement would have constituted a sort of ecclesiastical counterpart to the political practice of having senior and junior colleagues for the top magistracies in Rome and in the western municipalities.

Tertullian

Tertullian of Carthage (fl. early third century), writing no more than two or three decades after Irenaeus, differs from the latter when reporting the immediate postapostolic succession in Rome. Whereas Irenaeus places Clement third (after Linus and Anenctetus), Tertullian in his *Prescription against Heretics*, indicates Clement as being the first postapostolic bishop of Rome. He makes the following statement in the form of a challenge to heretics:

⁶"Rufinus to Gaudentius," as given in NPNF, 2d series, 3:564. This prefatory letter is prefixed to the "Recognitions of Clement" (see ANF 8:76; there the wording of the translation differs considerably from what is quoted herein from NPNF, but the same lines of thought are conveyed).

⁷Ibid.

⁸Ibid. It should be noted that Rufinus' explanation was not merely an invention on his part. The words prefaced to his explanation are given as follows in the ANF translation: "Now of this we have *heard* this explanation" (ANF 8:76, col. 1; emphasis supplied). Although this ANF rendering is more to the point than the NPNF wording quoted above, even it lacks the full force of the original, wherein the word *accepimus* conveys the thought of having "received" or "accepted" something already circulating (and presumably handed down).

Let them [the Gnostic heretics] produce the original records of their churches; let them unfold the roll of their bishops, running down in due succession from the beginning For this is the manner in which the apostolic churches transmit their registers: as the church of Smyrna, which records that Polycarp was placed therein by John; as also the church of Rome, which makes Clement to have been ordained in like manner by Peter.⁹

The question to be raised regarding this statement is whether Tertullian, even though he had undoubtedly read Irenaeus, chose for his own account a less authentic source—namely, the Pseudo-Clementine literature. That he might have done so is not, of course, impossible—that is, if that literature actually antedates Tertullian's reference. But in any case, we must ask whether it is logical to assume that Tertullian, who was trained as a lawyer and was usually quite perceptive, would have based his above-quoted statement on such a source. Even more importantly, we must take note of the fact that his statement itself is worded in such a way as to suggest the strong likelihood of Tertullian's having personally seen an actual succession roll from Rome.¹⁰ Irrespective, however, of the manner in which Tertullian gained his information, it is very likely that he recognized his source as representing an early and reliable tradition—a tradition to which he therefore gave credence.

The Apostolic Constitutions

The *Apostolic Constitutions*, a fourth-century compilation of a variety of earlier materials, gives still another account of the initial Roman episcopal succession. This is as follows: "Of the church of Rome, Linus the son of Claudia was the first [bishop], ordained by Paul; and Clemens, after Linus' death, the second, ordained by me Peter."¹¹ The first-person language, "by me Peter," is used because the prescriptions, rules, and commands of the *Apostolic Constitutions* purport to be given by the twelve apostles of Christ. That the

⁹Tertullian, *On Prescription against Heretics*, chap. 32 (ANF 3:258).

¹⁰Tertullian speaks so authoritatively about the apostolic churches transmitting their "registers" that it appears he had first-hand acquaintance with some of them. This would be especially so with regard to the one for Rome because of the close relationship and frequent contacts between Rome and Carthage, where Tertullian served as a presbyter.

¹¹*Constitutions of the Holy Apostles*, book 7, sec. 4, chap. 46 (ANF 7:478, col. 1).

traditions in this document actually go back directly to the apostles is most doubtful, of course, but they may well reflect information that was circulating earlier than the fourth century, perhaps in some cases well before that time.

Epiphanius

Epiphanius (fl. late 4th century) was mentioned in the previous essay (and also noted earlier in this essay) as the author of a succession list of Roman bishops that parallels the lists of Irenaeus and Eusebius. Epiphanius' list begins by referring to "Peter and Paul, apostles and bishops, then Linus, then Cletus,¹² then Clemens," after which there is a digression before the list is given in full from Peter and Paul to Anicetus ("Peter and Paul, Linus and Cletus, Clement, Euarestus, Alexander, Xystus, Telesphorus, Pius, Anicetus"). It is a statement in that digression which interests us now:

But possibly after Clement was appointed and had waived his claims (if indeed it did so happen, for I only surmise it, I do not affirm it), subsequently after the death of Linus and Cletus, when they had held the bishopric twelve years each after the death of saint Peter and Paul, which happened in the twelfth year of Nero [A.D. 66?], he [Clement] was again obliged to take the bishopric.¹³

This explanation obviously allows for Clement's known episcopal term from about A.D. 88 to 97, considerably after the time of Peter's martyrdom. In this respect, therefore, this "surmise" reconstruction may *seem* to have an advantage over the other above-noted attempts at reconciliation of the data. In fact, however, it is a totally untenable solution. Such an arrangement, which has Peter and Paul ordaining three persons to be bishops in linear

¹²As mentioned in my previous article, p. 154, n. 48, the name "Cletus" (Greek, κλέτος, "klētos") given by Epiphanius is undoubtedly to be identified with the "Anenclētus" of Irenaeus and Eusebius. See also n. 5 above.

¹³Epiphanius, *Panarion* 27.6, as translated in J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, Part 1, *S. Clement of Rome*, vol. 1, 2d ed. (London, 1890), 329. The Greek text is given in Lightfoot, 169-170.

succession after them, is totally incongruent and completely out of harmony with what is known about early-church practice.¹⁴

(A summary of the data given by the five sources just treated is provided in figure 3 on page 69. Further documents could have been cited, as well; but doing so would not serve any useful purpose, for these further materials simply echo the information concerning Clement that we have already noted.)

Analysis

The foregoing sources, though they vary from one another in certain respects, are all in general agreement concerning Clement's being ordained by Peter. Furthermore, except for Epiphanius' untenable conjecture, they all are also either explicit or implicit in placing Clement as the immediate successor of Peter, though the *Apostolic Constitutions* puts Linus before Clement in a modality nowhere else attested: namely, Linus as the successor of Paul, and Clement as the successor of Peter subsequent to Linus' death.

2. *Comparison of the Succession Lists and the Other Non-Contemporary References*

At this juncture it is useful to make a comparison between the succession-list information and the information from the above-noted sources (for easy reference to the relevant data, see figures 2 and 3 on pages 68 and 69). In such a comparison, two basic conclusions are inevitable: (1) The Liberian-Catalogue/*liber-pontificalis* chronology for Clement is compatible with the evidence given by the five sources treated above—unanimously so in regard to Clement's being ordained by Peter, and with but one exception (Epiphanius' speculation) in regard to the time of Clement's episcopal service. (2) The Eusebian chronology is out of step with all the sources except Epiphanius' conjecture (a conjecture that can readily be dismissed, as already pointed out above).

These mutually exclusive considerations pose a dilemma: On the one hand, we have the Liberian-Catalogue account and chronology supported by an array of witnesses; and on the other hand, we have the Eusebian chronology supported by known historical fact. How do we get off the horns of this dilemma?

¹⁴Clement himself (in 1 Clement 42 and 44) gives evidence of what the appointment procedure was (Christ appointed the apostles; the apostles appointed their successors; these successors of the apostles, in turn, appointed their own successors; etc.).

Modern scholarship has usually opted for the succession list of Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Epiphanius, together with Eusebius' chronology, rather than for a sequence and chronology which would make Clement the first postapostolic leader of the church in Rome. However, a further vital consideration emerges here: namely, the fact that both the Eusebian and Liberian-Catalogue chronologies rest on the questionable assumption that after the martyrdoms of Peter and Paul the Roman church immediately began a sequence of sole bishops. This is an assumption which, as we have seen, appears to be in conflict with the contemporary evidence. It involves, as well, the premise that the two chronologies are mutually exclusive.

Thus, in opting for Eusebius' general time frame for Clement, modern scholarship has ruled out the time frame given in the Liberian Catalogue. This, of course, also flies in the face of the other sources which place Clement in immediate succession after Peter. But should these sources be so readily dismissed? Perhaps they should, but *only if* the Liberian Catalogue chronology and all of these other sources can be demonstrated to have derived from a common antecedent, and then *only if* that common antecedent can be shown to be late and untrustworthy.

Although some of the sources we have noted do obviously derive or borrow from one another, and therefore are not independent witnesses, this can hardly be said regarding all the sources. In particular, the statements of Tertullian and the *Apostolic Constitutions* bear the earmarks of having a derivation different from, or at least in addition to, what is set forth in the Pseudo-Clementine literature and Rufinus. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Liberian-Catalogue chronology was merely an invention to accommodate the pseudo-Clementine account concerning Peter and Clement. The common placement of Clement in these various sources is an indication that something more substantial than the pseudo-Clementine material informed that chronology.

In view of the foregoing discussion, are we to conclude that the Eusebian and Liberian-Catalogue chronologies for Clement are not as much in conflict as is generally assumed? It would seem so. And one way in which the apparent conflict would find resolution is a reconstruction that I suggested in my previous article: namely, that Clement served as a bishop at least *twice*. This procedure finds a parallel in the pattern of consulships which Augustus had held

FIGURE 2
DATA FROM THE MAIN ANCIENT SUCCESSION LISTS OF EARLY BISHOPS OF ROME

The Listing of Names in Succession			Chronological Data Presented in Two Ancient Sources and a Modern Reconstruction		
Irenaeus, Eusebius and Epiphanius	Liberian Catalogue	Optatus and Augustine	Eusebius**	Liberian Catalogue	A Modern Reconstruction
Peter and Paul	Peter	Peter			
			Linus (68-80)	Linus (56-67)	Linus (64-76)
Linus	Linus	Linus			
			Anencletus (80-92)	Clement (68-76)	Anencletus (76-88)
Anencletus (Cletus)*	Clement	Clement			
			Clement (92-99)	Cletus (77-83)	Clement (88-97)
Clement	Cletus	Anacletus*			
			Evaristus (99-109)	Anacletus (84-95)	Evaristus (97-105)
Evaristus	Anacletus*	Evaristus			
			Alexander (109-119)	Aristus (96-108)	Alexander (105-115)
Alexander	Aristus (Evaristus)	Alexander			
			Xystus (119-128)***	Alexander (109-116)	Xystus (115-125)***
Xystus (Sixtus)	Alexander	Sixtus (Xystus)			
				Sixtus (117-126)***	
	Sixtus (Xystus)				

Notes:
 **"Anencletus" is undoubtedly the proper spelling, but the name occurs in the sources with a number of different spellings. "Cletus" is how Epiphanius renders it, and the Western lists use "Anacletus."
 **Eusebius' dates are from the Jeronian recension of Eusebius' *Chronicle* (dates which closely parallel those in his *Ecclesiastical History*; cf. figure 1 in my previous article).
 ***Xystus is known to have acceded to the Roman episcopal chair sometime within the years 114 to 116. Thus, both the Eusebian and Liberian-Catalogue dates for him are at least a year to three years in error and perhaps even three to five years out.

Source References: Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* 3.3.3; Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical History* 3.1, 4, 13, 15, 21, 34; Epiphanius, *Panarion* 27.6; Liberian Catalogue; Optatus, *On the Donatist Schism* 2.3; and Augustine's Ep. to Gensericus.

in 5 B.C. and then again in 2 B.C., after a lengthy interval from the time he terminated a series of sequential consulships in 23 B.C.¹⁵

This solution, however, does not fully solve our problem with regard to the two chronologies for Clement, for we are still left with the question as to why neither of the chronologies and none of the succession lists show Clement as being bishop twice. The explanation for this is perhaps quite simple: namely, that the compiler(s) of the succession list(s) envisaged a single line of bishops in which each bishop had only one period of service. When chronological data were added later by other persons, such data were probably based partly on sparse documentary evidence and partly on pure conjecture; but in either case, the data had to be inserted into a succession pattern whose configuration had already been predetermined by Hegesippus.

If, as I have suggested, there was indeed a collegial type of episcopal service, plus the possibility of multiple terms in office for any given individual, the two chronologies would not necessarily be mutually exclusive regarding Clement. The same would be true too, of course, if Clement's term of service was an extended period that encompassed the time frames of both chronologies for him.

The discussion thus far has made it obvious that the question of collegiality *versus* monepiscopacy is a crucial one. Therefore it will be well at this point to review briefly the procedure by which a monepiscopal succession could have got into the succession lists, when in fact the contemporary documentation points away from, rather than toward, this sort of succession.

3. *The Origin of the Monepiscopal Notion*

As noted in the previous article in this series, the earliest extant form of the succession list—that given by Irenaeus, Eusebius, and Epiphanius—can be traced back to Hegesippus.¹⁶ As for the other two groups of succession lists of Roman bishops—the one given in the Liberian Catalogue and *liber pontificalis* and the one set forth by Optatus and Augustine—these seem actually to provide

¹⁵For details, see Strand, 140-141. Octavian had also served as one of the two consuls as early as 43 B.C.

¹⁶*Ibid.*, 146-147. See also the convincing data presented by Burnett Hillman Streeter, *The Primitive Church Studied with Special Reference to the Origins of the Christian Ministry: The Hewett Lectures*, 1928 (London, 1929), 288-295.

the same succession too, once scribal errors are corrected.¹⁷ Thus we can conclude that all three major groups of lists go back, either directly or indirectly, to Hegesippus.

As also noted in the previous article, Hegesippus did not claim to have discovered a succession list. What he said was that he himself "drew up" or "arranged" the succession list.¹⁸ We must therefore ask: Why did Hegesippus put the names into a single line of bishops?

Hegesippus was a Syro-Palestinian Christian who traveled to Rome during the episcopate of Anicetus (ca. A.D. 155-166), stopping also in Corinth during this trip. This was a time when Gnosticism had become rife in Italy, as it had done earlier in the East.¹⁹ Hegesippus' purpose was to provide evidence that there had been an unbroken succession of church leaders reaching all the way back to the apostles, for this kind of continuous line of bishops would, he felt, give evidence of the genuineness of the church's doctrinal beliefs in contrast to the false teachings of the Gnostics. The Gnostics could not, of course, claim such a line of authority.

Thus, to best serve his purpose, Hegesippus would very likely have arranged from his source materials a list of prominent leaders in the Roman church, placing these leaders in a single line of succession, one after another. The strong probability of such being the case rests on two further significant factors: First of all, monepiscopacy was the *only* type of church governance with which Hegesippus had become acquainted in the East, where monepiscopacy had emerged very early.²⁰ And in the second place, monepiscopacy was also the very type of church organizational pattern that he found in use in both Corinth and Rome when he visited those places during the latter half of the second century. It would thus have been an easy and natural assumption for him to

¹⁷See Lightfoot, 270-275.

¹⁸Lightfoot in his in-text note no. "(3)" on p. 154 has correctly pointed out that the context of Hegesippus' statement (as given in Eusebius, *Ecl. Hist.* 4.22) "requires διαδοχὴν ἐπιτοῦσαμην, 'I drew up a list of (the episcopal) succession.'"

¹⁹For details and sources relating to this, see Kenneth A. Strand, "The Rise of the Monarchical Episcopate," *AUSS* 4 (1966): 76-80.

²⁰See *ibid.*, 71-75; also Arnold Ehrhardt, *The Apostolic Succession in the First Two Centuries of the Church* (London, 1953), for a thoroughgoing treatment of the backgrounds for monepiscopacy, including evidence for the early rise of this form of church governance in the Jerusalem church.

think that the monepiscopal form of polity had been the one and only form in use in the Roman church subsequent to the death of the apostles Peter and Paul. And hence he would have compiled his succession list accordingly.

4. *An Assessment of the Data*


In view of what has been said above, we may now turn our attention more directly to the indications of collegial leadership in the first-century Roman church. First of all, there was in Rome, as we have seen, a mentality attuned to collegiality (as evidenced in Roman civil administration). In addition, we may note the following considerations: (1) There is known to have been a collegiality of the apostles Peter and Paul in serving the Roman church together for a number of years, a practice that implies the high acceptance level of this kind of ministry in that church at that time. (2) The chronology given in the Liberian Catalogue suggests an overlapping in leadership prior to the deaths of Peter and Paul, since Linus' tenure in episcopal office was contemporary with that of the apostles. (3) The explanation conveyed by Rufinus indicates that Linus and Cletus (Anencletus) served as administrative leaders of the Roman church while Peter was still alive and ministering there. (4) The evidence of the *Apostolic Constitutions* indicates a "dual episcopacy" of some sort or other.

Although it is impossible, of course, for us to reconstruct from the extant data a precise line of collegial bishops and their exact dates of service, the foregoing considerations are weighty enough to warrant our looking in that direction. And even though the nature of our sources and the gaps in our knowledge would make foolhardy any attempt to outline a specific scenario (several possibilities exist), it may be useful to put into diagram form the main data we have reviewed. This is done in figure 4.

There are also several further points that deserve mention: First of all, even though I have suggested that allowance for a collegial episcopate and for multiple terms of service for the early Roman bishops reduces the conflicts among our sources, we must nevertheless bear in mind that by no means are all such conflicts eliminated. This should give us due caution in considering any and all possible reconstructions.

Second, it may be argued that since any attempt at outlining a collegial episcopal succession would involve speculation, therefore the idea of there being such a succession should be dismissed out of hand. To those who would take this position we

FIGURE 4
SYNOPSIS OF DATA PERTAINING TO THE ROMAN EPISCOPAL SUCCESSION



may well ask: What, then, are we to do with the strong indications that there was indeed a duality in the early episcopate in Rome? And, moreover, is not the premise of monepiscopal succession equally speculative, or even *moreso*, inasmuch as it goes contrary to a considerable amount of evidence?

Finally, we take note of the fact that the possibility of two bishops serving concurrently in the early Roman church has not gone unnoticed by modern scholarship. Indeed, the information set forth in the *Apostolic Constitutions* has heretofore led some modern researchers to a theory that there were two lines of bishops—one line drawing its succession from Paul, and the other deriving its succession from Peter. Each line, so it was supposed, served its own distinct segment of the Roman church. Even J. B. Lightfoot at first adopted this theory, but he eventually rejected it.²¹

This particular idea of "dual leadership" presupposes some sort of schism or division in the early Roman church,²² which, if ever it did exist, would certainly not have been condoned and perpetuated by the apostles Peter and Paul nor by Clement, for their counsel was ever toward a unified "body of Christ."²³ This untenable suggestion that there were initially two lines of concurrent Roman bishops is vastly different from my proposal of a collegial-leadership pattern, for my proposal envisages *cooperative leadership* of two co-equal administrators working toward the same goals within *one unified Christian community*.

5. Conclusion

The previous essay and this one have led us into what usually is considered to be a large "hodge-podge" of conflicting information. As we have seen, however, the conflicts need neither be as numerous nor as irreconcilable as is usually thought by modern scholars. The rather strong possibility that there was in the earliest period of the Roman church a collegial form of governance for that church opens the way for at least a partial resolution of the differing data.

²¹See Lightfoot, p. 68, n. 1.

²²In *ibid.*, Lightfoot indicates that his thesis had envisaged two Christian communities in Rome (Jewish and Gentile) which were fused together under Clement.

²³In the NT, see especially, 1 Cor 1:10-17; 3:1-9; and 1 Pet 3:8-10. In the "Apostolic Fathers," see the entire epistle entitled "1 Clement."

Researchers have normally found themselves in the position of choosing between the monepiscopal and the presbyterial governance modalities as the only possible alternatives anywhere in the early Christian church. Therefore, they have opted for one or the other of these modalities for the first-century Roman church,²⁴ this in spite of the lack of evidence for either of these, and despite the fact that neither of them do justice to the strong hints that exist in favor of collegiality in the earliest period of Roman church history.

The suggestion which has been put forward by some specialists to the effect that the early Roman church initially had two lines of bishops—one for each of two segments of that church—is also untenable. It is, moreover, simply a variation in, or adjustment to, the concept of monepiscopacy, for it rests on the notion that only two alternatives—monepiscopal governance and presbyterial governance—were possible, and it opts for the former.

On the other hand, my suggestion envisages a genuine and viable *third alternative*: namely, the pattern of *collegial* governance. Such governance was already evidenced in Roman political institutions. Moreover, it was exemplified in the Roman church itself in the type of service rendered by the apostles Peter and Paul.

We may close by taking note of the fact that a differing pattern of church governance in Rome from what it was in other regions should not be surprising. What it highlights is the ability of the early church to adapt in matters wherein different customs or different needs suggested the desirability of such adaptation. The NT itself indicates that as time went on, new needs and conditions led to certain new administrative offices or structures. This was the case both in Jerusalem and in the churches of Asia Minor (cf. Acts 6:1-6 and 14:23). That the church in Rome likewise utilized a form of governance adapted specifically to the conceptualization and needs of its members is precisely what we could and should expect.

²⁴The matter as to which of the two governance patterns is chosen by various modern scholars seems often to be related to these scholars' own church traditions of today (or are at least influenced by such traditions).

BOOK REVIEWS

Babcock, William S., ed. *Paul and the Legacies of Paul*. Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1990. xxviii + 426 pp. Hardcover, \$32.50; Paperback, \$16.95.

This volume offers its readers most of the papers and some of the prepared responses presented at a conference with the same title, held on the campus of Southern Methodist University in March 1987. It is divided into three parts. The first deals with early uses of the personal influence of Paul. Here the Pauline presence in Acts of the Apostles (D. R. Schwartz), 1 Clement, Ignatius and Polycarp (A. Lindmann), the Acts of Paul and Thecla (D. R. MacDonald), Irenaeus (R. A. Norris), and Tertullian (R. D. Sider) provide the basic sources.

The second part investigates the use of Pauline texts by early theologians. R. L. Wilken examines Greek commentaries of the third and fourth centuries and finds their authors arguing, in the tradition of Plato, Plutarch, Carneades and others, for the freedom of the will. Rom 9 is the scriptural text they need to explain. On the other hand, P. Gorday shows how this and similar Pauline texts are central to the description of divine sovereignty in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa. R. Greer concentrates on 1 Cor 15:45-47 and its contrasts between the first man and the last Adam, to review the Christology of Apollinaris of Laodicea and Gregory of Nyssa. A. M. Ritter examines the influence of Rom 12:1-8 in the social ethics of John Chrysostom. Using the theme of hope as an entering wedge, B. Studer examines the influence of Paul's letters on Augustine. Finally, P. Fredriksen argues that the Pauline letters played a decisive role in shifting Augustine's conception of the human condition from a broadly cosmological to a broadly historical one.

The third part looks for the Pauline influence in other areas. H. Y. Gamble asks, Why were the early Christians the first social group to make heavy use of codices, rather than scrolls, as the conveyors of their literature? He argues that the answer is to be found in the significance of the publication of the Pauline corpus. Finally, Ernst Dassmann reviews the available archaeological evidence and argues that, despite the stories of Paul circulating in the literature, the figure of Paul must have remained rather opaque.

Only five of the responses given at the conference in Dallas found their way into this volume. M. C. de Boer asks A. Lindemann, Which Paul is the one the Apostolic Fathers referred to? When the Fathers appeal to Paul, are they bringing to their side a figure of authority, the writer of letters, or the teacher of doctrines? And how is any of them related to the Paul of modern scholarship? S. K. Stowers asks D. MacDonald to make clear the criteria to be used in deciding that a particular presentation of the

apostle in the second century is un-Pauline. E. A. Clark contends, against M. Ritter, that Chrysostom's social ethics are heavily influenced by late Empire social stratification and may, ultimately, be more dependent on utopian readings of Genesis than on Paul. R. A. Markus wishes to have a more nuanced explanation of Augustine's dependence on Paul than that presented by Studer, since Augustine seems to have grown in his understanding of the apostle by continuous rereadings. This fact is also at the heart of William S. Babcock's comments on Fredriksen's essay. According to Babcock, Augustine shifts from a view of the human soul as capable, "with perfect ease," to rightly order life, a view well within the classical tradition, to a view of the self as bound to lust, so that only God's grace is responsible for the good done by any human, a quite unclassical view.

All the essays and the comments of the respondents are well documented (the notes take over 100 pages). The volume includes a rather well-selected bibliography, an index of biblical references, and an index of modern authors. There is no question that it offers a timely reappraisal of the Pauline influence on early Christianity. However, a collection of essays hardly carries a consistent argument, even when the papers were part of a well-planned conference. This collection may well serve to deal a final blow to the influential views of von Harnack and Bauer that Paul's letters had been popular only with the enthusiastic and gnostic versions of Christianity, and that Paul had been misunderstood and forgotten except by Marcion, who, even though he also misunderstood him, rescued the apostle for the "orthodox." Also discredited is Luther's definition of what is "Pauline," which guided the research of von Harnack, Bauer, and their followers.

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HEROLD WEISS

Blomberg, Craig L. *Interpreting the Parables*. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1990. 334 pp. Paperback, \$19.95.

The author presents two purposes for writing yet another book on the parables. He intends to report on the current status of parable scholarship and to challenge the dominant approaches to the interpretation of the parables in vogue today.

Scholars today generally agree with Juelicher in rejecting the allegorical interpretation of parables and in accepting the principle that a parable has only one main point. In addition allegorical elements in the parables are said to be later additions of the church and not belonging to

the authentic layer going back to Jesus. Blomberg contends that Juelicher goes too far on both counts.

Blomberg bases his disagreement with Juelicher's position on evidence from rabbinic parables. He faults Juelicher because of his dependence on Greek models, i.e., on Aristotle, rather than on the contemporaries of Jesus in the Jewish world. While the rabbinic parables date from a later period, their static nature through the centuries would indicate that what we see in them would have been present at the time of Jesus. While they are different from the parables of Jesus, these rabbinic parables almost always include allegorical elements. Juelicher's approach then appears too theoretical and irrelevant with respect to the parables of Jesus.

Blomberg rejects the form-critical proposition that each parable must have only one main point. He upholds the authenticity of the parables and their transmission by memorization. Blomberg also rejects redaction criticism's claim that the records have been so modified that contradiction and different theologies result. The differences, he claims, are minor compared the larger body of material involved.

In part II Blomberg deals with the meaning and significance of each of the parables. He deals with three-point (including the complex type where there may be more than three characters but one of the subordinate roles is illustrated with multiple examples), two-point, and one-point parables. Examples of these are: three-point—shepherd, lost sheep, ninety-nine sheep; three-point complex—priest-Levite, Samaritan, wounded man; two point—Pharisee and publican; one point—pearl of great price. The final chapter deals with the theology of the parables.

Blomberg's significant contribution may be in his classification of the parables according to the points that are made. He suggests that the details of the parables often portray unrealistic and atypical behavior, such as the father's watching for the prodigal son to return or the shepherd's going after one sheep. For him this stretching of reality points to the need for the use of allegory in the understanding of the parable, that is, the reference is not to an ordinary person but to God Himself.

On the theology of the parables, the emphasis is on the kingdom of God. However, Blomberg points to the veiled Christological issues they raise. By claiming to take upon himself divine prerogatives, e.g., forgiving sins, sowing divine seed, making judgment over men, and claiming to be the bridegroom, good shepherd, returning king, lord of the vineyard, etc., Christ puts himself on the level of God.

Blomberg writes clearly in setting forth points both for and against a position and makes some significant critiques of the current approaches to parable interpretation. He has presented evidence to question the position of the consensus regarding the view that a parable has only one

point and that a parable cannot be originally from Jesus if allegorical elements are present. However, it seems to me it does not necessarily hold that because there are three or two characters, or even one, it means that the parable has three or two points, or one. It is possible to look at the parable of the lost sheep as pointing to the great value that Jesus places upon the lost without necessarily saying there are three points to the parable. And is it necessarily allegorical to say that the shepherd in the parable points to Jesus? It seems to me that allegory as generally used deals with a much more extended and consistent application of symbols. What we have in this case is an illustration of a point.

However, we can thank Blomberg for pointing up weaknesses in current positions and suggesting new ways of looking at parables.

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SAKAE KUBO

Brooks, Roger. *The Spirit of the Ten Commandments: Shattering the Myth of Rabbinic Legalism*. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990. xiv + 199. \$21.95.

Confronted by a variety of student opinion on the meaning of Jewish law (*halakhah*), which compared it to Catholic casuistry, and contrasted it with Christian spirituality, Brooks sets out to clarify the day-to-day practice of Jewish law as the purveyor of morality, ethics and spirituality.

Contrasting Rabbinic Judaism with the notion of Pharisaic adherence to the letter of the law, Brooks gives a picture of the halakhic process which perceives the authority of law to come not only from Scripture, but from moral example and the entire halakhic process in which the Rabbis engaged.

This halakhic process, or legal discourse, in which diversity of opinion is common, gained contemporary relevance through consideration of a particular case, thus the casuistic character of Jewish Law. The discourse also advanced the student to new levels of holiness in act and intellect by seeking to educate and win the mind. In other words, a special kind of understanding came from involvement in the halakhic process and the heuristically derived insights. The practical grasp of one's duties in specific cases resulted from it.

In chapters three, four, and five, entitled: "In Search of the Rabbinic Agenda Within Scripture," "In Search of the Rabbinic Meaning of Scripture," and "In Search of Rabbinic Authority," Brooks explains several vital points by examples of rabbinic teaching.

The first is that the relation of sources of authority, the balance of ethical and theological issues, and the practical needs of legal interpretation express the goals of the Talmud. The second point is that

rabbinic meaning of Scripture lies in understanding the paradigmatic character of the Ten Utterances which permits reactualizing them at all times in history. Thus a particular moment in history is transcended by those who emulate and understand the rabbis and their theology.

The third point is that while the Commandments are an absolute authority, further clarification is offered by rabbinic moral theology as it probes the questions of purpose and consequence. By the halakhic process one is moved by the letter and the spirit of biblical law to a life of holiness through "absolute" submission to God and "exclusive" recognition of God's acts.

Brooks has adequately demonstrated that rabbinic theology is not a slavishly literal or fundamentalistic, thus legalistic, approach to biblical law. It is the practical and spiritual integration of the word of God with the word of humanity.

Brooks has given us an inside picture of the halakhic process, of rabbinic theology. By reading this book we get a feeling for the particular kind of reasoning the rabbis employed. It would be very difficult to characterize rabbinic theology as legalistic after understanding its inner dynamic. The book also serves to correct the popular notion that Judaism, by its legalism, was divorced from history. Such a charge seems impossible in view of the appeal in rabbinic interpretation to the acts of God, especially the Ten Utterances, in order to create a transhistorical perspective on divine-human relationship, and ultimately bring everything within the interpretive process to focus on specific situations in the here-and-now.

Andrews University

A. JOSEF GREIG

Brueggemann, Walter. *Israel's Praise: Doxology against Idolatry and Ideology*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988. xii + 196 pp. Paperback, \$10.95.

The thesis of Professor Brueggemann's book is that the Psalms "can only be understood and used rightly if we attend to their social interaction and function" (ix). In the preface Brueggemann states that he seeks to "advance our current situation in Psalms studies"; "be attentive to the central task of the pastor," which is the "liturgical task of nurturing a communal, intentional, and often alternative imagination"; and explore the "social reality of the Psalms," expressed in the communal experience of "world-making" or "social construction" (x). Then he tells the reader how he will go about it: he will study the Psalms critically from a sociological perspective, guided in his study by the presupposition that "it is no longer tenable to imagine that there is a 'given' world into which we may fit, and which we have only to describe, and to which we may bear witness. That

easy 'givenness' is now seen to be theologically unconvincing and sociologically naive" (x).

By the end of the preface the reader recognizes that the rest of the book requires reading with wide-open eyes. Some comfort may come from Brueggemann's hope that his book will be a "statement of an evangelical sort" (xi).

There are five chapters. In chapter 1, "Praise as a Constitutive Act," the author develops the idea that the cultic act of praise "creates a world." Praise is not merely responsive, but constitutive of reality. In chapter 2, "The 'World' of Israel's Doxology," Brueggemann develops the idea further and says that Israel's praise creates a "particular world in which Israel may live" and "makes available a world over which Jahweh rules." Chapter 3, "Doxology at the Edge of Ideology: The King of Majesty and Mercy," defines the world Israel's praise creates in terms of "grace and truth"—*hesed* and *emeth*. Chapter 4, "Doxology Without Reason: The Loss of Israel's World of Hope," focuses on the nature of the God who rules the world created by Israel's praise. He is a God who "acts decisively against the status quo in order to create new social possibility" (94). He is not the absolute God preferred by the king. The final chapter, "Doxology Inside the 'Claims of Time and Sorrow,'" reflects on the significance of the study for the "praise of the contemporary church," as well as the "responsibility of pastoral leadership as world-making" (123).

Brueggemann sees Old Testament pastors such as Jeremiah and Isaiah as not "fooled nor seduced by the grand claims" of Israel's praise, which he sees as analogous to the contemporary "religious right allied . . . with American militarism and participating in all of the fears that justify such militarism." But he is critical of "religious liberalism" as well, which is so certain of its ability to solve social problems that praise is "crowded out by the claims and perspectives of the social sciences" (127). Contemporary liturgies of praise put a lid on all "present reality" (135).

The book is a good example of theology written for theologians. The author plays the scholar-quoting game with gusto and will no doubt leave the busy parish pastor, whose primary concern is to build the faith of his people, lost in the maze created by references to "Kaufman's account," "Lebacqz's account," "Gunkel's understanding," "Mowinckel's hypothesis," "Kegan argues," "Kaufman states," sprinkled liberally throughout the book. It does not, however, generate much confidence in the Bible as inspired revelation from God. The authority is not Scripture, but the religious sociology of Israel.

Granting the author's presupposition, Jahweh becomes a liturgical construct of Israel's "world-making." Her words of praise create the King! This raises some questions. If Israel disappears from the scene, does the "world" her liturgy creates or evokes also disappear? What does that say

about revealed religion? Will a more "mature" faith evolve from the ashes of such a sociological creation of Israel's religious imagination?

Israel's Praise is a book that can make the reader mad, sad, and glad all at the same time. But it is a book that makes one think and think deeply. The best part, in which Brueggemann talks about pain as the matrix of praise, is to be found in pp. 129-160.

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C. RAYMOND HOLMES

Dybdahl, J. *Old Testament Grace*. Boise, Idaho: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1990. 152 pp. \$16.95.

Too often the Old Testament has been misunderstood by Christians. Since Marcion, the God of Law and Justice of the Old Testament has been opposed to the God of Grace and Love of the New Testament. For Dybdahl, God's personality is not split; the God of the Old Testament is the same as the God of the New Testament (chap. 1). Stories (chap. 2), institutions, rituals and symbols (chap. 3), and texts and words (chap. 4) witness to the pervasive presence of grace in the Old Testament. Hence the author infers responses to grace (chap. 5) and addresses objections to the Old Testament grace (chap. 6). The Old Testament is not only for the Old Testament people; even the New Testament Christian can learn grace from the Old Testament (chap. 7). The author accompanies this biblical demonstration with modern anecdotes, mostly taken from his own experience. In fact, the whole book stems from within his personal conversion and spiritual pilgrimage.

The book is short, well organized, and clearly written. However, Old Testament grace is much more complex than it may appear through this sometimes sketchy presentation. Dybdahl's systematic, yet practical and rather homiletical discourse does not do full justice to the beauty and the richness of the Hebrew concept of grace. The many stories illustrating grace in the Old Testament do not include the Genesis creation account, God's act of grace *par excellence*. The author's choice of "grace-filled words" (95-98) is somewhat arbitrary. For instance, he does not mention the important word *rah'mim* (compassion, mercy), while he gives special treatment to the word *ś'dāqāh*. The former is a technical word for grace—it is translated in the LXX by *charis* (grace), while the latter is not. Admittedly, the word *ś'dāqāh*, which expresses rather the opposite idea of justice, is often associated with Hebrew words for grace (Pss 116:5; 141:5; 145:17; Prov 12:10; Mic 6:8; etc.), thus showing an affinity between the Hebrew concept of justice and grace (see p. 143). Words such as "truth" (Deut 6:8, 9, 12; Isa 49:15; Ps 89), "covenant" (Deut 7:9; Ps 25:10; Dan 9:4), "peace" (Num 6:25-26), "glory" (Ps 84:11; Exod 33:18-19), and "love"

(Jer 31:3; Deut 7:8, 13; Hos 2:19-20), which play a significant role in the semantic inquiry of grace, are missing from the picture.

Dybdahl rightly chooses an inductive approach to trace and examine the biblical idea of grace. However, this approach alone precludes the exposition of grace according to biblical books and sections. Thus, the importance of grace in the Wisdom Literature is minimized.

Other matters are not totally clear. In the beginning of the book, Dybdahl strongly argues against progressive revelation (14); in the end, he seems to support it (137). One may question the theological analysis of the concept of obedience broken down into three parts (hearing, trust, action [21]). Hebrew thinking suggests, on the contrary, a reverse process, in which the action precedes the cognitive consciousness and elaboration (see Exod 19:8; cf. 24:7; Josh 3).

Certainly biblical grace is bound to stay ever far beyond the reality of what is conveyed in human words. Dybdahl is well aware of the limitations of his enterprise, as he humbly recognizes the value of questions rather than "final answers" (138), thus inviting further research and thinking (145).

Throughout the book valuable insights will surprise and inspire the reader: the role of covenant as "God's gracious gift" (69); the value of worship, "the forgotten jewel of God's people" (107); the sequence of grace before the law (24-26); the message of corporate thinking for the individualistic Christian (135, 151-152); and many others. Undoubtedly *Old Testament Grace* deserves special notice. It will remind thoughtful readers of one of the most important forgotten truths of the Bible. Readers, whether laypersons or pastors, will discover new dimensions of grace, while refreshing and deepening their relationship with the God of the Old Testament.

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JACQUES DOUKHAN

Efird, James M. *Revelation for Today: An Apocalyptic Approach*. Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1989. 139 pp. Paperback, \$ 9.95.

James M. Efird has presented in his *Revelation for Today* a small volume "intended for pastors and laypersons in the church to assist them in learning how to interpret apocalyptic literature correctly, specifically the book of Revelation" (12-13). One must applaud this statement of purpose, but does Efird successfully accomplish this task?

His "Commentary" section (45-126) seems to me to be flawed in several ways relative to his objectives: (1) His discussion is tied too tightly to the traditional preterist perspective (for a good critique of certain basic aspects of the traditional view, see Paul S. Minear, *I Saw a New Earth*

[Washington, DC: Corpus Books, 1968], 235-243, 247-259). (2) The book does not contain adequate application for our day to justify the title *Revelation for Today*. (3) Apocalyptic symbols are applied inconsistently, usually in a doggedly literal manner, but occasionally in the very opposite way (such as the spiritualization of the symbols in Rev 20). (4) The derivation, dynamic, and significance of Revelation's symbolic usage is too readily overlooked (e.g., Efirid fails to mention the importance of ancient Babylon's fall to the Medes and Persians in 539 B.C. as being a crucial background for the imagery used in Rev 16:12 in connection with "Armageddon" (v. 16)). (5) There appears to be inadequate appreciation of the fact that Revelation is not simply *an* apocalypse but decidedly a *NT* apocalypse which highlights prominent NT themes rather than merely describing socio-political events. (6) The significance of Revelation's being *epistolary* as well as apocalyptic in nature is given rather short shrift.

Efirid's little commentary is well written and therefore easy to read; but as far as I can see, his major application of Revelation to our day is found in his intermittent comments about this Bible book's portrayal of a courageous loyalty to Christ which we would do well to emulate. This is an excellent point, but is it *all* that is involved in Revelation's message? Unless there is more—unless there is some sort of significant undergirding substance to the message—what would make Revelation's depiction of faithfulness anything more and anything other than an example of the kind of fate achieved by misguided fanatics? But there is more, much more, as the book's very preamble makes clear (1:1-3) and as is highlighted in each of the book's visions. Indeed, every aspect of Revelation's content is permeated with the NT perspective and with significant NT themes relating to Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Church, etc.

Efirid's treatment possesses some positives too, of course. One such positive—indeed a refreshing one—is his rejection of the "perceived-persecution" thesis (popular in some studies with sociological emphasis) and his recognition that *real* persecution is reflected in Revelation. Another is Efirid's rejection of a modern "futurist" methodology that almost totally neglects attention to Revelation's original setting, except in connection with the prologue and the seven-churches vision.

The volume lacks an index (not really needed), but does contain a brief bibliography (137-139). After first listing ten "commentaries," this bibliography has three shorter sections of other titles: "Books on Apocalyptic and its Interpretation," "Books on Darbyism and the Darbyist System," and "Books from the Darbyist Perspective."

Fisher, Neal F. *The Parables of Jesus: Glimpses of God's Reign*. Rev. ed. New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1990. xiv + 178 pp. Paperback, \$9.95.

A revised edition of a volume first published in 1979, Fisher's approach is to deal with the parables with respect to God's Reign. He arranges his book under three parts: Part I—The Coming of God's Reign; Part II—Entering God's Reign; Part III—Living in God's Reign. In his first edition he used the phrase "the New Age" but because of its current usage he has used "God's Reign" instead. At the end of each chapter, Fisher has a section on "Questions and Suggested Methods" for discussion. This shows the work is directed toward laypersons who would read and discuss the book in small groups.

In his early chapters Fisher attempts to indicate the similarity between our situation and that of Jesus' day, i.e., we are both living at the intersection of two epochs. At the end, again based on this similarity, he encourages us to bring about the kingdom in our age.

Fisher emphasizes that the parables are an invitation for us to participate in and make a decision for the Kingdom. Jesus offers us an alternative view of the world, at the same time interpreting what kind of persons we are.

In the foreword Fisher indicates he will not deal with literary questions. His objective rather is focused on the themes of Jesus in the parables. For this reason, the author does not advance any new approaches or methodologies. However, it would have been profitable to discuss the current status of parable interpretation to help laypersons understand how parables are being seen today. In making a comparison between the ages, it is not clear whether Fisher sees our time as unique in comparison to that of Jesus or whether this kind of situation is present throughout history.

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SAKAE KUBO

Hamilton, Victor. *The Book of Genesis Chapters 1-17*. The New International Commentary on the Old Testament. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990. 944 pp. \$27.95.

The Book of Genesis, Chapters 1-17, by Victor P. Hamilton, is the first Genesis volume to appear in The New International Commentary on the Old Testament. The commentary itself is divided into two major divisions: "Introduction" and "Text and Commentary."

The "Introduction" has eight sections: "Title," "Structure," "Composition," "Theology," "Problems in Interpretation," "Canonicity," "The Hebrew Text," "Bibliography." The essays about Genesis' "Composition,"

"Theology," and "Problems in Interpretation" consume about 75 percent of the total introductory pages and well reflect the significance of those topics to an understanding of Genesis.

The "Text and Commentary" follows the outline of text-chapter divisions. Each section is conveniently titled according to its topic.

Hamilton writes from a cautiously conservative perspective. He is inclined to support the traditional interpretations of Genesis but is often influenced by alternative evidence. For example, he does not believe "that an evangelical view of Scripture is necessarily wedded to the Mosaic authorship of Genesis," although he feels that the evidence lends itself to the "unity of Genesis" with later editorial additions (38).

Hamilton's book illustrates, if unintentionally, why a growing number of scholars have become disillusioned with the extreme source-critical approach to biblical studies. On p. 16 he has collated from The Anchor Bible commentary of E. A. Speiser the widely accepted Genesis sources JEP. By putting these sources in chart form, Hamilton graphically demonstrates the immense editorial task an ancient editor would have faced in undertaking the compilation of the JEP sources, as many suppose. In addition, in his "Text and Commentary" section, Hamilton regularly offers uncomplicated, yet plausible, alternative suggestions for the subtleties of the text that JEP are supposed to represent (e.g., the use of *ʾādām*, 160). In doing so, Hamilton offers additional evidence that source analysis has been, at the least, overplayed.

As a commentary designed for a broad range of readers, the author has done an excellent job in noting items easily missed by non-Hebrew readers such as Hebrew word plays and other features (e.g., chiasms, 294, etc.). Many pastors and students will appreciate Hamilton's New Testament "Appropriations," which highlight NT uses of Genesis motifs and characters.

Difficult passages, such as the interpretation of God's words to Cain (4:7, 225-228) and the identity of the sons of God and the daughters of men in Gen 6:1-4, are logically treated, with organized suggestions offered (261-271). Hamilton is also not afraid to admit that at times there is no easy solution to a difficult passage (399).

There are a few curious features in this commentary. Not the least of these is the reason for ending the commentary with Genesis 17 instead of a more natural division. Readers may also be disappointed that Hamilton's introductory comments critique past and present scholars, often without clearly identifying his own perspective. Offering his own views without reference to a broader spectrum of ideas would have been unfair to his readers, but a historical critique without clear, concise statements supporting his own presuppositions may leave the reader unprepared to accept Hamilton's later textual interpretations. An example is Hamilton's

discussion, "The Patriarchs and History." By the end of this section we know the arguments of Wellhausen, Glueck, Albright (however, I believe Hamilton has misunderstood the nature of MBI [61] and, therefore, Albright's association of Abraham and the MBI period; see Albright, *The Archaeology of Palestine*, 82), Speiser, Gordon, Bright, Van Seters, and T. L. Thompson. I think the reader who uses Hamilton's commentary would have been helped by knowing whether Hamilton himself believed Abram was a historical character, and, if so, when Hamilton thought he lived, and why he had reached this conclusion.

Despite these few criticisms, *The Book of Genesis: Chapter 1-17* will be a useful commentary for pastors, students, and scholars.

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DAVID MERLING

Harris, Murray J. *Colossians and Philemon*. Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1990. xxix + 310. \$21.95.

Professor Harris of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School has taken, with *Colossians* and *Philemon*, a first step towards the completion of a twenty-volume exegetical guide of the Greek New Testament. Harris' experience as a teacher of Greek evidently sets the agenda for this work. He says the books are designed for "students tackling New Testament studies" and "preachers who wish to use the Greek text in their sermon preparation but whose knowledge of Greek has receded" (ii).

Harris wishes to "close that gap between stranded student (or former student) and daunting text and to bridge that gulf between morphological analysis and exegesis" (xiv). The author aims to help those who have already completed an introductory course in New Testament Greek (why he chooses Wenham as a model, I am not sure) and know the vocabulary with a frequency of 25 or more.

For each segment of the text (usually only a few verses) the guide contains the UBS Greek text, a structural analysis of the passage, a discussion of the passage, a translation, and an expanded paraphrase. Each section closes with a list of suggested topics for further study (with a bibliography for each) and homiletical suggestions for translating exegesis into sermon.

The core of the guide is the phrase-by-phrase discussion. However, the structural analysis, which Harris calls "a simple exercise in literary physiology—showing how the grammatical and conceptual parts of a paragraph are arranged and related" (xvi), lays the basis for the grammatical/exegetical study. Each phrase is studied in turn. Harris parses verbs and specifies cases. He considers syntax and textual problems

as well. Throughout the discussion, reference is made to standard sources, such as BAGD, *TDNT*, Blass and Debrunner, and Metzger. The translations of many English versions are used to clarify the Greek meaning.

When several interpretations are possible, Harris marks the one he prefers, usually without specifying the reason for his choice. For example, he lists three possible translations of *katabrabeuetō*: "disqualify," "rob of a rightful prize," and "condemn"—each with its references. An asterisk marks the first selection as his preference (120).

Two translations follow each section of phrase-by-phrase discussion. The first is a clean, literal translation. The second is expanded, with phrases rearranged to read smoothly in modern American English.

Almost every section has one or more bibliographies for further study on questions raised. For example, the section on Col 1:15-20 lists three topics: "Christological Hymns in the New Testament" (7 sources), "Christ as the Head of the Church" (5 sources), and "Reconciliation in Paul" (7 sources) (53-54). Harris has marked those sources he finds most helpful. The books and articles are mostly recent and from Evangelical authors and publishers. P. T. O'Brien's commentary on Colossians from the Word series appears repeatedly.

Finally, each section closes with one or more "homiletical suggestions" for translating exegesis into preaching. For example, after the section on Col 1:3-8, the suggestions are: "Paul's Thanksgiving for the Colossians," "A Christian Partnership," "The Gospel," and "Epaphras the Colossian." Harris notes that the suggestions are "outlines representing the three basic kinds of preaching of the Bible" (xvii).

If one is to understand by "exegesis" a reasonable translation of the text, Harris has done the student community a great service in putting together a guide to grammar, vocabulary, and syntax for the books of Colossians and Philemon. If one understands that exegesis includes the interpretation and even application of the text, the sources to which Harris refers must be used to complete the task.

The introduction to Colossians is achieved in four pages (3-6). Without a study of the background of the Colossian heresy, Paul's message to the church in Colossae has only a limited meaning. Likewise, the simplicity of Harris' presentation does violence to the richness of the text.

The homiletical suggestions are brief. Perhaps Harris intended this brevity to allow the preacher freedom of imagination. At most, they would provide a few ideas.

Professor Harris's book would be profitable for a second-year Greek class. I should like to hear a report on its use in the classroom.

Holbrook, Frank B., ed. *Issues in the Book of Hebrews*. Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 4. Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1989. xiii + 237 pp. \$7.95.

As can be readily ascertained from the title page, *Issues in the Book of Hebrews* is a book edited and published by the Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (SDA). Its preface, "To the Reader," as well as various statements throughout the book, makes clear that it is written primarily for SDA readers and deals with issues that are of specific doctrinal interest to SDAs. Its agenda arises out of recent (1980 and subsequent) challenges from within the SDA Church to certain doctrinal positions regarding the ministry of Christ in the heavenly sanctuary. The Daniel and Revelation Committee of the Biblical Research Institute, which was directly responsible for producing this volume, makes clear in the preface that the major question which the committee has attempted to answer is: "Does the book of Hebrews invalidate the two-phased priestly ministration of Christ which the sanctuary types and other passages of Scripture indicate?" (xiii).

The book begins with a consensus report by the Daniel and Revelation Committee on their discussions of the many papers submitted for their study. Following this come several papers representative of the consensus view. The four articles written by William G. Johnsson include two articles reprinted from *The Sanctuary and the Atonement*, edited by Arnold V. Wallenkampf and W. Richard Leshar (Washington, DC, 1981). The others are by Herbert Kiesler, Richard M. Davidson, Alberto R. Treiyer, and Alwyn P. Salom. Two short articles on technical terms by Alwyn P. Salom and George E. Rice, both reprinted from *Andrews University Seminary Studies*, have been added as appendices.

Johnsson's first article gives an overview of the book of Hebrews. His second article discusses—and affirms—the reality of the heavenly sanctuary. Then follows an exegesis of selected controversial passages by Kiesler, who concludes that Hebrews does not intend to explain in depth the nature of Christ's priestly ministrations. It emphasizes the inadequacy of the Levitical system and directs the reader to the living High Priest now ministering in God's presence for us.

In an article on Heb 9:23 Johnsson concludes that the book of Hebrews does not address the question of **when** the cleansing of the heavenly sanctuary takes place. Hebrews only affirms **necessity** for it.

Johnsson's fourth article studies the Day of Atonement allusions in Hebrews, to determine whether or not they point to the cross as the antitype of the Day of Atonement ritual. He concludes that these allusions are not central to the argument in Hebrews, but serve merely to point out the total inadequacy of the Levitical system to cleanse from sin.

Davidson's article on typology in Hebrews is a condensation of material from his dissertation, *Typology in Scripture* (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press 1981). He finds that "the sanctuary typology of Hebrews possesses unique vertical and cultic dimensions," which is evidence that "vertical sanctuary typology . . . is part of the fundamental biblical perspective on typology" (186).

Treiya studies whether the typology in Hebrews represents antithesis or correspondence. He concludes that, although all shadow-types by their very nature are limited, the correspondences are consistently affirmed rather than denied. "Therefore, it is incorrect to refer to the typology of Hebrews as antithetic or oppositional typology" (197).

The final chapter by Salom takes a theological approach to the book of Hebrews, covering much of the same ground encompassed by earlier chapters in an exegetical fashion. His general conclusion is a direct response to the initial question. The book of Hebrews does not deny the SDA doctrine concerning the two-phased ministry of Christ in the heavenly sanctuary or any question involving time relative to this ministry, because it does not address the issue. The author of Hebrews had other concerns.

The book is well organized and very readable. At the beginning of each chapter, except the first, there is an editorial synopsis. Then follows an outline of the chapter. These editorial additions make the book easier to read. There are a number of mechanical errors throughout the book, but on the whole it seems well edited. The layout makes for a good visual impression and easy reading.

Issues in the Book of Hebrews is must reading for SDAs who wish or need to be informed regarding current representative SDA thinking on the book of Hebrews and its relation to the doctrine of the two-phase priestly ministration of Christ in the heavenly sanctuary. It is also recommended for others who would like another scholarly perspective on some of the key issues in the book of Hebrews.

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EDWIN E. REYNOLDS

Mason, Rex. *Preaching the Tradition: Homily and Hermeneutics after the Exile*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. ix + 325 pp. \$49.50.

The realization that the church has been increasingly excluded from public policy has quickened exegetical and theological interest in the postexilic period when Judaism was supposedly in a similar position of political impotence. Rex Mason, a lecturer in Hebrew and Old Testament Studies at Oxford University, reflects this interest. Through his analysis of postexilic "addresses," Mason seeks "an illuminating window into the life,

beliefs, doubts, fears, and hopes of the post-exilic community of faith." He is especially interested in the cares and concerns of their spiritual mentors, who "left in their 'Scriptures' a vivid and living witness to their brave attempts to interpret the ways of God in difficult circumstances" (2).

Mason begins his analysis of postexilic hermeneutics with a careful translation and exegesis of first-person speeches in Chronicles (13-144). He argues that the Chronicler calls for a total and passive trust in Yahweh by appealing to Yahweh's activity in the past as the Davidic covenant and dynasty found their fulfillment in the temple and its cults: "the real purpose of God with the davidic dynasty was the temple which, by its proper upkeep and service, functioned as a place of encounter between God and His people" (131). In the process, Mason convincingly argues against von Rad's notion of the "Levitical sermon" and demonstrates that the addresses are generally neither Levitical nor sermons, though they may "reflect" postexilic "exegetical methods and homiletical practices" (144).

Mason further investigates thematic and rhetorical continuities and discontinuities with Chronicles in other postexilic literature. Mason argues that while Ezra-Nehemiah's speeches differ formally from Chronicles', they do share many common themes and rhetorical features. Haggai, Zechariah (1-8), and Malachi, despite their own individual styles and stronger eschatological interests, also share in the same general thematic and rhetorical world of the Chronicler. Mason thereby concludes that the various writers shared a common Second Temple homiletical tradition, while each individual writer shaped and applied this tradition in the "living process" of the ongoing life of the community (261).

Mason's attempt to provide a detailed analysis of Second Temple speeches and his nuanced account of both continuities and discontinuities within this material is praiseworthy. However, his conceptual vagueness calls into question the soundness of his conclusions. This is perhaps most seriously reflected in his notion of "preaching." While rightly rejecting the "Levitical sermon" as a category for the speeches, Mason nevertheless attempts to designate this material as produced by "preachers"—"those who preserved, developed, and taught the traditions which must have been becoming increasingly enshrined in Israel's 'Scripture'" (2). Yet, is an imperial decree (2 Chr 36:23; Ezra 1:2-4) in any way preaching? Do messages sent to opponents by Nehemiah (Neh 6:3, 8, 11) have any relationship to homiletical activity? Are not prophets (e.g., Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi) somehow formally distinct from "preachers"? Mason introduces as his key category a concept vaguely defined and, at most, minimally relevant for much of the material he analyzes.

Furthermore, the formal characteristics which lead him to posit a common Second Temple homiletical tradition, such as quotations from a text of "Scripture," plays on words, allusions to past history, or rhetorical questions, are general and pervasive enough throughout the whole of the

Old Testament to render suspect the phrase "a common postexilic tradition." Would not most of the preexilic prophets also stand in this "postexilic" tradition? It would seem that more methodological rigor and conceptual precision are needed before one can convincingly and meaningfully speak of a Second Temple homiletical tradition.

Indeed, Mason's work raises a pressing question: Was there any real Jewish "homiletical activity" in the Persian period? While Mason explicitly links preaching to the practice of the Second Temple (258), one may recall that temples were primarily places of sacrifice, political administration, and economic storage and distribution. Our best evidence for Judean public assemblies is not in the temple, but in the public square (Ezra 10 and Neh 8). It is possible that homiletics developed more out of the discourses of the public forum than in a "religious" and cultic sphere. If so, the general exegetical search for a nonpolitical, "religious" reworking of postexilic Israelite traditions corresponding to the privatization of religion in our day may well be, at its very premise, a misguided effort.

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JOHN M. WRIGHT

Stone, Michael Edward. *Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra*. Hermeneia. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990. xxii + 496 pp. \$44.95.

The appearance of Michael Stone's commentary on 4 Ezra in the Hermeneia series of "biblical" commentaries testifies to the persistent scholarly interest in the intertestamental literature.

Stone is the right man for the job. Since receiving the assignment in 1965, he has published some 30 items with direct or indirect bearing on the book. His primary interests have been in the apocalyptic features of 4 Ezra and in its complex textual history, especially the Armenian tradition.

The format of the commentary follows standard Hermeneia style. After the discussion of introductory matters, the text is broken into sections following Stone's analysis. For each section, translation ("adapted from the RSV") and textual notes appear first, followed by "Form and Structure," "Function and Meaning," and "Commentary." The Commentary is truly verse-by-verse, with each verse listed separately. Even verses with no comment are clearly tagged with the line, "No commentary," a helpful touch.

Stone avoids conjectural reconstructions of the Hebrew original or the primary Greek translation, both of which are now lost. But he does provide detailed notes on the significant variants in the secondary and tertiary versions. While recognizing that the Latin and Syriac traditions are

still "the most important group of witnesses to the text of 4 Ezra" (3), he holds that the Ethiopic and Georgian, in particular, should be granted more weight than accorded them by the RSV translators (8). Thus Stone includes the account of Ezra's assumption at the end of 4 Ezra 14, a reading absent from the Latin but attested (with variations) by the Syriac, Ethiopic, Arabic 1, and Armenian (437-438).

Stone's thorough work on the text does not overshadow other critical issues. He argues persuasively for the unity of 4 Ezra, rejecting the dissecting tendency popularized by Kabisch (1889) and Box (1912-1913). He joins the current debate over structure, unity, and purpose of the book, which focuses on the dialogue format and the tension between the complaining Ezra and the dogmatic Uriel. Central to Stone's approach is the view that the author found the solution to his agony in a conversion or "intensification" experience (326-327). There is no question about Ezra's transformation from complaint to affirmation. But opinions differ widely on the matter of how much (if any) of the "complaint" expressed in the first three episodes the author wanted his listeners to remember in the end. Stone is brilliant in analyzing how the author effected 4 Ezra's transformation from a literary point of view. His treatment of theological aspects is more mundane.

Two features of special interest to believing communities with apocalyptic roots are the eagle vision of 4 Ezra 11-12 and the account of Ezra's "inspiration" at the conclusion of chap. 14. In both cases Stone offers insights that are provocative, if not immediately self-evident in the text.

The eagle vision of 4 Ezra 12:11-12 gives a rare but clear example of an interpretation that changes with the times and is explicitly so labeled: a "new" identity for the fourth kingdom revealed to Daniel. Stone suggests that 4 Ezra claims "superiority" for Ezra's interpretation (360). Clearly the author of 4 Ezra offers a contemporary view, but to call it superior may be overstating the case. In any event, 4 Ezra is in good company, for the reapplication of prophetic and apocalyptic passages is well attested in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

As for "inspiration" in 4 Ezra, a major excursus (119-124) develops the thesis that the scene where Ezra is "inspired" to write the corpus of sacred literature (14:37-48) finds consistent parallels in the other visions as well. As a result, Stone argues for a unified view of inspiration throughout the book. While his analysis of the parallel features is intriguing, in essential elements the final scene differs markedly from the others. Previously, Ezra is the active mind to whom God speaks; in the closing scene he is the passive instrument **through** whom God speaks. Stone cites Philo's *De ebrietate* for graphic and conceptual parallels with the divine dictation which Ezra's fiery liquid produces (120). But from a descriptive point of view, that episode is unique rather than normative, just as

Balaam's experience with "dictation" (Num 23:12) is similarly unique rather than normative for canonical literature.

The commentary is well written, well documented; it is sober but stimulating. Serious students of the intertestamental era will value it highly.

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ALDEN THOMPSON

SOFTWARE REVIEW

Logos. Logos Research Systems, 26 W. Route 70 - Suite 270, Marlton, NJ 08053. Tel. 609-983-5766 or 1-800-87 LOGOS. \$149.00.

The introduction of *Logos* marks a new turn in Bible software. Indeed, *Logos* is the first Bible study program specifically designed for Windows, which exploits the program's most important features. A few other Bible search programs for Windows are available (e.g., *Word of God for Windows*); so far none matches *Logos*.

Logos comes with two English versions of the Bible, the KJV and the RSV. The "Book Scroll" and "Chapter Scroll" buttons illustrate the user-friendliness of *Logos*: they allow the user to switch from one chapter or book of the Bible to another. Keyboard short-cuts are available to perform those commands, most helpful for those who are making the transition from DOS-based Bible programs to *Logos*.

Logos' most interesting feature is probably the search command which includes four modes: (1) The well-known Strong's Concordance search allows the location of all occurrences of a given Strong number. (For instance, the word "Thessalonians" is defined as number 2331 and occurs 4 times in the NT.) (2) The "Approximate Search" is the slowest method but a remarkably powerful one in that it gives the user the ability and flexibility to adjust the search sensitivity via a sliding button. By using this method, approximate wordings or misspellings will still allow the location of the words searched. (3) The third method is the "Phrase Search." Although this method is not fast, it allows the user to search for expressions or specific phrases. Whether the search is case sensitive or not is a user-defined option. (4) The fourth method is by far the fastest, most efficient, and most precise. Wildcard searches are possible (e.g., a search for the string "kind*" would display all the occurrences of the words "kind," "kindness," "kindly," etc.). Boolean searches allow the use of AND, OR, ANDNOT, and XOR operators. A combination of the different methods produces an extremely complex and highly precise search, which, as far as I know, is not available yet in any other affordable Bible program.

Ibycus (Packard Humanities Institute) may have a better performance, but it costs \$5000. Searching of notes is also possible.

One particularity of *Logos'* iconbar is the presence of bookmarks numbered from 1 to 9. These numbers function as macros that recall the book and chapter assigned to them. An extra option recalls the last book and chapter used.

The program has a notepad or text editor where notes and comments (which can be attached to any verse of the Bible) are entered and formatted (indents, italics, and paragraphs are supported). Also, *Logos* can create cross references which can be activated or deactivated by clicking on a button in the iconbar. Another feature worth mentioning is the ability to create a topical index, which gives the freedom to create a personal topical concordance. Also, one can "link" two or more passage windows so that they can be synchronized when scrolling up and down.

Furthermore, *Logos* exploits the Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) capability of Windows. This powerful data linking—which allows different applications to call data from other applications and automatically update their own—adds flexibility to *Logos*. One would not be surprised if a future version of *Logos* would support Object Linking and Embedding capability.

Unfortunately, the manual is not sufficiently explicit. It is a 5.5" x 8.5" booklet with very concise explanations. Certain commands are not even described. For instance, the manual does not say what the command, "Save Workspace," does (Fortunately, the Help command, which is well documented, allowed finding the use of this feature.) Also, no explanation is given on how to jump to a specific book of the Bible. An index would have been more than welcome to facilitate the finding of references. Also, one would have expected more information on the use of the DDE; though not a totally new capability of Windows, it has remained an obscure feature for most common users.

The great concern of all Windows users is, of course, speed. Compared to other programs running under Windows, *Logos* can be qualified as a high-speed program. A point of reference would be the Windows version of Wordperfect, which runs noticeably slower than the DOS version. *Logos* Research System has already announced the release of the Greek version. The Hebrew version will soon be available, along with some reference tools. All these additions make *Logos* a very promising product.

One can strongly recommend this program to all serious students of the Bible. It constitutes a powerful tool for preachers in the preparation of sermons and Bible studies. It is also a valuable resource for laypersons who want to explore God's word.

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW AND ARAMAIC

CONSONANTS

א = <i>a</i>	ב = <i>b</i>	ג = <i>g</i>	ד = <i>d</i>	ה = <i>h</i>	ו = <i>w</i>	ז = <i>z</i>	ח = <i>h</i>	ט = <i>t</i>	י = <i>y</i>	כ = <i>k</i>	ל = <i>l</i>	מ = <i>m</i>	נ = <i>n</i>	ס = <i>s</i>	ע = <i>c</i>	פ = <i>p</i>	צ = <i>s</i>	ק = <i>q</i>	ר = <i>r</i>	ש = <i>š</i>	ט = <i>š</i>	ת = <i>t</i>	ת = <i>t</i>
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MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

- = <i>a</i>	וְ, וּ (vocal shewa) = <i>e</i>	וּ = <i>o</i>
ַ = <i>ā</i>	ׁ, ׂ = <i>ê</i>	׃ = <i>o</i>
ִ = <i>a</i>	ִ = <i>i</i>	ִ = <i>ô</i>
ֵ = <i>e</i>	ֵ = <i>î</i>	ֵ = <i>u</i>
ֶ = <i>ē</i>	ֶ = <i>o</i>	ֶ = <i>û</i>

(Dāgēs Forte is indicated by doubling the consonant.)

ABBREVIATIONS OF BOOKS AND PERIODICALS

AASOR <i>Annual, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.</i>	BT <i>The Bible Translator</i>
AB <i>Anchor Bible</i>	BTB <i>Biblical Theology Bulletin</i>
AcOr <i>Acta orientalia</i>	BZ <i>Biblische Zeitschrift</i>
ACW <i>Ancient Christian Writers</i>	BZAW <i>Beihfte zur ZAW</i>
ADAJ <i>Annual, Dep. of Ant. of Jordan</i>	BZNV <i>Beihfte zur ZNV</i>
AER <i>American Ecclesiastical Review</i>	CAD <i>Chicago Assyrian Dictionary</i>
AJO <i>Archiv für Orientforschung</i>	CBQ <i>Catholic Biblical Quarterly</i>
AHR <i>American Historical Review</i>	CC <i>Christian Century</i>
AHW <i>Von Soden, Akhad. Handwörterb.</i>	CH <i>Church History</i>
AJA <i>Am. Journal of Archaeology</i>	CHR <i>Catholic Historical Review</i>
AJBA <i>Austr. Journ. of Bibl. Arch.</i>	CIG <i>Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum</i>
AJSL <i>Am. Jrl., Sem. Lang. and Lit.</i>	CIJ <i>Corp. Inscript. Judaicarum</i>
AJT <i>American Journal of Theology</i>	CIL <i>Corp. Inscript. Latinarum</i>
ANEP <i>Anc. Near East in Pictures, Pritchard, ed.</i>	CIS <i>Corp. Inscript. Semiticarum</i>
ANESTP <i>Anc. Near East: Suppl. Texts and Pictures, Pritchard, ed.</i>	CJT <i>Canadian Journal of Theology</i>
ANET <i>Ancient Near Eastern Texts, Pritchard, ed.</i>	CQ <i>Church Quarterly</i>
ANF <i>The Ante-Nicene Fathers</i>	CQR <i>Church Quarterly Review</i>
AnOr <i>Analecta Orientalia</i>	CR <i>Corpus Reformatorum</i>
AOS <i>American Oriental Series</i>	CT <i>Christianity Today</i>
APOT <i>Apocr. and Pseud. of OT, Charles, ed.</i>	CTM <i>Concordia Theological Monthly</i>
ARG <i>Archiv für Reformatiungsgesch.</i>	CurTM <i>Currents in Theol. and Mission</i>
ARM <i>Archives royales de Mari</i>	DACL <i>Dict. d'archéol. chrét. et de lit.</i>
ArOr <i>Archiv Orientální</i>	DOTT <i>Docs. from OT Times, Thomas, ed.</i>
ARW <i>Archiv für Religionswissenschaft</i>	DTC <i>Dict. de théol. cath.</i>
ASV <i>American Standard Version</i>	EKL <i>Evangelisches Kirckenlexikon</i>
ATR <i>Anglican Theological Review</i>	Enclst <i>Encyclopedia of Islam</i>
AUM <i>Andrews Univ. Monographs</i>	EnclJud <i>Encyclopedia judaica (1971)</i>
AusBR <i>Australian Biblical Review</i>	ER <i>Ecumenical Review</i>
AUSS <i>Andrews Univ. Sem. Studies</i>	EuQ <i>Evangelical Quarterly</i>
BA <i>Biblical Archaeologist</i>	EuT <i>Evangelische Theologie</i>
BAR <i>Biblical Archaeologist Reader</i>	ExpTim <i>Expository Times</i>
BARev <i>Biblical Archaeology Review</i>	FC <i>Fathers of the Church</i>
BASOR <i>Bulletin, Amer. Sch. of Or. Res.</i>	GRBS <i>Greek, Roman, and Byz. Studies</i>
BCSR <i>Bull. of Council on Study of Rel.</i>	HeyJ <i>Heythrop Journal</i>
Bib <i>Biblica</i>	HibJ <i>Hibbert Journal</i>
Bibb <i>Biblische Beiträge</i>	HR <i>History of Religions</i>
BibOr <i>Biblica et Orientalia</i>	HSM <i>Harvard Semitic Monographs</i>
BIES <i>Bull. of Isr. Explor. Society</i>	HTR <i>Harvard Theological Review</i>
BJRL <i>Bulletin, John Rylands Library</i>	HTS <i>Harvard Theological Studies</i>
BK <i>Bibel und Kirche</i>	HUCA <i>Hebrew Union College Annual</i>
BO <i>Bibliotheca Orientalis</i>	IB <i>Interpreter's Bible</i>
BQR <i>Baptist Quarterly Review</i>	ICC <i>International Critical Commentary</i>
BR <i>Biblical Research</i>	IDB <i>Interpreter's Dict. of Bible</i>
BSac <i>Bibliotheca Sacra</i>	IEJ <i>Israel Exploration Journal</i>
	Int <i>Interpretation</i>
	ITQ <i>Irish Theological Quarterly</i>

Abbreviations (cont.)

JAAR	<i>Journ., Amer. Acad. of Rel.</i>	RenQ	<i>Renaissance Quarterly</i>
JAC	<i>Jahrb. für Ant. und Christentum</i>	RevExp	<i>Review and Expositor</i>
JAOS	<i>Journ. of the Amer. Or. Soc.</i>	RevQ	<i>Revue de Qumrân</i>
JAS	<i>Journal of Asian Studies</i>	RevScRel	<i>Revue des sciences religieuses</i>
JB	<i>Jerusalem Bible, Jones, ed.</i>	RevSém	<i>Revue sémitique</i>
JBL	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>	RHE	<i>Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique</i>
JBR	<i>Journal of Bible and Religion</i>	RHPR	<i>Revue d'hist. et de philos. rel.</i>
JCS	<i>Journal of Cuneiform Studies</i>	RHR	<i>Revue de l'histoire des religions</i>
JEA	<i>Journal of Egyptian Archaeology</i>	RL	<i>Religion in Life</i>
JEH	<i>Journal of Ecclesiastical Hist.</i>	RLA	<i>Reallexikon der Assyriologie</i>
JEOL	<i>Jaarbericht, Ex Oriente Lux</i>	RPTK	<i>Realencykl. für prot. Th. u. Kirche</i>
JES	<i>Journal of Ecumenical Studies</i>	RR	<i>Review of Religion</i>
JHS	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>	RRR	<i>Review of Religious Research</i>
JJS	<i>Journal of Jewish Studies</i>	RS	<i>Religious Studies</i>
JMeH	<i>Journal of Medieval History</i>	RSPT	<i>Revue des sc. phil. et théol.</i>
JMES	<i>Journal of Middle Eastern Studies</i>	RSV	<i>Revised Standard Version</i>
JMH	<i>Journal of Modern History</i>	RTP	<i>Revue de théol. et de phil.</i>
JNES	<i>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</i>	SB	<i>Sources bibliques</i>
JPOS	<i>Journ., Palest. Or. Soc.</i>	SBLDS	<i>Soc. of Bibl. Lit. Dissert. Ser.</i>
JQR	<i>Jewish Quarterly Review</i>	SBLMS	<i>Soc. of Bibl. Lit. Monograph Ser.</i>
JR	<i>Journal of Religion</i>	SBSBS	<i>Soc. of Bibl. Lit. Sources for Bibl. Study</i>
JRAS	<i>Journal of Royal Asiatic Society</i>	SBLTT	<i>Soc. of Bibl. Lit. Texts and Trans.</i>
JRE	<i>Journal of Religious Ethics</i>	SBT	<i>Studies in Biblical Theology</i>
JReIS	<i>Journal of Religious Studies</i>	SCJ	<i>Sixteenth Century Journal</i>
JRH	<i>Journal of Religious History</i>	SCR	<i>Studies in Comparative Religion</i>
JRS	<i>Journal of Roman Studies</i>	Sem	<i>Semitica</i>
JRT	<i>Journal of Religious Thought</i>	SJT	<i>Scottish Journal of Theology</i>
JSJ	<i>Journal for the Study of Judaism</i>	SMRT	<i>Studies in Med. and Ref. Thought</i>
JSOT	<i>Journal for the Study of OT</i>	SOR	<i>Studia Orientalia</i>
JSS	<i>Journal of Semitic Studies</i>	SPB	<i>Studia Possibilia</i>
JSSR	<i>Journ., Scient. Study of Religion</i>	SSS	<i>Semitic Studies Series</i>
JTC	<i>Journal for Theol. and Church</i>	ST	<i>Studia Theologica</i>
JTS	<i>Journal of Theol. Studies</i>	TAPS	<i>Transactions of Am. Philos. Society</i>
KJV	<i>King James Version</i>	TD	<i>Theology Digest</i>
LCC	<i>Library of Christian Classics</i>	TDNT	<i>Theol. Dict. of NT, Kittel and Friedrich, eds.</i>
LCL	<i>Loeb Classical Library</i>	TDOT	<i>Theol. Dict. of OT, Botterweck and Ringgren, eds.</i>
LQ	<i>Lutheran Quarterly</i>	TEH	<i>Theologische Existenz Heute</i>
LTk	<i>Lexikon für Theol. und Kirche</i>	TGI	<i>Theologie und Glaube</i>
LW	<i>Lutheran World</i>	THAT	<i>Theol. Handwört. z. AT, Jenni and Westermann, eds.</i>
McCQ	<i>McCormick Quarterly</i>	TLZ	<i>Theologische Literaturzeitung</i>
MLB	<i>Modern Language Bible</i>	TP	<i>Theologie und Philosophie</i>
MQR	<i>Mennonite Quarterly Review</i>	TQ	<i>Theologische Quartalschrift</i>
NAB	<i>New American Bible</i>	Trad	<i>Traditio</i>
NASB	<i>New American Standard Bible</i>	TRev	<i>Theologische Revue</i>
NCB	<i>New Century Bible</i>	TRu	<i>Theologische Rundschau</i>
NEB	<i>New English Bible</i>	TS	<i>Theological Studies</i>
Neot	<i>Neotestamentica</i>	TT	<i>Teologisk Tidsskrift</i>
NHS	<i>Nag Hammadi Studies</i>	TToday	<i>Theology Today</i>
NICNT	<i>New International Commentary, NT</i>	TU	<i>Texte und Untersuchungen</i>
NICOT	<i>New International Commentary, OT</i>	TZ	<i>Theologische Zeitschrift</i>
NIV	<i>New International Version</i>	UBSGNT	<i>United Bible Societies Greek NT</i>
NKZ	<i>Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift</i>	UF	<i>Ugarit-Forschungen</i>
NovT	<i>Novum Testamentum</i>	USQR	<i>Union Seminary Quarterly Review</i>
NPNF	<i>Nicene and Post. Nic. Fathers</i>	VC	<i>Vigiliae Christianae</i>
NRT	<i>Nouvelle revue théologique</i>	VT	<i>Vetus Testamentum</i>
NTA	<i>New Testament Abstracts</i>	VTSup	<i>VT, Supplements</i>
NTS	<i>New Testament Studies</i>	WA	<i>Luther's Works, Weimar Ausgabe</i>
NTTS	<i>NT Tools and Studies</i>	WO	<i>Die Welt des Orients</i>
ODCC	<i>Oxford Dict. of Christian Church</i>	WTJ	<i>Westminster Theol. Journal</i>
OIP	<i>Oriental Institute Publications</i>	WZKM	<i>Wiener Zeitsch. f. d. Kunde d. Mor.</i>
OLZ	<i>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung</i>	ZA	<i>Zeitschrift für Assyriologie</i>
Or	<i>Orientalia</i>	ZÄS	<i>Zeitsch. für ägyptische Sprache</i>
OrChr	<i>Oriens Christianus</i>	ZAW	<i>Zeitsch. für die altes. Wiss.</i>
OTS	<i>Oudtestamentische Studiën</i>	ZDMG	<i>Zeitsch. der deutsch. morgenl. Gesellschaft</i>
PEFQS	<i>Pal. Expl. Fund. Quart. Statem.</i>	ZDPV	<i>Zeitsch. des deutsch. Pal.-Ver.</i>
PEQ	<i>Palestine Exploration Quarterly</i>	ZEE	<i>Zeitschrift für evangelische Ethik</i>
PG	<i>Patrologia graeca, Migne, ed.</i>	ZHT	<i>Zeitsch. für hist. Theologie</i>
PJ	<i>Palästina-Jahrbuch</i>	ZKG	<i>Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte</i>
PL	<i>Patrologia latina, Migne, ed.</i>	ZKT	<i>Zeitsch. für kath. Theologie</i>
PW	<i>Pauly-Wissowa, Real-Encycl.</i>	ZMR	<i>Zeitschrift für Missionskunde und Religionswissenschaft</i>
QDAP	<i>Quarterly, Dep. of Ant. in Pal.</i>	ZNV	<i>Zeitsch. für die neutest. Wiss.</i>
RA	<i>Revue d'assyriologie et d'archéol.</i>	ZRGG	<i>Zeitsch. für Rel. u. Geistesgesch.</i>
RAC	<i>Reallexikon für Antike und Chr.</i>	ZST	<i>Zeitschrift für syst. Theologie</i>
RArch	<i>Revue archéologique</i>	ZTK	<i>Zeitsch. für Theol. und Kirche</i>
RB	<i>Revue biblique</i>	ZWT	<i>Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie</i>
RechBib	<i>Recherches bibliques</i>		
RechSR	<i>Recherches de science religieuse</i>		
REg	<i>Revue d'égyptologie</i>		
ReIS	<i>Religious Studies</i>		
RelSoc	<i>Religion and Society</i>		
ReISRev	<i>Religious Studies Review</i>		