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

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TRANSITIONS

Andrews University Seminary Studies is pleased to introduce our new Associate Editor, John W. Reeve. Reeve, who holds a B.A. from Pacific Union College (1985), and an M.Div. (1991) and an M.A. in Religion (1997) from Andrews University, is currently writing his dissertation in NT and early church history at Notre Dame.

Reeve replaces Roy Gane, who has taken the post of Director of the Ph.D./Th.D. Programs at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews University.

CALL FOR PAPERS

AUSS plans to publish four to six articles in 2005 on the intersection of ecclesiology and diversity (ethnic, gender, and individual). Articles may be written from various disciplinary perspectives, such as ethics, systematic or historical theology, OT, NT, church history, and Christian ministry.

Issues that could be addressed include, but are not limited, to: how does the church balance the need to prevent disintegration resulting from no boundaries with the need to avoid divisions resulting from overemphasis on boundary definition? How can the priesthood of all believers and the unity of laity and clergy be balanced with respect and authority for those who are ordained? How can the church be structured to be more intentional in inclusivity in the areas of culture, ethnicity, and gender? How does the understanding of "present truth" relate to the motivation to be a reform movement?

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Send queries and article submissions to *Andrews University Seminary Studies, 2005 Call for Papers*, Tan Hall N136, Berrien Springs, MI 49104-1500, or e-mail <auss@andrews.edu>. Article submissions accepted through May 2004.

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EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 2: SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND EVOLUTION[1]

FERNANDO CANALE
Andrews University

Introduction

Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute that Christian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its conclusions even if they explicitly contradict the teachings of biblical revelation on the origin of life on our planet? To answer this question we need to turn our attention to the scientific method employed in the formation of evolutionary theory. Specifically, we need to become aware of the concrete form in which the empirical method described in the previous article is shaped when scientists use it to explain the origins of life on earth.

In the first article of this series, our brief epistemological analysis of the scientific method in the empirical sciences reveals at least two main characteristics of scientific knowledge. First, scientific methodology is able to produce only hypothetical results. In other words, by applying scientific methodology scientists arrive at tentative, conjectural, hypothetical explanations—never at final absolute truth. Second, scientific hypotheses can only reach a limited and relative certainty—never absolute truth. Scientific knowledge is always relative to the presupposed theories from related fields and the macro-hermeneutical metaphysical presuppositions scientists assume to interpret their data and construct their explanations. We need to ask whether the evolutionary theory results from the application of the scientific method described above and, therefore, inherits its characteristics and limitations or whether it results from the application of a different sort of scientific methodology.

The fact is, however, that "not all sciences are created equal."[2] Differences between sciences are determined by the object of study they attempt to clarify (teleological condition). Due to the object it attempts to explain and the data from which it draws its conclusion, evolutionism works with a method that is substantially different from the method of the empirical sciences described above. In this article, then, I will begin by describing the difference between empirical and evolutionary methodologies. Then I will consider the conditions and procedures under and through which the method operates. Finally, I will reflect on the corroboration and epistemological status of evolutionary theory.

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[1] Fernando Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part I: Outline and Limits of Scientific Methodology," *AUSS* 41 (2003): 65-100 is the first of a series of three articles.

[2] David L. Hull, "The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 70.

Historical Nature

"What we are doing when teaching Darwin's biotic history to our biology students is pure history,"[3] writes M. H. Nitecki. This is so because evolution in general focuses "on the interpretation of individual historical events—events destined never to be repeated as time marches on."[4] There is a distinction between nonhistorical sciences such as physics and chemistry, which focus on the immutable laws of nature, and historical sciences such as geology, paleontology, and evolutionary biology, which attempt to reconstruct the physical and biological history of our planet. Epistemologists of evolutionary science are aware of this distinction and the problems it poses to the scientific status of evolution.[5]

The scientific status of evolution becomes problematic because the myth of science and the more modest description of the scientific method described above have been modeled after the likeness of nonhistorical disciplines such as physics and chemistry.[6] For this reason, evolutionists recognize that "the study of history is a discipline seemingly in search of, so far, very elusive theories or law."[7] They are forced to answer Popper's view that history is not a science because it is not interested in finding universal laws but in knowing concrete realities,[8] and his conviction that Darwinism is metaphysics.[9] Robert J. Richards recognizes that "evolutionary biology still does not meet the logical criteria that Popper proposed for science. That is because it is historical and suffers from the presumed disabilities of all history attempting to pass as science."[10] The question about the scientific status of the historical sciences, vis-à-vis the nonhistorical ones, such as the social sciences, arises.[11]

Not surprisingly, evolutionists strongly defend the scientific status of historical disciplines;[12] note that physical data are not ahistorical;[13] argue that historical explanations are the most fundamental explanations we find in science;[14] draw parallels between science in the history of human events and science in the history of geological and biological events; and discard criticisms that historical sciences are "anecdotal," while the phenomena of physics are "the keys" that unlock the universe.[15] The general conviction, then, is that history is or should be scientific.[16] Rachel Laudan observes that in both biology and history "historical explanations are similar and either none is, or both are, equally 'good science,' and the methodologies of general history and evolutionary biology are homologous."[17]

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[3] Matthew H. Nitecki, "History: La Grande Illusion," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 5.

[4] Niles Eldredge, *The Pattern of Evolution* (New York: Freeman, 1999), 8.

[5] For a discussion of the way evolutionists attempt to solve the challenges presented by the historical nature of their investigation, see Marc Ereshefsky, "The Historical Nature of Evolutionary Theory," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 81-99.

[6] Robert J. Richards, "The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 19.

[7] Nitecki, 5.

[8] David B. Kitts, "The Conditions for a Nomothetic Paleontology," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 131-145.

[9] Richards, 20.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Nitecki, 8.

These affirmations of the scientific status of historical science, however, miss the main difference that exists between historical sciences such as geology and paleontology, and empirical sciences such as physics and chemistry. The difference appears when one compares the teleological condition in empirical and historical sciences, i.e., what each attempts to explain. Succinctly put, empirical sciences explain *present* and *future* realities, while historical sciences explain *absent* and *past* realities. Moreover, empirical sciences attempt to discover general patterns in *cyclical recurrent events*, while historical sciences attempt to reconstruct, interpret, and discover general patterns in *linear unique events.*

Empirical sciences explain the present by searching for sameness, and by finding repetitive patterns in nature they can predict the future. Their celebrated successes depend on the cyclical-repetitive nature of the subject matter they study (the teleological condition they embrace). The description of the empirical scientific method we studied in the first article of this series is tailored to research repetitive cyclical realities in nature.[18]

Historical sciences attempt to reconstruct the past—not explain general recurrent patterns. This difference in the teleological condition of method determines that historical sciences reach a lower level of reliability and corroboration than physical sciences studying repetitive cycles of nature. Thus, physicists reconstructing the first seconds in the history of our universe face the same problems and limitations that evolutionists do in reconstructing the history of life. What results in both cases are explanatory theories inferred from present knowledge. But, by projecting inferences from the present to the unavailable past, scientific method can attain only *probable results*—falling far short of the relative certainty of present cyclical events.

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[12] "Marc Ereshefsky argues that the distinction between evolutionary biology and such nonhistorical sciences as physics and chemistry are [*sic*] not clear, and that in both evolutionary biology and experimental sciences there is a temporal ordering of events, the use of how-possibility explanations, the uniqueness of events, and the reliance on particular-circumstance explanations" (ibid., 7).

[13] "Yet it does not follow that the data of physics are ahistorical. It is obvious that all phenomena, however brief, have a temporal component and that it is the behavior of entities of the material universe over stretches of time—be they nanoseconds or billions of years—that provides the human mind with an opportunity to grapple with the *furniture* of the universe" (Eldredge, 12, emphasis original)

[14] Nitecki, 6-7.

[15] Richards, 21.

[16] Rachel Laudan, "What's so special about the past?," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 57.

[17] Nitecki, 6.

[18] Canale, 73-91.

The scientific reconstruction of the past results from combined contributions of several scientific disciplines, notably, physics, geology, paleontology, and biology. Of these four, the method in paleontological studies replicates more closely methodologies used in the reconstruction and interpretation of human events.[19] The difference between human history and biological history is the types of documents available and the different character of the causes: "genetics, interaction of species, geological changes, and so on."[20]

Finally, because evolution is a historical science, its method and outcome take the form of narrative. This means that "all explanations of events in time are ultimately narrative in structure."[21] Narratives explain by ordering "events along a temporal dimension, so that prior events are understood to have given rise to subsequent events and thereby to explain them—that, in brief, is what narratives do."[22] Evolution, thus, is properly a cosmogonic metanarrative explaining the origin and history of life's development on planet Earth. Let us turn our attention now to the conditions operating in the scientific method applied to the study of the physical, geological, and biological history of our world.

Teleological Condition

Evolutionary theory aims to understand and explain the historical process through which the present came into existence. Evolutionists attempt to understand past events that explain the present. The heart of historical explanation is to follow the order of causes behind present realities, thereby allowing humans to understand the world and themselves. We must distinguish, then, between events and their interpretations. When paleontologists speak of "facts" they mean that a past event actually took place.[23] By speaking about past events as "facts" many evolutionists "may be implying, or at least be forgetting to avoid assuming, that the events of the past not only actually occurred, but that they are the irreducible raw material with which all higher inferential operations in history begin."[24] To assume that past events caused present events is an acceptable general assumption. After all, since Aristotle we recognize that we know by identifying "certain causes and principles."[25] Because evolutionists start by accepting evolution as metanarrative, they run the risk of confusing the narrated events with the data from which those events are inferred. Yet, as Kitts reminds us, "historical events, however familiar they may become, and however routine the inferences that support them may seem to be, lie not at the beginning of our quest for synthesis and historical understanding, but somewhere along the way."[26]

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[19] Kitts, 133.

[20] Nitecki, 6.

[21] Richards, 23.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Kitts, 132.

[24] Ibid.

To avoid this confusion, evolutionists should distinguish between their object of study (teleological condition) and the data they study (material condition). Though past events properly play the role of teleological condition of method, they cannot offer data from which to study them simply because they are not available to the scientists for observation and experiment. Past events, then, are not the data, but rather are questions facing evolutionist theory.

The nonavailability of evolutionary events is different from the nonavailability, for instance, of the atom. The unavailability of the latter is due to the size of a *present* reality, while the unavailability of the former is due to the *total absence* of the object, event, or causes the evolutionary theory attempts to explain. Thus, evolutionary theory is forced to explain by producing a metanarrative that creates past events through "scientifically controlled" inferences and imagination. This method of metaphysical construction is similar to the one followed when pre-Socratic philosophers constructed their cosmogonies. They also used "controlled speculation" from what was then "firm" scientific knowledge to them. We have made progress in the amount and precision of what we today consider "firm" scientific knowledge of the world but still face the same methodological difficulty confronted by the early Greek philosophers: the events that caused our present world no longer exist.

The data of paleontology are the fossils, not the historical events they once were. Fossils are not historical events, but historical artifacts—the remains of life. In order to explain fossils' existence, paleontologists must first "imagine" events as possible causes of the fossil record. In the process, they "create" events of which we have no historical evidence. Macroevolutionary events belong to this category. Fossils, as the remains of life, testify to their past existence but say little about history, i.e., about the causal sequence that originated the existence of such remains. There is also a distinction between the existence and the nature of the remains. Fossils testify to the existence of living organisms but apparently say little about the cause of their existence or about the nature of the individual to which each fossil testifies. Reconstruction of life is very difficult because of its complexity. Science is good at learning by isolating factors. It is difficult to see how science would be able to know by considering all factors at the same time, especially when one has no possible way to know all the ecological conditions that could have been present billions of years ago.

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[25] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, I.1 (982a, 2).

[26] Kitts, 132-133.

Material Condition

What sources of data do scientists have to work with to produce the evolutionist metanarrative? Basically they have two sources, the present patterns of life studied by biologists,[27] and the remains of death studied by paleontology. But biological data do not reveal directly the macroevolutionary patterns required by evolutionary theory; and paleontological data, being controversial, spark disagreement among evolutionists about how to reconstruct the past and tell the "story" of evolution.[28] Thus, evolutionists warn us not to confuse specific models of evolution with its reality.[29]

"It is not the case that biologists discovered evolution in observable facts, and then proceeded to explain it."[30] Biologists have discovered only microevolutionary patterns that fall far short of the macroevolutionary progress essential to evolutionary theory. Thus, biological studies help only partially to reconstruct an already assumed evolutionary history by providing a basis from which to draw indirect inferences. By themselves, biological data do not testify to macroevolution. It is only when evolutionary macro-hermeneutical presuppositions are applied that biological data become the launching pad from which inferences can be projected to the past to reconstruct and flesh out evolutionary history in some detail.

The "fact" of the evolutionary narrative is established by paleontological studies. What data do paleontologists examine that tell them that life as we know it today came into existence through an unbelievably lengthy process of evolution? The fossil record is the silent witness from past life, which we encounter in our present. As a messenger from the past, the fossil record calls for rational explanation. Evolutionists claim evolution is the rational explanation for the origin of life and is, then, a better explanation of the fossil record.

However, the fossil record is not "raw data," unambiguously pointing to evolution. "The fact that evolutionary paleontologists and biblical creationists invoke it with equal facility is testimony to the ambiguities surrounding the very notion of a fossil record."[31] Of course, for evolutionists such as David B. Kitts these "ambiguities" are minor and do not preclude evolution—only its fine tuning. Their disagreements are not about whether evolution took place, but about how to better reconstruct the process through which it took place. What makes the difference between the creationist and evolutionist readings of the fossil record? Why are evolutionists so certain that evolution took place? The different interpretation of the fossil record produced by creationists and evolutionists is determined by the different sets of presuppositions used to interpret the data and deal with the data's ambiguities. This brings us to the core of evolutionary methodology, namely, the a priori hermeneutical conditions that make evolutionary theory possible.

---

[27] "My training in evolutionary theory, as for many organismal biologists of my generation, came from reading the works of the victors in the Evolutionary Synthesis, and through their students and followers. We learned that among the achievements of the Synthesis was the reconciliation between the genetical theory of evolutionary processes and the inferences of evolutionary history that emerge from the work of paleontologists, comparative morphologists, and systematists. That is, microevolutionary processes, suitably extrapolated through time, were sufficient to account for macroevolutionary histories of change. There have always been those who did not accept this conclusion, however, and in recent years the tension between students of evolutionary history and of evolutionary processes has become considerably more palpable" (Douglas J. Futuyma, "History and Evolutionary Process," in *History and Evolution*, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992], 103).

[28] Nitecki, 4

[29] Ibid., 5.

[30] Kitts, 141.

[31] Ibid., 140.

Hermeneutical Conditions

Since evolutionary theory came into existence by the combined interdisciplinary connections of geology, paleontology, and biology, we need to briefly consider their relation and the hermeneutical conditions under which they operate. My goal in this section is only to indicate some of the most influential conditions that make evolutionary theory possible. At the same time, the reader should bear in mind that if these conditions are challenged or defined in different ways, evolutionary theory must give way to an alternative explanation.

By interpreting the crust of our planet and the fossil record, geology and paleontology have established a long chronological sequence for the history of life. Accepting this historical time table, biological evolution explains how life came into existence and developed into its present form by way of a metanarrative. In so doing,

> geologists and paleontologists escape almost entirely the suspicion of any intent to distort history. When they rewrite history, as they do from time to time, it is not likely to be seen as the result of a change of opinion, but rather of an advance in knowledge. Scientists, by and large, regard themselves and are regarded by others as people who settle the issues which divide them by an appeal to facts.[32]

Yet, before geologists and paleontologists "begin their search for the past," they already "are committed to the view that whatever events they may propose as antecedents in explanations of the present, these events will be those that do not violate certain deeply held and widely shared theoretical notions."[33] That evolutionary methodology stands on a priori and hermeneutical conditions cannot be denied.[34] To understand the process through which evolution is conceived and formulated, we need to consider at least some of the "theoretical notions" on which it stands.

In what follows, I will deal with some of the a priori presuppositions operative in the construction of the evolutionary theory. By "a priori" I mean a theory that has been formulated previously and independently from evolutionary theory and that stands without scientific testing (what Popper calls "metaphysical standing" because such theories have no physical corroboration). The macro-hermeneutical presuppositions under which theologians operate are basically the same ones assumed by scientists. We can summarize them in two main kinds, presuppositions about reality (the object to be studied) and presuppositions about the subject developing scientific theories (reason). Since I am leading with scientific methodology as used in the construction of evolutionary theory in this article, I will concentrate on ontological presuppositions. I will begin with the ontological macro-hermeneutical presuppositions at the basis of all the sciences and will continue with the meso-hermeneutical presuppositions that derive from the various disciplines involved in the formulation of evolutionary theory.

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[32] Ibid., 134.

[33] Ibid., 133.

[34] "Both evolutionary biology and history are equally subjective activities because both are influenced by the training and social standing of their respective practitioners; yet both claim to reach beyond their immediate circumstances" (Nitecki, 4-5).

Ontological Macro-hermeneutical Presuppositions: A Priori Index of Reality: The Limits of Scientific Imagination

Science studies reality. The first and broader assumptions that science originates from are about the nature and general extension of the reality that scientists research. Scientists assume two primary interrelated ontological notions. First, they assume reality to be spatiotemporal. This presupposition may appear obvious to scientists today, but in reality it represents a huge paradigmatic change from the classical notion of timeless science that started with Greek philosophy. The notion that reality is spatiotemporal left God out of philosophical and scientific knowledge because philosophers and theologians had defined God's reality as timeless science. A science that studies what is temporal and spatial cannot accommodate the study of a timeless God. When evolutionists search for the biological history of the past, they leave God out because they do not find God in space and time today. However, neither do they find the events of evolution they so confidently consider "factual." The reason why God is left out is more than his objective absence from our present spatiotemporal causal order. It involves also the conviction that God could not have intervened within the spatiotemporal continuum at any time in the past. This conviction is grounded in the metaphysical assumption that God is timeless and therefore cannot act within the spatiotemporal continuum. Because of their commitment to the biblical view of God, Adventists do not assume the timeless view of God and therefore cannot displace God's historical causality as described in Scripture out of the realm of scientific research. Here Seventh-day Adventist theology radically departs from the presuppositions of science and most Christian theologies.

Because God is left behind by scientific methodology, evolutionists beginning with Darwin are forced to solve not only issues such as the geographical distributions of species, or the geologic column, but the metaphysical question about the origin of life itself, an issue that falls far beyond the reach of science. One assumption in science is that nothing comes out of nothing. In its present state, scientists have a hard time accepting this assumption about origins. Either the world is eternal or it had a beginning.[35] If it had a beginning, then the God hypothesis disturbs the otherwise tranquil waters of scientific assumptions. If it did not have a beginning, the question of origin, which the big-bang theory and evolution attempt to answer, is irrelevant.

Evolutionary scientists recognize the existence and operation of macro-hermeneutical ontological presuppositions only indirectly. For instance, Kitts says that "the study of history can be a rational enterprise only if some restriction is placed upon what we *may suppose* to have occurred. In what may be considered the mainstream of historical studies we are not, as James Hutton put it (1795:547), '. . . to make nature act in violation of that order which we actually observe.'"[36] Speaking about the credibility of historical evolutionary narratives, Robert J. Richards tells us that they must adjust to the "index of reality," which, among other things, includes the "grain of the reader's firm knowledge."[37] As we will see below, the reader's "firm knowledge" is determined from the present by the scientific community. The notion that divine causation in history is real falls outside the "index of reality" from which scientists have chosen to build their cosmogony. Leaving God outside science's horizon results from the acceptance of a naturalistic philosophical ontology without scientific corroboration. This assumption leaves out divine interventions in creation and the flood. This is a methodological decision which not only stands on philosophical rather than scientific grounds, but may actually guide scientists astray in the case that reality is not reduced to naturalistic causes, as they dogmatically assume. We now turn our attention to the micro-hermeneutical (disciplinary) presuppositions operating in evolutionary theory.

Geology Assumes Physics

Geology is the paradigm science responsible for drawing the broad outline of earth history on which paleontology and evolutionary theory build.[38] Thus, the hermeneutical presuppositions guiding geological theories also become presuppositions of evolutionary theory. Among some of the micro-hermeneutical presuppositions leading geological research are the theories of physics, the science that studies the most general aspects of natural reality. Kitts explicitly recognizes the hermeneutical role of physical theory in evolution in the following way:

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[35] This is a limit of human reason we cannot overcome that Kant already recognized as the fourth antinomy of pure reason (see his *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990], 257-258 [third conflict of transcendental ideas]).

[36] Kitts, 132.

[37] Richards, 24.

[38] "Geology is the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory" (Kitts, 138).

> Physical theory does not serve as a set of axioms by which all geological knowledge must be validated. It serves rather as a source of guiding principles for historical research, and a limit *permitting us to choose among all the accounts of the past which are consistent with the present state of the earth.* And in any quest for a nomothetic geology it would serve as a source of justification for claims that some geological hypotheses are to be accorded theoretical status (emphasis supplied).[39]

Notice the hermeneutical role played by physics. It guides in choosing among several theories that are consistent with the present state of the earth. In other words, reason and scientific methodology allow geologists to deal with the evidence in several ways. In order to select from among them, geologists use the guidance of physical theories. Assumed physical theories, in turn, have been conceived by bracketing out divine causality from the spatiohistorical continuum as required by ontological presuppositions. Let us now consider some specific assumptions from which geologists reconstruct the history of our planet.

Geology Assumes that the Present is the Key to the Past

In geological studies, we find a micro-hermeneutical expression of the ontological macro-hermeneutical assumption that nature embraces all reality and causes. Causes in geology "can be understood in large measure through observation of the world in which we now live."[40] If this is so, studying the present allows scientists to determine what could have taken place in the past, i.e., scientists may determine the precise shape of the "index" of reality to guide their extrapolations of present geological events to the past.[41] In geology, the assumption that the present becomes our key to the past became embodied in uniformitarianism and gradualism. Hutton, the father of geology, formulated uniformitarianism as the assumption standing behind the notion that the present is the key to the past.

> Methodological uniformitarianism is the essence of Hutton's gift to history. Gould notes that it amounts to nothing more, or less, than inductive reasoning: We make an underlying ontological assumption that physical processes operating in the material universe remain the same, from the earliest appearance of particular classes of material furniture, up through the present momentum, and continuing for as long as such classes *of furniture* continue to exist (emphasis original).[42]

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[39] Ibid., 139.

[40] Eldredge, 33.

[41] Theologians should notice that this principle is also at the center of the analogy principle on which the historical critical method of Bible interpretation stands; see Ernst Troeltsch, *Religion in History* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1991), 13-14. In geology, this notion was articulated by Charles Lyell; see Eldredge, 34.

[42] Eldredge, 34.

Another assumption on which geology builds its reconstruction of the past is the principle of gradualism, according to which "no additional processes *not* observable in the present underlie elements of earth and evolutionary history. Melded with methodological uniformitarianism, gradualism accounted for many of the early triumphs of geology and biology" (emphasis original).[43]

From the paleontological perspective, Niles Eldredge has perceived the inconsistency of these principles with the fossil record and has challenged them;[44] yet he continues to apply the results to which paleontology and evolutionary theory have arrived. Of course, due to the combined effect of the object they have set themselves to study—the origin of life on our planet—and the ontological constraints of naturalism, there are not many options available to explore. Besides, since geologists, paleontologists, and evolutionary biologists study the past—a nonexistent reality—they can hardly dispense with the principle of uniformitarianism which grounds the analogy between the two poles within which their methodological extrapolations take place. Without methodological uniformitarianism, evolutionary theory could not exist. Adventist scientists, on the other hand, cannot accept the naturalistic assumption, and are free to explore other possibilities.[45]

Geology Assumes Deep Time

By applying the presuppositions described above, geology arrived at the conclusion that to properly account for the history of our planet, deep time was necessary.[46] Methodologically speaking, a main foundation on which the evolutionary theory of the origin of life stands is the notion of deep time, which grows out of geological studies. The notion of deep time (i.e., long periods of time measured in billions of years) started as a working hypothesis that today is considered a proven fact because of absolute time measurements. Deep time was first deduced (1820-1870) as a condition of observations of sedimentation-erosion to explain geological observations[47] by determining "what is older than what."[48] Since 1905, technology measuring radioactivity was used to establish absolute time calculations in contrast with the old comparative methodology.[49] These methods obviously are not theory- or presupposition-free. They operate within the general hermeneutical matrix that supports evolutionary theory.

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[43] Ibid., 37.

[44] Ibid., 39.

[45] Naturalistic ontology denies the existence of God or his involvement in our universe and its history, notions which are necessary hermeneutical conditions of Adventist beliefs. If Adventist scientists accept naturalistic ontology, then they cease to think as Adventists. They may relate to the community at a social level but no longer at the level of its message and mission.

[46] For an overview of deep time see Verne Grant, *The Evolutionary Process: A Critical Review of Evolutionary Process* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 275-283.

[47] Eldredge, 46.

[48] Ibid., 53.

[49] Ibid., 56-57.

Deep-time measurement is a complex issue that needs to be investigated at the theoretical and procedural levels. Adventist thought has room for deep time due to the existence of the conflict between God and evil before creation week.[50] Thus, Scripture allows for deep time in the material components of our planet but not in the life forms existing on it.

Paleontology Assumes Geology

Once deep time was established, geology generated a general chronology of events.[51] While studying sedimentary strata geologists found fossils, which are studied by paleontologists. Unlike geology, paleontology cannot have direct, but only indirect, access to past biological events through the fossil record. In so doing, paleontologists assume the chronology and geologic column constructed by geologists. For Hutton and Darwin, the history of earth was written in the rocks of its crust.[52] The sequence of fossils in general is invariably repeated. Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis made it possible to understand the fossil record and the deep-time chronology set out by geology.[53]

Evolutionary Biology Assumes Evolutionary Paleontology

The study of evolution assumes the history of evolution reconstructed by paleontologists by drawing inferences from the fossil record, whose chronology is drawn by assuming biological evolution.[54] So biological evolution assumes paleontology, and paleontology assumes geology and biological evolution.

This brief sample of macro- and micro-hermeneutical presuppositions and the interdisciplinary effort necessary to support biological evolution suggests the theoretical complexity on which evolutionary theory stands.

Methodological Procedure

As we explained earlier, method is basically an action. What is the rational "action" scientists perform when building the theory of evolution? The major methodological procedure involved in the construction of evolutionary history is empirical inference.[55] Geologists infer from the rocks,[56] paleontologists infer from the fossil record interpreted from the background of geological time and chronology,[57] biologists infer from their observation of present biological processes.[58] The present is not only the key to the past, but the springboard from which the past is reconstructed by literally imagining large events not present to the scientists.[59] Thus, the rational procedure through which the evolutionary metanarrative is constructed is inference.

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[50] See Richard M. Davidson, "The Biblical Account of Origins," *JATS* 14/1 (2003): 4-43; and Randall W. Younker, "Understanding Genesis 1 and 2: A Look at Some Current Issues," unpublished paper delivered at the International Faith and Science Conference sponsored by the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (Ogden, UT: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, August 25, 2002).

[51] Eldredge, 47.

[52] Ibid., 46.

[53] Ibid., 49.

[54] "The study of evolution is fundamentally a study of history. The patterns of diversity that ultimately motivate most of us to study evolution cannot be understood without reference to this history, whether it be glimpsed through paleontology or phylogenetic analysis; and the evolutionary mechanisms that act on any population do so within bounds set by the population's history" (Futuyma, 123).

What do scientists do when they infer the past from the present? What is an inference? The dictionary tells us that to infer is the act of passing from one statement to another or of deriving conclusions from facts or premises. But how do scientists derive their conclusions from their present facts to reconstruct the absent past? They do not draw wild conclusions such as guessing in the dark, as, for instance, we do when brainstorming. What makes an inference scientific is that it takes place within an assumed theoretical context or "scenario" within which it "makes sense" and gains its "rationality."[60] Scientific inference, then, requires the hermeneutical condition of method for its very existence; and, thus, scientific inferences cannot be tested. If we could test them, they would no longer be inferences but experiments or observations. When private investigators and lawyers attempt to reconstruct a crime, they use inferences from the "evidence" of the crime that remains in the present. Inferences require evidence (data) and an assumed scenario (hermeneutical conditions).[61] Circumstantial evidence is weak because it does not spring directly from the act one is trying to reconstruct. Juries find it difficult to arrive at unanimous verdicts on the basis of circumstantial evidence. That is to say, evidence and scenario allow for various contradictory interpretations of the same act. Something similar takes place when scientists attempt to reconstruct the geological and biological histories of our planet. We have no direct evidence of macroevolution. Therefore, geological, paleontological, and biological data can construct only a *circumstantial* case in favor of evolution that depends more on the a priori scenario than on the evidence.[62]

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[55] Empirical inference differs from logical inference in that empirical inference starts from a spatiotemporal experience while logical inference starts with the meaning of statements.

[56] "Geology is the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory" (Kitts, 138). Moreover, "the significant principles of physical theories can be directly instantiated by the objects with which geologists begin their inferences and, consequently, more or less directly by the antecedent events meant to explain them" (ibid., 139). The first part of Kitts's statement is true, but to say that physical principles may be directly instantiated by the historical reconstruction of causes (theory of the earth) is not correct. Instantiation takes place through experiment or direct observation, which is impossible in the case of historical events.

[57] "Secondary historical events are, on the other hand, uniquely historical. They have no counterpart in the present. They are composed of primary events related in a spatial and temporal nexus. Some of the temporal relationships among the primary events composing a secondary event are secured by causal generalization linking events of certain kinds, but others are related by noncausal ordering principles [chronological dating from geology and paleontology]" (ibid., 137).

[58] Kitts, 137, calls the events that result from this kind of inference "primary historical events," which are based on researching present events available within the life span of the observer (136-137). "The question of whether or not such an event could occur or has occurred can, in principle, be settled by observation and experiment. Historical events of this kind differ from events we encounter in the present only by virtue of having occurred in the past. They are reached in primary historical inferences" (ibid., 137).

[59] "The properties which biology identifies as theoretically significant, such as genetic variability, community structure and energy requirements are simply not to be instantiated *in* fossils nor are they in any direct and straightforward way to be inferred *from* fossils. There is no mystery about this contrast between geology and paleontology. It is the result of the obvious fact that the living bodies and the remains of living bodies, which are the subject matter of biology, do not keep very well" (ibid., 139-140, emphasis original).

[60] "In the primary historical inference it is supposed that certain states and events in the present are to be explained by linking them with certain states and events in the past. Because events do not point intrinsically beyond themselves to other events, causal connections between past and present must be justified by reference to universal laws or, more commonly, to less comprehensive and formal generalizations. A generalization plainly cannot be tested by the

The absence of evidence corroborating macroevolution is a difficult problem facing evolutionists. To be persuasive, inference must not depart from the premise or fact from which a prediction or projection is made. In other words, the nature and extension of the conclusion cannot exceed or substantially differ from the inferential basis. So, how can a macroevolutionary history be developed from a nonmacroevolutionary basis? Eldredge suggests that evolutionism extrapolates.[63] It is not exactly clear what Eldredge means by "extrapolation" and in what way it differs from inference. If we understand "extrapolation" as the act through which we "project, extend, or expand (known data or experience) into an area not known or experienced so as to arrive at a usually conjectural knowledge of the unknown area,"[64] then the problem is solved, but the price may be higher than evolutionists are willing to pay. That is to say, if macroevolution is built by extrapolation from evidence, then evolutionary theory is mere conjecture, supposition, and guesswork.

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explanatory inference in which it is presupposed, and there is good reason why attempts are seldom made to test universal laws in any historical context whatever. Physical and biological laws, and even the less rigorous generalizations which are often directly invoked in historical inferences, are tested under the most controlled and circumscribed conditions" (ibid., 133).

[61] "There are no theory-free events nor any uninterpreted chronicle composed of them" (ibid., 134). Kitts says this while dealing with the role of theory in the construction of past natural history. This is not justifying knowledge, but projecting knowledge to the past by way of inference. What paleontologists do here is to build a history justifying it with generalizations from other sciences and from generalizations created from the study of the fossil record itself.

[62] "Writing history consists of identifying from among all the possible worlds permitted by some presupposed theory, the actual world. This involves describing the actual world in terms of the initial and boundary conditions which some theory identifies as relevant" (ibid., 135).

[63] "So a connection had to be forged between uniformitarianism, gradualism, and reductionism: *extrapolationism*, the projection of commonly observed rates and processes as a prediction of what history ought to look like" (Eldredge, 40).

[64] See *Merriam-Webster Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1993), s.v. "extrapolation."

Corroboration

By hearing the news, watching scientific documentaries on TV, and listening to scientists speak, one gets the impression that evolution is a fact.[65] By reading what evolutionary epistemologists say about the epistemological status of evolution, one gets the impression that, while not everything is crystal clear and there are still some rough edges to polish in evolutionary theorizing,[66] evolution is a fact as certain as the fact that I am writing this article. For them, doubting evolution seems unthinkable. One assumes that conclusive proof of evolution exists. Otherwise, scientists and the general public would not be so sure about it.

The brief epistemological analysis of the scientific method in empirical and evolutionary sciences has shown they do not produce absolute certainties, but only working possibilities in search of understanding. Moreover, we have discovered that due to the historical nature of the object it attempts to understand, evolutionary science has difficulties of its own that place its outcomes at a lower level than the outcomes of the ahistorical sciences, which study present repetitive natural phenomena. On the other hand, we have learned that scientists build theories to tear them down. Yet, that critical spirit mysteriously disappears when scientists speak about evolution and the history of the universe. Suddenly, absolute certainty appears out of nowhere. Is corroboration of evolution so strong that it is able to secure such a high level of rational certainty? How do we explain the absolute certainty scientists have about the "fact" that life on our planet evolved from nonexistence to the astonishing variety and complexity that exist today? It seems to me that evolutionary certainty is not empirical, but rational.

In the first article of this series, we learned that scientific theories cannot be corroborated directly, but only indirectly.[67] By deducing some empirical consequences from a theory, scientists place them under experiment to see if it reveals what the theory affirms. This testing obviously requires that the empirical consequences of the theory become directly available, in the present, to the researcher. But in the case of evolutionism this can only be done partially because past events which the theory is all about cannot be placed under testing or experiment.

Evolutionary biologists have tried to test the basic evolutionary notion, according to which higher forms of life appear from lower forms. The process of life, as biologists well know, is highly complex and sophisticated. Speciation,[68] i.e., the appearance of new sexually reproducing organisms, requires "from several hundred to several thousand years to complete. To an

[65] "Paleontologists seem to have expected something even more distinctly nomothetic to emerge from their own historical studies. Beginning with the claim that they had proved that evolution had occurred, they have turned to the past with the confidence that it would yield theoretical illumination as well as historical chronicle" (Kitts, 139); see also Futuyma, 102.

[66] Futuyma, 108-119; Laudan, 58-59.

[67] Canale, 89-91.

[68] For an introduction to the process of speciation, see Grant, 191-272.

experimental biologist, the process is hopelessly slow. After all, no utterly convincing case of true speciation (that is, involving sexually reproducing organisms) has as yet emanated from a genetics lab."[69] It seems, then, that there is no test as yet corroborating the mechanism of macroevolution.[70] In other words, the certainty about evolution does not stand on empirical test, experiment or observation. It stands in its "rationality" or explanatory power.[71]

What is the "rationality" or explanatory power of the evolutionary theory? Bunge summarizes what evolutionary theory does by remarking that the fact that

> most scientific hypotheses are stated in a categorical mode should not mislead us. When the biologist states that life emerged 2 billon years ago, that the first terrestrial organisms were lichens, that plants synthesize carbohydrates out of carbon dioxide and water, that oxygen is indispensable for animal life, or that all mammals are homeothermal, *he is not conveying information about experience* but is stating hypotheses by means of which *certain chunks of experience can be interpreted*: his assumptions, being hypotheses, are not about experience but about nonexperientiable facts, and he will employ them in order to explain his biological experience (emphasis supplied).[72]

The "power" by which evolution grips scientists and society rests on its coherent account of a considerable amount of what scientists consider "firm" knowledge, acquired by many sciences through a long period of time, by way of a single metanarrative explanation.[73] So, the more evolution matches the index of reality[74] of our culture, the less scientists and the general public may consider corroboration or testing necessary to accept it.[75] It just makes too much sense to be wrong.[76] The corroboration, then, is rational because the theory stands on its inner consistency and outer coherence within the general "web" of "firm" knowledge accepted by Western culture.[77] In the corroboration of macroevolutionary theory, the "web of belief" replaces empirical testability.

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[69] Eldredge, 37.

[70] Microevolution, i.e., changes within a species, has been discovered and tested by biologists.

[71] In his apology of evolution against creationism, *Abusing Science: The Case against Creationism*, evolutionist epistemologist Philip Kitcher makes considerable effort to counteract the creationist claim that evolution is not a science because it cannot be falsified (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982], 30-49). My point here is not that evolutionism is not a science—it obviously is—but that the certainty of its results is not rationally compulsive even by scientific standards. When it comes to scientific criteria, however, even scientists do not agree, and each one applies what works in his or her field and specific research project. Kitcher explicitly recognizes that evolutionary theory has not been corroborated by stating that "if one accepts the idea that science requires proof, or if one adopts the naïve falsificationist criterion, then the theory of evolution—and every other scientific theory—will turn out not to be a part of science" (ibid., 49).

[72] Mario Bunge, *Scientific Research I: The Search for System* (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1967), 225.

[73] "What, in the end, drives evolution? As the answers to these and many other questions unfold, we begin to converge on a coherent theory that links the evolution of life with the physical history of the planet—not as a long series of isolated events, but in regular, repeated, law like patterns that can be generalized into a coherent theory of physical and organic evolutionary process. Along the way, we also see how process is inferred from pattern—the fundamental ingredient of genuine scientific discovery" (Eldredge, 7).

[74] "Narratives derive their authority from two different sources: from the text and from the author. The authority of the text is simply a function of the index of reality that it manifests. The higher the index, the more authority we grant it. But text with a low index might yet be given greater authority because of the author" (Richards, 30); "Darwin's implicit strategy, though, was to blur the distinction between narratives of an imaginative character that expressly made the case he wanted to advance but having a low index of reality, with those of higher index" (ibid., 26).

But the rationality or inner consistency of evolutionary theory, with data such as the fossil record, is still in the making.[78] One could have assumed that if inconsistencies arise then the theory could be falsified. When inconsistencies arise in evolutionary theory, however, scientists do not abandon the theory, but patch it up by producing other hypotheses and theories that might smooth them out. This being the case, we need to ask whether evolutionary theory is falsifiable. According to Popper,

> a system must be described *as complex of the highest degree* if, in accordance with conventionalist practice, one holds fast to it as a system established forever which one is determined to rescue, whenever it is in danger, by the introduction of auxiliary hypotheses. For the degree of falsifiability of a system thus protected is equal to *zero* (emphasis original).[79]

It seems, then, that the inner consistency and explanatory power of a theory justify it. The higher its power, the less likely it is to be rejected by the scientific community and the general public. The explanatory power of evolutionary theory accounts for its hold on contemporary scientists and society. Even though all theories are revisable, not all theories are equal, argues Kitcher. "Even though our present evidence does not prove that evolutionary biology—or quantum physics, or plate tectonics, or any other theory—is true—evolutionary biologists will maintain that the present evidence is overwhelmingly in favor of their theory and overwhelmingly against its supposed rivals."[80] We should not understand Kitcher's phrase "present evidence" as a reference to experimentation or observation, but to the general status of our not-so-firm, scientific, theoretical, revisable knowledge. Moreover, the explanatory power and rationality of evolution do not corroborate it or make it true; they only make it persuasive.

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[75] For instance, commenting on Gould's proposal for fine-tuning evolutionary theory, Kitts, 143, affirms that "there is a significant way in which macro-evolutionary theories must be dependent. Paleontology can provide knowledge not only of events, but of patterns and trends among events. It cannot provide justification for the claim that any of its generalizations have explanatory efficacy; that they are, among other things, projected. The justification must come, as it does in geology, from showing that the generalizations are comprehended by theories which, by common consent, have such efficacy."

[76] "The higher the index of reality, the more the readers are invited to step beyond the particular history text to test the adequacy of its claims. Though, paradoxically, the higher the index the more the text suggests that readers need not accept the invitation, for a high index also brings greater authority and confidence in the truths of the narrative" (Richards, 25).

[77] Kitcher, 48-49, 130, attempts to salvage the scientific status of evolution by calling on its power of explanation and its comprehensive theoretical reach and complexity; for a summary of the explanatory power of evolution, see Tim Berra, *Evolution and the Myth of Creationism: A Basic Guide to the Facts in the Evolution Debate* (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52-69.

[78] Consider, for instance, that "although each side in the notorious dispute between those who subscribe to punctuated equilibrium and those who subscribe to gradualism points to paleontology in support of their position, there are enormous contingent barriers which stand in the way of resolving the issue on evidence provided by the fossil record" (Kitts, 142).

[79] Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, rev. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1959), 145.

It is obvious that creationism finds the same limitations about corroboration and falsifiability. Will we reach a point in which the controversy about the understanding of origins will be solved?

Believing the Myth (Metanarrative)

That evolution's hold on the scientific community stems from its explanatory power is only part of the equation. We need to consider also that the issues evolution explains are necessary for our human experience. In other words, we need to have an answer to the cosmogony question in order to understand our world and our own beings. This has always been so. Religion and philosophy deal with cosmogonies and cosmologies, and the output that comes from religious and philosophical discussion is referred to as worldviews.[81] Our understanding of the origination of the world and its nature are part of the macro-hermeneutical assumptions that guide our understanding of human affairs, the operation of human reason,[82] and even the construction of Christian theology.

Since both evolution and creation are commensurable, underdetermined theories attempting to explain the history of our planet,[83] we should not use them as presuppositions when considering other issues—theoretical or practical. We should not use them because we have no certainty about their truthfulness. Yet, we are forced to choose and in practice accept one of the competing theories as absolutely true. This acceptance is not based on reason or method, but on faith, i.e., on the relative confidence we personally place on the theory we adopt as being the most persuasive explanation of reality.

Epistemologically speaking, then, the basic difference between creation and evolution is not rational, but methodological. Methodologically, creation and evolution differ in the source producing the metanarrative about the origins of the

[80] Kitcher, 34.

[81] For a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of the notion of worldview, see David K. Naugle, *Worldview: The History of a Concept* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).

[82] See, for instance, how the acceptance of evolution makes an evolutionary approach to epistemology possible in Gerard Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley III, eds., *Evolutionary Epistemology, Rationality, and the Sociology of Knowledge* (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987).

[83] "But it is only on the basis of an agreed-upon external constraint that we can engage in rational debate about what the fossil record tells us. Of course, there may be perfectly legitimate disagreements about the character and extent of the restriction to be applied, but they are prior to an assessment of the fossil record. The dispute between evolutionists and biblical creationists is only the most incoherent of all of those about the meaning of the fossil record that have arisen outside the boundaries of an agreed-upon external constraint" (Kitts, 140-141). The incoherence of the debate comes from the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions and the index of reality derived from them that each party brings to the table. In short, they approach the issue with different rational and methodological a priories.

universe. Evolution's source is natural, our interpretation from the scattered traces of the past. Creation springs from divine revelation, God's summary account of his handiwork.[84] Both work on tacit metaphysical and theoretical macro- and meso-presuppositions. Both attempt to understand the same subject matter or reality. Both use rational procedures in reading the scattered traces from the past. The difference boils down to a different "index of reality." Creationists have a broader index of reality than evolutionists. The former includes God and his revelation, while the latter excludes them. No wonder the interpretations are different. This divergence about the index of reality becomes the leading macro-hermeneutical difference between the two conflicting metanarratives.

When evolutionism becomes a presupposition to explain other areas of reality, it ceases to be a scientific theory and becomes a metaphysical or religious belief we accept by a leap of faith. To criticize theories becomes increasingly difficult when we use them as presuppositions to interpret other fields of reality because we have made them the foundation of our entire intellectual position. When we use them in this way, they become absolute truth for us. Of course, when we speak of faith, theologians are on their own turf, while scientists have left theirs behind. The sooner scientists and theologians understand the macro-hermeneutical role of cosmology, and that faith, not reason, is required for its application, the sooner the far-reaching consequences of the creation-evolution debate will be understood. Creation and evolution are not only competing in the scientific attempt to interpret the history of our planet, but as they elicit our assent, they become metanarratives we accept by faith and use to build our understanding of the world and of Christian theology. Each alternative generates conflicting views of the entire world of human experience.

Creation and evolution are metanarratives in conflict. In classical times we would have seen them as conflicting metaphysical teachings. Neither is irrational, because each makes sense of the same broad chunks of reality. Each has been produced by appropriate methodological procedures accepted in its own field of research. Only by making the scientific a priori absolute can we say that creation and the metanarrative it elicits are not scientific. But the scientific absolute stands only on the consensus of the scientific community, not on the absolute dictates of reason or scientific methodology. The truth is that each is an equally persuasive account of reality as a whole. The conflict between them, then, will never be solved rationally, only eschatologically.[85]

Conclusion

The power and reliability of science stands on its method. From our brief analysis of scientific methodology in general (Part 1), we have discovered that scientific method reaches its highest level of reliability and predictability when it is applied to the present, repetitive phenomena of nature. Yet even at its highest level of certainty scientific methodology is always an interpretation dependent on hermeneutical a priories that prevent it from discovering absolute inerrant truth from empirically generated data. Scientific methodology applied to recurrent natural processes produces tentative explanations of reality, which should not be accepted dogmatically, but be critically examined, modified, rejected, and replaced.[86]

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[84] This makes biblical creation substantially different from Plato's account of creation. The former claims to originate in God, the latter in Plato's scientific explanation.

[85] It seems to me this issue will be eschatologically decided. If the God of Scripture is God he will manifest himself in space and time at the end of human history to fulfill his promises and renew our planet with the creative power by which he brought it into existence. At that time the creation theory will be corroborated and verified.

From the concise analysis of the way in which scientific methodology is used to build evolutionary theory the epistemological limitations become more prominent. Among others, a main limitation springs from the absence of the object of study, which, being past, stands beyond observation and experimentation. The historicity of its object forces scientists to rely heavily on inferences from what is accessible to them in the present (fossils, rocks, live organisms). From these empirically accessible sources of data scientists reconstruct the natural history of our planet in the form of a secular metanarrative. Such reconstruction has a very low level of rational certainty based on empirical evidence. For secular society, however, scientists play the role of prophets, and evolutionary metanarrative is received as cultural dogma imbued with a degree of certainty alien to scientific methodology. Evolution becomes a myth, scientific theory a fact. When evolution becomes dogma, faith replaces reason and science turns into religion.

We are now in a position to answer the question proposed at the beginning of this article: Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute that Christian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its conclusions even if they explicitly contradict the teachings of biblical revelation on the origin of life on our planet?[87] The answer is clear: Scientific methodology and rationality do not reach a degree of certainty that compels Christian theologians to accept evolutionary theory as a fact to which biblical teachings should be accommodated.[88] The rationality of scientific methodology has the power to claim evolutionary theory as a possible explanation of the highly complex question of origins. Yet, it clearly falls short of making its explanation absolutely certain, thereby necessitating the assent of all rational beings. Why, then, should Christian and Adventist theologians feel compelled to accommodate Scripture to the parameters dictated by the evolutionary metanarrative?

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[86] See Canale, 98-99.

[87] In this article, we are considering the science-theology relation only in regard to the cosmological questions of origins. However, the answer given to this relation extends to all issues on which science and Scripture have parallel pronouncements.

[88] Fritz Guy represents a sector of Adventist theologians and scientists convinced that evolution is a fact and that we should interpret Scripture and Christian doctrine accordingly ("Interpreting Genesis One in the Twenty-first Century," *Spectrum* 31, no. 2 [2003]: 5-16).

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THE ROLE OF TRADITION IN MODERN AND CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY: MEDIATING EPISTEMIC DIVIDES

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It is not inappropriate to understand the modern and postmodern periods in the West as representing two moments of intellectual revolution. The modern era was spawned by an intellectual revolution that upset the assumptions of medieval philosophy just as postmodernism in the contemporary period is founded on an intellectual outlook that challenges the assumptions of modern categories.[1] In this sense, both periods correspond to significant paradigm shifts in Western intellectual tradition.[2] By the nature of the case, theological reflection as an intellectual activity in each period is correspondingly impacted, thus making it possible to distinguish a characteristically modern theology from contemporary theology.

In each of these periodic shifts, the question of epistemology comes to center stage, although, as should be expected, an epistemological change signals a corresponding ontological adjustment.[3] From a theological perspective, the paradigmatic shift during the modern period was from the view that has been characterized as extrinsicism, to the developing school of historicism.[4] Epistemologically, extrinsicism stressed the place of divine revelation as the sole source of truth that owed nothing to history, except for the fact that it was given to the believers once and for all at a given point in history. Of course, this view did not preclude internal development through systematization to ensure clarity.[5] On the other hand, historicism reduced the realm of truth to history, maintaining, "all truth, including that of the Christian faith, must submit to the judgment of history."[6] In so doing, historicism was claiming the right to treat Christian doctrine as a matter of pure history and thereby subject it to critical study with the canons of reason. This was the modernist position. Thus was introduced the distinction between faith as assent to doctrine and history as the realm of reason and facts.

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[1] Stanley J. Grenz, *A Primer On Postmodernism* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 84; see also Peter C. Hodges and Robert H. King, eds., *Christian Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 10.

[2] I mean by the term *paradigm* what Thomas S. Kuhn understood as "an entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community" (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970], 175).

[3] Fernando L. Canale, *A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions* (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1983), 34ff. My concern in this paper, however, has to do with issues of an epistemological nature.

[4] See William A. Scott, "The Notion of Tradition in Maurice Blondel," *Theological Studies* 27 (1966): 384-385.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid., 385.

On the other hand, the contemporary paradigmatic shift is from modernism to postmodernism. In this instance, the modern concept of rationality, with its stress on autonomous reason and objectivity in the search for an overarching truth, has come under attack. Modernism sought to explain and provide meaning to all reality on the foundation of reason. In other words, the world was what reason thought it to be, and this was to be taken as universally true for all time. Over against modern rationality, postmodernism claims that the very idea of a belief system that is always and universally true is no longer credible. It is argued that the very fact of our situatedness in particular historical contexts forces us to experience the world through our individual and unique perspectives, such that the postmodern outlook "demands an attack on any claim to universality."[7]

Theologically, it is assumed that modernist assumptions of rationality have permeated evangelical thought since roughly 1850 to 1950.[8] Thus, conservative evangelicalism is, philosophically, said to be reflective of certain aspects of modern epistemology. On the other hand, the postmodernist influence in contemporary theology is seen in the various calls for revisioning evangelical theology[9] to reflect contemporary postmodern epistemological concerns.

The situation in which theology finds itself in each paradigm change leads to the stress of extreme positions that moderate voices find necessary to mediate and synthesize. This has been the case in both the extrinsicism/historicism dialectic of the modern period and the modern/postmodern confrontation of the contemporary era. In both cases, a specific concept has been called into service to mediate the competing viewpoints. The concept that has conveniently been called upon to play this irenic function is the notion of tradition, which in the process has undergone some revision.[10] This observation calls for a careful look at the concept of tradition. What is this apparently malleable concept (or concepts) of tradition that makes it amenable to facilitate dialogue between competing epistemological options? What implications does the evolving concept of tradition have for theological method, and how should these be assessed? This article will address these issues.

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[7] Grenz, 45.

[8] See John G. Stackhouse, ed., *Evangelical Futures* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 32. Donald Bloesch, for instance, has argued that modernist and rationalistic tendencies are discernible in the writings of such evangelical giants as Carl F. Henry, John Warwick Montgomery, Francis Schaeffer, and Norman Geisler (*Essentials of Evangelical Theology* [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979], 2:267-268.

[9] See, for example, Stanley J. Grenz, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology: A Fresh Agenda for the 21st Century* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993); and David Brown, *Tradition and Imagination* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

[10] For a concise but helpful overview of the evolution of the concept of tradition, see David F. Wells, "Tradition: A Meeting Place for Catholic and Evangelical Theology," *Christian Scholars Review* 5 (1975): 50-61. In this article, Wells notes how positions have changed regarding the concept of tradition and are, therefore, an encouragement toward a new dialogue between Catholics and evangelicals.

The approach adopted here will examine specific theological proposals that have been made regarding the understanding of the concept of tradition that is deemed essential for mediating between apparently irreconcilable epistemological positions. These proposals will be examined with the specific objective of underscoring the nature of the particular concept of tradition that its promulgators espouse. Subsequently, the possible implications that these concepts of tradition may have for theological method will be explored. Before I look at the revisions to the concepts of tradition proposed in the modern and postmodern periods, however, it may be worth reviewing briefly the concept from the early church until the modern period.

Tradition: From the Early Church to the Modern Period

It seems accurate to observe that during the period under review tradition was generally understood in an objective sense, although such characterization runs the risk of obscuring significant variations in meaning attached to the concept. The early patristic period maintained a clear distinction between apostolic *paradosis* (tradition) considered authoritative because of its divine origin, and the church's *didaskalia* (teaching), which was not authoritative, although it was not long before apostolic legends, liturgical practices, and generally accepted interpretations of biblical texts came to be classed under the category of *paradosis*.[11] The movement toward the equal valuation of apostolic *paradosis* and church *didaskalia* would be given a significant boost with Vincent de Lerins's publication of his *Commonitoria*, an event which strengthened the hand of the church in its responsibility, even obligation, in defining the truth.[12] The medieval contribution to this process was the handing over of apostolic authority to the church, as a result of which tradition came to be identified with the functioning of the church.[13] Nevertheless, the Council of Trent became a significant defining moment for the relationship between Scripture and tradition. The Council succeeded in bringing near harmony to three competing

[11] Ibid., 51; see also Josef Rupert Geiselmann, *The Meaning of Tradition* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 17. Geiselmann distinguishes the transmission of the *paradosis* to the church (including the committing to writing) by divine action from the testimony of ecclesiastical tradition, which is a human action, albeit with the Holy Spirit's assistance. Nevertheless as a testimony to the already developing elevation of ecclesiastical practices to the level of apostolic *paradosis*, Avery Dulles, for example, notes that Fathers such as Basil could write that "among the doctrines and the definitions preserved in the Church, we hold some on the basis of written teaching and others we have received, transmitted secretly, from apostolic tradition. All are of equal value for piety" ("Tradition and Creativity: A Theological Approach," in *The Quadrilog*, ed. Kenneth Hagen [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994], 313). Still, Dulles, ibid., concludes that "until the late Middle Ages the dominant tendency was to treat Scripture as the basic text of revelation and to rely on tradition, especially patristic tradition, for the authoritative interpretation of Scripture."

[12] Wells, 51.

[13] Ibid.

schools of thought on the relationship between Scripture and tradition when "it was almost unanimously agreed that the canonical Scriptures are not sufficient as a source of doctrine."[14]

Avery Dulles notes at least three different ways in which the concept of tradition has been nuanced since the Council of Trent: objectively to mean "revealed truths handed down from apostolic times by channels other than canonical Scriptures"; "to designate the process of transmitting the apostolic heritage," both scriptural or otherwise; and as "a criterion . . . to establish the authenticity of certain doctrines and practices."[15] It is quite evident that in all these variations, as in the rest of the period under consideration, there was a bent to see tradition in an objective sense; a body of doctrine, objectively identifiable and requiring to be preserved. The situation will be significantly different in the nineteenth century, which will mark the first major epistemic divide, and hence call for a radical nuancing of the concept of tradition. To this epistemic divide I now turn my attention.

Tradition: Between Premodern Extrinsicism and Modern Historicism

The objectivist understanding of the concept of tradition from the early church up to the modern period entailed a particular epistemological outlook. Extrinsicism, as this essentially theological epistemological view has been called, structured the relation between revelation and history in clearly defined and unequivocal terms. Knowledge from revelation, according to this view, is supernatural and extrinsic to man and the historical process. It is distinct from historical knowledge both in its source and its essential nature.

The Enlightenment of the seventeenth century, which ultimately gave birth to the modern period, created several difficulties for the epistemology that underlay extrinsicism. Among the powerful forces that were unleashed by the Enlightenment and that would eventually undermine the epistemological assumptions of extrinsicism, three have been noted. The widespread acceptance of the developing scientific worldview, philosophy's turn to the knowing subject, and the development of a new historical consciousness gave the modern period a new epistemological outlook.[16] Historicism was a natural development from the emerging intellectual milieu. Gotthold Lessing's "ugly broad ditch" was a pithy expression, during the eighteenth century, of the intellectual concerns of the school of historicism.[17] As noted earlier on, historicism saw history as the only truth, thus insisting, "all truth, including that of the Christian faith, must submit to the judgment of history."[18]

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[14] Avery Dulles, *The Craft of Theology* (New York: Crossroads, 1992), 88.

[15] Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity," 314.

[16] See Robert H. King, "The Task of Christian Theology," in *Christian Theology*, ed. Peter C. Hodgson and Robert H. King (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989), 10-12. The Kantian Copernican revolution, although epistemological at heart, together with David Hume's philosophical program, "attacked the metaphysical assumptions which undergirded . . . the classic doctrine of revelation," thus challenging the whole edifice of extrinsicism (ibid., 124).

[17] Lessing typically reflected the historicist view when he maintained that the accidental truths of history can never become the proof of the necessary truths of reason.

In the context of this extrinsicism/historicism dialectic, Maurice Blondel attempted, via the concept of tradition, to forge a nexus between the two apparently contradictory viewpoints. It was Blondel's goal to show that the values in both extrinsicism and historicism can be brought to subsist and serve the tradition of the church.

Tradition: Blondel's via Media[19]

It is central to Blondel's concept of tradition that tradition may furnish things that cannot be translated into language and that may not be immediately and integrally convertible into an intellectual expression.[20] Contrary to what appears to have been the early church's position, tradition in Blondel's view "is not a transmission, principally oral, of historical facts, of truths received, of teachings communicated, of consecrated practices and of ancient customs";[21] rather, tradition "is a preserving power . . . ; it discovers and formulates truths which the past lived, without being able to articulate them or define them explicitly; it enriches the intellectual patrimony by minting little by little the total deposit and by making it fructify."[22]

By redefining tradition as a formative process, Blondel made room for the influence of research, science, philosophy, and other human, historical means in the tradition-forming process without necessarily subjugating tradition to these means.[23] But underlying Blondel's notion of tradition as a "preserving power" is his philosophy of *action*, according to which truth unfolds in a constant process of action, reflection, and reaction.[24] Tradition, therefore, which in Blondel's view is the life, the action of the church, forms itself by the use of a methodology of action. But this is not all born of natural, existential phenomena, because, according to him, the traditioning process occurs under the active direction of Christ.

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[18] Scott, 385.

[19] A series of articles by Maurice Blondel on the subject of tradition between 1904 and 1905 have been reprinted in *Les Premiers Ecrits de Maurice Blondel.* Scott's "The Notion of Tradition in Maurice Blondel" provides a concise overview of Blondel's thought on the subject that will be relied on in this section of my discussion.

[20] See Scott, 386.

[21] Cited in Scott, 386.

[22] Ibid., 387. I should point out that the departure from the early church's objectivist position on tradition did not begin with Blondel. Already in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, Johann Adam Mohler had depicted tradition as a mysterious inner principle or power of spiritual life (Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity," 314).

[23] Scott, 389-390. Preserving for the church a principal role in the tradition-forming process, Blondel writes: "She speaks with an authority independent of all grounds of judgment; but she addresses herself to intelligence as much as to docility, asserting the right of reason because she wishes to teach a communicable truth. She does not have to take account of human contingencies and she does not preoccupy herself with being clever, opportune, adapted; but she uses all human means to be understood, and to find in men the points of insertion prepared for her action. Everywhere her supernatural wisdom lights itself with lights, surrounds itself with precautions, determines itself with natural operations" (ibid.).

[24] Ibid., 392. In his philosophy of action, Blondel sets up an indissoluble relation between

It is evident that through his philosophy of action Blondel attempts to bridge the divide between the extrinsicist and historicist views. We must note, however, the important points in the process of this transaction. First, the notion of tradition is invested with a new meaning, namely, the church living her life, as opposed to a deposit of truth to be guarded. Next, Blondel appears to adopt some theological presuppositions in his understanding of tradition. Without denying the committal of divine truth to the church, Blondel sees the need for the historical development and unfolding of this truth. As Scott correctly points out, it is germane to Blondel's view that not only did Christ not commit total truth to the church, but "the deposit of truth which He wanted to commit to the Church could not be given to it under a completely intellectual form."[25] Epistemologically, Blondel presupposes an insufficient original revelation, while his ontological presuppositions lead him to the conclusions that the divine truth could not be contained in any one set of human formulations, and that there cannot be a time in history when the mind of man can exhaust the divine mind.[26]

In more recent times the influence of Blondel's views on tradition, especially within the Roman Catholic Church, has been discernible in the Tübingen theologian Josef Rupert and the French Dominican Yves Congar. Through the contribution of these theologians, Vatican II received the stamp of Blondel's dynamic concept of tradition.[27]

Among Protestant theologians, Thomas C. Oden's concept of tradition would seem to come closest to the modern Catholic understanding of tradition adopted at Vatican II.[28]

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thought and concrete action out of which truth unfolds. It has been correctly observed that Blondel's philosophy of action has "nothing to do with those who conceive of philosophy as some sort of inviolate realm of pure thought not to be stained by the concrete loves, hatreds, fears, failures, and aspirations of the living human being as he works out in history and in himself the destiny of the human race. For while human nature is the same, it is existentially ever changing, and so essence must always be discussed in the real world on all levels, theological, historical, biophysical, and not merely on the metaphysical. The philosopher, then, must join hands with the mystic and the saint, with the artist, the scientist, the economist, the sociologist, the laborer in the field and factory, in a living expression and unfolding of truth" (E. Sponga, "The Philosophy and Spirituality of Action," 72-73, cited in Scott, 392).

[25] Scott, 393-394.

[26] Ibid., 394.

[27] Dulles, *Tradition and Creativity*, 315. Dulles, 316, explains that Vatican II in *Dei Verbum* "speaks of tradition in a subjective or active sense, to mean the process by which the apostolic heritage is transmitted and received in the Church. . . . Unlike Trent which looked upon tradition as invariant, Vatican II understands the tradition as a sense of the faith that develops organically under the aegis of the Holy Spirit."

[28] See Thomas C. Oden, *The Living God* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 338ff. Oden,

Tradition: Between Modern Objectivism and Postmodern Relativism

Whereas in the controversy between extrinsicism and historicism the critical issue is related to the origin of knowledge and truth, in the contemporary epistemological divide between modernism and postmodernism it is primarily modernism's objectification of rationality that postmodernists find objectionable. In this sense, David Brown's rough characterization of the modernist/postmodernist divide is helpful.

> On the one hand we have the modernists, those who continue to support the Enlightenment project of the pursuit of universal values and an ever increasing human knowledge that is seen as objectively validated in shared and secure foundations; on the other, the postmodernists, convinced that objectivity is a will-o'-the-wisp and that therefore what can be achieved is at most the celebration of particularism, with no overarching system of assessment available.[29]

On his part, Anton A. Van Niekirk presents the epistemological contrast between modernism and postmodernism as corresponding to metaphysical thinking versus postmetaphysical thinking.[30] Whereas the former is considered to be substantive, the latter is procedural.[31]

The epistemological crisis that postmodernism precipitates appears to have one clear implication for the destiny of rationality. In the opinion of J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen, "the critical rejection of modernist, universalist notions of rationality will indeed imply that it is the destiny of human rationality to stay with tradition."[32] It must be observed that the notion of tradition, which

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338, is decidedly against any "uncritical" use of the term "tradition" that makes it mean "rigid formulas and in-group prejudices." For Oden, tradition desires to be "danced, sung, feasted upon, and celebrated." Its vibrant nature allows it to play a vital, dynamic role without necessarily abandoning its enduring aspects.

[29] Brown, 9. Brown, 32-44, later provides a more detailed characterization of postmodernism as involving five different versions, with respect to exclusion of master narratives, no criteria for choice, failure of local master-narrative, meaning given internally by narrative, and no reference beyond the text.

[30] Anton A. Van Niekirk, "Postmetaphysical Versus Postmodern Thinking," *Philosophy Today* 39 (1995): 171-184.

[31] Van Niekirk, 175, explains the difference between substantive and procedural thinking as follows: "In metaphysical thinking, a fundamental assumption is that either theoretical reason will rediscover itself in a world that is itself rationally structured, or that nature and history are rational as a result of being structured by reason itself—whether through some type of transcendental foundation or in the course of a dialectical permeation of the world. In contrast, postmetaphysical thinking entails a procedural concept of rationality. . . . Rationality becomes something purely formal insofar as the rationality of content evaporates into the validity of results. . . . The order of things that is found in the world itself, or that has been projected by the subject, or has grown out of the self-formative process of spirit, no longer counts as rational; instead, what counts as rational is solving problems successfully through procedurally suitable dealing with reality. . . . Procedural rationality can no longer guarantee an antecedent unity in the manifold of appearances."

[32] J. Wentzel van Huyssteen, "Tradition and the Task of Theology," *Theology Today* 55 (1998): 214.

replaces modernity's universalist notion, must by the nature of the case be devoid of universalist and overarching connotations.[33] Thus Van Huyssteen is correct in noting that, with respect to tradition, the postmodern challenge represents a crisis of continuity, a crisis that "now disrupts the accepted relationship between an event and a tradition that gains its stability from that relationship."[34] It is in the context of this dialectic between modernity's *foundationalism* (hence universalism) and postmodernity's *nonfoundationalism* (i.e., extreme relativism) that Van Huyssteen proposes a *postfoundationalist theology*, via tradition, to mediate the opposing positions.[35]

Tradition in J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen's Postfoundationalist Theology

The problem that Van Huyssteen's postfoundationalist theology attempts to solve via tradition is the fragmentation of theology that has accompanied the postmodern challenge. To the extent that postmodernity renders rationality, as classically understood, problematic, the credibility of theology as a rational activity is seriously undermined. More specifically, by denying rationality any foundations and making it a social construct, postmodernity makes a contextual theological discourse virtually impossible. The exact effect of this state of affairs on Christian tradition is to deny its very condition of possibility as a phenomenon that embodies continuity.

It would seem that the challenge for Christian theology in the face of the postmodern threat is to show how and in what manner the continuity of the Christian tradition can be sustained intersubjectively in a nonfoundationalist epistemological milieu. By "intersubjective" I mean specifically the transcending of different historical and cultural contexts. Van Huyssteen takes the position that it is possible to analyze tradition in terms of its continuous and discontinuous elements. Therefore, he argues, "What is to be rejected is any claim to a necessary, modernist, or metaphysical continuity in history. In this sense, tradition is not something that we presume as an ontological datum, but is rather something we create out of the phenomenon of history."[36] Van Huyssteen concurs with Delwin Brown's theory of religious tradition, which sees change and continuity as primary categories of the dynamics of tradition and observes as follows:

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[33] It would seem that the so-called "New Yale theology," in spite of its striving for intertextuality, remains committed to a nonuniversalist notion of tradition. See Mark I. Wallace, "The New Yale Theology," *Christian Scholars Review* 17 (1988): 154-170.

[34] Ibid., 217.

[35] Van Huyssteen's approach to tradition is chosen as representative of a growing tendency among theologians and philosophers on the question of tradition. Among these the following especially may be noted: Brown; Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? What Rationality?* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). For a discussion on Alasdair MacIntyre's approach, see Jennifer A. Herdt, "Alasdair MacIntyre's 'Rationality of Traditions' and Tradition-Transcendental Standards of Justification," *Journal of Religion* 78 (1998): 524-546; also Jean Porter, "Openness and Constraint: Moral Reflection as Tradition-guided Inquiry in Alisdair MacIntyre's Recent Works," *Journal of Religion* 73 (1993): 514-536.

[36] Van Huyssteen, 218.

> This opens up a door, beyond the postmodern crisis of continuity, to doing theology with a tradition whose continuity does not have to be guaranteed anymore by a foundationalist metaphysics of history. In this way, we are empowered to criticize our traditions while standing within them but are also empowered to allow a particular history to speak for itself without being subsumed under the umbrella of an all-encompassing theory, based on a series of texts and interpretations we have endowed with a particular authority, which then functions as the accepted ideology of a specific community.[37]

What is tradition, bereft of its continuous metaphysical trappings? As Van Huyssteen develops his postfoundationalist theory of rationality for theology, tradition becomes quite clearly a heuristic phenomenon, the necessary stance of experience from which we interpret the world, and with which we should embark on an interdisciplinary conversation. Each tradition, then, essentially uncovers a *field of concerns*,[38] and constitutes a *research paradigm*.[39] Consequently, from an intersubjective point of view, traditions can only claim theoretical and experiential adequacy without telling us anything about the truth or falsity of the tradition.[40] In Van Huyssteen's view:

> We therefore have to accept that cognitive agreement or consensus in theology is also, and may be especially unattainable, and that what Nicholas Rescher called "dissensus tolerance" could prove to be a positive and constructive part of theological pluralism. It is at this point that we reach beyond our specific traditions in cross-contextual conversation, to a shared "borderlands epistemology" where the diversity of our traditions will yield the diversity of our experiences, our contexts and situations, and our values and methodologies.[41]

What Blondel did for the extrinsicism/historicism dialectic, Van Huyssteen does for the modern/postmodern conflict. Van Huyssteen appears to develop a notion of rationality via tradition that mediates the epistemological issues in the conflict between modernity's foundationalism and postmodernity's nonfoundationalism. But what we have is a deflated concept of tradition, at least from the point of view of the early church. Not only are we denied an ontological datum for reflection in tradition, but, epistemologically, tradition furnishes no truth content as such; only theoretical and experiential adequacy. In this latter regard, Blondel's approach is different from Van Huyssteen's since the former only postulated extended development of the *truth*, albeit incomplete, in the history of the church's life.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Ibid. Van Huyssteen, ibid., distinguishes "the field of concerns" as that within "which both consensus and dissent, continuity and discontinuity, acquire coherence and intelligibility," from a "consensus of authority."

[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., 220.

[41] Ibid., 226; see also Nicholas Rescher, *A System of Pragmatic Idealism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 1:3-4.

Methodological Implications of the Modern and Contemporary Concepts of Tradition

The modern concept of tradition is significantly different from the contemporary postmodern concept by virtue of the latter's denial of an ontological datum for reflection on tradition. From a methodological point of view, however, both concepts have similar effects on the theological enterprise. They both require similar thinking on the nature and goal of theology as well as its hermeneutical and material principles.

Nature and Goal of Theology

Prior to the modern period, and among conservative evangelicals during the modern period, the objective understanding of tradition that prevailed implied a specific understanding of the nature and goal of theology. On the basis of the conviction that God has disclosed truth to humankind, which tradition had the obligation to preserve, theology conceived its task as "the discovery of the one doctrinal system that inheres in the Bible."[42] In both the modern and postmodern concepts of tradition as outlined by Blondel and Van Huyssteen, *truth* does not have a clearly defined identity. In Blondel, historical development of tradition is required for a complete formulation of *the truth,* whereas in Van Huyssteen *the truth* is well-nigh unattainable, since we can only expect theoretical and experiential adequacy.[43] Especially in postmodernism, the altered understanding of truth changes the nature and goal of the theological enterprise. Stanley Grenz clearly reflects the nature and goal of theology in the changed situation. For him theology is a second-order enterprise that reflects a culturally conditioned language of the confession and worldview of the community of faith.[44] He explains further that "the assertion that theology speaks a second-order language is not intended to deny the ontological nature of theological declarations. Nevertheless, the ontological claims implicit in theological assertions arise as an outworking of the intent of the theologian to provide a *model of reality* rather than to describe *reality directly*" (emphasis mine).[45] The modern and postmodern concepts of tradition, therefore, through their ambivalence over the question of truth, redefine the nature and task of theology.

Hermeneutical Principles

The concept of revelation is central to any theological discussion on hermeneutics. An integral component of the modern and postmodern concepts of tradition is an increasing tendency to see tradition as revelation. Carl Braaten spoke to this point when he remarked as early as the mid-1960s that "the coupling of revelation with history is an omnipresent feature of modern theology."[46]

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[42] Grenz, *Revisioning Evangelical Theology,* 87.

[43] See also Michael Jessup, "Truth: The First Casualty of Postmodern Consumerism," *Christian Scholar's Review* 30/3 (2001): 289-304.

[44] Grenz., 78.

[45] Ibid.

The issue at stake here has to do with a changing understanding of the nature of revelation. Whereas the classical view of revelation involved the revealing of *truths*,[47] which for all practical purposes were identified with the Bible,[48] revelation in the modern and postmodern context is increasingly understood in terms of an ongoing divine self-disclosure. Thomas C. Oden, for example, remarks: "God continues to reveal himself in ever-emergent human history" in a way that "complements, extends and develops, but does not negate past disclosures."[49] It would seem that the subjective and dynamic conception of tradition in modern and contemporary postmodern theology requires a corresponding subjective and dynamic view of the doctrine of revelation.

The observations made so far on the question of revelation in modern and postmodern theology are primarily epistemological ones, yet the ontological repercussions of these epistemological moves are seen in the increasing emphasis in evangelical circles on the concept of the "openness of God" and a growing appreciation of the process view of God.[50] Among evangelicals who are inclined to the open view of God may be counted Gregory Boyd, Stephen Franklin, Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger.[51] The affinity between the open view of God and contemporary concepts of tradition appears to rest on the similarity of their thematic emphases. More and more, the themes of creativity, contingency, and solidarity are emphasized as properly constitutive of an adequate concept of tradition for our postmodern times.[52] These concepts, which are antithetical to the essentialist universalism of classical ontology in general, enjoy significant correspondence to the characteristic themes of freedom, process, and relationships, in process theism.

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[46] Carl F. Braaten, *New Directions in Theology Today* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966), 2:16; see also Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., *Revelation as History* (London: Sheed and Ward, 1969).

[47] J. I. Packer, *Fundamentalism and the Word of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 91.

[48] H. D. McDonald, *Theories of Revelation: An Historical Study, 1860-1960* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), 161. McDonald observes: "It had been the prevailing view that revelation and the Bible were for all practical purposes to be equated."

[49] Oden, 334.

[50] Millard Erickson notes that one of the factors that has contributed to a challenge of the classical doctrine of God is twentieth-century hostility toward any kind of metaphysics (*The Evangelical Left* [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1997], 88). It is relevant at this stage to recall the point made earlier that the postmodern concept of tradition, especially as espoused in Van Huyssteen's postfoundationalist theology, denies the concept any necessary ontological datum.

[51] See ibid., 91-107. For some of the works of the respective scholars mentioned above, see Gregory Boyd, *Trinity and Process: A Critical Evaluation and Reconstruction of Hartshorne's Di-polar Theism Towards a Trinitarian Metaphysics* (New York: Peter Lang, 1992); Stephen T. Franklin, *Speaking from the Depths: Alfred North Whitehead's Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990); Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger, *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God* (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity, 1994).

[52] See Arthur A. Vogel, "Tradition: The Contingency Factor," in *The Quadrilog: Tradition and the Future of Ecumenism*, ed. Kenneth Hagen (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1994), 255-269; also Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity: A Theological Approach," 313-327.

Material Principles

It is customary to think about Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience as the sources used in theological construction.[53] From a methodological point of view, a more important issue has to do with primacy and functional authority among these sources. David Wells has already observed, albeit cautiously, that contemporary theology has effectively reduced the traditional four sources to two: Scripture and experience.[54] Wells discusses the disappearance of reason as well as the assimilation of tradition into experience.[55] Yet, one may speak of a certain hermeneutical reductionism in the contemporary conception of tradition that functionally endows it with primacy.[56]

The contemporary hermeneutical insistence on the historical conditionedness of all texts, including the Bible, would seem to give more credibility to the total tradition of which the Bible is a part, albeit a formative part. David Brown appears to adopt this position when in arguing for the legitimacy of later traditions he observes of them, in connection with Christian tradition, that they should "not only be positively enriching but actually act as a critique of the Scriptural text."[57] Thus, in the end, the contemporary concept of tradition collapses Scripture into tradition, while tradition in turn is made an argument for experience, i.e., "the experience of the Holy Spirit within the people of God."[58] Thus, the modern concept of tradition shifts the focus from the *sola Scriptura* principle to the primacy of experience via tradition.

Conclusion

In the epistemological shifts and turns in Christian theology since the modern period, the concept of tradition has been used to mediate opposing viewpoints. At each juncture, the authenticity of the Christian faith has been argued for through a redefinition of the concept of tradition in a way that is alleged to invest the concept with its truest meaning. What seems certain, however, is that at each transitional point the concept reflects some of the significant elements of the philosophical orientation of the times. Thus, the concept of tradition during the modern period was a reflection not only of Blondel's own philosophy of action, but also of Henri Bergson's idea of *élan vital*.[59] Similarly, the postmodern concept of tradition shares some of the concerns of postmodern philosophies. For example, Van Huyssteen divests tradition of any necessary metaphysical continuity in response to Michael Foucault's antimetaphysical critique of Christian doctrine.[60]

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[53] On his part, Grenz criticizes the four sources commonly understood as the quadrilateral of sources, and in its place argues for what he call the three "pillars" or norms of theology, i.e., the biblical message, the theological heritage of the church, and the thought-forms of the historical-cultural context in which the contemporary people of God seek to speak, live, and act (*Revisioning Evangelical Theology*, 93).

[54] David Wells, "The Theologian's Craft," in *Doing Theology in Today's World*, ed. John D. Woodbridge and Thomas E. McComiskey (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991), 175.

[55] Ibid., 175-180.

[56] See Charles Brummett, "Recovering Pastoral Theology: The Agenda of Thomas Oden" (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1990). Brummett, 281, makes this observation of Oden's use of tradition and argues: "Pushed to its logical consequences, Oden's methodology, or at least as he applies it, allows Scripture to collapse into tradition."

[57] Brown, 5.

[58] Wells, "The Theologians Craft," 177.

The methodological implications of these redefinitions of the concept of tradition have been outlined above to stress the fact that these overtures, viewed from a methodological point of view, may indicate a real change in direction in Christian theology. Stanley Grenz confronts some of these same methodological changes and calls for a *revisioning* of evangelical theology. It may be, however, that to the extent that a change in method leads to a change in results, a change in evangelical theological method signals not simply a revisioning of evangelical theology, but a change in its very identity.

[59] Dulles, "Tradition and Creativity," 318.

[60] Van Huyssteen, 216-218.

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CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON PETRINE MINISTRY AND PAPAL PRIMACY

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Interest in the papacy and its role in Christianity is increasing. Two recent bestsellers have raised some contentious issues regarding the integrity of the ministry of the successor of Peter. The publication of John Cornwell's *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* caused a stirring of opinions regarding Pius XII's alleged complicity with the Nazi's "final solution."[1] Garry Wills's *Papal Sin: Structures of Deceit* also raised controversy in his surprising portrait of the modern papacy and its unwillingness to face the truth about itself, its past, and its relations with others.[2]

Notwithstanding these criticisms, there is no longer any doubt concerning the papacy's political power since John Paul II and Ronald Reagan "agreed [1982] to undertake a clandestine campaign to hasten the dissolution of the communist Empire."[3] The pope and Reagan were convinced that the fall of communism in Poland would bring about the same result in other Eastern European countries. Yet, aside from political activities and worldwide travels, John Paul's ailing health is feeding numerous rumors about who will be his successor. Will the next pope be as conservative, or will he be more open-minded to change?

Apart from contentious historical interpretations, rumors, and speculation, the halls of academia are also pondering the future of the papacy, and this at the express invitation of John Paul himself. The purpose of this article is to survey some of the current ideas regarding Petrine ministry and papal primacy in the context of the ecumenical movement and to provide one brief response to these ideas.

Invitation to Dialogue

Toward the end of his 1995 Encyclical *Ut Unum Sint*, John Paul II invited Christians of all persuasions to enter into "a patient and fraternal dialogue" with him regarding the ministry of the modern papacy.[4] Certainly he had in mind the words of his predecessor, Paul VI, who acknowledged that the papacy is the greatest obstacle for Christian unity.[5] "Whatever relates to the unity of all Christian communities clearly forms part of the concerns of the primacy," John Paul explains.

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[1] John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret History of Pius XII* (New York: Viking, 1999). Just as contentious for many is the pope's desire to canonize Pius XII. A recent decision on the part of the Vatican to open archival documents of Pius XII's pontificate to the public has brought to light documents that suggest Pius XII helped Italian Jews during World War II (see Antonio Gaspari, "Uncovered: Correspondence of Pius XII," *Inside the Vatican*, February 2003, 14-16; and "Pacelli denounces the Nazis," *Inside the Vatican*, March 2003, 30-31).

[2] Garry Wills, *Papal Sin: Structures of Deceit* (New York: Doubleday, 2000). Wills's sequel, *Why I Am a Catholic* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2002) is, in part, an excursus on the history of the papacy. He explains in the introduction that in *Papal Sin* he intends to treat "the papacy's dishonesty in its recent (anti-modern) era" and "the way dishonesty was used, in recent times, to defend whatever papal position was involved" (1).

[3] Carl Bernstein, "The Holy Alliance," *Time*, February 24, 1992, 28.

> I am convinced that I have a particular responsibility in this regard, above all in acknowledging the ecumenical aspirations of the majority of the Christian Communities and in heeding the request made of me to find a way of exercising the primacy which, while in no way renouncing what is essential to its mission, is nonetheless open to a new situation. . . . I insistently pray the Holy Spirit to shine his light upon us, enlightening all the Pastors and theologians of our Churches, that we may seek—together, of course—the forms in which this ministry may accomplish a service of love recognized by all concerned."[6]

Since the publication of this encyclical, a number of books and articles have been written and symposiums or conferences held in response to this invitation to dialogue. The responses have expressed a variety of viewpoints which are more or less compatible with Roman Catholic ecclesiology and with the important role the papacy plays in its structure. Both Roman Catholic and Protestant theologians have welcomed this invitation and have called for change. Yet change will be difficult because papal primacy is intrinsically connected to Roman Catholic self-identity and ecclesiology.

Relations with Non-Catholic Communities

Of prime importance to John Paul are the good relations entertained between Roman Catholics and other Christian churches, for it is in this context that he hopes for a genuine and cordial dialogue on the modern role of the papacy. However, such goodwill has at times been shaken, particularly with the release of the controversial Declaration *Dominus Iesus* in September 2000 by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Written as an attempt to stem the postmodern tide of religious pluralism, relativism, and indifferentism, this declaration reaffirmed the centrality of salvation in Christ and maintained the unique role of the Roman Church in bringing this salvation to the world. Many Protestants readily agreed with its earnest intent to uplift Jesus as the only salvific way to the Father, but they disagreed with *Dominus Iesus* in the assertion that since Protestant churches have not preserved a valid apostolic succession and episcopate, which is found alone in the papacy, they "are not Churches in the proper sense."[7] What shocked many Protestant denominations, particularly those which have been part of the ecumenical movement, is that the reference to this incompleteness is coupled with the insistence that the fullness of the universal Church of Christ is to be found only in the Roman Catholic Church.

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[4] John Paul II, *On Commitment to Ecumenism Ut Unum Sint*, May 25, 1995, §96 (hereafter cited as *Ut Unum Sint*).

[5] "Le Pape, nous le savons bien, est sans doute l'obstacle le plus grave sur la route de l'œcuménisme" (*Acta Apostolicae Sedis* 59/4 [1967]: 498).

[6] *Ut Unum Sint*, §95.

[7] Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaration *Dominus Iesus* on the Unity and Salvific Universality of Jesus Christ and the Church, September 5, 2000, §17.

It is important to remember, however, how much Roman Catholicism has evolved in its understanding of other Christian communities. As the modern ecumenical movement began to take shape in the 1920s, Roman Catholics were advised not to participate in any meetings or conferences with other Christian denominations. When, in 1919, Episcopal and Anglican leaders invited Pope Benedict XV to send representatives to a preparatory conference on Faith and Order, the Roman Catholic leadership made it clear that it would not be possible to acquiesce to their request. Benedict's successor, Pius XI, reiterated the same position in 1927, a few days before the first world conference on Faith and Order began in Lausanne, in the 1928 encyclical *Mortalium Animos*, in which Pius XI decreed that no Catholics were to take part in ecumenical activities.[8] His reason for this position was quite simple: Because of their refusal to accept the authority of the papacy, Protestants are not true Christians. He states:

> For since the mystical body of Christ, like His physical body, is one (I Cor. xii.12), compactly and fitly joined together (Eph. iv. 15), it would be foolish to say that the mystical body is composed of disjointed and scattered members. Whosoever therefore is not united with the body is no member thereof, neither is he in communion with Christ its head. Furthermore, in this one Church of Christ no man can be or remain who does not accept, recognize, and obey the authority and supremacy of Peter and his legitimate successors.[9]

If Catholics participated in such ecumenical conferences, "they would be giving countenance to a false Christianity quite alien to the one Church of Christ."[10]

Yet in spite of such a firm position, attitudes gradually began to change as the Catholic Church saw how other Christians cared deeply for unity in the church. The greatest changes occurred during the Second Vatican Council. John XXIII's calling of the Council had a significant ecumenical impact. Since the proclamation of the infallibility of the pope at the First Vatican Council in 1870,[11] many Protestants had felt that there would be no further need of councils of the Roman Catholic Church since an infallible pope could make all decisions.[12]

In preparation for the Council, John XXIII created the Secretariat for the Promotion of Christian Unity, which was given the responsibility of drafting a decree "On Ecumenism," *Unitatis Redintegratio*. This decree and the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, *Lumen Gentium*, changed the Roman Catholic perception of itself and of Protestant denominations. While prior to Vatican II the Roman Catholic Church viewed itself as the only true visible church of Christ,[13] Vatican II made room for the recognition of an ecclesial reality in non-Catholic faith communities. This change of attitude, however, did not change the role of papal primacy. Rather, it focused its meaning and significance on Christian unity.

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[8] See Oliver Stratford Tomkins, "The Roman Catholic Church and the Ecumenical Movement, 1910-1948," in *A History of the Ecumenical Movement, 1517-1948*, 3d ed., ed. Ruth Rouse and Stephen C. Neill (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1986), 680-684.

[9] Pius XI, Encyclical Letter *Mortalium Animos*, January 6, 1928.

[10] Ibid.

[11] First Vatican Council, Constitution *Pastor Aeternus*, July 18, 1870.

[12] Robert McAfee Brown, *The Ecumenical Revolution: An Interpretation of the Catholic-Protestant Dialogue* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1967), 62.

Lumen Gentium states that "the one Church of Christ which in the Creed is professed as one, holy, catholic and apostolic[,] . . . constituted and organized in the world as a society, ***subsists in*** the Catholic Church, which is governed by the Successor of Peter and by the bishops in communion with him, although many elements of sanctification and of truth are found outside of its visible structure."[14] The key words here are "subsists in." By this expression,

> the Second Vatican Council sought to harmonize two doctrinal statements: on the one hand, that the Church of Christ, despite the divisions which exist among Christians, continues to exist fully ***only*** in the Catholic Church, and on the other hand, that "outside of her structure, many elements can be found of sanctification and truth", that is, in those Churches and ecclesial communities which are not yet in full communion with the Catholic Church. But with respect to these, it needs to be stated that "they derive their efficacy from the very fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church" (emphasis supplied).[15]

The Decree on Ecumenism *Unitatis Redintegratio* also establishes this conviction:

> It follows that the separated Churches and Communities as such, though we believe them to be deficient in some respects, have been by no means deprived of significance and importance in the mystery of salvation.
>
> Nevertheless, our separated brethren, whether considered as individuals or as Communities and Churches, are not blessed with that unity which Jesus Christ wished to bestow on all those who through Him were born again into one body, and with Him quickened to newness of life. . . . We believe that Our Lord entrusted ***all*** the blessings of the New Covenant to the apostolic college ***alone***, of which Peter is the head, in order to establish the one Body of Christ on earth to which ***all*** should be fully incorporated who belong in any way to the people of God" (emphasis supplied).[16]

The Role of the Papacy in Catholic Ecclesiology

It is evident in the documents referred to so far that the papacy plays a central function in Catholic ecclesiology. In fact, without the papacy there would be no Catholic Church. Based on the three classical Petrine texts of Matt 16:13-19, Luke 22:31-34, and John 21:15-17 and Paul's understanding of Peter as first witness to the resurrection in 1 Cor 15:5, Roman Catholics believe Jesus conferred on Peter the primacy of a Petrine ministry of unity in the church.

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[13] Lactantius, in *Mortalium Animos*, reaffirms that "the Catholic Church is alone in keeping the true worship."

[14] Second Vatican Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Church *Lumen Gentium*, §8. These elements of grace, truth, and sanctification are found in all Christian communities because all of them are somehow historically connected to the Catholic Church.

[15] *Dominus Iesus*, §16.

[16] Second Vatican Council, Decree on Ecumenism *Unitatis Redintegratio*, §3.

Although the Catholic understanding of other Christian communities has changed from an exclusive to a more inclusive position, its self-perception of being the only church of Christ with the fullness of the gospel has not changed, neither has the role of the pope changed as the successor of Peter. It is perhaps in *Ut Unum Sint* that the current Roman Catholic understanding of primacy is best explained. The implications of this teaching should be noticed:

> The Catholic Church, both in her *praxis* and in her solemn documents, holds that the communion of the particular Churches with the Church of Rome, and of their Bishops with the Bishop of Rome, is—in God's plan—an essential requisite of full and visible communion. Indeed full communion, of which the Eucharist is the highest sacramental manifestation, needs to be visibly expressed in a ministry in which all the Bishops recognize that they are united in Christ and all the faithful find confirmation for their faith.[17]

For John Paul II, the Petrine ministry of the papacy is the principle of unity for all Christians (Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant), who are all united in the papacy, whether they realize it or not. Given this self-understanding and its implications for Christianity, the pope views himself as the divinely appointed agent to establish the true visible unity of the church. From being an unresponsive and indifferent observer in the early years of the ecumenical movement, the papacy now sees its role as central to the future of any real church unity.

In the midst of these conversations and dialogues, the pope expresses his wish to exercise a ministry of love among all Christians as the servant of the servants of God.[18] "The mission of the Bishop of Rome within the College of all the Pastors consists precisely in 'keeping watch' . . . over the handing down of the Word, the celebration of the Liturgy and the Sacraments, the Church's mission, discipline and the Christian life. . . . He has the duty to admonish, to caution and to declare at times that this or that opinion being circulated is irreconcilable with the unity of faith . . . [and to] declare that a certain doctrine belongs to the deposit of faith."[19]

Responses to John Paul II's Invitation

Will John Paul's invitation to engage in "patient and fraternal dialogue" on this subject produce any tangible and lasting results? Is there a need for a modern understanding of Petrine ministry and papal primacy among all Christian churches and communities? Are non-Catholic churches willing to take a positive look at the papacy and to welcome its universal ministry? The answers given to these questions by representatives of various churches and denominations over the last few years are, in fact, quite surprising. While some evangelical spokespersons have historical and theological difficulties in even seeing the need for a papacy, other churches, which have historically been closer to the apostolic succession, are more willing to consider the potential benefits of a renewed primacy if it were to be understood and exercised in different terms. Cardinal Walter Kasper, president of the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, states: "Today many churches see that in this increasingly globalized world it could be helpful to have such a center of reference as the pope offers—a voice that can speak on behalf of the church."[20]

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[17] *Ut Unum Sint*, §97.

[18] Ibid., §88.

[19] Ibid., §94.

Since the pope issued his invitation for dialogue, numerous churches and theologians have offered their responses. In spite of many historical and theological disputes between Rome and other churches, the irenic responses demonstrate an unprecedented openness.[21]

For many theologians, the difficulty with papal primacy is not centered on its existence, for most will admit that it can play a vital role in reunifying Christians. The real difficulty resides in its role and exercise of authority, with the greatest points of dispute relating to the pope's infallible, dogmatic teachings and his universal jurisdiction over the whole church. Many theologians and church representatives, however, could envision a Petrine ministry exercised within a conciliar context.

A tentative acceptance of some forms of Petrine ministry exercised by the pope is evident from many responses to John Paul's invitation to dialogue. For Orthodox Christians, the primacy of the bishop of Rome was historically in the first centuries a primacy of honor, not of juridical authority. "The mandate to feed the flock that was entrusted to Peter, is shared by all the bishops. The Church is not a monarchy; she is a communion whose life is guided, not by the judgement of a single person, *unius arbitrium*, but by the common law of the Catholic Church." Hence, Orthodox churches could, perhaps, accept a primacy of honor for the bishop of Rome, who, as first among equals, exercises within a conciliar context pastoral concern, leadership, and love over the church.[22] Likewise, an Apostolic Armenian viewpoint sees the "primacy as a *service of unity* whose aim and duty is *to admonish and caution*, [and] hardly can be rejected by anybody, if it is practiced in conciliarity and collegiality together with bishops or patriarchs of other Churches" (emphasis original).[23]

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[20] "That all may be one: An Interview with Cardinal Walter Kasper," *U. S. Catholic* 67/10, October 2002, 19.

[21] These papers, presented at a symposium in Rome in December 1997, were published in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church: Toward a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue*, ed. James F. Puglisi (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999). Of interest also is the publication of the papers read at a conference held at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota, June 6-8, 1999 (*Church Unity and the Papal Office: An Ecumenical Dialogue on John Paul II's Encyclical* Ut Unum Sint *(That All May Be One)*, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001]). In response to numerous papers sent to Rome, the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity distributed a document titled "Petrine Ministry: A Working Paper" in June 2002.

[22] See John H. Erickson, "First Among Equals: Papal Primacy in an Orthodox Perspective," *Ecumenical Trends* 27/2 (February 1998): 1-9.

Along the same lines, Anglican bishops, in response to *Ut Unum Sint*, expressed the thought that "Anglicans are . . . by no means opposed to the principle and practice of a ministry at the world level in the service of unity."[24] Hence, if papal primacy were to function within the collegiality of other bishops and not be seen as an intrinsically superior form of *episcope*, such a ministry would serve the integrity of the church at both regional and universal levels.[25]

The Lutheran-Roman Catholic dialogues have offered a new way of approaching the conversation on the role of the modern papacy by separating the Petrine function of Christian ministry from the Petrine primacy claimed by the pope. Along with Lutherans, many Christian denominations generally agree with Catholics that Christian ministry does have a Petrine function of unity and oversight defined as a particular form of ministry exercised by a person, officeholder, or local church with reference to the church as a whole.[26] This distinction suggests that Peter has indeed a successor in all Christian communities and for the Roman Catholic Church to say it has such a Petrine ministry in its midst should not create, after all, that much controversy. David Yeago remarks that "the central theological achievement of the U.S. [Lutheran-Roman Catholic] dialogues was to relocate the issue of primacy in a teleological context, within which we can ask what good the primacy of Rome might serve, in what ways, and under what conditions."[27] For some Lutherans, the question to ask in these dialogues is "whether it would be legitimate and helpful for the Petrine function of the ministry to receive a special concentration of this sort [in the papacy]. One can ask what reasons there are for locating such a Petrine ministry precisely in the local church of Rome and its bishop."[28]

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[23] Mesrob K. Krikorian, "The Primacy of the Successor of the Apostle St. Peter from the Point of View of the Oriental Orthodox Churches," in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church: Toward a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue*, ed. James F. Puglisi (Collegeville, MN: Liturigical Press, 1999), 93.

[24] House of Bishops of the Church of England, *May They All Be One: A Response of the House of Bishops of the Church of England to* Ut Unum Sint (London: Church House, 1997), §44, cited in John Hind, "Primacy and Unity: An Anglican Contribution to a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue," in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church: Toward a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue*, ed. James F. Puglisi (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 38.

[25] Hind, 49.

[26] David Yeago, "The Papal Office and the Burden of History: A Lutheran View," in *Church Unity and the Papal Office: An Ecumenical Dialogue on John Paul II's Encyclical* Ut Unum Sint *(That All May Be One)*, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 102-103.

[27] Ibid., 103.

[28] Ibid. Lutheran theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg is even more open to the universal ministry of the papacy when he states: "It is a fact of Christian history that with the end of the primitive Jerusalem church the church of Rome became the historical center of Christianity. If any Christian bishop can speak for the whole church in situations when this may be needed, it will be primarily the bishop of Rome. In spite of all the bitter controversies resulting from chronic misuse of the authority of Rome in power politics, there is here no realistic alternative. . . . We ought freely to admit the fact of the primacy of the Roman Church and its bishop in Christianity" (*Systematic Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998], 3:420-421).

Given these qualified responses of Orthodox and Protestant theologians, John Quinn, former archbishop of San Francisco, is correct in saying that "it is immensely significant that in Orthodox, Anglican, or Protestant dialogues about Christian unity there is no mention of abolishing the papacy as a condition for unity. There is, in fact, a growing realization of the true service the Petrine ministry offers the whole Church, how truly providential the primacy is."[29] Such an assessment of the ecumenical landscape on dialogues regarding the future role of the papacy reveals that much work has been done in theological thinking during the last fifty years. Opinions have certainly changed since the times when the papacy was commonly equated with the Antichrist or the beast of the apocalypse.

A Response

Historically, the theological contestation of the papal primacy involved essentially the preparation of studies "in which Scripture and the Fathers were combed for arguments for and against" the Roman Catholic claims. "Long before the beginning of the modern ecumenical movement, every shred of possible evidence on the development of the papacy . . . [was] gathered and organized into mutually contradictory systems of interpretation and argument."[30] But now, however, according to Quinn's assessment, increasing numbers of Protestant theologians regard papal primacy as a "providential" exercise of Petrine ministry that may play an important role in achieving church unity.[31]

I wish to offer a few reasons why I believe the biblical witness and the historical evidence do not support some of the current thinking on Petrine ministry and papal primacy. Even if the next few pages may resemble earlier studies "in which Scripture and the Fathers are combed for arguments" against the Roman claims, I still believe that genuine theological reflection on this subject must be enlightened by biblical and historical evidence. Furthermore, current Roman Catholic scholarship supports the assertion that it is biblically and historically inaccurate to link the current system of papal government with what happened in Rome between 34 and 150 A.D. While many scholars agree with this biblical and historical assessment, there are fundamental differences regarding how the historical facts are interpreted. My survey of biblical and historical evidences will necessarily be brief. After considering the lack of biblical evidence to support the institution of the papacy based on the ministry of Peter in Rome, we will consider the witness of the Apostolic Fathers on the development of church government and the steps taken in the development of the concept of apostolic tradition and succession in the second century. I will end this article with a brief look at the impact of theological methodology on this discussion.

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[29] John R. Quinn, *The Reform of the Papacy: The Costly Call to Christian Unity* (New York: Crossroad, 1999), 181. See also idem, "The Exercise of the Primacy" in *Commonweal* 123/13, July 12, 1996, 11-20.

[30] Yeago, 101.

[31] Quinn, *The Reform of the Papacy*, 181.

The Biblical Evidence

However disputable the interpretation of Matt 16:13-19 and other Petrine texts may be, there is no obvious support in Scripture for the institution of the papacy.[32] In fact, both Peter and Paul taught that Jesus is the rock on which the church has been founded.[33] Nowhere do we find in the NT that Jesus or the apostles instituted a sacramental episcopacy or papal primacy based on Peter's apostleship to promote, foster, or maintain the unity of early Christians. Rather, unity is defined in terms of Christians being in Christ through their acceptance of Jesus as Savior and Lord and through baptism (John 11:51, 52; Gal 3:26-28). Their unity is rooted in their common relationship with a heavenly Father, expressed in loving service for one another, and in devotion to the truth of God's word (John 17). Unity is experienced in faithfulness and devotion to the apostles' teachings and in service to the same Lord (Acts 2:42-47). As the apostles established new churches throughout Asia Minor, they established a presbyteral system of church government (Acts 14:23). When issues arose that threatened to divide the early church, a council of representatives from local churches met with the apostles to discuss, resolve the issues, and preserve Christian unity (Acts 15).

Also significant is the silence of Scripture on the historical role played by Peter in many aspects of early church organization and his relationship with the church of Rome. Nowhere does Scripture reference Peter as the founder of the church of Rome. Later, when Church Fathers began to make references to the church of Rome, they referred to Peter *and* Paul together.[34] The earliest reason offered to give some preeminence to Rome was not that Peter had founded the church in Rome, nor that he had been its first bishop, but rather that both Peter *and* Paul had suffered martyrdom in Rome and there had witnessed for their faith.[35] When Irenaeus of Lyons made a list of the bishops of Rome as an example of a church which could trace its origin and teaching to the apostles in his argument against the Gnostics, he named neither Peter nor Paul, but Linus as the first bishop of Rome.[36]

[32] This conclusion is readily accepted by Catholic scholars. Wills comments: "The papacy did not come into existence at the same time as the church. In the words of John Henry Newman, 'While Apostles were on earth, there was the display neither of Bishop nor Pope.' Peter was not a bishop in Rome. There were not bishops in Rome for at least a hundred years after the death of Christ. . . . Newman thought the papacy could not, at the earliest, arise until after the fourth century, when the Nicene Council exercised the power that the popes would later claim: 'I say then the Pope is the heir of the Ecumenical Hierarchy of the fourth century, as being, what I may call, heir by default'" (*Why I Am a Catholic*, 55).

[33] Acts 4:11; 1 Pet 2:4-8; 1 Cor 10:4; Eph 2:19-22; and Rom 9:33.

[34] *1 Clement* 5; Ignatius, *Romans* 4; Irenaeus, *Against Heresies* I.25.2, III.1.1, III.3.2, IV.35.2; Tertullian, *Prescriptions against the Heretics* 36. Cyprian of Carthage seems to be the first to associate only Peter with the preeminence of the church of Rome in *The Unity of the Catholic Church*, 4.

[35] *1 Clement* 5. Tertullian followed the same line of argument in *Prescriptions against the Heretics* 36.

[36] Irenaeus *Against Heresies* III.3.3. Although in this passage Irenaeus refers to the blessed apostles Peter and Paul as the joint founders of Rome, it is more accurate to say that the church

Early Church Government

Scripture gives a number of indications that the apostles instituted a presbyteral system of church government in the early church (e.g., Acts 14:23, 20:17, 28; Titus 1:5; 1 Pet 5:1-4). Likewise, the writings of the Apostolic Fathers contain numerous indications that early churches were led by a collegial group of presbyters (elders) or overseers (bishops).[37] Where the office of bishop existed, as in some churches of Asia Minor, the leadership of the bishop is clearly exercised within a council of presbyters.[38]

The epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians (*1 Clement*, ca. 95 A.D.) sheds some crucial light on the forms of church government in the early church. The occasion that prompted this letter was a schism among the presbyters in Corinth, some of whom seem to have been dismissed unfairly (44.3). Clement wrote on behalf of the church of Rome to exhort the Corinthians to end the strife and restore the unity and harmony they had lost.[39] Of interest is Clement's discussion of ministry in Corinth and the vocabulary he used. As Clement discusses the office of overseer, he indicates that the apostles provided for an orderly succession in the ministry they established (44.1-3) and that this function of oversight is held by a group of presbyters-overseers. From this, Francis Sullivan concludes that "there is general agreement among scholars that the structure of ministry in the church of Rome at this time would have resembled that in Corinth: with a group of presbyters sharing leadership, perhaps with a differentiation of roles among them, but with no one bishop in charge."[40] He adds:

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of Rome was already established before their first arrival in Rome. This is certainly the case with Paul, who wrote his letter to the Christians living in Rome long before he arrived in Rome (Francis Sullivan, *From Apostles to Bishops: The Development of the Episcopacy in the Early Church* [New York: Newman, 2001], 149).

[37] In agreement with many other scholars, Brian E. Daley states that in the Pastoral Letters, *1 Clement*, and *The Shepherd of Hermas*, "the terms ἐπίσκοπος ('bishop,' 'overseer,' 'supervisor') and πρεσβύτερος ('elder') are used interchangeably, and so suggest government by a body of elders rather than a single bishop" ("The Ministry of Primacy and the Communion of Churches" in *Church Unity and the Papal Office: An Ecumenical Dialogue on John Paul II's Encyclical* Ut Unum Sint [*That All May Be One*], ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. Jenson [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001], 39).

[38] Scholars argue that the use of the plural forms of *presbyteros* (presbyter) and *episkopos* (overseer) in the writings of the Apostolic Fathers (e.g., *Didache* 15; *1 Clement* 42, 44, 57) is an indication that church authority was under the responsibility of a council of elders or overseers. Sullivan, 90, comments: "The *Didache* does not mention presbyters, but it has *episkopous* in the plural. For that reason the word is best translated as 'overseers,' as there is no indication that the local church of the *Didache* was led by a single bishop." See also Hans von Campenhausen, *Ecclesiastical Authority and Spiritual Power in the Church of the First Three Centuries* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1969), 76-85.

[39] Sullivan, 91, remarks: "In the past, Catholic writers have interpreted this intervention as an early exercise of Roman primacy, but now it is generally recognized as the kind of exhortation one church could address to another without any claim to authority over it."

[40] Ibid., 100.

> *I Clement* certainly does not support the theory that before the apostles died, they appointed one man as bishop in each of the churches they had founded. This letter witnesses rather to the fact that in the last decade of the first century, the collegial ministry of a group of presbyters, like that seen in the later writings of the New Testament, was still maintained in the Pauline church of Corinth. This was most likely the case also in the church of Rome at this period.[41]

The letters of Ignatius of Antioch, written about 115 A.D., have greatly influenced theological reflection on ecclesiology and continue to be a focus of scholarly contention and discussion.[42] While many scholars argue that Ignatius's approach to church unity may be colored by his own experience with the church of Antioch and the apparent schism it experienced just before he left for Rome, his concerns for church unity and the role he ascribes to the bishop of a local church are an important part of any discussion on the development of episcopacy in the early church. In his opposition to false teachers, Ignatius stresses the importance of the local bishops in preserving the unity of the church. Not only is the bishop to be regarded as the Lord himself (*Ephesians* 6.1), but, in his hierarchical structure, the office of bishop becomes constitutive of the whole congregation; the congregation exists because there is a bishop (*Trallians* 1.1; *Ephesians* 1.1). However, Ignatius saw the bishop as working in harmony with his presbyters; in fact, "the harmony of the presbytery with the bishop is clearly a key to the unity of the whole community [*Ephesians* 4.1]."[43] What is not clear in Ignatius's letters (and is a focus of ongoing discussions) is whether the people Ignatius identifies as bishops in the various churches he writes to had been elected as bishops, or whether he is the one who considers them to be the bishops of these churches from among a group of presbyters. A case in point is Polycarp's letter to the Philippians written a short time after Ignatius's letters. Polycarp, who is identified by Ignatius as the bishop of Smyrna (*Polycarp* 1.1), speaks of the presbyters at Philippi, but makes no mention of a bishop there, nor does he refer to himself as a bishop. Other documents from the same period (the *Didache, the Shepherd of Hermas*, and Justin Martyr's *First Apology*) do not speak of a single bishop having oversight in Christian churches. These historical evidences seem to point in one direction: early Christian churches, up to about the middle of the second century, were led by a group of presbyters, and few churches had appointed a single bishop within a group of presbyters to oversee their communities. This is also true of the church of Rome. The primacy of the bishop of Rome emerged much later as a result of a synergy between various ecclesiological, historical, and political factors.[44]

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[41] Ibid., 101. William La Due agrees: "The situation in Rome was no doubt similar. The Roman church was governed by a college of presbyters or presbyters-bishops until roughly the middle of the second century" (*The Chair of Saint Peter: A History of the Papacy* [Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1999], 21).

[42] J. B. Lightfoot, *The Apostolic Fathers*, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 79.

[43] Sullivan, 107. Interestingly, in his letter to the Romans, Ignatius makes no mention of a bishop in Rome. He likely knew that the Roman church was not presided over by a single bishop.

[44] Kasper, 19, comments: "Everybody knows there has been a long history of its [the

The Concept of Apostolic Tradition and Succession

When Gnosticism began to threaten the unity of the church in the second century, church leaders appealed to the concept of apostolic tradition and succession to support their claim to historic Christianity. Interestingly, however, the origin of the concept of apostolic tradition rests with Gnosticism. It was the Gnostics who first claimed to have received their special teachings from the apostles and to possess the true historical, apostolic tradition. These teachings were not accessible to everyone, but only to initiated witnesses of the apostles or their disciples.[45] While Christianity was at first hesitant with the concept of tradition,[46] it adopted this concept in response to the Gnostics. For the early church, apostolic tradition and succession referred to the joint testimony of the early Christian communities and to the apostolic teachings they agreed on. As such, the church was a community of communities, opposed to the private revelations and charismatic individualism of the Gnostics, and their joint authority was the basis of their opposition to Gnosticism. The Church's appeal to the apostolic teachings and their references to chains of witnesses or teachers, extending back to the apostles, confirmed in their minds that their apostolic tradition was more reliable than that of the Gnostics.[47]

Hegesippus (ca. 180) seems to be the first author to refer to this concept by compiling a list of the bishops of Rome.[48] "Hegesippus apparently felt that by compiling a continuous list of bishops who handed the revelation of Jesus down—one to the other from generation to generation in each of the major apostolic churches—he could most effectively guarantee the authenticity of the Church's doctrine." Hegesippus's contribution was apparently his appeal that there was an uninterrupted "handing down" of the authentic message of Jesus in the Roman church from the time of the apostles.[49] Irenaeus of Lyons perfected Hegesippus's list in his *Against Heresies* (III.3.3), with the same intent to appeal "to the tradition handed down by the apostles and transmitted in the Christian churches by the bishops who succeeded one another as teachers down to his own day."[50]

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papacy's] evolution. The Petrine ministry in the first century was not exercised in the same way the bishop of Rome exercises it today."

[45] Von Campenhausen, 158-159.

[46] The teachings of Jesus and Paul were critical of the concept of tradition: Mark 7:1-13; Col 2:8; 1 Tim 6:20; 2 Tim 1:12-14.

[47] Von Campenhausen, 162-163; Wills, *Why I am a Catholic*, 63.

[48] Hegesippus's list has been preserved in part in Eusebius's *Ecclesiastical History* IV.22.

[49] La Due, 26. Eusebius does not give Hegesippus's complete list of the bishops of Rome from the time of Peter but acknowledges that Hegesippus made such a list while he was in Rome.

[50] Sullivan, 145. See also von Campenhausen, 170. Irenaeus's list of bishops in Rome is given as an example of what could be done with many other churches founded by the apostles or their coworkers. His list includes the following twelve names up to his time: Linus, Anacletus, Clement, Evaristus, Alexander, Sixtus, Telesphorus, Hyginus, Pius, Anicetus, Soter, Eleutherus.

However attractive these two lists may be, scholars have raised some issues regarding their validity. La Due remarks that

> the historical validity of the Roman list [in Hegesippus] is questionable because it is now quite generally accepted that the monarchical episcopate in Rome did not originate much before 140-150 A.D. The notion of apostolic succession, however, was clearly shifting from emphasis on the authentic teaching, which was handed down from generation to generation, to the list of teachers—one succeeding the other in an unbroken chain. The names prior to Anicetus that Hegesippus enumerated—people such as Linus, Clement, Evaristus, Telesphorus, etc.—were in all probability historical figures who were in one way or another prominent presbyters or presbyter-bishops in the Roman congregation. However, to position them in a continuous line of monarchical heads from Peter to Anicetus is not historically justifiable.[51]

In his *Prescriptions Against the Heretics* (ca. 200), Tertullian also challenged the right of Gnostics to claim their teachings were given to them by the apostles or their coworkers. Tertullian's objections asserted that the heretics have no right to argue their case from Scripture since the Scriptures are the exclusive property of the apostolic churches, in which the teaching of the apostles has been faithfully handed on.[52] Faithfulness to the apostles' teachings and doctrines is the real qualification for apostolicity. His argument is based on the harmony of teaching existing between churches founded by the apostles and newer churches and, hence, communion exists between older and newer churches because there is harmony and faithfulness to the same apostolic teaching. Sullivan comments: "It is noteworthy that Tertullian emphasizes the apostolic churches as reliable witnesses to what the apostles taught, rather than bishops as successors to the apostles. His proof that the Catholic churches of his day remained faithful to apostolic doctrine consisted of the assertion that they were in communion with churches known to have been founded by the apostles."[53] The authoritative point of reference is the teaching of the apostles, not the successors to the apostles.[54]

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[51] La Due, 26. Sullivan, 149, agrees with this analysis: "What I said there [in the previous chapter] about Hegesippus's list would also apply to that of Irenaeus, namely, given the fact that toward the end of the second century the clergy of Rome could provide the names of the men who *at that time were thought of* as having been the past bishops of their church, we can conclude that they remembered these men as the principal leaders and teachers among the Roman presbyters. At what point in time the leading presbyters in Rome began to be called 'bishops' remains unknown."

[52] Tertullian *Prescriptions against the Heretics* 15, 20.

[53] Sullivan, 156. He, 157, adds: "Tertullian's argument took for granted that the apostles and 'apostolic men' [i.e., coworkers] who founded churches had left bishops in charge of them and that the bishops of his day were the successors of those original bishops. It seems evident that he did not consider this a matter of controversy. . . . [H]is argument focused on the apostolicity of the Catholic churches, proven by the fact that they could provide a list of their bishops going back from the present incumbent to one appointed by an apostle or by an 'apostolic man.'" Catholic churches which could not trace their list of bishops back to apostolic times simply because they had been founded more recently also had a valid claim to apostolicity: they shared the same faith with the churches founded by apostles and were in full communion with them.

A Matter of Methodology

Another and greater issue regarding the primacy of the successor of Peter is the clear acknowledgment by theologians and church historians that references to the NT and early church history will not resolve the issue, but that a lack of NT and historical evidence is no longer an obstacle. This thought is presented by James Puglisi in his summary of the outcome of a symposium in Rome on the subject of Petrine ministry and papal primacy: "In spite of the fact that we would like to find the solution in our queries of today on such issues as the primacy and the papacy in the New Testament, the fact is that the New Testament alone cannot provide the answer to many of the issues which touch upon the papacy and the primacy of the Petrine ministry."[55] Such a clear admission among ecumenical scholars is, I believe, a matter of concern for biblical theologians, who should voice uneasiness with such an open departure from biblical theology and the acceptance of a nonbiblical ecclesiology. This claim that the NT cannot provide all the answers regarding the ministry of the successor of Peter is predicated by the acceptance of a higher-critical hermeneutical approach to Scripture and history. For instance, Catholic church historian Klaus Schatz asks three penetrating questions at the beginning of his book *Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present*:

> The further question whether there was any notion of an enduring office beyond Peter's lifetime, if posed in purely historical terms, should probably be answered in the negative. That is, if we ask whether the historical Jesus, in commissioning Peter, expected him to have successors, or whether the author of the Gospel of Matthew, writing after Peter's death, was aware that Peter and his commission survived in the leaders of the Roman community who succeeded him, the answer to both cases is probably 'no.' . . . If we ask in addition whether the primitive Church was aware, after Peter's death, that his authority had passed to the next bishop of Rome, or in other words that the

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[54] I believe Christ's discussion of the concept of Jewish succession can enlighten us to some extent. When he and some Jewish leaders argued over the validity of his testimony in John 8, the leaders claimed to know better than Jesus since they were descendants of Abraham. Jesus questioned this claim: "If you were Abraham's children, then you would do the things Abraham did" (John 8:39). In plotting to kill Jesus, they were not doing the works of Abraham. Rather, for Jesus a mere lineal descent from Abraham without a spiritual connection with him is of no value. I deduce from this discussion that apostolic succession is not to be defined as a succession of ordinations from one bishop to another; it does not rest upon the transmission of ecclesiastical authority, but upon a spiritual relation and faithfulness to the teachings of the apostles.

[55] James Puglisi, "Afterword," in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church: Toward a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue*, ed. James F. Puglisi (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999), 198. Metropolitan John of Pergamon made a similar assessment in his presentation "Primacy in the Church: An Orthodox Approach": "The historical method . . . has been used in the past extensively and . . . has led to no fruitful result. The question whether the primacy of the Bishop of Rome in the Church can be justified on the ground of biblical and Patristic evidence cannot decide the issue" (ibid., 117). "The primacy of the Bishop of Rome has to be theologically justified or else be ignored altogether" (ibid., 123).

> head of the community at Rome was now the successor of Peter, the Church's rock and hence the subject of the promise in Matthew 16:18-19, the question, put in those terms, must certainly be given a negative answer. . . . If one had asked a Christian in the year 100, 200, or even 300 whether the bishop of Rome was the head of all Christians, or whether there was a supreme bishop over all the other bishops and having the last word in questions affecting the whole Church, he or she would certainly have said no.[56]

Yet, having said this, Schatz concludes that these are not the right questions to ask. He believes these negative answers are inevitable because we approach the first centuries with the yardstick of our modern standards. He admits that a study of historical documents with such a frame of mind will inevitably bring these conclusions; and he believes the primacy is an institution that arose over many centuries, shaped by various historical contexts, in reaction to and as an answer to particular historical and political needs and concerns within the church. Reading and analyzing historical documents, whether they be Scripture or early Church Fathers, will lead to a proper understanding of the development of the papacy, its merits, value, and role, only if Scripture, tradition, and history are studied within a proper historical and theological hermeneutic.[57] Schatz's hermeneutical approach outlines the development of papal primacy within the contingency of history, culture, and politics:[58] "It is certainly clear that the primacy did not develop only as a result of theological factors and ecclesiastical necessities, but also *through political factors and interests*, these moreover being closely inter-related in pre-modern times" (emphasis original).[59] What seems obvious in Schatz's approach to Scripture and history is an interest in finding a proper theological and historical justification for the current ministry of the successor of Peter.

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[56] Klaus Schatz, *Papal Primacy: From Its Origins to the Present* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1996), 1-3.

[57] Ibid., 3. Sullivan, viii, also recognizes that "the question that divides Catholics and Protestants is not whether, or how rapidly, the development from the local leadership of a college of presbyters to that of a single bishop took place, but whether the result of that development is rightly judged an element of the divinely willed structure of the church. This question asks about the theological significance of a post-New Testament development, which history alone cannot answer."

[58] Klaus Schatz adds: "The historical problem of the primacy consists in the constant amalgamation—from the beginning and throughout all its further development—of these two factors that can never be clearly separated: concern for Christian unity and, at the same time, a conception of this unity in contingent forms of cultural unity, of better self-defense against ideologies or political systems, and even an expression of the primacy in political or quasi-political forms. . . . [T]he problem of *continuity* or *rupture* arises whenever the primacy, in response to new historical challenges, takes on a new historical form. As a general rule we can say that a right or a new idea is never invented without roots in the earlier tradition" ("Historical Considerations Concerning the Problem of the Primacy," in *Petrine Ministry and the Unity of the Church: Toward a Patient and Fraternal Dialogue*, ed. James Puglisi [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1999], 2).

[59] Ibid., 9. Schatz, 4-7, identifies five steps in the development of papal primacy after the fourth century.

Conclusion

With reference to Petrine ministry, there is no clear indication in Scripture that Jesus intended to give to Peter a primacy of ministry among his disciples, or that he appointed him to become the head of the church. Scripture and early church history indicate that Peter was not the founder of the church of Rome, that he was not its first bishop and that Rome did not have a bishop until about the middle of the second century. As admitted by many scholars, neither Jesus nor the apostles had in mind the institution of a universal Petrine ministry or papal primacy when the NT church was founded. Furthermore, both Scripture and early church history confirm that the system of church governance instituted by the apostles was a presbyteral system, not a monarchical episcopacy. When the concept of apostolic tradition and succession began to be used among Christians in their opposition to Gnosticism, their intent was to safeguard the teachings of the apostles as found in their writings and not to institute a new form of church government. What mattered in their argumentation was that a church's teaching was in harmony with that of other churches, even if it could not trace its origin to an apostle or one of the apostles' coworkers. Christians instituted the concept of apostolic tradition and succession to uphold the teachings and testimony of Scripture, not to replace them.

The hermeneutical approach and analysis espoused by many to support the modern Petrine ministry of the papacy are not new; this is an example of the persistent conflict between Scripture and tradition. The classic Protestant position is still valid: the teachings of Scripture should serve as the only infallible and reliable guide to doctrinal and theological developments in ecclesiology. The biblical witness and historical evidences from the early church do not support a universal Petrine ministry exercised by the primacy of the bishop of Rome.

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RECONSTRUCTING EVANGELICAL THEOLOGY: IS THE OPEN VIEW OF GOD A GOOD IDEA?[1]

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Some colleagues in the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) have become concerned whether my work in general and the open model of God in particular merit the label "evangelical." This is a fair question—if evangelical means anything theologically, it must be possible to go over a line and forfeit that name. If evangelical is compatible with anything and everything, it is meaningless. By no means do I treat lightly the fact that I am criticized by colleagues in the ETS whom I admire, e.g., Millard Erickson, Bruce Ware, William Lane Craig, John M. Frame, Norman Geisler, Robert A. Pyne, Stephen R. Spencer, John Piper, Robert E. Picirilli, Roger Nicole. Undoubtedly, some of the ideas I have advanced need to be critiqued. Daniel Strange writes:

> Can Pinnock still be called an evangelical theologian? This depends on your definition of evangelicalism. Perhaps Pinnock should take solace from the adage that those you criticise most are usually the ones closest to you. If we are to take Pinnock's sociological definition of evangelicalism as a loose coalition based on a number of family resemblances, then it will be easy to categorise his theology as evangelical.[2]

Although evangelicalism is a movement without a confession, it has theological interests and a theological ethos. One expects evangelical theologians (for example) to hold to sound teaching and contend for the faith once delivered, though in a transdenominational way. Differences can be expected, given the ecumenical character of the movement and experiments in theological reform in which new ground is broken. The movement is not stagnant theologically—new light still emanates from God's holy Word (even in conservative circles), and at least a little room exists for theological creativity. Thus evangelical theology can be conservative and contemporary. In recent years, the antimodernist coalition has entertained a measure of rethinking of issues. For some, this is a sign of health and vigor—for others, it is a disaster. From my perspective, I see it as a search for a generous orthodoxy and an effective church-wide witness.

Theologically, this is possible because of the work of the Holy Spirit making possible a hermeneutic of Spirit, not merely of flesh. On one hand, the Spirit binds us to the definitive salvific action of God in Jesus Christ and, on the other hand, causes everything which Jesus said and did to be seen in a new light. According to John, the Paraclete guides the community into more truth on the basis of the original gospel, so that we can reproclaim it in timely ways.[3] The Spirit does not add to or surpass what Christ has revealed, but causes everything to be revealed afresh. One could think of it in musical terms as improvisation, where the performer discovers in the score a range of fresh, unexplored possibilities.[4] One can speak of a hermeneutic of the Spirit, not of the flesh. [5]

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[1] This paper was presented at the Evangelical Theological Society annual meetings in Colorado Springs, CO, November 14-16, 2001.

[2] A recent book of critical essays has appeared, edited by Tony Gray and Christopher Sinkinson, *Reconstructing Theology: A Critical Assessment of the Theology of Clark Pinnock* (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000). Daniel Strange's comment is on p. 18.

Thus, as we search the Scriptures, we strive to hear what the Spirit is saying to the churches and discern what matters most in the present situation. What are the signs of the times telling us? What new treasures can be brought out of the storehouse? (Matt 13:32). This makes theology an altogether delightful activity and full of surprises.[6] Stanley Grenz remarks: "Theology is progressive, in that it is an ongoing discipline that repeatedly gives rise to new ways of looking at old questions, brings into view previously undervalued aspects of the Christian belief-mosaic, and occasionally even advances the church's knowledge of theological truth."[7]

Fresh proposals in theology are always being made, even when it concerns the nature of God. The reality of God is, after all, deep and inexhaustible. St. Paul speaks of "the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God" (Rom 11:33) and of "the love of Christ that surpasses knowledge" (Eph 3:19). God is an inexhaustible mystery and the ways of responding to him are innumerable. Though we "see in a mirror dimly" and "know only in part," the subject always invites fresh thinking in a spirit of cooperation (1 Cor 13:12). It is not enough just to rehearse the tradition—we ought to welcome fresh acts of interpretation. Let us not be afraid of such exercises, but hope for enrichment out of dialogue.[8]

The question before us now is whether the open view of God is a proposal that can be considered evangelical. The model was proposed seven years ago in my book *The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God*[9] and since then has been widely discussed and represented in such books as my *Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God's Openness*;[10] in the dialogue between John Sanders and Christopher Hall in *Christianity Today*;[11] in John Sanders's *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence*;[12] and in Gregory S. Boyd's *God of the Possible: A Biblical Introduction to the Open View of God*[13] and *Satan and the Problem of Evil*.[14]

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[3] James D. G. Dunn, *Jesus and the Spirit: A Study of the Religious and Charismatic Experience of Jesus and the First Christians as Reflected in the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1975), 351-353.

[4] Hans Küng, *The Church* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), 191-203.

[5] Francis Martin, "Spirit and Flesh in Doing Theology," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 18 (2001): 5-31.

[6] As in Jürgen Moltmann, *The Coming of God: Christian Eschatology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), xiii-xiv.

[7] Stanley J. Grenz, *Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 243.

[8] S. Mark Heim has also applied this insight to an understanding of other faiths in *The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology of Religious Ends* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001). Heim, like many others today, is an open theist without saying so. Other examples would include Richard Swinburne, Paul S. Fiddes, John Polkinghorne, Nicholas Wolterstorff, and Ward.

[9] Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1994; and Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 1994.

Exposition

The open view of God is a trinitarian theology in which Father, Son, and Spirit eternally give and receive love. Not a philosophical speculation, it lifts up the heart of the biblical faith and projects a vision of God's gracious, relational nature. It affirms that God, in love and by his sovereign power, created the world, making human beings capable of experiencing love. To this end, God gave them the capacity to enter into relationship with him and fellow creatures and granted them the freedom necessary for such relationships to develop. Despite the fact that we abused our freedom by turning away from God, he remains faithful to his intentions for creation. This reading of Scripture directs us away from abstract, impersonal, and relationally detached approaches to the divine mystery and toward interactive and personal categories. Sanders summarizes: "Whereas classical theism's root metaphor is God as the pillar around which all else moves, the root metaphor for relational theism is a personal God in loving relations with creaturely persons."[15]

To speak of God as triune suggests that God is not a solitary monad, but self-communicating love; not the supreme will to power, but the will to community. It sees God as the ultimate power, whose very being consists in giving, receiving, and sharing love. Thus the reign of the triune God is a rule of sovereign love, not a rule of brute force. God is not absolute power, infinite egocentrism, or majestic solitariness. The triune God is creative, sacrificial, and empowering love, whose glory consists not in dominating others, but in sharing with them. In our experience of it, love is accompanied by vulnerability. Inauthentic love seeks control like a possessive parent holding on desperately to a child and denying it room to grow. Authentic love is precarious and brings with it the risk of rejection.

To introduce new terminology, one could think of the open view of God as a theology of self-emptying (or *kenosis*). The term is often associated with Christology, but it has wider implications. It was first taken up to express the notion of the Son of God surrendering the divine glory in order to become a human being. He chose to enter fully into the human condition and to share in human suffering. There was a self-limitation of the divine Word in taking flesh and becoming a human being. What a mystery—God wanting to be loved by us and willing to make himself vulnerable! The eternal Son became a fragile child, dependent on human care. Though we are completely dependent on him, God is willing to be dependent on us.[16] The open view of God sees self-giving and self-sacrificing action for the good of others in Jesus Christ, who is the very self-expression of the Father (Heb 1:3). It is characteristic of love to be self-emptying and self-sacrificing, and the incarnation reveals to us how God likes to use his power not to dominate, but to love.

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[10] Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001; and Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2001.

[11] May 21, 2001, 39-45 and June 11, 2001, 50-56.

[12] Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998.

[13] Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000.

[14] Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001.

[15] Sanders, 175.

Though God could at any time destroy or modify the world, he has decided to let himself be affected by creation, delighting in its beauty and grieving over its tragic aspects. God freely chose self-limitation for the sake of a covenant with humankind. Not the God of Aristotle, indifferent to the world, thinking of nothing but himself, the God of the gospel is completely aware of the finite world and intimately involved in its flow of events. Indeed, God is the supreme actor on the stage of history. God's experience of the world is such that he deals with us in temporal ways and experiences events as they occur. It means that our actions impact God and affect the future. In creating, there was a *kenosis* of omnipotence. God allowed a created order to exist alongside himself and let it function so that while all that happens is permitted by God, not all that happens is in accordance with God's will.

We would speak also of a *kenosis* of eternity. By bringing into being a temporal creation whose nature is expressed in unfolding history, the Creator granted reality to time and actualized in his nature a temporal pole such that he knows things as they really are, temporally in their succession. God knows how to be involved with time and history, indicating that there must be in God both that which is wholly free from variation (so that God's character is eternally unchangeable), but also that which corresponds to the varying circumstances of a temporal creation. The eternal God evidently can embrace the experiences of time. The incarnation involves so drastic an involvement with temporal reality that we can only conclude that time is not foreign to the divine nature.

A controversial aspect of the open view of God lies in its speaking of a *kenosis* of omniscience. If God does not control the future in exhaustive detail, the open view of God takes it as unlikely that he would know the future in exhaustive detail either. If this is a world of real becoming, open to a future that is being brought about both by causal principles (such as natural law) and by human agency and divine providence, it seems likely that the future of the world would, to some extent, still be in the process of being decided. (This is an intellectual decision, but it enjoys a certain amount of support from the OT in particular.[17]) We take it that God's close engagement with time implies that

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[16] Ronald J. Feenstra takes the first step: "Reconsidering Kenotic Christology," in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays*, ed. Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), 128-152.

[17] Terrence Fretheim, *The Suffering of God: An Old Testament Perspective* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), chap. 4.

God does not yet know all that will eventually happen. If the future does not yet exist, God may not yet know all of it. He knows all that can be known but, because he is engaged with time, does not know all that will eventually be known. If God's project is dynamic and the future open to what creatures (as well as God) will decide, then the future is not yet fixed and may not be exhaustively foreknown. This does not imply that God is unprepared for any future or would be incompetent in facing it. God knows every possibility, but perhaps not as actualities. Practically speaking, the advantage of the open view at this point is that if we thought the future was still open to being changed, we might take a little more responsibility for it. This may explain why it is that practically oriented people seem to accept the open view more readily than those who hang on to the old traditions.[18]

Let me pause to say that all evangelicals affirm that God is omnipotent and omniscient. There is no disagreement *that* God is omnipotent and omniscient, but only *how* God is omnipotent and omniscient. If it is OK to discuss how God is omnipotent, why isn't it OK to discuss how God is omniscient? It would seem perfectly legitimate. In this matter, the open view of God is a version of free-will theism, not identical with classical Arminianism. For this reason, it should perhaps be called neo-Arminian since it shares a great deal with Arminianism, e.g., God's universal salvific will, genuine interactivity, real freedom. In our view, it is a stronger and more radical form of that position. Further, it is more of a threat to the Augustinians, provoking a stronger reaction from them than to the Arminianism with which they are familiar. The Arminians, for their part, have to decide whether they think the open view of God is a legitimate extension of their position or a danger to it. What the Augustinians' hope is, is that the classical Arminians will join them in condemning the open view of God and shut it out of the evangelical discussion once and for all. I sincerely hope this does not happen.[19] I do, however, have a question for all critics. I would like to ask them, Do you think it is possible for God to create a universe, the future of which he would not exhaustively foreknow? If it is possible, doesn't it look as if this is such a world? If it is not possible, who is limiting divine sovereignty?

Open theists believe that they embrace a beautiful vision of God. Though self-sufficient in glory and lacking in nothing, God nevertheless gives room to creatures and deploys his power on their behalf, not against them. For the sake of love, God self-limits and even self-sacrifices himself. If he had only love without power, as in process theism, God would be a compassionate but impotent spectator of the world. If he had only power without love, as in deterministic theology, God would be a cosmic tyrant, holding the whole of history in an unrelenting grasp. As it is, God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is neither a bystander nor the director of a puppet theater. God is love and deploys his power for the good of humanity. God permits the wayward freedom of his creatures and enters into their pain in order that, finally, they might share his bliss. The history of the world is the movement from divine self-emptying to creaturely fulfillment in God. Open theists rejoice in the freedom to understand God not as an indifferent metaphysical iceberg or a solitary narcissistic being who suffers from his own completeness, but as a free and creative trinitarian person.

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[18] Some critics ask how we can hold to biblical inerrancy if we deny the clear teaching of Scripture that God knows all the events of the future. The reason we can do so is that we do not find the Bible to be clearly teaching any such thing. It would be a dark day if the ETS began to expel members for holding biblical interpretations of which the majority disapprove. We would be saddened, for example, if Roger Nicole were to be expelled for his feminism.

[19] See Tony Gray, "Beyond Arminius: Pinnock's Doctrine of God and the Evangelical Tradition," in *Reconstructing Theology*, ed. Tony Gray and Christopher Sinkinson (Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 120-146.

Although this way of thinking is more developed in open theism, it is not as if other evangelicals have not noticed problems in the traditional approaches. They too are revising conventional theism, but hope that no one will notice. Most of the issues, apart from the question of omniscience, are discussed by critics of the open view, e.g., the nature of divine immutability (Bruce Ware), the divine pathos (Wayne A. Grudem), and divine temporality (Ronald Nash). John M. Frame wants to speak of God's "temporal immanence" and "real interaction in time." Remarkably, Frame says that God can feel, as do human beings, the flow of time from day to day. He can mourn one moment and rejoice the next. There is a give-and-take relationship between God and creatures. He can change in some respects, but not in others. Frame agrees with Jürgen Moltmann that God suffered in the suffering of Christ. In saying so, Frame may have opened up a rift between his Calvinist version and the Thomistic version of classical theism. (Norman Geisler will not like it and neither will Paul Helm, I'd judge.)[20] It is important to say that the issue is evidently not whether we should revise classical theism, but how we should revise it in ways faithful to Scripture.

More interestingly, if they keep making such changes, these critics may end up open theists themselves! If scholars want to put aside, for instance, the traditional concept of impassibility, make no mistake they are on the path toward the open view of God. Pyne and Stephen R. Spencer observe that Charles Hodge thought that God experiences changing emotions, but they do not seem aware of the fact that if Hodge did so, he was not thinking coherently, given the other things that he held to. How can God be timeless and, at the same time, be experiencing changes of emotion?[21] At one level, evangelicals know that God loves and is loved, acts and is acted upon, moves and is moved, but on another level they have trouble admitting it theologically. Somehow, and I think this gets to the heart of it, we must learn to elucidate our belief in the incarnation so that we capture the beauty of

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[20] John M. Frame, *No Other God: A Response to Open Theism* (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2001), 157-159, 175, 187.

[21] Robert A. Pyne and Stephen R. Spencer, "A Critique of Free Will Theism," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 158 (2001): 276-277.

God's perfection in changing as well as in unchanging terms.[22]

Interaction

Reception of the open view of God covers a broad spectrum from Peter Wagner's hailing it as one of the most important theological discoveries since the Reformation, to Ware's judging it to be a diminishing of God's glory.[23] Some acknowledge that the open view of God has strengths. They see it bringing out the truth of God as a triune person. They often agree with us that God is moved by the suffering of his people, that God interacts dynamically with creation, that God accommodates himself when relating to his people, that God holds human beings accountable for what they do.[24] Frame admits that open theism influenced him, forced him to think harder and do greater justice to the responsiveness of God.[25] On the other hand, critics rightly point out that the open view of God raises a lot of important questions and requires considerable rethinking of issues. They understand the paradigm-like shift that it requires in our thinking and worry about the ramifications of the change. At the same time, they want to engage open theism in respectful dialogue, drawing upon the centuries of reflection on behalf of more traditional views; and they appreciate the discussions that the open view has been stimulating.[26] Some even leave the impression that the discussion we are having is generally positive.[27]

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[22] Richard Bauckham, *God Crucified: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 79; Joseph M. Hallman, *The Descent of God: Divine Suffering in History and Theology* (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1991), 125-127.

[23] C. Peter Wagner has come out publically in support of the open view of God, saying that he considers it the fourth most important theological insight since the Reformation because of its implications for world missions. The other three insights are Wesley's teaching on holiness, Wagner's sense that God needed people to evangelize, and the recovery of the charismatic dimension (and Elizabeth Alves, *Destiny of a Nation: How Prophets and Intercessors Can Mold History*, new ed. [Colorado Springs: Wagner Publications, 2001]). Others like R. K. McGregor Wright and Robert A. Morey have had an "existential fit."

[24] William T. Chandler speaks of strengths in open theism in *A Description and Assessment of Clark Pinnock's Openness View of God* (M.Th. thesis, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2000). Terrance Tiessen also models the kind of civil discussion we ought to be having (*Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the World?* [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000]). Jon Balsersk is also helpful ("The God of Love and Weakness: Calvin's Understanding of God's Accommodating Relationship with His People," *Westminster Theological Journal* 62 [2000]: 177-195).

[25] Frame, 211.

[26] Cf. Christopher A. Hall and John Sanders, *Divine Debates: A Dialogue on the Classical and Openness Views of God* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002); Gregory E. Ganssle, ed., *God and Time: Four Views* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002); and Paul R. Eddy and James K. Beilby, eds., *Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002).

[27] My impression of Terrance Tiessen is that he regards it in this way (*Providence and Prayer: How Does God Work in the World?* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000). I have also noticed Tiessen trying to do justice to the idea that God "responds" to what happens. This is a key point and might lead him to the open view of God. Should his own middle-knowledge version of Calvinism fail, the open view might become even more attractive.

There are other critics who attack us mercilessly. Albert Mohler writes concerning the open view of God: "Evangelicalism faces a crisis of unprecedented magnitude. The denial [*sic*] and redefinition of God's perfections will lead evangelical theology into disintegration and doctrinal catastrophe. The very identity and reality of the God of the Bible is at stake."[28] Such critics issue severe judgments. Royce Gruenler says that we are Pelagian, even though we affirm that grace precedes and fosters faith in us.[29] Robert Strimple says that we are Socinians, even though we are social trinitarians.[30] Picirilli criticizes us for revising classical theism, not altogether aware that he, as an Arminian, is also revising it.[31] Timothy George repeats the charge that we are process theists, in spite of our insistence that God's limitations are self-limitations and not necessary limitations.[32] Michael Horton repeatedly charges that we are driven by modern culture, not by a sincere attempt to interpret the Bible. I expect Geisler in his forthcoming book, *The Battle for God*, to repeat his charge that any theologian who espouses a suffering God must, perhaps unintentionally, advocate a panentheistic notion of God because, if the cosmos impacts God in this way, God does not transcend the world. Evidently, we have touched a raw nerve and have threatened to disestablish a theological ideology or two. Apparently the idea that God suffers or shares sovereignty or can be surprised are notions badly conceived and wreak havoc upon the gospel.[33] Nicole calls the open view a "cancer on evangelicalism" and D. A. Carson says it is "amateurish" and dressed-up Socinianism.[34] If we are

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[28] In a comment supportive of Bruce A. Ware's book, *God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism* (Wheaton: Crossway, 2000). Since Ware's work, two more books hostile to the open view have appeared: Norman L. Geisler and H. Wayne House, *The Battle for God: Responding to the Challenge of Neotheism* (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2001); and John Frame, *No Other God: A Response to Open Theism* (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2001). Geisler's and Houses's title brings to mind Robert A. Morey's *Battle of the Gods* (1989), a much earlier critique which foresaw what he calls "the gathering storm." Also Gary W. Johnson and R. Fowler White state in the introduction that the open view is heretical (*Whatever Happened to the Reformation?* [Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 2001], 14). See also Robert A. Pyne and Stephen R. Spencer for a calmer, though still negative, view ("A Critique of Free Will Theism," *Bibliotheca Sacra* 158 [2001]: 259-286; 387-405).

[29] *Christianity Today*, March 5, 2001, 58. If the truth be told, we are semi-Augustinian synergists like most Christians. Some evangelicals who look to Edwards and Hodge espouse soteriological monergism, but many who look to Wesley and Finney consider evangelical synergism a valid option (Roger E. Olson, *The Story of Christian Theology*, 595).

[30] John H. Armstrong, ed., *The Coming Evangelical Crisis* (Chicago: Moody, 1996), chap. 8; and Johnson and White, chap. 2.

[31] Robert E. Picirilli, "An Arminian Response to John Sanders's *The God Who Risks: A Theology of Providence*," *JETS* 44 (2001): 467-491.

[32] Timothy George, *Amazing Grace: God's Initiative—Our Response* (Nashville: Lifeway, 2000), 37-38. Thankfully, Robert A. Pyne and Stephen R. Spencer rebut the charge: *op cit* n. 5 (see n. 21 above).

[33] Even Thomas G. Weinandy, no rabble-rouser, speaks strongly against us: "Does God Suffer?" *First Things* 117 (2001): 36. To think of God suffering diminishes God—a step which evangelical critics generally do not blame the open view for taking.

[34] Comments in support of Frame's book, *No Other God*.

Socinian because we share one point with them (present knowledge), then Calvinists are astrologers because they share one point with them (a definite future).

In thinking about the interaction, I have formed some impressions. First, we appear to have run afoul of a group of sectarian evangelicals. I have always known there was a vigorous paleo-Calvinist credalism in evangelicalism, which places a great deal of stock in being intellectually and doctrinally precisely right. Open theists have collided with devotees of a narrow branch of the Reformed faith, who not only claim to speak on behalf of the whole Reformed tradition, but also presume to speak for all evangelicals. They seem to be of the opinion that God has little or no more light to bring forth from his Word, other than what they themselves have received. One senses a hardening of the categories typical of fundamentalism and an excessive traditionalism. They find it difficult to admit that a number of different views might be valid at least as positions to discuss. They find it difficult admitting that their tradition might have erred. Is it too much to ask for a little less arrogance and zeal devoted to sorting out the true evangelicals in contrast to the pretenders, the deviants, and the apostates?[35] In a recent letter I was called a blasphemer, a cult leader, and a poisonous influence. Wouldn't it be nice if these people would stop talking about non-Augustinian, non-Reformed theologies as necessarily flawed guides, even at their best? Is not the hallmark of authentic evangelicalism not blind submission to tradition, but fresh biblical study?[36] I wonder, who is it really troubling Israel (1 Kgs 18:18)?[37] The flesh rather than the Spirit can sometimes also dominate theology. The desire for power, an unwillingness to learn, a refusal to change, and egotism can lead to bad judgments. Living experience of the Spirit in community is essential to good interpretation.

Let me make a plea for theological flexibility. Trees look strong when compared with wild reeds, but when the storm comes, it is the trees that are uprooted, not the reeds, because the reeds, due to their flexibility, remain rooted. If in theology we cling to our own positions and are not willing to learn or be influenced by the beliefs of others, we may be overcome. Being a reed need not mean being wishy-washy, but moving a little with "the times and seasons" while being solidly anchored. An intense, humorless, opinionated rigidity about matters can break the spirit and make us bitter, ugly people. Let's be flexible, while being deeply rooted.

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[35] John G. Stackhouse, *Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 49-50, 57.

[36] A similar situation crops up in the evangelical defense of the traditional view of the nature of hell—the argument seems to be tradition-driven, not Scripture-driven. A very few texts control the interpretation of a large number of texts (Cezar R. Luchian, "Hell, Hermeneutics, and Theology: A Methodological Appraisal of the Contemporary Evangelical Debate on the Duration of Hell" [MA Thesis, Andrews University, 2001]).

[37] So asks Olson, in Stackhouse, 205-206. See Stanley J. Grenz on "The Question of Evangelical Boundaries" in *Renewing the Center: Evangelical Theology in a Post-Theological Era* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000), 175-183.

Second, an important theological issue has become central. Ware put his finger on it in the title, *God's Lesser Glory: The Diminished God of Open Theism.*[38] What is the nature of God's glory? Does it consist in his exercising total control over the world or in his self-giving and self-sacrificing? Evangelicals of a certain type are strong on divine transcendence, but weak when it comes to the divine condescension. I think we want to say that God is free and sovereign and does not need us, but also that God has decided not to be alone. This too he is free to do. Can we not recover the balance? Does God have to be presented as far away, aloof, and as cold as possible? I frankly worry about theologians who admire a God with the properties of a tyrant and seem to dislike a God with the properties of a lover. My critics sometimes remind me of Peter when he resisted the self-sacrificing vocation of Jesus (Matt 16:21-23).

God's weakness was and is a scandal and an offense, but it is also the true glory of God and the heart of the gospel. Luther warned against a theology of glory and advocated a theology of the cross. It is a serious error to resist the gracious condescension of God. While God is the "most" and the "best," there are different kinds of goodness and greatness. Therefore, when we ascribe maximality to God, we need to understand what is involved. Is it divine perfection to be vulnerable? Is it not God's glory to want a relationship with creatures, a partnership in which God makes himself weak and even suffers? Do not some of my critics lessen God's glory with their concept of an all-controlling and unconditioned deity? J. R. Lucas remarks: "Instead of the impassible Buddha, untroubled by the tribulations of mortal existence, Christians see God on a cross. Instead of the Aristotelian ideal of a self-sufficient God, who devotes his time to enjoying the contemplation of his own excellence, Christians worship a God who shared the human condition and came among us."[39] The issue is not how much power God has—we agree about that—but how God chooses to use it. If God wanted to control everything, he could. But he also has the power to create a world with free agents in it, as every Arminian admits. To be glorious in power, God does not have to be a dictator.

Third, I sense a degree of fear and even fear-mongering on the part of some. Confronted with the truth of God's self-sacrificing and self-limiting nature, they try to stir up in people's minds an uneasiness about God's ability to reign over a world in which he does not exercise total control and does not have exhaustive foreknowledge. They ridicule the notion that God might actually have chosen to take risks for the sake of love. How, they insinuate, can God cope with a future that is partly open and unsettled? How could God be competent in the absence of a predestinarian blueprint? I believe that many reject the open view of God not because it does not make good biblical, theological, philosophical, and practical sense, but because of the insecurity of trusting a God who has created a truly dynamic universe. What if God is not able to cope with a future that is partly open? What if his wisdom is not up to

[38] Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2000.

[39] J. R. Lucas, *Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and the Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 232.

it? What if we can't trust him? I say shame on critics who play upon people's fears. I say it is a (carnal?) desire to want a God completely in control of everything who can make no room for relationships of love. Why should control be considered the highest form of sovereignty? Isn't the need to control everything a sign of weakness rather than strength? No—it takes a truly self-confident God to give away some of his sovereignty and create a world with free agents in it. Fear can hide the glory of God, and insecurity can drive the critique of the open view of God. Fear is also visceral and may explain the hard-to-understand misrepresentations and lies.

Of course, God cannot be ignorant of anything that he must know in order to realize his objectives, but that does not require that his foreknowledge be complete in every detail, which might imply that the future is already determinate and human freedom illusory. The open view of God does not strike fear in us. It tells us that our lives and our prayers matter to God and may contribute to the victory of God. According to the open view of God, God knows a tremendous amount about the future, perhaps most of it. He knows everything that will happen on the basis of what has already happened. He knows everything that could happen and might happen. He knows the whole range of what is possible and the relative likelihood of any particular event occurring. And God knows what his future plans call for and what things he intends to do which are not contingent on human decisions.[40]

What Now?

In an early review of *The Opennesss of God* in 1994, Roger Olson wondered how evangelicals would handle the proposal. He thought it might be a test of the maturity of their work. In retrospect, I would say that we have not handled it very well. But we could handle it better if we would commit ourselves to "open evangelicalism." Our movement is a loose family or coalition, centering upon several key commitments: commitment to the biblical message; belief in a transcendent, triune God, who interacts with creation and acts in history; celebration of the transforming grace of God in human life; and the importance of mission to bring the good news to the whole world. Evangelicalism, says Paul Hiebert, is not so much a bounded set as a centered set, involving an openness to the wider church and the practice of civility.[41]

Evangelicalism is a transdenominational and multiconfessional group. Let Calvinists take seriously what Arminians say, and let the Dispensationalist listen respectfully to the Anabaptist. Writes John G. Stackhouse:

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[40] In a certain way this dialogue puzzles me. If my critics are correct, all of us do what we are disposed to do and believe what we are disposed to believe. So what's the point of discussing anything? I have been predestined to believe this very error, have I not? Also, if they are right, how could I be guilty of diminishing God's glory, when the whole point of their position is that nothing can possibly diminish it? Even the open view, despicable though it is, contributes to God's glory.

[41] Clark H. Pinnock, "Evangelical Theology in Progress," in *Introduction to Christian Theology*, ed. Roger A. Badham (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1998), chap. 6. Robert K. Johnston, "Orthodoxy and Heresy: A Problem for Modern Evangelicalism," *EvQ* 69 (1997) 7-38.

> A perspective that starts from a given position but is inclined to appreciate, not merely guard against, other evangelical traditions, might lift us beyond inherited impasses and draw on fresh light regarding perennial mysteries such as original sin, the relation of the human will and divine providence, and the nature and scope of the atonement.[42]

The theological boundaries of evangelicalism have always been broad. They allowed a Zwingli to trash a 1,500-year-old conviction about sacraments, a Calvin to devise a new theology of infant baptism, and a J. N. Darby to invent a new dispensational theology. The boundaries of evangelical theology have been flexible and should remain so. Are critics unaware of the paradigm shifts that have taken place in Christianity over the centuries? Do they think it has been smooth sailing?[43] The open view of God is just a variant of age-old free-will theism in theology. Why pick on it?[44]

There have always been two kinds of evangelical theology: one which promotes the orthodoxy of old Calvinism (Puritan-Princeton; cf. George Marsden) and one which gravitates to pietism, evangelism, and spirituality (Pietist-Pentecostal; cf. Don Dayton). Those who look to Calvin regard monergism as the norm, while those who look to Wesley hold synergism to be an equally valid option. This debate, now having opened a new front, is not going away—we might as well get used to it.[45]

Second, let's also commit ourselves to what Millard Erickson calls "open scholarism, a strange term but a welcome one."[46] This is the idea that scholars, being limited in knowledge, ought to be able to learn from others, whatever their own convictions. Theology is an unfinished business. Even if we think that God has given us a set of propositions, there would still be much more to know about God than we presently know. Let's have new proposals and test them. Let's set for ourselves and for all people a rich feast. Let's not merely rehearse traditions, but welcome fresh acts of interpretation. Let's continue to reform theology. Doesn't one good reformation call for another?[47]

Let's also learn to disagree better. G. K. Chesterton once said that the trouble with quarreling is that it spoils a good argument. We need to learn to disagree civilly and learn from each other. Let's stir each other up to better ways of thinking. Let not the eye ever say to the foot, "I have no need of you." Even theologians need one another as members of the one body of Christ. It might be wise to invoke the golden rule: "In everything, do to others as you would have them do to you" (Matt 7:12). For the Augustinians and the Thomists I have the highest respect. May I not expect at least a measure of toleration? If we want an open evangelicalism and an open scholarism, we have to allow the open view of God a place at the theological roundtable as an evangelically possible point of view.[48]

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[42] Stackhouse, 57.

[43] To correct this mistake, Hans Küng, *Christianity: Essence, History, and Future* (New York: Continuum, 1996); and Roger E. Olson, *The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1999).

[44] Pinnock, *Most Moved Mover*, 104-111; and Gray and Sinkinson, 120-152.

[45] Roger Olson, *The Story of Christian Theology*, 594-655, 612.

[46] See the inside front cover of the program book of the ETS, November 14-16, 2001.

[47] Roger Olson, "Reforming Evangelical Theology," 201-207.

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[48] A doctrinal analogy might be the way the Evangelical Alliance (UK) has insisted on a place at the table for the proponents of the annihilational approach to the nature and duration of hell.

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TERMINOLOGICAL PATTERNS AND THE PERSONAL NAME יעקב "JACOB" IN THE BOOKS OF AMOS AND MICAH

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Concordances, and today even more efficiently Bible computer programs, are an appropriate and timesaving means to gain, as it were, an insight into the "workshop" of biblical writers. Since we have no information concerning the concrete procedure of the production of biblical literature, our literary and redaction-critical models are to be assessed as very vague.[1] Therefore, any attempt to restore the *ipsissima verba* of biblical writers is doomed to failure. Consequently, we have to rely on the text as transmitted in the manifold Hebrew manuscripts and those of the ancient versions. Besides, since no author writes at random, "we can expect to find some logic or system—not necessarily conscious—behind the placement of material, and we can further assume that this placement is supposed to serve the author's goals."[2] In view of this sensible verdict it seems reasonable to make the *Endgestalt*, i.e., the final shape, the starting-point of any exegetical endeavors.[3] The "final text" this study is resting on is the electronic version of *BibleWorks*, a text-version that has been collated against the various editions of the Hebrew Bible,[4] which is, by the way, very similar to the *Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia*. Besides, the findings presented in the following pages have not only been checked by the concordance edited by S. Mandelkern, but they have likewise been compared with the LXX as printed in the critical Göttingen edition.

The methodological approach to be applied in the present paper was also employed in two recent studies published in *AUSS*.[5] By way of tabulating, counting, and evaluating the frequencies of the words used in a given pericope, an entity which may consist of a brief passage, a chapter, or even an entire biblical book, some terms turn out to be of structural significance; and these outlines based on counting a given sentential entity, word, or term have been designated "terminological patterns."[6]

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[1] Cf. G. Steins, *Die "Bindung Isaaks" im Kanon (Gen 22). Grundlagen und Programm einer kanonisch-intertextuellen Lektüre*, HBS 20 (Freiburg: Herder, 1999), 220.

[2] M. V. Fox, *Character and Ideology in the Book of Esther*, Studies on Personalities of the Old Testament, ed. J. L. Crenshaw (Columbus: University of South Carolina Press, 1999), 153.

[3] With regard to the ongoing debate discussing the synchronic versus the diachronic approach in biblical studies, see, e.g., J..C. de Moor, ed., *Synchronic or Diachronic: A Debate in Old Testament Exegesis*, OTS 34 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995).

[4] *BibleWorks* 4. *The Premier Biblical Exegesis and Research Program: User Manual* (Bible Works, 1999), 219-224.

[5] W. Warning, "Terminological Patterns and Genesis 38," *AUSS* 38 (2000): 293-305; idem, "Terminological Patterns and the Term עצום 'Strong, Powerful' in the Pentateuch," *AUSS* 39 (2001): 233-240.

As of the beginning of 2002, more than 140 terminological patterns have been discovered in the Pentateuch, primarily in Genesis and Leviticus,[7] and preliminary research has disclosed another sixty-plus such structures in Isaiah, Hosea, Joel, Micah, Jonah, Haggai, Matthew, Mark, Luke, John, and the Apocalypse. Whereas common words tend to be used in creating short-range linkages,[8] rarer terms have been employed in composing long-range linguistic links.

In view of the numerous terminological patterns hitherto disclosed in the Hebrew Bible, the following conclusion may be drawn: Due to the indubitable fact that the terminological reading is based on both terminological *and* numerological notions, such a "restricted methodology" can consequently uncover only a certain part of the thematic makeup and the theological message. On the other hand, the findings of previous studies strongly suggest that in spite of the deliberately imposed restrictions, the terminological reading often corroborates and complements the results reached in previous research. At the same time it must be noted: In many cases the terminological patterns clearly cross the boundaries set by, e.g., source-critical and redaction-critical studies. In contrast to the results of these studies, the linguistic linkages present the respective *Endgestalt* as a carefully crafted literary whole. In my view, this fact underscores the importance of the final text as the (mandatory) starting point of all exegetical work. Due to the lack of any information concerning the concrete procedure of the production of biblical literature, it is of no consequence for this paper whether the perceptible homogeneity of a given pericope is rooted in its first inception and composition or whether it is the end product of the final redactor. In any case, the only fact available to us is the extant text in all its complexity, and therefore my definition of the term "author" is as follows: The word "author" is used and understood as referring to the person(s) responsible for the respective *Endgestalt*, the person(s) who composed the literary units we call, for example, "Oracles against the Nations," "The Book of Visions," "The Book of Amos," "Micah 7," or "The Book of Micah," literary entities that did not exist prior to their being composed, whatever the prehistory of the respective parts may have been.[9]

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[6] W. Warning, *Literary Artistry in Leviticus*, BinS 35 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1999), 25.

[7] W. Warning, "Terminologische Verknüpfungen in der Urgeschichte," *ZAW* 114 (2002): 262-269—seen from the viewpoint of terminological patterns, the so-called "P" and "J" creation stories appear to be a homogeneous whole; idem, "Terminologische Verknüpfungen und Genesis 12, 1-3," *Bib* 81 (2000), 386-390—to a certain degree the *Urgeschichte* culminates in Gen 12:1-3; idem, "Terminologische Verknüpfungen und Genesis 15," *Hen* 23 (2001): 3-9—a seven-part structure outlines the chapter *per se* and through another two seven-part linguistic links it has been integrated into the extant text of Genesis and the Pentateuch respectively; idem, "Terminological Patterns and Genesis 17," *HUCA* 70/71 (2001): 93-108; idem, "Terminologische Verknüpfungen und Genesis 22," *Spec Christiana* 12 (2001): 30-47; idem, "Terminological Patterns and Genesis 39," *JETS* 44 (2001): 409-419. Close reading of Gen 17, 22, 38, and 39 discloses both the linguistic linkages outlining the respective pericope and the verbal links through which they have been embedded into the larger context of Genesis. In each of the latter four studies terminological patterns come to the fore that extend from Gen 2/3 to the very end of the Joseph story in Gen 50; idem, "Terminological Patterns and the Divine Epithet *Shaddai*, *TynB* 52 (2001): 149-153; idem, "Terminologische Verknüpfungen und Leviticus 11," *BZ* 43 (2002): 97-102; idem, "Terminological Patterns and the First Word of the Bible (ב)ראשית '(In the) Beginning,'" *TynB* 52 (2001): 267-274; idem, "Terminological Patterns and the Verb מול 'Circumcise' in the Pentateuch," *BN* 106 (2001): 52-56.

[8] W. Warning, *Artistry*, points to the structuring role of common words such as ארץ "land" (53-54; 77-78; 113-115), כל "all" (56-57; 67-74), נתן "give" (78-79; 110-113), היה "be" (80-81), בן "son" (97-98), and אני "I" (115-116).

As stated above, the terminological reading does include "arithmetical aspects," i.e., biblical texts have evidently been composed by making use of the symbolic significance the ancients ascribed to "certain numbers."[10] Corresponding to the *inclusio* or envelope structure well known in biblical studies, the term "open-envelope structure"[11] has been coined for an outline in which the second and second-from-last resemble each other, and a terminological pattern in which the third and third-from-last, fourth and fourth-from-last, etc., positions are similar or even verbatim has been designated "equidistant structure."[12]

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[9] Whereas D. U. Rottzoll, *Studien zur Redaktion und Komposition des Amosbuchs*, BZAW 243 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1996), 285-290, claims to have discovered *twelve* redactional layers (three of which are present in the six texts juxtaposed in the table), A. Schart, *Die Entstehung des Zwölfprophetenbuchs: Neubearbeitungen von Amos im Rahmen schriftenübergreifender Redaktionsprozesse*, BZAW 260 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1998), 90-100, comes up with seven distinct layers, H. W. Wolff, *Dodekapropheton 2. Joel und Amos*, BKAT 14/2 (Neukirchen/Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1985), 129-138, postulates six redactional reworkings, and S. M. Paul, *Amos: A Commentary of the Book of Amos* (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1991), 4, maintains: "When each case is examined and analyzed on its own, without preconceived conjectures and unsupported hypotheses, the book in its entirety (with one or two minor exceptions) can be reclaimed for its rightful author, the prophet Amos." Cf. Th. Lescow, "Das vorexilische Amosbuch: Erwägungen zu seiner Kompositionsgeschichte, *BN* 93 (1998): 23-55; idem, "Das nachexilische Amosbuch: Erwägungen zu seiner Kompositionsgeschichte," *BN* 99 (1999): 69-101; J. Nogalski, *Literary Precursors to the Book of the Twelve*, BZAW 217 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993); idem, *Redactional Processes in the Book of the Twelve*, BZAW 218 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1993); E. Zenger, et al., *Einleitung in das Alte Testament*, Studienbücher Theologie 1,1 (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1995), 391-393; J. Jeremias, *Hosea und Amos: Studien zu den Anfängen des Dodekapropheton*, Forschungen zum Alten Testament 13 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1996), 257-271.

[10] With regard to the book of Micah, G. Metzner, *Kompositiongeschichte des Michabuches*, European University Studies, Series 23 Theology, vol. 635 (Frankfurt: P. Lang, 1996), 185-196, assumes five different redactional layers, whereas H. W. Wolff, *Dodekapropheton 4. Micha*, BKAT 14/4 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1982) proceeds from four redactional strata, and B. M. Zapff, *Redactionsgeschichtliche Studien zum Michabuch im Kontext des Dodekapropheton*, BZAW 256 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1997) presumes two redactional levels (cf. 296-297). Furthermore, the *Forschungsgeschichte* presented by E. Ott, "Micha/Michabuch," *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, vol. 22 (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1992), 695-704, summarizes the various hypotheses concerning the development of the present text; R. Kessler, "Zwischen Tempel und Tora, Das Michabuch im Diskurs der Perserzeit," *BZ* (1999): 21-36; Zenger, 408-410.

[11] L. Alonso-Schökel, *A Manual of Biblical Poetics* (Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblica, 1988), 191.

[12] Warning, *Artistry*, 32-33; 115-120; 156-159.

With regard to such "veiled counting"[13] in the Hebrew Bible, the following counsel should be carefully considered:

> The literary units to be scrutinized concerning the frequency of characteristic words must be clearly and distinctly recognizable as such, and if possible they should be delimited in the same way in previous research, so that the exegete will not be tempted or be exposed to the reproach that he or she places the caesura in the continuum of the text in such a way that the characteristic term occurs the desired number of times.[14]

Considering the fact that present-day biblical scholars rarely employ this approach, certain reservations on their part are understandable. However, at times we seem to miss significant aspects of the theological message because of not taking the *Endgestalt* at face value. Considering the results that substantiate the methodological appropriateness of this approach, it has been rightly remarked:

> After having become accustomed to this aspect of art, you will no longer have any basic problems with the veiled countings of the Old Testament. You will rather realize that the significance of the components of a piece of art and their simple identifiability are not necessarily in a positive ratio to one another.[15]

The terminological reading of the extant texts of Amos and Micah brings to light two verbal links based on the personal name "Jacob." It is my contention that the *Endgestalt* of Amos and of Micah are extraordinary examples and plausible evidence that in "literature the form is meaningful. . . . In literature the form creates meaning. . . . In literature the meaning exists in and through form."[16] The respective author has evidently employed the very same structuring devices used by the authors of the primeval story, the patriarchal narratives, the legal texts of Leviticus, and the oracles of Isaiah, Hosea, Joel, Jonah, Haggai, and Esther. In my view, it is both surprising and significant that similar stylistic means have been used by authors of biblical books belonging to very different literary genres. Ultimately, the reader is called upon to weigh the evidence personally and to decide whether the approach applied in the following pages is valid or not.

The Personal Name "Jacob" in the Book of Amos

If we tabulate the six occurrences of the name "Jacob" in the extant Hebrew text of Amos, the following outline comes to light, a terminological pattern focusing on the prophet's intercessory plea for his people. Amos' petition for pardon appears first in 7:2 (in the context of the first vision), and it is repeated verbatim in 7:5 (in the context of the second vision). In both of these visions the word-for-word entreaty is followed by the divine promise: "'This will not happen (either),' the (Sovereign) Lord said" (7:3, 6; NIV). As can be seen in the following table, the verbatim statement has been placed in the third and third-from-last positions, and hence this outline is reckoned among the equidistant structures. Due to the LXX translators' reading "Jacob" instead of the personal name ישחק "Isaac" in 7:16, this equidistant structure does not show in the Greek text.

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[13] Thus far equidistant structures have been detected in different parts of the Pentateuch, Jonah, Haggai, and Esther.

[14] M. Tsevat, "Abzählungen in 1 Samuel 1-4," in *Die Hebräische Bibel und ihre zweifache Nachgeschichte: Festschrift für Rolf Rendtorff zum 65. Geburtstag* (ed. E. Blum et al. [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1990), 213, speaks of "verhüllte Abzählungen."

[15] Ibid., 208.

[16] L. Alonso-Schökel, "Hermeneutical Problems of a Literary Study of the Bible," *Vetus Testamentum Supplement. Congress vol. 28 Edinburgh 1974* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 7.

Furthermore, close reading of the table makes us detect the terminological and thematic correlation of the first and last, and second and second-from-last positions. The first and last texts both mention the "house of Jacob." In 3:13-15 the Lord's judgment is pronounced against the house of Jacob:

> "Hear this and testify against the house of Jacob," declares the Lord, the Lord God Almighty. "On the day I punish Israel for her sins, I will punish the altars of Bethel; the horns of the altar will be cut off, and will fall to the ground. I will smash the winter house along with the summer house; the houses adorned with ivory will be destroyed and the mansions will be demolished," declares the Lord.

Yet 9:8 contains a message of hope for (the remnant of) the house of Jacob: "'Indeed, the eyes of the Sovereign Lord are on the sinful kingdom. I will destroy it from the surface of the earth—yet I will not totally destroy the house of Jacob,' declares the Lord." The clear-cut antithetic arrangement of the two texts, one being a dire threat of judgment and the other being a promise of hope, cannot be overlooked.

The same antithetical arrangement seems to be true for the second and second-from-last texts. The phrase גאון יעקב "pride of Jacob" occurs first in a dire message of judgment: "I abhor the pride of Jacob and detest his fortresses" (6:8), i.e., the Lord rebukes Israel because of her haughtiness and trusting in her own (military) strength. The semantic antithesis between Israel's haughtiness and pride (6:8) and "the Pride of Jacob" in 8:6 could hardly be more explicit, because in the latter the term גאון יעקב seems to function as a divine epithet.[17]

The following table evidences the artistic arrangement of the personal

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[17] Cf. H. N. Rösel, "Kleine Studien zur Auslegung des Amosbuches," *BZ* 42 (1998): 12-13; Jeremias, 257-271. In the extant text of Amos the Lord is thrice the subject of the verb שבע "swear," and hence it might be helpful to illustrate its structuring role of the verb by juxtaposing the three texts.

4:2	Adonai	YHWH has sworn by his holiness
6:8	Adonai	YHWH has sworn by himself
8:7		YHWH has sworn by the Pride of Jacob

In view of 4:2 and 6:8 where the Lord swears by "his holiness" and "by himself" respectively, it seems sensible to interpret the "The Pride of Jacob" also as a divine circumscription.

name "Jacob" in the *Endgestalt* of the book of Amos; and, second, the articulate thematic antithesis between the first and last, and second and second-from-last positions seems likewise self-evident. In contrast to many a modern study on the book of Amos claiming clearly recognizable redactional layers, we may therefore conclude: The author of the final text has employed the personal name "Jacob" as one of the twenty-plus terminological patterns, linguistic links that will be presented elsewhere, by means of which a major part of the book has been outlined. Furthermore, this terminological pattern is obviously based on both terminological and thematic considerations:[18]

3:13	Hear this and testify against the	*house of*		**Jacob**	
6:8	I abhor the		*pride of*	**Jacob**	
7:2	**Who will raise**			**Jacob,**	**as he is so small?**
7:5	**Who will raise**			**Jacob,**	**as he is so small?**
8:7	The Lord has sworn by the		*Pride of*	**Jacob**	
9:8	yet I will not totally destroy the	*house of*		**Jacob**	

Exegetical inferences: The two central texts belong to the first and second visions, and therefore they should be interpreted in this context: When the Lord appears in vision and speaks, Amos is the first who speaks, even before the Lord can convey his message.

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[18] The hypothesis of authorial deliberateness is further substantiated by the terminological pattern based on the tenfold occurrence of the verb קום "rise, raise," an outline in the center of which we again find Amos 7:2, 5:

2:11	I	**raised**	up some of your sons to be prophets
5:2a	the virgin Israel has fallen, she will never	**rise**	again
5:2b	and no one	**raises**	her up
6:14	for soon I will	**rise**	against you
7:2	**Who will**	**raise**	**Jacob, as he is so small?**
7:5	**Who will**	**raise**	**Jacob, as he is so small?**
7:9	and I shall	**rise**	with my sword against the house of Jeroboam
8:14	they shall fall and never	**rise**	again
9:11a	on that day I shall	**raise**	David's booth that has fallen
11b	and I shall	**raise**	his ruins

> Amos flings himself into the breach as intercessor. . . . That action is unique in the annals of Israel and of its prophets. The only other successful intercession of this kind recorded in the Bible is credited to Moses, who intervened in the crisis of the golden calf. . . . He is a dedicated partisan of his people and will soon again intercede. . . . Amos knows that the message is urgent and the time short. His intercession buys time, but no more than that.[19]

The ancient author has apparently managed to let terminological pattern and theological message correspond perfectly.

The Personal Name "Jacob" in the Book of Micah

If we tabulate the eleven occurrences of the name of Israel's eponymous ancestor, an exquisite equidistant structure comes into view whereby the whole book has been outlined, except for the first five verses. Significantly, this outline can likewise be shown in the LXX. In the "center" of this outline, in the fifth and fifth-from-last positions, the heads and leaders of Micah's day, "the authoritative members of the Judean establishment who held in their hands the reins of society,"[20] are addressed. These heads and leaders were possibly officials who functioned as judges in deciding legal matters in the city gates, and it certainly was their responsibility to "know" justice, i.e., "to act justly and to love mercy" (Micah 6:8), and it is these political leaders who have been singled out as the object of his denunciations. Because of their being the prophet's addressees, it is noteworthy that the term קצין "leader" occurs only twice in Micah (3:1, 9), a fact that seemingly supports the intentionality of the equidistant structure. Although it is impossible to establish in the following table any clear-cut antithetic arrangement of the first and last, second and second-from-last, etc., positions, as is the case in Amos, the following conclusion cannot be contradicted: By way of deliberately distributing the eleven occurrences of the name "Jacob," the verbatim address to the people's leaders has been positioned in a fine structural balance, and by doing so the author of the *Endgestalt* has been rather successful in outlining the entire book, except for the first five verses (see figure below).

Exegetical inferences: A fine congruence of terminology (heads and leaders being addressed) and theology (the respective context of 3:1, 9 clearly elucidates that those who should have been the watchmen of judicial justice and public welfare, who should have guarded the old morality of social equity, the men at the top, were marked by moral perversity) underlines the prophet's challenge. Micah, who had been called to be a watchman for the house of Israel, to hear the Lord's exhortations, and to warn his contemporaries (cf. Ezek 33:7), reprimands those who should have been upholders of the social concern laid down in the covenant stipulations; but who, alas, were foremost in perverting law and moral order.

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[19] F. L. Andersen and D. N. Freedman, *Amos: A Translation with Introduction and Commentary* AB 24A (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 729.

[20] L. C. Allen, *The Books of Joel, Obadiah, Jonah, and Micah*, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 317.

1:5	All this is because of	**Jacob's**	transgression
1:5	What is	**Jacob's**	transgression?
2:7	Should it be said, O house of	**Jacob:**	
2:12	I will surely gather all of you,	**Jacob**	
3:1	**listen** to this **you leaders of**	**Jacob.**	**you rulers of the house of Israel**
3:8	to declare	**Jacob**	his transgression
3:9	**listen you leaders of** the house of	**Jacob.**	**you rulers of the house of Israel**
4:2	to the house of the God of	**Jacob**	
5:6	The remnant of	**Jacob**	will be in the midst of many people
5:7	The remnant of	**Jacob**	will be among the nations
7:2	You will be true to	**Jacob**	and show mercy to Abraham

Conclusions

Although there is at the present moment no consensus whatever about, when, and through whom the books named after two eighth-century prophets reached their present form, and the date about their composition differs considerably, the two preceding equidistant structures based on the distinct distribution of the personal name "Jacob" seemingly support the textual integrity of the respective *Endgestalt.*

In the context of the ongoing discussion of the development of the books of Amos and Micah and the formation of the "Book of the Twelve," the results of this study should be considered. My contention is that in scrutinizing the function of the catch-words that allegedly/actually interlink different minor prophets, we ought to be mindful of the following: First, we are to bring to light the linguistic links in the extant text of each of the Twelve; and only then, in a second step, may we venture to search for terms and phrases by means of which the compilers of the Dodekapropheton have arranged them in the order they presently have in the Hebrew Bible.

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THE INTRA-JEWISH DIALOGUE IN 4 EZRA 3:1-9:25

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The analysis of the first three visions of 4 Ezra[1] (3:1-9:25)[2] offered below seeks to address two areas of scholarly inquiry. The first inquiry concerns the significance of the time of 4 Ezra's composition, which lies in close proximity to the tragedy of 70 C.E.,[3] for the understanding of the book. Produced in the face of the stiffest challenge to Judaism yet, 4 Ezra offers an unparalleled vista into the vortex of a radical and emotional reaction[4] mounted from within Judaism against both the particularist and the universalist—in other words, traditional—interpretations of covenantal theology. The book is a valuable source of information for understanding how fragmented Second Temple Judaism moved toward the direction of unified Rabbinic Judaism as an aftermath of the destruction of the Temple.[5]

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[1] For a comprehensive introduction, see Michael E. Stone, *Fourth Ezra: A Commentary on the Book of Fourth Ezra*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1990), 1-47; for a brief introduction, see B. M. Metzger, "The Fourth Book of Ezra: A Translation and Introduction," *OTP*, 515-559; see also Bruce W. Longenecker, *Eschatology and the Covenant: A Comparison of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11*, JSNTSS 57 (England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1991), 40-49.

[2] For this paper I shall deal only with the first section (3:1-9:25), because the author's intra-Jewish dialogue within the framework of contemporary deuteronomistic debate is most apparent in these verses. Furthermore, although there are signs of later interpolations, like 9:7b (Christian?) within the main body of the section, 3:1-9:25 appears to be a solid unit. I tend to agree with Sanders's view that the final visions of the book may be later additions (*Paul and Palestinian Judaism* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977], 418). Concerning the unity of 4 Ezra, see the historical review by Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 11-21; his own view appears on pp. 21-23. For another review of the history of investigation about the literary unity of 4 Ezra, see the excellent summary in Heinrich Hoffman, *Das Gesetz in der frühjüdischen Apokalyptik*, Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments, vol. 23 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 218-220. See also on the matter of literary unity, M. A. Knibb, "Commentary on 2 Esdras," in *The First and Second Books of Esdras*, CBC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 109; Michael P. Knowles, "Moses, the Law, and the Unity of 4 Ezra," *NT* 31 (1989): 257-274; Edith McEwan Humphrey, *The Ladies and the Cities: Transformation and Apocalyptic Identity in Joseph and Aseneth, 4 Ezra, the Apocalypse and the Shepherd of Hermas*, JSPSS 17 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 57-58; and Bruce W. Longenecker, *2 Esdras*, Guides to Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha (England: Sheffield Academic Press, 1995), 86. In this volume, Longenecker tries to establish the unity of 4 Ezra through an analysis of the literary structure, comparing Ezra's experience with that of Moses.

[3] Robert A. Bartels states: "This date is highly important to the understanding of the particular struggle with which the writer was faced. The fall of Jerusalem had occurred, and it was fresh in his mind" ("Law and Sin in Fourth Esdras [sic!] and Saint Paul," *LQ* 1 [1949]: 319-320). Concerning the date, see Knibb, 101-105; Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 9-10; and Longenecker, *2 Esdras*, 13-14. Second Baruch, by comparison, is already more objective in its reflection of the tragedy. Yet both 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch stand out as the most brilliant works from the period. They sought to pioneer new ways of looking at the old questions in light of the fall of Jerusalem. Note Gwendolyn B. Sayler, who states that "the similarities between the books [4 Ezra and 2 Baruch] indicate that they originated in a common milieu" (*Have the Promises Failed? A Literary Analysis of 2 Baruch*, SBLDS 72 [Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984], 111); she aptly adds, 130, "that 4 Ezra and 2 Baruch are controlled by different agendas, and thus represent significantly different responses to the events of 70 C.E." Also note Andrew Chester, who states: "Both of these works [4 Ezra and 2 Baruch] are important for understanding the development of eschatology and messianism in Judaism in the *post-70 period*" ("The Parting of the Ways: Eschatology and Messianic Hope," in *Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135*, ed. James D. G. Dunn [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1992], 248, emphasis supplied).

The second area of scholarly research I wish to address concerns the inquiry into the literary and conceptual relations that exist between 4 Ezra and Paul.[6] Fourth Ezra is the first Jewish work outside of Paul that tried to move beyond the traditional framework of universalism and particularism[7] to systematically and radically reorder the semantic field of meaning[8] with respect to covenant, election, Abraham, and creation.[9] What is particularly significant is that Paul preceded 4 Ezra.

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[4] Isolde Andrews describes well the literary function of hostile emotion in 4 Ezra. In "Being Open to the Vision: A Study from Fourth Ezra," *Literature and Theology* 12 (1998): 231-232, she states that "these unhappy thoughts open Ezra's first vision and [the author] goes on to challenge God with an historical narrative."

[5] Geert Hallbäck states: "[4 Ezra] was written when Jewish ideology was at a critical turning-point, i.e., on the transition from antique Judaism to early rabbinical Judaism" ("The Fall of Zion and the Revelation of the Law: An Interpretation of 4 Ezra," *JSOT* 6 [1992]: 287). On the balance, however, it appears that 2 Baruch has received greater attention in this respect. See A. F. J. Klijn, who states: "In this connection it is plausible that 2 Baruch is often seen as the product of rabbinical circles. Even Johannan ben Zakkai, or his disciples, have been suggested as the author of 2 Baruch" ("Recent Developments in the Study of the Syriac Apocalypse of Baruch," *JSP* 4 [1989]: 8). It seems that both 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra became the most immediate precursors of the Mishnah's theology. Others, such as *Testament of Abraham*, *Apocalypse of Abraham*, *Testament of Sederach*, *2 Enoch*, *4 Baruch*, *Assumption of Moses*, and *Apocalypse of Zephaniah* either followed or led up to the groundbreaking theological efforts of 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra. It is an aim of this paper to call attention to 4 Ezra as also being an important precursor of Rabbinic Judaism. See also W. Harnisch, *Verbängnis und Verbeissung der Geschichte: Untersuchungen zum Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis im 4. Buch Esra und in der syr. Baruchapokalypse* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck u. Ruprecht, 1969), 227; P. Bogaert, *Apocalypse de Baruch: Introduction, Tradition du Syriaque et Commentaire*, Sources chrétiennes, nos. 144-145 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1969), 1:438-444; and J. J. Collins, *The Apocalyptic Imagination: An Introduction to the Jewish Matrix of Christianity* (New York: Crossroad, 1984), 172.

[6] Michel Desjardins speaks for many Pauline commentators when he notes that the anthropological condition of sin referred to in 4 Ezra is the same as that found in Rom 5 ("Law in 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra," *SR* 14 [1985]: 34-35). But Bartels is perhaps the most outspoken advocate of the affinity that exists between 4 Ezra and Paul. On p. 319 he states: "The problem of law and sin as it is dealt with in IV Esdras [sic!] (chaps. 3-10) is especially striking when put alongside of Paul's treatment of it"; again on p. 327: "The reader of Paul and of IV Esdras [sic!] (IV Ezra) is struck, however, with the affinity which exists between Paul and the apocalyptist"; then on pp. 328-329, after showing the parallels between 4 Ezra and Romans in some detail, he declares: "Literary dependence of Ezra upon Paul is no question here" (329). Unfortunately, however, he goes on to explain without much basis (besides what he offers from 4 Ezra and Romans) that "the parallels only serve to show the general religious atmosphere which surrounded the Jews of the Diaspora" (329; but note p. 326). See also Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 22: "The structural similarities are especially evident when 4 Ezra is compared with Paul's letter to the Roman Christian communities, chs. 1-11 in particular"; but Longenecker's explanation runs along similar lines as Bartels's: "'Ethnocentric covenantalism' provides the best backdrop against which 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 should be read." (34); W. O. E. Oesterley, *II Esdras (The Ezra Apocalypse): With Introduction and Notes* (London: Methuen, 1933), xxxviii-xliv, compares 4 Ezra with the NT, particularly with Paul, under the title "The Importance of the Book for New Testament Study."

[7] Longenecker aptly states that "for both Paul and the author of 4 Ezra, traditional understandings concerning the God of Israel's history need to be informed (or corrected) by the

The perspective from which I wish to address the two areas of scholarly inquiry in this paper is the intra-Jewish dialogue taking place in 4 Ezra.[10] It is easy to miss the systematic and highly intellectual contribution 4 Ezra is making to the self-understanding of Judaism. One reason for this is its dramatic and visionary style of writing. Another reason is its often deeply emotional language.[11] After all, at the time of the writing, the tension-filled history of Israel—a frustrating history of promise and nonfulfillment—had finally collapsed. Ezra's words echo through and through with sorrow, revealing to the reader the heart of anguish out of which the theology of 4 Ezra arose.[12] But as will be seen, the author's intention is to engage the reader in a systematic and unemotional dialogue.[13]

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revelation of God's eschatological ways" (*Eschatology*, 170). There seem to be two basic ways of explaining 4 Ezra's radical departure. According to Longenecker, it was a creative fusion: "Traditional [scholarly] formulations of the 'two eschatology' approach . . . tended to cite inconsistencies in the eschatological portrayals of *4 Ezra* as evidence of two distinct eschatological traditions (the national and the universal) which have been fused together by the author/redactor" (ibid., 47-48); but according to Hallbäck, it was something of a break: "Many interpreters have seen this shift from the collective to the individual as a marked reversal to a universalistic orientation in 4 Ezra, indicative of a break with the narrow-minded Jewish particularism" (290).

[8] Longenecker: "Their [4 Ezra and Romans] authors argue independently of each other that an ethnic exclusivism of this kind involves an inherently flawed understanding of the covenant, which they then seek to repattern along different lines" (*Eschatology*, 170).

[9] Hallbäck, 277-278, identifies the themes of the visions somewhat differently as "the story of the Creation, the story of Israel, its election and fate, and the coming judgment."

[10] Scholars have taken note of the intra-Jewish dialogue taking place in 4 Ezra from various angles, without saying as much (ibid., 287; similarly, 292). So also A. P. Hayman, who states: "The anguished tone of IV Ezra reflects his own mental turmoil at the realization of how inadequately traditional Jewish theodicy explains the problem of evil, sin, and justification" ("The Problem of Pseudonymity in the Ezra Apocalypse." *JSJ* 6 [1975]: 55); Christopher Rowland states: "The issues which are raised are what we would have expected Jews to have struggled with after the traumatic experience of 70 C.E." ("The Parting of the Ways: the Evidence of Jewish and Christian Apocalyptic and Mystical Material," in *Jews and Christians: The Parting of the Ways, A.D. 70 to 135*, ed. James D. G. Dunn [Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1992], 221); and Chester, 270, states: "In 2 Baruch and 4 Ezra, the issue is bound up with concern with theodicy; that is, the question of what has become of righteous Jews who have perished in the revolt against Rome, as well as the fate of the Jewish people as a whole."

[11] E. Breech, "These Fragments I Have Shored Up Against My Ruins: The Form and Function of 4 Ezra," *JBL* 92 (1973): 267-274, with his scheme of grief to consolation, tries to arrive at an experiential understanding of the book.

[12] Desjardins, 31, notes aptly that "4 Ezra has a definite post-holocaust mood to it."

[13] Such an unflappable temperament, characteristic of many apocalyptic works, should not be confused with rational discourse, as we shall see. Michael E. Stone aptly notes that the apocalyptic mode of thought is "non-logical in that in employs other organizing principles than logical consistency between the meanings of its statements" (*Features of the Eschatology of IV Ezra*, HSS 35 [Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989], 23).

In order to more fully appreciate the presence of intra-Jewish dialogue in 4 Ezra, one needs to consider the overall literary structure of 3:1-9:25. The section is composed principally of dialogues between Ezra and his heavenly visitors, and it is divided into three sustained dialogue units of 3:1-5:20, 5:21-6:34, and 6:35-9:25. Each of these dialogue units is introduced by Ezra's fasting and supplication in behalf of Israel and humankind, which is immediately followed by the revelations of the heavenly messengers (mostly Uriel) and Ezra's anguished appeals.

The dialogues form a cacophonous and extended exchange between what Israel had understood in the past to be true about God and the new insights that the author discovers in the indifferent datum of Israel's recent disastrous history.[14] A closer look, however, reveals that the author's true voice is to be found in the speeches of Uriel, rather than those of Ezra.[15] The chief reason for this is that it is in Uriel's speeches that we find the traditional—both universalistic and particularistic—interpretations of Israel's cardinal beliefs about election, covenant, creation, and Abraham systematically reordered. By contrast, Ezra's speeches merely affirm, without much reinterpretation, the same traditional elements.

For example, in 8:34-35 Ezra raises his complaint against God by appealing to the traditional theology about covenant and mercy. This passage contains both the particularist language of covenant mercy and the universalist concern for all humankind.

> But what are mortals, that you are angry with them; or what is a corruptible race, that you are so bitter against it? For in truth there is no one among those who have been born who has not acted wickedly; among those who have existed there is no one who has not done wrong.[16]

In stark contrast, the impassive voice of Uriel (8:37-41) delivers fresh insights. Not surprisingly, the author speaks for God:

> For indeed I will not concern myself about the fashioning of those who have sinned, or about their death, their judgment, or their destruction; but I will rejoice over the creation of the righteous, over their pilgrimage also, and their

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[14] The function of the smaller disputations occurring between the major statements appears to be to field possible objections that could be raised against the author's new revelation.

[15] For the discussion regarding whose voice—Ezra's or Uriel's—represents the author's own conviction, see Desjardins, 31-32. "D. Rössler and A. L. Thompson believe that the seer's voice represents the author's *alter ego,* while E. P. Sanders and W. Harnisch have argued the opposite, stating that the divine position best reflects the author's." D. Rössler, *Gesetz und Geschichte: Untersuchungen zur Theologie der jüdischen Apocalyptik und der pharisäischen Orthodoxie* [Neukirchen: Kreis Moers, 1962], 106); A. L. Thompson, *Responsibility for Evil in the Theodicy of IV Ezra: A Study Illustrating the Significance of Form and Structure for the Meaning of the Book,* SBLDS 29 (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1977), 157; Sanders, 417-418; Harnisch, 60-67. Hallbäck notes that "the first three visions . . . start with a complaint from Ezra provoking a dialogue with Uriel the angel, who concludes the talk with a revelation of eschatological secrets" (271-272). I am in full agreement with Hallbäck's view that the angel's speech constitutes the conclusion of each dialogue. I go a bit further and suggest that the angel's speeches constitute the real point of 4 Ezra.

[16] Unless otherwise noted, quotations from 4 Ezra are from the NRSV.

> salvation, and their receiving their reward. As I have spoken, therefore, so it shall be. "For just as the farmer sows many seeds in the ground and plants a multitude of seedlings, and yet not all that have been sown will come up in due season, and not all that were planted will take root; so also those who have been sown in the world will not all be saved."

The God whom the author presents to the reader is not the personal, compassionate, and forgiving God of Scripture. Rather, he is a being who is impersonal and indifferent like the seasonal cycle of planting and harvesting. No amount of appeal based on what Judaism has previously believed about God and his merciful ways can change God's indifference. Like the seeds that perish according to the laws of probability and nature, lost Jews and lost humans are of no value to God. This is the author's version of Jewish covenant theology, which he believes is the only way to make sense of God in the face of the great tragedy.

It seems, however, that exegetes have missed the intensely intra-Jewish nature of the dialogues because their concern has been chiefly soteriological. Sanders, for example, writes that "in IV Ezra one sees how Judaism works when it actually does become a religion of individual self-righteousness. In IV Ezra, in short, we see an instance in which covenantal nomism has collapsed. All that is left is legalistic perfectionism."[17]

It is hoped that through the analysis offered below, further light may be shed on the questions about how as a community Second Temple Judaim was processing the theological and emotional grief of 70 C.E., and about the role that Paulinism may have played in the process, if any.

Covenant

The first dialogue unit of 3:1-5:20 addresses the question of the covenant. First, the traditional theology is expounded, using the traditional covenant language:

> When those who dwelt on earth began to multiply, they produced children and peoples and many nations, and again they began to be more ungodly than were their ancestors. And when they were committing iniquity before you, you chose for yourself one of them, whose name was Abraham; and you loved him and to him only you revealed the end of the times, secretly by night. You made with him an everlasting covenant, and promised him that you would never forsake his descendants; and you gave to him Isaac, and to Isaac you gave Jacob and Esau. And you set apart Jacob for yourself, but Esau you rejected; and Jacob became a great multitude (3:12-16).

[17] Sanders, 409; for criticism of Sanders, see Longenecker, *Eschatology,* 18, 21, where Longenecker correctly criticizes Sanders for being too concerned with soteriology and failing to take into consideration "the background of the prevailing covenantalism of his day" (21). Longenecker himself, however, is preoccupied with soteriology. He states: "I have concerned myself only with those passages which are most relevant to the question of how each author interacts with ethnocentric covenantalism on matters of the law and the people of God" (ibid., 36). Hallbäck, 280, tries to interpret 4 Ezra too much from an individualistic soteriological perspective, seeing a shift in "the emphasis from the problem of national misfortune to the individual's distress." Again, he states: "The very selective salvation turns the problem of national fate into one of individual fate before the coming judgment" (280); and "Now it is no longer the collective contrast of *Babylon* and *Zion* he sees, but the individual '*the evil heart*' versus *the Law*" (285).

The passage elaborates its covenant theology with a particularistic focus. There is no indication in the passage that the world at large is a concern. Rather, Ezra takes for granted that there is an uninterrupted transition from Abraham to Jacob, and by implication, from Abraham to Moses (cf. vv. 17-19). God chose Abraham from a world full of evil people and established a covenant with him concerning his posterity. At the same time, Jacob is the true fountainhead of Abraham's posterity: "Jacob [rather than Esau] became a great multitude" (v. 16). Without question, Ezra's focus in this passage is God's covenant with physical Israel—a form of particularism.

In Ezra's complaint that follows, however, the focus shifts dramatically to the universalistic side.[18] Let us look at the passage in detail.

> Yet you did not take away from them their evil heart, so that your Law might bring forth fruit in them. For the first Adam, burdened with an evil heart, transgressed and was overcome, as were also all who were descended from him. Thus the disease became permanent; the law was in the people's heart along with the evil root. . . . So you delivered the city into the hands of your enemies. . . . Now therefore weigh in a balance our iniquities and those of the inhabitants of the world; and so it will be found which way the turn of the scale will decline. When have the inhabitants of the earth not sinned in your sight? Or what nation has kept your commandments so well? You may indeed find individual men who have kept your commandments, but nations you will not find (3:20-22, 27, 34-36).

The universalistic theology of this passage flows mainly in the negative direction and tries to relativize the prized position of the Jews in salvation history. First, in apparent contrast to the passage that precedes, Ezra begins his complaint with Adam rather than Abraham or Jacob. Ezra speaks of the evil heart of Israel as being on a par with that of the rest of the nations.[19] Second, in this passage a Jewish writer other than Paul utters, for the first time, that the Mosaic covenant was an impossibility. Ezra charges that God already knew, or at least he should have known, that it would be impossible for Israel to keep the laws when he gave them to Moses: "The law was in the people's heart along with the evil root. . . . *So* [i.e., by giving the law] you delivered the city into the hands of your enemies" (emphasis supplied). In short, Israel was doomed like anyone else when the law was given. Finally, the universalism of this passage bears more than a passing resemblance to Paul's universalism in Rom 5. As in Rom 5, the Mosaic covenant does not stand on the same plane as Abraham as an extension of his covenant, but it connects directly to Adam and his transgression.[20]

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[18] Cf. Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 46.

[19] Oesterley, xxx, states: "It is in accordance with this world-view of our Seer that he regards the Law as having been intended not for the Chosen People alone, but for the Gentiles too; thus, in speaking of humanity in general, the transgression of Adam is referred to in vii. 11." See also Desjardins, 33-34; and Hallbäck, 278, states: "The principle of this history is that in spite of God's attempts to eradicate sin once and for all in the deluge, and in spite of his then favouring a specially elected people, the impact of sin has remained *universal* in the history of mankind. It was implanted in Adam, and after him every human being is born with an evil heart" (emphasis supplied).

It is important to note at this point that the intention of the author of 4 Ezra is to reject both traditional particularism and universalism. He wants to move beyond the soteriological straightjacket and find an altogether new way of thinking. The author's new revelation comes in Uriel's voice:

> Your understanding has utterly failed regarding this world, and do you think you can comprehend the way of the Most High? . . . If you can solve one of them for me, I will show you the way you desire to see, and will teach you why the heart is evil. . . . Go, weigh for me the weight of fire, or measure for me a measure of wind, or call back for me the day that is past. . . . You cannot understand the things with which you have grown up; how then can your mind comprehend the way of the Most High? (4:2, 3, 5, 10).

The new insight the author gleans from contemplating the fall of Jerusalem is that there can be no rational understanding of how God deals with Israel or with humans.[21] Fourth Ezra rejects both the universalistic and the particularistic understandings as inadequate rational constructs. The fall of Jerusalem, which is simultaneously the complete breakdown of the covenant history and an act of God, simply defies all rational and ethical explanations.[22] The author considers the nonrational language as the most appropriate vehicle for comprehending and communicating the meaning of such an event.

Ezra objects to the concept of nonrationality:

> I beseech you, my lord, why have I been endowed with the power of understanding? For I did not wish to inquire about the ways above, but about those things which we daily experience: why Israel has been given over to the gentiles as a reproach. (4:22-23).

Uriel reiterates his point in 4:26ff.: One cannot understand the present; a true understanding can come only in the end time. This revelation, which seems to constitute the climax of the first dialogue, makes a startling admission that even God cannot cause the promises to be fulfilled in this age because of its extremely evil character: "The age is hastening swiftly to its end. For it will not be able to bring the things that have been promised to the righteous in their appointed times, because this age is full of sadness and infirmities" (4:26ff.).

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[20] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 22-23, states: "The authors of 4 Ezra and Romans 1-11 develop their respective cases with two common convictions in their sights: (1) the pervasiveness of sin throughout humanity, and (2) the effectiveness of God's grace within the covenant. . . . This condition of sinfulness includes all humanity." It is, however, important to note that, according to my analysis, the author of 4 Ezra treats Paul's Adam theology within the framework of universalistic covenant theology, which he rejects; see also Oesterley, xxxviii-xliv, under the subtitle, "The Importance of the Book for New Testament Study."

[21] Andrews, 233; Bartels, 327, states: "Another parallel is in both Paul's and Ezra's acknowledgment that God's ways are inscrutable and beyond finding out" (Rom 9:6-29).

[22] Nonrational language seems to be the author's definition of apocalyptic. Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 150, seems to be suggesting the same thing when he states: "In the final episodes, Ezra, having accepted Uriel's case, receives confirmation of his new perspective through the eschatological visions, which themselves conform to Uriel's description of God's ways." In other words, the author of 4 Ezra had to resort to visionary language in order to convey his message.

It appears that the author of 4 Ezra is inviting his readers to think the unthinkable: God is unable to make good on his covenant promises. In order to comprehend this kind of theology—that some things are impossible even for God—one needs to adopt a nonrational language. C. C. Rowland aptly states that "the character of the divine secrets which were revealed [in the apocalypses] is not easily defined and includes almost anything which the human mind cannot comprehend."[23]

The rest of the first dialogue is made up of questions about the end, among which an interesting comment appears regarding the place of the mind in relation to the question about the end:

> Then [i.e., in the end] shall reason hide itself, and wisdom shall withdraw into its chamber, and it shall be sought by many but shall not be found, and unrighteousness and unrestraint shall increase on earth. One country shall ask its neighbor, "Has righteousness, or anyone who does right, passed through you?" And it will answer, "No."

In other words, the end is an absolutely evil time during which reason and wisdom will vanish. One simply cannot make sense of such a time.

The notion that God cannot honor his promise in the present time because of its overwhelming evilness shakes the foundation of Israel's covenant theology. If almighty God can renege on his promise, for whatever reason, then what basis could there be for Jewish hope? The author's aim in the first dialogue, therefore, is to dismiss as a rationalization of the historical process both the particularist and the universalist ways of thinking about the covenant and to set the stage for the unveiling of his new, nonrationalist paradigm. It is interesting that, for the author, covenant theology as a whole represents the rational side of Israel's theology. In order to comprehend the unparalleled event of the present, he feels compelled to reject the rational, cause-to-effect construct of the covenant language.

Election and Abraham

The repudiation of the traditional covenant theology leads directly to the question of the election of Israel in the second dialogue (5:21-6:34).[24] Even if the author of 4 Ezra rejects the traditional formulations of covenant theology, he does not reject the election of Israel.

Ezra once again opens his discourse with a particularist formulation of election:

> O sovereign Lord, from every forest of the earth and from all its trees you have chosen one vine, and from all the lands of the world you have chosen for yourself one region, and from all the flowers of the world you have chosen for yourself one lily, and from all the depths of the sea you have filled for yourself one river, and from all the cities that have been built you have consecrated Zion

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[23] Christopher C. Rowland, *The Open Heaven* (London: S.P.C.K., 1982), 94.

[24] Andrews, 232, states: "Ezra's conversations in successive dream-visions deal with theodical problems concerning the tension between Israel's fate and election." See also Bartels, 320.

> for yourself, and from all the birds that have been created you have named for yourself one dove, and from all the flocks that have been fashioned you have provided for yourself one sheep, and from all the multitude of people you have gotten for yourself one people; and to this people, whom you have loved, you have given the Law which is approved by all (5:23-27).

This passage is an unmistakable particularist, deuteronomistic[25] discourse, which speaks eloquently of election as God's favoring of one nation, Israel, above all other nations. Furthermore, the particularist bias of the passage is evident in the nonchalant manner in which it speaks about the rest of the world and the way in which it speaks of the law as the identifying mark of the chosen people.

The next passage (vv. 28-30) contradicts the particularist beliefs about the election:

> And now, O Lord, why have you given over the one to the many, and dishonored the one root beyond the others, and scattered your only one among the many? And those who opposed your promises have trodden down on those who believed your covenants. If you really hate your people, they should be punished at your own hands (5:28-30).

Here the language changes from "one dove" and "one tree" of the preceding passage to the notion of "one among many." The destruction of Jerusalem at the hand of Gentile nations means that Israel can expect no more from God than any other nation can.[26] Is Israel just one nation among many? The question that the passage implies is both rhetorical and universalistic: In what sense is Israel special in relationship to the rest of the world?

Once again, Uriel's reply rejects both the particularist and the universalist options and offers a new revelation that intimates that God's promises to Israel do not concern Israel of the present age (5:33, 40): "Do you love him more than his Maker does? . . . [Y]ou cannot discover my judgment, or the goal of the love that I have promised my people."

Uriel goes on to disclose what will happen at the end time, for he envisions a time in which the whole world will be converted. In unfolding his new revelation, Uriel makes a surprising, if enigmatic, revelation (6:7-10) about Abraham's relationship to Israel's election:

> I [Ezra] answered and said, "What will be the dividing of the times? Or when will be the end of the first age and the beginning of the age that follows?" He said to me, "From Abraham to Abraham, because from him were born Jacob and Esau, for Jacob's hand held Esau's heel from the beginning. For Esau is the end of this age, and Jacob is the beginning of the age that follows. For the end of a man is his heel, and the beginning of a man is his hand; between the heel and the hand seek for nothing else, Ezra!"[27]

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[25] For the purpose of this essay, I found it impractical to maintain the distinction between *deuteronomic* and *deuteronomistic*, as suggested by Frank M.. Cross, *Canaanite Myth and Hebrew Epic: Essays in the History of the Religion of Israel* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1973), 274, n. 1. Accordingly, both categories have been referred to as *deuteronomistic*.

[26] Desjardins, 34; and Hallbäck, 278.

[27] Stone's translation in *Fourth Ezra*, 143-144; see also his discussion about the textual

The question is about how to divide the end of the first age from the beginning of the second, or perhaps the final, age. To use the wording of the text itself, the first age refers to "this age" and the second, or the final age, refers to "the age that follows." Stone maintains in his commentary, with the majority of scholars, that Esau represents Rome.[28] This interpretation is problematic, as it fails to explain adequately the meaning of the preceding statement "from Abraham to Abraham." The main problem is that it can in no way be demonstrated that Rome stands in some positive relationship to Abraham, as in the case of Esau. Rome does not go back to the time of Abraham, nor does it come onto the scene of history as the result of the promise given to Abraham. Stone himself admits that the statement "from Abraham to Abraham" is "unclear."[29] The most reasonable way to interpret the parable is to consider Esau as representing the age of the nations, inasmuch as Abraham was promised that he would become the father of many nations (Gen 17:4).

Abraham, the original receiver of the covenant promise, lies outside of history in the parable, marking both the beginning and the end of the present age. "From Abraham to Abraham" means that the promise given to Abraham is in hiatus with Esau intervening. This seems to be an answer to the first question: "What will be the dividing of times?" The promise of Gen 17:4 is divided by two aeons, just as the two progeny—Esau and Jacob—were born to him. Esau claimed his birthright as an offspring of Abraham, just as much as Jacob did. Like Esau, the nations (Christians?) can claim to be the children of Abraham through the promise given in Gen 17:4 that Abraham will be the father of many nations.[30] Whatever obscurity, the point about Abraham seems to be reasonably clear: the things that were promised to him will not find their fulfillment in this age because the fulfillment is interrupted by the birth of Esau, who represents this evil age,[31] namely, the age of the nations.

For the author of 4 Ezra, however, the two ages are successive rather than overlapping. Just as Jacob emerged from the womb immediately after Esau, the first age must end before the next age can come. Furthermore, between the end of this evil age (i.e., Esau's heel) and the beginning of the coming age (i.e., Jacob's hand)—"for Jacob's hand held Esau's heel from the beginning"—there is no obstruction.[32] In other words, there is no room for the "already-and-not-

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problems (ibid.). For this study, I am following Stone's harder reading as opposed to the NRSV's.

[28] There is a protracted discussion in scholarship about how to understand the two aeons. See Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 159-161; idem, *Features of the Eschatology*, 47-53.

[29] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 160.

[30] It is possible, in this manner, to see Rome as a descendant of Abraham. What I oppose is singling out Rome as Esau.

[31] Samuel Sandmel, *Judaism and Christian Beginnings* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 83.

[32] Stone, *Fourth Ezra*, 161. I am not here suggesting an allegorical reading of hands and heels, only that the age to come "will follow immediately."

yet theology" in the thinking of 4 Ezra. This present age belongs to Esau, whose evil kind stand in the way, obstructing the fulfillment of the covenant promise given to Abraham. The coming age will suddenly dawn with nothing coming in between.

What is remarkable about this parable is that the age of Esau, representing the present age of the nations, certainly must include the present Jewish nation. By the same token, the coming age, represented by Jacob—another way of saying Israel, hence new Israel, i.e., the true children of Abraham—also comprises all the nations of earth that have been renewed:

> It shall be that whoever remains after all that I have foretold to you (i.e., this evil age) shall be saved and shall see my salvation and the end of my world. And they shall see the men who were taken up, who from their birth have not tasted death; *and the heart of the earth's inhabitants shall be changed and converted to a different spirit.* For evil shall be blotted out, and deceit shall be quenched; faithfulness shall flourish, and corruption shall be overcome, and the truth, which has been so long without fruit, shall be revealed (6:25-28; parentheses and emphasis supplied).[33]

Nevertheless, 4 Ezra reserves a special place for the physical descendants of Israel in the end time: the ending of Zion's humiliation will either result in or signal the end time: "It is said, "The days are coming when I draw near to visit the inhabitants of the earth, and when I require from the doers of iniquity the penalty of their iniquity, and when the humiliation of Zion is complete."

In conclusion, 4 Ezra tries to eschew both the particularistic and the universalistic ways of speaking about election. Election does not belong exclusively to Israel, nor does it concern the nations of the present age. His solution is rather to take Abraham out of this age and place him above and beyond it as a unique phenomenon in history. The election of Abraham concerns the end time and not the present age. Inasmuch as physical Israel belongs to this age, Abraham's election does not benefit them in the present age. At the same time, Abraham cannot be truly considered the father of many nations in this age, because his election concerns the universal posterity of the age to come.[34]

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[33] The same basic motif is repeated in 6:55-7:44, but with respect to a universal judgment. The space does not allow us to pursue the same detailed study as above through the whole of 4 Ezra, but enough has been said to suggest what might constitute its basic theological orientation. See the misreading of 6:55f. in W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 63: "The most extreme expression of contempt towards the latter [the Gentiles] is found in 4 Ezra. Thinking of the Gentiles the author writes [and Davies quotes 6:55f]." The passage, however, is voicing a view that the author of 4 Ezra is dismissing, rather than the one he is endorsing.

[34] Scholars have repeatedly noted the postponement of eschatology in 4 Ezra to an undesignated time at the end. Bartels, 323-324: "The course and duration of the present world have been predetermined, and the decisive moment will soon arrive (4:33-50). "Eschatology enters the picture. All of the difficulties are to be solved by the coming of an entirely new age." Collins states: "Although none of Uriel's arguments consoles Ezra, Ezra's despair is gradually eroded by repeated assurances from Uriel concerning the eschatological cure to the disease of sin" (*The Apocalyptic Imagination*, 162, as summarized by Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 47). Hallbäck, 266,

This manner of speaking creates a conflict between creation and election because election takes place within and belongs to the created order, which is passing away.

Election and Creation

The third dialogue begins with a recitation of the creation story (6:38-54) in the style of *Jub.* 2:1-16. Ezra closes it with an appeal based on the hard-line particularistic theology about Israel's election (vv. 55-56). The Gentiles are about as significant to God as a drop of water (cf. Ps.-Philo. 7:3, 12:4; *2 Bar.* 82:5). They are mere "spittle." In contrast, God has chosen Israel alone to inherit his creation (cf. *Pss. Sol.* 14:5), being blessed "above all the nations" (cf. *Pss. Sol.* 11:9; 11:8-11; Ps.-Philo 11:1; 19:8; 30:4; 35:2):[35]

> All this I have spoken before you, O Lord, because you have said that it was for us that you created this world. As for the other nations that have descended from Adam, you have said that they are nothing, and that they are like spittle, and you have compared their abundance to a drop from a bucket (vv. 55-56).

The next three verses, however, reveal that the neat particularist, deuteronomistic construct has been thrown into disarray by the tragedy of 70 C.E. (vv. 57-59):[36]

> And now, O Lord, these nations, which are reputed to be as nothing, domineer over us and devour us. But we your people, whom you have called your firstborn, only begotten, zealous for you, and most dear, have been given into their hands. If the world has indeed been created for us, why do we not possess our world as an inheritance? How long will this be so?

After a lengthy discussion about the implications of rejecting the deuteronomistic theology of creation and election, the author presents, in 7:132-8:3, a refutation of the universalist theology on the same subject. Ezra argues that God should have compassion on sinful humans[37] because they are his creation: "He shows patience toward those who have sinned, since they are his own creatures" (v. 134). The call for compassion is couched in the traditional language of election akin to that found in Exod 34 and appeals to God's merciful character. But in keeping with its universalistic character, the

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states: "Uriel again appears and shows how Ezra is incapable of comprehending, and he repeats his reference to the coming time of salvation"; see also Oesterley, xxx-xxxvii, under the subtitle "Eschatology." What they fail to note, however, is that for the author of 4 Ezra the age to come lies beyond history.

[35] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 30.

[36] Cf. Bartels, 320: The observation that Israel had been handed over to the Gentiles "raises in the writer's mind the question, 'why.' The tragedy, which had taken place, was completely incongruous with the writer's view of the place of the Jewish people in God's plans. To him, as to all Jews, they were the 'Elect.'"

[37] Oesterley, xxviii-xxx, discusses this universalistic aspect of 4 Ezra under the subtitle "Universalism."

present passage makes no mention of the elevated place of the Jews. Rather, by combining the language of election—e.g., compassion, mercy, patience—with the language of creation—namely, God's creation and sustenance of all humankind—Ezra appeals, in the manner of Moses, to God's fatherly compassion in behalf of all humans (vv. 132-140):

> I answered and said, "I know, O Lord, that the Most High is now called merciful, because he has mercy on those who have not yet come into the world; and gracious, because he is gracious to those who turn in repentance to his law; and patient, because he shows patience toward those who have sinned, since they are his own creatures and bountiful, because he would rather give than take away; and abundant in compassion, because he makes his compassions abound more and more to those now living and to those who are gone and to those yet to come—for if he did not make them abound, the world with those who inhabit it would not have life—and he is called the giver, because if he did not give out of his goodness so that those who have committed iniquities might be relieved of them, not one ten-thousandth of humankind could have life; and the judge, because if he did not pardon those who were created by his word and blot out the multitude of their sins, there would probably be left only very few of the innumerable multitude."

Ezra's final discourse that began in 6:38 seems to comprise two appeals: one based on God's particular concern for the elect (6:57-59), and the other, which is based on God's universal concern for his creation (7:132-140). At the same time, these appeals provide a clue that the theme of the present dialogue unit is creation in relationship to election. Furthermore, the author seems to intend that this final dialogue unit function as the conclusion to the preceding two. The author seems to hint at this in the closing parable of 9:14-22, where the basic theme of election and creation surfaces again. The unmistakable allusion to the first vision (5:23-27) in verse 22 seems to be an attempt to tell the reader that the three major dialogue units should be seen as a coherent whole. Moreover, there seems to be a self-evident logical progression in these dialogues: The thesis of the first dialogue that the language of covenant is a nonrational discourse and the thesis of the second dialogue that election concerns the end time and not the present age, culminate in the final dialogue that discusses the questions about the relationship between election and creation.

Accordingly, the parable of 9:14-22 fully bares for the reader what 4 Ezra has been preparing to say about the election of Israel in this age and merits a closer look:

> I answered and said, "I said before, and I say now, and will say it again: there are more who perish than those who will be saved, as a wave is greater than a drop of water." He answered me and said, "As is the field, so is the seed; and as are the flowers, so are the colors; and as is the work, so is the product; and as is the farmer, so is the threshing floor. For there was a time in this age when I was preparing for those who now exist, before the world was made for them to live in, and no one opposed me then, for no one existed; but now those who have been created in this world, which is supplied both with an unfailing table and an inexhaustible pasture, have become corrupt in their

> ways. So I considered my world, and saw that it was lost. I saw that my earth was in peril because of the devices of those who had come into it. And I saw and spared some with great difficulty, and saved for myself one grape out of a cluster, and one plant out of a great forest. So let the multitude perish that has been born in vain, but let my grape and my plant be saved, because with much labor I have perfected them."

In 4 Ezra, as in *Sirach*, election is viewed as an act of creation, and creation as an act of election. Fourth Ezra, however, interprets this theme somewhat differently. For 4 Ezra, election is a process of elimination, through which God creates the people of the age to come. Verses 19-22 bring this point to the fore. Because of the Fall, the world was already as good as destroyed (vv. 19-20). But it was out of compassion that God decided to save some, which he undertook with great difficulty (v. 21). God cannot do anything for, and does not care about, those who perish because they were worthless from the beginning. Why should he be blamed for destroying what should have been destroyed in the first place?—so the argument seems to run.

The purpose of this argument seems to be to justify God's election of Israel. God let history continue because he wanted to save one seed, one vine (vv. 21-22). When considered in the light of vv. 15-16, the staggering proportion of this reasoning becomes clear: "I said before, and I say now, and will say it again: there are more who perish than those who will be saved, as a wave is greater than a drop of water."[38] The author is arguing for the congruence of the properties of the lesser and those of the larger from which the lesser is taken. Israel, the lesser, is to the rest of the world as the drop of (ocean) water is to the rest of the waves and the ocean that produces them. Both share the same properties. As the drop is a representative sample of the sea, so is Israel the representative sample of the world. Israel is the good seed that was taken from a heap of bad seeds that were doomed to go wrong and subject to destruction. God is blameless in his doing, however, because the world was already spoiled at the Fall. Instead, he is fully justified in his effort to save, as it were, one good plant that will represent the whole from which it was taken.

The parables of the sea and the city in 7:3-9 also illustrate the same relationship of the few and many:

> I said, "Speak, my lord." And he said to me, "There is a sea set in a wide expanse so that it is deep and vast, but it has an entrance set in a narrow place, so that it is like a river. If there are those who wish to reach the sea, to look at it or to navigate it, how can they come to the broad part unless they pass through the narrow part? Another example: There is a city built and set on a plain, and it is full of all good things; but the entrance to it is narrow and set in a precipitous place, so that there is fire on the right hand and deep water on the left. There is only one path lying between them, that is, between the fire and the water, so that only one person can walk on the path. If now the city is given to someone as an inheritance, how will the heir receive the inheritance unless by passing through the appointed danger?"

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[38] Bartels, 323: "None who have been born have not sinned (cf. 8:34-35)."

The first parable contrasts the wide expanse of the sea with the narrow strait at its opening (vv. 3-4). This strait, functioning as an entrance, is so narrow that only a few can navigate through it (v. 5). The next parable seems to illustrate the same point. There is a city built on a plain, and full of good things (v. 6), but to get there one has to travel through a narrow path that passes between the fire and water (v. 7). This path is so narrow, it is said, that "only one person can walk on the path" (v. 9). The principle that these parables seem to illustrate is that the entryway of any entity is smaller, in fact much smaller, than the entity itself. As the gate is to a city, and as the strait is to the vast sea, so Israel is to the world, Israel being the entry point of the world. Thus v. 9 states: "If now the city is given to someone as an inheritance, how will the heir receive the inheritance unless by passing through the appointed danger?" Once again, vv. 10-11 reiterate the same principle: "So also is Israel's portion. For I made the world for their sake, and when Adam transgressed my statutes, what had been made was judged." Applying 4 Ezra's basic principle of the proportions to the problem of Adam's transgression, these verses seem say: When Adam transgressed, the world was judged as lost; God chose Israel (the lesser) to be his portion to represent the lost world (the larger); by saving the lesser, the larger will be also saved in the form of representation; and so Israel is to inherit the world.

Israel in these parables refers, however, to the deuteronomistic system of Israel's covenant rather than to its political boundaries; hence, it addresses also the diaspora. The description that there is "fire on the right hand and deep water on the left" in front of the entrance (v. 7) is a clear allusion to the deuteronomistic prohibition not to turn to the right hand or to the left of the Mosaic law (Deut 5:32; 17:11; 17:20; 28:14; Josh 1:7; 23:6). Consequently, the only pathway that passes "between the fire and the water" from this age to the entrance of the coming age (v. 8) is the covenantal system of Israel that operates in the context of deuteronomistic curse and blessing. According to the author of 4 Ezra, this covenantal system is so narrow and difficult that only one person at a time can walk through it.

Considered together, these parables set forth a fascinating interpretation of election. Israel's election means that it has been elected to serve merely as an environment that provides an entry point into the world that is waiting to be inherited. The actual inheritance of the world, however, goes to those who manage to travel successfully through Israel's covenantal maze.

The discussion about the intercession of the patriarchs yields a further indication that 4 Ezra distinguishes the actual heirs from the general election of Israel. The implication is that the election of Israel is only the first step in the process through which the heirs are carefully culled from the world. Ezra replies:

> I answered and said, "How then do we find that first Abraham prayed for the people of Sodom, and Moses for our fathers who sinned in the desert, and Joshua after him for Israel in the days of Achan, and Samuel in the days of Saul, and David for the plague, and Solomon for those in the sanctuary, and Elijah for those who received the rain, and for the one who was dead, that he might

> live, and Hezekiah for the people in the days of Sennacherib, and many others prayed for many? If therefore the righteous have prayed for the ungodly now, when corruption has increased and unrighteousness has multiplied, why will it not be so then [i.e., in the end time] as well?" (7:106-111).

To this question, Uriel replies: "This present world is not the end; the full glory does not remain in it; therefore those who were strong prayed for the weak. . . . [N]o one will then [i.e., in the end time] be able to have mercy on someone who has been condemned in the judgment, or to harm someone who is victorious" (7:112, 115). The prayers of the saints, including those of Abraham, are simply denied of their efficacy for the coming world. In other words, the election of Israel that came through the patriarchs serves another purpose than the collective salvation of their descendants. The implication is that the election was the first step in the process of the selection of the heirs, and the judgment is the final step in the process, with no positive effect of the former upon the latter.

The resultant theological construct is that the election of the patriarchs and the people of Israel was paradigmatic of how God intends to *create* a new humanity. The election is a process of elimination, by which God culls out the choice seeds with which he can repopulate the world (7:132-8:3, 6, 38-41). Ezra, for example, appears to be one of those who will partake in this process of repopulation. In other words, election is creation, and creation is election. By electing a few, and then taking an ever fewer number from their descendants, God is creating a purified new humanity.[39] It is a "survival-of-the-fittest" kind of election theology—a Darwinian construct of salvation that was conceived of before Darwin! Significantly, 4 Ezra employs the term "contest" to describe this competitive process of salvation (7:127). The role of Moses was to introduce a system that would help weed out the worthless majority (v. 129). In this system, however, Moses functions as the convergence point for both Adam and Abraham. The Mosaic system of contest eliminates the corrupt children of Adam, who are responsible for the way this age is (vv. 118-126), and narrows down the process of selection to the final few whose election corresponds to that of Abraham.[40] Accordingly in 4 Ezra, the introduction of the new creation coincides with the total elimination of the present creation (7:30, 39-42; 9:1-6). Throughout the third dialogue, the author tries to answer objections that could be raised against this position. Among them, the most serious is the question about God's cruelty involved in such a cutthroat procedure of competition.[41] Thus Ezra asks, Why did God then create the mind that can understand (7:62-74)? The human mind is certainly more than mere seeds. One reply is that the disobedient human mind is a worthless mind (vv. 72-75) that was condemned for destruction at the time of the Fall (v. 11). It is the mercy of God that he is trying to save at least a seed or two with which to repopulate the earth, as he did with Noah and his sons. At the same time, however, 4 Ezra tries to direct the mind of even those who have been elected for salvation to think in nonrational terms that would enable them to think the unthinkable. The ultimate unthinkable is that nothing that accords with the promises of the Bible will happen in this age.[42]

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[39] 4 Ezra does not explicitly state how any of the nations becomes part of the pure humanity.

[40] Hallbäck, 290, seems to be rather unclear on this point: "Many interpreters have seen this shift from the collective to the individual as a marked reversal to a universalistic orientation in 4 Ezra, indicative of a break with the narrow-minded Jewish particularism. . . . The shift from the collective to the individual complex of problems does not aim at universalizing the salvation; on the contrary, it introduces the Law as a decisive salvation factor. 4 Ezra testifies to an individualization of Judaism, but definitely not to an universalization."

[41] Hayman, 54.

Conclusion

It appears that the debate, which began with the return from the exile, between the universalist and the particularist concerning election, creation, covenant, and Abraham continued to be weighed throughout the Second Temple period, without coming to an agreement.[43] The most striking contribution of the author of 4 Ezra to Judaism appears to be that he persuaded the Jewish thinkers to abandon the traditional covenantal paradigms of universalism and particularism. He accomplished this by urging his people to think the unthinkable: it is possible to forge Israel's new identity with the law at the center without tying it to the notion of conditionality, that obedience to the law ushers in the time of deuteronomistic blessing, namely, the age to come. Moreover, the author cuts loose any earthly ties Israel might have had to Abraham. First, the promise given to Abraham is shown as applying to the coming age, and not to this age. Second, using the idea of competition, election is defined as an ongoing process of creation rather than an event that happened with the ancestors in the distant past. In short, what the author of 4 Ezra wants is to divest Judaism of its former deuteronomistic framework as the basis for holding out hope for this age.

A similar theological tendency can be seen in the Mishnah's way of discussing and defining the laws without heavy reliance on the deuteronomistic framework of curse and blessing, the ancestors, and the end time. Hallbäck states:

> [4 Ezra] shows how the problem [of circumstances meeting traditional Jewish interpretations] may be surmounted by emphasizing the Law as a decisive mediator . . . between collective expectations and individual responsibility. And this was exactly what the surviving rabbinical Judaism fell back on. In this way 4 Ezra becomes an almost emblematic symptom of the transition from antique to rabbinical Judaism.[44]

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[42] Perhaps, for this reason, the rest of 4 Ezra is written in a symbolic language about the future. Longenecker, *2 Esdras*, 97: "Uriel's perspective, which Ezra seems later to accept, is marked out by the underlying conviction that God's activity is determined by the divinely pre-ordained timetable of history, and that hope lies not in divine grace in the present but in the dramatic in-breaking of God in the final stages of this age and in the next"; and Tom W. Willett states: "Neither work saw any hope of a reconciliation of their problems in the present, but instead looked to the future when the present world order would be overthrown and retribution would occur" (*The Apocalyptic Imagination*, 162, as summarized by Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 47).

[43] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 32, speaks appropriately of "a significant degree of tension among the variety of Jewish groups of that time"; cf. Hallbäck, 291.

[44] Hallbäck, 292.

It is also noteworthy that 4 Ezra's theology bears more than a passing resemblance to Paul's. Fourth Ezra's basic presuppositions about Abraham, Israel, covenant, creation, and election are also found in Galatians and Romans.[45] In Paul's theology, Abraham stands by himself above history and connects directly to the Messiah (Gal 3:16). Abraham's election had a different purpose than to benefit Israel (Rom 9:8; Gal 3:7-8). And Paul establishes a direct link of death between Adam and Moses (Rom 5:12-14). This raises an important question about who influenced whom. In my judgment, the direction of flow is unquestionably from Paul to 4 Ezra. Not only did Paul write before the destruction of the Temple and 4 Ezra afterwards, but these ideas are completely absent from any of the Second Temple period literature written before Paul,[46] including Philo, Josephus, and the Dead Sea Scrolls, which we do not have the space to examine here.

Two observations are in order. First, Paul should not be read in the light of 4 Ezra or Rabbinic Judaism, but the other way around. Second, the author of 4 Ezra does not have the intention of "circumcising" Paul's teachings and passing them on to his people. Rather, the author of 4 Ezra wants to characterize and dismiss Paul's ideas as a subset of Jewish universalism.[47] Furthermore, the author of 4 Ezra seems to want to make Paul's point about Abraham moot by setting Paul's own covenantal argument on its head. The author does this with the notion that the promise given to Abraham belongs to the end time, not to the present age. By rejecting the notion that the end can come through an earthly Messiah and relegating the fulfillment of the promise given to Abraham to an unknown end time, the author of 4 Ezra invalidates any application of the Old Testament prophecies to an event occurring within the framework of history. The net effect of this thinking for Judaism appears to have been the development of its identity and theology quite apart from Abraham, the Messiah, and the end time.

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[45] Bartels, 325-326.

[46] See D. A. Carson, Peter T. O'Brien, and Mark A. Seifrid, eds. *Justification and Variegated Nomism*, vol. 1, *The Complexities of Second Temple Judaism*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament. 2. Reihe, 140 (Tübingen: Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001). Interestingly, in this rather detailed and comprehensive investigation of the Second Temple period literature, no evidence has turned up that any Jewish writer before Paul had entertained the unique ideas found in Paul; contra Bartels, 329; but note on the same page: "Literary dependence of Ezra upon Paul is no question here."

[47] Longenecker, *Eschatology*, 168, states: "Universalism proved, of course, to be the controversial point of Paul's gospel since it appeared to deny the effectiveness of God's election of, and dealings with, the people of Israel as the particular focus of his affection and attention."

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JAMES KEMUEL HUMPHREY AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE UNITED SABBATH-DAY ADVENTISTS

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The urbanization of the African American[1] population in the first half of the twentieth century did not diminish or dampen the premium black people placed on the religion they had practiced in the rural south and the islands of the West Indies. Indeed, the anonymity, heterogeneity, and mobility of the urban community only heightened the need to glean from religion stability and a sense of belonging in their new surroundings. Additionally, the untoward and unwelcome conditions they encountered as they poured into American cities in unprecedented numbers called for an interconnectedness and grounding they experienced in their churches. Yet black urban churches, especially small independent ones, were infinitely more than community centers that served as oases of belonging in an alien environment. They were monuments to the drive for self-determination and autonomy that permeated the African American community during that time.

Given the radicalness of the act of migrating, it is not surprising that blacks were not averse to identifying with small urban churches that operated outside the mainstream of American religion.[2] Often these groups were spawned by charismatic leaders unafraid to buck the status quo and willing to exploit the still-robust black nationalism of the late nineteenth century.[3] Many of these individuals were especially drawn to Harlem, New York, which had evolved from a sleepy village on the northern tip of Manhattan in 1900 to being the undisputed black capital of the United States, if not the world, by the 1920s, and was the locus for the black cultural awakening known as the Harlem Renaissance.[4] One such individual was James Kemuel Humphrey, a Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) minister who in 1930 established an independent religious organization in Harlem, New York, called the United Sabbath-Day Adventists (USDA). Humphrey and the early history of the United Sabbath-Day Adventists amply demonstrate the struggles of small, independent black congregations in the urban community during the twentieth century.

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[1] In the first half of the twentieth century, Americans of African descent were not referred to as African Americans. "Negro" and "colored" were the acceptable terms then. Later in the century, "Afro-American" and "Black" were the preferred terms. Today, the terms in vogue are "African American" or "African-American," though some people of African descent who were not born in the United States and are not U.S. citizens question the validity and utility of the term. In this study, I use "black" and "African American" interchangeably.

[2] Religion has always been a central force in black life, and nowhere was it more so than in early twentieth-century Harlem, where it was expressed in an array of religious organizations. Some of these manifestations were established and structured, while others were loose, moving, and transient. Cults and sects abounded in Harlem, which had churches with names such as "The Metaphysical Church of the Divine Investigation," "St. Matthew's Church of the Divine Silence and Truth," and "Tabernacle of the Congregation of the Disciples of the Kingdom." See James Weldon Johnson, *Black Manhattan* (New York: Arno Press and the New York Times, 1968), 163-168. As a contributing editor of *The New York Age*, a black paper, Johnson questioned the existence of, and need for, Harlem's plethora of churches (idem, "The Question of Too Many Churches," *The New Yorker*, 33/26, March 20, 1920, 4).

[3] For a trenchant treatment of the subject, see Wilson Jeremiah Moses, *The Golden Age of Black Nationalism, 1850-1950* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); see also Kevin Gaines, *Uplifting the Race: Black Leadership, Politics, and Culture in the Twentieth Century* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).

The Seventh-day Adventist Ministerial Career of James K. Humphrey

James Kemuel Humphrey was born in Jamaica, West Indies, on March 7, 1877, and embarked on a career as a Baptist minister shortly after marrying in 1900. The following year, Humphrey left Jamaica to visit Africa, stopping in New York City for a sightseeing tour that changed his plans and life.[5] J. H. Carroll, an Adventist layman who had been converted from Catholicism to Adventism by Stephen Haskell, was facilitating meetings in his home in Brooklyn, New York, one day when Humphrey walked in. Struck by the simplicity and logic of what he heard, Humphrey joined the Adventist Church, walking away from the Baptist ministry and aborting his trip to Africa.

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[4] Among the useful works of the era, known in United States history as the Progressive era, are John W. Chambers, *The Tyranny of Change: America in the Progressive Era, 1900-1917* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), Robert M. Cruden, *Ministers of Reform: The Progressives' Achievement in American Civilization, 1889-1920* (New York: Basic Books, 1982), John Milton Cooper, *Pivotal Decades: The United States, 1900-20* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); Gabriel Kolko, *The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); William Leutenberg, *The Perils of Prosperity, 1914-1932*, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); Geoffrey Perret, *America in the Twenties* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). Excellent analyses of Harlem in its heyday, dubbed the "Roaring Twenties," are Jervis Anderson, *This Was Harlem: A Cultural Portrait, 1900-1950* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1981); John Henrik Clarke, ed., *Harlem: A Community in Transition* (New York: Citadel, 1963); David Levering Lewis, *When Harlem Was in Vogue* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981); Mark Irving Helbling, *The Harlem Renaissance: The One and the Many* (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1999); Gilbert Osofky, *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

[5] Humphrey was a part of the first wave of West Indian immigrants to New York City, who began migrating to the United States in significant numbers around 1900, continuing to do so until 1924, when a change in the country's immigration laws slowed their coming. They came in the hundreds during the first three years of the twentieth century, and in the thousands from then on up to 1924, when a little over 12,000 West Indians arrived in the United States. By 1925, West Indian blacks made up approximately 21 percent of New York City's black population. See Ira de Augustine Reid, *The Negro Immigrant: His Background, Characteristics and Social Adjustment, 1899-1937* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 44; Philip Kasinitz, *Caribbean New York: Black Immigrants and the Politics of Race* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 24-25; Herbert G. Gutman, *The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom, 1750-1925* (New York: Pantheon, 1976), 511; Calvin B. Holder, "The Causes and Compositions of West Indian Immigration to New York City, 1900-1952," *Afro-Americans in New York City Life and History*, 11/1, January 1987, 7:27; "Harlem—1920's Mecca for East Indians," *New York Amsterdam News*, Saturday, September 6, 1980, 9. West Indians who entered the United States did so in the dual capacity of immigrant and black, differing from the indigenous African American population in social mores more than in physical characteristics. When the two groups encountered each other for the first time, each reacted with a mixture of uncertainty and distrust bom of ignorance, and their interactions were characterized by a complex web of likes and dislikes. The stereotypes they harbored about each other marred their relationship initially. In the end, however, the social vision of each group expanded and their cultural sensibilities were enhanced as they were forced to deal with each other.

In 1903, Humphrey was chosen to lead the small group of ten Adventists that had grown out of Carroll's labors. The following year he began to function as a licensed missionary with the Greater New York Conference, and he was ordained as a Seventh-day Adventist minister in 1907. That year he was invited to serve on the executive committee of the Atlantic Union Conference. When the North American Negro Department of the General Conference of SDAs was established in 1909, Humphrey was appointed as one of the members of its executive committee.[6]

The meteoric rise of Humphrey in the Adventist Church continued through the 1910s and 1920s. Humphrey was chosen as a delegate from the Atlantic Union to the General Conference Session in 1913, and the gifted evangelist and leader held several tent revivals in New York City, especially in the borough of Manhattan, all through the decade. The result was that by 1920 the membership of the First Harlem Church, where Humphrey was serving as pastor, had grown to 600. There were four black churches in the Greater New York Conference by the end of 1922, all of them under his supervision.[7] First Harlem continued to grow so well that on January 1, 1924, it planted Harlem Number Two with 108 members. Matthew C. Strachan was called from Florida to lead the new congregation and spoke glowingly of Humphrey's twenty-four years of service to the denomination. When Harlem Number Two was voted into the sisterhood of Seventh-day Adventist churches two months later, its membership was 125.[8]

In spite of Humphrey's success as an Adventist pastor, it appears that his ministerial career in the denomination was marked by stress. As Humphrey tendered his report of Adventist ministry in the African American community to the delegates at the Eighteenth Session of the Greater New York Conference, he lamented his physical condition, which he claimed had curtailed his evangelistic activities in Harlem the previous year. He explained that his

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See Lennox Raphael, "West Indians and Afro-Americans," *Freedomways*, 4/3, Summer 1964, 442; Orde Coombs, "West Indians in New York: Moving Beyond the Limbo Pole," *New York*, 3/28, July 13, 1970, 28-32; Lennox Raphael, "The West Indian Syndrome: To Be or Not To Be an American Negro," *Negro Digest*, 13/1, November 1963, 30-34.

[6] *The General Conference Bulletin*, 6/16, Thirty-Seventh Session (Washington, DC: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1909), 243.

[7] Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Minutes of the Seventeenth Session of the Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists*, June 20-24, 1922, Greater New York Conference Archives, Manhasset, New York.

[8] Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Minutes of the Eighteenth Session of the Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists*, March 12-14, 1924, Greater New York Conference Archives, Manhasset, New York.

burden then was not to raise money, but to see his membership grow, and that membership growth was his lifelong ambition. Yet Humphrey held up the giving totals of blacks—$22,224 in tithes and $18,388 for foreign missions—of the previous year for analysis, arguing that, given their limited economic resources, blacks were giving proportionally more than other groups. In his report, Humphrey hoped for the time when he would be asked to evangelize not only in New York City, but in Philadelphia and Chicago as well.[9]

It appears that Humphrey wanted to leave New York City, twice petitioning church leaders to be relocated. On both occasions he was turned down, ostensibly because the church in New York City was thriving under his leadership. Humphrey never offered reasons for wanting to leave New York City, though they are not difficult to infer. Humphrey's association with, and tenure within, the SDA Church was marked by emotional stress over the race issue. In 1905, shortly after he began working as a licensed missionary, he was accosted by an individual about to cut ties with the church and was asked to do the same.[10] Obviously, Humphrey was disenchanted with his church, and his displeasure was known. Yet Humphrey "flatly refused" to dissociate himself from the denomination at that time, protesting that he had never come across a precedent in God's word for anyone rejecting "God's organized plan of work" and succeeding.[11]

Humphrey shared this information at the General Conference Session of 1922, at which he had been asked to preach. The pastor of Harlem Number One chose suffering and "The Divine Program" as the theme and title of his sermon, which was based on 1 Pet 5:10. More personal testimony than the exposition of the biblical passage, the sermon reveals a man with a heavy heart and a mind struggling to come to grips with unresolved issues. Humphrey claimed that independent churches, like the one the brother wanted to start, only appealed to recalcitrants and individuals who had grown lukewarm in their commitment to the church, and stated that those who love the truth as it is found in Jesus Christ do not lower its bar. His intention was to remain in the Word, and he asserted that "the cause of Jesus Christ is greater than men, greater than plans, greater than organization." Of supreme importance to him were the salvation of his own soul, the glorification of God, and the salvation of all whom God had entrusted to his care.[12]

Throughout the 1920s, James K. Humphrey served the SDA Church with vision and distinction, leading his congregation to a position of primacy and prominence in the Greater New York Conference. In 1927, First Harlem was the largest SDA Church in New York City and one of the largest in the United States.[13] Yet, as the 1920s drew to a close, Humphrey's patience with the way the denomination was relating to people of color wore thin. A series of events then took place in 1928 and 1929 that ultimately led to Humphrey's break with the SDA denomination and the establishment of his own religious organization.

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[9] Ibid.

[10] No one is sure who the individual referred to is, though speculation centers on Louis C. Shaefe, whose Washington, DC, congregation defected from the denomination in 1907. The group returned to the fold some years later. Subsequently, Schaefe left again, never to return. See Jacob Justiss, *Angels in Ebony* (Toledo: Jet Printing, 1975), 45.

[11] *General Conference Bulletin*, Fortieth Session, 9/11, Mountain View, California, May 25, 1922, 253, 254.

[12] Ibid.

In October 1928, William H. Green, the black Detroit lawyer who had led the Negro Department for almost ten years, died, creating a vacuum in the black work.[14] At the Spring meeting of the world church the following year, the Black Caucus passed a resolution calling for the creation of regional conferences to replace the Negro Department, which they believed was ineffective. Humphrey was at the forefront of the call for regional conferences. General Conference leaders responded to the request by empaneling a committee to study the issue. The committee consisted of eighteen individuals, eleven of whom were white, and Humphrey was one of the committee's six blacks. Outnumbered two to one, the blacks were powerless to stop the body from "emphatically and absolutely" voting down the idea of regional conferences. Yet what particularly distressed them was the committee's statement that "Black Conferences are out of the question. Don't ever ask for a Black Conference again."[15]

Sometime after the spring meeting of Adventist world church leaders, Humphrey began to promote the idea of an all-black commune among his members.[16] The project was called Utopia Park and billed as the "Fortune Spot of America for Colored People."[17] When conference leaders learned of this venture, they attempted to talk about it with Humphrey, who rebuffed them. Unable to have an audience with Humphrey, SDA church leaders felt constrained to advise the revocation of his ministerial credentials and the expulsion of his congregation, which voted 595 to 5 in support of him, from the denominational structure in January 1930.[18]

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[13] Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Comparative Reports for the Years 1920-1927, Twentieth Session*, March 20-24, 1928.

[14] Humphrey was one of the three individuals who authored the obituary of W. H. Green, who died on October 31, 1928. Humphrey was at Green's funeral services, which were held in Detroit, Michigan, and presided over by General Conference president, W. A. Spicer, who delivered the eulogy (*Advent Review and Sabbath Herald*, 105/52, December 27, 1928, 22).

[15] Alven Makapela, *The Problem with Africanity in the Seventh-day Adventist Church* (Lewiston: Mellen, 1996), 229-231; W. W. Fordham, *Righteous Rebel* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1990), 79.

[16] For an excellent examination of the history and purpose of utopian communities, see William H. Pease and Jane H. Pease, *Black Utopia: Negro Communal Experiments in America* (Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1963).

[17] *The Utopia Park Health Benevolent Association* (n.p.: n.d.).

[18] See Joe Mesar and Tom Dybdahl, "The Utopia Park Affair and the Rise of Northern Black Adventists," *Adventist Heritage*, 1/1, January 1974, 34-41, 53-54; James Lamar McElhany, ed., *Statement Regarding the Present Standing of Elder J. K. Humphrey* (Washington, DC: General Conference

The United Sabbath-Day Adventists Under Humphrey, 1930-1952

Establishment of United Sabbath-Day Congregations

Frustrated that the SDA denomination had failed to give them "due consideration" in spite of their faithfulness and loyalty and, more importantly, had failed to "show a better example of Christlikeness in Righteousness, Justice and Equity," Humphrey and his loyalists believed they had ample reason to dissociate themselves from the SDA Church and form their own.[19]

The group adopted the name USDAs in January 1930 after a committee of twenty-three individuals had given extended study to the matter. The committee, which voted twenty-one to two in favor of the name, believed that it could not continue using the name "Seventh-day Adventist" because that term stood for "unfair treatment of colored people through discrimination and 'Jim-Crowism.'" "United" was chosen because of the emphasis the Bible places on unity, and because unity is a hallmark of true Christianity. Additionally, the new religious body would try to effect unity between individuals and groups, including racial and ethnic groups. This unity would authenticate and motivate the group's endeavors to preach the gospel worldwide. Still believing in the sanctity of the Sabbath, the group opted to the use the term "Sabbath-Day," going a step further to assert that people who keep the Sabbath holy must of necessity be holy themselves. Finally, because members were convinced that Jesus would be returning to earth soon to end the reign of sin and usher in an age of peace and holiness, they kept the word "Adventists."[20]

United Sabbath-Day Adventists were buoyant and optimistic at the start of their organization, believing that American society was ripe for proseltyizing. The group decried the sluggishness with which SDAs had tried to reach African Americans, and was particularly chagrined that after almost sixty years of contact, black SDA church membership was only approximately 9,000. While Sabbath-Day Adventist evangelistic outlook was going to be global, the new religious body would give specialized focus to their marginalized brothers and sisters in the United States, whom they characterized as "susceptible to the religion of Jesus Christ, and are so willing

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of Seventh-day Adventists, 1930); "Seventh-day Adventists Break with White Governing Body Over Minister: Harlem Church Severs Ties with Conference on Grounds that Parent Group Practices Racial Discrimination," *New York Amsterdam News*, November 6, 1929, 20/49, 1; "Adventist Pastor Slams Broadsides at Fraud Charges," *New York Amsterdam News*, November 13, 1929, 20/50, 1, 3; "Rev. J. K. Humphrey Loses 25-year Pastorate in 7th Day [*sic*] Adventist Church in New York," *The New York Age*, 43/10, November 16, 1929, 1; "Minister Cleared in Resort Project: Kelly Denies His Office Persecuted Sponsor of Venture," *The New York Amsterdam News*, December 4, 1929, 21/1, 2; Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Minutes of the Twenty-First Biennial Session of the Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventists*, January 27-29, 1930, Greater New York Conference of Seventh-day Adventist Archives, Manhasset, New York.

[19] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, 2/11, November 1931, 5.

[20] Ibid., 4.

to hear any one speak of the Savior who died for them."[21]

The evidence appears to substantiate the claims of Sabbath-Day Adventist leadership that the infant denomination grew quickly. Not surprisingly, the largest USDA congregation was in New York City, where Humphrey lived and was well known. Parent of every other Sabbath-Day Adventist congregation, this congregation, which by mid-1931 numbered 530, was committed to fostering evangelistic efforts worldwide. Its Sabbath school was touted to be the best organized among Adventists in the world, and the church boasted a youth membership well in excess of 200. By late 1931, other USDA congregations had been spawned in Chicago, Boston, St. Louis, Omaha, Milwaukee, Newark, and Kingston, Jamaica. How USDAs established these churches is unclear, though it appears that people sympathetic to Humphrey and his cause contacted him with requests to be organized.[22]

Humphrey alleged that a torrent of calls for the organization of Sabbath-Day Adventist congregations had been received from Jamaica and Central and Latin America. The calls prompted him to appeal for human and financial resources, and only a lack of help had thwarted a more aggressive response from the new religious body, according to Humphrey. A dearth of financial resources had prevented him from visiting Panama, though two groups organized themselves there in 1931.[23] United Sabbath-Day Adventist congregations were small and saddled with pressing financial needs, which, given their Depression-era context, are understandable.

By August 1932, USDAs were lauding their rise and progress, accomplished "under the courageous and energetic leadership of Elder James K. Humphrey." In spite of severe opposition from detractors, the organization had moved "forward steadily," proving wrong the predictions of an early demise and standing tall as a "challenge to the bigotry and selfishness of those who once exploited them."[24] The organization claimed a worldwide membership of 1,200 people, worshiping in fifteen congregations and missions in places as far away as Jamaica, West Indies. Saying that "a good report maketh the bones fat," Humphrey informed his followers in August 1932 that the New York Supreme Court, ruling in their favor, had directed the Greater New York Conference to return the deed of their property to them.[25]

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[21] Ibid., 6.

[22] Ibid., 9.

[23] Ibid., 14.

[24] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, 3/8, August 1932, 3.

[25] Property ownership had played no small role in Humphrey's break with the SDA Church in 1929. Humphrey and his supporters fundamentally disagreed with the SDA church policy, in which the local conference corporation holds the title to all property belonging to its constituent churches. Ostensibly, it was only after local conference, union, and General Conference officials agreed on the night of November 2, 1929, to turn over the title of First Harlem's building that they were allowed to leave the premises unharmed. USDAs jealously guarded their property once it was returned to them.

Humphrey believed that the ruling was an answer to prayer and that "in every respect" the new body was much better off than "when she was connected with the Seventh-day Adventists."[26]

Who were the people that joined the Sabbath-Day Adventists? Did the group attract only urban slum dwellers, immigrants from the South and the West Indies searching for stability in an unfriendly, alien environment? Based on the photos, art work, and articles in the denomination's official organ, the *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, a reasonable conclusion is that the group attracted educated, middle-class, well-to-do individuals, as well as those mired in poverty. Pictures of church leaders and members show well-dressed, immaculately coiffured people. Children are adequately and tastefully clothed, and even snapshots of the Kingston and Higgins Town, Jamaica, congregations tell a story of blacks being able to clothe themselves well in the midst of worldwide depression.

General Conference Sessions

Almost from their inception, USDAs convened General Conference sessions annually. The objectives of these sessions included the receiving of reports from satellite groups and the dissemination of information from headquarters. Committees on Nominations, Constitution and By-Laws, Entertainment, Plans and Recommendations, and Credentials and Licenses were impaneled, usually completing their tasks before the sessions adjourned. Humphrey presided over each session and was never averse to injecting devotional elements into these business sessions. As such, each session started with singing, and whenever there was not much business to attend to or there were lapses in the agenda, delegates took to the floor to testify of God's blessings and the joys of being associated with the organization. Seldom were doctrinal or theological issues taken up. A General Conference session more often addressed housekeeping matters, serving as a rallying point for the faithful and a motivational device for the feeble of faith.[27]

The General Conference of Sabbath-Day Adventists had officer personnel and directors for the Sabbath School and Youth Departments. It is certain that all these positions were up for reelection at a General Conference session. The only position not up for reelection was the presidency. Obviously, that Humphrey would continue on as leader of the group was not up for discussion, debate, or a vote. Humphrey was the indisputable leader of the organization, and would be at its helm during his lifetime.[28]

The Theology of James K. Humphrey

Humphrey came searching for a better life in America, where he lived through World War I, the Harlem Renaissance, the stock-market crash, the Great

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[26] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, 3/8, August 1932, 7.

[27] *Constitution and By-Laws of the New York United Sabbath-Day Adventist Church* (n.p., n.d.).

[28] Due to failing health, Humphrey did give up leadership of the Sabbath-Day Adventists in 1947, five years before his death in 1952.

Depression, World War II, the Korean War, and the start of the Cold War. The first half of the twentieth century was a period of upheaval and "Hard Times" interspersed with stints of glamor and vigor. When Humphrey died, America was but two years into the "Fabulous Fifties."

A product of his times, Humphrey was not trained in theology and may never have attended a seminary for ministerial instruction. Yet he performed with distinction as a minister and exhibited an appreciable knowledge of the Bible, which was his standard and rule and the matrix in which his theological understanding was grounded. Humphrey believed that "the Bible and the Bible only is the indisputable word of God," adding that "there is no other book upon which the world may depend for the gospel but the Bible." As such, he appealed to his members to live up to the "truths of the gospel brought forth in God's holy book."[29]

Humphrey held that history was purposeful, with events moving inexorably toward a definite goal. He based his belief on the "biblical" passage: "There is a time and place for everything under the sun."[30] For Humphrey, time was about to run out, and his was earth's last generation, making the preaching of the gospel of the kingdom an urgent matter. "Jesus Christ is near at hand," Humphrey affirmed, calling upon followers to "prepare the people to meet this solemn event." Yet to do so meant paying heed to and proclaiming God's Ten Commandment Law, especially the fourth, which "calls upon every man, woman and child to remember the Sabbath Day which is the seventh day of the week (Saturday) to keep it holy." Humphrey contended that Scripture contained no warrant or backing for the observance of Sunday as the Bible Sabbath.[31]

For Humphrey, the time was right for "members of the Ethiopian race" to take "a pure and true gospel" to the world. To be sure, the gospel was not the exclusive property of any race or group of people; yet it had been bequeathed to the "dark-skinned peoples of the world who have been slighted and segregated and discriminated against by both Jews and Gentiles." God, in his providence and wisdom, had elevated "downtrodden and despised" blacks by giving them an opportunity "to help themselves in the knowledge of the Gospel of the kingdom of the Lord Jesus Christ." It was now the "duty and obligation" of the people of African descent to promulgate the gospel.[32]

Referencing Gen 10:1-5, the bishop[33] posited that Jews had descended from Japheth and were once the chosen people of God, but that they had been replaced when, believing themselves better than the rest of humankind, they had failed to share their knowledge of God. Subsequently, God conscripted the Gentiles for service. Yet the Gentiles had failed "just as lamentably as the Jews," discriminating against both Jews and blacks, and becoming in the process "unfit to proclaim the gospel." It had become the lot of blacks to preach the gospel, and Humphrey, as an "Apostle to the Negro race," felt constrained to "point out the prophecies that relate to the dark-skinned peoples of the world in the call to give the closing message to mankind." This call to serve humbled the bishop, who believed that all people were to be addressed with the gospel, even though some would ultimately reject it.[34]

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[29] *United Sabbath-Day Messenger*, August 1932, 3.

[30] Ibid., 2. The biblical passage to which Humphrey was alluding is a conflation of Eccl 3:1: "To everything there is a season, a time for every purpose under heaven" with the phrase "under the sun," which occurs some twenty-five times in Ecclesiastes.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Humphrey assumed the title of "bishop" soon after the launch of his denomination. In doing so, he followed in the tradition of black religious leaders. As understood by these individuals, "bishop" "is a rank in the ordained Christian ministry. The bishop oversees the affairs of the church in a particular area, and only bishops can ordain others to the ministry" (Albert J.

Humphrey believed that the worldwide economic depression of the 1930s was the direct result of humanity's selfishness. He thought as much because he understood God to be omnipotent and, as such, able to supply all the temporal needs of the human family. The Depression was viewed as an embarrassment to individuals and entire nations alike, and Humphrey indicted England and the United States as the two main culprits for triggering it. As a consequence, these two nations were primarily responsible for implementing the drastic measures needed to deal with the crippling effects of the Depression. The Sabbath-Day Adventist leader held that the selfishness of humanity was at variance with the love and benevolence of God, which, coupled with God's power and mercy, were reasons for thanksgiving. Yet the Thanksgiving season of 1931 would be marred because of the ravishing effects of the Depression.[35]

Humphrey thought World War II was a fulfillment of Bible prophecy and a sure sign that the end of human history was imminent. To be sure, war had always been a fact of human existence, but World War II was a unique conflagration in which new artillery was being used for the first time, causing the bishop to cast and view the war in apocalyptic images. Humphrey saw no safety or deliverance for the faithful in human ingenuity, but only in God, who was an ever-present recourse and refuge. Moreover, in spite of the breathtaking inventions of humanity, the victory of God's people was guaranteed. Though he did not advise his congregants whether they should enlist in the armed forces or seek employment in any war-related industry, he did affirm the NT teaching that Christians support their governments and leaders.[36]

Humphrey asserted that suffering was God's wonderful program for

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Raboteau, *African-American Religion* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1999], 133). An insightful and valuable contribution on some of these individuals, including some who are not as well known, is Randall K. Burkett and Richard Newman's *Black Apostles: Afro-American Clergy Confront the Twentieth Century* (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1978).

[34] *United Sabbath-Day Messenger*, August 1932, 2.

[35] *United Sabbath-Day Messenger*, 2/11, November 1931, 3.

[36] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, 16/3, July-September 1944, 1-5. World War II did have an impact on USDA operations. Among other things, it led to the cancellation of their 1944 General Conference Session (ibid., 6).

Christians, who must all suffer in this world for some time. Suffering being in the will of a sovereign God, Christians have no control over it and must accept it as submissive children of a God who knows what is in their best interest and for their most good. Suffering puts people on an equal footing, uniting them in a community of shared sympathy and leading them to a state of perfection. In fact, suffering is one of the means through which perfection is realized. For Humphrey, suffering liberates and sanctifies, grounding Christians in the truth; yet suffering is a fleeting reality caused by the temporal nature of the universe. This being the case, Humphrey, like most Christians of his time, was eager for the return of Jesus Christ, and he urged his fellow pilgrims to hold on in the hope of their Lord's soon return.[37]

Like Seventh-day Adventists, Humphrey made a sharp distinction between the uses that could be made of tithes and offerings. The tithe was to be used exclusively for the remuneration of the credentialed and licensed clergy. Basing his argument on the Melchizedek model of the OT, Humphrey asserted that Jesus was the High Priest of the Christian, and, as such, desires to see "his ministers kept on the job by the faithfulness of His people bringing their tithes into the storehouse." Offerings were intended either for foreign or home missions. As the former, they were to be used beyond the precincts of the church that generated them, while home mission offerings could be used to meet the operating expenses of the local congregation, including the salaries of church personnel other than the minister.[38]

Humphrey prized young people, who he believed faced an inordinate amount of temptation to evil. He frowned upon the penchant of adults to condemn the youth for the "frivolity and fickleness" that often characterized their religion, reminding the adults that they were still growing as Christians too. At the same time, adults were not to give blanket endorsement to the activities of youth. Youth needed to be taught, and it was the duty of adults to mentor and model for them. Humphrey reminded parents that their most effective teaching was a life that exemplified the truths and principles they expected their children to emulate.[39]

Citing the economic crisis then gripping the world as proof that governments and nations were unable to provide meaningful relief for the critical challenges and issues of life, the bishop believed that the youth of society constituted the best hope for the future of the church and the world. He called upon churches to partner and collaborate with homes to "understand the thoughts, feelings, interests, and actions of the youths committed to their care." With a view to making Christianity "real, practical, and meaningful,"

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[37] *General Conference Bulletin*, Fortieth Session, 253, 254. Humphrey's understanding of pain and suffering does not reflect the historic African American perspective. Two excellent studies of the African American theology of pain and suffering are James H. Cone, *God of the Oppressed* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1975); and Anthony B. Pinn, *Why, Lord: Suffering and Evil in Black Theology* (New York: Continuum, 1995).

[38] *United Sabbath-Day Messenger*, June 1939, 5.

[39] Ibid.

Sabbath-Day Adventist youth systematically visited the sick and suffering, leaving behind cheer and goodwill. The New York congregation often partnered with other congregations in these humanitarian jaunts, realizing that in unity there is strength.[40]

Seventh-day Adventists and Sabbath-Day Adventists: A Comparative Analysis

In his seminal work, *The Social Teaching of the Black Churches*, Peter J. Paris argues that the major objective of the independent black church movement was "the institutionalization of the Christian faith in a nonracist form" and that the founders of independent black churches never intended that their churches differ from those of their white counterparts in policy and doctrine. According to Paris, two factors accounted for their reality. The first is that black churches were dependent on the cooperation of whites for their emergence and development, often needing their help to procure loans to acquire property. Additionally, because blacks resolutely believed in the ideal society of love and inclusion, they saw black churches as a necessary, though temporary, evil prompted by the contingencies of race.[41]

While the first factor does not appear to have applied to the Sabbath-Day Adventists, the second does. Sabbath-Day Adventists were comfortable with most of the doctrines and teachings of the SDA Church, their theological beliefs not just approximating those of their former associates, but in many respects mirroring them.[42] Sabbath-Day Adventists accepted the teaching of the Holy Spirit as the third member of the Trinity, emphasizing that a belief in and, more important, a reception of the Holy Spirit, did not entail glossalia or the emotional outbursts that others claimed it did. They also believed in the imminency of the Second Coming of Jesus Christ, salvation through faith in Jesus Christ alone, the efficacy of Christian stewardship, and the power of the gospel to transform lives and characters through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Obedience to the Ten Commandments of God received special emphasis from them, as did faith in Jesus Christ. Like all Christians, they desired to see the gospel preached around the world, believing that transformed lives on earth offered a glimpse and foretaste of what life in the world to come would be like.[43]

Not surprisingly, the sanctity of the Sabbath was an item on which both Seventh-day Adventists and Sabbath-Day Adventists agreed. While Humphrey contended that Sabbath-keeping did not inherently contain any soteriological or salvific properties, he believed that it was the single most distinguishing

[40] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, November 1931, 11.

[41] Peter J. Paris, *The Social Teaching of the Black Churches* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 129.

[42] The closest thing to a fundamental set of doctrines that Sabbath-Day Adventists adopted was authored by R. Leo Soaries, vice-president of the organization, in 1932. It shows that, in the main, Sabbath-Day Adventist beliefs reflected those of mainstream Christianity; see *The United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, August 1932, 9-10 (Appendix A).

[43] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, November 1931, 3.

feature of his group. He often reminded members of this fact, imploring them to exercise maximum care with the start and conclusion of the Sabbath, times when people are most prone to violate the Sabbath. In encouraging greater fidelity in Sabbath-keeping, Humphrey cautioned against the temptation to lapse into the spiritual pride of the "holier-than-thou" attitude of many Christians who fall victim to a "works theology." Yet he asserted that greater faithfulness in Sabbath-keeping would engender more conversions among a Sabbath-keeper's neighbors, who the bishop believed were hungry for the truth. Getting people to keep the Sabbath was what Humphrey was all about. As such, the spiritual leader of the Sabbath-Day Adventists preferred that the heretofore unchurched join his congregation, not Seventh-day Adventists disgruntled with their denomination.[44]

Like SDAs, USDAs emphasized Bible study, bemoaning the unacceptably high level of biblical illiteracy among the general population. Believing that knowledge of the Holy Scriptures benefitted people both spiritually and socially, USDAs sought to engender a love for the Bible among their members by offering a plethora of opportunities for its study. More importantly, Humphrey anchored his preaching in the Bible, unapologetically pointing members to the Bible's primacy and potency, and reminding them that the Bible supplied powerful antidotes for the stressors of life.[45]

One tool used to encourage Sabbath-Day Adventists to study the Bible was *The Sabbath School Tutor.* Authored by Humphrey, *The Sabbath School Tutor,* with the text "Thy Word is a Lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my Path—Psalm 119:105" boldly displayed across its cover, was a virtual spinoff of the Sabbath School Lesson Quarterly of Seventh-day Adventists. Published quarterly, its lessons consisted of a main passage of Scripture to be memorized, and a series of questions followed by a verse of Scripture that supplied the answers. Little supplementary material was used, although from the way the material was presented, one could detect the influence of outside sources. The lessons were well written and attractively presented, each lesson ending with a thought-provoking question on a practical element of faith[46] and a reminder that members not forget to support the Thirteenth Sabbath offering.[47]

Sabbath-Day Adventists also believed in the primacy and power of prayer. For them, God was capable of doing anything, including restoring health to the sick. God was an unchanging God, who, to the extent of the faith exercised in him, could repeat any of the miraculous feats recorded in sacred Scripture. An objective of USDAs was relating to God in such a way that they would be in a position to receive from God spiritual help and physical healing. Believing that the human being is an integrated whole, Humphrey sought to bring spiritual, social, and physical healing to his members. In keeping with the biblical injunction found in Jas 5:12, the bishop prayed for the sick, anointing them as he laid hands on them. Humphrey also believed in the power of God to bring deliverance to demon-possessed people; yet the bishop's anointing services were not like the flamboyant ones practiced by some of the African American preachers in Harlem at the time.[48]

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[44] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger,* June 1939, 4. Speaking more on the issue, Humphrey claimed that former SDAs made "bad members" (ibid.).

[45] *United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger,* November 1931, 14.

[46] *The Sabbath School Tutor,* July-September 1944, 16/3, 7-14.

[47] Like SDAs, USDAs divided the calendar into four quarters, the last Sabbath of each quarter being designated Thirteenth Sabbath. On this Sabbath, a special offering was collected for missionary endeavors around the world.

In matters of lifestyle, Sabbath-Day Adventists, like SDAs, did not always live what they believed and preached. For example, in the area of dress, members early demonstrated a stubborn independence, opting to wear jewelry, the absence of which was at the time a hallmark of Seventh-day Adventism.[49]

United Sabbath-Day Adventists continued more than the doctrinal traditions of SDAs, perpetuating also many of the programs and ministries of their former associates. For example, the Sabbath-Day Adventists continued the annual Fall Week of Prayer, publishing the readings for the week in their official organ, *The United Sabbath-Day Adventist Messenger*, in much the same way as SDAs published theirs in the *Review and Herald*, the official organ. Yet it was in structuring their congregations like the SDAs that Humphrey showed a disinclination to veer away from his former church in discernible and distinguishable ways. The religious services and ministries of USDAs were like those of SDAs. In addition, Humphrey grouped his congregations together in conferences and, like SDAs, held General Conference Sessions annually for the first decade of their existence and biennially thereafter. Given Humphrey's experience with the SDA organization, and the deep-seated feelings of disappointment and disillusionment engendered as a result, his decision to maintain so much of the SDA Church is noteworthy. The similarities between the two religious bodies created confusion among the uninformed, and not a few people associated with the USDAs, thinking they had joined an SDA Church.[50]

Sabbath-Day Adventists differed from SDAs in one significant area—the prophetic ministry of Ellen G. White. To be sure, Humphrey initially believed in the authority of White, who was a contemporary of his for almost two decades of his association with the SDA Church. While it is uncertain if the two ever met, it is true that Humphrey became increasingly disillusioned with White's counsel on the race issue—or more precisely, the misapplication of her counsel by white church leaders to support policies biased against blacks.[51] It is also true that there was one significant development in the bishop's teaching and preaching after his break with the SDA organization. Noticeably absent was any mention of White as an authoritative prophet sent by God with an urgent message for earth's last generation. Humphrey never quoted White to augment the material in his denomination's Sabbath school booklet. More importantly, Humphrey, unlike most SDA preachers of his era, never referred to White in any of his sermons. For him the Bible was the only source he needed, and it required no outside interpretation or elaboration. The bishop painstakingly stressed the difference between the writings of White and the Holy Scriptures, arguing that White was to be used as a reference only. For him, White's works could never approximate the canonicity of the Holy Bible, and the bishop explained the differences between the writings of White and the Bible so well that some of his members concluded their leader neither believed in nor accepted her works as authoritative or guiding.[52] Others have asserted that their founding pastor's position on White is the main reason the Sabbath-Day Adventists have been unable to reconcile with SDAs.[53]

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[48] Ucilla La Condre (interview by author, tape recording, Bronx, New York, June 11, 2000). For an insightful look at some of the more flamboyant personalities who ministered in the African American community during Humphrey's era, see Arthur Huff Fauset, *Black Gods of the Metropolis: Negro Religious Cults of the Urban North* (New York: Octagon, 1970); see also Jill Watts, *God, Harlem, U.S.A.: The Father Divine Story* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); and Robert Weisbrot, *Father Divine and the Struggle for Racial Equality* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1983).

[49] Bernice Samuel (interview by the author, tape recording, Queens, New York, April 17, 2000). Humphrey was jolted when his daughter showed up at church one day with her ears pierced. Thereafter, his relationship with his daughter soured. In time, Ruth stopped attending church altogether, even though she lived across the street from the church building.

[50] The fact that USDAs abbreviate their name as Seventh-day Adventists do (SDA) contributed to the confusion. There is no evidence that Sabbath-Day Adventists did so precisely for this purpose.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding what seems like the proliferation of USDA congregations during the 1930s and up to Humphrey's death in 1952, the fact is that the organization never experienced great success attracting the unchurched and unbelievers, and only limited success proselytizing former SDAs. Humphrey may have been one of Seventh-day Adventism's premier evangelists and outstanding pastors before he was defrocked, but once he became the head of the Sabbath-Day Adventists, he ceased to engage in evangelism on the scale he had done previously. More importantly, from their inception USDAs had one major goal—survival. Struggles with the SDA denomination and internal conflicts only made the pursuit of their goal more acute. Yet Sabbath-Day Adventists during Humphrey's lifetime may not be characterized as an insular, self-contained group preoccupied with self-preservation and self-perpetuation.

E. Forrest Harris Jr. contends that the independent black church movement and the black cults and sects of the North were "unique expressions of black people's quest for collective self-consciousness through religious commitments." Further, these religious bodies functioned as a "source of power and self-definition alternative to the dehumanizing anti-self images" in the broader society, providing members with "hope, assurance, and a sense of

[51] See Ronald D. Graybill, *E. G. White and Church Race Relations* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1970).

[52] La Condre; Samuel.

[53] Olga La Beet (interview by author, tape recording, New York, New York, June 12, 2000); Dorothy Simmonds (interview by author, tape recording, Mt. Vernon, New York, June 11, 2000).

group identification."[54] Thus, for USDAs, church was a place where relationships were formed and nurtured, life partners were procured, children were socialized, youth were trained to assume positions of responsibility in society, and, most importantly, a religious organization was built through which they could express their dreams and aspirations.[55]

In the end, Humphrey's troubles with the SDA Church did not center around the denomination's theology or biblical understanding, a fact that saw his preaching remain, for the most part, mainstream Adventist. His orthodoxy did not veer much to the left or right of Seventh-day Adventism's fundamental beliefs. In spite of the negative experiences he had had in the SDA demonination, Humphrey never publicly condemned or spoke ill of his former denomination. On more than one occasion he tried to clear up from the pulpit controversy surrounding White's counsels regarding African Americans.[56] In the pulpit he was all dignity and decorum, never using the "sacred desk" as a vantage point from which to lob verbal assaults or denunciations, because he was too busy "preaching the word."[57]

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[54] E. Forrest Harris Jr., *Ministry for Social Crisis: Theology and Praxis in the Black Church Tradition* (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1993), 24-25.

[55] See, e.g., Lawrence Levine, *Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), xi.

[56] La Beet; cf. n. 51 above.

[57] Ibid.

APPENDIX

FUNDAMENTAL BELIEFS OF SABBATH-DAY ADVENTISTS SOME THINGS WE BELIEVE

United Sabbath-Day Adventists Believe

That the Bible is the word of God, and that all scripture was given by inspiration and is profitable for doctrine, reproof, correction, and instruction in righteousness, in order that believers may attain unto perfection. 2 Tim. 3:16.

That the Holy Scriptures are sufficient to impart unto us all the wisdom, knowledge and understanding necessary to salvation. 2 Tim. 3:15.

That the word of God should be studied and rightly divided by those who are seeking God's approval. 2 Tim. 2:15.

That prophecies were not given by the will or intelligence of men, but holy men wrote as they were moved upon by the Holy Spirit. 2 Peter 1:20, 21.

That the prophecies of the Bible are sure to be fulfilled, that, like a giant indistinguishable ray of light, they shine through the darkness of time until Jesus Christ returns. 2 Peter 1:19.

That those who follow the word of God will never walk in darkness. Psa. 119:105.

That God used Jesus Christ as the Creator of all things in heaven and earth. John 1:1-5; Col. 1:13-16; Heb. 1:1, 2.

That Jesus possessed a human and divine nature to successfully accomplish the work of redemption; that he had to be human and divine to make the connection (that was broken through the sin of our first parents) between fallen man and Jehovah. Phil. 2:8; Matt. 1:21, 23; Heb. 2:14-18.

That Christ is able to save the vilest sinner from sin and eternal death. Matt. 1:21; Acts 16:31; Rom. 5:1; John 3:16; Matt. 9:13.

That eternal life is a gift which was made possible through the death of Christ, and we also believe that the wages of sin is eternal death. Rom. 6:23.

That death came as a result of man's disobedience. Rom. 5:12-19.

That man was created a mortal being in a condition where death was possible. Gen. 2:16, 17; 3:22.

That the soul of man is himself, that the term "Immortal soul" is contrary to the Scriptures, and that at death the soul dies. Gen. 2:7; Ezek. 18:4; Rom. 16:3.

That the dead are in their graves, and there they shall remain until Jesus comes. Job 14:7-15; 17:13.

That the righteous shall be rewarded at the Second Advent of Christ. Isa. 40:10; 62:11; Rev. 22:12.

That the wicked shall be punished with complete annihilation after the thousand years' reign of Christ and the saints. Rev. 20:7-9; Mal. 4:1; Psa. 37:10, 20, 38; 34:21, Prov. 2:22.

That the Judgment takes place after the coming of our savior Jesus Christ. Psa. 96:13; 50:3; 2 Tim. 4:1; Matt. 25:31-40.

That the testimony of Jesus Christ is the spirit of prophecy; that it was the Spirit of Christ that prompted and actuated the prophets, and that, therefore, Christ was directing intelligence behind every statement made, whether orally or in writing, by them. It was Christ who testified, through the prophets, therefore the testimony of Christ is the spirit of prophecy, and not the gift of prophecy. 1 Peter 1:10, 11; Rev. 1:9; 19:10.

That the martyrs throughout the Dark Ages had the testimony of Christ, and suffered for it. Rev. 20:4.

That the one hundred and forty-four thousand are not Gentiles, but Jews from the fleshly stock of Abraham, who shall be saved in God's kingdom; that they are not contaminated with popular false doctrines, hence they are considered virgins and are the first fruits of the gospel of Jesus Christ. We further believe that they form a special class, which follow the Lamb wherever He goes. Rev. 7:1-4; 14:1-5.

That the Holy Spirit is the seal of God and that we are sealed with that Spirit. Eph. 4:31; 1:13, 14; 2 Cor. 1:22. We believe that Christ was sealed with the Holy Spirit on the day of His baptism. John 6:27.

That the Holy Spirit is given for the purpose of leading and guiding God's people into all truth, and to glorify Christ in their lives. John 16:13, 14.

That the Holy Spirit is given as the Comforter, and abides with the Christian for ever. John 14:16, 17.

That whenever a man repents and is converted and baptized, he receives the gift of the Holy Ghost. Acts 2:38; 3:19.

That a man should be converted, or should be the recipient of the "new birth" to enter into the Kingdom of God. John 3:5; Matt. 18:3.

That those who are looking for the coming of Christ should live such lives as will make them worthy of being caught up to meet the Lord in the air. Titus 2:12, 14; 2 Pet. 3:11-14; 2 Thess. 4:14-18.

That the law of God is a transcript of His character, and is therefore as eternal as God Himself. Psa. 111:7, 8; Psa. 89:34.

That the seventh day of the week, commonly called Saturday, was sanctified and set apart as the Holy Sabbath, and should, therefore, be observed as the day of worship by all Christians. Gen. 2:1-3; Exod. 16:23, 28; 20:8-11.

That the Bible plan of tithing and the giving of offerings by its members is the proper means for the support of the Church. Mal. 3:8-11; Matt. 23:23.

That we are living in "the eleventh hour" of the history of the world, and that the call of the hour is to Negroes to preach the gospel to the world, since, through prejudice and race hatred, and in God's economy of grace, the Gentiles' (white race) time has been fulfilled. Matt. 20:6; 16:21-24.

That the Gentiles, as originally defined by the Bible, were Japhethites, or the white race, and that the terms "Ethiopian," Egyptian," Hamite," and "Cushite" are applied to the Negro or black race. Gen. 10:5; Mark 10:33; Rom. 11:11, 25; Isa. 19:23-25; 11:11.

R. Leo Soaries

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THE ADVENTIST TRINITY DEBATE, PART 2: THE ROLE OF ELLEN G. WHITE

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In 1846, James White dismissed the doctrine of the Trinity as "the old unscriptural trinitarian creed."[1] A century later, the denomination he cofounded voted an official statement of "Fundamental Beliefs" that included belief in a Trinity.[2] That a major theological shift occurred is no longer subject to debate. That most of the early leaders among Seventh-day Adventists held an antitrinitarian theology has become standard Adventist history[3] in the forty years since E. R. Gane wrote an M.A. thesis on the topic.[4] What is now disputed in some quarters is Gane's second hypothesis, that Adventist cofounder Ellen G. White (1827-1915) was "a trinitarian monotheist."[5] Since the 1980s that view has come under intense attack from some writers, mostly from outside the academic community.[6] Nevertheless, the renewed scrutiny of the role of Ellen White in the development of the Adventist Trinity doctrine has raised enough questions to warrant a fresh examination of the issue.

[1] James White, *Day-Star,* January 24, 1846, 25.

[2] "Fifteenth Meeting," General Conference Report No. 8, *Review and Herald,* June 14, 1946, 197. For a discussion of the historical context, see Jerry Moon, "The Adventist Trinity Debate, Part 1: Historical Overview," *AUSS* 41 (2003): 122-123.

[3] See Russell Holt, "The Doctrine of the Trinity in the Seventh-day Adventist Denomination: Its Rejection and Acceptance" (term paper, Andrews University, 1969); Le Roy Edwin Froom, *Movement of Destiny* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1971), 148-180—although Froom's pleading on the basis of Millerite statistics that a "majority" of the Adventist founders were trinitarian (ibid., 147) has not been supported by the evidence; Merlin Burt, "Demise of Semi-Arianism and Anti-Trinitarianism in Adventist Theology, 1888-1957"(term paper, Andrews University, 1996); Woodrow W. Whidden, "Salvation Pilgrimage: The Adventist Journey into Justification by Faith and Trinitarianism," *Ministry,* April 1998, 5-7; Fernando L. Canale, "Doctrine of God," in *Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology,* ed. Raoul Dederen, Commentary Reference Series, vol. 12 (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000): 117-150; and Woodrow Whidden, Jerry Moon, and John W. Reeve, *The Trinity: Understanding God's Love, His Plan of Salvation, and Christian Relationships* (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2002), 190-220.

[4] Erwin R. Gane, "The Arian or Anti-Trinitarian Views Presented in Seventh-day Adventist Literature and the Ellen G. White Answer" (M.A. thesis, Andrews University, 1963).

[5] Gane, 67-79.

[6] See, e.g., [Fred Allaback], "The Doctrine of the Trinity in Adventist History," *Liberty Review* (5250 Johnstown Road, Mt. Vernon, Ohio), October 1989, 4-5, 7-8; Lynnford Beachy, "*Adventist Review* Perpetuates the Omega," *Old Paths* (Smyrna Gospel Ministries, HC64, Box 128-B, Welch, WV; website www.smyrna.org) 8/7, July 1999, 1-14; David Clayton, "The Omega of Deadly Heresies," n.p., n.d. (ca. 2000), in my files; idem, "Some Facts Concerning the Omega Heresy," www.restorationministry.com/Open_Face/html/2000/open_face_oct_2000.htm; accessed March 10, 2003; and Bob Diener, *The Alpha and the Omega* (Creal Springs, IL: Bible Truth Productions, [ca. 1998]), videocassette.

Part 1 of this research identified six stages in the development of the Adventist doctrine of God, from opposition to the Trinity doctrine to acceptance of the basic concept of one God in three divine persons.[7] Part 2 will present evidence in support of a fourfold hypothesis: first, that Gane's characterization of Ellen White as a "trinitarian monotheist" is accurate regarding her mature concept of God, from 1898 onward. In the 1840s, however, she did not yet have all the components of that view in place. Her mature view developed through a forty-year process that can be extensively documented. Second, that her writings describe two contrasting forms of trinitarian belief, one of which she consistently opposed and one that she eventually endorsed. Third, that Ellen White's developing understanding exerted a strong influence on other Adventist writers, leading eventually to a substantial degree of consensus in the denomination. Finally, that the method by which early Adventists came to this position was by disallowing ecclesiastical tradition from having any normative authority and insisting on Scripture alone as the basis for doctrine and tests of membership. This rejection of tradition led them initially to some heterodox views that received severe criticism from the broader Christian community. Their dependence on Scripture, however, brought them eventually to what they believe is a more biblical view of the Trinity.[8] This material will be presented under five subheadings: Evidences for Change, Varieties of Trinitarianism, The Development of Ellen White's Understanding of the Godhead, The Kellogg Crisis and the Capstone Statements, and Conclusion.

Evidences for Change

At the core of the debate is the question regarding Ellen White's position and her role in the process of change. Some assume that Ellen White did not change her position regarding the Trinity, that she was either always trinitarian or never trinitarian.[9] There is ample evidence, however, that her beliefs did change on a number of other issues, so it is entirely plausible that she grew in her understanding of the Godhead as well. When she declared in 1849, "We know we have the truth,"[10] she was referring to the beliefs that Sabbatarian Adventists held in distinction from other Christian groups. She did not mean that there was no more truth to be discovered or that

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[7] Moon, 113-129.

[8] Canale, 150.

[9] For example, John Kiesz, an antitrinitarian of the Church of God (Seventh Day), speculates that White was a "closet trinitarian" who kept that view to herself for half a century until in the 1890s she suddenly broke her silence to challenge the then majority view of Seventh-day Adventists ("History of the Trinity Doctrine," Study No. 132, <http://www.giveshare.org/BibleStudy/132.trinityhistory.html>, accessed January 2001).

[10] Ellen G. White to Brother and Sister Hastings, March 24-30, 1849 (Letter 5, 1849), 5-6; reprinted in *Manuscript Releases*, 21 vols. (Silver Spring, MD: Ellen G. White Estate, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1993), 5:200.

Adventists would never need to change any of their views.[11]

The argument that her views did change is based on the recognition that at every stage of life her knowledge of God and his will was a combination of what she had learned through ordinary means such as parental training, church attendance, Bible study, and personal experience, and—after December 1844—what she received through visions. Furthermore, she herself considered her visions as an educational process that continued in cumulative fashion for many years.[12] Consequently, her personal understanding, especially in the earlier years, contained many elements not fully consistent with her later beliefs, because neither her personal Bible study nor her visions had yet called her attention to those inconsistent elements.

For instance, after her first vision in December 1844, she continued to observe Sunday as the Sabbath for almost three more years. She had not yet learned about the seventh-day Sabbath.[13] A second example of a changed view was the discovery of the "time to commence the Sabbath" in 1855. For nine years after they accepted the seventh-day Sabbath, the Whites and most of the Sabbatarian Adventists observed the Sabbath from 6:00 P.M. Friday to 6:00 P.M. Saturday. Not until J. N. Andrews in 1855 demonstrated from Scripture[14] that the biblical Sabbath begins at sunset did Ellen White reluctantly acknowledge that for nine years Adventists had been ignorant of the biblical time to begin the Sabbath.[15]

A third example is what Adventists have historically called health reform. Until 1863, most of them, including James and Ellen White, were heavy meat eaters, even slaughtering their own hogs. Not until after basic denominational organization had been achieved was the attention of the movement called to a broader platform of health principles, including complete proscription of pork products and the strong recommendation of vegetarianism.[16]

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[11] "We have many lessons to learn, and many, many to unlearn," she wrote in 1892. "God and heaven alone are infallible. Those who think that they will never have to give up a cherished view, never have occasion to change an opinion, will be disappointed. As long as we hold to our own ideas and opinions with determined persistency, we cannot have the unity for which Christ prayed" (E. G. White, "Search the Scriptures," *Review and Herald*, July 26, 1892, par. 7).

[12] "With the light communicated through the study of His word, with the special knowledge given of individual cases among His people under all circumstances and in every phase of experience, can I now be in the same ignorance, the same mental uncertainty and spiritual blindness, as at the beginning of this experience? Will my brethren say that Sister White has been so dull a scholar that her judgment in this direction is no better than before she entered Christ's school, to be trained and disciplined for a special work? . . . I would not dishonor my Maker by admitting that all this light, all the display of His mighty power in my work and experience, has been valueless, that it has not educated my judgment or better fitted me for His work" (E. G. White, *Testimonies for the Church* [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1948], 5:686).

[13] It should be noted that when she and James White did accept the Sabbath, their acceptance was based initially on Bible study prompted by reading a tract by Joseph Bates. Later the correctness of this view was confirmed by vision (Arthur L. White, *Ellen G. White: The Early Years, 1827-1862* [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1985], 1:116, 120-121.

[14] See, e.g., Lev 23:32 and Mark 1:32; J. N. Andrews, "Time for Commencing the Sabbath," *Review and Herald*, December 4, 1855, 76-78.

[15] A. L. White, 1:322-324.

In view of these and other areas of conceptual development, it is not particularly surprising that Ellen White should show both development and change in her view of the Godhead. Her writings about the Godhead show a clear progression, not primarily from anti- to protrinitarianism, but from relative ambiguity to greater specificity. Some of her early statements are capable of various interpretations, but her later statements, 1898-1906, are explicit to the point of being dogmatic. Her change of view appears clearly to have been a matter of growth and progression, rather than reversal, because unlike her husband and others of her associates, she never directly attacked the view of the Trinity that she would later explicitly support.

Varieties of Trinitarianism

The conceptual key that unlocks the enigma of Ellen White's developmental process regarding the Trinity is the discovery that her writings describe at least two distinct varieties of trinitarian belief. One of these views she consistently opposed throughout her adult ministry, and the other she eventually endorsed. The trinitarian concept that she opposed was one that "spiritualized" the members of the Godhead as distant, impersonal, mystical, and ultimately unreal beings. The concept that she favored portrayed God as personal, literal, and tangible. She did not initially recognize God's trinitarian nature, but when she did, she would describe the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as real individuals, emphasizing their "threeness" as willing, thinking, feeling, social, and relational persons, and explaining their oneness in terms of nature, character, purpose, and love, but not of person. The basis of these differentiations will become clearer as we examine the historical context and process of her developing thought.

The Development of Ellen White's Understanding of the Godhead

Three pieces of evidence are particularly significant for reconstructing the historical context of Ellen White's earliest references to the Godhead: the role of "spiritualizers" in postdisappointment Millerism, the polemics of James and Ellen White against those spiritualizers, and a contemporary Methodist creed that the Whites (and other early Adventists) repeatedly cited in support of their rejection of traditional trinitarianism.

In the postdisappointment period of 1845, many former Millerites "spiritualized" the Second Coming, by interpreting the biblical prophecies of Christ's return as having a spiritual, not literal, meaning.[17] Hence the spiritualizers could believe that Jesus did come on October 22, 1844, not literally, but "spiritually." This view led to a wide range of aberrant behavior. Among the most extreme were the "no-work" fanatics, who believed that the seventh millennium had already been inaugurated as a Sabbath of perpetual rest, and that the way to demonstrate saving faith was to refrain from all work. Others of the "spiritualizers" dabbled in "mesmerism,"[18] joined the Shakers,[19] or even became followers of occult spiritualism.[20]

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[16] Richard W. Schwarz and Floyd Greenleaf, *Light Bearers: A History of the Seventh-day Adventist Church*, rev. ed. (Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2000); D. E. Robinson, *The Story of Our Health Message: The Origin, Character, and Development of Health Education in the Seventh-day Adventist Church*, 3d ed. (Nashville: Southern Publishing Association, 1965), 75, 81. Most Adventists were already opposed to the use of alcoholic beverages.

[17] Schwarz and Greenleaf, 53-54. For the most extensive investigation to date of

James and Ellen White believed this teaching was false, because it took a Bible doctrine that they believed was clearly intended to be "literal" and made it nonliteral or "spiritual." The core belief of Millerite Adventism was the literal, bodily, premillennial Second Advent. From this perspective, if the Second Advent is not a literal, bodily return of the same divine-human Jesus who ascended, but is rather some subjective spiritual "revelation" to the individual heart or mind, then the teaching of his literal return has been not just modified, but destroyed—hence the phrase "spiritualize away." To "spiritualize away" means to take something intended as literal, and by calling it "spiritual" to so radically change the concept that it no longer has any real meaning.

For this reason both James and Ellen White came early to the conviction that they must oppose this spiritualizing as heresy. Ellen's polemics against this doctrine and its resulting behaviors are well known.[21] James also wrote repeatedly in the post-Millerite *Day-Star* against these spiritualizing tendencies.[22]

One of James's polemics against the spiritualizers included an antitrinitarian remark that implied a commonality of belief between the spiritualizers and the trinitarians.[23] Apparently some of the "spiritualizers" were supporting their error by reference to what James called "the old *unscriptural trinitarian creed*." James charged that both the "spiritualizers" and the traditional trinitarians "spiritualize[d] away the existence of the Father and the Son, as two distinct, litteral [*sic*], tangible persons."[24]

In maintaining that the Father and the Son are real, literal persons, the

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postdisappointment Millerism, its division and disintegration, see Merlin D. Burt, "The Historical Background, Interconnected Development, and Integration of the Doctrines of the Sanctuary, the Sabbath, and Ellen G. White's Role in Sabbatarian Adventism from 1844 to 1849" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 2002), 60-272.

[18] Burt, "The Historical Background," 145.

[19] Enoch Jacobs, editor of the *Day-Star*, led in this move (ibid., 231-242).

[20] Ibid., 242; George R. Knight, *Millennial Fever and the End of the World* (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1993), 260.

[21] See, e.g., E. G. White, *Life Sketches* (Mt. View, CA: Pacific Press, 1943), 85-94.

[22] Burt, 146-147, lists four such items, each titled "Letter from Bro. White," *Day-Star*, September 6, 1845, 17-18; October 11, 1845, 47; November 29, 1845, 35; and January 24, 1846, 25 .

[23] James White, *Day-Star*, January 24, 1846, 25; Ellen Harmon's first published writing was "A Letter from Sister Harmon" in the same issue, 31-32.

[24] James White, *Day-Star*, January 24, 1846, 25.

Whites did not doubt that "God is spirit" (John 4:24),[25] but they insisted that as Spirit, God is still someone real, tangible, and literal; not unreal, ephemeral, or imaginary. They felt that the terms used for Trinity in the creeds and definitions they knew of made God seem so abstract, theoretical, and impersonal that he was no longer perceived as a real, caring, loving being. Thus, the attempt to make him "spiritual" rather than literal actually "spiritualized him away," that is, destroyed the true concept of who he is and what he is like.

A third piece of evidence confirms that James was indeed linking the spiritualizers with traditional trinitarians—a group that were in almost every other way the theological opposites of the spiritualizers. A Methodist creed of the same period—and the way this creed was quoted and rebutted by other early Adventist writers[26]—supports the suggestion of common ground between Ellen White's earliest statements about the person(s) of God, and the antitrinitarianism of her husband (although she never in print denounced trinitarianism as he did). The suggestion that there is a dual linkage here—spiritualizers with philosophical trinitarians, and Ellen's concept of a personal God with James's antitrinitarianism—may sound far-fetched to many readers. But against the background of post-Millerite spiritualizers, consider the wording of a typical trinitarian creed of the time. One aspect of traditional trinitarianism espoused by some Protestant groups, but rejected by early Adventists, was the somewhat curious statement that "There is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body or parts."[27] The early Adventists vigorously refuted this, citing several biblical passages that portrayed God as having both "body" and "parts."[28]

This question was evidently on the mind of Ellen White as well.[29] Twice in early visions of Jesus, she asked him questions related to the "form" and

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[25] In 1877, Ellen White quoted John 4:24 KJV: "God is a Spirit; and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth" (*Spirit of Prophecy* [Battle Creek, MI: Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association, 1877], 2:143). In 1904, she wrote: "God is a spirit; yet He is a personal being, for man was made in His image" (*Testimonies for the Church* [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1948], 8:263). James White held that God is "a Spirit being" (idem, *Personality of God* [Battle Creek: SDA Publishing Assn., ca. 1868], 3).

[26] Several Adventist writers cited almost the same creedal phrases. D. M. Canright quotes two creeds: Methodist and Episcopal. The Methodist creed included the phrase "without body or parts," whereas the Episcopal creed specified that God is "without body, parts, or passions." Canright claimed knowledge of "other creeds" that went "still further" and said that God is "without center or circumference" ("The Personality of God," *Review and Herald*, September 5, 1878, 81; cf. idem, September 19, 1878, 97; J. B. Frisbie, "The Seventh Day-Sabbath [*sic*] Not Abolished," *Review and Herald*, March 7, 1854, 50. Cf. James White, *Personality of God*.

[27] *Doctrines and Discipline of the Methodist Episcopal Church* (New York: Carlton and Porter, 1856), 15.

[28] For instance, Exod 24:9-11; 33:20-23; John 1:18; Heb 1:1-3; Uriah Smith, *The State of the Dead and the Destiny of the Wicked* (Battle Creek, MI: SDA Publishing Association, 1873), 27-30. Note Smith's polemic against any "mystical interpretation of our current theology" (ibid., 27).

[29] The creed in question was a Methodist creed. White, though raised Methodist, was later closely associated with Adventists who cited this creedal detail as one of the unbiblical aspects of trinitarianism.

"person" of God. In one early vision, she "saw a throne, and on it sat the Father and the Son. I gazed on Jesus' countenance," she said, "and admired His lovely person. The Father's person I could not behold, for a cloud of glorious light covered Him. I asked Jesus if His Father had a form like Himself. He said He had, but I could not behold it, for said He, 'If you should once behold the glory of His person, you would cease to exist.'"[30]

Also about 1850, she reported, "I have often seen the lovely Jesus, that He is a *person.* I asked Him if His Father was a person and had a form like Himself. Said Jesus, 'I am in the express image of My Father's *person.*'"[31] Thus she gained visionary confirmation of what her husband had written in the *Day-Star* in 1846, that the Father and the Son are "two distinct, literal, tangible persons."[32] In terms of the trinitarian question, this is ambiguous. By itself it contains nothing contradictory to early Adventist antitrinitarianism, though it also offers no contradiction to her explicitly trinitarian declarations of the early 1900s.

Other hints of her early views came in 1858 with the publication of the first volume of *Spiritual Gifts.*[33] Her belief in the Holy Spirit is not in question, for she links the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in Christ's baptismal narrative. But she does not mention the Holy Spirit in connection with the divine councils about Creation and the plan of salvation.[34] These statements, like the 1850 statements, are also ambiguous. They could be read without conflict by all early Adventists, regardless of their trinitarian or antitrinitarian leanings.

Perhaps her first statement that is clearly dissonant with her antitrinitarian colleagues comes in 1869 in a landmark chapter, "The Sufferings of Christ," where in the opening paragraph she asserts on the basis of Heb 1:3; Col 1:19; and Phil 2:6 that Christ in his preexistence was "equal with God."[35] At this point it becomes evident that if no one else was listening, her husband was. James White's early statements on the Trinity are uniformly negative,[36] but in 1876 and 1877 he followed her lead. In an editorial comparison of the beliefs of Seventh-day Adventists with Seventh Day Baptists, he included the Trinity among the doctrines which "neither [SDAs nor SDBs] regard as tests of Christian character." "Adventists hold the divinity of Christ so nearly with the trinitarian," James White observed, "that we apprehend no trial [controversy] here."[37] Clearly James was moving away from his early polemics against trinitarianism. A year later he proclaimed in the *Review* that "Christ is equal with God." He was not yet a trinitarian, but another remark in the same article shows that he was in sympathy with certain aspects of trinitarianism. "The inexplicable trinity that makes the godhead three in one and one in three is bad enough," he wrote, "but ultra Unitarianism that makes Christ inferior to the Father is worse."[38] In asserting Christ's equality with the Father, James was echoing what his wife had written eight years earlier. For another evidence of her leading her colleagues, note that her assertions that Christ was uncreated[39] preceded by more than two decades Uriah Smith's published acceptance of that concept.[40]

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[30] Ellen G. White, *A Sketch of the Christian Experience and Views* [Visions] *of Ellen G. White* (Saratoga Springs, NY: James White, 1851).

[31] E. G. White, *Early Writings* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1945), 77, emphasis original.

[32] Note the similarity of expression between her view ca. 1850 and what he wrote in 1868: "The *Father and the Son were one* in man's creation, and in his redemption. Said the Father to the Son, 'Let us make man in our image.' And the triumphant song of jubilee in which the redeemed take part, is unto 'Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, forever and ever.'"

"Jesus prayed that his *disciples might be one as he was one* with his Father. This prayer did *not* contemplate *one disciple with twelve heads, but twelve disciples, made one in object and effort* in the cause of their master. Neither are the Father and the Son *parts of the 'three-one God.' They are two distinct beings, yet one in the design and accomplishment of redemption.* The redeemed . . . ascribe the honor, and glory, and praise, of their salvation, to both God and the Lamb" (James White, *Life Incidents* [1868], 343, all emphasis added).

[33] The title was an explicit assertion of her claim to have received the gift of prophecy.

[34] E. G. White, *Spiritual Gifts* (SDA Publishing Association, 1864), 1:17-18, 22-28; 3:33-34.

[35] E. G. White, "Testimony 17 (1869)," in *Testimonies for the Church* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1948), 2:200; cf. "The Son of God was in the form of God, and he thought it not robbery to be equal with God" (E. G. White, *Spirit of Prophecy* [1877], 2:10).

Brick by conceptual brick (perhaps without even being aware of it herself), she was slowly but surely dismantling the substructure of the antitrinitarian view and building a trinitarian view. In another clear break with the prevailing semi-Arian consensus, she declared in 1878 that Christ was the "eternal Son."[41] Ellen White did not understand his *eternal* Sonship to imply *derivation* from the Father. Sonship in his preexistence denoted that he was of the same nature as the Father, in unity and close relationship with the Father; but it did not imply that Christ had a beginning, for in taking human flesh Christ became the Son of God "in a new sense." From the perspective of his humanity, he for the first time had a "beginning," and also, as a human, he began a new relationship of dependence on the Father.

> In His incarnation He gained *in a new sense* the title of the Son of God. Said the angel to Mary, "The power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee shall be called the Son of God." While the Son of a human being, He became the Son of God

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[36] "To assert that the sayings of the Son and his apostles are the commandments of the Father, is as wide from the truth as the old Trinitarian absurdity that Jesus Christ is the very and eternal God" (James White, "The Faith of Jesus," *Review and Herald*, Aug 5, 1852, 52).

[37] James White, "The Two Bodies," *Review and Herald*, October 12, 1876, 116; cf. Froom, 178.

[38] James White, "Christ Equal with God," *Review and Herald*, November 29, 1877, p. 72.

[39] E. G. White, "The First Advent of Christ," *Review and Herald*, December 17, 1872, par. 4; cf. E. G. White, "Bible Study," *Review and Herald*, January 11, 1881, par. 3.

[40] Uriah Smith called Christ the first created being (*Thoughts on the Revelation* [Battle Creek, MI: SDA Publishing Association, 1865], 59), a view he repudiated in *Looking Unto Jesus* (Battle Creek, MI: Review and Herald, 1898), 17, 12.

[41] E. G. White, "An Appeal to the Ministers," *Review and Herald*, August 8, 1878, par. 4; Ellen G. White to E. J. Waggoner and A. T. Jones, February 18, 1887 (Letter 37, 1887), facsimile in idem, *1888 Materials*, 28.3; idem, "'Search the Scriptures.' John 5:39," *Youth's Instructor*, August 31, 1887, par. 1; idem, "The Truth Revealed in Jesus," *Review and Herald*, February 8, 1898, par. 2.

> *in a new sense.* Thus He stood in our world—the Son of God, yet allied by birth to the human race. . . .
>
> *From all eternity Christ was united with the Father,* and when He took upon Himself human nature, He was still one with God [emphasis supplied].[42]

An even more fundamental departure from the "old view" emerged in 1888, in the context of the struggle over the law in Galatians (3:19-3:25) and a clearer view of justification through substitutionary atonement. Ellen White and others came to the realization that a broader concept of the atonement and of righteousness by faith demands the full Deity of Christ. "*If men reject the testimony of the inspired Scriptures concerning the divinity of Christ,*" she wrote, "it is in vain to argue the point with them; for no argument, however conclusive, could convince them. [1 Cor 2:14 quoted.] *None who hold this error can have a true conception of the character or the mission of Christ, or of the great plan of God for man's redemption*" (emphasis supplied).[43] Christ is "one with the eternal Father,—one in nature, in character, and in purpose," "one in power and authority,"[44] she proclaimed, "the only being that could enter into all the counsels and purposes of God."[45] The context shows that her phrase "the only being" contrasts Christ with the angels. Nevertheless, this statement precedes the fuller exposition of the role of the Holy Spirit.

In 1890, she followed up her 1888 affirmation of Christ's unity with the Father (in nature, character, and purpose) with perhaps her last major statement that can still be read ambiguously. "The Son of God shared the Father's throne, and the glory of the eternal, self-existent One encircled both."[46] Retrospectively, this phrase harmonizes perfectly with her later statements (especially *The Desire of Ages,* 530) that Christ is "self-existent" and that his Deity is not "derived" from the Father. It is also possible, however, to read the sentence from a binitarian or even semi-Arian perspective—that Jesus, exalted to the Father's throne in the presence of the angels, was "encircled" by "the glory of the eternal, self-existent One," i.e., the Father. *Patriarchs and Prophets,* where the phrase appears, was an amplification of an earlier work, *Spirit of Prophecy,* vol. 1 (1870), where the corresponding phrase says simply, "The Son was seated on the throne with the Father."[47] The surrounding context in both works is similar, reflecting her earlier

[42] E. G. White, "Christ Our Only Hope," *Signs of the Times,* August 2, 1905.

[43] E. G. White, *The Great Controversy* (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press, 1888), 524. Cf. E. J. Waggoner's assertion that "Our object in this investigation is to set forth Christ's rightful position of equality with the Father, in order that His power to redeem may be the better appreciated" (*Christ and His Righteousness* [Riverside, CA: The Upward Way, 1988]; 19).

[44] E. G. White, *Great Controversy* (1888), 493, 495.

[45] Ibid., 493; idem, *Patriarchs and Prophets* (Oakland, CA: Pacific Press, 1890), 34.1; cf. idem, "That We Might Be Partakers of the Divine Nature," *Signs of the Times,* October 14, 1897, par. 3.

[46] E. G. White, *Patriarchs and Prophets* (1890), 36.

[47] *Patriarchs and Prophets* (1890) was an amplification of an earlier work, *Spirit of Prophecy,* vol. 1 (1870), where the corresponding sentence says simply, "The Son was seated on the throne with the Father, and the heavenly throng of holy angels was gathered around them" (E. G. White, *Spirit of Prophecy,* vol. 1 [1870], 17).

perspective, while the new phrase, "the glory of the eternal, self-existent One encircled both," reflects her growing understanding in 1890.

A pamphlet published in 1897 carried the next major component in her developing doctrine of God, that the Holy Spirit is "the third person of the Godhead."[48] This concept would receive wider attention and more permanent form in *The Desire of Ages* (1898), where she repeated and made emphatic the previous two points: "In Christ is life, original, unborrowed, underived," and the Holy Spirit is the "Third Person of the Godhead."[49] In 1899, she confirmed the other side of the paradox, that in "person," Christ was "distinct" from the Father.[50] Here the essential trinitarian paradox of the unity of God in a plurality of persons is clearly articulated, and her trinitarianism is essentially complete. All that remains for her capstone statements of 1901 and 1905 is to affirm most explicitly that the three "eternal heavenly dignitaries," the "three highest powers in heaven," the "three living persons of the heavenly trio," are one in nature, character, and purpose, but not in person.[51]

Thus, there is a clear progression from the simple to the complex, suggesting that Ellen White's understanding did grow and change as she received additional light. Fernando Canale has pointed out that this progression is similar to the one presented in the NT. In the Gospels, the first challenge was to convince the disciples that Christ was one with the Father. Once their concept of monotheism had been expanded to accept "one God" in two divine persons, it was comparatively easy to lead them to recognize the Holy Spirit as a third divine person.[52]

The Kellogg Crisis and the Capstone Statements

As noted above, Ellen White's writings on the Godhead address at least two distinct varieties of trinitarian belief—one she consistently opposed and another she eventually came to agree with. Her differentiation between these two views of the Trinity became most explicit during the Kellogg crisis of 1902-1907.[53] Because certain of the writings of both J. H. Kellogg and Ellen White during this period have been seriously misunderstood in recent years, it is necessary to consider this controversy in some detail.

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[48] E. G. White, *Special Testimonies for Ministers and Workers*, [series 1] no. 10 (Battle Creek, MI: General Conference of SDAs, 1897). 25, 37.

[49] E. G. White, *The Desire of Ages* (Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1940). 530, 671.

[50] "The world was made by him, 'and without him was not anything made that was made.' If Christ made all things, he existed before all things. The words spoken in regard to this are so decisive that no one need be left in doubt. *Christ was God essentially, and in the highest sense. He was with God from all eternity, God over all, blessed forevermore.*

"*The Lord Jesus Christ, the divine Son of God, existed from eternity, a distinct person, yet one with the Father*" (Ellen G. White, "The Word Made Flesh," *Review and Herald*, April 5, 1906, par. 6-7, emphasis supplied.

[51] E. G. White, Ms. 130, 1901, in *Manuscript Releases*, 16:205; idem, *Special Testimonies*, Series B, no. 7 (St. Helena, CA: by the author, 1905), 51, 62-63.

[52] Canale, 128-130.

[53] On the Kellogg crisis, see R. W. Schwarz, *John Harvey Kellogg, M.D.* (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1981), 174-192; idem, *Light Bearers to the Remnant* (Mountain View, CA:

Dr. J. H. Kellogg, medical superintendent of the Battle Creek Sanitarium, was the leading person of scientific credentials among SDAs at the turn of the twentieth century. Possibly influenced by intellectual companions from outside Adventism,[54] he theorized that the life of every living thing—whether tree, flower, animal, or human—was the very presence of God within it. His view was a form of pantheism.[55] Traces of this view can be found in his public presentations in the 1890s,[56] but the "crisis" did not break until 1902.

Following the Battle Creek Sanitarium fire of February 18, 1902, Kellogg proposed a fund-raising plan to finance the rebuilding. He would donate to the Review and Herald Publishing Association the manuscript for a new book on health.[57] If the Review and Herald would donate the costs of publishing, and if the 73,000 members that composed the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1902 would undertake to sell 500,000 copies at one dollar each, the proceeds would both pay off long-standing debts and rebuild the sanitarium. This plan was accepted. *The Living Temple* was primarily a handbook on basic physiology, nutrition, preventive medicine, and home treatments for common ailments. But the title page quoted 1 Cor 6:19 about the body being the "temple of the Holy Ghost," and here and there Kellogg incorporated his theological views.

While preliminary readers of the manuscript were pleased with what it said about physiology, they sharply criticized some of its speculations about the doctrine of God. Despite this criticism, Kellogg pressed ahead with publication. On December 30, 1902, however, while the Review and Herald Publishing Association was in the midst of printing the first edition, the publishing house burned to the ground. Among other losses were the printing plates and unfinished copies of *The Living Temple*. Kellogg promptly took the manuscript to another printer and contracted for 3,000 copies at his own expense.

When the book was finally distributed, the most flagrant departures from established Adventist theology appeared in the opening chapter, "The Mystery of Life."[58] "God is the explanation of nature," Kellogg declared, "—not a God outside of nature, but *in* nature, manifesting himself through and in all the

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Pacific Press, 1979), 282-298; Jerry Moon, *W. C. White and Ellen G. White: The Relationship between the Prophet and Her Son* (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1993), 274-320.

[54] Froom, 351.

[55] W. A. Spicer, "Pantheism Here and in Its Ancient Setting," in *How the Spirit of Prophecy Met a Crisis: Memories and Notes of the "Living Temple" Controversy,"* [1938], chapter 13. http://www.sdanet.org/atissue/white/spicer/index.htm, accessed September 18, 2003.

[56] See J. H. Kellogg, "God in Man, No. 1," "God in Nature, No. 2," and "God in Man, No. 3," in *General Conference Daily Bulletin,* 1897, 72-84.

[57] J. H. Kellogg, *The Living Temple* (Battle Creek, MI: Good Health, 1903).

[58] Ibid., 28-30.

objects, movements, and varied phenomena of the universe."[59] Evidently reacting to some of his prepublication critics, Kellogg sought to blunt or circumvent their objections by specific reference to the Holy Spirit. He reasoned that if the Holy Spirit could be everywhere at once, and if the Holy Spirit were also a Person, then no one could say that the God Kellogg set forth as dwelling in all things was an impersonal God. "How can power be separated from the source of power?" Kellogg asked? "Where God's Spirit is at work, where God's power is manifested, God himself is actually and truly present."[60] In claiming that God's power equals his presence, Kellogg blurs his logic, as a brief example will show. A military commander can issue orders to mobilize the armed forces, and through those orders the leader's power reaches right down to the home of an individual soldier, but that's clearly different from the commander visiting that home in person.

Then Kellogg spins his defining metaphor—the most quoted paragraph from *The Living Temple.*

> Suppose now we have a boot before us,—not an ordinary boot, but a living boot, and as we look at it, we see little boots crowding out at the seams, pushing out at the toes, dropping off at the heels, and leaping out at the top,—scores, hundreds, thousands of boots, a swarm of boots continually issuing from our living boot,—would we not be compelled to say, "There is a shoemaker in the boot"? So there is present in the tree a power which creates and maintains it, a tree-maker in the tree, a flower-maker in the flower, . . . an infinite, divine, though invisible Presence . . . which is ever declaring itself by its ceaseless, beneficent activity.[61]

Kellogg's theory was vigorously debated in the church for several years. Since leading Adventists had pointed out its errors,[62] Ellen White hoped at first that it would not be necessary for her to get involved. But by September 1903, Kellogg's views were gaining adherents. When he claimed publicly that the teachings of *The Living Temple* "regarding the personality of God" were in accord with the writings of Ellen White, she could remain silent no longer. "God forbid that this opinion should prevail," she declared.[63] "We need not the mysticism that is in this book," she continued. "[T]he writer of this book is on a false track. He has lost sight of the distinguishing truths for this time. He knows not whither his steps are tending. The track of truth lies close beside the track of error, and both may seem to be one to minds which are not worked by the Holy Spirit, and which, therefore, are not quick to discern the difference between truth and error."[64]

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[59] Ibid., 28.

[60] Ibid.

[61] Ibid., 29.

[62] See, e.g., W. W. Prescott, "Suggestions on Matter Found on Galleys 1-129, Inclusive, of Matter for Dr. Kellogg's New Book, *The Living Temple,*" Record Group 11, A. G. Daniells, 1901-1950, J. H. Kellogg Case File, General Conference Archives, Silver Spring, MD.

[63] "E. G. White to the Teachers in Emmanuel Missionary College, September 22, 1903 ('Teach the Word')," in *Spalding and Magan's Unpublished Manuscript Testimonies of Ellen G. White, 1915-1916* (hereinafter referred to as *Spalding-Magan Collection* (Payson, AZ: Leaves-Of-Autumn Books, 1985), 320.

In a follow-up letter, she zeroed in on the core issue: "The Lord Jesus . . . did not represent God as an *essence pervading nature,* but as a *personal being.* Christians should bear in mind that God has a personality as verily as has Christ."[65]

A few weeks later, in a letter to former General Conference president G. I. Butler,[66] Kellogg defended his view: "As far as I can fathom the difficulty which is found in the Living Temple [*sic*], the whole thing may be simmered down to this question: Is the Holy Ghost a person? You say No." (Butler was of the older antitrinitarian school which held that the Holy Spirit was an aspect or power of God, but not a person.) Kellogg continued: "I had supposed the Bible said this for the reason that the personal pronoun 'he' is used in speaking of the Holy Ghost. Sister White uses the pronoun 'he' and has said in so many words that the Holy Ghost is the third person of the God-head [*sic*]. How the Holy Ghost can be the third person and not be a person at all is difficult for me to see."[67]

Here is a fascinating example of Kellogg as a debater. Essentially he is saying, "I have been misunderstood. I didn't claim that the Father is in everything; it is the Holy Spirit who is in everything. And if the Holy Spirit is a person, then Ellen White is wrong in saying my view undermines the personality of God." Thus he sought to outmaneuver Ellen White's reproof and maintain the legitimacy of his own opinion.

Butler, however, was not fooled. "So far as Sister White and you being in perfect agreement is concerned, I shall have to leave that entirely between you and Sister White. Sister White says there is *not* perfect agreement. You claim there *is*. . . . I must give her the credit . . . of saying there is a difference" (emphasis supplied).[68]

Kellogg is here telling casuistic half-truths to Butler, attempting to portray the "pantheism" of *Living Temple* as simply a scientific perspective of the same doctrine of God that Ellen White had expressed in *The Desire of Ages*. That is what Kellogg wanted his readers to believe, but that does not make it true, although Ellen White herself acknowledged that "to minds which are not worked by the Holy Spirit" it might seem so.[69]

As the conflict dragged on into 1905, Ellen White wrote another document

[64] Ibid., 320-321.

[65] Ibid., 324. Kellogg hinted in *Living Temple*, 29-32, that the concept of a personal God was an (ultimately unfactual) construct for the benefit of immature minds, implying that intellectuals like himself could perceive the reality beyond the anthropomorphic accommodation.

[66] George I. Butler had been president of the General Conference (1871-1874, 1880-1888), and in 1903 he was president of the Southern Union Conference.

[67] J. H. Kellogg to G. I. Butler, October 28, 1903a [one of two letters from Kellogg to Butler on the same date], Center for Adventist Research, Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI.

[68] G. I. Butler to J. H. Kellogg, April 5, 1904.

[69] E. G. White, "Teach the Word," September 22, 1903, in *Spalding-Magan Collection,* 321.

that exposed the matter to the church in such stark lines that it could not be misunderstood. The manuscript offers perhaps the most radical, foundational indictment she ever wrote against a false view of the Trinity, followed by one of her most explicit descriptions of what she considered to be the true understanding of the Godhead. In this document, published in 1905, she labels the first view "spiritualistic," "nothingness," "imperfect, untrue,"[70] "the trail of the serpent," and "the depths of Satan."[71] She said those who received it were "giving heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils, departing from the faith which they have held sacred for the past fifty years."[72]

In contrast to this view which she unsparingly denounces, she sets forth another view which she regarded as "the right platform," in harmony with "the simplicity of true godliness," and "the old, old times . . . when, under the Holy Spirit's guidance, thousands were converted in a day."[73] The antagonism between two opposing views could scarcely be drawn in more stringent terms in a theological context, than a disagreement between doctrines of "seducing spirits" and the doctrine of "the old, old times" of the original Pentecost. She is talking about two contrasting doctrines of the Trinity. Here is the first, attributed explicitly to "Dr. Kellogg" and his associates in "our leading medical fraternity."

> I am instructed to say, The sentiments of those who are searching for advanced scientific ideas are not to be trusted. Such representations as the following are made: "The Father is as the light invisible; the Son is as the light embodied; the Spirit is the light shed abroad." "The Father is like the dew, invisible vapor; the Son is like the dew gathered in beauteous form; the Spirit is like the dew fallen to the seat of life." Another representation: "The Father is like the invisible vapor; the Son is like the leaden cloud; the Spirit is rain fallen and working in refreshing power."
>
> All these spiritualistic representations are simply nothingness. They are imperfect, untrue. They weaken and diminish the Majesty which no earthly likeness can be compared to. *God can not be compared with the things His hands have made.* These are mere earthly things, suffering under the curse of God because of the sins of man. The Father can not be described by the things of earth [emphasis supplied].[74]

Then, in the very next sentence, she defines what she understands to be the truth about the Godhead.

> The Father is all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and is invisible to mortal sight.
>
> The Son is all the fulness of the Godhead manifested. The Word of God declares Him to be "the express image of His person." "God so loved the

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[70] E. G. White, *Special Testimonies,* Series B, no. 7, 63.

[71] Ibid., 62, alluding to Rev 2:24.

[72] Ibid., 61.

[73] Ibid., 63-64.

[74] Ibid., 62.

> world, that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." Here is shown the personality of the Father.
>
> The Comforter that Christ promised to send after He ascended to heaven, is the Spirit in all the fulness of the Godhead, making manifest the power of divine grace to all who receive and believe in Christ as a personal Saviour. There are three living persons of the *heavenly trio;* in the name of these *three great powers*—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit—those who receive Christ by living faith are baptized, and *these powers* will co-operate with the obedient subjects of heaven in their efforts to live the new life in Christ [emphasis supplied].[75]

In charging that Kellogg, with his "spiritualistic" Trinity doctrine was "departing from the faith" Adventists had "held sacred for the past fifty years," Ellen White clearly refutes the assumption that all doctrines of the Trinity are the same and that objection to one demands the rejection of all. She is clearly distinguishing between two varieties of trinitarianism.

Significantly, Ellen White condemns Kellogg's view of the Trinity in almost identical terms to those used by her husband James in 1846 when he condemned the "old *unscriptural trinitarian creed*" for "spiritualiz[ing] away the existence of the Father and the Son, as two distinct, literal, tangible persons." This supports the interpretation that she was at least in partial agreement with him in 1846, and that she later saw similarities between the creeds that claimed God was "invisible, without body or parts" and Kellogg's "spiritualistic representations" of God under metaphors of light and water.

Further, Ellen White claims that in Kellogg's heresy she "recognized the very sentiments" she had opposed among spiritualizing ex-Millerites in 1845 and 1846.[76] The implication is that the spiritualizing of the postdisappointment fanatics, the creedal teaching that God is formless and intangible, and Kellogg's impersonal concepts of God were all associated by James and Ellen White under the general heading of "spiritualistic theories."[77]

This is directly germane to the current debate, because some have claimed that Kellogg's view which Ellen White condemned is the same view of the Trinity later accepted by the church[78]—a claim that is not supported by the evidence. White clearly rejects the view of the Trinity that makes God seem distant, untouchable, impersonal; and embraces a literal, biblical[79] view of the Trinity, a view that shows God as including three individual divine personalities, who in nature, character, purpose, and love are one.

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[75] Ibid., 62-63.

[76] E. G. White, *Selected Messages*, (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958), 1:203.

[77] Ibid., 204.

[78] Diener.

[79] Bible texts that Ellen White cited as supporting various aspects of a trinitarian view include Rom 8:16 (*Evangelism* [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1946], 617); 1 Cor 2:10-14 (ibid.); John 16:7-14 (ibid., 616); John 14:16-18, 26; 16:8, 12-14 (*Desire of Ages*, 669-671); and Col 2:9 (*Evangelism* [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1946], 614).

Her latest affirmations of one God in three persons are fully in harmony with the first explicitly trinitarian belief statement among Seventh-day Adventists, written by F. M. Wilcox in the *Review and Herald* in 1913.[80] "Seventh-day Adventists believe,—" Wilcox explained, "1. In the divine Trinity. This Trinity consists of the eternal Father, . . . the Lord Jesus Christ, . . . [and] the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Godhead"[81]

Conclusion

Part 1 of this study noted that the 1946 General Conference Session was the first to officially endorse belief in the Trinity,[82] just 100 years after James White's strong rejection of that idea in the 1846 *Day-Star.* This change was not a simple reversal. The evidence is that Ellen White agreed with the essential positive point of James's belief, namely, that "the Father and the Son" are "two distinct, litteral [*sic*], tangible persons." Subsequent evidence shows that she also agreed with James's negative point: that the traditional, philosophical concepts held by many trinitarians did "spiritualize away" the personal reality of the Father and the Son.[83]

Soon after this she added the conviction, based on visions, that both Christ and the Father have tangible forms. She progressively affirmed the eternal equality of Christ and the Father, that Christ was not created, and by 1888, that an adequate concept of the atonement demands the full and eternal Deity of Christ. Only in the 1890s did she become aware of the full individuality and personhood of the Holy Spirit, but when she did, she referred to the Holy Spirit in literal and tangible terms much like those she had used in 1850 to describe the Father and the Son.[84] By 1905, she explicitly declared her belief in three divine persons united in one God.

This confirms the fourfold hypothesis with which this article opened. First, E. R. Gane's characterization of Ellen White as a "trinitarian monotheist" is accurate regarding her mature concept of God, from 1898 onward. She never, however, used the term "Trinity" to describe her belief about God. Perhaps the closest she came was her use of the phrase "heavenly trio."[85] A likely reason why she consistently shunned the term "Trinity," even after she had embraced certain aspects of trinitarian teaching, is the second hypothesis: that she had become aware of two varieties of trinitarian belief, one that she embraced and one that she vehemently rejected. An uncritical use of the term "Trinity" might appear to endorse philosophical concepts to which she was diametrically opposed.

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[80] F. M. Wilcox was editor of the *Review and Herald* from 1911-1944 and one of the original five trustees appointed by Ellen White to superintend her estate.

[81] [F. M. Wilcox], "The Message for Today,"*Review and Herald*, October 9, 1913, 21.

[82] Moon, "The Adventist Trinity Debate, Part 1," 122.

[83] James White, *Day-Star,* January 24, 1846, 26.

[84] "We need to realize that the Holy Spirit, who is as much a person as God is a person, is walking through these grounds, unseen by human eyes; that the Lord God is our Keeper and Helper. He hears every word we utter and knows every thought of the mind" (E. G. White, "Talk at Avondale School," March 25, 1899, in *Sermons and Talks* [Silver Spring, MD: E. G. White Estate, 1994], 2:136-137.

[85] E. G. White, *Special Testimonies*, Series B, no. 7 (1905), 62-63.

This seems especially plausible in light of the third hypothesis, that as she endorsed conceptual steps toward a biblical trinitarianism, her developing understanding exerted a strong influence on other Adventist writers, leading eventually to a substantial degree of consensus in the denomination.

Fourth, the method by which the early Adventists sought to separate the biblical elements of trinitarianism from those derived only from tradition, was to completely disallow tradition as a basis for doctrine, and struggle through the long process of constructing their beliefs on the basis of Scripture alone. In doing so, they virtually retraced the steps of the NT church in first accepting the equality of Christ with the Father, and second, discovering their equality and unity with the Holy Spirit as well. In the process, Adventist theology showed temporary similarities to some of the historical heresies, particularly Arianism. The repudiation of tradition as doctrinal authority was costly in terms of the ostracism they endured as perceived "heretics," but their dependence on Scripture brought them eventually to what they believed was a more biblical view of the Trinity.[86] A controversial corollary is the conviction that the classical formulation of the Trinity doctrine, resting as it does on Greek philosophical presuppositions of timelessness and impassibility, is simply incompatible with a thoroughly biblical theological system.[87]

Not an objective observer, but a systematic theologian deeply involved in the development of the Adventist doctrine of God, Fernando Canale has written extensively on the distinction between a theology based on Greek philosophical presuppositions and one based on biblical presuppositions.[88] He argues that

> in a very real sense, Adventist emphasis on Scriptures as the sole source of data for executing theology has given theological reflection on God a new and revolutionary start. Systematically distrustful and critical of traditional theological positions, Adventists were determined to build doctrines on the basis of Scripture alone. The difficulties implicit in this fresh approach may account for the scant number of Adventist statements on the doctrine of God.[89]

Canale makes a strong case for his contention that because Adventists

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[86] Canale, 150.

[87] Ibid, 148-150. On a more popular level, see Moon, "The Trinity in the Reformation Era: Four Viewpoints," in *The Trinity: Understanding God's Love, His Plan of Salvation, and Christian Relationships*, Woodrow Whidden, Jerry Moon, and John W. Reeve (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald), 166-181.

[88] Fernando Luis Canale, *A Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series, vol. 10 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1983), 359; 402, n. 1; idem, "Doctrine of God," 117-118, 126, 128-129, 132, 138-140, 145, 148-150.

[89] Canale, "Doctrine of God," 148.

"departed from the philosophical conception of God as timeless" and "embraced the historical conception of God as presented in the Bible," they were enabled to develop a genuinely biblical view of the Trinity.[90]

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[90] Canale, 150, elaborates: "Finally, having departed from the philosophical conception of God as timeless and having embraced the historical conception of God as presented in the Bible, Adventists envisage the relation between the immanent and economic Trinity as one of identity rather than correspondence. The works of salvation are produced in time and history by the immanent Trinity [Fritz Guy, "What the Trinity Means to Me," *Adventist Review,* September 11, 1986, 13] by way of its different Persons, conceived as centers of consciousness and action. Consequently, the indivisibility of God's works in history is not conceived by Adventists as being determined by the oneness of essence—as taught in the Augustinian classical tradition—but rather by the oneness of the historical task of redemption [Raoul Dederen, "Reflections on the Doctrine of the Trinity," *AUSS* 8 (Spring 1970): 20]. The danger of Tritheism involved in this position becomes real when the oneness of God is reduced to a mere unity conceived in analogy to a human society or a fellowship of action. Beyond such a unity of action, however, it is necessary to envision God as the one single reality which, in the very acts by which He reveals Himself directly in history, transcends the limits of our human reason [W. W. Prescott, *The Saviour of the World* (Takoma Park, MD: Review and Herald, 1929), 17]. In no way could human minds achieve what the classic doctrine about the Trinity claims to perceive, namely, the description of the inner structure of God's being. Together with the entire creation, we must accept God's oneness by faith (James 2:19)."

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

PAUL'S APPARENT REVERSAL OF CONCERN FOR THE WEAK BROTHER IN 1 CORINTHIANS 10:29B-30: AN EXAMINATION OF THE TEXT IN LIGHT OF GRECO-ROMAN RHETORIC

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Date Completed: September 2002

Problem

In 1 Cor 8:1–10:29a, Paul is consistently on the side of the brother with a weak conscience in regard to eating food offered to idols (8:11). However, he seems to reverse himself in 10:29b-30, suggesting that one should be able to eat anything regardless of its provenance or the effect such eating may have on others. What, then, should be made of the two questions asked in 10:29-30, which appear neither fitted to the *context* nor directly answered by what precedes and follows in the discussion of εἰδωλόθυτα in 8:1–11:1?

Approach

Scholars have employed various methodological interpretations in search of a contextual meaning of the two questions posed in 10:29b-30. However, these two questions have not been examined as a rhetorical argumentative device intended to resolve the problem of eating idol food discussed in 8:1–11:1. In order to understand the function of 10:29b-30 in Paul's argumentation, I have used the following method:

Following an introductory chapter, four broader issues where no consensus exists, and which impact the understanding of the questions posed in 10:29b-30, are discussed. For example, the view that Paul offered two different solutions to the question of eating food offered to idols, has led to a division of chapters 8 and 10 into two pericopes: 8:1-13 + 10:23-11:1, where it is argued that Paul allows the eating of idol food; and 10:1-22, where the same practice is denounced. Because Paul defends a position of *not* eating on account of the weak brother, this view is found inadequate upon a contextual examination of 10:29b-30.

Second, the examination of 10:29b-30 in the larger context of 8:1-10:22 (chap. 3) and the narrower context of 10:23–11:1 (chap. 4) suggests a unified, deliberative rhetorical argumentation that is characteristic of 1 Corinthians. Paul's deliberative style, which is similar to that of Greco-Roman rhetoric, reveals that the two questions in 10:29b-30 function in two ways: First, they are intended to *dissuade* the "strong" from setting a bad example for the "weak" by participation in idol feasts. Second, they help to *persuade* the strong to adopt Paul's own behavioral patterns rather than following their wrong use of knowledge (1 Cor 8), exercised in the name of authority or "rights" (1 Cor 9) and freedom (1 Cor 10). Thus, the two questions asked in the passage belong to one of three proofs (πίστεις) Paul uses to persuade the strong to consider the weak brother (vv. 29b-33) before his final appeal in 11:1.

Conclusion

My investigation of the function of the two rhetorical questions asked in 1 Cor 10:29b-30 reveals some of the problems in the interpretation of 1 Corinthians in general and in 8:1–11:1

in particular. However, Paul's use of the deliberative rhetorical device provides insights for resolving the problems in regard to the passage's meaning, helping to account for 10:29b-30 as Paul's means of disarming the strong in their wrong use of freedom and his reason for choosing not to eat idol food because of his concerns for the weak brother.

BOOK REVIEWS

Antoun, Richard T. *Understanding Fundamentalism: Christian, Islamic, and Jewish Movements.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 192 pp. Hardcover, $69.00.

Richard T. Antoun is Professor of Anthropology at the State University of New York at Binghamton, a former Fulbright Scholar, and a former president of the Middle East Studies Association. As a result of his extensive research in Jordan and Iran over the last forty years, he has written three books, of which one is titled *Muslim Preacher in the Modern World: A Jordanian Case Study in Comparative Perspective* (1989). His interest in comparative religions and his long experience in the Middle East provide him with the authority to write on such a complex issue as religious fundamentalism.

Antoun's approach is well defined by his statement: "The anthropologist aims for empathy rather than sympathy" (vii). The popular view equates religious fundamentalism with religious bigotry, scandalous beliefs, opposition to science, and puritanical sexual ethics (1). Antoun appropriately demonstrates that the truth is more complex: "Fundamentalism is a response to the questioning of the great religious traditions—Islam, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism—in the changing world" (2). He further expands this concept by stating that fundamentalism is not only a response; it is also a "transnational religious phenomenon" and "a cross culturally applicable concept to a wide variety of religious traditions" (3). It must be noted, however, that the author limits his study to Islam, Christianity, and Judaism.

The book's strength lies in its well-articulated explanation of fundamentalism and its complexities. It is well documented and consists of eight chapters with a useful glossary and index. The "Suggestions for Further Reading" section (165) refers to essential titles that cover Christian, Islamic, and Jewish fundamentalism. Antoun's Middle East experiences are supported by other primary sources, written by experts who compare different religious fundamentalist movements.

Antoun explains that fundamentalism is neither limited to certain parts of the world nor an exclusively Muslim phenomenon. In fact, there is a fundamentalist segment in every religion or ideology. Why? Because in each religion or ideology there are some people who are not satisfied with what their institutions and communities have to offer them. They believe the pure and true faith has been abandoned. All fundamentalists idealize the past history of their tradition—"the mystic past with its heroes who are archetypes for contemporary behavior" (55). They strongly refuse the ideology of modernism with its permissive secular society, and try to reverse the process that has removed religion from much of public life.

The "Great Western Transmutation" (GWT) is defined "as part of a major historical shift in world view and power relations" (11). Its consequences are the transfer of loyalties from God and religious institutions to the secular nation-state, which had its inception in Europe at the beginning of the eighteenth century (13). The GWT has long been accused of leading to pluralism of beliefs and relativization of traditional public values. The purpose of life is no longer to go to heaven, but to become rich and to enjoy all manner of earthly pleasures. The inevitable results are social injustice and immorality.

Fundamentalism, the author claims, is not only a critic of our modern society; its main ambition is to bring people back to authentic and pure religion. How can this be accomplished? In chapter 4, the author exposes three strategies common to all fundamentalist entities in their quest for purity: separation—the world must be avoided as impure; political passivism—God himself will change the world; confrontation—among others, Antoun mentions Hamas and the Christian Coalition, who fit this model. He notes that some groups have shifted from one strategy to another, especially in Islam, where the fundamentalists tend to become politically involved and radical.

I would like to ask Antoun the following questions. Do you believe that Christian fundamentalists in the United States may become as violent as the Islamic fundamentalists? Can we imagine the Christian Coalition acting like Hamas? If not, is it fair to categorize them together? Can we imagine the violence and crimes committed against abortionists as the beginning of violent Christian fundamentalism in the United States?

Because there are so many exceptions, Antoun built his work on an "ideal type" of fundamentalist. But we must continue to explore the idea that religion itself influences and even foments fundamentalism. Are fundamentalists so powerful in Muslim countries, and yet so marginal in Christian countries? Why is the concept of religious freedom and free choice largely accepted in traditionally Christian countries, while it is widely rejected in Muslim countries? What about fundamentalism in the Catholic and Orthodox traditions? Antoun clearly explains the causes and outcomes of fundamentalism in relation to society's transformation. Is the primary influence religious or social?

Antoun's book is an important contribution to the knowledge of a major aspect of the modern world. It explains the religious aspects of terrorism and the mechanisms that create and nurture religious extremism. It is a useful resource for all who are involved or interested in religion, contributing a serious and balanced approach to our understanding of fundamentalism.

Fundamentalism is not terrorism. Rather, fundamentalism is a reaction to a world filled with injustice and immorality, whose values it cannot accept. Violent fundamentalism, however, is the wrong answer to the problems we face today. Unfortunately, especially in repressive societies, fundamentalists are often tempted to use violence as an agent for change. It is possible for fundamentalism to exist in democratic societies, as a religious expression protected by pluralism. Ironically, fundamentalists need freedom to survive and human rights to share their faith. Where fundamentalists control the power, there is no room for other ideologies and religious beliefs; human rights are nonexistent and religious freedoms are annihilated. Antoun, however, does not go this far, but his book helps the reader to better understand a phenomenon that has already become a major influence on geopolitical relationships and delayed hopes at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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Bar, Shaul. *A Letter That Has Not Been Read: Dreams in the Hebrew Bible*, Monographs of the Hebrew Union College, no. 25, trans. Lenn J. Schramm. Cincinnati, OH: Hebrew Union College Press, 2001. xii + 257 pp. Hardcover, $39.95.

After Sigmund Freud's study on dreams published in 1952, Oppenheim's in 1956, and Jean Marie Husser's in 1999 (to name a few key representatives), Bar's book is the most comprehensive and up-to-date publication on biblical dreams. It is an outstanding exegetical and theological study with pertinent research behind it that fills the gap in the recent theological literature on the topic. The publication is an excellent inquiry that thoroughly treats the phenomenon of dreams in the Hebrew Bible. Shaul Bar, Associate Professor of Bible in the Bornblum Judaic Studies at the University of Memphis, fittingly analyzes the biblical material on dreams, evaluates and categorizes it, and finally draws well-balanced conclusions.

The author very clearly structures his book into six chapters. In the introduction, he points out that in the Hebrew Bible one finds dreams, which are channels of communication between God and humans, in contrast to the Freudian concept that dreams are manifestations of the subconscious. He also struggles with the insightful question of why God chose to communicate his message through dreams rather than through direct conscious revelation or encounter with the Deity. He claims that dreams are a more safe, refined, elaborated, and sophisticated way of communication because they lead the hearer or reader to think while providing a hidden truth. Thus, an interpretation is needed.

Bar categorizes dreams into two groups, prophetic and symbolic, and differentiates between them. Prophetic dreams are described in chapter 1 and symbolic dreams in chapter 2. Both types come from God (44), but the main, clearly defined difference between them is that God himself does not appear in symbolic dreams (43). Prophetic dreams are characterized by the word of God which is delivered in a clear form and is instantly and fully understood (4). In symbolic dreams, the dreamer has visions in symbols with hidden meaning; the emphasis is on seeing, because "dreamers see symbols but hear nothing" (5); they require interpretation. For biblical authors, it is "the Lord who causes dreams to be dreamt and interpreters to decipher their meaning" (77). Both types of dreams can also prefigure future events.

In the rest of the book, the author further elaborates on the issue of dreams. In chapter 3 Bar examines the art of interpretation of dreams and discusses and compares the Egyptian, Mesopotamian, and rabbinic approaches to this task. Rabbi Hisda aptly said: "A dream that has not been interpreted is like a letter that has not been read" (6). In the biblical narratives it is clear that the interpretation of dreams comes from God, while in Egypt or Mesopotamia it was a magical art. Chapter 4 deals with the perception of dreams in the prophetic and wisdom literature, where there are three different attitudes towards dreams: associated with false prophets, classification as metaphors for imagery, and viewed positively as legitimate dreams from God such as can be found in Joel or Job (141). In contrast to dreams, vision phenomenon is treated in chapter 5. Bar claims that "the line of demarcation between dreams and visions, or between God's appearance in a dream and a true waking theophany, is not always clear and distinct." (7) Finally, in chapter 6, the intent of dream stories is discussed, "what they are meant to teach and why they were included in Scriptures" (182).

There is an important observation made by Bar that dreams occur most often in the book of Genesis and are well structured, organized, and elaborated. On the other hand, there are no dreams reported during the time of the Prophets, even though prophets use the word "dream," but only to "reject and ridicule dreamers" (6). However, Bar also mentions that prophetical literature contains a phenomenon that he calls "dream visions." He provides good insight into the etymology of terms such as "dream" (10-13) and "vision" (144).

The author, in dealing with dreams in the book of Daniel, explains the sequence of four empires by identifying them according to the current popular view with the following sequence of the four kingdoms: Babylon, Media, Persia, and Greece (62), thus overlooking the exegetical data of the book itself (which matches perfectly with historical facts), in which Media and Persia are understood as one united kingdom after the fall of Babylon (see Dan 5:28; 6:8, 12, 15; 8:21). Even though our author does not deal with the dreams/visions of Dan 7 and 8, it is significant to observe that in these two chapters both seeing and hearing occur. One might also wish that Bar would explain the difference, if there is any, between "*ḥāzôn*" and "*mar'eh*" in Dan 8 and 9.

Additionally, it would be useful if the author explained more about the control of the dreams. This phenomenon is used even today to deceive sincere believers; dreamers claim authority and exercise influence. This biblical insight would help people to better understand how to react to this phenomenon. Especially in view of Joel 2:28-29, questions such as "How does one distinguish a genuine dream coming from the Lord from a an ordinary dream of modern origin?" or "How can we know whether the interpretation of a dream is correct?" are perplexing. These issues, of course, go beyond the scope of the present study, but one is curious as to what practical conclusions can be drawn from this momentous academic exercise.

Bar's publication is a superb study and must be taken seriously by every student of the Hebrew Bible wishing to grasp and to become familiar with the phenomenon of dreams.

Andrews University JIŘÍ MOSKALA

Brasher, Brenda E., ed. *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism*. New York: Routledge, 2001. xviii + 558 pp. Hardcover, $125.00.

Landes, Richard A., ed. *Encyclopedia of Millennialism and Millennial Movements*. New York: Routledge, 2000. xii + 478 pp. Hardcover, $125.00.

These two focused reference works are part of the Religion and Society Series under the general editorship of David Levinson, a cultural anthropologist and editor of such works as the *Encyclopedia of World Cultures* and the *Encyclopedia of Cultural Anthropology*. To date there has been at least one volume in the series in addition to the two being reviewed—the *Encyclopedia of African and African American Religions*, edited by Stephen D. Glazier.

Brasher, editor of the work on fundamentalism, is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Mount Union College and is the author of *Godly Women: Fundamentalism and Female Power*. Landes, editor of the millennial volume, is an Associate Professor of Medieval History at Boston University and is the cofounder and director of the Center for Millennial Studies, "an independent organization dedicated to teaching, archiving, and interpreting the manifestations of apocalyptic expectation in and around the year 2000." He is the author of *Relics, Apocalypse, and the Deceits of History: Ademar of Chabannes*.

The two reference works have, to some extent, overlapping topics, since much of fundamentalism is tied to millennialism. On the other hand, their treatments from certain perspectives are quite divergent. For example, Landes's coverage is much more broad than that of Brasher's volume on fundamentalism. The *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism* has a much stronger Christian orientation than does the *Encyclopedia of Millennialism*, although neither is it exclusively Christian in content. Those coming from a conservative Christian perspective might be tempted to think that that balance reflects the reality of the respective fields, but the recent work of Martin Marty and his colleagues has gone far to demonstrate that fundamentalism is a cross-cultural frame of mind rather than something unique to Christianity. On the positive side, even though the *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism* did not give as much space to non-Christian fundamentalism as we might expect, the book does provide overview articles on topics such as Islamic, Jewish, and Hindu fundamentalism, though the number of their subtopics is much fewer than for Christian fundamentalism. Of course, part of the editorial function is to select topics for scarce space in a reference work. Thus one can provide a good justification for a Christian emphasis. But while that is true, there is also a sense in which the strong Christian emphasis in the fundamentalism volume seems to be out of step with the generally even-handed breadth of the other volumes in the series.

The *Encyclopedia of Millennialism and Millennial Movements* is historical, cross-cultural, and interdisciplinary, drawing upon the fields of religion, anthropology, history, and political science, among others, in its study of a wide-based variety of millennial movements. The cast of topics is also extremely broad. A reader can find articles on such topics as the "Year 1000," the "Ghost Dance," "Cargo Cults," the "Branch Davidians," "Islam," and 150 others. The present reviewer was happy to find an insightful article on "Nazism" as a millennial movement, and one on the millennial implications of Marxism.

True to its actual content, the introduction to the *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism* states that its focus is on Christian Protestantism, even though "some Fundamentalist-like assumptions can be found in most, if not all, religious traditions" (xv). As noted above, that statement seems to be more than a little weak. After all, a non-Christian fundamentalism is in many ways driving the ongoing difficulties in the Middle East on both the Jewish and Islamic sides. Thus while it is certainly a valid editorial choice to somewhat restrict the breadth of a reference work, some readers might wish for a broader treatment.

Within the criteria set forth for the volume, the selections relating to Protestant fundamentalism are helpful. Those selections center around six major categories: the religious context of fundamentalism; major events in the history of fundamentalism; primary beliefs and institutions, major bodies, movements, or churches; political and social perspectives; and individuals who were central to the rise of fundamentalism.

On the level of individual articles in the *Encyclopedia of Fundamentalism*, one wonders at times if the most qualified authors were selected. That question certainly arises in regard to the article on the Millerites, where, even though it is factually correct, it is strange that not one of the major research treatments of Millerism is found in the bibliography.

That weakness, however, is not endemic to the series as a whole. Most of the bibliographies are excellent. And as with most reference works, the good news is that these two volumes generally have insightful introductory essays to a wide variety of topics, as well as helpful bibliographies. Thus, they provide excellent starting places for studying a broad spectrum of issues related to fundamentalism and millennialism.

Andrews University GEORGE R. KNIGHT

Brown, William P., and S. Dean McBride Jr., eds. *God Who Creates: Essays in Honor of W. Sibley Towner.* Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000. xx + 273 pp. Paper, $24.00.

William P. Brown, Associate Professor of Old Testament at Union Theological Seminary and Presbyterian School of Christian Education (Richmond, VA), and S. Dean McBride Jr., Cyrus H. McCormick Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament at the same institutions, have edited this *Festschrift* in honor of their colleague W. Sibley Towner, Professor of Old Testament, also of the same institutions), who has written significant scholarly essays, curricula, and sermons on creation. The collection of seventeen essays by well-known scholars is divided into four parts: Pentateuch, Psalms and Job, the Prophets, and the NT.

As the editors indicate in the Preface, this volume "identifies a tectonic shift in emphasis that has taken place in the theological study of the Bible over the past several decades. . . . In a nutshell, this change marks nothing short of a paradigm shift from a once exclusive stress upon the mighty intervention of God in history to God's formative and sustaining ways in creation" (xi). Steering away from the half-century-long scholarly consensus in OT studies that creation occupied only a marginal status at best within the purview of biblical theology and was overshadowed by (and a mere foil for) God's mighty acts in salvation history (as per G. Ernest Wright and Gerhard von Rad), this volume moves in the direction of a radically different, recent emphasis (long argued particularly by H. H. Schmid) that regards creation as foundational to all other biblical dimensions of faith. According to the editors, the essays in this volume demonstrate that "the Bible, in short, presents nature and redemption, history and creation, as a seamless whole, never to be rent asunder" (xv). Further, the placement of the creation account at the beginning of the canon indicates "the affirmation that God is creator is the starting point for defining Christian faith" (xv).

This volume is not only set apart by its paradigm shift from an emphasis upon salvation history to creation, but by a methodological paradigm shift as well. Instead of dealing with the ancient Near Eastern mythological background material or the relation of the biblical creation material to modern science or ecology, as in most other studies of creation, *God Who Creates* "explores the various perspectives of creation within their native theological contexts, including literary and historical" (xvi). With the exception of one or two essays, the contributions follow the new literary paradigm in OT studies that synchronically examines the final canonical form of the biblical text (without necessarily denying a precanonical history).

Instead of dealing in some detail with only a few of the scholarly essays, as I would normally do in reviewing a *Festschrift*, I am constrained to briefly mention the whole sweep of coverage represented by the contributors (omitting only the homily [on Psalm 8 by Dusty Fiedler]), since the cumulative canonical effect of the evidence presented is critical to the thesis of the book.

The title of S. Dean McBride's lead essay, "Divine Protocol: Genesis 1:1–2:3 as Prologue to the Pentateuch," already indicates his thesis that the opening creation account in the Torah "functions admirably as a cosmological prologue to the whole Pentateuch" (5). As a "protocol," this passage "epitomizes divine procedure and purpose, setting an agenda that previews the Creator's continuing relationship to an "ordered but still malleable cosmos" (7). McBride shows how the cosmos that God creates is presented as a Temple, in which he takes up residence on the first Sabbath, with the humans created in his image as "a terrestrial counterpart to God's heavenly entourage" (16). The five covenants that frame the rest of the "received Pentateuch," i.e., the Pentateuch in its final form, are simply "formal instruments by which supplementary decisions are integrated into the cosmic design of the God who creates" (19).

Marsha M. Wilfong's essay, "Human Creation in Canonical Context: Genesis 1:26-31 and Beyond," suggests that the opening creation account "stands at the beginning of Scripture and offers a vision of God's intentions for creation—in particular, for human creation" (52). Humankind is presented as the "lynchpin of Creation" (46), and the emphasis is upon human relationships: with God, the human community, and the rest of creation. Human sin (Gen 3) is faithlessness in relationship with God, which is reflected in distorted relationships between human beings and with the rest of creation. Within the biblical canon, Jesus Christ, in the true image of God, came to restore broken relationships. This canon climaxes with Jesus making all things new as in the beginning (Rev 21:5).

E. Carson Brisson ("The Gates of Dawn: Reflections on Genesis 1:1-10; 2:1-4a") argues that in Gen 1, once chaos is leashed in the beginning, creation "begins its formal move toward the Sabbath purpose for which it is brought into existence" (57). Brisson explores the dimensions of Sabbath rest as "repose in God offered to creation by the parts and sum of the reigning will of Israel's Lord." "Indeed," Brisson exclaims, "were the entire created order to embrace sabbath, the world would in that moment become a hymn (Ps. 148:7-8)" (58).

James L. Mays ("'Maker of Heaven and Earth': Creation in the Psalms") summarizes the primary features of the way "creation" is treated in the Psalms and examines sample psalms that focus on creation of the "world" or "earth" (Pss 8, 24, 29, 98, and 104). From these psalms comes a rich and multifaceted perspective on the created world. Patrick D. Miller Jr. ("The Poetry of Creation: Psalm 104") deals particularly with Psalm 104, which he identifies as "the most extended explication of God's work of creation outside Genesis" (87). Miller analyzes the structure and movement of the Psalm, uncovers eight theological themes, and places the Psalm in its literary and theological context within the canonical arrangement of the book of Psalms. By recognizing the linkage between Pss 103 and 104, Miller points out that the community joins both creation and history in their praise of God's "works."

In contrast with most studies of creation that deal with its cosmic contours, William P. Brown ("*Creatio Corporis* and the Rhetoric of Defense in Job 10 and Psalm 139") narrows the focus to creation of the individual, *creatio corporis,* in Job 10 and Ps 139. He demonstrates that these two texts bridge between creation and covenant, and that, according to the latter passage, "in conception was established both the physical and moral constitution of a human being" (114). Karen Pidcock-Lester's analysis of Job 38-41 ("'Earth Has No Sorrow that Earth Cannot Heal': Job 38-41") shows how God answers the question of human suffering by pointing to the creation, and how a focus upon God's creation transforms rage to trust.

In the section of the book on the Prophets, Thomas W. Mann ("Stars, Sprouts, and Streams: The Creative Redeemer of Second Isaiah") explores the "Creative Redeemer" theme, especially in Isa 40 and 43, laying bare the emphasis upon YHWH's process of continuous (redemptive) creation. Walter Brueggemann ("Jeremiah: *Creatio in Extremis*") sets forth the book of Jeremiah as a "clear test case and model for the shift in scholarly paradigms in Old Testament study" from history of traditions toward creation, and concludes that creation theology "pervades the book of Jeremiah, a pervasion mostly denied and kept invisible by the once dominant history-of-traditions perspective" (152-153). Brueggemann finds that creation themes are not only found "in many incidental ways" in the book, but are also "of structural importance to the theological accents of judgment and hope in the final form of the text" (166). Brueggemann also acknowledges that the creation theology of Jeremiah stands against the conventional Enlightenment concept of autonomy (and his own Marxist-leaning human mandate). Steven Tuell ("The Rivers of Paradise: Ezek 47:1-12 and Gen 2:10-14") focuses upon the intertextual linkages between Ezek 47 and Gen 2, suggesting that Ezekiel envisions Zion as Eden, the home of God, and that this Zion is not the earthly one, but the mythic heavenly reality.

Robert R. Wilson ("Creation and New Creation: The Role of Creation Imagery in the Book of Daniel") traces the role of creation imagery in the book of Daniel, specifically in Dan 7, with its intertextual linkages to Gen 1. He argues that instead of viewing the chapter as prophecy of future events, one should interpret it as the author's view of reality. The composite beasts of the chapter are to be seen as mutants from the basic types of species indicated in Gen 1, as violations of God's natural order, and therefore the kingdoms they represent are also violations of that order; "the world has reverted to its pre-creation state and is clearly in need of re-creation" (202). Daniel's vision also indicates that God is able to restore order and bring the world back permanently to the way it was in the beginning.

David L. Petersen ("The World of Creation in the Book of the Twelve") looks at creation themes in the Book of the Twelve, utilizing traditiohistorical analysis, and concludes that in the Book of the Twelve "Creation traditions provide a check against the cosmic instability in day of the Lord traditions. Together, these traditions emphasize the permanence but fragility of the created order" (214). A final essay on the Prophets by Gene M. Tucker ("The Peaceable Kingdom and a Covenant with the Wild Animals") examines the prophetic statements about the eschatological transformation of creation in Isa 11:6-9 and Hos 2:18 [2:20], and concludes that these descriptions "stop short of an apocalyptic transformation that presupposes the possibility of rejection of the world as created" and do not "promise a return to a primordial paradise." Rather, "they look either to the restoration of a prejudgment state of the relationship with creation or to an ideal world ruled by a divinely ordained king" (225).

The last two essays deal with creation themes in the NT. David L. Bartlett ("'Creation Waits with Eager Longing'") looks at the creation—a new creation theme in Paul's theology and the synoptic Gospels, uncovering the NT writers' interpretation of the Genesis creation story that contains an implicit narrative of four acts: "God creates the world as good," "sin mars God's good creation," "God acts in Jesus Christ to redeem the world," and "the lost good creation is [will be] restored—purer and brighter than before" (232). Finally, John T. Carroll's essay ("Creation and Apocalypse") reveals "the central and determinative role Revelation and other apocalyptic texts assign to God in the work of re-creation" (260).

Some specific arguments in the book appear to be on more solid ground than others, depending upon one's presuppositions and preferred methodology. I am not persuaded by Wilfong's and Brisson's interpretation of Gen 1:2 as "menacing" chaos (47) that has to be "leashed" (57); see the recent studies of this question in the three-part series in *AUSS* (vols. 36/2, 37/1, and 38/1) by Roberto Ouro. Nor am I convinced that the poetry of Ps 104 provides evidence against interpreting the creation accounts of Gen 1-2 literally, as intimated by Miller (96).

The intertextual priority of one passage over another and reconstruction of layers of tradition in a given passage, based upon assumed dating of materials as argued by several authors, is far from certain (see, e.g., 117, 122, 136, 158). Tuell's contention that the image of the tree of life in Rev 22 growing on both sides of the river is "literally nonsensical" (172-173) seems to overlook modern botanical parallels, e.g., the banyan tree, with multiple trunks spread over a wide geographical area, and also the power of God in recreation. His confident assertions that various images in the OT perforce derive from ancient Near Eastern mythology (176) are also debatable, as is his insistence that the geography of Gen 2 is clearly "symbolical, mythical" and not intended by the biblical writer as literal (180). Wilson's similar claims that Dan 7 is to be interpreted in view of Canaanite mythology (193) and that there is no real prophecy of the future in this chapter (194) also involve presuppositions regarding the nature of this apocalyptic literature that are not universally accepted. He also seems to falter in his interpretation of Gen 1:11, which he claims teaches that "there is no possibility of creating new species through mutation" (201); to the contrary, the Hebrew word *min* refers to a broader modern scientific classification than species and does not rule out mutation within these broader categories (see Gordon L. Lewis and Bruce A. Demerest, *Integrative Theology: Historical, Biblical, Systematic, Apologetic, Practical* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996], 2:40). I am not convinced by Tucker's arguments that the new-creation passages of Isa 11 and Hos 2 are limited and not cosmic; the arguments of Hans Walther Wolff, Francis I. Andersen, and David Noel Freedman seem more persuasive that here we have a virtual cosmic return to a primeval time (219-220).

In NT studies, Bartlett's antinomian view of Paul's new-creation theology (237, 245, 250) and his suggestion that Paul at times implies universal redemption for the human race (243) are controverted by a large corpus of recent Pauline exegesis. Finally, regarding Caroll's essay, I do not find the Genesis narrative implying that "the fruit of the 'tree of life' went uneaten in the primeval paradise" (254), as Carroll states, but only that after the Fall the human pair were barred from continuing to eat the fruit of this tree. As with Wilson's view of apocalyptic in Daniel, I am hard-pressed to see that the final form of Revelation does not present precise prediction of future events, as Carroll seems to indicate (260). This appears to be the modern reader's presupposition showing through, not the message of the canonical text.

While one might quibble with the contributors regarding this or that minor point, as I have done above, the cumulative impact of the various essays in this *Festschrift* is powerful and inescapable: Creation suffuses the biblical canon and can no longer be marginalized as peripheral or only ancillary to salvation history. Creation is foundational to biblical faith and inextricably linked with salvation history in the final form of both OT and NT.

I found the methodological approach in most of the essays to be refreshing, consisting of a synchronic reading of the "received text" in its final canonical form, by contrast with so many atomizing studies of creation (and other themes) in the past that have never come to grips with the biblical theology of the text as it now presents itself to us. James Barr's essay, "Remembrances of 'Historical Criticism': Speiser's Genesis Commentary and Its History of Reception," was omitted in the survey above, since it seemed out of place in this work. This essay characterizes David Gunn and Danna N. Fewell's critique of Speiser's work as "a massive misunderstanding and misrepresentation." I found Barr's definition of "historical criticism," which for him means only source criticism and excludes form criticism, tradition criticism, and other critical methodologies, to be extremely narrow.

This book not only identifies a "tectonic shift" in biblical studies toward the significance of creation theology, but contributes significantly toward substantiating the validity of this shift. Furthermore, it gives evidence of the power and theological richness of the recent methodological trend in biblical studies toward holistically presenting the theology of the Bible in its final canonical form. While different perspectives and insights into creation theology appear in different books and blocks of the biblical canon, there emerges an overarching unity, rooted in the Genesis creation accounts, that forms the "divine protocol" and "prologue" not only of the Pentateuch, but of the sentire Bible.

Andrews University RICHARD M. DAVIDSON

Davis, Jimmy H., and Harry L. Poe. *Designer Universe: Intelligent Design and the Existence of God.* Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman, 2002. 252 pp. Paperback, $12.99.

Jimmy Davis and Harry Poe have *almost* written a great book. *Designer Universe* has been positively reviewed by Charles Colson (BreakPoint with Charles Colson. June 27, 2002. Considering the Evidence: Intelligent Design in the Twenty-first Century), and *Christianity Today* bestowed an Award of Merit in Apologetics/Evangelism on it in their 2003 Book Awards (Union News & Information, News Release May 23, 2003. "Union's Poe and Davis Take *Christianity Today* Award"). Both authors hold teaching positions at Union University in Jackson, Tennessee: Davis in chemistry and Poe in the area of faith and culture. Integrating the perspectives of a scientist and a theologian in one book had the potential to result in a seminal interdisciplinary work on the question of design in nature. *Designer Universe* could have been, but is not, the great book that should have resulted from this collaboration.

Before discussing failures that remove *Designer Universe* from among the best books on faith and science, we need to note a wonderful contribution made by this book. The first three chapters make an excellent presentation of different ways in which philosophers and theologians from Christian and non-Christian religions have approached the question of design in nature. These three chapters would make profitable reading for anyone interested in the argument for God from design. This is particularly true for those who believe that the study of nature naturally leads to discovery of the Christian Creator God. This is denied not only by scientists committed to the philosophy of materialism, but by the reality within which all people of faith live.

As Davis and Poe point out in the first chapter, one of them first heard the design argument for the existence of God from a Hindu mystic named Swami Chinmayananda. Evidence of intelligent causes in nature reveals the necessity of something we call "God," but whether this is the God of the Bible is an entirely different matter.

The first three chapters make a profound point: there have been and are many different views of what God is, what design is, and what design means. Any Christian interested in using the argument from design needs to be thoroughly aware of these different perspectives if they intend to use this approach in sharing their faith. Reading these chapters would greatly benefit both scientists and theologians interested in questions of science and faith.

If only the subsequent chapters continued the excellent foundation developed in the first three, *Designer Universe* would be an excellent book, but it fails to do this. After the first three chapters, the text degenerates into something like a weakly written high-school textbook with occasional parenthetical comments that amount to "Wow, God must have had a hand in this!" Instead of using specific examples from nature to continue discussing how various views of design and God may influence interpretation of evidence, a plodding description of physical, chemical, and genetic wonders is given.

Perhaps chapters 4 through 6 would be useful background information for people who never took a high-school science class. However, anyone familiar with high-school science can safely skip the last four chapters; instead of advancing the interesting argument, these chapters simply bog it down. Using chapters 4 through 6 to improve understanding of the wonders of nature needs to be done with care as, inexplicably, there are a number of errors. In my own area of specialty, genetics, the mistakes are glaring. In chapter 6, "Designer Genes," Davis and Poe say, "Each organism has a unique number of chromosomes" (182). This is flat-out wrong; gorillas, orangutans, chimpanzees, and no doubt many other animals and plants, have 48 chromosomes. On the other hand, *Daturata stramonium* (common names include Thorn-apple, Mad Apple and Jimson Weed) may have anywhere from 24 to 36 chromosomes (W. S. Kluge, and M. R. Cummings. *Concepts of Genetics*, 2d ed. [Columbus: Merrill, 1986], 265). However this grammatically imprecise sentence is read, it is incorrect.

Because other errors are present in chapter 6, one can only hope that as a chemist Jimmy Davis wrote more accurately about chemistry and physics than was the case with biology. No biologist would write: "Not only do the macromolecules occur in the same proportions, but they have the same functions in all cells" (175). Even if we ignore quibbles over the second phrase, the idea that macromolecules occur in the same proportions in different kinds of cells disregards the different roles of cells and different uses of macromolecules. Comparing the makeup of fat cells and muscle cells demonstrates why this statement is wrong. Fat cells store triglyceride (fat) macromolecules and thus have a high proportion of fat to proteins. Muscle cells contract using protein motors and thus have a relatively high proportion of protein to fat. Finding different cell types with the same general proportions of macromolecules would be surprising.

When it comes to genetics and cell biology, the authors appear to have been out of their depth. This is understandable and not nearly as disappointing as the failure to take information discussed in the science chapters and apply the philosophical introduction given in the first three chapters. Reading about water's amazing properties and how they make life possible is interesting if you are reading about it for the first time. What made it interesting for me was thinking about the various ways different philosophical and religious approaches might view the information. It was disappointing to finish wading through it all to be informed that "water is a unique molecule; some people consider that a mark of design" (157). This is hardly a revelation. I want to know *why* some people think water's uniqueness is a sign of design and why others may not. I want the philosophical foundation laid in the first three chapters applied to this information. That it isn't applied makes all the information about materials such as water, carbon, and the periodic table of the elements an informative chemistry lesson but misses an opportunity to provide a much more profound lesson.

The final chapter, "Awe and Wonder," makes an enthusiastic if unfocused argument from aesthetics. While this is an important and often ignored argument for a benevolent Creator, again it is only loosely connected with the chapters on science. Even more frustrating is the Epilogue, where the reader is informed, "this book has no conclusion" (233). What a pity that a book that started out with such promise could muddle to this end. So many potential and interesting conclusions suggest themselves, but instead the epilogue drones off into a befuddled discussion of Michael Behe's Irreducible Complexity (IC). Here the level of confusion is startling: IC "may be an example of the infinite regress so feared by the philosophers of old." In the previous paragraph the immune system is presented as no longer being IC, but no one ever claimed that it was. In his book defining IC, Michael Behe discusses the immune system in Chapter 6, "A Dangerous World." Because it is in reality several systems, Behe never argues that the entire immune system is IC. Instead, in a section entitled "Step by Step," Behe argues that three components are necessary for B-cells antibody production to work and this may be IC. However, B-cell antibody production is only one part of one system(*Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* [New York: Free Press, 1996]). After this, steam engines and Zeppelin airships are reduced to steam coming from a kettle and ash sailing up a chimney. This is so simplistic that it is not worth arguing over. What is revealed is a profound misunderstanding of concepts fundamental to the Intelligent Design movement. For a book with "Intelligent Design" in the title, this is appalling.

That the authors do not understand what Intelligent Design (ID) is about is not a surprise that requires reading to the end of the book. Anyone reading the introduction would be startled to read: "The Intelligent Design Movement is concerned that people believe in God as the cause of the universe and everything in it." Such statements in print are extremely unhelpful to the ID movement. While this accusation is frequently made by those opposed to ID, it is patently and profoundly wrong. ID is about removing theological preconceptions about data before asking whether it is best explained in terms of natural or intelligent causes.

What should be done with *Designer Universe*? Recommending that anyone read it is almost out of the question, especially given the excellent books on Intelligent Design already available (see, e.g., William A. Dembski, ed., *Mere Creation: Science, Faith and Intelligent Design*. [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1998]); Phillip E. Johnson, *The Wedge of Truth: Splitting the Foundations of Naturalism* [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000]); M. J. Behe. *Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution* [New York: Free Press, 1996]). But the first three chapters of Davis's and Poe's book are difficult to ignore. Readers looking for information about different philosophical and theological approaches to the question of design in nature and its meaning will find these chapters useful. Because the rest of the book contains inaccuracies and fails to apply the earlier lessons, it is difficult to recommend reading it. Those interested in questions raised in the first three chapters may want to lobby Davis and Poe to get this book right. With a year's sabbatical, a rigorous editor, and lots of effort, *Designer Universe* could become a great book.

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TIMOTHY G. STANDISH

Del Olmo Lete, Gregorio, and Joaquín Sanmartín. *A Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language in the Alphabetic Tradition.* Translated by Wilfred G. E. Watson. Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1, The Near and Middle East, 67. Leiden: Brill, 2003. 2 parts: xliv, 1007 pp. Hardcover, €199.00.

Until the end of the twentieth century, the most comprehensive works on Ugaritic lexicography were the glossary in C. H. Gordon's *Ugaritic Textbook* (1965, revised reprint 1998) and J. Aistleitner's *Wörterbuch der ugaritischen Sprache* (1963, 1965). Of course, since their publications new texts have surfaced and there has been a constant stream of articles and studies devoted to Ugaritic lexicographic research and comparative linguistics. Our understanding of the Ugaritic language has immensely grown (see the recent grammars by D. Sivan [1997] and J. Tropper [2000] and the essays in the fourth chapter of the *Handbook of Ugaritic Studies* [1999]). Thus, the up-to-date *Dictionary of the Ugaritic Language* (*DUL*) fills a wide gap in Ugaritic lexicography.

DUL is the English edition of the two-volume Spanish *Diccionario de la lengua ugarítica* (*DLU*), *Aula orientalis supplementa* 7-8 (Barcelona: AUSA, 1996, 2000) that began in 1984 (cf. G. del Olmo Lete and J. Sanmartín, "A New Ugaritic Dictionary: Its Lexicographical and Semantic Structure," *Aula Orientalis* 6 [1988]:255-274, esp. 255). Appearing only a little over two years after the completion of the Spanish work, this comprehensive dictionary is now available to a wider circle of English-speaking readers, making the additional use of a Spanish-English dictionary obsolete. The two original editors, and particularly Wilfred G. E. Watson, who translated and edited the English *DUL* in an exemplary way, as well as the publishers, are to be congratulated for such a speedy materialization.

In fact, *DUL* is not merely a translation of the Spanish original. Watson was able to incorporate recent results in Ugaritic lexicography and to consistently update the bibliographic references, fulfilling the clearly stated task "to indicate the stage reached by lexical description and to serve as a reference work for later study" (vii).

With regard to bibliographic references and sources, *DUL* uses for the Hebrew *HALOT* (*DLU* uses the German *HAL*), and adds for Amorite R. S. Hess, *Amorite Personal Names* (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1993) and for Egyptian the transcription in J. E. Hoch, *Semitic Words in Egyptian Texts of the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Also included has been text material from the epigraphic collection of RS 86.-RS 92, to be published by P. Bordreuil and D. Pardee, and from J. Belmonte Marín's *Die Orts- und Gewässernamen der Texte aus Syrien im 2. Jt. v. Chr.*, RGTC 12/2 (Wiesbaden: Reichert, 2001), as well as bibliographical references to a number of works that appeared after the publication of the Spanish *DLU*. For example, *DUL* incorporates the articles in *UF* up to 32 (2000). However, the article by Dietrich and Loretz on *ma/iḫd* and *m(a/i)ḫdy* is not cited (*UF* 32 [2000]: 195-201), and some of the corrections to *CTU* published by J. Tropper and J.-P. Vita (*UF* 30 [1998]: 697-702) have not been incorporated; e.g. *DUL* refers to *maḫbt* instead of *maḫdt* in 4.14:11, or to *mkly* in 4.299:4 (although the correct *mlky* is cited under *mlky* [I] and *mlky* [II]). On the whole, *DUL* is remarkably comprehensive in its inclusion of recent literature, although a few more could have been incorporated. For example, M. Dietrich and O. Loretz, *Studien zu den ugaritischen Texten I: Mythos und Ritual*, AOAT 269/1 (Münster: Ugarit, 2000) is truly a goldmine for lexicographical information, and its glossary makes this information readily accessible.

A comparison of *DUL* with the Spanish *DLU* by means of randomly selected entries illustrates the extent of augmentation in the English edition. For example, the entry *bnš* ("man") contains the following additional material: one bibliographic reference with text reference in the heading, five additional and five corrected text references, and two bibliographic references in the main body, and three additional phrases and seven additional text references under "fragmentary context." The entry *aṯt* ("woman") contains the following additional material: one uncertain reading with text reference, three corrected text references, one corrected form, thirteen additional text references (of which seven are to one text tablet), two bibliographic references, a whole paragraph of four lines on readings in fragmentary context (two bibliographic references, seven texts, four phrases), and one comparative entry. The entry of the common verbal root *l-q-ḥ* ("to take") adds two morphological verb forms attested, six text references, one corrected text reference, and six passages in fragmentary context.

DUL comes in two parts. Part 1 contains a foreword, a list of abbreviations that includes 24 pages of bibliographical abbreviations, and the dictionary proper, covering the lexemes from *ʔ(a/i/u)* to *kẓy* (1-474); Part 2 covers the lexemes from *l* to *ẓ* (475-1007). The lexical units listed are independent morphemes (i.e., words); attached morphemes (i.e., affixes); and proper names of people, places, deities, and months. As such, *DUL* is also a Ugaritic word list with a complete inventory.

In general, there are two commonly used ordering systems of lexical items: one follows the Hebrew alphabet (e.g., *Word-List of KTU* [1996]); the other lists the transliteration symbols according to the Roman alphabet (a third one, suggested by Pardee, follows the native Ugaritic alphabetic order as attested in at least eleven alphabet tablets, but so far has not gained wide acceptance). The lexical items in *DUL* are ordered according to the Roman alphabet with the *aleph*-sign *ʔ* and the ` *ayin*-sign *ʕ* as the first two letters before *b*. The reasons provided for choosing that order are pragmatic: to emphasize the difference between Ugaritic and Hebrew, and to adopt the standard order in Akkadian, as in *CAD*. In the alphabetic order *ś* is included under *s*, *s̄* under *š*, and *⊕* under *ṯ*, which leads to the headings *s/ś*, *š/s̄*, and *ṯ/⊕*.

Nouns are entered in the absolute singular form, verbs by verbal stem. Derivatives are listed at the end of an entry. This system is a major advantage for beginning students, who would find it difficult to locate a specific word if verbs and nouns alike had been listed under a single triliteral root (for Hebraists: the organization of *DUL* is similar to *HALOT* but different from *BDB*).

The readings are based on *CTU*. Different readings are marked by the sign "(!)." It is unfortunate that *DUL* refrains from using square brackets for "certain" reconstructions. I believe that the epigraphic evidence could have been incorporated in such a way, particularly as Ugaritologists are well accustomed to this practice (cf. *CTU*).

The typical entry is arranged in two paragraphs. The entry begins with the lexical item in bold face, its grammatical category, and a gloss or glosses. After this follows the etymological and comparative data with a list of cognates, sometimes qualifying the likelihood of their relation. Since the Ugaritic text material is relatively limited, such comparative data is relevant, as it often provides the only extended context for determining the best gloss of a given lexeme. Then, selected bibliographic references are provided (a good help for further study), giving due note to views different from the one of the editors. The first paragraph ends with a list of all attested forms of the lexeme. The second paragraph is devoted to contextual verification. Here, the editors present a selection of what they consider to be the important contexts for establishing the glosses of the lexical item. Finally, any derivatives of the lexeme are listed.

By nature, a lexicon is at the same time an interpretation. It has to be expected that one cannot always agree with the choice of the authors in regard to a gloss or translation, or with their selection of important contexts. All in all, however, their decisions are reliable, and the bibliographic addition of different opinions guarantees, at least to some degree, a well-balanced nature of the lexicon.

Let me mention briefly some methodological considerations. *DUL* follows the pattern of the traditional Semitic lexicons. Such a dictionary has its place and is certainly necessary for the Ugaritic language. However, it may be noteworthy to consider also a more functional approach to lexicography. For example, *DUL* does not include syntactic analyses (e.g., with which verbs a noun is used as subject or as object, or with which nouns or prepositions a verb is used), which are at least advisable for lexemes occurring more frequently. The relation of a specific lexical item with other lexical items in a clause (syntagmatic analysis) could receive more attention. Also the organization of glosses under frequently used lexical items does not necessarily reflect a semantic analysis. A paradigmatic analysis is partly undertaken in that parallel lexemes in a poetic context are listed. However, *DUL* lacks a systematic notation of synonyms or antonyms. There is also no differentiation between the use of a word in prose texts and in poetic texts. Since the occurrences of a lexical item are not necessarily listed comprehensively in an entry, an indication of frequency would have been a helpful feature.

The layout of the dictionary leaves a few things to be desired, especially if one is used to the clearly arranged Spanish original. In *DUL* there is no additional space between the individual entries, and the hanging indent of the lemmata is barely large enough to indicate a new entry. Here, a more liberal use of space and especially the printing of the lemmata in a more distinct boldface (the boldface used is hardly distinguishable from the normal typeface) and/or in a larger font size would have facilitated a much easier and quicker overview. The type of font used is, at least for my taste, not pleasant to read, particularly because the print does not appear to be very sharp. These shortcomings regarding the layout are partly due to the small format of the volume (6" x 9.5"=15 cm x 24 cm; cf. the size of the Spanish *DLU*: 8" x 10.5"=20 cm x 27 cm). The inconsistency on the title page of part 1—the beginning lemma is given as "'(a/i/u" instead of "ʔ(a/i/u)"—catches one's eye. Somewhat unorthodox is the transliteration of the gutturals /’/ and /‘/ with the signs *ʔ* and *ʕ* (the Spanish *DLU* uses ’ and ‘). The list of abbreviations lacks the frequently used "*bkn*" (always "*bkn ctx.*") which apparently stands for "broken" and designates fragmentary readings.

DUL sets a high standard for Ugaritic lexicography. Presently, it is the most important and up-to-date lexical tool for Ugaritic studies. Not only students of Ugaritic, but also those of cognate languages (including particularly Biblical Hebrew) will tremendously benefit from it. Despite the fact that this dictionary is expensive, I highly recommend it for use in Ugaritic classes of all levels, since it is simply the best choice for serious translation. It is not difficult to foresee that *DUL* will find its firm place on the scholarly desk for years to come, even when finally the long-awaited *Ugaritisches Handwörterbuch (UHw)* is published.

Berrien Springs, Michigan MARTIN PRÖBSTLE

Goodacre, Mark. *The Case Against Q: Studies in Markan Priority and the Synoptic Problem.* Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 2002. 228 pp. Paperback, $30.00.

The author, Mark Goodacre, is Senior Lecturer in New Testament Studies in the Department of Theology at the University of Birmingham in the United Kingdom. He earned his B.A., M. Phil., and D.Phil. degrees from Oxford University. His previous publications include *Goulder and the Gospels: An Examination of a New Paradigm* (JSNTSup, 133; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) and *The Synoptic Problem: A Way Through the Maze* (The Biblical Seminar, 80; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 2001). Goodacre's study joins several recent works analyzing the hypothetical gospels source document Q (e.g., Christopher M. Tuckett's *Q and the History of Early Christianity: Studies on Q* [Edinburgh:

T. & T. Clark, 1996], Dale Allison's *The Jesus Tradition in Q* [Harrisburg, PA: Trinity Press International, 1997]; and John S. Kloppenborg Verbin's *Excavating Q: The History and Setting of the Sayings Gospel* [Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000]), yet it mounts a full-fledged scholarly assault on Q in order to challenge its very existence. While Goodacre's book is not the first to attempt to discredit the legitimacy of Q, it does represent one of the most recent, erudite, and engaging works to threaten Q's viability.

R. E. Brown recently noted that, for most readers, the issue of the tangled literary relationships among the Synoptic Gospels, known as the "Synoptic Problem," is "complex, irrelevant to their interests and boring" (*An Introduction to the New Testament*, Anchor Bible Reference Library [New York: Doubleday, 1997], 111). Goodacre is well aware of Brown's concern (105), yet he dives into the subject unafraid. His overarching goal is to demonstrate that instead of Matthew and Luke both utilizing Mark and Q in their Gospels, Luke utilized Matthew as well as Mark, but with no need of a sayings tradition such as Q. Goodacre thus joins such earlier skeptics of Q as Austin Farrer, John Drury, and Michael Goulder. The stakes are high in this debate, for the scholarly consensus is clearly on the side of those who accept the viability and usefulness of Q in understanding the literary relationships among the Synoptic Gospels.

Goodacre's work contains nine chapters and an epilogue. Most of the chapters are updated versions of scholarly essays presented and/or published elsewhere. Chapter 1 sets forth Goodacre's concerns about the emerging acceptance of Q as a "concrete entity with recognizable parameters, a Gospel that has been 'discovered,' a once-lost text that has been found" (9)—one that even has the paraphernalia of a *de facto* text with its own critical edition, synopsis, concordance, and versification system (7). Here he also introduces his concern to de-link rejection of Q with rejection of the Markan Priority hypothesis. He vigorously defends Markan Priority in chapter 2. Chapter 3 entails Goodacre's critiques of arguments in favor of Q, both those constructed positively and negatively. In chapter 4, he looks carefully at one of the pillars of the Q hypothesis—the argument that Luke's arrangement and order of material common to Luke and Matthew assumes he did not know Matthew. Here he examines what he understands to be Luke's reworking of Matthew's "Sermon on the Mount." This focus extends into chapters 5 and 6, the former of which utilizes Narrative Criticism in order to "inject some fresh life" (105) into the Synoptic Problem, and the latter of which analyzes how twentieth-century cinematic versions of the life of Jesus deal with the Sermon on the Mount in order to accomplish the same goal. Chapter 7 finds Goodacre focusing his magnifying glass on the first beatitude as it occurs in Matthew, Luke, Thomas, and Q in order to demonstrate that Luke had reason enough to write his version of this saying in light of what Matthew had already written. In chapter 8, Goodacre examines the major and minor agreements between Luke and Matthew, and in chapter 9 he explores the narrative sequence of Q 3-7 and contrasts it with Thomas in order to demonstrate that while Thomas *is* a Sayings Gospel, Q is *not*. After an epilogue in which Goodacre reflects on what life would be like without Q, the book ends with a bibliography and three indices (ancient texts, authors, and subjects).

Goodacre is well acquainted with the literature on the subject of Q, and he makes judicious use of his secondary sources in order to illustrate and clarify his arguments. On several occasions, he effectively lays out for his readers the basis for his arguments regarding the primary documents (the Synoptic Gospels, and sometimes Thomas) by placing his evidence in either a two-column or three-column format. By displaying not only the English, but often the Greek and/or Coptic in these comparative formats, he makes his points not only visually compelling but precise and easy to follow.

Goodacre wishes neither to simply attack Q proponents nor to whitewash Q skeptics. While not afraid to duel with those who disagree with him regarding Q, he is nonetheless willing to highlight their evidence and arguments when he agrees with them (cf. his observations on Christopher Tuckett's work [94-95]). Even in his "farewell" to Q, Goodacre sounds regretful if not emotional (cf. his reference to "a lump in our throats" [189]) because "it has served us well" (ibid.). At the same time, he exhibits no reticence in criticizing those who misjudge or misread the evidence, even when they oppose the concept of Q (cf. his critique of David L. Dungan's misreading of Goulder [12, n. 52]). Methodological flaws are critiqued, and persuasive evidence is highlighted—on both sides of the Q spectrum.

But one finds Goodacre typically critiquing methodological flaws used in favor of Q. He shows no patience with flawed premises (52); logical fallacies (54); misstated, inaccurate, or overlooked evidence (55, 61, 134, 146); circular arguments (55, 77, 82, 117); the use of excessive rhetoric instead of argument (78-79); and so on. Goodacre's analytical scalpel repeatedly slices up the evidence and arguments of Q proponents. But this overt and sustained approach puts the responsibility on him to avoid the same flaws, and he does not always succeed in doing so.

For instance, though I am not an advocate of Markan Posteriority, the evidence Goodacre provides to support his assertion that the dating of Matthew and Luke is "clearly post-70" (23) is unpersuasive: using words like "suggestive," "hints," "may," "perhaps," and "not conclusive" (23-25) is not the most compelling way to build a clear and conclusive case. Also, his assertion that Luke keeps Mark 13 "intact" in Luke 21 (96, n. 42) is not congruent with the evidence: the concern in Mark 13:15-16 about what those on the housetops and in the fields should do is substantially found in Luke 17:31, rather than Luke 21.

In building parts of his case to dispose of Q, the hypothetical nature of which underscores his concerns in chapter 1, Goodacre's own alternative theories, suggestive scenarios, and imaginative possibilities (cf. 89-91) seemed at times to quickly morph into conclusions. For example, Goodacre states that "we might theorize" (89) that Luke had a copy of Mark for a much longer time than he had a copy of Matthew. Yet a page later—in the conclusion to this particular section—Goodacre's "theory" takes on the dimensions of a settled conclusion: "Perhaps Luke is even more sure of Markan Priority than we are; he has known Mark for longer and it has had time to enter his bloodstream before there is any question of contamination from its interpretation by and absorption into Matthew" (90). Maybe it's easier to see, on the basis of this movement from theory to conclusion, how Q proponents can write with such certainty about the nature of Q.

I found the weakest chapter of the book to be the one in which Goodacre compares contemporary cinematic depictions of the life of Christ as support for his reading of the Synoptic Problem. Goodacre realizes that such an endeavor is questionable (121) and knows that such comparisons are not perfect (130), so he carefully sketches the goals he is aiming at in making such an analysis: opposing the trend to view the Gospels in isolation from each other, illustrating ways in which the Gospels can be reworked, and stimulating the imagination as one studies the Synoptics (122-23). I believe he is successful in realizing his goals. Nevertheless, this chapter, while stimulating to read, would work better as an appendix since it does not carry the same weight as the other chapters. It is difficult, for instance, to compare the artistic inspiration of the writers and directors of such films as *The Greatest Story Ever Told* and *The Last Temptation of Christ* (and, to a lesser degree, *Monty Python's Life of Brian*), with the literary goals of the Gospel writers. And again, arguments stemming from conjecture (e.g., "Luke, like the filmmakers, may have felt that so much direct speech all at once would be too much to keep the audience interested" [126]), do not ultimately convince.

At times it is clear that *The Case Against Q* has been written in pieces. For example, while Goodacre refers to "Q skeptics" in chapter 1 (10), he later defines what he means by the term—as if he were using it for the first time—in chapter 2 (19, n. 1). While one would not necessarily be surprised to discover such illogical sequences cropping up in a book of essays written over a period of a few years, Goodacre's work deserves further editing to make it more seamless and integrated, and, thus, more forceful.

Such editing would also correct some syntactical and/or typographical problems I encountered in reading the book. The reference, for example, to "Griesbach's Mark's alleged omissions" (28, n. 23), is not easy to understand at first glance. Also, the end of a complicated sentence ("is adjusted in *Q 4:1-13, 16*, 463, in which no doubt is recorded in the Critical Text" [174, n. 16]) at best encroaches upon incomprehensibility. As for glaring typographic errors, I found three examples: "The question that these rather limited examples of special Mark raise [*sic*] see above, is [*sic*] whether they are best regarded, . . ." (32); "The desire to look each [*sic*] of the Gospels . . ." (107); and the reference to "Luke 9:51-18" (181). Fortunately, such problems do not appear regularly.

I was surprised with another feature of the book, one that Goodacre apparently had little to do with: its price. The book, while brimming with incisive, scholarly argumentation, is not a thick work; yet $30.00 seems to be too steep a price to pay for all of its 228 pages, especially since it is a paperback.

While consensus is hard to overturn, it often becomes a target for further investigation. In this case, however, it is unlikely that Q skeptics will win over Q proponents—or vice versa—any time soon. In the context of unpacking his argument that Luke reworked Matthew's Sermon on the Mount, Goodacre states: "Yet the theory of Luke's use of Matthew makes equally as good an account of the data as does the Q theory" (97). This is part of the basic problem: the evidence can be explained in more than one way. Only time will reveal whether Goodacre's work—and the work of others who are skeptical of Q's existence—will break the consensus that currently exists.

Goodacre has provided an accessible, scholarly, and largely lucid case against the consensus on Q. It is arguably the best current work from the Q-skeptical perspective. Both scholars and nonspecialists outside the field of synoptic studies will profit from examining his evidence and arguments. I believe Brown was correct in his assessment of most readers' dismal views of the thorny Synoptic Problem. Yet Goodacre has clearly injected not only new life, but imagination, creativity, and forceful argumentation into the seemingly arcane subject of the Synoptic Problem, and his book will certainly cause a further reevaluation of the evidence and arguments used in favor of Q.

Berrien Springs, Michigan ROSS E. WINKLE

Grossmann, Peter. *Christliche Architektur in Ägypten,* Handbook of Oriental Studies, Section 1: The Near and Middle East, vol. 62. Leiden: Brill, 2002. xxxii + 792 pp. Hardcover, $161.00.

The author of this colossal work received his doctorate in the history of architecture. As a professor at the University of Karlsruhe, Germany, he is member of the German Archeological Institute in Cairo. He has published numerous articles, reports on the excavations at Abū Mīnā (1967-2000), and books dealing predominantly with the history of ancient architecture.

The main body of *Christliche Architektur in Ägypten* consists of two major parts. In six chapters and 378 pages, the author deals with the history of Christian architecture in Egypt, including architectural elements, building techniques, and other related issues.

This section is followed by a catalog of the most important ecclesiastical buildings in Egypt in topographical order from north to south (192 pages), describing and explaining 71 churches found in urban centers and villages as well as 42 monastic churches.

The main body of the book is followed by an extensive bibliography, which covers English, French, German, Greek, and Italian literature. The author's own works and reports listed there comprise more than two pages. Indices include a geographical register and an index dealing with specific items and terms. The last section of 186 pages contains 193 drawings of excavation sites—namely groups of buildings and numerous floor plans of individual buildings—plus an additional 32 photos of ancient ecclesiastical buildings in Egypt. The drawings—most of them produced by the author—reflect the most recent discoveries. Older plans were—as far as possible—verified *in situ*. These drawings and pictures are cross-referenced with the previous parts of the book.

The author feels that the Christian era of Egyptian history, including its ecclesiastical buildings, has not received as much attention as the era of the Pharaohs. With his book Grossmann wants to remedy that situation by portraying Egyptian Christian architecture from its beginning until the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In his first chapter he points to the special situation with regard to Christian architecture in Egypt. It seems that Egyptian Christians had dissociated themselves from the pagan architecture of the Pharaohs and followed the more neutral Roman-Hellenistic style. Grossmann furnishes several reasons for the scarcity of historical ecclesiastical buildings in Egypt. He also points out that in the beginning, Christianity in Egypt was divided into two rival churches, one being the official church following the Council of Chalcedon and the emperor, whereas the other church held to monophysitism. When the official church was suppressed by the Muslims, the latter became dominant, being called the Coptic Church, and received most of the church buildings formerly belonging to the Chalcedonian Church. The design of church buildings erected by the two rival churches probably did not differ much, but Grossmann believes that a distinction must be made between urban and monastic churches, a distinction which he maintains throughout his volume. The monastic churches reflected the simple lifestyle of the monks and nuns.

In chapter 2, the author deals with different types of urban and monastic churches. At the same time, he points to three historical eras which influenced Christian church buildings in Egypt. The first phase lasted from the beginning of Christianity in Egypt until the Arab invasion in the seventh century. The second phase reached from the Arab conquest until the middle of the thirteenth century. The third phase covered from the middle of the eighteenth century on. In the second phase Christians were tolerated at first, but later they were suppressed. Many Christians—especially those of the Chalcedonian Church—left Egypt. Monasteries were closed. Existing churches had to be downsized. Although some new churches were built, often it was difficult even to repair existing church buildings. New church buildings maintained the previously known architectural styles. The quality became poorer. However, a new architectural element may have been introduced, namely, the erection of a *hūrus*, a room built between the place where the congregation met and the "sanctuary" which laity was not allowed to access. A door connected both areas. In the third phase persecution of Christians led to mass conversions to Islam. Creativity decreased. Churches received more than one altar. Islamic architecture influenced Christian architecture.

In chapter 3, Grossmann deals with the different parts of Christian churches, such as narthex, atrium, naos, apsis, baptistry, and tombs. In chapter 4, he discusses building materials, building techniques, and decor; and chapter 5 focuses on the accessories needed in Egyptian Christian churches.

The longest chapter, chapter 6, explains other Christian buildings in Egypt, namely, early centers of pilgrimage, monastic architecture such as living quarters for the monks, refectories, guest houses, infirmaries, towers, and walls, as well as tombs and related buildings. The chapter also includes early Christian fortifications and houses.

Christliche Architektur in Ägypten is addressed to historians, archaeologists, experts in Coptic, and theologians. It contains a wealth of material. Not only is Christian architecture extensively and thoroughly discussed; the book also contains interesting historical sections (e.g., 63-67, 79-80, 87, 94-95), some pointing to important theological issues (e.g., baptism on pp. 137-140 and the state of the dead on 315-321). In addition, the descriptions of church buildings in Egypt also point to an understanding of Christian ecclesiology, clergy, laity, and asceticism (56, 62, 73), which lend themselves to further discussion by biblical scholars and theologians. The material presented is impressive and opens new vistas into the Coptic and Chalcedonian Egyptian Churches. The author knows his field and the current literature well. He is careful to make tentative statements and present his own opinion in the form of hypotheses, where final conclusions cannot yet be made (e.g., 55, 75, 333, 371). He acknowledges that his book is not the final word, it does not solve all problems, nor is it complete (xv-xvi); yet he is creative enough to make interesting suggestions, which in some cases may solve apparent contradictions (376-377).

The book contains some repetition (e.g., 158-159 and 193-195; 210-216, 229-231, and 404-409; 306, 365, 367). This may partially be due to the character of the approach. Some foreign terms are explained, others are not, or not sufficiently, or only later—namely, some time after the respective word has been introduced (e.g., *ambo* on p. 191; *parapetto* on 157-158; *stibadia* on 318, 331; and the *hypogē* on 323), which makes it difficult for the uninformed reader. A glossary would be helpful. On page xxxi, a map of Egypt is produced pointing to the most important sites of Christian architecture. However, the print is so fine that it cannot be read without the use of a magnifying glass. A few typos occur (e.g., 140, 180, 280, and back cover), but they are insignificant. With regard to the circular benches, it is claimed that they precede straight benches, although we do not have the respective archaeological evidence (287). Reasons for sitting in circles are introduced only later (290-291). The book ends abruptly without any conclusion or summary. Short summaries at the end of the individual chapters are also lacking. Such summaries would help the readers to follow the author more easily.

In spite of these minor deficiencies, I would warmly recommend this volume. It is an indispensable tool for all those who seriously want to study Christianity and Christian architecture in Egypt.

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Hauerwas, Stanley. *With the Grain of the Universe: The Church's Witness and Natural Theology: Being the Gifford Lectures Delivered at the University of St. Andrews in 2001*. Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001. 249 pp. Hardcover, $22.99.

For those unfamiliar with the work of Stanley Hauerwas, his most recent book, *With the Grain of the Universe*, is not a good place to start. Similarly, for readers unfamiliar with natural theology and the Gifford Lectures this book will not be attractive. But this is no fault of the author. Hauerwas, in his usual manner, lets the reader know from whence his analysis flows; he is a theological ethicist. He is quick to note, however, that he is no "proper" theologian. Thus, he prefers to refer to himself as a Christian ethicist. This distinction is important to Hauerwas since he believes all theology, all ethics, must emerge from a place of conviction, identity, and witness. Furthermore, Hauerwas introduces the reader to the lectures held in honor of Adam Lord Gifford, who died in 1887. The Gifford Lectures are held at various universities in Scotland and are devoted to the topic of natural theology. Hauerwas stands alongside the single most controversial lecturer in the history of this distinguished series, namely, Karl Barth. In 1936-1937, Barth titled his lecture "Nein!" NO! to the assertion of natural theology. In Barth's estimation, there were no grounds for establishing a knowledge of God apart from a special revelation of God. But rather than simply repeat Barth's famous exclamation these many years later, Hauerwas sets out to tell the theological story of the twentieth century. Hauerwas is keen on telling stories, and in this text he tells the story of natural theology through the lives and lectures of William James, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Karl Barth.

Natural theology, of the sort envisioned by Gifford focusing on providing "philosophically compelling arguments for the existence of God" (231), is in the context of a modern world, where it is "assumed that Christianity must be tested by standards generally accepted by the intellectual elite of the day" (87). It is not that Hauerwas (and Barth) completely reject natural theology. Hauerwas wants his lectures to remind us of Barth's notion that "natural theology is the attempt to witness to the nongodforsakenness of the world even under the conditions of sin" (20). Given the differing perspectives on what constitutes natural theology, it is no surprise that Hauerwas is critical of James's and Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures. Hauerwas's analysis of James's Gifford Lectures, later published as *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, is, I trust, accurate when he proclaims it to be "an expression of pietistic humanism" (44). This text is James's most influential work, and in it he tries to establish that the religious experience of humankind is not in the least dependent upon whether or not God actually exists. Thus the reader shouldn't be surprised that Hauerwas finds James's Gifford Lecture wholly unsatisfactory. What vexes Hauerwas, however, is that "James' world has so thoroughly become 'our' world" (85).

Hauerwas is equally critical of Reinhold Niebuhr's notions of natural theology printed under the title *The Nature and Destiny of Man*. Like James, Niebuhr assumed that the claims of Christianity must be tested by some type of rationalism. Niebuhr assumed he could bring Christian ethics into a political world (the Jamesian world) now devoid of explicit language of God and Christian community. Hauerwas shows in his analysis of Niebuhr's Gifford Lectures how much William James influenced Niebuhr's Christian "pragmatism." Niebuhr thought the Jamesian world would be accepting of the ethics of a Christian theology. If the world's evaluation of rationalist arguments for God is negative, then Niebuhr would show how an ethic derived from Christian religious experience was successful. But Hauerwas insists that the world in which Niebuhr advanced his Jamesian ethics no longer exists.

Hauerwas does not believe that our society has any more need of the "Christian veneer" that James and Niebuhr provided. This is bad news for those who still think that the "future of Christianity depends on a concordat with liberal social and political arrangements" (139). That Hauerwas now turns to Karl Barth and his Gifford Lectures is, again, no surprise. In contrast to Niebuhr's inability to offer authentic and explicit Christian theology and ethics, Barth's theology is an "unfaltering display" of thoughtful Christian speech. For Hauerwas, this unapologetic witness allows for an offering of natural theology that is true to God and meaningful for those who would maintain that what we believe actually has some bearing on who we are as persons.

I find Hauerwas's presentation of Barth's natural theology particularly interesting for Seventh-day Adventists. I have long thought that Adventist reflection on general and special revelation lends itself to a doctrine of natural theology; yet it is highly unlikely that Adventists would be inclined toward notions of natural theology of the sort forwarded by the majority of Gifford lecturers. On the other hand, if natural theology can be seen—as Hauerwas would like us to see it—as a form of witness to the God of creation, Adventists should enter the theological door which Barth and Hauerwas have opened in these Gifford Lectures.

How is natural theology a witness of this sort? I see two interconnected ways we might perceive (we should perceive) natural theology as an epistemological claim. The first point is to agree with Paul in Romans that the human who has not the benefit of the special revelation found in Scripture is capable, nonetheless, of coming to a knowledge (saving knowledge?) of God. Secondly, in order to argue a natural theology of this sort, one must hold a thoroughgoing theistic ontology that insists that God is the Creator and that Scripture is a revelation of him. I stand with Hauerwas, when he says "that natural theology makes Christian sense only as a part of the whole doctrine of God" (159). Or, as Barth would put it, all that is—including any conclusions about God by humans using human reason—is so by God's grace.

There are additional reasons why Adventists should find Hauerwas's work worth reading, and this is true of almost all of his publications: Adventists would do well to learn the art of storytelling in the deliberate manner in which Hauerwas proceeds in all his theological works. Our story is profound; it deserves to be told well, and when it is, it will serve as a witness to the God of creation. A question within the telling of our story that I would argue is yet to be resolved is whether or not our witness is found in the stream of Constantinian Christianity or its radical nonviolent counterpart.

And finally, like Hauerwas I take it that "the truthfulness of our theological convictions is inseparable from the questions of how we are to live" (22). When all is said and done, we do theology as if it matters! To engage in talk about God of the sort that natural theology insists upon "requires a transformation not only of speech itself but of the speaker" (176).

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Hengel, Martin, with Roland Deines. *The Septuagint as Christian Scripture: Its Prehistory and the Problem of Its Canon*, Old Testament Series, intro. Robert Hanhart, trans. Mark E. Biddle. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2002. xvi + 153 pp. Hardcover, $49.95.

When addressing matters of the OT that arise when studying the NT, it is customary to reference the OT directly. However, a period of some four centuries passed between the end of Malachi and the events of the NT. Outside of scholarly circles it is not commonly known that Scripture for the NT period was not directly the Hebrew Bible (HB), but the LXX, the Greek translation made in Alexandria in Egypt between about 250 B.C.E. and 150 B.C.E. that also includes some books written originally in Greek. In this volume, Hengel studies the implications of this translation becoming the resource used by Christians to access the world of Hebrew thought, our OT.

Had the NT never referenced the LXX, the latter would be studied only for its own sake as a translation at a particular time and place, and for the witness it bears to the Hebrew *Vorlage*. As it is, the NT makes frequent reference to the OT Scriptures via the medium of the Greek Bible. However, the quotations are not uniformly from one standard text. Rather, it is the equivalent of an English author variously—and at times, almost randomly—quoting Scripture from different modern translations.

The first of the book's five chapters is titled simply "A Difficult Subject" and briefly outlines issues to be dealt with in the book. The subject is "difficult" because of the paucity of available data. Hengel includes extensive footnotes throughout the volume, often quoting Greek or Latin sources directly.

The second chapter views the LXX from the perspective of a collection of (Jewish) writings taken over by Christians. The term "Septuagint" (Latin: *septuaginta* = 70) first appears in our extant witnesses in Christian writings, not Jewish. However, it is not until the time of Justin in the mid-second century C.E. that the issues surrounding the LXX came to the fore. By this time, the Greek text passed through several recensions, or editions, and no one standard text was uniformly available. It was in contact with Jews of the time that matters came to a head. Some Christians, unaware of the history of their text, were quick to blame the Jews for the differences, claiming that predictions of significance for Christians were being suppressed from the Jewish writings. Not surprisingly, one of the texts most prominent in the debate was Isa 7:14, "virgin" vs. "young woman."

Hengel is illuminating as he details the way in which the Christian church dealt with the growing concern over textual differences and traditions: Christians came to regard the LXX as inspired and inerrant, effectively putting the issues beyond debate. In the meantime, Jewish scholars such as Theodotion and Aquila (not the NT convert) retranslated the text in a more literal fashion for use by Jews.

The third chapter extends the discussion of the second chapter when it addresses the Christian OT canon in terms of what was to be included and what excluded. In the fourth and fifth centuries C.E., three great uncial manuscripts—Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, and Alexandrinus—were produced. While all of them contain Greek translations of the HB, there are differences in order and in terms of which books of the Apocrypha are included. All of the writings from the biblical period extant in the Rabbinic period were included in the HB, but not all of the surviving noncanonical Jewish books quoted or referenced in the NT were included in the LXX.

The fourth chapter addresses what would be the first or one of the first topics discussed when writing from the viewpoint of an OT or LXX scholar: the origins of the LXX. Here Hengel deals with whether the Letter of Aristeas, a basically apocryphal document written to promote the fledgling Greek translation, made it worthy of consideration in place of the HB for Greek-speaking diaspora Jews. The letter does yield the information that the initial translation was only of the Pentateuch and was based on Palestinian manuscripts (e.g., as opposed to those from Babylon).

The final chapter addresses how the Christian church ended up with the forty-nine books (plus the additions to the book of Daniel) found in the LXX today. As Hengel points out, the issues are ultimately insolvable, since much critical information is no longer available. In light of this, Hengel concludes with an important question: "Does the church still need a clearly demarcated, strictly closed Old Testament canon, since the New Testament is, after all, the 'conclusion', the goal and the fulfillment of the Old?" For him, the answer is found in the words of Jesus: "The Law and the Prophets are until John," about which he observes, "We simply cannot go any further back" (126), i.e., the Christian OT canon should at least include all the documents quoted in the NT.

Included in the volume is an Introduction to the history of the LXX text, written by LXX scholar Robert Hanhart. I have left mentioning it until now even though it comes first in the book, since most readers will find it provides too much information too soon. Reading it is much like arriving several weeks late for a graduate seminar in an unfamiliar area of study.

Given the high level of scholarship manifest, I am surprised to see the author repeatedly accepting uncritically the role of the so-called Council of Jamnia as a step in establishing the canon of the HB. It is over two decades now since this construct was critically evaluated and found wanting.

This volume deserves careful consideration by both NT and LXX scholars: by the former, because all too often the LXX is overlooked as a link in the chain between the NT and the OT; by the latter, since the quotations in the NT are an important, even complex, witness to the ongoing development of the LXX text. Also students of both disciplines as well as students of early church history will find the book beneficial. I leave the (informed) layperson last, because it is not easy reading but offers much in terms of understanding how the question of canon was addressed, should one have the patience to persist.

Loma Linda, California BERNARD TAYLOR

Hunter, Cornelius G. *Darwin's God: Evolution and the Problem of Evil.* Grand Rapids: Brazos, 2001. 192 pp. Hardcover, $17.99.

Cornelius G. Hunter is a recent graduate of the University of Illinois Center for Biophysics and Computational Biology. He is also the author of *Darwin's Proof: The Triumph of Religion over Science* (Brazos, 2003). As an advocate of the Intelligent Design movement, Hunter joins ranks with Phillip Johnson, Michael Behe, and William Dembski.

Hunter proposes that evolution is a reaction against a particular view of God. Thus evolution is a metaphysical, rather than a scientific, argument. He demonstrates this contention by discussing the main points of Darwin's argument for evolution, then shows how each of these points hinges on metaphysical arguments (chaps. 2-4). Thus, for him, "evolution is neither atheism in disguise nor is it merely science at work" (8).

Hunter proposes in chapter 1 that Darwin was influenced by Milton's characterization of God in *Paradise Lost.* Milton dealt with the problem of moral evil by distancing God from his creation. Darwin, Hunter contends, carried this separation of God further by making God unnecessary to his creation. God could not be responsible for either moral or natural evil because he was not directly responsible for the process of creation. Rather, natural laws governed the development of life and, in fact, were the source of evil.

In chapters 2 through 4, Hunter examines the three primary evidences for Darwin's evolutionary theory: comparative anatomy, small-scale evolution, and the fossil record. He then examines problems with this evidence and concludes each chapter with the metaphysical attributes inherent in Darwin's arguments. He demonstrates that Darwin's theories were centered around the problem of God and providence. For instance, he notes that two metaphysical arguments are embedded in Darwin's understanding of comparative anatomy. First, God would never repeat a pattern in his creation of the species, and second, evolution is proved to be true by the process of elimination. God would not create a world where evil exists and where there are many quandaries present among organisms; thus evolution is proven true on the basis of negative theology. Hunter believes that the use of such negative theology underlies all of evolutionary theory.

In his discussion of Darwin's understanding of small-scale evolution, Hunter finds three metaphysical arguments. First, Darwin brought about the downfall of Linnaeus's fixity and essentiality of the species by legitimatizing the notion that new species are regularly created by unguided natural forces. A second metaphysical problem that emerged out of Darwin's small-scale evolutionary theory was that God is not a micromanager. It was impossible to believe that God would bother to create such a menagerie of different species. The third metaphysical problem that Hunter deals with in chapter 3 is that the "evidence for evolution incorporates religious ideas" (63). He points out that evolutionists from Darwin to the present use their arguments directly against the doctrine of divine creation. Thus "evolutionists' rebuttals to creation, though cloaked in scientific terms, are metaphysical because they hinge on one's doctrine of God and creation" (64).

Finally, Hunter examines the metaphysical arguments imbedded in Darwin's interpretation of the fossil record. God would not have made a world with so many different types of species; nor would God have allowed the vast majority of these species to result in extinction. He contends that "evolutionists are using nonscientific arguments for evolution. Their arguments rely on an unspoken premise about the nature of God and how God would go about creating the world" (84). Thus, "some people find extinctions troubling because they focus on God's benevolence. Others can just as easily interpret extinctions as a result of the futility to which creation has been subject" (84). Therefore, he views Darwin's conclusion to be that it is "better to line species up in a sequence and ascribe it to natural law. If God cannot do it, then nature can. And the new view is so convincing because the old view is so untenable. . . . Evolution is a fact for the simple reason that the alternative, modernism's divine creation, is not considered viable" (84). The modern solution to the problem of evil and what to do about God's part in it, is to effectually separate God from creation and to accept evolutionary theory because creation is impossible.

In chapter 5, Hunter argues that Darwin's metaphysical arguments have continued to the present. In his examination of five evolutionists (Joseph Le Conte [1888], H. H. Lane [1923], Arthur W. Lindsey [1952], Sir Gavin de Beer [1964], and Verne Grant [1991]) who have attempted to *prove* that evolution is "undeniably true," Hunter shows that the metaphysical foundations of evolution have remained stable since Darwin. Hunter believes that stability has been maintained because the popular understanding of God has not changed significantly from Darwin's day. Further, he contends that evolutionists are not responsible for this picture of God; "it was, rather, formed over many centuries, long before Darwin was ever born" (113).

In chapter 6, Hunter then describes the belief in God that laid the foundation for Darwin's theory of evolution. He discusses how the attempt to explain creation scientifically led to the belief that God created the world through secondary means via natural laws. David Hume overthrew natural theology through his rejection of miracles. Hume believed that the principle of cause and effect excluded any "interference of supernatural transcendent powers and that therefore there is no 'miracle' in this sense of the word. Such a miracle would be an event whose cause did not lie within history" (Hume, cited on p. 120). Thus God was placed outside of history, uninvolved and inefficient in regard to the development of human history. Hunter then turns to the problem of evil, showing that the nature of God was first questioned under the rubric of moral evil and then natural evil. The development of a theodicy became necessary for many, such as Leibniz, because it was felt that the actual realities found through scientific discovery were in conflict with popular conceptions about the character of God. Hunter contends that the shift in understanding that occurred in regard to creation and the problem of evil during this period laid the foundation for Darwin's evolutionary theory.

In chapter 7, Hunter discusses how, "in the nineteenth century, the opinion among intellectuals that God was superfluous in philosophy and science grew from a minority position to the consensus" (127). He points to three major problems that contributed to the development and acceptance of evolutionary theory: rational theism, uniformitarianism, and the problem of evil. Rationalistic theism came as a result of a human-centered outlook that permeated much of nineteenth-century religious thought. "Amidst this milieu of religious thought, two important themes are discernible in the writings of Darwin and his fellow naturalists: Gnosticism and natural theology" (129).

Gnosticism contended that God is separate from his creation (a trend, Hunter proposes, already developing in modern theology in the writings of Milton, Leibniz, and others). Natural theology rationalized God through the use of logical proofs for his existence. Uniformitarianism came out of the earlier understanding that God had created no new species after his initial creative act. This idea then grew into the modern notion that creation is stable with fixed, predictable laws. Thus when organisms with apparent disparities were found in nature, the protest was that the God of rational theism would not have created such a world. As scientific discoveries were made that seemed to show quandaries between the picture of a benevolent and loving Creator and the presence of natural evil, evolutionary theory began to have more presence among scholars. Darwin's theory of evolution was successful, Hunter proposes, because he was the first to provide a scientific answer to the problem of evil.

In chapter 8, Hunter shows the relationship of evolution to metaphysics. Throughout the book, Hunter builds his argument by showing that Darwin's theory came from a metaphysical, rather than a scientific, stimulus: the desire to separate God from the problem of evil and to protect God's benevolent character from the quandaries found in scientific discovery. In chapter 8, he specifically addresses the metaphysical problem. Darwin's theory, now with the scientific stamp of approval, moved from the minor leagues to major consensus within a relatively short period of time. However, Hunter contends, with every effort to separate God from creation, and even to declare God not only unnecessary but dead (Nietzsche), the central problem that evolutionary theory deals with is God. This, he affirms, is strictly against the scientific method, which separates metaphysics and nature, making them mutually exclusive from one another. Evolutionary theory, on the other hand, appeals to science to solve the metaphysical problem of God's existence and action in the world. To add insult to injury, Hunter believes, evolutionists generally refuse to acknowledge the metaphysical foundations upon which evolutionary theory is built.

Hunter concludes his book with an examination of the "blind presuppositionalism" of evolutionary theory. Thus his task in the chapter is to examine "the various responses to evolution and how they can be understood in terms of their treatment of evolution's presuppositions" (163). He believes that it is important to understand the presuppositions that lie behind any theory. He notes that evolution is an interesting case study, "not as a model of how objective knowledge might be arrived at, but as a model of how subtle the use of presupposition can be" (162). Further, he contends that the theory of evolution "relies on the belief that God never would have created the world as we find it" (162-163). He shows how evangelicals, such as Warwick and van Til, have been influenced by evolution and how this influence has subsequently affected their theology, especially in regard to their understandings of God. Hunter's final thought is that "we need to understand the metaphysical interpretations that are attached to the scientific observations. We need to understand these things because, ultimately, evolution is not about the scientific details. Ultimately, evolution is about God" (175).

Hunter's presentation in *Darwin's God* is concise and to the point. Rather than wandering through unnecessary criticisms of evolutionary theory, he sticks to his main point and provides documentation to support his theory. His easy-to-read style makes the book acceptable for introductory college courses and for those without extensive study in the physical sciences. However, his ability to present an easy read does not detract from the book's scholarly potential. For all of Hunter's easy-reading style, there is a subtle (or perhaps, not so subtle) turning of the evolutionary argument back on itself. Hunter demands that evolution stick within its own self-ascribed laws of scientific method. Further, he makes frequent use of the Leibnizian (Aristotelean) law of contradiction, in which one must assume the meaning of something in order to deny it; otherwise the denial would be meaningless (i.e., Hunter challenges the evolutionary claim that God does not involve himself directly in the creative process, if indeed he exists at all. If one assumes that God does not exist, then one must have assumed that God did exist, because otherwise the notion of God would not be an issue at all). Once again, Hunter forces evolutionists to reexamine their arguments and to acknowledge the Leibnizian (and other) presuppositions that bolster their beliefs, and to move on to surer and (if truly scientific, less religious) foundations than those upon which evolutionary theory is currently based. To argue against divine creation, Hunter contends, is ultimately a religious, metaphysical idea. To support it, then, with scientific evidence is a contradiction of scientific methodology, which clearly distinguishes between the metaphysical and the physical. Thus, evolution is not atheism, nor is it science.

I recommend this book as a valuable source tool for better understanding the hermeneutical issues behind evolutionary theory.

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Johnson, Phillip E. *The Right Questions: Truth, Meaning and Public Debate.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002. 191 pp. Paper, $16.00.

Phillip Johnson, dean of the Intelligent Design (ID) movement, has been portrayed as leader of a nefarious conspiracy to undermine science teaching in American public schools. Barry Palevitz huffs that IDers like Johnson "have a strategy that would make any conspiracy maven drool" ("Intelligent Design Creationism: None of Your Business? Think Again," *Evolution* 56/8 (2002): 1718-1720). Barbara Carroll Forrest and Paul Gross have written a whole book "exposing" Johnson's "Wedge strategy" complete with secret memos from the Discovery Institute (*Evolution and the Wedge of Intelligent Design: The Trojan Horse Strategy* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003]). Ironically, all this hyperbole is directed at a movement that is transparently open in its goal to liberalize science and science education from constraints imposed by materialist dogma.

There is no clandestine ID agenda and certainly no reason to search for secret memos by the conspirators involved; from the start Johnson has been open about the "Wedge strategy." For all the details, any interested party can consult his highly readable book *The Wedge of Truth: Splitting the Foundations of Naturalism* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2000). If there is a plot and Johnson is leading it, it is one of the most poorly concealed conspiracies in history. In *The Right Questions,* Johnson continues the open discussion characteristic of his previous writings. This is a good thing for those interested in clear thinking about the origin of life, as concealing Johnson's sharp-edged wisdom on this and related topics in conspiratorial secret memos would be a tragedy.

The thesis of *The Right Questions* is simple. When controversial topics are discussed, the right questions must be asked before constructive dialogue can occur. In no area of intellectual life is this principle truer than in the current debate over the origin of life. However, Johnson does not restrict his questions to quibbling details about what may or may not be at certain strata in the fossil record, or whether nature is capable of producing molecular machines. Instead, he deals with questions that his career as a professor of law at UC Berkeley has uniquely prepared him to address. In this book, among other subjects, he tackles the right questions about logic and the right questions about truth and liberty. When addressing these broad questions, Johnson uses his expertise as a logician and trial lawyer to bring into sharp focus the issues involved and expose fuzzy thinking. For most readers this will be both enlightening and uncomfortable. Johnson is not so much providing answers as he is teaching how to think.

Those familiar with Johnson's recent stroke may have cause to wonder whether he is physically capable of teaching others how to think. Readers of *The Right Questions* will quickly discover that, if anything, the brilliance of Johnson's mind shines through more clearly in this book than in his more detailed analysis of Darwinian arguments in books such as *Darwin on Trial* (2d ed. [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1993]).

Each chapter of *The Right Questions* is a case study in clear thinking that quickly penetrates to core issues while avoiding superficially simple approaches to problem solving. For example, in a chapter entitled "The Word of God in Education," Johnson investigates the right questions about the religious foundations of education. Johnson asks:

> Should a college education prepare students to understand the ultimate purpose or meaning for which life should be lived and to choose rightly from among the available possibilities? Alternatively, should this subject be left out of the curriculum on the ground that the choice among ultimate purposes involves only subjective preferences and not knowledge? (68).

These profound questions should be carefully answered before addressing questions of curriculum or teaching pedagogy. Once addressed, the general aspects of what should be taught and how it should be taught naturally follow. Johnson, with good reason, claims that subsequent decisions are likely to be more logically coherent, but does not pretend that the consequences will be uncontroversial. He explicitly points out that explaining to constituents why bad ideas should be taught at Christian schools may be difficult. When teaching evolution in Christian schools, this was certainly my own experience. And yet, if we believe that education is about "prepar[ing] students to understand the ultimate purpose or meaning for which life should be lived and to choose rightly from among the available possibilities," then students must be exposed to the strengths and weaknesses of all possibilities. As Johnson puts it: "The way to deal with timidity and self-deception in Christian education is not to try to prevent bad ideas from being taught but rather to ensure that the bad ideas are effectively countered by better ideas in an atmosphere of open deliberation" (59). I believe that every Christian parent, teacher, principal, and school board member should read this chapter. After completing the book, I would add only that it would be a loss for anyone who only stopped at the education chapter; there is so much more.

Trying to represent and critique the questions and arguments raised by Johnson is an almost impossible task in a review. *The Right Question* is a short book and easy reading, yet it seems to effortlessly concentrate vast quantities of wisdom into its fewer than 200 pages. Perhaps even more amazing, only 161 pages were written by Johnson. There is a bonus that should not be missed at the beginning of the book: Nancy Pearcey, possibly the best contemporary evangelical Christian writer, wrote the Foreword. Readers seeking to gain the full benefit of *The Right Questions* will not skip over her profound insights.

Issues discussed in *The Right Questions* are thought-provoking and wide-ranging, but readers seeking a detailed critique of evolutionary theory will be disappointed. On the other hand, those seeking fresh and logical approaches to the issues raised by Darwinian thinking and its materialist underpinnings will be greatly rewarded. Because of this, *The Right Questions* represents profitable reading for both experts in the sciences and those pastors, teachers, citizens, and parents who are interested in the impact of materialist thinking and ways it may be addressed in our culture.

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Kennard, Douglas Welker, ed. *The Relationship Between Epistemology, Hermeneutics, Biblical Theology and Contextualization: Understanding Truth.* Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1999.

The Relationship Between Epistemology, Hermeneutics, Biblical Theology and Contextualization was written "to forge a way through the morass of options to develop a positive theory for both understanding and living truth" (i). *The Relationship* emerged from a series of discussions about the issue of the relationship of epistemology, hermeneutics, and contextualization, jointly engaged in by the Evangelical Theological Society and the Evangelical Missiology Society at the 1997 Midwest regional meetings. The book was edited by Douglas Welker Kennard of Moody Bible Institute, who also contributed three chapters, Harold A. Netland, Grant R. Osborne, and David J. Hesselgrave, all of Trinity Evangelical Divinity School.

Osborne designates the hermeneutical stance of the authors by rejecting poststructuralism, deconstructionism, and postmodernity, and by organizing hermeneutics under the rubric of critical realism (i). This organization is done by bringing together the locutionary (the propositional side), illocutionary (what the text accomplishes), and the perlocutionary (the effect it produces) in theology, philosophy, and missiology in an attempt to move from theory to practice. Further epistemology, critical realism, and hermeneutics come together to form "an ethics of reading that moves from the claims of the author in a text to the needs of the readers as they study the text," i.e., contextualization (ii).

Following the pattern of Luke ("having investigated everything carefully from the beginning to write it out for you in consecutive order," 1:4), the authors begin with the premise that "the Biblical text is concerned about truth and that the reader understand this truth in accurate, consecutive, and warranted ways" (1). Thus, the authors attempt to bring a progressive examination of the "hermeneutical maze" by beginning with epistemological concerns, moving to hermeneutics, and then going on to the issue of contextualization. Kennard and Hesselgrave approach the topic primarily from the perspective of Biblical Theology, while Netland and Osborne believe that the interpreter's tradition provides the frame for understanding issues and texts. "Neither view denies the other" (2).

In chapter 1, Kennard probes the "distinctive epistemological tools available to the premodern, modern, and postmodern thinker" (2), providing illustrations from theology, music, art, literature, science, psychology, and hermeneutics. Kennard demonstrates how concepts of experience (both scientific and spiritual) have displaced the intellectual, cognitive hermeneutics of premodernity and, further, how this has affected definitions of reality, cosmology, theism, and the interpretation of Scripture. His table, "Characteristics of Intellectual Stages," provides a useful summary of his survey of philosophy.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INTELLECTUAL STAGES

Premodern	***Modern***	***Postmodern***
Established communal faith	Individual epistemology	Individual epistemology
Fideistically confident	Rationally confident	Rationally skeptical
Naive realism	Empirical naturalism	Phenomenalism
God's order is inherently good	Knowledge is inherently good	Knowledge can be used for evil
Unified in communal truth under God and king	Culture is unified under social contract and pragmatic workability	Relativism fragmenting culture with increasing alienation

Divine right of kings	Republic	Contextualized democracy or anarchy
God structures creation	Evolution is inevitable	Increasing pessimism to surmount the magnitude of life's problems
Science is a higher activity which ordinary life subserves	Science should benefit ordinary life	The lack in science needs a transcendental object
Church calling is special	Increased status of lay, especially the scientist	Increased status of cultural heroes (e.g. actors, athletes, etc.) who can draw you into their mythical lives
Romanticism with God	Romanticism with the transcendent	Romanticism with self as transcendent
Biblical law funds ethics	Hedonism funds communal utilitarianism	Existentially choose your own morality as a self-fulfiller
Obedience begets divine blessing	Natural order establishes personal freedom, dignity, commitment & rights	My personal space is my right

Kennard calls for a "moderate foundationalism in the spirit of Alvin Plantinga's Reformed epistemology but with the modern foundations and epistemic tools being appraised by what they can reliably provide" (3, 58). He proposes a three-part "holistic epistemology" that builds upon important hermeneutical components of the premodern, modern, and postmodern eras. From the premodern period, Kennard retains the recognition of the "communities of faith in God" and the Bible as being the "primary authority for our lives" (31). Thus, the interpretation of Scripture requires the reader "to think in the thought forms of the Biblical authors intertextual to them and not primarily our own traditions" and, simultaneously, to "value our own traditions and communities of faith as a historical and interactive guide but not to the extent that it inhibits honest study, dialog and proclamation grounded in warranted epistemic means" (31).

From the modern perspective, Kennard calls for allowing "each epistemic tool to contribute the warrant it reliably can" (31). Thus, "rational self-evidence can provide some foundations," e.g., self-existence, basic logical categories, and speech. Kennard notes that the modern period is also known for its passion, due to the influence of Romanticism. This passion may be translated into a deep conviction as believers live out their beliefs about God. Finally, testimony, as a derivative of experience, "recognizes and trusts in narrative in the Biblical text and from each others' lives" (32).

Finally, Kennard proposes that postmodernity "reminds us of our existential situation in a complex world" (33). He notes that "existentialism and language games sensitize us to our own context, intellectual heritage, and to the need to communicate in ways that deal with our deepest issues, and are understandable and attractive to the audience who hears us. Then we can woo them to truth" (33). However, Kennard warns that "complexity should temper the optimism of grand solutions" (33). But while simplified answers should not be a part of biblical scholarship, "postmodernism also reminds us of the playfulness of being engaged in a discipline which fits us as individuals and one that we pursue with passion" (33).

Kennard examines the correlation between faith and knowledge in chapter 2.

Continuing his understanding that experience and knowledge must work in tandem, he examines how the relationship between faith and knowledge has progressively changed throughout Christian history. He first categorizes epistemic approaches into fideism (Tertullian, Damian, Luther, and Hare), faith seeking understanding (Augustine, Anselm, Kant, and Hegel), simultaneous faith and knowledge (Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Austin, James, and Plantinga), understanding in order to believe (Aquinas), and knowledge as justified true belief (Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Descartes, Locke, Russell, and Positivitism). Kennard notes, however, that after carefully categorizing the spectrum of stated epistemological positions there are, in the end, really only two primary epistemic categories: simultaneous faith and knowledge, into which he places Tertullian, Damian, Luther, Hare, Augustine, Anselm, Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, Austin, James, Plantinga, Aquinas, Descartes, and Locke. The second category is that of knowledge as justified true belief, in which he places Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, Descartes, Anselm, Locke, Russell, and Positivism. Kennard believes these differentiations in epistemological approaches are important, "for this relationship frames a methodology that has great impact on how one will approach anything in one's world view" (36). He argues that "if a person is properly functioning, then faith and knowledge are largely synonymous," and "neither [faith nor knowledge] has priority over the other, but rather they are simultaneous" (36).

In part 2 of chapter 2, Kennard pursues Austin's (*How to Do Things with Words*) and Wittgenstein's (*Philosophical Investigations*) contentions that "ordinary usage of the language of knowledge and faith will show that they are synonyms" (36). Kennard notes that at times "belief is knowledge in that it reflects conventions" (62); however, "there is a fluidity in knowledge and belief. Some things I now know I used to only believe. . . . Some further things I now only believe, I once used to know. . . . With increased time and experience reinforcing awareness, faith may increase in confidence to become knowledge, and with time and experience clouding awareness, knowledge may lose confidence, leaving faith" (62-63). This, however, is not to say that faith is only mere confidence, so that faith and knowledge have no priority over one another.

In part 3, Kennard examines the biblical evidence for the parameters of faith and knowledge. He examines the several words translated "faith" and "knowledge" in Scripture by exploring each word's range of semantic field and its implications for theological methodology. His final definition for faith is "trust in someone and what he promises because he has demonstrated himself to be trusted, and a conscientious loyalty to this trust" (69). Knowledge is defined as "to have cognition, acquaintance, discernment or experience of evidenced data and a consistent application of this data" (ibid.). Thus there is a balance between "faith seeking understanding" and "understanding in order to believe." Kennard concludes that "faith and knowledge to a great extent are synonymous as evidenced by: (1) A Biblical Theology use of the terms in the context of salvation and Christian Life, and (2) An examination of the epistemic starting points (e.g., what reason do you have for accepting your basic beliefs? What assumptions do you make for your basic knowledge claims?" (69).

Harold Netland combines philosophy and practical missionary experience in the formation of his apologetical approach. He formulates criteria of consistency or noncontradiction in aiding the apologetical task of crossing religious and cultural boundaries: (1) "A statement that is self-contradictory is false. If two or more statements are mutually contradictory, or entail further statements which are contradictory, at least one of the statements must be false"; and (2) "if a worldview or perspective on reality entails that ultimately there is no real distinction between good and evil, right and wrong, then we have good reason to reject that perspective as false" (4). Netland calls for creativity and sensitivity in conducting cross-cultural apologetics. What may speak eloquently to one culture may be meaningless or even offensive to another. Knowing what a particular culture's beliefs, customs, social structure, and attitudes are will help apologists to reframe the argument while retaining the true spiritual message intended by the Bible writers. He suggests several ways of accomplishing this task: "One must be sensitive to the particular issues relevant to a given context," "the means of persuasion that are appropriate will vary from context to context," "the apologist must earn the right to be heard," and "the apologist must be careful to avoid being identified with symbols of oppression and power" (92).

Grant R. Osborne examines postmodern hermeneutics by tracing postmodernity's development in Heidegger, Gadamer, Ricouer, structuralism, semiotics, and deconstruction. Then he examines the effect of postmodern thought on culture and its ripple effect through evangelicalism. He concludes that "evangelicalism must engage in an intellectual war" (4).

Osborne believes that the postmodern tendency toward tolerance has produced a negative effect in society. Because there is no ultimate truth, respect comes through the simultaneous tolerance of one another's individual beliefs, with the result of pluralism. Osborne notes that the evangelical church has struggled with the insurgence of liberalism, with a particularly telling blow occurring at the Scopes "monkey trial." In the aftermath of disappointment, conservative evangelical scholars were not, initially, allowed to express their views in meaningful dialogue with liberal scholars. Then later, when opportunities did avail themselves, they were too slow to react. Philosophical material written in the 1960s in support of postmodernity were not responded to by conservatives until the 1980s. However, Netland concludes, in spite of the slow start, conservatives have made a strong comeback in the form of such scholars as F. F. Bruce, I. H. Marshall, and Leon Morris.

Osborne concludes his chapter by examining the negatives of postmodern influence on the church. Beginning with what he refers to as "an inadvertent surrender to the prevailing culture," he notes seven areas where a postmodern shift may be seen in evangelicalism: "the ascendance of pragmatism as the primary governing rod that determines church strategy," "the triumph of secularism has weakened the impact of the church on society," "a sad and incredible increase in biblical illiteracy," "a concomitant decline in biblical preaching and teaching," "relevance has replaced biblical mandates," "the power of possessions has turned all too many Christians into rampant materialists," "the decline of the evangelical academy has helped foster the lack of biblical and theological depth in the Church" (108-112). He notes that "the result is a new wave of pastors unable to do serious theological reflection or search the Scriptures adequately to answer the controversies of our day. Once again, postmodernism has made it easier to replace truth with pragmatics, to laud praxis while ignoring theory" (112).

Osborne then proposes that the answer to postmodernity is to "seize the day" (112). First, the church must "go to war" with postmodernity by acknowledging that while a postmodern first reading of the text has a "formative place in interpretation," interpretation cannot stop there, but must proceed to an examination of grammar, semantics, and background. Therefore, pure pragmatism must be replaced with biblical theology and secularism must be defeated by revival. There is a need to return to the Bible and for Bible-centered or expository preaching. In addition, the church can be culturally relevant without being culture-bound. The path of contextualization and materialism finds its best solution in radical discipleship. Finally, the evangelical academy needs to lead the church by finding the proper balance between academics and practical concerns.

Kennard proposes that the task for accomplishing a revolution within the church is an integration of the epistemological and hermeneutical concerns outlined thus far. He does this by developing a hybrid methodology based on a Ricouerian "existential sensitivity that helps the reader feel placed in a story in order to obtain shared passion, motivation, self understanding and self possibilities from the symbols experienced," and a Thiseltonian approach that "shows itself through a critical realist's spiral (like a Pierceian pragmatism with a textual empiricism) within the authorial context from contextual overviews (like Biblical theology) to textual particulars." Out of this approach, Kennard develops a three-level process of interpretation, in which all the levels operate simultaneously. In level one (existential), the reader feels placed in the story by familiar relationships, traditions, and similar experiences. This prompts in the reader a shared passion and motivation and opens the door to self-understanding and self-possibilities. In level 2 (hermeneutical spiral within authorial context), the authorial context moves from contextual overviews to textual particulars, which clarifies the meaning of the text. The goal in this level is to understand the text in the same way in which the author and original audience did. To the extent that the meaning is clear, coherent, and has textual support, the reader can be assured that he or she has obtained the author's interpretation and application. In level 3 (spiral between contexts), the hermeneutical task is to move from the horizon of the text to that of the reader. This calls for the exclusion of any assumptions, understandings, or possibilities that are foreign to the text and gaining those that are appropriate to the text. Kennard concludes that "proper hermeneutics is our responsibility; do not try to do the task with too simplistic a methodology" (148).

The final primary chapter in the book brings the discussion of contextualization and biblical theology to a climax. Hesselgrave begins the chapter by defining his horizon. Three important terms that aid this process are "contextualization" ("the process of making God's revelation of his person and plan as revealed in the Old and New Testaments understandable to the people of a given culture with a view to making it possible for them to respond to it in a meaningful way" [6]), "biblical theology" ("that type of theology that deals with the words and acts of God in history as they are revealed in the Old and New Testaments with a view to displaying their progression, meaning and significance" [158]), and "culture" ("the ways in which any given group of people go about the task of thinking, acting and interacting in order to solve problems related to living" [158]).

Hesselgrave next uncovers four areas of preunderstanding that form the foundation of contextualization: conceptions of knowledge required for Christian contextualization, the nature of the Christian mission, conceptions of the Bible, and notions of culture and its role in Christian contextualization. Out of these preunderstandings, he develops five axiomatic propositions, in which Christian contextualization is concerned not only with the nature of Scripture, but also its function as God's Word; it recognizes that the Bible in and of itself "constitutes the most needful and effective contextualization of the Christian gospel"; that the starting point of Christian contexualizing is the Bible and Biblical Theology; "that the Bible must be allowed to determine its own priorities, set its own agenda, and unfold its own plan"; and that the Bible in its entirety must be communicated (163-172).

Out of his preunderstandings and axioms, Hesselgrave develops a procedure for contextualization. He begins by "drawing attention to the Bible itself" (173). This is accomplished by considering the type of book it is, by explaining its importance, and by modeling a proper usage of it. A second procedure is to allow Scripture to unfold chronologically as the primary context for the gospel message. Hesselgrave gives precedence to biblical narrative in the process of contextualization and advises making full use of pictures, drawings, charts, drama, and other art forms to more fully explicate the meaning of Scripture. He also calls for the function of the church as a "hermeneutical community." This does not mean that individual study is to be done away with, but there is an interpretational need, as well as spiritual and social ones, for the community to come together to study the Bible. Finally, he proposes the integration of all learning with a study of the biblical text. The scientific method, which has compartmentalized areas of study and effectually separated the metaphysical and physical, has resulted in the fragmentation of knowledge.

In spite of all the difficulties in crossing religious, philosophical, and cultural boundaries, Hesselgrave concludes that the ultimate task of Christian contextualization is to make God's Word known to all people in all cultures.

The book concludes with a brief review, once again reiterating the need for a proper biblical hermeneutic and correct cultural understandings, and for the coming together of hermeneutical community.

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Lingenfelter, Judith E., and Sherwood G. Lingenfelter. *Teaching Cross-Culturally: An Incarnational Model for Learning and Teaching.* Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003. 134 pp. Paper, $12.99.

The Lingenfelters, a husband-and-wife team, bring to this volume appropriate credentials. Both have doctoral degrees in the subject area, and both are currently teaching: Judith at Biola University, Sherwood at Fuller Theological Seminary. Both have extensive experience in cross-cultural teaching at home and abroad. This is Sherwood's fourth book on the interplay of culture and mission published by Baker (*Ministering Cross-Culturally*, 1986; *Transforming Culture*, 1992, rev. 1998; *Agents of Transformation*, 1996).

The intended audience is "the western-trained educator who is working or planning to work in a non-western school setting or in a multicultural school or university in a major city of North America" (9). The authors set out their goals: to "help teachers understand their own culture of teaching and learning" (9), "to equip teachers to become effective learners in another cultural context" (10), and to enjoy the experience. This they do "using the perspective of Scripture and faith in Jesus Christ" (10).

Throughout the book, the Lingenfelters urge cross-cultural teachers to become "150-percent people"—75 percent culture of birth and 75 percent culture of ministry (22-23). Telling their own story, they show how this can be done.

Each culture has its own agenda for learning, and each has its traditional way of teaching and learning. Solutions from one culture do not solve the problems of another culture. What works in my group will probably not work for those, even in my own place, who have different cultural traditions. While some learn by observation and imitation, others learn by doing. For some, rote learning is *the* style, while others insist on questioning and discussion. In some cultures, students learn in a group; in others, learning is individual.

The definition of intelligence varies from culture to culture. In a Zambian tribal group, intelligence encompasses "wisdom, cleverness, and responsibility" (62). The Lingenfelters note how Gardner's seven different kinds of intelligence are valued differently in different cultural groups.

Teachers are variously seen as facilitators, authority figures, parents, or outsiders. But all teachers should teach for change. While we need cultural stability, as Christians "we seek to measure our lives and ministries against the standards set forth" by Jesus (89). Thus, we cannot conform to certain cultural patterns. One of the most powerful tools for achieving change is experiential learning, which involves doing and reflecting (90).

Efforts to teach well may be hindered by false expectations about resources, curriculum, testing, visual learning, status, and planning. The novice at cross-cultural teaching needs to face these and devise coping mechanisms, not judging but using "the fundamental principle of a loving relationship—ask, seek, and knock" (111).

The final chapter presents suggestions for becoming an effective Christian, cross-cultural teacher. Important among these are those that indicate ways of creating a place for oneself in the community, finding fellowship with locals, and coping with culture shock.

The book is a readable combination of scholarship (in-text references and bibliography) and story (the authors' own and that of others). Each chapter closes with research and reflection questions. Useful figures help to visualize information presented.

From my perspective of years of international teaching, the Lingenfelters are right on target. Those planning to teach cross-culturally—especially those who wish to do so from a Christian perspective—would do well to carefully study this delightful and useful volume.

Yucaipa, California NANCY JEAN VYHMEISTER

Maier, Harry O. *Apocalypse Recalled: The Book of Revelation after Christendom.* Minneapolis: Fortress, 2002. xvi + 271 pp. Paperback, $18.00.

This book is refreshingly different from anything I have ever read on the book of Revelation. Maier does not offer readers a commentary on the Apocalypse; neither does he offer a treatise on exegesis, theology, backgrounds, or even the many popular versions of Reader Response. Instead he explores the Apocalypse in service of a basic thesis; that the book is an indispensable resource for helping first-world Christians understand the true role of the church in a secular society. In other words, Revelation is a call to radical discipleship. To achieve this reading, Maier integrates elements of all the above approaches.

Maier argues that in its original context the Apocalypse was written as a critique of the economic and political order of the Roman Empire. John was urging his readers to view the attractions of "empire" as antithetical to God's intentions for the human race. Maier goes on to argue that the message of Revelation, as he outlines it, is just as relevant today as it was in the first century. He sees the position of Christians in the Western world as analogous to their situation in John's day. Like John's audience, Christians today are faced with a choice; they can uncritically participate in "empire," ignoring the suffering it unleashes on the world, or they can seek out a more costly kind of discipleship, one that goes against the tide of commercialism and political power.

To reach this point, Maier departs from the traditional consensus that the Apocalypse was written to comfort Christians facing Roman persecution. He believes that the book addresses a situation where there "is not too much persecution, but too little." The Christians of John's day, he believes, had become all too comfortable with their position in society (he calls his approach to the book "reading Revelation as a Laodicean"). The Apocalypse, then, becomes an "unveiling" of the Empire in all its domination, tyranny, and idolatry. The face of empire is a lie, and John's readers are called to stir up trouble rather than get comfortable with their situation.

Maier's standpoint on the Apocalypse is informed by his own family's experience. He grew up German in post-World-War II Canada. His older relatives remembered the suffering and privation of being German in Eastern Europe at the close of the war. As a result, they never felt truly at home in the Englishness of Western Canada or in its peace, prosperity, and material comfort. In the context of this double alienation, the book of Revelation spoke to these expatriates as if it had been written just for them. The problem with Canada was not persecution of Germans, but its foreignness to both the language and the values these Germans had brought with them from the East.

Reading Maier's book is far too rich an experience to summarize adequately here. I will attempt, however, to briefly categorize the seven main chapters. In the first chapter ("Apocalypse Troubles"), the author suggests that Revelation ought to be seen as a "troublemaker" that afflicts the comfortable more than it comforts the afflicted. The tool the book uses to do this is memory. The empire built great monuments to the past so that imperial history would govern the way people thought and lived in the present. The Apocalypse, likewise, used reminders of the cross and its OT antecedents to create a contrasting view of the present. The Maier family brought nothing with them from Eastern Europe but their memories, and those memories kept them from being truly at home in the Canadian West. So at a time in history when memory seems redundant (in light of hard drives and internet data bases), Revelation calls readers to challenge the empty and repetitive material consumption of the present with the memory of Apocalypse and its alienation from the contemporary culture.

The second chapter ("I, John") focuses on the kind of person who could write an apocalypse like the Revelation. Maier first traces depictions of John through centuries of classic paintings. Earlier painters depict John roaming free on Patmos; later ones confine him to a cave, or is it a psychiatric clinic? Maier then surveys more recent attempts to psychoanalyze John. The Apocalypse seems to welcome such analysis, for John and his emotions are cleverly embedded in the vision he describes. First-person narrative draws us into the story line of the Apocalypse. We witness what John saw. His eyes become our eyes and his ears become our ears.

This analysis leads to the themes of the next two chapters ("Seeing Things" and "Hearing Voices"). If one thinks of the Book of Revelation as a play, the audience of the play (readers) quickly discovers that they are not only watching the play; they are part of the show themselves. John's eyewitness reports draw the audience to adopt his point of view about God and about the ethical responsibilities of those who follow God. Conversely, in an honor-shame culture, the concept that all creation is under God's all-seeing eye elicits shame from those inclined to take up the viewpoint of Jezebel, Balaam, or the Nicolaitans.

The Apocalypse not only lets you see things you hadn't seen before; it also makes you hear things: hymns, woes, and heavenly discourse. According to Maier, the Apocalypse is "the New Testament's noisiest book." It is a blend between the oral and the written; it is intended to be heard as well as read (Rev 1:3). Originality in oral situations is more like variations on a theme rather than an invasion of bold, new melodies. It is the nature of orality to rehearse the same idea in different words and from differing viewpoints. It is also natural in orality to be flexible in regard to narrative time. All these characteristics are abundantly "heard" in Revelation (e.g., 7:4-8; 9-17).

The fifth chapter explores the "Games with Time" that are found in the Apocalypse. A. A. Mendilow has noted that third-person novels write a story forward from the past. First-person novels write them backward from the present. Maier notes, however, that the Apocalypse is first-person narrative that spans from the past all the way into the future. In a sense, time in Revelation is on two levels; in the earthly realm time seems to rush on ahead of itself; in the heavenly realm it slows down virtually to a stop (Rev 4:8-11). At various points in the book (such as 7:4-8) one is catapulted into the future, only to plunge back into cycles of earthly destruction that precede in point of time (e.g., 8:7-9:21). But the Apocalypse, in spite of all this rushing around in time, does not end with the End, but returns to the world of the seven churches, placing before them the decisions they need to make (Rev 22:16-21).

In the sixth chapter ("The Praise of Folly"), Maier takes up the hot issue of violence in the Apocalypse. Following the lead of David Aune, Sophie Laws, Eugene Boring and others, he sees the violence of the Apocalypse more in terms of an action comedy (such as the movie *True Lies*) than a violent and depressing tragedy (such as *Apocalypse Now*). He argues that those, such as Tina Pippin, Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, and Robert Royalty, who focus on the dark side of Revelation's violence, have missed an important element. Taking a cue from John's comedic double stupidity near the end of the book (Rev 19:10 and 22:9), Maier sees the irony in Revelation working to undermine standard ancient models of irony. Instead of poking fun at the "other" from a distance, as irony was and is wont to do, he sees John poking fun at himself and his perceptions as well. Ultimately, this is "unstable irony," where the reader is led to question all pretensions to absolute knowledge and power. John does not replace one empire with another; he turns the concept of "empire" inside out. While Jerusalem resketches the images of Babylon, it is everything that Babylon is not; it is a reversed image.

In chapter 7 ("Remembering Apocalypse"), this reversed image focuses on a slain Lamb at the heart of the final Paradise (Rev 21:22-23; 22:1, 3). The consummation of the Apocalypse contains the images of Roman wealth and power but with a decisive difference. The Roman goal of wealth, status, and dominance is replaced by what Maier calls "cruciform irony." To remember "Apocalypse" is to view everything from the perspective of the cross of Jesus of Nazareth. Cruciform irony denies cultural urges to be greedy, idolatrous, and self-centered. It invites disciples of the Lamb to stop trying to control secular society or conquer the world for Christ. Cruciform irony considers the earthly transformations of both revivals and the social gospel as temptations to unbelief and faithlessness. It is satisfied instead with the abundance that comes from loving God and one's neighbor as oneself.

The whole book is provocative. Readers from all sides of the Christian spectrum will certainly find plenty to be offended about. Many "liberals" will be offended at Maier's seeming disinterest in projects for earthly reform, his advocacy of Christian withdrawal from attempts to transform this world (205-206). Many conservatives, on the other hand, will be offended at his apparent dismissal of any inevitable ending to history (xi) and his relative disinterest in the heavenly realities that most Christians have seen in the book. I too did not agree with everything I read in this book. But I somehow sensed that I was a better person for having read it, and for me, that was enough.

Andrews University JON PAULIEN

Mathewson, Steven D. *The Art of Preaching Old Testament Narrative.* Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002. 288 pp. Paper, $16.99.

The title of this volume accurately summarizes its content. Its author is a practising preacher with a passion for expounding narrative texts, and that enthusiasm is clearly evident as he unfolds the homiletical possibilities of OT stories. The book is well organized into three main sections. In the first, "From Text to Concept," Hebrew narrative conventions are explained and guidelines given for sensitive exegesis. The second, "From Concept to Sermon," outlines strategies for moving from exegesis to exposition. This is followed by a third section composed of five sample sermons, the first by Mathewson himself, aimed at exemplifying the preceding theory. Two appendices deal with advanced plot analysis and recommended Old Testament commentaries.

Mathewson's explanation of the nature of Hebrew narrative, covering, e.g., plot analysis, characterization, and point of view, is a fair summary of current scholarship. There is nothing here that is original, however, and one would not expect a book of this type to break new ground. This section is clearly for the uninitiated evangelical preacher. Those who have read Alter, Bar-Efrat, Berlin, or Gunn and Fewell will not have their understanding of Hebrew narrative enhanced. The author's evangelical background, and an assumed evangelical readership, mean that he gives hardly any space to ways of reading narrative that counter his presuppositions. So while Mathewson is a congenial guide to some current trends in narrative interpretation, he is less than comprehensive. Overall, however, he succeeds in alerting evangelical preachers to the imaginative dimension of biblical literature and to its use of metaphor, irony, ambiguity, aspects that have often sat uncomfortably with conservative perceptions of "inspiration."

The homiletical theory that takes up the second section is profusely illustrated with examples taken from OT narrative. But anyone who has read Haddon Robinson's *Biblical Preaching: The Development and Delivery of Expository Messages* will be in familiar territory. One can do far worse than take Robinson as a model, but his influence on this present volume is enormous. He is cited more often than any other homiletician, on average appearing on every sixth page of the first two sections. In addition, he contributes the book's foreword and a sample sermon. Perhaps this influence is understandable, given that Robinson was Mathewson's mentor at seminary, but the student seems to be in awe of his master.

Published sermons rarely deliver the punch of live delivery, so almost inevitably the five sample sermons that form the third main section of the book are disappointing. None more so, unfortunately, than Mathewson's own contribution on Gen 22. The sermon's main point that "the greatest thing you can do for your kids is to worship God, not your kids," is fair enough in itself. However, I am less than convinced that there is enough exegetical anchor for it in the text of Gen 22, especially when read within the context of the Abraham story as a whole.

Appendix A, "Advanced Plot Analysis," is an up-to-date summary of current thought. However, it requires a knowledge of Hebrew, is heavy going, and even granting Mathewson's decision to relegate it to an appendix, is unlikely to appeal to the majority of readers. Indeed, they might well ask themselves why it should, given that two of the sample sermons are by preachers who admit to having studied no Hebrew at all (Paul Bordem, 201; Alice Mathews, 225). Another uses an interlinear (Donald Sunukjian, 186), and even the revered and omnipresent icon Haddon Robinson admits that he is not as skilled in Hebrew as he would like to be (213). Mathewson alone seems to have the required linguistic skills.

Despite the reservations noted above, as a class text for homiletics I would rate this volume quite highly. In fact, I intend to use it as required reading in my "Preaching from the Old Testament" master's-level course. The author is aware of the contemporary (American) intellectual climate in general, and his biblical and homiletical scholarship is up to date. He writes in a user-friendly style, regularly providing helpful summaries in tabular form. The numerous examples from Scripture make it extremely practical. Mercifully, he is also realistic, repeatedly reminding the reader that it takes a lot of hard work and perseverance to interpret and expound OT narratives well. Some might ask what the advantage is in using this book rather than reading a standard work on the poetics and interpretation of OT narrative (e.g., Berlin), coupled with Robinson's classic volume. For those who have already done that, the gain in using this present volume will be modest. But for the novice evangelical preacher, especially one without a knowledge of Biblical Hebrew, Mathewson provides under one cover a coherent, profusely illustrated, user-friendly guide to preaching OT narrative that is likely to become a standard text for some time to come.

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Mills, Watson E., ed. *Daniel*, Bibliographies for Biblical Research: Old Testament Series, vol. 20. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 2002. xviii + 103 pp. Hardcover, $89.95.

Bibliographies on biblical books are always a valuable tool for biblical scholars. However, in the time of computerized research, when it is easily possible to download in a relatively short time numerous entries, a printed bibliography needs to excel in many aspects, foremost in practicality.

The present bibliography on the book of Daniel in the Bibliographies for Biblical Research series (*BBR Daniel*) is volume 20 of a series of bibliographies on the books of the Bible and deuterocanonical literature that projects a total of ca. 55-60 volumes. According to the series editor, who also edited this bibliography on Daniel, each volume compiles "works published in the twentieth century that make important contributions to the understanding of the text and backgrounds of the various books" (ix).

The bibliographical entries in *BBR Daniel*, which are enumerated throughout the book, are arranged in three parts: citations by chapter and verse (410 entries), citations by an alphabetical list of different subjects (518 entries), and commentaries (77 entries). The array of languages from which the entries are drawn is commendable. Besides English, German, and French, the articles referred to are written in Afrikaans, Dutch, Italian, Norwegian, Portuguese, and Spanish. It is definitely a plus that Mills includes articles from more exotic journals which one may not so easily come across elsewhere. An author index concludes the volume.

Though the preface claims that the bibliography indexes publications dating from "the twentieth century through the early months of 2000," there are only eleven entries from the first half of the twentieth century, starting from 1931, and the most recent articles indexed were usually published in 1997. The bibliography contains only two essays from 1998 (entries #0509, 0510) and one article in 1999 in *BAR* (#0486, 0512, 0595, 0674). The latter (A. Malamat, "Caught between the Great Powers: Judah Picks a Side... Loses"—by the way, the bibliography fails to mention that Malamat's article appeared in no. 4 of vol. 25) cannot be considered as an important article for the understanding of Daniel, since it deals with the history of the final years in Judah from 609-586 B.C.E. Likewise, the two essays published in 1998 examine only peripheral issues for Daniel, one dealing with Neo-Babylonian royal inscriptions and the other with Nabonidus's origin. What about articles published in 1998-2000 that are clearly concerned with Danielic texts? A simple search in the ATLA Religion Index under Scripture Citation "Daniel" for the years 1998 and 1999 results in sixteen entries, of which about half appeared in major sources (*CBQ*, *JBL*, *SBLSP*, *VT*, *ZAW*). Mills's bibliography lists none of these sixteen articles. Hence, it is not as up-to-date as it claims to be. The situation is different with regard to the list of 77 commentaries that are published evenly throughout the twentieth century, starting with Farrar's *The Book of Daniel* (1900) and ending with Reddin's *Daniel* (1999).

I have several basic concerns about the present bibliography—selectivity and omissions, multiple entries, and inconsistencies—and I will start with the most serious one. An essential principle applied to the compilation in *BBR Daniel* is selectivity. Mills only wants to pick the "important contributions." He admits at this point that an individual compiler makes her/his specific contribution" (ix). No doubt selection is hard work, and space constraints could even force one to choose among the important articles. However, Mills does not only omit some of the important works (which in itself could be forgivable), but he also includes a number of irrelevant works instead. Let me illustrate this.

Readers of *AUSS* will be interested to know that the bibliography indexes ten articles of that journal. Except for one, all date from 1985 to 1996. Since *AUSS* has published in the years 1963-2000 at least thirty articles dealing with the book of Daniel or with some aspects relating to it, it is clear that Mills indeed presents only a selection of those articles. Unfortunately, he is omitting significant ones. For example, an article by J. Doukhan ("The Seventy Weeks of Daniel 9: An Exegetical Study," *AUSS* 17 [1979]: 1-22) is missing in Mills's collection, although it seems to be a rather essential study on one of the major passages in Daniel. Similar observations can be made for other journals as well. In sum, the criteria by which *BBR Daniel* includes or excludes articles or essays are far from obvious to me.

The omission of some sources is a serious problem. For instance, there are no articles listed from *JATS*, particularly *JATS* 7/1 (1996), which contains eight articles on the book of Daniel. Other lapses are in the area of collected essays, e.g., the failure to list any of the articles in W. Bader, ed., "*Und die Wahrheit wurde hinweggefegt*": *Daniel 8 litguistisch interpretier* (Tübingen: Francke, 1994), in which ten essays deal in depth with Daniel 8. Regarding commentaries, a simple comparison with the bibliography of 46 twentieth-century commentaries on Daniel in J. J. Collins, *Daniel* (Hermeneia, Fortress, 1993), 455-456, shows that Mills does not list twenty of those commentaries. Certainly, the important ones by R. H. Charles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1929), J. J. Collins (1984), and G. L. Archer (1985) would have deserved an entry. Finally, it is deplorable that there are no references to dissertations or to other books than commentaries to be found in *BBR Daniel*.

For quite a number of entries it is questionable whether they should really belong in a bibliography on Daniel. Again, two examples need to suffice. Christian Grappe, "Essai sur l'arrière-plan pascal des récits de la dernière nuit de Jésus," *RHPR* 65 (1985): 105-125, is cited under "Dan 6:11," "Dan 6:14," and "redaction criticism." However, the article refers to Dan 6:11, 14 in just one sentence on p. 114, to mention that the Gethsemane pericope in Mark 14 is probably modeled after the Jewish prayer of three times a day as found in Dan 6:11, 14 and 2 Cor 12:8. So much for Daniel Grappe's article. The second example is Abramowski's "Die Entstehung der dreigliedrigen Taufformel," *ZTK* 81 (1984): 417-446 (cited under "Dan 7" and under "word studies"), which refers on about two pages to Jane Schaberg's hypothesis that the threefold baptismal formula derives from a pre-Matthean Daniel midrash on Dan 7 (426-428). I regard this hardly as enough reason for the inclusion of Abramowski's article in a Daniel bibliography. At the most, the article could be cited in a specialized bibliography on the reception of Daniel. There are many other articles listed in *BBR Daniel* that deal with the reception of Danielic material, specifically in the Gospels and in the book of Revelation. However, I regard the usefulness of these articles for the research on Daniel itself as rather limited.

There are also wrong entries in *BBR Daniel*. The article by R. Fuller, "Text-Critical Problems in Malachi 2:10-16," *JBL* 110 (1991): 47-57 (#0042, 0727), has absolutely nothing to do with Daniel. And there is no article by Eugene Rosenberg, "Daniel Manuscripts from Qumran. Part 1," *BASOR* 268 (1987): 17-37 (#0015, 0725, 0839). This is an erroneous double entry for the article by Eugene Ulrich, which, by the way, immediately follows or precedes the wrong entries. One also wonders why Part 2 of Ulrich's article (*BASOR* 274 [1989]: 3-26) was not listed in the bibliography.

Another area of concern is the phenomenon of multiple entries. In the introduction to the series, Mills specifically mentions the possibility of duplication of the same entry in the scriptural citations and the subject citations, and the possibility of "multiple citations by scriptural citation . . . where relevant" (ix). An article can, therefore, be listed under several biblical references and/or under several different subjects.

A comparison of the author index with the entries in parts 1 and 2 shows the extent of multiple citations. I found that the 928 entries of the bibliography refer to a total of 381 publications. That means that on an average, a publication is listed 2.4 times; the maximum being eleven entries of Shea's "Further Literary Structures." In other words, if each publication would have been entered only once—which, of course, is not desirable—the 90-page bibliography of parts 1 and 2 would come down to ca. 37 pages.

In principle, such multiple entries need to be allowed for. They are even necessary for articles that contain substantial discussions on several texts or on different themes. However, more sensitiveness could have been exerted to when a multiple entry is required and when it is redundant. A case in point is Shea's article "Further Literary Structures in Daniel 2-7: An Analysis of Daniel 4," *AUSS* 23 (1985): 193-202, which is found under chapter 4, 4:4-7, 4:8-9, 4:10-17, 4:18-19, 4:27, 4:28-33, 4:34-38, as well as under "chiasmus," "dreams," and "Nebuchadnezzar." The multiple entries in the subject category cannot be avoided, but to mention Shea's article eight times in the scriptural category in the range of just three pages lacks any justification. It seems to me that one entry under chapter 4 would have been sufficient. Another example is an article by P. Grelot that is listed three times in succession under 3:7, 3:10, and 3:15 (#0077, 0078, 0079). In the subject category similar things happen, e.g., the twelve entries under "Septuagint" are also found under "LXX." Such entries are redundant and only blow up the bibliography unnecessarily.

There are numerous inconsistences in the arrangement of the entries. Two examples may suffice. Cacquot's article "Les quatre bêtes et le 'Fils de l'homme,'" as well as Casey's monograph *Son of Man*, are listed under "Dan 7" (#0179, 0201) but not under the subject "son of man," whereas other articles are listed under both, e.g., Muilenburg, "The Son of Man" (#0175, 0766). And Lust's essay on "Cult and Sacrifice in Daniel" is indexed under "sacrifice" (#0743), but not under "cult."

A brief comparison with another bibliography on Daniel may be helpful. In the preface, Mills acknowledges the *Bibliographic biblique* by Paul-Émile Langevin (1972, 1978, 1985), but, surprisingly, he does not mention Henry O. Thompson's annotated bibliography *The Book of Daniel* (New York: Garland, 1993). The entries in Thompson's bibliography are arranged alphabetically by author, and both a Scripture index and a subject index refer to the relevant entries. Two other sections list the journals with their articles and the dissertations relevant for Daniel. In the end, such a layout seems for me to be preferable and is certainly more economical. For example, whereas the two articles by Shea that are indexed in *BBR Daniel* occupy seventeen entries in Mills's bibliography, they are listed only once each in Thompson's bibliography.

In compiling scholarly bibliographies it is especially important to pay attention to details. It is disappointing to come across numerous slips as well as textual and formal errors in *BBR Daniel*. One can only wish that greater care would have been exercised.

A last word concerns the price. The publisher apparently intends the book to be a library acquisition, since for the individual customer the 100-page book is highly overpriced. In fact, containing references to 458 publications, of which 77 are commentaries, one pays 9 cents per entry, and 16.8 cents per indexed publication!

Mills's compilation of sources for Daniel can be consulted if one wants to find some of the newer sources, particularly those published between 1993 and 1997. Of course, a recent commentary or a computerized search of the ATLA Religion Database should do the same, if not a better, job. The fact that at the time of its publication in 2002 *BBR Daniel* is basically five years old—i.e., presenting relevant articles up to 1997—is difficult to comprehend. *BBR Daniel* helps certainly as additional bibliography; but, by far, it is rather disappointing for its arbitrary selectivity—one cannot be sure that all the important articles and essays have been referred to—and its unnecessary, repetitious material.

In the end, besides the basic necessity to be up-to-date, a bibliography for scholarly research is functional and meets its purpose only if it either strives to be comprehensive, so that the researcher can delve into the fullness of information, or if it selects the really important material to provide the researcher with a well-justified overview of the relevant material, preferably even with brief annotations about the work's contents. *BBR Daniel* is not intended to fulfill the first task, and, in my opinion, it falls short in the second.

Berrien Springs, Michigan MARTIN PRÖBSTLE

Nesbitt, Paula D., ed. *Religion and Public Policy*. Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira, 2001. xii + 278 pp. Paper, $26.95.

When she organized a panel on "Religion and Social Policy for the Next Millennium" for the 1998 American Sociological annual meetings, Paula D. Nesbitt discovered "how globally diverse, far-ranging, and deeply embedded are religious issues, values, and themes in matters of secular public social policy" (xii). That recognition led to this collection of essays, which is organized around the assumption that religion is a "fundamental variable" (x) in the formulation of social policy. The increasing religious diversity of many societies around the world, Nesbitt believes, requires sociological analysis that also takes into account "gender, racial, and ethnic diversity, as well as socioeconomic inequality and political marginalization" (xii). The concerns shaping this volume reflect the editor's professional responsibilities, for she teaches Women's Studies and serves as director of the Carl M. Williams Institute for Ethics and Values at the University of Denver.

The volume is organized into three parts, with each individual essay accompanied by notes and a bibliography. Part 1, "Religious Freedom, Identity, and Global Social Policy," examines social policies in relation to minority experiences. These essays include: Otto Maduro, "Globalization, Social Policy, and Christianity at the Dawn of a New Millennium: Some Reflections from a Latin American Emigrant Perspective"; James T. Richardson, "Public Policy toward Minority Religions in the United States: A Model for Europe and Other Countries?"; James A. Beckford, "The Tension between an Established Church and Equal Opportunities in Religion: The Case of Prison Chaplaincy"; Tink Tinker, "American Indian Religious Identity and Advanced Colonial Malignancy"; and Ronald Lawson, "Tensions, Religious Freedom, and the Courts: The Seventh-day Adventist Experience."

Part 2, "Religion and Domestic Social Policies," emphasizes case studies of religious social service organizations. These essays include: Helen Rose Ebaugh and Paula Pipes, "Immigrant Congregations as Social Service Providers: Are They Safety Nets for Welfare Reform?"; Katherine Meyer, Helen Rizzo, and Yousef Ali, "Islam, Women's Organizations, and Political Rights for Women"; Nancy Nason-Clark, "Woman Abuse and Faith Communities: Religion, Violence, and the Provision of Social Welfare"; Clare B. Fischer, "Work and Its Discontents: Two Cases of Contemporary Religious Response to Unemployment"; and Adair T. Lummis, "Regional Judicatories and Social Policy Advocacy."

Part 3, "Further Local and Global Complexities," addresses a variety of issues, including the effort by religious organizations to become more fully multicultural. These essays include: Katie Day, "Putting It Together in the African American Churches: Faith, Economic Development, and Civil Rights"; Brenda E. Brasher, "The Civic Challenge of Virtual Eschatology: Heaven's Gate and Millennial Fever in Cyberspace"; Alan Myatt, "Religion, Race, and Community Organizing: The Movimento Negro in the Roman Catholic Church in Brazil"; Yvonne Young-ja Lee, "Religious Syncretism and a Postimperial Source of Healing in Korea"; and Paula D. Nesbitt, "The Future of Religious Pluralism and Social Policy: Reflections from Lambeth and Beyond."

Many readers will find Lawson's examination of Seventh-day Adventists especially interesting. The author, who teaches at Queens College and is working on a book-length sociological study of international Adventism, argues that in the United States Adventists have learned how to use the court system to protect many of their religious liberties. But because of their traditional opposition to labor-union membership, he believes, they have had relatively little success in protecting Sabbath-observance rights from employment requirements: "Generally speaking Adventists are still excluded from shifts that work on Friday nights or Saturdays" (83) because they are unable to participate in shift-swapping or collective bargaining agreements, both of which are controlled by unions. He also notes that as Adventist institutions have grown, the church has become increasingly involved in lawsuits, both receiving and initiating such legal actions. He observes that the Seventh-day Adventist Church has moved from the isolation that characterized its early years to considerable accommodation with contemporary society, the latter probably best symbolized by the denomination's action to trademark its name. The church has also impacted secular social policy. "Naturalization laws, employment compensation for employees fired for refusal to breach their conscience, laws governing compulsory union membership, and the freedom of religious organizations to discriminate against women employees," Lawson concludes, "have all been strongly affected by Adventist cases" (89-90).

Lawson's objective tone is characteristic of many of the essays in this volume. A few of the contributors, however, make no pretense of objectivity, advocating instead seemingly ideological viewpoints; e.g., Maduro calls on Christians to "announce and denounce the lethal dimensions of the globalization process as it is actually being oriented in our times and places" (8). Tinker argues similarly that only Native American communities themselves can "determine who is one of them and who is not" (69). Although for the most part writing descriptively and analytically, Young-ja Lee takes a negative view of the Protestant rejection of syncretism between Christianity and indigenous Korean religion, arguing that such hostility arises from "the need to secure justification for social and political power through the imperial religion" (233).

Nesbitt has put together an interesting and thought-provoking collection of essays, despite their uneven tone. Because of the diversity of religions and geographical areas examined, most readers will focus on those essays that fall within their professional specialities. But the volume as a whole makes the reader aware of how issues of pluralism, social action, and religious freedom cut across both religious and national boundaries. Furthermore, as some authors point out explicitly and others implicitly, the values of pluralism and multiculturalism pose serious challenges to those religions that make exclusive truth claims. While this volume does not directly address theology, it raises issues that deserve theological reflection.

Andrews University GARY LAND

Santmire, H. Paul. *Nature Reborn: The Ecological and Cosmic Promise of Christian Theology.* Minneapolis: Fortress, 2000. 154 pp. Paper, $15.00.

H. Paul Santmire has written in the field of theology of nature for more than thirty years. His Ph.D. dissertation at Harvard University (1966) was "Creation and Nature: A Study in the Doctrine of Nature with Special Attention to Karl Barth's Doctrine of Creation." Among his books are *Brother Earth: Nature, God and Ecology in a Time of Crisis* (1970) and *The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology* (1985, rereleased 1993). In the latter work, Santmire surveyed what past theologians (218) contributed to Christian attitudes toward nature, and proposed an ecological reading of biblical faith such as works by Irenaeus, Augustine, and Francis.

Despite the veritable flood of theological writing on the environment, the travail of nature continues. In the present work, Santmire picks up his own torch to reclaim and reenvision Christian resources and further an ecological reading of biblical faith. Among contemporary theological options he considers promising are those of Matthew Fox, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, and Martin Buber. The author also cites both the biblical witness and the classical Celtic saints, to redescribe the Christian story in the context of the modern ecological crisis: human alienation from nature. He seeks to take seriously Col 1:20, "God was pleased to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven, by making peace through the blood of his cross."

Santmire sees himself in the tradition of orthodox revisionists that wish to retrieve "hidden ecological and cosmic riches that many modern Christian theologians mostly neglected" (9). In this role, he allies himself with Joseph Sittler, James A. Nash, John Polkinghorne, Terrence Fretheim, and Denis Edwards. He challenges the church to revise the Christian tradition so as "to identify and to celebrate its ecological and its cosmic promise" (9). He deliberately uses these two terms (*ecological* and *cosmic*): *ecological*, to keep in mind the interrelatedness of this earthly habitat; *cosmic*, to focus on the immensity of the universe. These terms bring to mind John F. Haught's *The Promise of Nature: Ecology and Cosmic Purpose* (1993). Haught's work, however, promotes process thought as a basis for interacting with nature; Santmire does not explicitly dwell upon that notion.

It seems a great challenge to sum up Fox, Teilhard, and Buber and then offer a credible critique. Santmire seems to do a fair, if general, job here, although he must focus on only a few main ideas. At times, however, he seems to simply employ radical terms for rather orthodox beliefs. On the other hand, Santmire himself makes some apparently heterodox speculations.

For example, he believes "the world as created good is at once a world where creatures come into being and pass out of being. All things will die. All things must die" (57); "death and suffering are given with the created goodness of the cosmos" (58). It is one thing that death entered the world because of sin; it is rather another thing to posit that death is an integral part of nature. Santmire later asks: "Is it really possible for us to embrace the ecology of death?" He believes the example of the Celtic saints, who lived with a great consciousness of death, can help us. However, I found it difficult to satisfactorily reconcile an "ecology of life" with an "ecology of death."

Santmire's strength, even on the previous point, is in taking sin and death seriously. He eloquently calls the Christian church to cry out for the victims of global environment abuse. Unfortunately, the concluding challenge and specific suggestions are altogether brief.

The work is a stand-alone volume; but because of the many footnotes referring to his earlier work, reading *The Travail of Nature* makes *Nature Reborn* more comprehensible.

Modesto, California JIMMY J. HA

Schultze, Quentin. *Habits of the High-tech Heart: Living Virtuously in the Information Age.* Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002. 256 pp. Hardcover, $24.99.

Quentin J. Schultze, Professor of Communication Arts and Sciences at Calvin College, has written 100 articles and ten books, among which are *Internet for Christians: Everything You Need to Start Cruising the Net Today* (1998), *Communicating for Life: Christian Stewardship in Community and Media* (2000) and *Dancing in the Dark: Youth, Popular Culture and the Electronic Media* (editor, 1990). In the present work, Schultze is concerned about the loss of a sense of moral proportion due to informationism and cyberculture. He advocates the "good life" (according to Socrates), in contrast to the successful life, as basic to democracy and uses (perhaps to excess) the ideas of Alexis de Tocqueville and Vaclav Havel to explain it. He calls for responsibility and discernment, recognizing that with the mastery of technology comes a consequent idea of utopia that is accompanied by increasing moral dilemmas in a milieu of moral insensitivity.

Technology cannot be expected to solve our moral and spiritual problems. Schultze calls into question "faith" in information, which denies the importance of wisdom and virtue. He suggests that the demand for speedier dissemination of information leads to promiscuous knowing and superficiality. He values the wisdom of the religious traditions as providing the "metanarrative" that points to the "ought" of virtuous living, thus transcending the "is" and immediacy of informationism. He upholds the virtue of humility as the way to maintain a healthy sense of skepticism and humor, in order to keep a sense of proportion amid the arrogance of technological pursuits. Authenticity (that our "yea be yea" and our "nay be nay") is fundamental to accountability and a sense of reality. Cyberculture fosters celebrities who dominate and manage without thought for cosmic diversity.

The virtues upheld in chapters 1 through 7 are discernment, moderation, wisdom, humility, authenticity, and diversity, which are not the prime focus of virtual living. A complete communicator must study the discipline of communication to become rhetorically savvy, but it should also guide to spiritual wisdom. This includes a relationship with God and a knowledge of the truth. In rhetorical outrage, Schultze assumes a prophetic stance and explores the consequences of the "technologizing of everyday life" on who we are and what happens to us (13). He emphasizes the importance of real community, in which we responsibly seek the common good. He concludes by calling for thoughtful sojourners who continue the journey of life on this earth together as part of an eternal journey undertaken by those who humbly seek goodness and avoid folly along the way.

Andrew Calcutt in *White Noise: An A-Z of the Contradictions in Cyberculture* (1999) raises an issue about the technodeterminist perspective of authors such as Schultze, who describe trends in society as if they are effects caused by new technology (x). His thesis is that technology is developed in accordance with the "social context from which it is derived" (ibid.). Cyberculture is characterized by contradictions of ideas. It is a culture, but within it there is an alternative or counterculture that is antisocial, and which states truths about society with which we have become comfortable. Contradictions that are needed to inform our wisdom include anarchy/authority and community/alienation. Calcutt explains that "Cyberspace is regarded as both the end of the state and the extension of state surveillance and control" (1). Some champion cyberspace as the home of virtual communities, while others warn that it is a place of extreme alienation (19). Democracy is enhanced by the Internet, which in turn facilitates diversity. However, democracy and diversity are more contradictory than complementary. Should cyberspace be free or become a marketplace?

Cyberculture provides an escape from reality, but what is the reality that it offers? Is it an improvement on the past? Is it merely sidestepping the problems man has created, which haunt our future? The debate should be, What "ought [we] to be doing with our information and our machines?" (43). It almost seems that the sci-fi prediction of the machine, of artificial intelligence, as the ultimate end of technological pursuits and socially engineered progress is imminent. Living in one's own virtual reality by one's own moral code does not bode well for the future of society in terms of the family, the church, and the school.

As a Christian commentator on the media-saturated society, Schultze contributes to our understanding of contemporary society. Although he helped to launch www.gospelcom.net (1995), his current concern is with the intersection of religion and the new media and how the noise of the internet threatens to drown out the still small voice of God as he attempts to communicate with us. Religion has become "consumerized," and an Internet site such as SelectSmart.com provides a list by which to select a religion that "suits one the best." He asks about "faith" and "what has happened to church" when 25 percent of Americans use Internet for religion. In the quest for intimacy, both sex and religion are used to restore a sense of community. Even Bill Gates, the "chief evangelist of technology," is taking his own industry to task for having too much faith in digital solutions, especially with respect to solving the world's problems at a time when mothers are asking him, "My children are dying; what can you do?" He is concerned that computers are put into the perspective of human values, of the reality that the majority are struggling for survival. In conclusion, we can observe that the illusion of progress in light of eschatology raises issues that demand attention and suggests the need for a Seventh-day Adventist approach to cyberculture.

Andrews University DELYSE E. STEYN

Stewart, David R. *The Literature of Theology: A Guide for Students and Pastors.* Louisville, KY: John Knox, 2003. 164 pp. Paper, $19.95.

Where to begin when you don't know where to begin; this helpful guide to theological reference works can provide an entry point into a new area of investigation. Whether one is a student needing initial information, a busy pastor needing quick and precise information, or a seasoned scholar needing to check out a corollary field, this book gives you a bibliography of the basic reference works in each of the major fields of theological research.

Stewart's work is a revised and updated version of John Bollier's 1979 book of the same title, and the update has been sorely needed. There has been a veritable explosion of scholarship in the theological fields in the last quarter-century, severely limiting the usefulness of Bollier's book of late. Stewart's update includes some 500 encyclopedias, dictionaries, and guides, the vast majority of which have been published or revised within the last decade. The material presented is up-to-date through 2002, and even includes some pending volumes of series and sets of which only initial volumes are currently available. This makes Stewart's book by far the most comprehensive and current annotative bibliography in the field of theology available in English.

Stewart's organization of the material is simpler, and, therefore, easier to navigate than Bollier's. Stewart begins with twenty-two "basic resources," which include the most general and comprehensive references for each of the major fields of theology. He then develops eight more chapters: books about the Bible, Bible commentaries, the church in history, Christian thought and theology, world Christianity, ecumenics, world religions, Christian denominations, practical theology, and Christian spirituality. For the most part, this list of theological areas uses the standard divisions of theology and follows Bollier's divisions with one exception. Stewart has provided a separate chapter for comparative religions and missiology, whereas Bollier merely included these under practical theology. This highlights a recent shift of academic endeavors in the West to include more study of non-Christian religions and non-Western Christianity. Stewart's final chapter, "Christianity and Literature," includes books on poems and fiction of Christ, Christians, or Christian themes, as well as works on the arts and literature seen from a Christian perspective. Works that address the actual writing of Christian literature are also included.

Ironically, in spite of the profusion of new encyclopedias and dictionaries, Stewart managed to keep the number of entries in his book, 535, to just fewer than Bollier's 543 entries in 1979. Inevitably, Stewart has had to leave out some types of entries that Bollier included in order to make room for the great influx of later material, leaving out published bibliographies, indices, style manuals, and library catalogues as entries in favor of an appendix of Works on Theological Bibliography and Research and an appendix devoted to "Literature of Theology on the Web." Since so many of these indices and catalogues are readily available on the web sites suggested, they are not needed in print. However, their quantity can easily confuse the beginner. Perhaps a suggestion of starting with the *ATLA* for articles and edited books could allow the neophyte guided access to theological research on the web. In a similar vein, the removal of all style manuals seems to leave a gap for a beginner attempting to write her own first theological literature.

A more serious omission is the removal of entries of primary historical works available in English. For instance, Stewart excluded the *Ante-Nicene Fathers*, the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, *Ancient Christian Writers*, and *Fathers of the Church* series in his section on the early church. There is a large learning curve when it comes to accessing primary literature. A "leg up" in this area can go a long way toward helping a new student of Christian history to become enamored with what is available rather than frustrated with not being able to find things.

The book is well edited, seemingly free of typos and misspellings. This is of vital importance in finding books and web sites. However, I did find one error that is probably irksome only to a few. In his chapter on Christian denominations, Stewart included the reference works of both the Seventh-day Adventists and the Church of God, Seventh-day under the heading Seventh-day Adventists rather than using a more general heading, possibly Sabbatarians.

David Stewart, thank you for this golden resource; it will be especially useful for the next few years when it includes the latest and best from every field of theology. Here's one reader who hopes that it will not be another quarter of a century before the next update.

Andrews University JOHN W. REEVE

Sunquist, Scott W., ed. *A Dictionary of Asian Christianity*. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. xliv + 937 pp. Hardcover, $75.00.

Since its publication, *A Dictionary of Asian Christianity* (*DAC*) has quickly become a definitive work. As the first-ever basic reference work in its area, it fills a large void that for years has been a source of frustration for teachers and students of Asian Christian history. Scott Sunquist (editor), along with David Wu Chu Sing and John Chew Hiang Chea (associate editors), all professors at Trinity Theological College in Singapore, began the ambitious project in 1990 and completed the volume eleven years later. During its evolution, the project has become a historical event in itself. It involved an ecumenical group of nearly 500 scholars, church leaders, and missionaries from eighteen Asian countries, engendering unprecedented fellowship among Asian church historians.

The 1,260 articles of this epochal volume cover the history of Christianity in areas ranging from Pakistan to Japan and from Mongolia to Indonesia, covering important encounters with Asian political movements, cultural practices, indigenous religions, the roles of particular leaders, and large-scale developments in Asian Christianity during the past two millennia. Maps, cross-references, and bibliographies attached to longer articles enhance the usefulness of the volume.

The *DAC* is particularly strong on biographies and national Christian histories. The volume will make an excellent starting point for research on the spread of Christianity in China, Japan, Korea, and the Philippines. It also contains fine articles on various subjects that are important to Asian Christianity, such as colonialism, the ecumenical movement, ancestor worship, medical work, and Bible translations.

The volume is not without problems and weaknesses. First, the geographical delimitation based on "cultural and historical tests" has resulted in the exclusion of materials on post-seventh-century western Asia (xxiii). Russia is also excluded.

Strangely enough, the volume lacks an overview article on India, even though the world's second most populous nation lies within the delimited region. This is glaring, particularly when much smaller countries such as Brunei and Nepal are given overviews. Such omissions leave readers questioning the book's claim to cover the history of "Asian" Christianity. As it stands, the volume is primarily concerned with eastern and southeastern Asia.

A second weakness is the fact that treatment of various religious groups is quite uneven. Overall, the book seems to betray an evangelical and mainline Protestant bias over against Roman Catholicism and newer religious movements. For example, the book is deficient on the influence of Catholicism in India and the Philippines, even though it is the largest Christian group in both countries. The number of pages allotted to various denominations and movements is also uneven. The articles on Methodism and Anglicanism span eleven and nine pages, respectively, whereas the ones on Pentecostal, Presbyterian, and Reformed churches have just three pages each. The articles on Roman Catholics, Baptists, and Seventh-day Adventists are about six to seven pages long. The article on cults—written by the senior editor—places the Latter-day Saints, the Jehovah's Witnesses, and the Unification Church in this category without defining the term "cult." Neither the Latter-day Saints nor the Jehovah's Witnesses are treated in their own articles, but the Unification Church does receive such separate treatment. The article on cults contains information on such movements in Japan and Vietnam only, omitting the flourishing progress of various new developments in Korea and the Philippines, for example.

The six-page article on Seventh-day Adventism was written by Chek-Yat Phoon, Thomas van den End, and Man Kyu Oh. Phoon and Oh are theologians teaching at Adventist colleges in Singapore and Korea, and van den End is a Reformed Church missionary in Indonesia. The article is divided into ten geographical areas where Adventism has been active. Although not comprehensive in scope (Mongolia is omitted), and uneven in emphasis (Adventism in Japan receives a mere paragraph, compared to a full page for Indonesia), it is an informative article on Adventism in eastern, southern, and southeastern Asia.

In spite of some obvious weaknesses, *A Dictionary of Asian Christianity* successfully fills a gap. As indicated by Sunquist in the introduction, it should be "seen best as a first edition resource for the study of Asian Christianity as told by Asians" (xxiv). No doubt the *DAC* and the scholarly fellowship fostered during its production will lead to the creation of more resource tools in the future. This book is definitely a must-own reference work for all theological libraries and students of Asian Christianity.

Pacific Union College JUHYEOK NAM
Angwin, California

Tennent, Timothy C. *Christianity at the Religious Roundtable: Evangelicalism in Conversation with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam.* Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002. 270 pp. Paper, $19.99.

Several recent books have drawn attention to the dramatic, if not startling, ethnic and religious changes in Western nations during the past 20 years. One does not now have to cross oceans to engage members of the major world religions. Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and other religious communities are now in our midst and constitute a significant presence in many Western societies.

This study by Timothy Tennent, Associate Professor of World Missions at Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, who also serves as a visiting professor at the

Luther New Theological College in India, invites the reader to explore the religious thought of, and engage in dialogue with, members of the major world religions. The subtitle of the book, *Evangelicalism in Conversation with Hinduism*, accurately describes its contents, and the word *Roundtable* in the title serves notice of the approach. Christianity is no longer at the head of the table; open dialogue, in which each view/understanding is seriously considered, is advocated.

The study commences with a concise chapter in which Tennent clearly outlines his own position regarding dialogue between evangelicalism and representatives of the world religions, on the pattern and methodology of dialogue employed in the study, and on the relationship of Christianity to other religions. The body of the book is comprised of three parts of two chapters each, which are devoted successively to details of the dialogue with Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. Part 4 is devoted to "historical dialogue" with three great Christian missionary apologists of the past. Justin Martyr's use of *logos spermatikos*, Bramabandandhav Upadhyay's restatement of trinitarianism using Hindu categories, and A. G. Hogg's distinction between faith as a subjective existential trust in God and an intellectual assent to creedal formulations are analyzed with the purpose of uncovering patterns of thought relevant to contemporary dialogue.

The value of this book lies both in its distinctive approach and in the finely honed and clearly defined theological positions analyzed in the dialogues. First, Tennent makes a case for dialogue from an evangelical perspective. At the outset, he forthrightly rejects any tendency to downplay Christian distinctives and harmonize the beliefs of the world's religions, as is the case in the fulfillment theology of the liberal tradition. On the other hand, he just as vigorously rejects the reluctance of conservative Christians to engage in dialogue lest in so doing the gospel be placed on an equal footing with non-Christian religious affirmations. After concisely outlining the triad of traditional views regarding the relationship of Christianity to other religions, viz., exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, he describes himself as an "engaged exclusivist." As such, he pursues a middle course between that of H. Kramer, who recognized no revelation of God in the world other than that in Scripture, and the fulfillment theology of J. N. Farquhar, who recognized a certain continuity between other religions and Christianity. Over against Kramer he takes a more open stance in recognizing general revelation as a *preparatio evangelica*.

Secondly, engaged exclusivism affirms the missionary dimension of dialogue. As such, it is not a one-way apologetic of Christianity, but encourages an open and vigorous two-way exchange of ideas. Tennent lays down four ground rules for the ensuing dialogue: differences should be shared honestly and fairly; dialogue relates to the big picture, and peripheral exaggerations should not be exploited; discussion should be firmly held to the central theme; and, finally, there should be no compulsion on either side for change in religious affiliation.

Parts 1 through 3 consist of successive fictional conversations between an evangelical Christian and representatives of Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. These are based on numerous real-life dialogues Tennent has conducted with members of these religions. At the outset of each, Tennent presents a concise overview of the major tenets of belief, particularities, history of the founding and developmental trajectory, and practice of the particular religion. These introductory sections provide an invaluable foundation for the ensuing discussion at the "Religious Roundtable."

Two key doctrines are focused upon in each dialogue. The first in each case relates to the doctrine of God, or ultimate reality, as this is defined within each tradition. The second is different in each case. The discussion regarding ultimate reality (Brahman) with representatives of Hinduism naturally leads into discussion of understandings of creation and the nature of the world (Maya). This is important because the concept informs much in Hindu thought and practice and is not well understood in the West. With proponents of Buddhism, dialogue moves into the discussion of ethics, which is generally regarded as one of the most important contributions of Buddhism to world thought. Inasmuch as the Quran presents its own doctrine of Christ and this constitutes a significant frontier between Christianity and Islam, the dialogue with Muslims progresses to consideration of understandings of Christ and the incarnation.

The study is brought to a close with a brief "Epilogue"—perhaps "Conclusion" would be premature at this stage—in which Tennent makes three fundamental personal affirmations: first, dialogue neither implies nor necessitates a pluralistic view in which the distinctiveness of Christianity is lost; second, dialogue and witness are not mutually exclusive; third, dialogue stimulates and sharpens our own concepts of truth. Finally, there is a brief statement of the gains and losses inherent in postmodern patterns of thought and of the applicability of aspects of the latter to discussion at the religious round table.

This is a timely book. Most Westerners have little knowledge of the religious thought and practices of the Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist communities in our midst. This book provides not only the information necessary to understanding, but also thoughtful introductions to paths of discussion. On a more academic level, it is valuable on account of its distinctive approach to Christian dialogue and the vigorous clarity it brings to foundational theological positions on each side. Even fairly advanced seminary students are likely to find that it helps them define some Christian beliefs more sharply than is the case in general theological studies. It constitutes an invaluable tool in Missions courses dealing with world religions and the theology of religions, and an invaluable resource for missionaries relating to members of these religions. It is scholarly, without bias, and written from a conservative evangelical position. Whether this pattern will be followed to any extent by evangelical missionaries and, if so, what the results will be, remain to be seen. I, for one, will be keenly interested in further developments.

The book contains a Glossary of terms used, a fairly extensive Bibliography, and both Subject and Scripture Indices. Error noted: *homoiousios* on p. 155 should surely be *homoousios*. *Homoousion* on p.171 is correct.

Andrews University RUSSELL STAPLES

Ward, Pete. *Liquid Church.* Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002. 107 pp. Paperback, $14.95.

Imagine church without conferences, unions, and divisions. Better still, can you imagine the church existing without local congregations meeting together each week? Yet this is precisely what Pete Ward is suggesting in this challenging book. Ward defines the present structural church as "solid church." This is the church all are familiar with—local congregations, sessions with regular boards, committees, and meetings; yet Ward points out the problems encountered by "solid church." The biggest failure is the inability of the church to fulfill the mission of Christ.

In contrast, Ward suggests what he calls "liquid church" as a possible solution. Liquid church is one that exists without all the organizational paraphernalia of the modern church. He envisions church as groups of people spontaneously getting together for fellowship and worship, as well as outreach. The liquid style of church, Ward feels, would better appeal to the postmodern mind.

In reality, Ward admits that such a church does not yet exist. The purpose of this book is not to describe the intricate details of such a church, but to help people begin to dream of a new way of doing church. It obviously would be much more helpful if he had actually tested these ideas in the real world and recommended them because they worked. However, that does not seem to be his intention.

In fact, it appears that Ward really isn't suggesting that we totally abandon "solid church," but it seems that the principles he has dreamed of would be very helpful in enabling "solid churches" to become more "liquid." For example, he envisions church being "a retreat center, a Christian shop, a music group," rather than the weekly meeting of the congregation. Adventist café churches in Scandinavia would probably fit well into his definition of "liquid church." The modern "cell church" movement would also be an attempt to move in the direction of "liquid church." However, even these two examples do not fully display what Ward is dreaming, but in his view they would be important milestones in the right direction. They are headed toward "liquid church" but are not the complete fulfillment of the dream he is envisioning.

The last chapter helps put some flesh on the ideas he promotes throughout the rest of the book. Until one gets to that chapter, the ideas seem unrealistic, but the final chapter helps to capture what Ward actually has in mind. Even then, the idea of a completely liquid church still appears to be an unrealistic glimpse into the future.

The book is well worth reading for anyone engaged in attempting to find solutions to the limited growth of Christ's church in the Western world during the twenty-first century. A person will probably not attempt to implement a completely "liquid church," but there are many parts of "solid church" that can be made more "liquid." From that perspective, the book will be valuable to those who are seeking to find a contemporary approach to mission.

From my perspective, the biggest problem with the ideas expressed is the ability of the church to become a community of faith. Ward seems to recognize this when he suggests: "Liquid church will abandon congregational structures in favor of a varied and changing diet of worship, prayer, study, and activity" (89). Such a structure or nonstructure would mean that communities of believers would be in constant flux and change. Christian fellowship would not be lasting and enduring. It appears as if Ward is suggesting that the spiritual growth of an individual is the primary issue rather than Paul's strong emphasis on the church as a community (Rom 12).

This reviewer recommends the book not as the final answer to the problem of reaching the world for Christ, but to challenge our thinking and ability to move beyond the more structured way of doing church and to discover new ways to "liquefy" the church for the future, even if the church continues to maintain much of its "solid" nature.

Andrews University RUSSELL BURRILL

Warren, Mervyn A. *King Came Preaching: The Pulpit Power of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001. 223 pp. Hardcover, $20.00.

Martin Luther King Jr. was one of America's most prominent twentieth-century religious and social leaders. The son and great-grandson of Southern Baptist preachers, King was raised in the church during an era of disenfranchisement for blacks. At the age of 15, he matriculated at prestigious, all-black Morehouse College in Atlanta before being granted a scholarship to Crozer Theological Seminary, and he earned a Ph.D. in Systematic Theology from Boston University. King began his pastoral ministry at the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church in Montgomery, Alabama, moving on to become the associate pastor of Ebenezer

Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, where his father was senior pastor, and from where he was catapulted into national prominence by the civil-rights movement.

In *King Came Preaching*, Mervyn Warren investigates and analyzes the homiletical methodology and preaching prowess of Dr. King. The book is an outgrowth of Warren's Ph.D. dissertation, which he submitted to the faculty of Michigan State University and gave to King's wife, Coretta Scott King, in 1988. Warren, a preacher and academician, was for many years Professor of Homiletics and Chair of the Department of Religion and Theology at Oakwood College in Huntsville, Alabama, and is currently the institution's provost. In this monograph, Warren seeks to avoid two extremes: "a mere biography of a preacher with only incidental references to his hands-on process of bringing a sermon to readiness and presentation, and a flooding of readers and practitioners with homiletical assumptions whose vagueness and impalpability would be mere shadows for chasing around discussion tables in ivory towers" (12).

King's oratorical ability is legendary, and his "I Have a Dream" speech is among the most widely played and heard in the world today. Yet King was first and foremost a preacher of rare gifts and competence who remained the pastor of a church throughout his life. These facts were not lost on Warren, whose focus in this work is on King's pulpit power. To begin with, Warren offers a "homiletical biography" of King, providing a succinct sweep of his spiritual, educational, and vocational journey from infancy to the day he was felled by an assassin's bullet. Acutely aware that King did not live in a vacuum, Warren places him in his social, political, and economic context, an era that began in the "roaring twenties" and ended in the tumultuous sixties.

Warren proceeds to examine the theological underpinnings that informed and shaped King's sermons, following this with an analysis of his audiences. No mean theologian himself, King's dissertation compared the conceptions of God in the thinking of Paul Tillich and Henry Nelson Wieman, and his sermons abounded with prodigious quotes from philosophers and theologians; yet King was at heart a Bible preacher, whose overriding objective was to "persuade human beings to live together as brothers and sisters and thereby fulfill a prerequisite to experiencing effectually the spiritual relationship with God as their Father and establishing the kingdom of God both on earth and in human hearts" (67).

To expand on the content of King's sermons as reflected in his ethos, logos, and pathos, and to examine his themes, language, sermon design, preparation, and delivery, Warren read and analyzed sixteen of King's sermons. The author's expansive knowledge of communication theory and techniques serves him well in this regard as he painstakingly and faithfully dissects the sermons. A strength of this book is that Warren is not content to state his inferences or conclusions without providing backing for them. Thus, he juxtaposes his own homiletical theory with examples in King's sermons, a practice that does not compromise the author's credibility and makes for easier reading.

As an honest researcher, Warren felt obligated to investigate the charges of plagiarism leveled at King, especially after his death. Warren concludes that King "doubtless assembled ingredients from a number of sources, but then he kneaded and worked and formed until he made his own loaf of bread" (135).

The concluding chapter of this volume explores King's contributions to preaching, theology, and the understanding of Christian life, including rediscovery of the relevance of preaching by applying Christianity to the contemporary context, assisting all Christians in experiencing "a fresh encounter with God" and understanding that "faith in God means also love for fellow human beings in their socioeconomic-political struggle," and facilitating the then-emerging trend among preachers to utilize philosophy and "formal reasoning" to herald and defend the gospel (169).

Appendices to *King Came Preaching* include a speech King presented at Oakwood College in 1962, a sermon titled "The Ultimate Doom of Evil" that he preached at the Central United Methodist Church in Detroit in 1964, a sermon titled "The Prodigal Son" (Ebenezer Baptist Church ca. 1966), another titled "No Room at the Inn" (Ebenezer ca. 1967), and a spreadsheet noting the quotations and references (including biblical references) in sixteen of King's sermons. A collection of pictures in the center of the book brings vividness, vibrancy, and poignancy to the volume.

Warren augments his exhaustive research of published material with personal interviews of his subject, a fact that makes *King Came Preaching* ring with authenticity and bulge with fresh insights. The author's syntax is neat and lucid, and he amply succeeds in realizing his stated objectives. Although there are several books about King on the market, few have tackled his pulpit person and power. So this work makes a valuable contribution to the literature on the veritable drum major for truth and justice. Pitched more to the academic community, the book should still find a ready readership among practitioners of the preaching craft and the general public.

Andrews University R. CLIFFORD JONES

Warren, Mervyn A. *King Came Preaching: The Pulpit Power of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.* Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2001. 223 pp. Hardcover, $20.00.

This is an unusual book. It is not just another biography of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr., of which there are plenty. It is not just another book on preaching, of which there are also many. It is neither a romanticizing of a Black hero nor a glamorization of his preaching. It is a homiletical biography. This insightful and informative book by Mervyn Warren, with a foreword by Gardner Taylor, is arranged in nine chapters and five appendices. It explores the sermons, preaching techniques, pulpit gifts, and audience impact of Martin Luther King Jr., whose preaching and leadership in the civil-rights movement changed America for the better.

In *King Came Preaching*, Warren's doctoral dissertation has been recast for popular consumption. Viewing King as one of the most effective and celebrated preachers in Western history, the author designed the book to revisit King's life through his sermons. It breaks new ground by giving biographical glimpses into his life as well as "practical, understandable, doable homiletical theory." This volume is not presented by a detached author who gathered his materials in a library. On the contrary, it was authorized by King, who provided Warren with interviews and opportunities to view him *in situ* as he crafted his work. Illustrations capture King in various stances in the act of sermonic delivery. The book is illustrated and aimed at both the experienced practitioner and the beginning preacher.

While providing insights into King the preacher and his interaction with his congregations, and while analyzing King's preaching (composition, content, style, presentation, and impact), *King Came Preaching* is also about Mervyn Warren. It offers him an opportunity to reflect on and submit his views of preaching after so many years as a practioner and teacher of this art, without actually presuming to write another homiletical text (cf. 91). The reader will find much benefit from his insights on King as well as his own approaches to, musings on, and vignettes about the preaching craft.

Chapter 1 introduces the volume with an insightful innovation—a homiletical biography of King. It not only sets his life in the historical context of his times, but also presents his life from beginning to end and traces his homiletical ancestry, solidly rooting him within an intergenerational preaching tradition. This chapter also looks at his academic tradition and how it prepared Martin for his lifework. Not only does the chapter reflect Warren's talks with King and his family; it also reports interviews with his academic professors and gives their candid insights and reflections regarding their famed student.

Chapter 2 presents King as a black preacher and examines his approaches to the liberating word of Scripture. It looks at the beginning of black preaching, traces its development, and explores King's use of it. Warren's triumvirate of outlooks and dimensions of black preaching—genetic, generic, and geometric—are instructive; yet his narrow definition of the genetic is problematic. If it is called "black preaching," then although it is intrinsically linked to African Americans, it should also include contributions and expressions of the "longing need for liberation from injustice" by others of the African Diaspora; yet no such allowances are made (47-48). Notwithstanding, King as a black preacher is viewed in priestly, prophetic, and apologetic styles as one who maintained a balance between scholarship and affirmation of the gospel. Indeed, Warren asserts that King's sermons reflect "the best of Christian preaching—relevance, theological consciousness and biblical grounding."

Chapter 3 analyzes King's audiences and his approaches to them, making a distinction between those who heard and those who listened. Four dominant aspects of black audience dynamic are presented: emotion, polarization, social facilitation, and circular response. According to Warren, King viewed a good sermon as having three elements (three P's, with the alliteration reflecting his respect for the preacher-audience relations): A good sermon "proves"—an appeal to the intellect; it "paints"—an appeal to the imagination; and it "persuades"—an appeal to the heart. King appealed to the three principal emotions—happiness, holiness, and love—outlined by the homiletician John Broadus.

Chapters 4 and 5 look at the content of King's sermons. While chapter 4 approaches content as reflected in the person, chapter 5 does it from the perspective of logos and pathos. Warren suggests that the person of the preacher "constitutes the strongest content of any preaching situation." As such, he presents the following traits as relevant to the content of King's person—empathy, sincerity, humility, uncompromising convictions, competence, persuasion, and goodwill. Not only does Warren look at the positive aspects of King's ethos, he presents, examines, and evaluates the negative challenges to his character. Chapter 5 analyzes King's use of generalizations, pathos, examples, narratives, statistics, and quotations in his sermons.

Chapter 6 presents the themes of King's sermons, beginning with his sources and noting the profound impact of men like Thoreau, Rauschenbusch, Niebuhr, and especially Gandhi. Warren observes that Jesus' impact on King came before Gandhi's, but the latter broadened his thinking and gave perspective for a better understanding of the former. Among the individual themes that Warren lists as used by King are personalism, love, the social gospel, good neighborliness, and human oneness. He also surveys theological tenets and concepts that were common to King's sermonic discourses: God, Jesus Christ, the church, the preacher, humankind, love, prayer, and good and evil.

Chapter 7 examines the language that King used in his sermons. It analyzes them by Rudolf Flesch's measures, looks at his sentence composition, and surveys his employment of some eighteen rhetorical devices and figures of speech. He also contrasts his oral and written language styles. Chapter 8 examines King's sermon design, preparation, and delivery, reflecting on such qualities as unity, order, proportion, and smooth transitions. King usually began his sermons early in the week and had them completed and written out by Saturday, even though he never preached from a manuscript. The final chapter outlines King's contributions to preaching and theology. This is followed by four appendices, each with a previously unpublished sermon of King, and a fifth appendix that analyzes King's use of sources.

This is an important volume. It is well researched, thoroughly documented, and engagingly written. It meets the author's purposes and reader expectations. On the whole, it presents valuable information that should benefit all readers. Indeed, there is much to learn from the style and methodology of this greater preacher. I enthusiastically recommend this book to homileticians, old and new—pastors, professors, college, and seminary students—as well as to those who want to take another look at King the pastor, speaker, preacher, theologican, leader, and person.

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Wheeler, Gerald. *James White: Innovator and Overcomer.* Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2003. 288 pp. Hardcover, $16.99.

White, James, *Life Incidents.* Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 2003. 373 pp. + xv introduction. Hardcover, $21.99.

These two books are the beginnings of two new series edited by George R. Knight: the first, a series of biographies intended to reach nonscholars; and secondly, a series of reprint editions of significant early Adventist works. The first volumes of these series revolve around James White, cofounder of the Seventh-day Adventist Church and organizational genius extraordinaire.

Although James White has much to be praised for (credit is due for starting the first denominational periodical [1849], founding the church's publishing work [1861], and organizing the church [1863], to name just a few), his proclivity to overwork often led to serious health problems. At times, especially during these health crises, he could be critical and exacting of others. White's complex personality may contribute in part to the lack of scholarly work available on his life in contrast to that of his prophetess wife, Ellen. Thus Wheeler accomplishes the once-thought-impossible task of casting a portrait of White with all of his accomplishments and failures. In doing so, he does not try to be strictly chronological, but instead seeks to condense White's life into major themes. Thus Wheeler builds upon the work of Virgil Robinson (Review and Herald, 1976).

Wheeler makes a major contribution by placing White within his own milieu. The author provides detailed information on his early life—of special import is the first major treatment of White as a Christian Connexion minister (29-36). Wheeler also develops early on a conflict with Cyprian Stevens (57-59, 101-102) as a source of early tensions that plagued White the rest of his life. Additional strengths in this book include a detailed description of the Whites' early years after marriage (1846) up through Rochester (1855), which is meticulously researched. After this, the narrative becomes more difficult to follow as it focuses more narrowly on White's organizational accomplishments (chaps. 10 and 15), his health problems (chap. 13), and some of the internal struggles in Battle Creek (chaps. 12 and 14). Wheeler, furthermore, alludes to a final renewal in White's Christian experience with a deeper understanding of righteousness by faith, but does not develop the topic enough. While this biography is an excellent introduction to the life of White, much is still left unresolved. For example, more could be said to describe his charisma that led some early church leaders after his death in 1881 to ask Ellen White if they might pray to raise him from the dead (E. G. White, Lt. 82, 1906). The latter half of the book is missing the continued contextual background that was so masterfully developed earlier. In summary, this is no work of hagiography and helps fill a void in Adventist historiography. One egregious mistake should be noted: Wheeler has both James and

Ellen White calling each other "my crown of rejoicing" (41-42), when in fact it was James who made the statement.

Not to be left out, the new edition of *Life Incidents* is attractively bound and complements Wheeler's biography with a primary-source account of White's story in his own words. The pages, enlarged from the original 1868 edition by 25 percent, are much easier to read. Also included is a ten-page critical introduction by Jerry Moon, Associate Professor of Church History at the Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary.

Berrien Springs, Michigan Michael W. Campbell

Whidden, Woodrow, Jerry Moon, and John W. Reeve. *The Trinity: Understanding God's Love, His Plan of Salvation, and Christian Relationships.* Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2002. 288 pp. Hardcover, $19.99.

Seventh-day Adventism changed its basic understanding of the Godhead from an early "anti-Trinitarian dominance" to a later "Trinitarian dominance" (190-203). Such a change was well taken by most Adventists, who perceived it as a significant move toward a more biblical view of God. But since the early 1990s an increasing number of Adventist "restorationists" are accusing that denomination of apostasy from its original anti-Trinitarian belief. Their criticisms, initially circumscribed to private publications, eventually reached a worldwide scope through the Internet. This has challenged mainstream Adventists to define more precisely how they relate to their own history and how they justify their present position on the Trinity.

In response to those challenges, three Andrews University professors—Woodrow Whidden, Jerry Moon, and John W. Reeve—joined efforts in producing *The Trinity*, the most comprehensive and thorough mainstream Adventist biblical-historical treatment on the Trinity. Due to its relevance to the contemporary debate, the book has been translated into Portuguese and published in Brazil by Casa Publicadora Brasileira (www.cpb.com.br). Intended primarily to help Seventh-day Adventists respond more effectively to contemporary anti-Trinitarianism, the work has a richness of content that goes far beyond the discussions of the problem within Adventism (limited basically to chaps. 13 and 14).

The book is divided into four major sections, each of them introduced by a specific "Glossary" that helps the reader know in advance the meaning of the technical terms and expressions used in the text that follows. Section 1, "The Biblical Evidence for the Full Deity of Christ, the Personality of the Spirit, and the Unity and Oneness of the Godhead," was written by Woodrow Whidden in a faith-uplifting style, with frequent rhetorical questions to involve the reader in the overall discussion. The content of this section is essentially biblical, with sporadic references to other commentators and theologians. The author not only explores the meaning of the Bible passages that support the Trinitarian view, including the full deity of Christ and the distinct personality of the Holy Spirit, but also analyzes the most common texts used by anti-Trinitarians to defend their own views.

John W. Reeve wrote section 2, "The History of the Trinity Doctrine from A.D. 100 to A.D. 1500," in a more formal historical style. This section unfolds the development of early and medieval Trinitarianism, with special attention to the political-ecclesiastical controversies engendered by different philosophical-theological perspectives. The overall discussion helps the reader to understand the various nuances of the term "Trinity" during that period and the way Roman Catholic Trinitarianism ended up heavily loaded with Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical presuppositions.

Section 3, "Trinity and Anti-Trinitarianism from the Reformation to the Advent Movement," by Jerry Moon, includes four chapters. During the Reformation era the doctrine of the Trinity was understood from a more philosophical-dogmatic perspective by Roman Catholicism, a less philosophical and more biblical outlook by mainline Reformers, and from a solely biblical basis by Restorationist Anabaptists. In the same era, some Rationalists fostered a radical rejection of Trinitarianism. The discussion within this section then moves to nineteenth-century North America, where anti-Trinitarianism was promoted by Rationalists such as the Deists and Unitarians, and some Restorationists such as the Christian Connexionists. In the chapter on Seventh-day Adventism, Moon correctly argues that its pioneers inherited much of the Connexionist anti-Trinitarianism, which between the 1880s and the 1940s was gradually replaced by biblical Trinitarianism. Crucial in that process was the prophetic role of Ellen G. White, to whom the author gives special attention (chap. 14, plus a Supplement to it).

In the final section, Woodrow Whidden deals with "The Doctrine of the Trinity and Its Implications for Christian Thought and Practice." He argues that the biblical concept of the Trinity is the highest expression of "outward-oriented love" (246), which is "mutually self-submissive, self-sacrificing, and overflowing with creative and redemptive consequences to the created beings of the universe" (267). In his perception, anti-Trinitarian and Unitarian religious traditions lean toward "legalistic views of salvation," while Trinitarian movements (with the exception of Roman Catholicism) have "a strong tendency to give a renewed emphasis to forgiveness or justification by grace through faith alone" (252)—so much so that "it was only when Seventh-day Adventism began to emerge out of its non-Trinitarian understandings of Christ's divinity that it began to find clarity on justification by grace through faith alone" (253).

Despite perceivable differences of literary style among its four sections, *The Trinity* is a well-planned book in which each new section tries to build on the foundation laid by the previous section and to prepare the ground for the next one. A specific bibliography appears at the end of each section, allowing the authors to mention in parentheses within the text itself the last name and the page number of each source referred to. Explanatory endnotes appear at the end of some chapters for the sake of clarification. Helpful subject and scriptural indices are provided at the end of the book.

The book is definitely a major contribution to understanding the various discussions about the Trinity. Without overlooking sound traditional concepts proposed by other authors, the work bears an overall taste of freshness due to the new insights and conclusions that spring here and there throughout its whole content. But, evidently, its most important contribution is the way it deals with early Adventist anti-Trinitarianism. Under the assumption that both Roman Catholicism and Protestantism have traditionally been much indebted to the Greek dualism between "(1) soul and body; (2) God and man; and (3) time and timelessness" (167-74), Jerry Moon suggests that Adventists' rejection of traditional presuppositions allowed them to develop eventually a truely biblical Trinitarian doctrine, "free from the controlling influence of Greek philosophy" (219, also 201-202).

There are, however, a few technical details that could be corrected and/or improved. For example, on p. 201, an article by Raoul Dederen is misdated 1972, when it actually appeared in print in 1970, as correctly indicated in the "Bibliography for Section Three" (233). Some readers might wonder why one of the authors in the first few pages of the "Introduction" frequently refers to himself as "I," "my," and "me" (7-8) and then changes the treatment to "we" and "our" (9-11), without any reference to who wrote those pages. Yet personal references within the sections themselves are easily identified by the authorship attributed to each of them (11).

Repetition might be helpful for clarification, but on p. 85 one of the authors states unnecessarily three times the same concept that "the first two hymns of [Revelation] chapter 5 praise the Son (verses 9, 10, 12) and the final hymn glorifies both the Father and the Son (verse 13)."

Some readers might not feel completely at home with the interpretation of the "river of life" in Rev 22:1 as a symbol of the Holy Spirit (88-89). Yet such an interpretation, whether acceptable or not, does not overshadow at all the important role of the Holy Spirit described in several other passages of the Revelation of John (78-91). Other readers could perhaps expect some additional discussion of contemporary theories of the Trinity, but such discussion seems not to be part of the original purpose of the study under consideration.

The Trinity succeeds in presenting relevant theological and historical information, understandable even for readers without formal theological training. Although it was written primarily for the Seventh-day Adventist community, the book should be welcomed also by other Christian theologians and ministers interested in the topic under discussion.

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Williams, Peter W. *America's Religions from Their Origins to the Twenty-First Century.* Chicago: University of Illinois, 2002. xi + 601 pp. Paper, $29.95.

How does one write a comprehensive religious history of a polyglot nation like the United States with such a vast array of religious traditions while achieving balance and coherence? Peter Williams has attempted this monumental task with some degree of success. Williams is perhaps attempting to compensate for the traditional religious-history texts that have focused narrowly on the white, male, Protestant tradition, by producing an incredibly a magisterial study that succeeds in capturing the vast religious plurality of America.

His work seeks to gather in and validate the religious varieties within the mainstream. A task of such magnitude and bold vision runs the risk of simply being an encyclopedic survey of many religious traditions rather than a serious historical analysis of American religious traditions. There are doubts about whether Williams has accomplished this enterprise, but he has definitely produced a credible work and has provided an exhaustive bibliography to fill in the gaps.

Williams's book consists of five major sections with fifty-five chapters. In Part 1, he examines the roots of the major religious traditions of America. He also describes and summarizes the basic religious ideas of Native Americans and African Americans.

In Part 2, he describes the religious traditions during Colonial America, suggesting that the American colonies formed "one of the most elaborate laboratories ever devised for the intermingling of peoples, cultures, and religious and social patterns."

Part 3 connects the relationship and influence of religious traditions in the formation of the American nation. For Williams, the first major event in American history was a religious event. The Great Awakening helped to prepare the way for the American revolution and nurtured national consciousness. America's birth was seen as a remarkable religious event, in which God unfolded his plan to create a nation that would be his special agent for good in an evil world.

Part 4 deals with the rebirth of the American nation in the aftermath of slavery and the Civil War. America became industrialized and urbanized. The religious hegemony of evangelical Protestantism was broken because of internal conflicts, the rise of modernism, and the dramatic demographic shift of population due to increased immigration, especially from non-Protestant Europe.

Part 5, covering chapters 42-55, deals with America's continuing evolution as a modern, religiously pluralistic nation. This period also marks the rebirth of neo-Conservatism, which was no longer just Protestant but now allied with conservative elements from other religious traditions.

Williams claims that he is not simply presenting a narrative account in postmodern fashion regarding each "locus of individual or group religious experience as equally valid and useful in understanding something about the American religious scene" (3). He seeks to acknowledge the commonalities of the religious communities and how they interact with the dominant American social and cultural system in which they find themselves. The main feature of his narrative is to delineate the major features of public religion, which he defines as "religious expression and organization of a group of people who have constituted themselves formally as a religious community" (3, 4).

His premise is based on the nature of American history—that each major wave of conquest and colonization and settlement brought people with their religious institutions, beliefs, and practices. Once they became established, he calls them a religious tradition, which provided people with a way of dealing with the ultimate questions of human existence, which can, in turn, be passed on as religious culture.

The strength of the book is the access it provides us to the treasure trove of American religious literature organized according to traditions and themes. There is an incredible inclusiveness about the work, for it covers scores of religious traditions, movements, and leaders that cut across a vast spectrum of ethnic groups, races, regions, and periods.

Williams struggles to bring coherency by attempting to correlate all these religious strands within the prevailing culture, societal, and historical current of the time. However, he has succeeded more in giving us a good survey of the religious history of America. The bibliography alone in his book is worth its price, for Williams has done an incredible job of pointing out the vast scholarship available on this subject. The bibliography on the continuing evolution of native American religious history is noteworthy, as traditional religious history texts simply omit any references to the ongoing evolution of Native American religions.

In his attempt to be so inclusive and pluralistic, Williams has at times failed to emphasize the truly significant and major religious junctures and events and how they may have shaped American history. The sheer volume of the information on the various groups is often overwhelming and lacks a unifying and coherent strand to tie it together. While this work qualifies as an excellent survey, it lacks insightful and profound analysis. Overall, this book makes a contribution to religious history in America and will provide valuable leads to anyone who wants to study in depth any area of American religious history.

Andrews University TREVOR O'REGGIO

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS AND REVIEWERS

"Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers" and frequently used abbreviations may be found on our website at www.auss.info, or in *AUSS* 40 (Autumn 2002): 303-306 and back covers, or copies may be requested from the *AUSS* office.

For general English style, see Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed., rev. John Grossman and Alice Bennett (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

For exhaustive abbreviation lists, see Patrick H. Alexander and others, eds., *The SBL Handbook of Style* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 68-152, 176-233. For capitalization and spelling examples, see ibid., 153-164.

Articles may be submitted by email, attached document. Queries to the editors in advance of writing are encouraged. See "Guidelines for Authors and Reviewers" for further details.

TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW AND ARAMAIC

CONSONANTS

א = ʾ   ה = h   ט = ṭ   מ = m   פ = p   שׁ = š
ב = b   ו = w   י = y   נ = n   צ = ṣ   שׂ = ś
ג = g   ז = z   כ = k   ס = s   ק = q   ת = t
ד = d   ח = ḥ   ל = l   ע = ʿ   ר = r

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

ַ = a   ֶ = e   ֵי = ê   ֹ = ō   וֹ = ô
ָ = ā   ֵ = ē   ִ = i   ָ = o   וּ = û
ֲ = ^{a} ֱ ְ (vocal shewa) = ^{e} ִי = î   ֳ = ^{o} ֻ = u

No distinction is made between soft and hard begad-kepat letters;
dāgēš forte is indicated by doubling the consonant.

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