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

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EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 3: EVOLUTION AND ADVENTIST THEOLOGY

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Introduction

The analysis of scientific methodology and its application in the construction of evolutionary theory has shown its epistemological limitations.[1] When theologians understand evolution as a "fact" to which Christian theology should accommodate, they are not responding to an unshakable certainty produced by reason or method, but to the consensus of the scientific community and the conviction of contemporary culture.

The purpose of this final article in a series of three is to explore the relationship between theological method and evolutionary theory in Adventist theology. Understanding the role of theological method in the generation and construction of theological thinking may help to illuminate the conditions and implications involved in rejecting evolution or accommodating Adventist doctrines to it. The study of theological methodology is a broad and complex field of studies. As in the first two articles of this series, I will deal with theological methodology only as it is directly concerned with the relation between creation and evolution. I will approach the broad issues of theological methodology by first briefly introducing the notion of "theological method" and the "scientific" status of theology. Then, I will explore the theology-science relation. Third, the way in which Christian theologies relate to evolutionary theology will be considered. Once these background issues have been reviewed, I will examine the question of theological method in Adventism, the way in which Adventist theology relates to evolutionary theory, and, finally, some tasks that Adventist thinkers must perform as they consider whether to accommodate theology to evolutionary theory.

Method as a Presupposition of the Creation-Evolution Debate

The creation-evolution conflict of interpretations is generally thought of in terms of faith and science or faith and reason. Although these approaches are important, they are misleading because they suggest that the generation of the content of faith does not involve reason or

[1]See Fernando Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 1: Outline and Limits of Scientific Methodology," *AUSS* 41 (2003): 65-100; and idem, "Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 2: Scientific Method and Evolution," *AUSS* 41 (2003):165-184.

scientific method.[2] In reality, the conflict between evolution and creation arises when theological methodology defines its material condition from the *sola Scriptura* principle. As theological "science,"[3] Adventist theology results from the use of human reason and theological methodology.

Though Adventist theology has developed more in the area of biblical studies than in the areas of fundamental and systematic theologies, it assumes strong positions in all these areas. Systematics studies the inner logic or coherence of the entire body of teachings of the church. To accomplish this task, it builds on biblical interpretations of the material, teleological, hermeneutical, and methodological principles. On this basis, systematic theologians pursue the logical connections of biblical thought, as opposed to the textual connections followed by biblical theologians. Thus, the doctrine of creation begins as a detailed exegesis of all biblical data related to the creation of the world, but then proceeds to demonstrate that creation is a divine action involving a divine pattern and purpose. Therefore, systematic theologians explore the understanding of creation not only in faithfulness to the biblical texts, but also by factoring in what is logically assumed in the issue, event, or reality that the doctrine explains. Creation is explored as divine activity (which requires a precise preunderstanding of divine nature and activity) and as what results from that activity (general knowledge of the world).

Because of this methodological and disciplinary basis, the conflict between evolution and creation should not be conceived as a conflict between a scientific theory and the Gen 1-2 accounts of creation, but as a conflict between the results of carefully defined empirical and theological methodologies. If the conflict were only between the Genesis accounts of creation and the theory of evolution, the Genesis accounts could not stand the intellectual weight and complexity of evolutionary methodology and theory. Yet, the Christian doctrine of creation is only one part of a larger

[2]Richard Rice, for instance, defines faith as "a voluntary act of complete trust in God which affirms, among other things, his existence and love in response to evidence that is helpful but not conclusive" (*Reason and the Contours of Faith* [Riverside, CA: La Sierra University Press, 1991], 29). To many, however, the contents of faith do not involve "a claim to know something" (ibid, 19). For them, the contents of faith do not originate through reason or method, but through imagination. Evidence, though never conclusive, may help believers in affirming their faith. Apparently, this way of thinking does not involve method in forming the contents of faith. Nonetheless, all definitions of faith, biblical and otherwise, arise from explicit or implicit concrete methodological principles.

[3]The term "science" has a variety of meanings. Though most associate the term with the empirical or so-called "hard" sciences, there are also the human or so-called "softer" sciences. In a broader sense, then, the term "science" applies to all methodically construed research activity. In fact, theology is "scientific" as far as it involves a plurality of scholarly disciplines. For an introduction on the many meanings and uses of the word "science," see Alister E. McGrath, *A Scientific Theology: Nature* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 1:25-26.

theological complex. Its intelligibility does not stand on one isolated text, but on the explanatory power of theological method and the inner logic of the entire sweep of biblical revelation.

In this conflict, reason, methodology, and interpretation are involved and omnipresent. Yet, reason can produce only interpretations, not absolute truth. Interpretation takes place because reason and method always lean on assumptions. Reason can produce at least two or more interpretations on any given issue or doctrine, which is why there are various views about reason, methodology, and interpretation. The competing views of creationism and evolutionism on the question of origins flow from the hypothetical nature of reason and method.[4]

Adventists seeking to harmonize evolution with Christian beliefs generally attempt to relate evolutionary metanarrative to biblical narrative (Gen 1-2). Not surprisingly, some have suggested that the two metanarratives be blended into one, at least as a temporary measure until there is more time to consider the evidence.[5] However, this approach, which at first seems the logical thing to do, ignores the fact that any harmonization between creation and evolution involves more than harmonizing a theory with Gen 1-2.

The harmonization between evolution and biblical creation involves two different methodologies and theoretical explanations. Failing to recognize that the doctrine of creation stands on a complex theological methodology in which it plays a leading hermeneutical role, and that creation is an inextricable component of the inner logic of biblical thinking, leads to the illusion that harmonization only requires the replacement of the obvious historical meaning of the Genesis account with a "theological" interpretation.[6]

Theological Method

Most scientists have a difficult time accepting theology as a science. Yet, some theologians think of their trade as scientific in a rational, as opposed to an experiential, sense. For example, Thomas Aquinas

[4]Creationism is not only the result of biblical exegesis, but also a possible conclusion of human reason, e.g., Plato thought of creation as a possible explanation of the origin of the world on rational rather than revelational grounds (*Tim.*, 27, e-29).

[5]See, e.g., Jack W. Provonsha, "The Creation/Evolution Debate in the Light of the Great Controversy Between Christ and Satan," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and Theological Perspectives*, ed. James L. Hayward (Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000), 310-311.

[6]Such is Fritz Guy's proposal, which runs against the clear literal-historical meaning of the Gen 1-2 account of creation, but fits the concrete methodological principles implicit in Guy's theological interpretation ("Interpreting Genesis One in the Twenty-first Century," *Spectrum* 31/2 (2003): 5-16). For an introduction to the historical meaning of Gen 1-2, consider Richard M. Davidson, "The Biblical Account of Origins," *JATS* 14 (2003): 4-43.

declared: "*Sacra doctrina* is a science,"[7] while in the twentieth century Thomas Torrance renewed the claim that theology is a science.[8] While most theologians do not generally refer to their trade as "scientific" per se,[9] they do, however, speak about theological method. As in the case of the so-called "hard" sciences, the scientific status of theology corresponds closely to the formal structure of the scientific method considered in the first article of this series. The scientific or scholarly nature of theology also relates closely to theological method.

With the increasing need for scientific verification, it is not surprising that Christian theologians representing a broad spectrum of traditions have recently approached the issue of theological method. Among the more influential contributors to the current debate on theological method are John Macquarrie (1966),[10] Thomas F. Torrance (1969),[11] Rene Latourelle (1969),[12] José Miguez Bonino (1975),[13] Gerhard Ebeling (1975),[14] Gordon D. Kaufman (1975),[15] Wolfhart Pannenberg (1976),[16] Bernard Lonergan (1979),[17] Frederick E. Crowe (1980),[18] Randy L. Maddox (1984),[19] Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger (1987),[20]

[7]Thomas Aquinas, *STh*e (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), Ia. 1, 2.

[8]The title of Thomas F. Torrance's *Theological Science* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969) clearly expresses that conviction.

[9]For theologians associating the term "science" with "theology," it is important to bear in mind Wolfhart Pannenberg's warning that "science" is "a term with its own multitude of meanings" (*Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, trans. Philip Clayton [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988], 130).

[10]John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology*, 2d ed. (New York: Scribner, 1966).

[11]Torrance.

[12]René Latourelle, *Theology: Science of Salvation*, trans. Mary Dominic (Staten Island: Alba, 1969); and also René Latourelle and Gerald O'Collins, eds., *Problems and Perspectives of Fundamental Theology* (New York: Paulist, 1982).

[13]José Miguez Bonino, *Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975).

[14]Gerhard Ebeling, *The Study of Theology*, trans. Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975).

[15]Gordon D. Kaufman, *An Essay on Theological Method* (Missoula: Scholars Press, 1975).

[16]Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Theology and the Philosophy of Science*, trans. Francis McDonagh (Philadelphia: Westminister, 1976).

[17]Bernard Lonergan, *Method in Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1979).

[18]Frederick E. Crowe, *Method in Theology: An Organon for Our Time* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1980).

[19]Randy L. Maddox, *Toward an Ecumenical Fundamental Theology* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984).

[20]Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental Theology*, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1987).

David Tracy (1988),[21] Avery Dulles (1992),[22] Richard Lints,[23] Kevin J. Vanhoozer,[24] and other evangelical theologians (1991).[25] A review of these and other writings on theological method reveal that what theologians mean by theological method varies greatly between traditions, schools of theologies, and individual theologians. These variations seem to take place because theologians usually address method theologically (materially) rather than epistemologically (formally), i.e., they explain what they do in their theological constructions rather than describe the components, operations, procedures, assumptions, and goals of their activities without reference to the actual subject matter of their investigations.[26]

When considered epistemologically, however, the rationality and formal structure of theological and scientific method are the same.[27] As with scientific method, theological method is a means by which specific goals are achieved.[28] Bernard Lonergan correctly describes method as "*a normative pattern of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and progressive results.*"[29] Thus, in a technical sense, method is a set of

[21]David Tracy, *Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1988); and idem, *The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism* (New York: Crossroad, 1991).

[22]Avery Dulles, *The Craft of Theology: From Symbol to System* (New York: Crossroad, 1992).

[23]Richard Lints, *The Fabric of Theology: A Prolegomenon to Evangelical Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).

[24]Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *God, Scripture, and Hermeneutics: First Theology* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2002).

[25]See, e.g., John D. Woodbridge and Thomas Edward McComiskey, eds., *Doing Theology in Today's World: Essays in Honor of Kenneth S. Kantzer* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991).

[26]This situation comes to view in the generation of the historical-critical method. Exegetes created the method on the go. Epistemological explanations of the method are few. Examples of a growing epistemological analysis of the method include Steven MacKenzie and Stephen Haynes, eds., *To Each Its Own Meaning: An Introduction to Biblical Criticisms and Their Application* (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1999); and the ongoing work of Christian philosopher Raúl Kerbs, "El método histórico-crítico en teología: En busca de su estructura básica y de las interpretaciones filosóficas subyacentes (Parte I)," *DavarLogos* 1/2 (2002): 105-123; and idem, "El método histórico-crítico en teología: en busca de su estructura básica y de las interpretaciones filosóficas subyacentes (Parte II)," *DavarLogos* 2/1 (2003), 1-27.

[27]For an introduction to the formal description of theological method, see Kwabena Donkor, *Tradition, Method, and Contemporary Protestant Theology: An Analysis of Thomas C. Oden's Vincentian Method* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2003), 45-60.

[28]Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method, Part I," 70-71.

[29]Lonergan, 5. He, 4, further explains that "there is method, then, where there are distinct operations, where each operation is related to the others, where the set of relations forms a pattern, where the pattern is described as the right way of doing the job, where operations in accord with the pattern may be repeated indefinitely, and where

procedures or rules prescribed for the purpose of facilitating the achievement of a goal.[30] In addition to the teleological condition, from which method receives its goals, there are other conditions that regulate methodological activities, procedures, and operations: the material condition, or data (i.e., the information about God required to spark issues that require explanation, produce interpretation, and construct theological explanations) and the hermeneutical condition (i.e., principles that guide theological interpretation and construction).

In theology, hermeneutical presuppositions consist of the principles of reality (i.e., the interpretation of the reality of God, human beings, and the world as studied with the tools of ontology, philosophical anthropology, and cosmology), articulation (i.e., the interpretation of reality as a whole and the way in which the parts connect with one another as studied with the tools of metaphysics[31]), and knowledge (i.e., the interpretation of the origin of theological knowledge [the understanding of revelation-inspiration] and the interpretation of human knowledge).

Thus, the goals of method function as the teleological condition, the data serves as the material condition, and the ideas that are assumed function as the hermeneutical condition. The conditions, working closely together, shape the concrete profiles of theological and scientific methods.[32]

As the formal (i.e., epistemological) features of scientific methodology are applied to a plurality of empirical sciences (e.g., physics, biology, geology, paleontology, and zoology), theologians apply the formal (i.e., epistemological) features of theological methodology to a plurality of theological disciplines (e.g., exegesis, systematic theology, and practical theology). Each theological discipline appropriates the formal characteristics of theological methodology by adapting them to the task of achieving the specific object of study that justifies its existence. Thus, there is no single theological method that is applicable to all disciplines. Rather, each discipline develops its own methodology

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the fruits of such repetition are not repetitious, but cumulative and progressive." Consequently, Lonergan, 6-25, organizes his discourse on method as an identification and explanation of the operations involved in the task of doing theology. Macquarrie, 33, agees with Lonergan's definition of method, but goes on to apply it in a different way to the task of theology.

[30]René Descartes explained that "by method I mean certain and simple rules, such that, if a man observe them accurately, he shall never assume what is false as true, and will never spend his mental efforts to no purpose, but will always gradually increase his knowledge and so arrive at a true understanding of all that does not surpass his powers" ("Rules for the Direction of the Mind," in *Great Books of the Western World*, ed. Robert Maynard Hutchins [Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1952], 5).

[31]On the metaphysical designation of the whole versus the part, see Aristotle, *Metaph.* V.26; 1023b, 26-102a, 10; and Pannenberg, *Metaphysics and the Idea of God*, 139-152.

[32]For further clarification on the conditions of theological method, see Fernando Canale, "Interdisciplinary Method in Christian Theology? In Search of a Working Proposal," *Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 43/3 (2001): 371-375.

in light of its specific objective (i.e., teleological principle). In order for the various theological disciplines to interact harmoniously with one another, they must share the same understanding of the hermeneutical (i.e., interpretational) and material (i.e., source of theology) principles of their particular methods. The disciplinary division of theological studies and the specific methodologies within each discipline requires an overarching interdisciplinary methodology through which all disciplines communicate, complement, and correct one another as each discipline contributes to the achievement of the final objective of theology.[33]

The difference between scientific and theological methodologies appears at the material level, i.e., when scientists and theologians give concrete content to the conditions and activities of method. Scientific methodology has nature as its intended formal object or cognitive goal, while theological methodology has God as its intended formal object or cognitive goal.[34] These goals, in turn, require different sources of data. Due to its object of study, scientific method works from empirical data. Christian theology, on the other hand, works from data believed to be supernaturally revealed. Scientists tend to agree among themselves as to the concrete content of the teleological and material conditions of scientific methodology and thus accept general patterns of empirical scientific methodology. Theologians, however, do not agree upon a universal method. The reason for this foundational disagreement may be found in the various ways in which different schools of theology define the material, teleological, and hermeneutical conditions of theological method.

Method in Theology

To understand the evolution-creation debate and the theological attempts to harmonize the biblical doctrine of creation to evolutionary theory requires the consideration of the main contours of Adventist and other Christian theological methodologies. I will use the "model" method of presentation,[35] i.e., I will attempt to summarize a few important characteristics of a very complex subject matter (i.e., method in Christian theology) in order to maximize communication, show the role that theological method plays in approaches that either reject

[33]For the "final objective of theology," see below on the teleological condition of method.

[34]It was not by chance that Aquinas, I, 1, 1, began his *STh*e by distinguishing between philosophical and theological sciences on account of their respective objects of study (i.e., teleological condition of method).

[35]David Tracy explains: "A widely accepted dictum in contemporary theology is the need to develop certain basic models or types for understanding the specific task of the contemporary theologian" (*Blessed Rage for Order*, 22). For further discussion of models, see Frederick Ferré, *Language, Logic and God* (New York: Harper, 1961); Ian Ramsey, *Models and Mystery* (London: Oxford University Press, 1964); and idem, *Christian Discourse* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965).

harmonization or that attempt harmonization of biblical creation with evolutionary theory, and, finally, to open the dialogue on this weighty issue. As I contrast Adventist theological methodology with other Christian methodologies, I will describe in explicit terms what, in Adventist theology so far, takes place mostly implicitly. In addition, while I will highlight some broad assumptions of Christian theological methodology, I will be dealing primarily with the classical (i.e., Roman Catholic and Protestant) model of theology with some references to modern theological methodology.[36]

The existence of Adventist doctrines assumes the existence of a theological method. However, Adventist theologians generally do not explain explicitly the methodology assumed in their interpretations and teachings. Further, Adventism has, so far, neglected the epistemological study and definition of theological methodology.[37] For this reason, I cannot build my analysis in this section from studies on this issue. I will rely in this section, then, on the occasional writers who have addressed the issues involved in theological methodology and in the methodologies implicitly assumed by current trends in Adventist thought.[38] This description will only

[36]For the purpose of this article, this brief treatment will suffice. I plan to study classical, evangelical, and modern models of theological methodologies in greater depth in a future study. Though there are some substantial differences between the classical and modern theological methodologies, their commonalities lead to similar results concerning the creation-evolution controversy we are focusing on in this series of articles.

[37]Adventists have been mostly concerned about biblical interpretation. For decades, their understanding of method revolved around exegetical methodology and familiarity with the principles of biblical interpretation. Representatives of this approach are Gordon Hyde, ed., *A Symposium on Biblical Hermeneutics* (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Committee, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1974); and Gerhard F. Hasel, *Biblical Interpretation Today* (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute, General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1985). In a series of articles published after his death, Gerhard F. Hasel went beyond exegetical methodology and principles of biblical interpretation to consider the disciplinary matrix of biblical theology as a scholarly discipline ("The Nature of Biblical Theology: Recent Trends and Issues," *AUSS* 32 (1994): 203-215; "Recent Models of Biblical Theology: Three Major Perspectives," *AUSS* 33 (1995): 55-75; and "Proposals for a Canonical Biblical Theology," *AUSS* 34 (1996): 23-33. Frank Hasel gave preliminary thought to the relation between systematic and biblical theologies in "Algunas Reflexiones sobre la relación entre la teología sistemática y la teología bíblica," *Theologika* 11 (1996): 105-123.

[38]Fritz Guy's *Thinking Theologically: Adventist Christianity and the Interpretation of Faith* extended the discussion on method to the area of theological studies. He explicitly states: "This book is an essay in theological methodology, which is one component of metatheology. It is an attempt to identify and explain important characteristics of Adventist theology (along with much of the theology of the larger Christian community), and to propose basic principles to guide this activity" ([Andrews University Press, 1999], 8). Guy, viii-ix, not only tells us that Adventist methodology is not unique, but that it should follow closely "much of the theology of the larger Christian community," (ibid., 8) notably, the modern pattern of theological method (ibid., 10). The modernistic pattern of Guy's, 10, theological methodology comes clearly into view when he states: "As the interpretation of faith, thinking theologically is thinking as carefully, comprehensively, and creatively as possible about the content, adequacy, and implication of one's own religious life." Guy's modernistic approach to theological

attempt to identify trends without analyzing them or discussing their overall consequences for Adventist theology or, more specifically, the issue of creation versus evolution.

Classical and modern theologians have reflected at some length on the theological methods their traditions use. While I am aware of these studies, my description of classical theological methodology will also take into account .what exemplary theologians actually do methodologically, a necessary step to clarify positions about the material, teleological, and hermeneutical conditions of method that studies in method may not have yet explicitly included.

Thus, theological method builds on the material, hermeneutical, and teleological conditions that shape its essence and procedures. We will now briefly consider the way in which classical and Adventist theologies deal with the conditions of method in the hope that this may help to explain why some Adventists consider harmonization between Adventist beliefs and the theory of evolution as being possible, while others do not.

The Material Condition

Various interpretations of the sources of theology and the inspiration and revelation of Scripture continue to generate divergent views on the material condition of theological methodology. In turn, this diversity of opinion on the identification and nature of theological sources produces different schools of theology that generate various traditions and communities.

Classical and modern theologies adopt a multiplicity of theological sources from which theological data originates. In spite of holding a high view of Scripture and inheriting the Reformation *sola Scriptura* principle,[39] most evangelical theologians subscribe to multiple sources of theology. In theory, they minimize the role of extrabiblical sources as "small,"[40] "utilitarian,"[41] or "eclectic."[42] In practice, however, whether

methodology explains why he can suggest harmonizing evolutionary theory and biblical creation by way of a "theological" interpretation of Gen 1 ("Interpreting Genesis One in the Twenty-first Century," 5-16). Recently, Donkor studied the formal structure of theological method and the role that tradition plays in the consensual methodology of Thomas Oden in his *Tradition, Method, and Contemporary Protestant Theology*. Donkor, 169, criticizes Oden's tradition-based methodology because it tends to subsume Scripture within the tradition category, something similar to what Guy seems to do in his definition of theological thinking as reflection on religious experience.

[39]For an introduction to the discussion of the role of Scripture in the Reformation and Protestant Orthodoxy, see Frank Hasel, *Scripture in the Theologies of W. Pannenberg and D. G. Bloesch: An Investigation and Assessment of Its Origin, Nature, and Use*, Europäische Hochschulschriften, 555 (New York: P. Lang, 1996). 31-61.

[40]Analyzing the role of natural theology (i.e., philosophical and scientific reflection on God) in Christian theology, Rice, 201, concludes that "there is validity in the time-honored distinction between the truths of reason and the truths of revelation, and the relative content of natural theology will be *considerably smaller in scope* than that of revealed theology" (emphasis supplied).

[41]Donald G. Bloesch, *A Theology of Word and Spirit: Authority and Method in Theology*,

explicitly or implicitly, theologians use philosophical (i.e., ontological, metaphysical, and epistemological) and scientific (i.e., cosmological) sources to shape the hermeneutical principles of their theological method. In so doing, philosophy and science become the guiding lights that theologians follow in their interpretations and systematic construction of Christian doctrines. This approach lies at the foundation of the Roman Catholic theological method and, in a less overt fashion, is still operative in Protestant theological methodology.

Among the sources from which Catholic and Protestant theologians draw theological data are Scripture, tradition, reason, philosophy, science, culture, and experience.[43] Theologians consider that all these sources are, in one way or another, products of divine revelation.[44]

In regard to Adventist theology, there are two competing views on the source of Christian theology. While some hold to the traditional *sola Scriptura* view, others hold to the notion of *prima Scriptura*.[45] The *sola*

Christian Foundations (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1992), 1: 49.

[42]Millard Erickson explains that he will use philosophy as a multiple source for theology, but will not commit to any system of philosophy (*Christian Theology*, 2d ed. [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998], 53).

[43]Different traditions configure these sources in different ways and understand their interrelationship in different ways. This diversity in understanding the multiplicity-of-sources pattern further fragments the way in which different schools of theology concretely interpret the conditions of theological methodology, e.g., Tracy thinks that the material condition of theological method must include two principal sources, "Christian texts and common human experience and language" (*Blessed Rage for Order*, 43). More specifically, "the Christian faith in its several expressions and contemporary experience in its several cultural expressions" (ibid., 45). Hans Küng, similarly speaks of "two constants, poles, or horizons for a critical ecumenical theology," which are: first, "our present-day experience with all its ambivalence, contingency, and changeableness;" and second, "the Jewish-Christian tradition" (*Theology for the Third Millennium*, trans. Peter Heinegg [New York: Doubleday, 1988], 166, 168). Many modern and postmodern theologians accept this view as a self-evident axiom. See also Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 1:119-257.

[44]For instance, according to Avery Dulles, 103: "Tradition is 'divine' insofar as it is aroused and sustained by God." Yet, we should be aware that the divine tradition includes the teachings of classical metaphysical principles. Thus, Dulles, 133, explains that as Roman Catholicism interacts with increasingly diverse philosophical trends, "the successful insights of the classical tradition must survive, or at least be subsumed in some recognizable form, in any future system. Historically, and I think providentially, Catholic faith has been linked with the metaphysical realism of classical thought, and has refined that realism in the venerable philosophical tradition."

[45]In *Thinking Theologically*, Guy departs from the *sola Scriptura* principle of the Protestant Reformation, which the first Fundamental Belief of Seventh-day Adventism clearly states, and replaces it with a plurality of sources and the *prima Scriptura* principle. Guy, 120, thinks that "the formal statement, 'Fundamental Beliefs of Seventh-day Adventists,' describes itself as a formulation of 'the church's understanding and expression of the teaching of Scripture,' which is 'the standard by which all teaching and experience must be tested.' While this statement is necessarily an oversimplification, ignoring both the presence of other ingredients in the community's theological thinking and the complexity of the relationship between scripture and experience, it appropriately

Scriptura view maintains that Scripture alone can provide theological data. The *prima Scriptura* conviction maintains that Adventist theology should build its doctrines upon a plurality of sources, among which Scripture has the primary or normative role. Evangelical circles identify this plurality of sources as the Wesleyan Quadrilateral. Roman Catholic theology also accepts a plurality of theological sources. On one hand, it is not difficult to see that when Scripture, tradition, reason, and experience are accepted as valid sources of theological data, any change in scientific or philosophical teachings becomes a change in theological data that might require changes in the hermeneutical conditions of theology. On the other hand, it is also easy to see that when Scripture alone is the source of revealed theological data, changes in science or philosophy will not alter theological reflection or understanding at the level of methodological conditions. Science and tradition are resources adjusted to the intelligibility and conditions dictated by the source of theology, namely, Scripture.[46] The difference between source and

and emphatically affirms the pre-eminent place of scripture in an Adventist interpretation of faith." Thus, Guy rejects the "*sola Scriptura* principle" that the Seventh-day Adventist community officially affirms and replaces it with a plurality of sources, among which Scripture functions as "first." Guy fails to notice here, perhaps due the material condition his modernistic methodology endorses, that in Fundamental Belief 1, Adventists state: "The Holy Scriptures, Old and New Testaments are the written Word of God given by divine inspiration," and, that they are "the infallible revelation of His will." Guy correctly perceives in this statement an "oversimplification" because other "ingredients" (i.e., sources of theology) are ignored. However, Guy forgets that the "oversimplification" is intentional, revealing a methodological decision made by the community. The community has chosen explicitly to build its theology based on the Bible and the Bible alone. Throughout her writings, Ellen White constantly reminds us of this methodological decision on which Adventism stands. Conversely, at the level of the grounding material condition of theological methodology, Guy's convictions clearly depart from the explicitly expressed "faith" of the Adventist community. On the *prima Scriptura* principle in Adventism, see also Woodrow W. Whidden, "*Sola Scriptura*, Inerrantist Fundamentalism and the Wesleyan Quadrilateral: Is 'No Creed but the Bible' a Workable Solution," *AUSS* 35 (1997): 211-226.

[46]Alister McGrath apparently subscribes to the *sola Scriptura* principle in his model for methodologically engaging tradition. He begins by stating his overall conviction: "I shall here suggest that one of the most fundamental distinctives of the evangelical approach to theology is its insistence that theology be nourished and governed at all points by Holy Scripture and that it seek to offer a faithful and coherent account of what it finds there" ("Engaging the Great Tradition: Evangelical Theology and the Role of Tradition," in *Evangelical Futures: A Conversation on Theological Method*, ed. John G. Stackhouse Jr. [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000], 139). In fact, however, he subscribes to the multiple sources of theology approach without distinguishing between revealed source, Scripture, and human-originated resources such as tradition, science, philosophy, and experience (see, e.g., 151). Yet, his strong advocacy of Scripture in dealing with the teachings of tradition stems from and leans toward the *sola Scriptura* principle. For instance, consider this statement: "It must be conceded that tradition includes mistakes. Well, what else can you expect? Theologians are human beings and hence prone to error. The important thing is to identify and correct these errors in the light of scripture itself" (ibid., 153). As far as I know, however, McGrath has not applied the primacy of Scripture to the contents of the hermeneutical condition of theology, the reality of God,

resource is that the former is generated by divine revelation, while the latter springs from human imagination. As resources originate in human understanding and imagination, they may contribute to theological discourse only after the *sola-tota-prima Scriptura* principle is applied.

The application of the *sola Scriptura* principle means that the hermeneutical condition of theological method, including the principles of divine, human, and world realities, is interpreted only from biblical thought. The *tota Scriptura* principle refers to the interpretation of all biblical contents and the inner logic from the biblically interpreted hermeneutical condition of theological method (*sola Scriptura*). The *prima Scriptura* principle refers to the fact that the hermeneutical principle, interpreted from scriptural thought (*sola Scriptura*) and the entire content of biblical thought (*tota Scriptura*), will guide theologians in critically selecting and incorporating from other sources (e.g., philosophy, science, experience) information as the teachings and inner logic of biblical thinking may require.

In Adventism, then, the material condition closely relates to the understanding of revelation-inspiration. Adventist theologians, however, also seem to be divided between the verbal,[47] thought,[48] and encounter[49]

humans, and the cosmos. In his recent *Nature*, McGrath, 21, seems to follow the traditional pattern that surrenders to natural theology the task of interpreting the principle of reality. If this is correct, once again, the affirmation of a plurality of theological sources and even a strong affirmation of *prima Scriptura* will lead theologians to define their hermeneutical principles from their own reflections on nature and, in turn, explicitly or implicitly use them to interpret and construct their understanding of Christian theology.

[47]The verbal theory of inspiration sprang from the classical method of theology. Briefly put, the verbal theory of inspiration maximizes God's activity to the point of virtually obliterating human contributions in the origination of Scripture. The classical notion of divine sovereignty advanced by Augustine and continued by Luther, Calvin, and Protestant theology stands as the foundation of this theory of revelation-inspiration. For an introduction to and critique of the verbal model of inspiration, see Fernando Canale, *Back to Revelation-Inspiration: Searching for the Cognitive Foundations of Christian Theology in a Postmodern World* [Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2001], 75-88). For a historical description of the presence of this view in Adventist theology, see George Knight, *A Search for Identity: The Development of Seventh-day Adventist Belief* (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 128-159. This theory is also known as "plenary" inspiration (I. S. Rennie, "Plenary Inspiration," in *Evangelical Dictionary of Theology*, ed. Walter A. Elwell [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984], 860-618; idem, "Verbal Inspiration," in *Evangelical Dictionary of Theology*, 1242-1244; and Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970], 1:165). "Verbal" indicates opposition to the notion that only the prophets' thoughts rather than their words are inspired. Both "verbal" and "plenary" theories consider inspiration as divine assistance that renders the words of Scripture inerrant. Archibald Alexander clarifies that the "plenary" view of revelation-inspiration upholds the absolute inerrancy of Scripture (*Evidences of the Authenticity, Inspiration and Canonical Authority of the Holy Scriptures* [Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath-School Work, 1836], 223, 230).

[48]The notion of "thought inspiration" is primarily an Adventist phenomenon, which takes its inspiration from Ellen White's famous statement: "It is not the words of the Bible that are inspired, but the men that were inspired. Inspiration acts not on the

views of inspiration-revelation. Theologians who adhere to the "thought" or "encounter" theories of revelation-inspiration and to the Quadrilateral of sources will be more likely to contemplate a harmonization between the biblical doctrine of creation and the theory of evolution and to consider such a harmonization as a positive scientific advance that Adventist theology should recognize. Theologians who believe that the inspiration of Scripture reaches not only its thoughts but also its words[50] and who hold

man's words or his expressions but on the man himself, who, under the influence of the Holy Ghost, is imbued with thoughts. But the words receive the impress of the individual mind. The divine mind is diffused. The divine mind and will is combined with the human mind and will; thus the utterances of the man are the word of God" (*Selected Messages* [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1958], 1:21). From this statement comes the theory that God's activity only relates to and originates "thoughts," but is not present to guide the prophet's choice of words. The implication is that if God is not involved in the writing by choosing the words, then Scripture can contain errors. This notion has circulated within Adventism as an "antidote" to the encounter theory of inspiration (see Edward Heppenstall, "Doctrine of Revelation and Inspiration, Part 1," *Ministry*, July 1970, 16-19; and idem, "Doctrine of Revelation and Inspiration [conclusion]," *Ministry*, August 1970, 28-31). The notion of thought inspiration has also been used as an antidote to problems arising from a strict application of the verbal-inspiration theory and its implicit corollary of total inerrancy (Juan Carlos Viera, *The Voice of the Spirit: How God Has Led His People Through the Gift of Prophecy* [Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 1998], 81-82); and to open room for the use of the historical-critical method in Adventist exegesis (Alden Thompson, *Inspiration: Hard Questions, Honest Answers* [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1991], 47, 53). Finally, some Adventists, convinced that evolutionary theory or deep time are unavoidable truths they cannot deny, use the notion of "thought" inspiration as a starting point for harmonizing evolutionary theory with biblical creation. See, e.g., Raymond F. Cottrell, "Inspiration and Authority of the Bible in Relation to Phenomena of the Natural World," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and Theological Perspectives*, ed. James L. Hayward (Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000), 195-221; Frederick E. J. Harder, "Prophets: Infallible or Authoritative?" in *Creation Reconsidered*, 223-233; and idem, "Theological Dimensions of the Doctrine of Creation," in *Creation Reconsidered*, 279-286. What these authors forget is that White's overall view of inspiration and Scripture does include God in the generation of the words of Scripture. Ellen White argues against the way in which the classical doctrine of inspiration (i.e., verbal, plenary theory) interprets God's operation in the origination of the thoughts and words of Scripture. God does not bypass human agency, but engages it in the generation of both the content and the words of Scripture (*The Great Controversy* [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1950], v-vii).

[49]The encounter model of revelation-inspiration teaches that God encounters biblical writers personally rather than cognitively. According to this view, the bottom line is that God does not communicate information—either thoughts or words—to the prophets. Consequently, every word, thought, or other type of information communicated in Scripture originates in the imagination of human beings. See, for instance, Herold Weiss, "Revelation and the Bible: Beyond Verbal Inspiration," *Spectrum* 7/3 (1975): 49-54. From this perspective, we should expect to find all sorts of philosophical, scientific, historical, and ethical errors in Scripture. It is not clear how many Adventist theologians work within this modernistic definition of the origin of Scripture. Obviously, those working from this perspective can consistently argue not only for harmonization between Scripture and science, but for plain scientific correction of biblical teachings.

[50]To affirm that divine inspiration reaches the words of Scripture, one does not

the *sola Scriptura* view will be more likely to reject the theory of evolution as being incompatible with Christian teachings. Thus, choices regarding the material condition of theological method clearly determine the coherence and viability of harmonizing biblical thought with scientific theories.

The Teleological Condition

The teleological condition refers to the final and intermediate objectives theological methodology attempts to reach by way of its activities and procedures. Thus, there is an overall goal which theology proper seeks, specific disciplinary goals, and immediate goals for each research project or activity within the various theological disciplines (e.g., exegesis, systematic theology, practical theology, and church administration).

Determining the overall goal of theology also affects the decision whether to harmonize creation with evolution or deep time. For those following Augustine's lead,[51] the overall objective of theology is human understanding and relation to God, which generates little in regard to the conflict between theology and evolution. Instead, the classical understanding of the teleological condition of theological method calls for complementation between science and theology, preempting the need to harmonize them. Complementation becomes possible when theologians understand that scientific and theological methodologies have different teleological conditions. The objective of science is to understand nature; the objective of theology is to understand God. Thus, when considered at the methodological and disciplinarily level, there is a prearranged complementation between science and theology: theology studies God; science studies the world. As theologians and scientists study the question of origins, each has its own, different goal. While theologians deal with origins from the side of God's role in creation, scientists deal with origins from the side of the world's primordial history.

This way of viewing the overall objective of theology flows from the material condition of method understood as a plurality of sources (see previous section). It simultaneously flows from the classical interpretation of the hermeneutical condition as the timeless being of God (see the next section). The attempt to interpret Gen 1 "theologically" flows from within this constellation of methodological conditions. Within this presetting of the conditions of theological methodology, a "theological" interpretation of Gen 1 searches for the overall objective of theology, namely, God, and

need to submit to the classical-Protestant theory of "verbal" or "plenary" inspiration. For an alternate theory of revelation-inspiration that overcomes the verbal-thought-encounter debate, consider the historical-cognitive model of revelation-inspiration (Canale, *Back to Revelation-Inspiration*, 127-153).

[51]"God and the soul are the main objectives of Saint Augustine" (cited from Augustine, *Soliloquies* I, 2, 7; II,1,1 by Armand Maurer, *Filosofia Medieval* [Barcelona: Emece, 1962], 2: 8 (my translation); see also Guillermo Fraile, *Historia de la Filosofia* [Madrid: BAC, 1966], 2: 208).

discards everything else as irrelevant for theological purposes. This methodological disruption of meaning violates the integrity of the multiple meanings and carefully interwoven referents that a careful exegesis reveals as present in the texts.

As far as I know, Adventists have not given specific thought to this issue. In Adventist circles, discussions related to this area of theological methodology usually revolve around the relative importance of practice and theory in theological education. Traditionally, Adventists seem to assume that the overall objective that theology attempts to achieve is the understanding of Scripture, thereby overlooking the task of systematic and practical theologies.

From the *sola Scriptura* methodological perspective, the definition of all theological objectives should spring from Scripture. Scripture suggests that the overall goal of theology may include attaining eternal life (Phil 3:11) as we come to know God and Christ (John 17:3). However, according to Scripture, the overall objective of theology may also include the understanding of God's works of creation and redemption. If this is so, the understanding of everything in relation to God is part of the overall objective of theology (Heb 2:8-10; Eph 1:10; 1 Cor 15:27-28).

If, instead of following Augustine's lead, Scripture is allowed to lead so that the overall objective of theology also includes the knowledge of how God relates to everything including creation and history, then the content of the teleological condition of the theological method will be defined in a way that includes rather than excludes the world. Because the biblical definition of the overall objective of theology does not separate but rather historically integrates God and the world, we can now interpret Gen 1 "theologically" without disrupting the complexly interwoven net of meanings present in the text. Genesis speaks about God, its proper methodological objective. Science speaks about the world, its proper methodological objective. But when we define what a "theological" interpretation means from a biblical definition of the teleological condition of theological methodology, the world is included rather than excluded as the theological objective. In this context, a "theological" interpretation of Gen 1 does not allow us to harmonize Scripture with science.

Any "theological" interpretation of Gen 1, then, depends on the way in which theologians and exegetes define or implicitly assume the teleological condition of their theological methodology. Theologians willing to leave the traditional consensus behind and interpret the teleological and hermeneutical conditions of theological methodology from Scripture will discover that a different "theological" interpretation of Gen 1 is possible. This methodological shift will form a "theological" interpretation that, instead of calling for a separation of God from the realm of nature, calls for their integration. This interpretation is "theological" because it seeks to understand the origin of the world from data God originated through the

revelation and inspiration of Scripture.[52] Conversely, this interpretation is not "scientific" because it does not build its understanding from sensory experience, scientific method, or scientific theories.

The scientific search for understanding the origins of our planet and universe is a different and legitimate enterprise.[53] Yet, when we define the contents of the teleological condition of our theological method from Scripture and include in it not only God, but also his relations to nature and history, a partial overlapping with the overall objective of scientific methodology takes place. Though sharing the same teleological principle (i.e., understanding the origin of nature), scientific methodology and a biblically constructed theological methodology find the epistemological justification for their independent approaches in the radically different origin of the data from which they work (i.e., different views of the material condition). Scientific data originates from sensory-perception experiences. Theological data originates from divine revelation and inspiration. For this reason, complementarity is not possible. Instead, conflict between creation and evolution becomes possible. Harmonization between their teachings will depend on their contents. If their interpretations collide with each other, which discipline will surrender to the other? The way in which the material condition of theological method is defined will strongly influence the answer to this question. If Christian theology is built on a plurality of sources, biblical thought will tend to be adjusted to scientific and philosophical thinking. If, on the other hand, theology is built on the *sola Scriptura* principle, scientific and philosophical teachings will tend to be conformed to biblical thought. We now turn to the hermeneutical condition of theological methodology.

The Hermeneutical Condition: Introduction

As scientific methodology assumes an a priori hermeneutical condition, so does theological methodology. The hermeneutical condition refers to the presuppositions that scientists and theologians must assume when they attempt to interpret their data and achieve the overall goals of their disciplines. In theological method, the hermeneutical condition provides the guiding principles for interpreting biblical texts and constructing the content of Christian theology. This condition of theology is by far the most complex and influential in processing data and in theory construction.

As in scientific methodology, theological methodology includes different levels of hermeneutical principles. According to their relative extension or inclusiveness, one can speak of micro-, meso-, and macro-

[52]This builds on the assumption of the *sola Scriptura* principle and the rejection of the plurality of sources or quadrilateral of sources.

[53]See Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method, Part 2."

hermeneutical principles.[54] Most Adventist theologians are better acquainted with biblical principles of interpretation (i.e., micro-hermeneutics) than with theological principles of interpretation (i.e., meso-hermeneutics), and have minimal awareness of the most inclusive ontological, epistemological, and articulation principles (i.e., macro-hermeneutics) used in interpreting micro- and meso-hermeneutical principles and the data of theology.[55]

Due to this scholarly situation, Adventists are likely to approach the creation-evolution debate as a dialogue/conflict between the "correct" way to interpret Gen 1[56] and the "assured" conclusions of scientific reflection.[57] In this way, the current debate bypasses the highly complex

[54]I borrow the designation "macro, meso and micro" from Küng, 134. Küng applies the terms to his analysis of the disciplinary matrix (i.e., methodological procedures) of theology. I use them to designate the guiding presuppositions that the task of doing Christian theology necessarily requires. For a discussion of macro-, meso- and micro-hermeneutical paradigms, see Fernando Canale, "Evangelical Theology and Open Theism: Toward a Biblical Understanding of the Macro Hermeneutical Principles of Theology?" *JATS* 12/2 (2001): 20-26.

[55]This situation is slowly changing. With the growth of worldwide Adventism and the origination of new universities and doctoral programs, research in this area has begun. Additionally, the forceful advent of postmodernity at the end of the twentieth century has also shown the need to deal seriously and in depth with the epistemological and cultural presuppositions of theology. Symptomatic of this beginning is volume 10, numbers 1 and 2 of the *Journal of the Adventist Theological Society* published in 1999, titled "Hot Topics & Postmodernism Issue." Identifying postmodernism as an issue shows awareness of its importance for the collective reflection of the church. Yet, only six out of twenty-eight articles related to postmodernity. This reveals the incipient status of this area of Adventist scholarship. The contributions of Rice's *Reason and the Contours of Faith* (1991), Guy's *Thinking Theologically* (1999), and Norman Gulley's *Systematic Theology: Prolegomena* (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 2003) are a welcomed exception to the rule.

[56]Frederick E. J. Harder advises Adventists to make a nonliteral interpretation of Gen 1 ("Literary Structure of Genesis 1:1-2:3: An Overview," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and Theological Perspectives*, ed. James L. Hayward [Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000], 245), while Guy urges a theological interpretation (Guy, "Interpreting Genesis One in the Twenty First Century," in *Creation Reconsidered*, 11-13). Harder also thinks of creation in terms of Gen 1 rather than as a complex biblical doctrinal pattern, when he points out that Adventists are inconsistent "in affirming deep time for the universe and denying it for earth history" ("Theological Dimensions of the Doctrine of Creation," 281). Harder, 245, concludes: "The creation narratives concede no authority for separating in time the creation of this planet from the universe beyond." Harder does not seem to realize that in accepting deep time for the heavens and not for life on earth Adventists do not build on Gen 1 alone, but also on the Great Controversy understanding of Scripture that flows from the creation pattern scattered throughout the OT and NT. Besides, Davidson has persuasively argued that Gen 1 makes room for a "passive gap" between the creation of the universe (Gen 1:1-2) and the creation of our planet (Gen 1:3ff.) ("The Biblical Account of Origins, 20-25). Thus, there is no "Adventist inconsistency" as Harder suggests. Adventist discrimination between accepting deep time for the universe and rejecting it for life on earth stands on sound exegesis and on the overall pattern of biblical revelation about creation.

[57]"Progressive" Adventists' certainty about evolution and deep time seems deeply rooted in their thinking (Hayward, "Preface," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and*

intellectual interpretive-methodological process through which we arrive at both theological and scientific conclusions.

Previously we addressed the nature and role of hermeneutical presuppositions in our general outline of scientific methodology[58] and its application to evolutionary method.[59] We turn now to the presence and operation of these presuppositions in classical-modern Christian theology and in specifically Adventist theology. As the goal of exegesis is to understand the meaning of biblical texts, so micro-hermeneutics assumes the basic literary and historical characteristics of biblical texts. As in theology, there is an attempt to understand realities instead of texts, so meso-hermeneutics assumes the basic characteristics of reality that each specific doctrine studies (e.g., God, Christ, church). Finally, since theology attempts to understand God and everything else in relation to God, exegetes and systematicians always assume general ideas (macro-hermeneutics) about God, human beings, the world, and the way in which they interact. Since theology is a search for understanding, in doing exegesis and systematic theology theologians also bring "pre-" understandings about the ways in which they understand God, humanity, and world, i.e., about the way in which they assume their cognitive capabilities to function and what these capabilities reach when operating properly. This includes an understanding of reason and of the means through which it receives its data (i.e., through the process of revelation-inspiration).

We must now consider briefly the way in which classical and modern theological models have interpreted the leading hermeneutical principles from which Christian theology has been constructed.

The Hermeneutical Condition: Classical-Modern Interpretation

Shortly after the close of the NT canon, Christian theologians recognized the pivotal role that cosmology played in the construction of Christian theology.[60] As contemporary theologians do with the

Theological Perspectives, ed. James L. Hayward [Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000], 11-14). Their certainty seems grounded on the application of methodologies and assumptions broadly accepted as contemporary "normal science." Thus, short of an epoch-making paradigm shift upsetting the currently "orthodox" evolutionary paradigm in the scientific community, Progressive Adventists' certainty of the dictates of evolutionary science and deep time is not likely to change. This certainty is so high that persuasive arguments from biblical theologians or biblically originated science (scientific creationism) most likely will not change their minds.

[58]I discussed the presence, identification, and role of the hermeneutical conditions in scientific methodology briefly in the first article of this series, "Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 1," 79-84.

[59]I discussed the presence, identification, and role of the hermeneutical conditions in evolutionary methodology in "Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 2," 171-176.

[60]"The first Christian theologians, called the Apologists (second and early third centuries), frequently chose a different strategy. They presented Jesus not as the

evolutionary theory, early Christian theologians did with Platonic cosmology: they incorporated the broadly accepted cosmology of their times into the material condition of their theological method. This perspective guided them in their interpretation of the reality (i.e., ontology) of God and of human beings (i.e., anthropological ontology).[61] The cosmology of the times was Neoplatonism.[62] Gnosticism followed it so closely that it almost destroyed the distinctive features of NT thinking.[63]

Classical theology rejected the extreme use of Neoplatonic thought as modeled in Gnostic syncretism, but settled for a more moderate usage of the same cosmological pattern.[64] This moderate use of Neoplatonic cosmology settled the fate of Christian theology. Neoplatonic cosmology became a leading hermeneutical light, guiding the Christian interpretation of divine and human ontologies to which it remained attached. Thus, the Greek timeless ontological understanding of God and human beings was introduced into Christian theology via the ontological interpretation of a timeless God and an immortal (i.e., timeless) soul.[65] Even today, most Christian theologians

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contradiction of Greek wisdom, but as its fulfillment. Justin Martyr (c. 100-c. 165) and Clement of Alexandria (c. 150-c. 215), for example, admitted that Christians had no monopoly on wisdom. They taught that the truth sought and explicated by Socrates and Plato found its fullest expression in Christ. The One whom Plato taught to be the source of everything was the Father of Jesus the Christ. The synthesis between the wisdom of the Greeks and Christian revelation attempted by the Apologists defines the theological task. Its presupposition undergirds the history of the Catholic thought" (Jack A. Bonsor, *Athens and Jerusalem: The Role of Philosophy in Theology* [New York, NY: Paulist, 1993], 23-24).

[61]Paul Tillich explains that "Neo-Platonism is important not only because of its influence on Origen, who produced the first great theological system, but because through Dionysius Areopagite it influenced all later forms of Christian mysticism and most forms of classical Christian theology, especially with respect to the doctrines of God, the world, and the soul. It is impossible to understand the further development of Christian theology without knowing something about Neo-Platonism, the last great attempt of paganism to express itself in terms of a philosophical theology,which was both science and life for the ancient mind" (*A History of Christian Thought: From Its Judaic and Hellenistic Origins to Existentialism* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967], 50-51).

[62]J. N. D. Kelly states: "In Neo-Platonism, the tendency to make God transcendent was carried as far as it could go. This was that fully developed system, Platonic in its main inspiration, but incorporating Aristotelian, Stoic and even Oriental elements, which flourished from the middle of the third century and with which the fathers of the second half of our period were familiar. It is best exemplified by Plotinus (205-270), the Greek-speaking Egyptian who was its founder and also one of the greatest thinkers of the ancient world" (*Early Christian Doctrines*, rev. ed. [San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1960], 20).

[63]Justo L. Gonzalez, *A History of Christian Thought* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 1:140.

[64]For a detailed introduction to Gnosticism, see Simone Pétrement, *A Separate God: The Origins and Teachings of Gnosticism*, trans. Carol Harrison (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 1984).

[65]Jaroslav Pelikan notes: "Two Christian doctrines are perhaps the most reliable

accept, as a methodological fact, that the Christian faith results from reflection upon data provided by a multiplicity of sources.[66] Moreover, the broad ontological principles of Greek philosophy determine the way Christian thinkers assume the nature of material and spiritual realities on which the classical Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies are constructed. Platonic cosmology conceived the world as a composite of two tiers: a timeless, spaceless world or level of reality and our spatiotemporal world or tier of reality. Material realities are spatiotemporal; spiritual realities are neither spatial nor temporal.

This cosmological dualism[67] became the guiding hermeneutical principle theologians used to interpret the biblical notion of God as timeless and nonhistorical and the reality of human beings as a composite of spiritual-timeless (the soul) and material (the body) substances.[68] Thus, the dualistic pattern of Greek Platonic and Aristotelian ontologies shaped the way in which classical theologians understood the components of the principle of reality (i.e., God, human nature, and the world) of the hermeneutical condition of theological methodology. As successive generations of theologians called on these notions to play a hermeneutical role in their theological reflection, the system of classical Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies came into

indications of the continuing hold of Greek philosophy on Christian theology: the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the doctrine of the absoluteness of God" (*The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine* [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971], 1:5). He, 5, also states that "the idea of the immortal and rational soul is part of the Greek inheritance in Christian doctrine; Thomas Aquinas and Philip Melanchthon are only two of the many theologians to compose treatises with the title *On the Soul* whose content was determined more by philosophical than by biblical language about the soul."

[66]Regarding the multiplicity of sources in the classical evangelical tradition, see Albert C. Outler, who identifies Scripture, tradition, experience, and reason (*The Wesleyan Theological Heritage*, ed. Thomas C. Oden and Leicester R. Longden [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1991], 22-37). In the modernist tradition, Tracy identifies two main sources: Christian texts and common human experience (a phenomenology of "religious dimension" present in everyday and scientific experience and language) (*Blessed Rage for Order*, 43-63).

[67]Plato's view of the cosmos is "dualism" and not mere "duality," where two different levels of reality interact, because, according to him, the earthly lower world of history and nature "duplicates" the higher world of timeless realities. Plato put it this way: "Now the nature of the ideal being was everlasting, but to bestow this attribute in its fullness upon a creature was impossible. Wherefore he resolved to have a moving image of eternity" (*Tim.* 37.d).

[68]Regarding the doctrine of God, Pelikan, 1:5, remarks that the notion of divine impassivity was taken from Greek ontology and customarily assumed by theologians "as an axiom, without bothering to provide very much biblical support or theological proof." Finally, Pelikan, 1:53, notices that "whether theologians found Platonic speculation compatible with the gospel or incompatible with it, they were agreed that the Christian understanding of the relation between Creator and creature required 'the concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality'—a concept that came into Christian doctrine from Greek philosophy."

existence through an intellectual process similar to what Thomas Kuhn describes as "normal science" in the natural sciences.[69]

The classical theological synthesis reached its high point with Augustine and Aquinas. A minor paradigm shift took place when dissatisfaction with the "normal" theological thinking of the time led Luther and Calvin to "reform" the classical system of theology, thus introducing a paradigm shift in the normal theological science of the times.[70] Their theological reformation, however, still stood on the earlier application of Platonic cosmology to biblical teachings via Augustine's thought patterns.[71]

Thus, to this day, Platonic cosmology continues to be a leading macro-hermeneutical principle of Christian theology. Particularly, it continues to determine the ontological background from which Christians understand the natural and supernatural levels necessarily involved in theological thinking. Accordingly, reality is understood to include two major levels: the spiritual and the material. God and theology belong to the spiritual; natural science belongs to the material. The spiritual order comprises the order of timeless realities and their "logical" order of causality, where historical sequential causality does not take place.

The material order embraces all realities and causes occurring in the

[69]Thomas S. Kuhn defines "normal science" as "research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundations for its further practice" (*The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2d ed. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970], 10). He, 10-51, further expanded his notion of normal science in the hard-science domain in the same book. A number of leading theologians met in Tübingen to consider the application of Kuhn's notions of normal science and paradigm shift in the realm of Christian theology. The papers and discussions presented in the symposium were published in Hans Küng and David Tracy, eds., *Paradigm Change in Theology: A Symposium for the Future* (New York: Crossroad, 1991). Hans Küng published his own take on the issue in his *Theology for the Third Millennium*. See also, Frank M. Hasel, "Thomas Kuhn's Concept of Paradigm and Paradigm Change," *JATS* 2/2 (1991): 160-177.

[70]Stephan Pfürtner tentatively concludes that "the Reformers, with their theologically influential supporters and their communities, pursued a highly intensive 'study' of the new paradigm in its interpretative framework" ("The Paradigms of Thomas Aquinas and Martin Luther: Did Luther's Message of Justification Mean a Paradigm Change?" in *Paradigm Change in Theology*, ed. Hans Küng and David Tracy [New York: Crossroad, 1991], 130-160). See also Hans Küng, *Christianity: Essence, History, and Future*, trans. John Bowden (New York: Continuum, 1995), 539-577.

[71]According to Pelikan: "The presupposition for the doctrine of justification was a vigorous reassertion of Augustinian anthropology" (*The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine*, 4:139). Calvin makes clear that he is in total agreement with Augustine's thinking: "Augustine is so much at one with me that, if I wished to write a confession of my faith, it would abundantly satisfy me to quote wholesale from his writings" (*Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God*, trans. J. K. Reid [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1977], 63). It goes without saying that in such a coincidence of thought, the basic philosophical ontology and epistemological presuppositions on which Augustine built his theology were attached by default to Calvin's and Luther's theological paradigm.

spatiotemporal continuum (i.e., nature and history). Here historical and natural causes take place. According to this theological paradigm, God's reality and actions are timeless and spaceless. This understanding of God, derived from Greek ontology, creates a chasm between God, who exists in the timeless level of reality, and the level of nature and history. This chasm does not exist in biblical thinking, where God interacts directly within the historical, spatiotemporal flow of his creation.

For centuries, Christian theologians have attempted to solve the many theological problems created by this ontological view of God and the world. With time, the Roman Catholic synthesis came to understand the logic of Christianity in a way substantially different from the historical logic of biblical thinking. Protestant and modernistic[72] syntheses continued to operate within the boundaries imposed by Platonic cosmology.[73]

Following this ontological dichotomy between God and the world, Catholic and Protestant theologies study causation within the timeless level of spiritual realities to which the Christian doctrines of God, salvation, sacraments, justification by faith, predestination, providence, and creation belong. From this hermeneutical perspective, the historical portrayals of divine actions and salvific operations that are found in Scripture become illustrations or symbols pointing to theological realities, but are not descriptions of how things really are.

The way one understands the hermeneutical principle of reality determines the way in which one understands the principle of knowledge. Thus, Augustine also set the methodological structure of the classical principle of knowledge. Real, true knowledge reaches the timeless truths of God. Thus, theology (wisdom) studies what is eternal (timeless) and science (knowledge) considers what is temporal.[74]

[72]Friedrich Schleiermacher, the father of modern theology, continues to accept the Greek philosophical notion of divine timelessness (*The Christian Faith*, trans. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928], §52, 1-2, and postscript). Karl Barth also affirms the timelessness of God: "The being is eternal in whose duration beginning, succession and end are not three but one, not separate as a first, a second and a third occasion, but one simultaneous occasion as beginning, middle and end. Eternity is the simultaneity of beginning, middle and end, and to that extent it is pure duration. Eternity is God in the sense in which in himself and in all things God is simultaneous, i.e., beginning and middle as well as end, without separation, distance or contradiction. Eternity is not, therefore, time, although time is certainly God's creation or more correctly, a form of His creation. Time is distinguished from eternity by the fact that in it beginning, middle and end are distinct and even opposed as past, present and future" (*Church Dogmatics*, trans. G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936], II/1, 608-677). Emil Brunner, *The Christian Doctrine of God*, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1949), 266-270.

[73]That the timelessness of God continues to be at the center of the modernistic theological synthesis becomes apparent as Pannenberg revives Plotinus's Neo-Platonic understanding of timelessness (*Systematic Theology*, 1:401-410).

[74]Augustine of Hippo states: "If therefore this is the right distinction between wisdom and knowledge, that the intellectual cognizance of eternal things belongs to wisdom, but the rational cognizance of temporal things to knowledge, it is not difficult

The modern model of theology springs from Immanuel Kant's notion that humanity can know only what is temporal and spatial.[75] If, as, according to the classical hermeneutical principles, God and the soul are timeless, then reason cannot know them. On this basis, Friedrich Schleiermacher shaped the material principle of theology on the experience of absolute dependence.[76]

The Hermeneutical Condition: Biblical Interpretation

Since its origin, Adventism has worked from a specific macro-hermeneutical perspective that E. G. White called the "pillars" of Adventist faith. She specifically named four pillars: the Sanctuary, the Three Angels' Messages, the Sabbath, and the nonimmortality of the soul.[77] Particularly the Sanctuary and fulfilled prophecy became macro-hermeneutical presuppositions that influenced the shape of Adventist theology for more than a century. [78]

During the second half of the twentieth century, many Adventists began to do theology from the meso-hermeneutical perspective of justification by faith, thereby slowly departing from the original macro-hermeneutical perspective and adopting the Protestant approach. Most Adventists are unaware that the biblical-eschatological-sanctuary and the Protestant-soteriological-justification-by-faith macro-hermeneutical perspectives assume quite different interpretations of God, human beings, the world, the whole of reality, and reason.

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to judge which is to be preferred or postponed to which" (*The Trinity*, ed. Philip Schaff, Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, vol. 3 (Oak Harbor: Logos Research Systems, 1997), 12: 15, 25. Notice how Augustine's cosmological dichotomy regarding God's timelessness and the world's temporalness determines his understanding of the science-theology relation. This strengthens the notion of complementarity between science and theology derived from Augustine's interpretation of the teleological principle considered above.

[75]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn (Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 1990), 43, 325.

[76]See, e.g., Schleiermacher, §3, 3.

[77]Ellen White states: "The passing of the time in 1844 was a period of great events, opening to our astonished eyes the cleansing of the sanctuary transpiring in heaven, and having decided relation to God's people upon the earth, [also] the first and second angels' messages and the third, unfurling the banner on which was inscribed, 'The commandments of God and the faith of Jesus.' One of the landmarks under this message was the temple of God, seen by His truth-loving people in heaven, and the ark containing the law of God. The light of the Sabbath of the fourth commandment flashed its strong rays in the pathway of the transgressors of God's law. The nonimmortality of the wicked is an old landmark. I can call to mind nothing more that can come under the head of the old landmarks. All this cry about changing the old landmarks is all imaginary" (*Counsels to Writers and Editors*, 31).

[78]Richard W. Schwarz and Floyd Greenleaf note that the "basic concepts" of these doctrines were "worked out by the end of 1848," and remained dominant within Adventism at least through 1957 (*Light Bearers: A History of the Seventh-day Adventist Church* [Nampa, ID: Pacific Press, 2000], 65-67, 454-457).

The soteriological perspective of Protestantism implicitly builds on the classical interpretation of macro-hermeneutics that was a carry-over from Roman Catholic theology. It explicitly follows Greek philosophical ideas that clearly contradict biblical ideas on the same issues. For instance, according to the classical view, God is a timeless, spaceless being. Correspondingly, human beings are a soul-body composite (i.e., the soul is a timeless-spaceless entity). The inner logic of these macro-hermeneutical ideas determines most theological content in the Roman Catholic and evangelical theological syntheses. Most evangelical theologians, who claim to give a prominent role to the *prima Scriptura* principle in the Wesleyan quadrilateral of theological sources, are not aware that they implicitly build on notions derived from Greek philosophy, which were adopted by way of tradition.

Early Adventists, however, established implicit macro-hermeneutical principles that were based on a more critical approach to tradition[79] and a "keener appreciation for the authority of the entire Bible" than those of the Protestant reformers.[80] From this understanding of the material principle of method they not only interpreted biblical prophecy, but used it as a macro-hermeneutical presupposition to interpret the entire doctrinal corpus of Christian theology.[81]

The hermeneutical principles of Adventist theology, then, do not derive from philosophy or science, but from Scripture. So far, however, they have operated primarily in an implicit rather than an explicit way. Though they are present in and operate from what the early Adventists identified as the "pillar" doctrines of Adventism, Adventists have not yet identified them technically or used them in the context of theological methodology.

In a summary way, the doctrine of the Sanctuary assumes a temporal-historical understanding of the being of God that in Adventist theology has

[79]C. Mervyn Maxwell, "A Brief History of Adventist Hermeneutics," *JATS* 4 (1993): 213-214.

[80]Maxwell, 214, observes that "the Reformers insisted on the superlative authority of Scripture, yet Adventists have shown a keener appreciation for the authority of the entire Bible. Luther is well known for his tendency to reject James, make very little use of Hebrews, and set up a canon within the canon. Calvin virtually rejected the book of Revelation. The later Scottish-American reformers, Thomas and Alexander Campbell, contemporaries of the Adventist pioneers, rejected the entire OT."

[81]Maxwell, 214-215, comments: "Luther and other Reformers honored the historicist interpretation of prophecy, including the year-day principle. But the Seventh-day Adventist pioneers, having arrived by the same route at the conviction that the Second Advent movement was a fulfillment of prophecy, used that fulfillment as a hermeneutical principle in the further development of their message. Once established as scriptural, the fulfillment of prophecy in the second advent movement became a hermeneutical tool for helping establishing [*sic*] the Sabbath, sanctuary, spiritual gifts, true church, second advent doctrine, etc." The so-called "pillars of the church" doctrines—the Sanctuary, Three Angels' Messages, nonimmortality of the soul, and the Law and the Sabbath—also played macro-hermeneutical roles in the formation of Adventist theology.

implicitly replaced the philosophically originated timeless understanding of God. The historicity of God's being and actions is the implicit ontological basis on which the historicist interpretation of prophecy, the process notion of divine atonement as an ongoing historical work of Christ in heaven, and the Great Controversy approach to systematic theology are interpreted and constructed. Next to the historical understanding of God stands the historical understanding of human beings, implicit in the Adventist denial of the philosophically originated idea of the immortality of the soul and the affirmation of a wholistic understanding of human beings. The biblical ontology of God and human beings also implies radical changes in the epistemological principle of the hermeneutical condition of theological methodology.

This paradigmatic fracture at the macro-hermeneutical level seriously threatens the theological unity of Adventism. It also sets the stage for two different approaches to the creation-evolution debate.

Evolution and Christian Theologies

After reviewing alternative approaches, Fritz Guy concludes: "Wandering around the highways and byways of recent theology, I have not encountered even one example of a serious, sustained theological argument for affirming the creation of the world in six literal days a few thousand years ago."[82] Is Adventist belief in a seven-day-twenty-four-hour historical process of creation[83] not only in contradiction with scientific "facts," but also theologically naive?[84] Why can other Christian denominations and theologians accept evolution and yet remain Christian? Does a persistent literal reading of the Genesis account as a historical process, in spite of scientific findings, reveal a theological naivete that distorts the truth of Christian theology? Does harmonization of Christian theology with evolutionary theory reveal a deeper and more mature level of theological thinking that brings us closer to understanding the truth and mystery of Christianity? To answer these questions, it is necessary to consider briefly how other

[82]Fritz Guy, "Genesis and Geology: Some Contemporary Theological Perspectives," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and Theological Perspectives*, ed. James L. Hayward (Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000), 300.

[83]Fundamental Belief, no. 6: "God is Creator of all things, and has revealed in Scripture the authentic account of His creative activity. In six days the Lord made 'the heaven and the earth' and all living things upon the earth, and rested on the seventh day of that first week. Thus, He established the Sabbath as a perpetual memorial of His completed creative work. The first man and woman were made in the image of God as the crowning work of Creation, given dominion over the world, and charged with responsibility to care for it. When the world was finished it was 'very good,' declaring the glory of God" (General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Seventh-day Adventists Believe . . . : A Biblical Exposition of 27 Fundamental Doctrines* [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1988], 68).

[84]Guy, "Genesis and Geology," 289.

theological methods and systems are able to harmonize the biblical doctrine of creation with evolutionary theory.

There are different ways of harmonizing evolution and science. Maximal harmonization involves the acceptance of the full evolutionary theory.[85] Minimal harmonization involves the acceptance of deep time and the fossil column, stopping short of harmonizing theology with evolutionary patterns of development.[86] Conservative Protestant theologians with a high view of Scripture are likely to embrace a

[85]Theistic evolution and Process theologies are examples of this type of maximal harmonization. Wolfhart Pannenberg's view of creation is both interesting and imaginative. He conceives God's entity as timeless, but inclusive of all temporality and finitude (*Systematic Theology*, 1: 410). From this basis, he, 2:34, deals extensively with the act of creation from within the act of trinitarian life. He concludes his long explanation of the "trinitarian origin of the act of creation" remarking that "a trinitarian exposition of the concept of creation makes it possible, then, to relate what is said about creation to the totality of the world from the standpoint of its duration in time. It does not concern merely the world's beginning. To limit it to the beginning, as the OT stories seem to do in accordance with near Eastern myths of a primal era, is one-sided." Without mentioning deep time or evolutionary theory, Pannenberg's view opens room for it as part of the "totality of the word" that is included in God's timelessness and creative activity.

[86]Erickson, 409, adopts a minimalist harmonization by affirming "progressive creationism." According to this idea, God created every kind perfect as Scripture says, not after the schedule and pattern revealed in Genesis. Rather creation follows the evolutionary timetable. Erickson, 407, argues his harmonization model on the basis that the meaning of the Hebrew word for day (*yôm*) is not limited to a twenty-four-hour period. Erickson forgets that "the phrase 'evening and morning,' appearing at the conclusion of each of the six days of creation, is used by the author to clearly define the nature of the 'days' of creation as literal twenty-four-hours days. The references to 'evening' and 'morning' together outside of Gen 1, invariably without exception in the OT (57 times, 19 times with *yôm* 'day' and 38 without *yôm*), indicate a literal solar day. Again, the occurrences of *yôm* 'day' at the conclusion of each of the six 'days' of creation in Gen 1 are all connected with a numeric adjective ('one [first] day, 'second day,' third day,' etc.), and a comparison with occurrences of the term elsewhere in Scripture reveals that such usage always refer to literal days" (Davidson, 14). For a summary of the exegetical arguments and counter-arguments against and in favor of a twenty-four-hour interpretation of *yôm* in Gen 1, see Wayne Grudem, *Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine* (Leicester: InterVarsity, 1994], 293-297).

It is interesting to notice that Erickson's theological method does not make room for his "progressive creationism." Erickson, 56, claims that revelation supplies "the major tenets of our understanding of reality" and that "whenever a tradition, whether it is a teaching of ancient origin or of a recent popular leader, comes into conflict with the meaning of the Bible, the tradition must give way to Scripture" (ibid., 284). To be consistent with his stated methodology Erickson should affirm the six-days creation pattern of Gen 1 and deal with deep time from that perspective. Erickson's partial harmonization of Gen 1 to deep time is not convincing. It may help pastors to preempt questions from a scientifically educated audience. Yet, by itself deep time has no power of explanation. It requires an ontological-cosmological theory. By affirming deep time as real, Erickson provides the first step toward adopting evolutionary theory. He will not take it now. Yet, other believers will unavoidably follow the inner logic of his first step to include the evolutionary pattern of explanation. Besides, the notion that God created a little here and there through billions of years raises questions regarding biblical claims about his omniscience, foreknowledge, wisdom, power, mercy, and love.

minimalist harmonization.[87] The concrete way in which maximalists and minimalists interpret the various conditions of theological method determines both models of harmonization.

It has already been argued that the general acceptance of evolution in contemporary society stems more from its power of explanation than from its empirical ground.[88] Now it is necessary to examine the hermeneutical effect that harmonization with evolutionary cosmology would have on Adventist theology by becoming aware of what it takes to harmonize Christian doctrine with evolutionary theory. The complex structure of theological method discussed above suggests that the issue of harmonization should be analyzed from the perspective of theological methodology and systematic theology. For this reason, it is important to understand the way in which classical theological methodology led to the construction of the classical theological system behind what are today known as the Roman Catholic and Protestant traditions.

The Christian doctrine of creation does not escape the reach of the hermeneutical condition of method. On the contrary, because classical theology assumes the ontological dichotomy between a timeless God and a temporal world, the classical doctrine of creation explains that the existence and design of the universe come from God's ontological,

[87]While deep time arguments persuade Grudem's, 308, mind scientifically, he recognizes that "Scripture seems to be more easily understood to suggest (but not to require) a young earth view, while the observable facts of creation seem increasingly to favor an old earth view." Since he, 308, sees science and Scripture as inconclusive on the age of the earth, he suggests increasing dialogue between old and young earth believers. He, then, stops short of harmonizing. Dialogue, however, only delays the moment of commitment. Should he stand by Scripture or should he harmonize Scripture to the teachings of evolutionary science? Grudem begs the question. Stanley Grenz stops short of endorsing evolutionary theory, due mainly to the epistemological limitations of science. Yet he quotes approvingly the notion that the Bible and evolution are not mutually exclusive (*Theology for the Community of God* [Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1994], 147-148). Since for Grenz there will be no resolution between evolution and the biblical account of the creation of humans, he is prepared to harmonize. He, 149, does this by taking an essentialist view of human nature: "Regardless of how Adam actually appeared on the earth, God's purposes in creation reach a new plane with Adam. Beginning with this creature, God is at work in a special way on the earth, for he has determined a unique destiny for Adam and Adam's offspring." Grenz, 149, further explains that "humanity begins at a specific point in the history of the universe, namely, with the appearance of Adam on the earth. With Adam (or 'homo sapiens') and solely with Adam, God enters into a special relationship or covenant. In this covenant God declares a new intention for creation, namely, that his creation—Adam and his offspring— fulfill a special destiny by being related to God in a way unique from all other aspects of the universe that God has made." Technically speaking, Adam is created when, in the process of evolution, God decides to infuse an immortal soul probably in the womb of one hominid (ibid., 149, 167). Thus is how we come "to have" an "eternal" soul, which is the basis of our individuality (ibid. 167). Grenz's position builds on classical anthropological dualism and agrees with the Roman Catholic position, which accepts evolution as an explanation for the body, but traces the origin of the soul to God's creation.

[88]Canale, "Evolution, Theology, and Method, Part 2," 182.

timeless reality. This ontological, spiritual reference to God's power to bring things into existence is what theology can properly say about creation. Further, in order for this ontology of divine reality to work as a hermeneutical condition of theological method, it requires a "theological" rather than literal-historical reading of Gen 1. Again, the reason for a "theological" reading of Gen 1 is not for the exegesis of Scripture, but to seek the ontology of divine reality that theologians bring to the text. According to this view, then, the text of Gen 1 represents only an external clothing or illustration of the real ontological order of spiritual causes, within which God operates in creation. The Genesis narrative of creation is only an illustration "for us," so that we can understand within our own level and patterns of understanding what God does in his level of being and action.

Therefore, we should not understand the biblical narrative literally, because it speaks about an act of God that does not take place in time, but in timelessness. To express the theological meaning of the text, then, theologians *translate* biblical-historical language and categories into spiritual, timeless language and categories.[89] This process has been going on for more than fifteen centuries and has a firm hold on Christian theology as a whole.

For instance, Augustine clearly states that God creates by his timeless Word,[90] which is not related to the history of divine activities

[89]The timeless ontology of God and his activity requires the application of category translation. Statements about creation have a double ontological referent: timeless divine activity and the temporal processes that actually take place in space and time. What Scripture presents as having a temporal-historical referent, the timeless definition of the hermeneutical condition of theological methodology requires to be translated into its proper nonhistorical, philosophical referent, God's acts. As a result, there is also a category translation at the historical level. John T. Baldwin defines category translation within the realm of biblical exegesis in the following way: "Category translation is the contemporary refashioning or translation of ancient biblical stories—particularly those recounting earth history—into categories other than those categories which may have been intended by the original author. Perhaps we might say that the narratives are translated into extrascriptural categories. The purpose of category translation is to render the biblical passage meaningful in light of the interpretations of earth history by modern and postmodern natural sciences" ("Category Translation," [unpublished paper, Biblical Research Institute Science Committee, 1999], 5). Thus, there is a double category translation, an ontological and a historical. The ontological translation relates the historical meanings of the text to the timeless reality of divine realities and takes place in systematic theology. The historical category translation transposes the literal historical meanings of OT and NT texts to other historical meanings determined by contemporary science and culture. But category translation violates the biblical text.

[90]Augustine of Hippo states: "Thou callest us then to understand the Word, God, with Thee God, Which is spoken eternally, and by It are all things spoken eternally. For what was spoken was not spoken successively, one thing concluded that the next might be spoken, but all things together and eternally. Else have we time and change; and not a true eternity nor true immortality. This I know, O my God, and give thanks. I know, I confess to Thee, O Lord, and with me there knows and blesses Thee, whoso is not unthankful to assure Truth. We know, Lord, we know; since inasmuch as anything is not which was, and is, which was not, so far forth it dieth and ariseth. Nothing then of Thy Word doth give place or replace, because It is truly immortal and eternal. And therefore

found in Gen 1-2.[91] According to Aquinas, creation is the emanation from God of all being[92] ("the world"), that "took" place by divine timeless action,[93] which, in turn, originated time without movement.[94] This implies that God's creation "took" place in the first instant when the whole world "came" into existence. This instant, being the beginning of time, was real to the world but not to God. Because the Genesis account describes a temporal series of divine actions, it portrays divine creation through sensory figures designed to "illustrate" the truth we reach by way of reasoning.

Calvin is more biblical by far than either Augustine or Aquinas. He takes seriously the history of creation presented by Moses. In his

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unto the Word coeternal with Thee Thou dost at once and eternally say all that Thou dost say; and whatever Thou sayest shall be made is made; nor dost Thou make, otherwise than by saying; and yet are not all things made together, or everlasting, which Thou makest by saying" (*Confessions* [Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, 1996], 11. 7).

[91]Ibid., 13.29: "And I looked narrowly to find, whether seven, or eight times Thou sawest that Thy works were good, when they pleased Thee; but in Thy seeing I found no times, whereby I might understand that Thou sawest so often, what Thou madest. And I said, 'Lord, is not this Thy Scripture true, since Thou art true, and being Truth, hast set it forth? Why then dost Thou say unto me, 'that in Thy seeing there be no times'; whereas this Thy Scripture tells me, that what Thou madest each day, Thou sawest that it was good: and when I counted them, I found how often.' Unto this Thou answerest me, for Thou art my God, and with a strong voice tellest Thy servant in his inner ear, breaking through my deafness and crying, 'O man, that which My Scripture saith, I say: and yet doth that speak in time; but time has no relation to My Word; because My Word exists in equal eternity with Myself. So the things which ye see through My Spirit, I see; like as what ye speak by My Spirit, I speak. And so when ye see those things in time, I see them not in time; as when ye speak in time, I speak them not in time.'"

[92]Thomas Aquinas states: "We must consider not only the emanation of a particular being from a particular agent, but also the emanation of all being from the universal cause, which is God; and this emanation we designate by the name of creation. Now what proceeds by particular emanation is not presupposed to that emanation; as when a man is generated, he was not before, but man is made from 'not man,' and white from 'not-white.' Hence if the emanation of the whole universal being from the first principle be considered, it is impossible that any being should be presupposed before this emanation. For nothing is the same as no being. Therefore, as the generation of a man is from the 'not being' which is 'not-man,' so creation, which is the emanation of all being, is from the 'not-being' which is 'nothing'" (*STh*, Ia.45.1).

[93]Ibid., Ia.46.1.ob.8: "God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word 'prior' signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing."

[94]Ibid., Ia.45.2.ob.2: "Creation places something in the thing created according to relation only; because what is created, is not made by movement, or by change. For what is made by movement or by change is made from something pre-existing. And this happens, indeed, in the particular productions of some beings, but cannot happen in the production of all being by the universal cause of all beings, which is God. Hence God by creation produces things without movement. Now when movement is removed from action and passion, only relation remains, as was said above." "Hence creation in the creature is only a certain relation to the Creator as to the principle of its being; even as in passion, which implies movement, is implied a relation to the principle of motion" (ibid., Ia.45.3).

Institutes, Calvin explains that even though God could have created the whole world instantaneously, he divided the formation of the world into six days "to display his providence and paternal care towards us in this, that before he formed man, he provided whatever he foresaw would be useful and salutary to him."[95] Yet, he articulates the logic or inner coherence of Christian theology following Augustine's interpretation of predestination that operates in the nonhistorical level of spiritual realities. At the center of this logic is the gospel, which God causes in his eternal predestination.[96] Salvation clearly belongs to the realm of the spirit rather than history. For this reason, divine decrees follow a logical rather than a chronological order. In conclusion, due to accommodation to the Platonic two-tier cosmology, Christian theology conceives God's acts as taking place within the logic of spiritual-timeless causality (events). In this context, it should not be surprising that the six-day history of creation has little relevance in the doctrine of creation or in the economy of salvation.

During the classical period, there was no reason to challenge the veracity of the Genesis story. Christian theologians and scientists accepted it as the explanation of the origin of the natural realm. However, with the advent of modern science and evolutionary theory, things changed. Since modern scientists no longer believe in creation and the biblical story, what would theologians do? Each theologian answers according to his or her own "kind." The methodological parameters accepted by a theological tradition (specifically, the material, teleological, and hermeneutical conditions of method) determines a theological "kind." Because most theologians define the material condition of method as containing multiple sources, the doctrine of evolution becomes somehow "authoritative" for them. The teachings of modern science are for modern theology as authoritative as the ontological and cosmological teaching of Plato and Aristotle were for patristic and medieval theologians.

Moreover, because the hermeneutical condition generally accepted in Christian theology places God and his actions in the spiritual nontemporal level of reality, classical and modern theological methods have room for scientific explanations of the natural historical order that run parallel to theological truths without contradiction because each explains a different parallel complementary perspective of reality. Not surprisingly, then, Catholic and Protestant theologians, working from a theological methodology that defines its ontological hermeneutics from Greek ontological principles, will see the accommodation of Gen 1 to deep time and evolutionary theory as not affecting their theological beliefs. After all, Genesis achieves its explanation in the temporal order, which by the criteria

[95]John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* trans. Calvin Translation Society, 1845-1846 (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, 1997), I.14.22.

[96]Calvin, *Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God,* 58.

of theological methodology belongs to the scientific rather than the theological field of investigation. Thus, within the classical and modern theological methods, the doctrine of evolution may be considered the true historical explanation of the way in which life on this planet originated, provided that one does not use it also as the explanation for the origin and dynamics of the spiritual side of reality.

At the same time, theologians have their own spiritual, ontological truth about creation in that they affirm that the entire process, as described by evolution, stands on God's power and grace. Within this methodological understanding, John Paul II was able to recognize evolution as a scientific theory that, at the present time, seems to more accurately explain the history of the origins of our planet. However, the church does not accept evolution as the explanation of the origin of the human soul, because only God originates spiritual reality.[97]

Though the notions of evolution and deep time do not appear to reach to the spiritual core of classical theology, they nevertheless become part of the principle of reality of theological method. The hermeneutical application of deep time and evolutionary theories to theological thinking modifies Christian beliefs on providence and salvation history that are essential to the Adventist system of Great Controversy theology. "Providence and salvation history," explains Dulles, "take on a whole new significance when seen against the background of the billions of years of cosmic existence postulated by contemporary science but undreamt of by

[97]Pope John Paul II built his remarks on Pius XII's conviction that there was no opposition between evolution and the doctrine of the faith about man and his vocation, on condition that one did not lose sight of several indisputable points (Encyclical *Humani generis* [1950]). "Today, almost half a century after the publication of the Encyclical, new knowledge has led to the recognition of more than one hypothesis in the theory of evolution. It is indeed remarkable that this theory has been progressively accepted by researchers, following a series of discoveries in various fields of knowledge. The convergence, neither sought nor fabricated, of the results of work that was conducted independently is in itself a significant argument in favour of this theory" ("Message to Pontifical Academy of Sciences" (http://abbey.apana.org.au/articles/0044.htm,October 22, 1996), 4. John Paul II reminds us that Pius XII considered the immortality of the soul an "indisputable point." It is accepted Catholic ontological teaching that even though the "human body takes its origin from pre-existent living matter [the spatiotemporal-historical realm] the spiritual soul is immediately created by God" (*"Animal enim a Deo immediate creari catholica fides nos retinere inhet"*; Encyclical *Humani generis*, AAS 42 [1950], 575). John Paul II, 575, concludes: "Consequently theories of evolution which, in accordance with the philosophies inspiring them, consider the mind as emerging from the forces of living matter, or as a mere epiphenomenon of this matter, are incompatible with the truth about man. Nor are they able to ground the dignity of the person." Thus the clearly marked parameters of classical theological methodology from which the Pope harmonizes Catholic belief in the immortality of the soul (derived from Greek ontology) with present teachings of evolutionary cosmology are seen. Evolution, as theory, can apply to the scientific study of the material world and causation. The spiritual world where God acts and the Church mediates belongs to philosophical and theological interpretation grounded on Greek ontological patterns and supervised by the Magisterium.

Bishop Ussher and his contemporaries."[98]

Evolution and Adventist Theology

Is Seventh-day Adventist theology compatible with the evolutionary metanarrative, according to which life on our planet originated through deep time by way of a process in which higher organisms of life emerged from lower forms? Can Adventist theology be harmonized with evolutionary science? The question is not merely whether evolution is compatible with the Genesis account of creation, but whether evolution is coherent with the Adventist theological system of beliefs. What would happen to Adventist beliefs and mission if Adventists become convinced that evolution describes the way in which things came into existence? Can Adventist theology answer these questions by borrowing the macro-hermeneutical pattern of Christian theology described above?

These questions are important because some Adventist scholars wrestling with evolutionary issues seem to have become convinced that evolutionary science is true.[99] How did this happen? Adventist scientists and theologians adopt evolutionary ideas by engaging themselves in the process of normal contemporary evolutionary science.[100] In simple terms, scientists and theologians adopt evolutionary theory because they learn it as the methodological paradigm within which their objects of study make sense; the power of explanation makes evolution persuasive; and in their eyes, the scientific method used in its construction makes it "true." Once these convictions set in the mind, they become powerful macro-hermeneutical presuppositions requiring not only the reinterpretation of Scripture[101] but also the reinterpretation of the entire theological system. Eventually, the acceptance of these presuppositions will lead to the reformulation of the entire body of Christian doctrines.

Adventist scientists, then, find themselves between two dogmatically received and contradictory traditions: evolutionary science (evolutionary method) and biblical theology (biblically grounded theological method). The inherent rational drive in humans pushes them to reach a harmonious unified understanding of truth. Eventually, to resolve the cognitive dissonance, one or both positions will be modified. Chances are that in this process scientists and scientifically oriented theologians will find it easier to modify theological teachings than to reconsider the evolutionary paradigm. To harmonize Adventism with evolutionary cosmology, some Adventist scholars may borrow the theological pattern used by classical and modern theologians described earlier in this article.

[98]Dulles, 146-147.

[99]Hayward, 11-15.

[100]Cf. Kuhn, 193.

[101]Richard M. Ritland, "Distribution of Life and the Creation of Biological Diversity," in *Creation Reconsidered: Scientific, Biblical, and Theological Perspectives*, ed. James L. Hayward (Roseville, CA: Association of Adventist Forums, 2000), 141.

Adventist theology arose from the naive assumption that Scripture reveals things as they really are. By applying the historicist method of prophetic interpretation, the early Adventists not only became pioneers of "eschatological theology" a century before the writings of Wolfhart Pannenberg and Jürgen Moltmann, but they also departed from Platonic cosmology and the spiritual logic of Christian theology constructed by Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. In fact, the doctrine of the Sanctuary, a pillar of Adventist theology, opened to view a complete system of theology and philosophy.[102] The theological change that took place in the first five years after the 1844 Great Disappointment implicitly changed the hermeneutical foundations Christian theologians had assumed thus far. Simply put, they implicitly assumed that God works his salvation within the spatiotemporal order of his creation through a historical process Adventists generally describe as the "Great Controversy." In Adventism, this historical process replaced the timeless, spiritual logic of classical and Protestant theologies. Moreover, Adventist theology is a radical challenge to the "systematicity" of classical and modern Christian theologies. As history reveals, this resulted from the close application of the *sola Scriptura* principle to the understanding of eschatology, salvation, and the whole system of theology.

In the Adventist theological system, the material condition of method is defined as the *sola Scriptura* principle and the macro-hermeneutical condition is understood temporally and historically instead of timelessly and spiritually. Thus, Gen 1-2 is not only the explanation of how the temporal stands on God as its ground, but also of how the history of God with his creatures revealed in Scripture began. In biblical thought, creation history not only explains the existence and design of nature, but the structure and dynamic of history as designed by God in its initial stage of perfection. The entire system of biblical theology works within the same historical understanding of reality and follows the same causal dynamics of interaction between Creator and creature. If creation week does not reveal how things actually happened, then there is not much reason to believe what it says about salvation or eschatology. If creation week did not take place, then there was neither a first couple perfectly created nor an origin of evil by disobedience to the historical order created by God. Then how are we to understand sin and redemption?

If the text is taken at face value, the temporal sequence of divine actions in Genesis cannot be isolated from its "theological" meaning

[102]According to Ellen White, "the subject of the sanctuary was the key which unlocked the mystery of the disappointment of 1844. It opened to view a complete system of truth, connected and harmonious, showing that God's hand had directed the great Advent movement, and revealing present duty as it brought to light the position and work of his people" (*Great Controversy*, 424). She also declares that Scripture "unfolds a simple and complete system of theology and philosophy" (*Education* [Mountain View, CA: Pacific Press, 1952], 106).

without in some way superimposing on the text the timeless notion of God. For instance, Calvin suggested that the sequence of days in Genesis shows how good a provider God is. However, the text reveals much more, including, among others, the high complexity of God's creative work, the spatiotemporal level in which the creation process took place, and the way in which God brought our planet into existence. As is true of the entire Bible, in the history of creation God appears not as a timeless, spiritual entity unrelated to space and time, but directly involved and moving within the concrete spatiotemporal order of causes. Scripture contradicted Platonic cosmology before Plato invented it. Thus, the historical-theological understanding of Gen 1-2 is more necessary to explain the origin of human history and Christian theology than to provide a scientific account of origins of the natural realm. A historical-theological understanding of Gen 1-2 focuses on God's powerful historical process of interconnected creative acts. Adventism cannot change the history of creation without pulling from under its feet the foundation upon which it stands. Without this foundation, the doctrine of the Sanctuary and the historical interpretation of prophecy become literary exercises that do not help us to understand either nature or God's works of salvation. Evolutionary theory destroys the biblical history of salvation as a redemptive process that moves from creation to new creation.

In conclusion, evolutionary theory challenges much more than the deep historical-theological meaning of Gen 1-2. It calls for a wholesale deconstruction and reinterpretation of the fundamental principles of Adventist theology and the rejection of the historical understanding of salvation as presented in Scripture. Accommodation to evolutionary history implies rejecting and replacing the theological revolution from which Adventism originated. In turn, the community will lose the uniqueness that is its reason for existing. Adventists need to consider these points carefully before harmonizing Seventh-day Adventist beliefs with evolutionary patterns and history.

This report on method clearly indicates that the "scientific" status of evolutionary theory should not intimidate Adventist theologians into accommodating the scriptural view of history to the evolutionary view of history. Epistemologically speaking, evolutionary theory is a hypothetical, methodologically and culturally conditioned, historical metanarrative still in need of harmonizing with its data and in need of corroboration. We should recognize its rationality (power of explanation), but by no means feel that we are rationally or methodologically bound to accept it. Alternative explanations to evolutionary theory are always rationally and scientifically possible.

If, on the other hand, Adventists decide to harmonize biblical thought on the origins of life on this planet with the theory of evolution, we should be aware that what we are proposing is not a

minor exegetical change in our understanding of Gen 1. Instead, we will be introducing a radical paradigm shift in theological methodology. Sweeping changes in the implicit material and hermeneutical conditions of the theological method will generate changes permeating the entire Adventist system of theology[103] and practice.

Harmonization of the biblical doctrine of creation with evolutionary theory necessarily requires a methodological departure in the material condition of theological methodology. The Roman Catholic and Protestant methodological conviction that God reveals himself through multiple sources that include the shifting sand of philosophical and scientific teachings will replace the traditional Adventist conviction that theological truth builds on the *sola Scriptura* principle. Harmonization also involves radical changes in the hermeneutical condition of method. For instance, a spiritual, nonhistorical pattern of divine activity conceived from philosophical sources replaces the biblical historical pattern of divine activity central to the Adventist notion of the Great Controversy. Changes in the material and hermeneutical conditions of Adventist theological methodology will unleash a new way of understanding Scripture. A new Adventist theology will replace that of the early Adventists.[104]

The notion that we should blend evolution and creation into one single explanation that somehow merges the main contributions of both implies, at least, the conviction that Scripture does not provide the correct understanding of the origin of the world. The proponents of harmonization are convinced that science needs to mend what Scripture teaches. This implication entails a methodological shift of gigantic

[103]By "Adventist system of theology," I mean the theological system that the Sanctuary doctrine opened to the eyes of the Adventist pioneers (White, *Great Controversy*, 423). White has theologically formulated this system of truth throughout her writings and the Seventh-day Adventist Church has summarized its more salient components in its 27 Fundamental Beliefs.

[104]This harmonization will bring radical changes in Adventism similar to those Ellen White envisioned had Kellogg's pantheistic ideas found a home in Adventism. Consider her words as a description of the far-reaching implications that radical changes in theological method will entail for Adventism: "The enemy of souls has sought to bring in the supposition that a great reformation was to take place among Seventh-day Adventists, and that this reformation would consist in giving up the doctrines which stand as the pillars of our faith, and engaging in a process of reorganization. Were this reformation to take place, what would result? The principles of truth that God in His wisdom has given to the remnant church, would be discarded. Our religion would be changed. The fundamental principles that have sustained the work for the last fifty years would be accounted as error. A new organization would be established. Books of a new order would be written. A system of intellectual philosophy would be introduced. The founders of this system would go into the cities, and do a wonderful work. The Sabbath of course, would be lightly regarded, as also the God who created it. Nothing would be allowed to stand in the way of the new movement. The leaders would teach that virtue is better than vice, but God being removed, they would place their dependence on human power, which, without God, is worthless. Their foundation would be built on the sand, and storm and tempest would sweep away the structure" (*Selected Messages*, 1:204-205).

proportions. Harmonizing creation and evolution[105] inescapably leads to the abandonment of the *sola-tota-prima Scriptura* principle.[106] If science can correct Scripture's views on origins, it can also correct it in any area where scientific and theological discourses overlap. Finally, any attempt at harmonization calls for a radical change in the understanding of the divine revelation and inspiration of Scripture.[107]

If this way of thinking about the sources of Christian theology becomes accepted, Adventist theology will not be able to maintain its critical stance against tradition. After all, what is today called "tradition," former generations called science. In classical times, science was philosophy containing a Neoplatonic cosmology whose guidance led Christian theologians to the classical version of Christianity still found ruling in Roman Catholic[108] and Protestant evangelical theologies today.[109] In modern and postmodern times, the same methodological dynamic is at work. Empirical science containing an evolutionary

[105]The reader should bear in mind I am speaking of harmonizing evolution as a theory of science with creation as a systematic doctrine. I am not speaking, for instance, of harmonizing the Genesis story of creation with geological data or vice versa as Fritz Guy does ("Genesis and Geology," 297). After all, to try to harmonize geological data with the creation story is the same thing that evolutionists do when they continually attempt to harmonize geological data with evolutionary theory. To harmonize the biblical story from the geological data is impossible. Data mean nothing without a theory. Therefore, to harmonize biblical data to geology is to accommodate Scripture to a scientific theory, not to scientific data. To search for the meaning of the geological data from the perspective of biblical-creation cosmology is a scientific enterprise that works within all the characteristics and limitations of scientific methodology described in this paper. The only difference is that the hypothesis or theory being used to explain the data is not drawn from human imagination, but from the biblical record. To try to harmonize or interpret Genesis from geology is a problem of exegesis that uses an extrabiblical assumption to interpret the data of Scripture. Obviously, the problem facing theology is the attempt to harmonize two opposite cosmogonies and cosmologies. Though a synthesis between creation and evolution is certainly possible (e.g., Teilhard de Chardin's synthesis in his *El fenómeno humano* [Paris: Taurus, 1955]), it always implies considerable modification in one or both of the competing cosmologies.

[106]"The Holy Scriptures, Old and New Testaments, are the written Word of God, given by divine inspiration through holy men of God who spoke and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Spirit. In this Word, God has committed to man the knowledge necessary for salvation. The Holy Scriptures are the infallible revelation of His will. They are the standard of character, the test of experience, the authoritative revealer of doctrines, and the trustworthy record of God's acts in history" (Ministerial Association of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Seventh-day Adventists Believe*, 4).

[107]Implicitly, those who seek harmonization between the teachings of evolutionary science and Christian theology seem to recognize this much. See, e.g., Cottrell, 195-221.

[108]Bonsor, 6, states: "The philosophical environment of the early church was dominated by forms of Platonism. These philosophical perspectives provided a rich source for Christian revelation, a source that continues to enlighten revealed truth."

[109]See, e.g., Donald G. Bloesch, *God the Almighty: Power, Wisdom, Holiness, Love*, (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1995), 208-211.

cosmology[110] leads to a process-theology version of Christianity. Ultimately, these radical changes in the material and hermeneutical principles of Adventist theology will cause changes throughout the entire system of Adventist theology.

Harmonizing Scripture to evolution, then, requires the harmonization of the Adventist theological method to the always-changing dictates of human science and tradition. In turn, methodological changes will require a reformulation of the entire corpus of Adventist doctrine and, eventually, the reformulation of all 27 fundamental beliefs. Before seeking harmonization between the creation and evolution metanarratives, then, Adventists should seriously think whether they are willing to give up the very reason for their existence as a church.[111]

The Task Ahead

Adventism has grown in numbers and institutions. In spite of the proliferation of church-sponsored universities around the world, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the intellectual frontier remains mostly unconquered territory. The issue of evolution is one of the many intellectual challenges Adventists have to meet as they pass their beliefs from one generation to the next and share the Three Angels' Messages with the world. Intellectual challenges must be met with intellectual weapons and solutions. Because Adventism has a practical and missionary bent, it has been slow to recognize intellectual challenges from within and without the

[110]The more influential version of evolutionary cosmology is process philosophy, pioneered by Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, Gifford Lecture Series, 1927-1928 (New York: Macmillan, 1960). The ontological dualism of Platonism, Neo-Platonism, and classical Christian theology still survive in process philosophy, but are greatly softened and diffused into a plurality of levels. Diffused ontological dualistic levels of reality are apparent, e.g., in the so-called "panexperiantialism with organizational duality" (Ian G. Barbour, *Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues* [San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1997], 288). This view applies specifically to anthropological dualism. David Jay Griffin explains: "This doctrine provides the basis for a position that avoids Cartesian dualism while still affirming a distinction between the soul and the brain, a distinction that affirms the reality of human freedom and the possibility of life after death" ("Process Theology and the Christian Good News: A Response to Classical Free Will Theism," in *Searching for an Adequate God*, ed. John B. Cobb Jr. and Clark H. Pinnock [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000], 4). For an introduction to Teilhard de Chardin's and John Cobb's versions of evolutionary process theology, see Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, *20th Century Theology: God and the World in a Transitional Age* [Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1992], 130-144).

[111]White comments: "But God will have a people upon the earth to maintain the Bible, and the Bible only, as the standard of all doctrines and the basis of all reforms. The opinions of learned men, the deductions of science, the creeds or decisions of ecclesiastical councils, as numerous and discordant as are the churches which they represent, the voice of the majority—not one nor all of these should be regarded as evidence for or against any point of religious faith. Before accepting any doctrine or precept, we should demand a plain 'Thus saith the Lord' in its support" (*The Great Controversy*, 595).

church. Those involved in intellectual activities within the church should search for solutions fostering further understanding of truth and for strengthening the unity and mission of the church.

This brief review of the epistemological structure of scientific and theological methodologies has argued that the authority science presently enjoys as the undisputed source and arbiter of truth is disproportionate with the powers of reason and the conditions under which scientific methodology operates. We should respect the seriousness with which scientists do their job. Yet, their findings should not be considered as divine oracles. Adventists should develop a true scientific spirit that begins by doubting what we receive from both scientific and theological traditions. We should apply doubt in both science and theology. Yet doubt should lead us back to the data, not to a subjective selection of theories that we like better. For instance, some are critical of biblical theology because, for them, other theories exhibit a higher power of explanation. Therefore, they use what is persuasive to them to criticize even Scripture itself. Instead, all theories should be tested by the appropriate data—Adventist theology by the biblical data and scientific discovery and explanation by empirical data.

For example, those who find evolution persuasive, use it to criticize biblical beliefs and harmonize them to evolution. This "critical" approach is not scientific because it does not generate from the things themselves.[112] Scientific criticism leads the researcher back to the sources, to the things themselves. For example, scientific criticism in paleontology should lead back to the fossils themselves; scientific criticism in theology should lead back to Scripture. In going to "the things themselves," the researcher makes a conscious choice to suspend belief in previously received theories, in order to see whether better ones could be created that would hold a higher power of explanation. Science operates in this way. Researchers should not so much reflect others' theories, but in faithfulness to the appropriate data, they should create their own theories and explanations.

The task before Adventist theologians is not easy. It implies that they should forget the way many have recently been doing theology (by cutting and pasting from the work of non-Adventist theologians), in order to return to "the things themselves." In theology, the "things themselves" are the data. For Adventist theology committed to the *sola*

[112]Martin Heidegger states: "The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under interrogation comes to a point where it begins to totter. Among the various disciplines everywhere today there are freshly awakened tendencies to put research on new foundations" (*Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Collins, 1962), 29 n. 9; see also his definition of phenomenology (ibid., 58, n. 34).

Scriptura principle, the "things themselves" are the words of Scripture.[113]

This is especially pertinent to the theory of evolution, because scientific tradition has sided with a theory that directly contradicts the inner logic of Scripture and the entire system of Adventist beliefs. But both scientific and theological methodologies call for better approaches. Adventist scholars need to produce alternative theological and scientific explanations.[114] It is no longer sufficient to merely reshuffle the old.

The starting point is to agree on the material condition of theological methodology. If we depart from the *sola Scriptura* principle there is no hope for theological unity in Adventism. If Adventism accepts evolution as the correct way for understanding the question of origins, it simultaneously exchanges one foundational macro-hermeneutical principle of biblical and theological interpretation for another. As such, evolution will cause Adventists either to modify their theological understanding of fundamental beliefs or to change the statement itself. From agreement on the material condition of theological methodology, we should come to an agreement on the hermeneutical condition; especially, the way in which we understand the being of God, humans, and the world.

This report on method suggests that we should give attention to the way in which the intellectual positions challenging the church are generated. Many lack the necessary tools to face scientific, theological, and philosophical theories that conflict with biblical positions. This lack of familiarity with methodological issues may explain why many feel the need for harmonizing with ideas incompatible with biblical revelation. If Adventists would become more familiar with the characteristics and limitations of scientific method, they might not feel so "rationally" compelled to harmonize biblical thought with scientific or theological theories. There is a need to demythologize science and philosophy in Adventist education. We can do this by allowing new generations of Adventist students to become acquainted with philosophical and scientific epistemologies.

This study on method also suggests that Adventism should give serious study to the method through which it reaches theological

[113]As for science, the "things themselves" are the data on which its theories stand. In theology the "things themselves" are the revelation of God that Adventists, together with all Christians, find in the words of Scripture. That words can be understood scientifically as "things themselves" becomes clear when Hans-Georg Gadamer explains: "All correct interpretation must be on guard against arbitrary fancies and the limitations imposed by imperceptible habits of thought, and it must direct its gaze 'on the things themselves' (which, in the case of the literary critic, are meaningful texts, which themselves are again concerned with objects). For the interpreter to let himself be guided by the things themselves is obviously not a matter of a single, 'conscientious' decision, but is 'the first, last, and constant task'" (*Truth and Method*, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2d rev. ed. [New York: Continuum, 1989], 266-267).

[114]In science, see, e.g., Leonard Brand, "The Integration of Faith and Science," *JATS* 14/1 (2003): 121-137. In theology, see, e.g., Gulley.

conclusions. Due to the worldwide nature of the Adventist Church, the proliferation of universities around the world, and the consequent tendency to theological fragmentation, it is imperative that theological methodology and its material, teleological, and hermeneutical conditions are not borrowed from other schools of theology. Creative work is necessary to express the Adventist message and theological system at the highest intellectual level without distortion. This will prepare new generations of Adventists who are capable not only of understanding biblical revelation in its inner historical logic, but who are also capable of communicating it to a secular and postmodern society.

Adventists also need to grasp the inner historical coherence or logic of biblical thought that the early Adventists discovered, but which is beginning to be lost with the passing of time. The complete system of theology and philosophy contained in Scripture, which the doctrine of the Sanctuary opened to view, is still there for us to discover anew. At this point, we need to remember again that the lure of evolution revolves around its "explanatory power," not in its "factuality." If an entire generation of Adventists around the world could recapture the explanatory power of biblical thinking, the explanatory power of evolution would begin to lose its grip on the minds of many inside and outside the church.

This, of course, will not exempt Adventists from doing the required thinking—fossil by fossil, assumption by assumption, experiment by experiment—as we search for a better understanding of our world and in testing the beliefs that we have received. As all believers should do theology for themselves by going and personally studying the data of biblical revelation, so Adventist scientists should also go back to the data which evolutionary theory explains to seek for better explanations in the light of Scripture.

Scientists who dogmatically believe in evolution are not likely to change their theory any time soon. After all, the material condition of their methodology requires that they seek for an explanation considering only empirical evidence. However, those who understand the power of explanation of evolutionary theory should not forget that not everything in scientific method originates from empirical data. Scientific and evolutionary methodologies also include all-inclusive hermeneutical a prioris, presuppositions that cannot be empirically corroborated. Thus, there is a legitimate way to apply scientific methodology from a biblically originated hermeneutical a priori. Some Adventist scientists are already working from this hermeneutical perspective. For them, the Gen 1, seven-day, historical process God used to create life on our planet becomes a cosmological a priori, hermeneutically conditioning their hypotheses, their explanations of known data, and their search for fresh new evidence. The task is difficult and no single individual will finish it in his or her lifetime. Yet, we cannot give up, because to function as human rational beings we need to assume a working cosmology. The cosmology Adventists choose will determine the

content of our rationality, the hermeneutical condition of our scientific and theological methodologies, our biblical interpretation, the shape of our theology, and the mission of the church.

The study of method indicates that we need to consider the question of theological sources carefully. Will we still build on the *sola Scriptura* principle? What do we mean by revelation and inspiration? The answers we give to these questions will determine the way in which we will define our macro-hermeneutical presuppositions. Will we choose to define them from Scripture alone or from science and philosophy? If we choose the former, then we cannot define our cosmology by accommodating our theology to evolution. If we choose the latter, we will. What macro-hermeneutical principles will we use to probe into the inner logic of Christian theology? If we choose to retrieve them from Scripture, then we will see what the early Adventists saw. If we define them from science and philosophy, then we will see what Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin saw.

Should we be loyal to biblical revelation?—or to theological tradition, scientific theory, and philosophical doctrines? In postmodern times, we can hardly deposit our faith in a human tradition that has no foundation.[115] Christian theology has its foundation in the divine, historical revelation found in the pages of Scripture.[116] From this revealed source, we should define our methodology, discover the inner logic of Scripture, and construct the teachings of the church for the present time. Personally, I find that the epistemological analysis of theological and scientific methodologies helps me to better understand the intellectual world in which I live and the intellectual task confronting Christ's disciples in postmodern times.

Finally, does acceptance of biblical history of a six-day creation imply the sacrifice of intellect? Our report on method suggests it does not. On the contrary, it calls for exercising intellect to the fullest, while there are many who dogmatically uphold either creation or evolution without thinking, but simply on the basis of biblical or scientific authority. As we have suggested, faith stands on interpretations. Thus, to avoid believing a lie, every believer needs to thoroughly investigate his or her own intellectual beliefs.

There is no doubt that scientists have taken their work seriously when building their explanations. Evolutionary theory is a complex construction that involves and interlinks with many theories in many fields using various rational and technological procedures. Nevertheless, evolution is not a fact but a theory that reconstructs a past event that forever remains outside of our empirical experience. From the side of its teleological condition, evolutionary science is historical and therefore differs radically from the

[115]For an introduction to the rejection of the modern epistemological foundationalism, see, e.g., Stanley Grenz and John R. Franke, *Beyond Foundationalism: Shaping Theology in a Postmodern Context* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001).

[116]Cf. Canale, *Back to Revelation-Inspiration*, 1-26.

method of empirical science. Outcomes in empirical sciences are theories corroborated by way of deduction and experiment. In the case of evolutionary theory, no such corroboration is possible. In historical science, corroboration is weaker than in the empirical sciences because corroboration is limited to the implications of inner consistency and explanatory power. Evolutionists are still working on the inner consistency of their theory. Empirical corroboration, however, of both creation and evolutionary theories is possible eschatologically. With the passing of time, either a new biological organism will develop from a lower form of life or the biblical Creator will recreate the earth with the same power and procedures involved in the original creation of our planet and the universe. Meanwhile, for practical reasons we need to assume a cosmology to make sense of our lives and the uses of our rational powers. This implies that we must choose one of several rational alternatives. The biblical history of creation is a rational alternative revealed by God. Its divine origin does not diminish its rationality; it only places it outside of the options which scientific methodology allows us to imagine.

The adage "all truth is God's truth" sounds good, but it is not very helpful. Many use it as a shortcut to argue for the underlying harmony between theology and science in God's mind. Of course, one cannot easily apply it to solve the creation-evolution debate because theological and scientific methods do not produce truth as it is in God but only human interpretations and constructions. Moreover, since science does not recognize God, we can scarcely say that it produces God's truth. To imply that science produces God's truth when it does not consider him, confers to reason a power that epistemology does not recognize.

In the final analysis, both theology and science attempt to explain reality as a whole. By using reason and method, they produce coherent and persuasive explanations that can be accepted on the basis of faith in their foundations. Some place their confidence in divine revelation. Others choose to follow the dictates of human imagination and research. Reason and faith are active and at work in both theological and scientific methodologies. That there is a conflict of interpretations between science and Christian theology constructed on the *sola Scriptura* principle should not surprise Adventists who believe in the Great Controversy.

As protagonists in this ongoing controversy, we should face competing theological, scientific, and cultural explanations with a twofold strategy: by maximizing the weakness of competing views and by further exploring the inner coherence and explanatory power of biblical teaching. This requires that Adventists take the intellectual side of their faith seriously. Perhaps we can rekindle the passion for biblical truth that brought our pioneers together and come to see the same complete and harmonious system of theology and philosophy that originated the Adventist Church. Faithfulness to God requires no less.

Conclusion

After a three-article series on method we can now look back on the broad questions that motivated our reflections.[117] How do we arrive at conclusions? We arrive at theological and scientific conclusions by using reason and method. How do we arrive at truth? We arrive at truth by faith in our conclusions. In other words, reason and method, both in theology and science, allow for conception and formulation of various, even contradictory conclusions that are equally rational and scientific. Science and theology are interpretations. Neither reason nor method are miraculous tools producing absolute truth equally persuasive to all human beings at all times. However, we need truth. Therefore, we choose as truth the conclusions that are most persuasive to us. When we adopt them by faith, they become truth for us. Scientists deposit their faith in the explanatory strength of rationality and methodology. Adventists have deposited their faith in the explanations presented by God in Scripture. Creation and evolution are conflicting metanarratives explaining the origins of human life and history. From the perspective of science, harmonization with creation is impossible because God is not a factor recognized by scientific methodology (i.e., material condition and index of reality).

Theologically, harmonization is possible. Traditions whose theologies recognize multiple sources of divine revelation and define their hermeneutical principles from philosophy and science accommodate evolution to their beliefs. In the process, philosophy and science become sources of theology that define the macro-hermeneutical principles of theological methodology. In this way, Platonic cosmology came to shape the inner, timeless spiritual logic of Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies, because, when theology does not engage the spatiotemporal level, the possibility of conflicts between theology and science disappears. If conflict arises, however, theology is methodologically required to harmonize whatever is demanded by developments in one of its sources. For this reason, most systems of Christian theology can coexist with the doctrine of evolution without changing their inner logic and teachings. This is not the case with Adventist theology. Its beliefs cannot harmonize with evolutionary theory without forfeiting the inner historical logic of biblical thinking on which they stand and without reinterpreting the entire range of its fundamental beliefs.

In what way is the Bible the foundation of truth? The answer to this question depends on one's views on revelation-inspiration and on the material condition of theological method (i.e., the sources of theology). At the present time, Adventists disagree on these issues. However, Adventists believe that "the Holy Scriptures [Old and New Testaments] are the infallible revelation of His will. They are the standard of character, the test of experience, the authoritative revealer

[117]Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method, Part I," 65-100.

of doctrines, and the trustworthy record of God's acts in history" (Fundamental Belief 1).[118] On this basis, Scripture becomes the source of true explanation because it has an unmovable origin, God. Revelation, rather than reason, is the source of explanation and truth for those who believe in God and his revelation in Scripture. The Bible's words and inner logic, however, still need interpretation. That is why we need to place all Christian theologies, including Adventist theologies, under careful methodological criticism to make certain we understand biblical thinking on its own terms and not from hermeneutical presuppositions defined by philosophy, science, and culture. Only then can we say in practice that the Bible is the foundation of truth. Truth, then, stands on God's special revelation[119] in Scripture, reached by rational understanding, and embraced in the commitment of faith.

I hope that this brief report on method will help theologians, pastors, scientists, and lay persons to become familiar with the intellectual scenario behind the creation-evolution clash of interpretations in order to better understand the challenges before us and to devise appropriate plans to face these challenges in intellectual integrity and faithfulness to biblical revelation.

[118]General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, *Seventh-day Adventists Believe*, 4.

[119]"Special revelation" refers to Scripture in contradistinction to "general revelation" of God in nature. General revelation should not be confused with natural theology. The former is a divine activity in producing and administrating the natural realm the latter is a human interpretation of what people think nature is and points beyond itself.

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THE GENESIS FLOOD NARRATIVE: CRUCIAL ISSUES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE[1]

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Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine major interrelated issues that are present in current discussions about the biblical Flood narrative of Gen 6-9. These include such questions as: the unity and literary genre of these chapters, the nature and extent of the biblical Flood, the relationship between history and theology in the Flood narrative, and the relationship of the biblical Flood narrative to other ANE flood stories. There are three major interpretations of Gen 6-9: (1) nonhistorical (mythological) interpretations suggest that Gen 6-9 is a theologically motivated account redacted from two different literary sources (J and P) and largely borrowed from other ANE mythological flood traditions; (2) limited or local flood theories narrow the scope of the Genesis Flood to a particular geographical location or locations (usually in Mesopotamia); and (3) traditional views regard Gen 6-9 as a unified, historically reliable narrative describing a worldwide, global Flood, and written as a polemic against other ANE Flood stories. The major issues with regard to the biblical Flood narrative may be summarized under one of three opposing alternatives: (1) nonhistorical (mythological) vs. historical interpretations of the Flood; (2) limited/local vs. universal/global Flood interpretations; and (3) theories of dependence on ANE traditions vs. theories of theological polemic. In the pages that follow, each of these three opposing alternatives is briefly discussed. Special attention is given to the question of the extent of the Genesis Flood, building upon and advancing beyond my previous study of this issue.[2] The position set forth in this article is that only the traditional understanding of a literal, historical, global Flood does full justice to the biblical data and that this interpretation is crucial for Flood theology in Genesis and for the theological implications drawn by later biblical writers.

Nonhistorical (Mythological) vs. Historical Interpretations of the Flood

Nonhistorical (Mythological) Flood Interpretations

Proponents of a nonhistorical interpretation of the Genesis Flood narrative generally contend that Gen 6-9 is a mythological account

[1]A version of this paper was presented at the Science and Religion Conference, Glacier View Ranch, Ward, Colorado, August 2003. Biblical translations are the author's.

[2]Richard M. Davidson, "Biblical Evidence for the Universality of the Genesis Flood," *Origins* 22 (1995): 58-73; revised and expanded under the same title in *Creation, Catastrophe, and Calvary*, ed. John T. Baldwin (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000), 79-92.

comprised of two different literary sources (Jahwist and Priestly), largely borrowed from earlier ANE mythological traditions and woven together by a redactor for the primary purpose of affirming the theological distinctives of Israel's faith.[3]

Those advancing a nonhistorical interpretation often acknowledge that the final redactor of Genesis intended the Flood narrative of Gen 6-9 to be taken as a literal account, as well as its having theological significance;[4] but in light of the "assured results" of modern scientific investigation, they insist that the historical nature of the Flood narrative must be rejected in favor of recognizing its essentially mythological and theological (nonhistorical) character. Thus, the early part of Genesis (chaps. 1-11) is often separated from the rest of the book and is labeled as primeval myth, historicizing myth, tales, sagas, legends, or the like.[5] The crucial question is, Can such partitioning of Genesis into "primeval" (nonhistorical) and patriarchal (historical) sections be justified within the text of Genesis itself, with the Flood narrative confined to the former (nonhistorical) section? To this we now turn our attention.

A Historical Interpretation of the Flood Narrative

Two important literary-structural elements tie the Flood narrative together with the rest of the book of Genesis and support the internal unity and historicity of Gen 6-9: the use of the word *tôlĕdôt* ("generations, account, history," 13 times in the book) and the symmetrical literary structure of the Flood narrative.

1. *Tôlĕdôt.* Each narrative section of the book of Genesis begins (or ends) with the term *tôlĕdôt.*[6] The term means literally "begettings" or "bringings-forth" (from the verb *yālad,* "to bring forth, beget") and

[3]This is the prevailing view of historical-critical scholarship. See, e.g., Gerhard von Rad, *Genesis: A Commentary,* rev. ed. (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 116-134; Walter Brueggemann, *Genesis,* Interpretation: A Bible Commentary for Teaching and Preaching (Atlanta: John Knox, 1982), 73-88; and Terence E. Fretheim, "Genesis," NIB (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 388-389.

[4]James Barr summarizes: "[S]o far as I know there is no professor of Hebrew or Old Testament at any world-class university who does not believe that the writer(s) of Genesis 1-11 intended to convey to their readers the ideas that . . . Noah's flood was understood to be worldwide, and to have extinguished all human and land animal life except for those in the ark" (cited by Alvin Plantinga, "Evolution, Neutrality, and Antecedent Probability: A Reply to McMullin and Van Till," in *Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives* [Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001], 217).

[5]Of course, many critical scholars reject the historicity of all of Genesis, including the patriarchal narratives. So, e.g., von Rad writes: "The old, naive idea of the historicity of these narratives as being biographically reliable stories from the life of the patriarchs must be abandoned" (Von Rad, *Genesis,* 40). For von Rad and many others, what is stated regarding the nonhistoricality of the patriarchal narratives applies even more to the "primeval history" of Gen 1-11.

[6]Gen 2:4; 5:1; 6:9; 10:1, 32; 11:10, 27; 28:12-13; 25:19; 36:1, 9; 37:2.

implies that Genesis is the "history/account of beginnings."[7] Walter Kaiser has carefully analyzed the literary form of Gen 1-11 in light of this *tôlĕdôt* structure and shown that this whole section of Genesis should be taken as "historical narrative prose."[8]

The term *tôlĕdôt* is used as the heading for the Flood account (6:9), thereby connecting it with the rest of the book of Genesis and indicating that the author intended this narrative to be as historically veracious as the rest of Genesis.[9] One cannot logically accept that the author of Genesis intended only some sections of the *tôlĕdôt*, such as the accounts of the patriarchs, to be historical, while making others, such as the Flood account, to be only theological in nature. As Kenneth Mathews aptly states:

> The recurring formulaic *toledôth* device [of the book of Genesis] shows that the composition was arranged to join the historical moorings of Israel with the beginnings of the cosmos. In this way the composition forms an Adam-Noah-Abraham continuum that loops the patriarchal promissory blessings with the God of cosmos and all human history. The text does not welcome a different reading for Genesis 1-11 as myth versus the patriarchal narratives. . . . [I]f taken as theological story alone, the interpreter is at odds with the historical intentionality of Genesis.[10]

2. *The Symmetrical Literary Structure of the Flood Narrative.* The chiastic literary structure of Gen 6-9, as recognized by numerous scholars and displayed on page 53,[11] provides weighty evidence for the unity of the Flood narrative. Instead of these chapters being divided into small textual units (J and P) as suggested by the Documentary Hypothesis, the narrative is a single literary unit.[12] A close reading of the Flood narrative as a coherent literary whole, with particular attention to the chiastic structure, resolves apparent discrepancies in the Genesis account.[13] In the literary structure of the Flood narrative, the genealogical frame or envelope construction (Gen 5:32 and 9:28-29) plus the secondary

[7]J. B. Doukhan, *The Genesis Creation Story: Its Literary Structure*, Andrews University Seminary Dissertation Series, 5 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1978), 167-220; see also K. A. Mathews, *Genesis 1:1-11:26*, NAC (Nashville: Broadman and Holman, 1996), 26-41.

[8]W. C. Kaiser Jr., "The Literary Form of Genesis 1-11," in *New Perspectives on the Old Testament*, ed. J. B. Payne (Waco: Word, 1970), 48-65.

[9]Doukhan, *The Genesis Creation Story*, 167-220.

[10]Mathews, 41, 111.

[11]Adapted from William H. Shea, "The Structure of the Genesis Flood Narrative and Its Implications," *Origins* 6 (1979): 22-23. For a similar structural analysis, see Bernard W. Andersen, "From Analysis to Synthesis: The Interpretation of Gen 1-11," *JBL* 97 (1978): 38. This basic palistrophic structure is recognized by numerous recent commentators.

[12]U. Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis*, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964), 2:30-34; Shea, 8-29.

[13]G. J. Wenham, "The Coherence of the Flood Narrative," *VT* 28 (1978): 336-348; Shea; G. F. Hasel, *Understanding the Living Word of God* (Mountain View: Pacific Press, 1980), 49-50, 150-151.

genealogies (Gen 6:9-10; 9:18-19) actually provide powerful indicators that the account is intended to be factual history.[14]

The Genesis Flood narrative presents profound theology. But this theology is always *rooted* in history. Any attempt to separate theology and history in the biblical narratives does so by imposing an external norm, such as Greek dualism, upon the text. Read on its own terms, the biblical narratives, including the Flood narrative, defy attempts to read them as nonhistorical theology.

Limited/Local vs. Universal/Global Flood Interpretations

Limited/Local Flood Interpretations

Limited flood theories narrow the extent of the Genesis Flood to a particular geographical region (usually Mesopotamia).[15] These theories rest primarily on scientific arguments that present seemingly difficult geological, biological, and anthropological problems for a universal flood.[16] However, as Bruce Waltke points out: "The geological arguments favoring a local flood assume that the history of the earth's geology is uniform."[17] A number of recent scientific studies provide a growing body of evidence for diluvial catastrophism instead of uniformitarianism.[18]

[14]Scriptural narratives are often placed in intricate and symmetrical literary forms, such as chiasms or panel writing, to highlight important theological points in the narrative without distorting the historical account. Cf. D. A. Dorsey, *The Literary Structure of the Old Testament: Genesis–Malachi* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1999), 15-44.

[15]See, e.g., Fretheim, 388: "The Genesis account should be related to a major flood in the Mesopotamian valley, which in time was interpreted as a flood that covered the then known world." W. Ryan and W. Pitman suggest that the Genesis Flood is related to a gigantic flood in the area of the Black Sea (*Noah's Flood: The New Scientific Discoveries about the Event that Changed History* [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998].

[16]E.g., J. P. Lewis notes that "scholars are agreed that archaeological evidence for a universal flood in the historical past is wanting"("Flood," *ABD* 2:798). Cf. D. C. Boardman, "Did Noah's Flood Cover the Entire World? No," in *The Genesis Debate: Persistent Questions about Creation and the Flood*, ed. R. F. Youngblood (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990), 212-223; A. C. Custance, *The Flood: Local or Global?* Doorway Papers 9 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 28-58; D. Kidner, *Genesis: An Introduction and Commentary*, TOTC, ed. D. J. Wiseman (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1967), 93-95; B. Ramm, *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1954), 232-249; R. Youngblood, ed., *The Genesis Debate: Persistent Questions about Creation and the Flood* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), 171-210.

[17]Bruce K. Waltke, *Genesis: A Commentary* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001), 133.

[18]E.g., H. G. Coffin and R. H. Brown, *Origin by Design* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1983); A. M. Rehwinkel, *The Flood in the Light of the Bible, Geology, and Archaeology* (St. Louis: Concordia, 1951); A. A. Roth, "Are Millions of Years Required to Produce Biogenic Sediments in the Deep Ocean?" *Origins* 12 (1985): 48-56; idem, "Catastrophism—Is It Scientific?" *Ministry* 59 (1986): 24-26; idem, "Those Gaps in the Sedimentary Layers," *Origins* 15 (1988): 75-85; idem, *Origins: Linking Science and Scripture* (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1998); idem, "The Grand Canyon and the Genesis Flood," in *Creation, Catastrophe, and Calvary* (Hagerstown: Review and Herald, 2000), 93-107; J. C. Whitcomb, *The World That Perished*, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988); J. C. Whitcomb and H. M. Morris, *The Genesis Flood* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1961).

E The flood proper

b The flood crests
The ark rests
God remembered Noah
(8:1-5)

a The flood rises. . . . . **a'** The flood abates
(7:17-24) (8:6-12)

D Preliminary to the flood . . . . . **D' After the flood**

d Enters the ark . . . . . **d'** Exits the ark
(7:11-16) (8:13-19)

c Brings in clean animals . . . . . **c'** Noah's sacrifice
(7:6-10) (8:20-22)

b Brings in clean animals . . . . . **b'** Noah's diet
(7:1-5) (9:1-7)

a My covenant with you . . . . . **a'** My covenant with
(6:11-22) you (9:8-17)

C Secondary genealogy (6:9-10) . . . . . **C' Secondary genealogy (9:18-19)**

B Prologue: man's wickedness (6:1-8) . . . . . **B' Epilogue: man's wickedness (9:20-27)**

A Primary genealogy (5:32) . . . . . **A' Primary genealogy (9:28-29)**

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e The flood crests, the ark rests,
God remembers Noah (8:1)

d 150 days prevail . . . . . **d'** 150 days waters abate
(7:24) (8:3)

c 40 days of the flood . . . . . **c'** 40 days first birds
(7:12, 17) sent out (8:6)

b 7 days till the flood . . . . . **b'** 7 days next bird
(7:10) sent out (8:10)

a 7 days till 40-day . . . . . **a'** 7 days last bird
storm (7:4) sent out (8:12)

Local flood theories assert that biblical terminology used to describe the extent of the Flood should be understood in a relative rather than absolute universal sense. Therefore, seemingly universal terms imply a limited locality, thereby appearing to indicate universality within the writer's worldview but a limited scope in terms of the modern worldview.[19] This claim is examined in the section that follows.

The Global Flood Interpretation

Biblical Terminology Expressing the Global Extent of the Flood

Perhaps the most important type of biblical evidence for a global Flood is the specific all-inclusive terminology found within the Genesis account itself.[20] There are some thirty different terms, expressions, or complexes of terminology in Gen 6-9 and elsewhere in Scripture, many echoing their intertextual counterparts in the account of global creation in Gen 1-2, that specifically indicate the universal, global extent of the Flood.[21]

1. *"Humankind."* The divine purpose given for the bringing of the Flood makes explicit its universal scope: "And the Lord said, 'I will destroy humankind [*hā'ādām*] whom I have created from the face of the earth; both man, and beast, creeping thing and birds of the air, for I am sorry that I have made them" (Gen 6:7; cf. vv. 5, 7; 8:21). The reference to "humankind whom I have created" is clearly an allusion to the creation of humankind (*hā'ādām*) in Gen 1:26-28. Nothing less than a complete destruction of the human race (except for Noah and his family, 6:8; 7:1) seems envisaged. Given the length of time from creation (over 1,650 years minimum according to the canonical MT), the longevity of the antediluvians (nearly a thousand years on average, see Gen 5 and 11), and God's command at creation to "fill the earth" (Gen 1:28), it is highly unlikely, from the perspective of the Hebrew canon, that the pre-Flood population would have stayed only in Mesopotamia. Thus, based upon the evidence supplied by the narrator of Genesis, the destruction of humanity would necessitate more than a local Flood.

[19]So, e.g., John Hartley, *Genesis,* NIBC (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2000), 106: "The local flood view is not necessarily the opposite of a global view. Since, from the biblical author's perspective, the deluge covered the known land mass, the flood is spoken of in categorical terms. But for that author the earth was a landmass surrounded by water, not a giant sphere. Consequently the categorical language does not require a global flood." Cf. Boardman, 223-226; Custance, 15-27; Kidner, 93-95; Ramm, 241-242.

[20]Gerhard Hasel has provided a careful treatment of some of this terminology in three penetrating studies in issues of *Origins*: "The Fountains of the Great Deep," *Origins* 1 (1974): 67-72; idem, "The Biblical View of the Extent of the Flood," *Origins* 2 (1975): 77-95; idem, "Some Issues Regarding the Nature and Universality of the Genesis Flood Narrative," *Origins* 5 (1978): 83-98.

[21]For further discussion of some of these points, see Richard M. Davidson, "Biblical Evidence for the Universality of the Genesis Flood," *Origins* 22 (1995): 58-73, esp. 60-64.

2. *"The Earth."* The term *hā'āreṣ* ("the Earth," 46 times in the Flood narrative, see, e.g., Gen 6:12, 13, 17) always appears without an accompanying genitive of limitation in Gen 6-9. It clearly parallels and intertextually harks back to the same usage in the account of worldwide, global creation in Gen 1:1, 2, 10.[22] In Prov 8:26, the poetic version of creation that echoes the Genesis account, the term *hā'āreṣ* is used in poetic parallelism with the indisputably universal term *tēbēl* ("world"), thus providing further evidence that the Genesis creation and Flood terminologies are to be taken as global in extent.[23] The reference to God's intention to destroy "*all flesh* with the earth [*hā'āreṣ*]" (Gen 6:11) further shows that this term is universal in scope (see point no. 5 below).

3. *"Upon the face of all the Earth."* The phrase *ʿal-pĕnê kol-hā'āreṣ* ("upon the face of all the Earth"; Gen 7:3; 8:9) is a clear allusion to the same expression in the account of global creation (Gen 1:29; cf. Gen 1:2 for a related universal expression) and thus implies a universality of the same dimension as in creation. The Genesis narrator consistently uses a universal sense of the entire land surface of the globe when this phrase is applied outside of the Flood narrative (e.g., Gen 1:29; 11:4, 8, 9), with no indication in the Flood narrative of any less universality.[24]

4. *"The face of the ground."* The phrase *pĕnê hāʾᵃdāmāh* ("face of the ground"; Gen 7:4, 22, 23; 8:8, 13) occurs in parallel with the universal terms *hā'āreṣ* (7:23) and *ʿal-pĕnê kol-hā'āreṣ* (8:9). It likewise recalls its first usage in the global context of creation (Gen 2:6).

[22]The term may, at times, be used without a genitive and still, in context, be limited in scope to a certain "land." However, the explicit intertextual link between the global creation and the Flood account (esp. Gen 6:6, 7) serves as the hermeneutical control and clearly gives a global context for its usage in Gen 6-9.

[23]Some have argued that *hā'āreṣ* is more limited in nature than the term *tēbēl*, which means the world as a whole, dry land in the sense of continents, or globe. Therefore, it is argued, if Moses had wished to indicate the entire world, he would have used *tēbēl*. However, *tēbēl* is not used in the entire Pentateuch, including the creation and Flood accounts. The term is used only in poetic texts (39 times), usually as a poetic synonym in parallel with *hā'āreṣ*.

[24]While the term "upon the face of all the earth" (*ʿal-pĕnê kol-hā'āreṣ*), or its shortened term "all the earth" (*kol-hā'āreṣ*) may have a limited meaning elsewhere in Scripture when indicated by the immediate context, it is the intertextual linkage to the creation account and not word study on later usage in the Hebrew Bible, that must be determinative for understanding the scope of the expression in the Flood narrative. In addition, the two places in Genesis where, in context, a similar phrase "upon all the face of the earth" is not universal [the land of the plain of Sodom and Gommoroh viewed by Abraham in Gen 19:28, and the famine mentioned in Gen 41:56], the Hebrew in these verses has a significant change in word order from elsewhere in Genesis to *ʿal-kol pĕnê hā'āreṣ* ("upon all the face of the earth") instead of *ʿal-pĕnê kol-hā'āreṣ* ("upon the face of all the earth"). These two latter passages indicate the shift from global to local context by making the word "all" (*kol*) modify "face/surface" and not "earth." Outside of Genesis, for a localized context of the term "upon the face of all the earth" (*ʿal-pĕnê kol-hā'āreṣ*), see, e.g., Deut 11:25; 1 Sam 30:16; 2 Sam 18:8; Dan 8:5; and perhaps Zech 5:3. For use of the shortened term "all the earth" (*kol-hā'āreṣ*) in a less than global context, see, e.g., Gen 41:57; Exod 10:5, 15; Num 22:5, 11; 1 Kgs 4:34; 10:24; and 2 Chron 36:23.

5. *"All flesh."* The term *kol-bāśār* ("all flesh"; Gen 6:12, 13, 17, 19; 7:16, 21; 8:17; 9:11, 15, 16, 17) is accompanied by additional phrases that recall the creation of animals and man (Gen 1:24, 30; 2:7), e.g., "in which is the breath of life" (Gen 6:17 and 7:15), "all in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life" (Gen 7:21-22), and "every living creature" (Gen 9:10-12)—see below for discussion of these expressions.

When the word *kol* ("all") is placed before an indeterminate noun with no article or possessive suffix, as in Gen 6-9, it indicates totality.[25] Thus, God's announcement to destroy "all flesh" (Gen 6:13, 17) and the narrator's comment that "all flesh" died (Gen 7:21-22) with the exception of the inhabitants of the ark indicate universal destruction. The occurrence of *kol* plus the determinate noun *habbāśār* ("all the flesh") in Gen 7:15 also indicates totality as well as unity.

6. *"The end."* In Gen 6:13, the "eschatological" term *qēṣ* ("end") is introduced in the Flood narrative: "And God said to Noah, 'I have determined to make an end of all flesh.'" Linked to the universal phrase "all flesh" (discussed in point 5 above), this "end" clearly assumes universal, global dimensions in which the existence of the whole human race outside the ark is to be terminated. The term *qēṣ*, appearing later in the Hebrew canon and in the NT, becomes a technical term for the eschaton.

In the Flood narrative, the "eschatological" divine judgment involved a period of probation (Gen 6:3), followed by a judicial investigation ("The Lord saw," Gen 6:5; "I have determined," Gen 6:13, RSV),[26] the sentence (Gen 6:7), and its execution (the bringing of the Flood; Gen 7:11-24).[27] Warren Gage shows how Gen 1-7 is presented typologically within the Hebrew canon as a paradigm for the history of the world.[28] The reduplication of the motifs in Genesis only carries through the fourth narrative, implying that the fifth (universal judgment) will be fulfilled in the eschatological, cosmic judgment.[29]

[25]The term can occasionally express less than totality if the context demands.

[26]So Nahum Sarna comments on Gen 6:7: "This phrase ['The Lord saw'] has juridical overtones, implying both investigation of the facts and readiness for action" (*Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew Text with New JPS Translation/Commentary*, JPS Torah Commentary [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989], 47).

[27]Cf. Cassuto, *Genesis*, 56-57.

[28]Warren A. Gage, *The Gospel of Genesis: Studies in Protology and Eschatology* (Winona Lake: Carpenter, 1984), 7-16.

[29]In addition to evidence for universal Flood typology within the Flood narrative itself, Isaiah indicates that the Flood is a type of covenantal eschatology (Isa 54:9) in his descriptions of the eschatological salvation of Israel (the "flood of mighty waters overflowing" (Isa 28:2); "the waters . . . shall not overwhelm" (Isa 43:2); God's "overflowing wrath" (Isa 54:8); and the "windows of heaven" (Isa 24:18), while the prophets Nahum (1:8) and Daniel (9:26) depict the eschatological judgment in language probably alluding to the Genesis Flood. As noted again later in this article, the NT writers also recognize the typological connection between Flood and eschatology. The salvation of Noah and his family in the ark finds its antitypical counterpart in NT eschatological salvation connected with water baptism (1 Pet 3:18-22; see Richard M.

7. *"Every living thing."* The phrase "every living thing" (*kol-hāḥay*), found in Gen 6:19 and 9:16, is linked with the phrase "of all flesh" discussed above and clearly expresses universality.

8. *"Every living creature."* The Hebrew phrase *kol-nepeš haḥayyâ* ("every living soul/creature") is synonymous to the expression "every living thing" mentioned above and constitutes another universalistic expression (Gen 9:10-12).

9. *"All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life."* This phrase, *kōl ʾăʾšer nišmat-rûaḥ ḥayyîm bĕʾappāyw*, found in Gen 7:22, elaborates the similar phrase "all . . . in which is the breath of life" in Gen 6:17 and 7:15. These expressions are clear allusions to the creation account (Gen 2:7) and indicate global dimensions, not merely a local setting.

10. *"All existence."* The similar term *kol-hayĕqûm* means, literally, "all existence" (Gen 7:4, 23). This is one of the most inclusive terms available to the Hebrew writer to express totality of life. All existence (on the land, as later specified) was destroyed in the Flood!

11. *"All . . . that I have made."* Further evidence for the global extent of the term "all existence" [*kol-hayĕqûm*] is the addition of the clause "all existence *that I have made*" (*ʾăšer ʿāśîtî*) (7:4), which is an allusion to creation. Everything that God had made on the earth (excluding the sea creatures, as noted below, and the inhabitants of the ark) was destroyed.

12. *"Only Noah and those who were with him in the ark remained alive."* In Gen 7:23, the term "all existence" [*kol-hayĕqûm*] has yet another clause added to indicate totality: *wayiššāʾer ʾak-nōaḥ waʾăšer ʾittô battēbâ* ("only Noah and those who were with him in the ark remained alive"). This first reference to a "remnant" in Scripture also provides a powerful statement of universality regarding the extent of the Flood.

13. *"Everything on the Earth."* The expression of what died in the Flood, *kōl ʾăšer-bāʾāreṣ*, literally "all which is on the Earth" (Gen 6:17), is another universalistic expression in the Flood narrative, which, in light of the global meaning of "the Earth" (*hāʾāreṣ*) in these chapters (see discussion above), constitutes a statement of total destruction of terrestrial life on planet Earth.

14. *"All on the dry."* According to Gen 7:22, the creatures that died in the Flood included *mikkōl ʾăšer beḥārābâ* (literally, "from all which was on the dry"). This statement not only provides another universalistic expression for the Genesis Flood, but also makes clear that this worldwide destruction is limited to terrestrial creatures and does not include the inhabitants of the sea.

15. *"Under the whole heaven."* The phrase "under the whole heaven"

Davidson, *Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical* τύπος *Structures*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 2 [Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1981], 316-336). The Flood also serves as a type of the final judgment at the end of the world, and the conditions of pre-Flood morality provide signs of the end time (Matt 24:37-39; Luke 17:26-27; 2 Pet 2:5, 9; 3:5-7).

(*taḥat kol-hāšŝāmāyim*; Gen 7:19) is found in two verses that describe the extent of the Flood: "and the waters prevailed so mightily upon the earth that all the high mountains *under the whole heaven* were covered. The waters prevailed fifteen cubits upward, and the mountains were covered" (7:19, 20, emphasis added). John Skinner notes that this passage "not only asserts its [the flood's] universality, but so to speak proves it, by giving the exact height of the waters above the highest mountains."[30] The universal phrase "under the whole heaven," or "under all the heavens," also globalizes the phrase "under heaven" (Gen 6:17) in this same Flood context.[31]

H. C. Leupold observes that the writer of v. 19 is not content with a single use of *kol* ("all") in "all the high mountains," but "since 'all' is known to be used in a relative sense, the writer removes all possible ambiguity by adding the phrase 'under all the heavens.' A double 'all' (*kol*) cannot allow for so relative a sense. It almost constitutes a Hebrew superlative. So we believe that the text disposes of the question of the universality of the Flood."[32]

16. *"All the high mountains . . . were covered."* The covering of "all the high mountains" (*kol-hehārîm haggĕbōhîm*) by at least 15 cubits (Gen 7:19-20) could not simply involve a local flood, since water seeks its own level across the surface of the globe. Even one high mountain covered in a local Mesopotamian setting would require that same height of water everywhere on the planet's surface.[33]

Proponents of a local flood often object that a worldwide Deluge would imply "that the earth's surface was completely renovated during the

[30]John Skinner, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Genesis*, ICC, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), 1:165.

[31]The word "heaven," when alone, can have a local meaning (e.g., 1 Kgs 18:45), but here the context is clearly global. Ecclesiastes, which contains numerous allusions to creation, likewise utilizes the term "under heaven" with a universal intention (Eccl 1:13; 2:3; 3:1; cf. the parallel universal, worldwide expression "under the sun" in Eccl 1:3, 9; 2:11, 17). Cf. Mathews, 365.

[32]H. C. Leupold, *Exposition of Genesis* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1942), 301-302. The phrase "under the whole heaven" is used six times in the OT outside of the Flood narrative with a universal meaning (see Deut 2:25; 4:19; Job 28:24; 37:3; 41:11; Dan 9:12). For example, the phrase is used to describe God's omniscience: "For He looks to the ends of the earth and sees under the whole heavens" (Job 28:24). Again, it depicts God's sovereignty: "Whatsoever is under the whole heaven is mine" (Job 41:11, KJV). Note that the usage in Deut 2:25, which describes "the nations under the whole heaven," is further qualified and limited by the phrase "who shall hear the report of you" and thus is potentially universal and not an exception to the universal sense.

[33]In this connection, it is not necessary to postulate the existence of mountains as high as Mount Everest at the time of the Flood and thus to require waters covering the earth to a depth of six miles, as some proponents of a local flood suggest would be necessary. The antediluvian mountains were possibly much lower than at present. Passages in the book of Job may well be referring to the process of postdiluvian mountain uplift (see Job 9:5; 28:9), but Ps 104:5-9 probably refers to creation and not to postdiluvial activity, as is sometimes claimed.

flood year" and thus "prediluvian topography would have been exceedingly different from postdiluvian topography." This implication, they claim, is in conflict with biblical evidence that "strongly suggests that prediluvian geography did basically resemble postdiluvian geography,"[34] particularly in regard to the topographical descriptions in connection with the Garden of Eden, e.g., the lands of Havilah and Cush and the four rivers, two of which (the Tigris and the Euphrates) were familiar to the readers of Genesis in Moses' time.

Although there are some similarities between the prediluvian and postdiluvian topography, there are more differences. Two of the rivers, the Pishon and the Gihon, which apparently no longer existed in the time of the narrator, are mentioned in terms of where they used to flow in the postdiluvian areas of Havilah and Cush respectively. The other two rivers—the Tigris and Euphrates—are described as coming from a common source in the Garden of Eden, certainly far different from their present courses. Thus, the topographical descriptions in the early chapters of Genesis are in harmony with a worldwide Flood.

It has also been suggested that the reference to "all the high mountains" being covered (Gen 7:19) actually alludes to idolatrous "high places" similar to those mentioned later in the Prophets in their castigation of the fertility cults. Therefore, the Flood need rise no higher than the local antediluvian hills with their idolatrous cultic shrines.[35] Idolatry may well have been a part of the antediluvian rebellion against God, but it is never specifically mentioned as a reason for the Flood in the Genesis narrative; alleged intertextual linkages to idolatry in Ezekiel are weak and unconvincing.[36] Further, it is claimed that the phrase "all the high

[34]Davis A. Young, *Creation and the Flood: An Alternative to Flood Geology and Theistic Evolution* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), 210.

[35]Gordon J. Wenham, following the research of Eugen Drewermann, suggests that Gen 6:1-8 may be a polemic against the fertility cults (*Genesis 1-15*, WBC 1 [Waco: Word, 1987], 141). Warren Johns builds upon this hypothesis and further speculates that the language for "high mountains" in Gen 6-9 refers to the high places of idolatrous worship ("Theology, Science, and the Flood: A Close Reading of Genesis 6-9" [January 2004 revised version of an unpublished paper presented at the Science and Religion Conference, Glacier View Ranch, Ward, CO (August 2003)], 18-21).

[36]Contra Warren Johns, "Exodus and Ezekiel the Inspired Keys to Unraveling the Mystery of the Flood," and "Ezekiel the Inspired Key to the Flood, Genesis 6-9," unpublished papers, 2000, 2001. Obviously, both the Flood narrative and the book of Ezekiel contain a message of divine judgment; and, therefore, some of the same terms appear, describing the wickedness of the people and the certainty and severity of judgment. There is even mention of "flooding rain" as one of the agents of judgment in Ezekiel (38:22). However, in the same verse there are other agents of judgment that will "rain down" upon the wicked, harking back to other earlier acts of divine judgment, such as "great hailstones, fire, and brimstone." These latter agents of judgment may well allude to the time of the Exodus and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, events that certainly did not focus upon idolatrous high places. The only ostensibly strong linkage between Ezekiel and alleged cultic practices in the Flood narrative is the mention of the "high mountains," but as noted in the next footnote, this terminological parallelism does not hold up in the Hebrew original. Ezekiel does not provide the inspired intertextual key to

mountains" is "precise technical wording" for the high places of idolatrous worship in the Prophets and, therefore, this phrase should be given the same interpretation in the Flood narrative. However, this can only be argued from the English translations; in the Hebrew, *not one* of the alleged parallel passages in the Prophets contains *both* key terms, "high" (*gĕbōhîm*) and "mountains" (*hārîm*) as in Gen 7:19.[37] Thus, it is very unlikely that the Prophets are alluding to idolatrous practices of the Flood narrative, nor does the phrase "all the high mountains" in the Flood narrative refer to cultic high places.[38]

This conclusion is confirmed within the context of the narrative itself with the addition of the universalizing phrase "under the whole heaven" (Gen 7:19) and other language, making clear the general thrust of the surrounding verses of this section of the Flood narrative. From a literary perspective, the force of this narrative section is to portray the unimaginable crescendo of ever-rising waters.[39] Within the short span of forty-seven Hebrew words, the term "waters" occurs five times,

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understanding the Flood narrative; instead, the Flood narrative, as well as other narratives such as the Exodus and Sodom and Gomorrah, provide the intertextual keys to Ezekiel as the models of judgment to which the prophet alludes.

[37]The Hebrew phrase in Gen 7:19 is *kol hehārîm haggĕbōhîm* ("all the high mountains"), with the key terms *kol* ("all/every"), *hārîm* ("mountains"), and *gĕbōhîm* ("high"). The alleged parallel passages in the Prophets (Former and Latter in the Hebrew Bible; Prophets and Historical Books in the English Bible arrangement of the canon) that refer to idolatrous high places include: Deut 12:2; 1 Kgs 4:23; 2 Kgs 16:4=2 Chron 28:4; 2 Kgs 17:10; Jer 2:20; 4:24; 17:2; Ezek 6:13; 20:28; 34:6, 14; Hos 4:13. The only passage in the Prophets that has all three of these terms is Isa 30:25, but the referent of this passage is not idolatrous high places but the abundant verdure of a new creation. I do not deny that Ezekiel utilized imagery from the Flood narrative (among other OT narratives) in describing both the sin ("corruption" and "violence") and the punishment (e.g., "wiped out," "flooding rains") of Judah, but there is no intertextual hint in Ezekiel that the "high mountains" of the Flood narrative are to be interpreted as idolatrous cultic high places.

[38]It is further argued that the phrase "tops of the mountains" (*rā'šê hehārîm*)in Gen 8:5 is a "technical expression" in the OT referring to the fertility-cult high places (Johns, "Theology, Science, and the Flood," 27). Johns sets forth "all the usages in the OT for the expression 'tops of the mountains,'" which includes three other passages besides Gen 8:5: Eze 6:13; Hos 4:12-13; and Joel 2:5. The passage in Joel 2:5, Johns acknowledges, does not refer to cultic high places. Johns fails to point out two other OT passages that employ this precise terminology and clearly have no relationship to fertility-cult high places: Judg 9:25, 36. Thus out of five occurrences of this expression besides Gen 8:5, only two refer to cultic high places. This hardly indicates that the phrase constitutes a "technical term" for idolatrous high places. (Note also another some thirteen OT references to the singular "top of the mountain" [*rō'š hāhār*] and some four references to "top of the mountains" [*rō'šê hārîm*], none of which have idolatrous high places in view.) The context of Gen 8:5 makes clear that the expression "tops of the mountains" is not employed as a *terminus technicus* for cultic high places in this passage. The point of the phrase in Gen 8:5 is not a negative allusion to sites of idolatrous worship, but a positive, redemptive sign! The virtual return to precreation "chaos" brought about by the Flood—with water covering the entire globe—is now being reversed as the New Creation dawns and dry land appears as on the third day of creation (see Doukhan's block parallelism and further discussion of uncreation, below).

[39]Mathews, 379.

"increased" two times, "rose" three times, and "greatly" three times, all "to underscore the sense of the escalating waters."[40] The escalation swells from the simple expression "increased" (v. 17), to "prevailed and greatly increased" (v. 18), to "prevailed exceedingly" (v. 19a), and then to the climax in the covering even of the highest mountains of the globe: "And the water rose higher and higher above the ground until all the highest mountains (*hārîm*) under the whole of heaven were submerged" (vv. 19b-20, NJB). This escalation of waters does not fit with an interpretation of "high mountains" as cultic high places on local hilltops, but connotes the quintessence of elevation in the rising waters, culminating in the covering of all the land surface of the globe.

17. *"All the fountains of the great deep."* The phrase *kol-ma'yĕnot tĕhôm rabbāh* ("all the fountains of the great deep"; Gen 7:11; cf. 8:2) constitutes an intertextual link with the universal "deep" (*tĕhôm*) or world-ocean described in the creation narrative in Gen 1:2.[41] The "breaking up/bursting forth" (Heb. *niptāḥû*, possibly referring to geological faulting) of *all* (*kol*)—not just some—of the fountains (i.e., subterranean water springs) of the great deep, using language drawn from creation and coupled in the same verse with the opening of the windows of the heavens, cannot refer only to a local scene, but rather has global implications. Gerhard Hasel perceptively concludes that "the bursting forth of the waters from the fountains of the 'great deep' refers to the splitting open of springs of subterranean waters with such might and force that together with the torrential downpouring of waters stored in the atmospheric heavens a worldwide flood comes about."[42]

This is not to say that the oceans supplied any new source of water for the Genesis Flood: the oceans were already in place. But the *fountains* of the "great deep," which refer to fresh-water subterranean streams that may have surged up from the earth's crust through the oceans as well as dry

[40]Ibid.

[41]See Hasel, "The Fountains of the Great Deep," 62-72, for full discussion. Compare with Ps 104:6 (also a creation context): "You covered it [the earth] with the deep [*tĕhôm*] as with a garment; the waters were standing above the mountains." The "breaking up" or "bursting forth" (Heb. *niptāḥû*) of the fountains of the great deep is recognized as connected to creation in Prov 3:19-20, where the same two terms are employed as in Gen 7:11: "The Lord by wisdom founded the earth. . . ; by His knowledge the depths [*tĕhōmôt*] were broken up [*niptāḥû*]." Prov 8:24, also in the context of creation, uses terms from Gen 7:11 in poetic parallelism: "When there were no depths [*tĕhōmôt*] I was brought forth, When there were no fountains [*ma'yĕnot*] abounding with water." That the expression *tĕhôm rabbāh* ("great deep") can in the OT refer to oceans as well as terrestrial water is apparent in Ps 36:6, which clearly contrasts the highest points on earth (the mountains) with the depths of the oceans (the great deep). The NLT captures the flow of this verse: "Your righteousness is like the mighty mountains, your justice like the ocean depths." Isa 51:10 specifically places *tĕhôm rabbāh* "great deep" in synonymous poetic parallelism with *yām* ("sea"): "Are You not the One who dried up the sea [*yām*], the waters of the great deep [*tĕhôm rabbāh*]; that made the depths of the sea a road for the redeemed to cross over?"

[42]Hasel, "The Fountains of the Great Deep," 71.

land, combined with the torrential rains from above, raised the level of water to cover all the high mountains, thereby returning the earth virtually to its state described in Gen 1:2 ("darkness was on the face of the deep [*tĕhôm*] and the Spirit of God was hovering over the face of the waters").

The divine creative work of separating the dry land from the waters (the third day of creation week) and the waters above from the waters below the firmament (the second day of creation week) was reversed during the Flood. The surface of the entire globe was once again covered by the *tĕhôm* (i.e., world-ocean). P. J. Harland summarizes: "The flood returned the world to the pre-creation state of one large ocean."[43]

18. *The mabbûl.* The term *mabbûl* ("Flood/Deluge"; 12 occurrences in Genesis,[44] once in Ps 29:10) is reserved exclusively in the Hebrew Bible for reference to the Genesis Flood. Perhaps derived from the Hebrew root *ybl* ("to flow, to stream") or a *maqtûl* pattern noun related to the Akkadian verb *nabālu* (to destroy; literally "a destruction of waters"), the term is usually associated with *mayim* ("waters") in the Flood narrative and seems to have become "a technical term for waters flowing or streaming forth and as such designates the flood (deluge) being caused by waters. . . . *mabbûl* is in the Old Testament a term consistently employed for the flood (deluge) which was caused by torrential rains and the bursting forth of subterranean waters."[45] This technical term clearly sets the Genesis Deluge apart from all local floods and gives it a global context. The LXX reflects the technical meaning of the Hebrew *mabbûl* and only employs the Greek term translated *katakhysmos* ("flood, deluge") with reference to the Genesis Flood.

The vast array of universalistic terms for the extent of destruction that we have surveyed thus far in the Genesis Flood in Gen 6-9 is impressive when seen in isolation, but these expressions become even more significant when it is realized how many of them appear in clusters both before and after the Flood, in order to give the effect of total destruction. Note, for example, how, in Gen 6:17, God announces his intention to bring the Flood, utilizing six different universalistic expressions to indicate the global extent of the Deluge: "And I myself am bringing [1] the flood of waters [2] on the earth, to destroy [3] from under heaven [4] all flesh [5] in which is the breath of life; and [6] everything that is on the earth shall die." Further, after the Flood had done its destroying work, Gen 7:21-23 records the extent of destruction, this time using *ten* different universalizing expressions:

> And [1] all flesh died [2] that moved on the earth: [3] birds and cattle

[43]P. J. Harland, *The Value of Human Life: A Study of the Story of the Flood (Genesis 6-9)*, VTSupp 64 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 92.

[44]With the article: Gen 6:17; 7:6, 7, 10, 17; 9:11, 28; 10:1, 32; 11:10. Without the article: Gen 9:11, 15.

[45]Hasel, "Some Issues Regarding the Nature and Universality of the Genesis Flood Narrative," 92-93. See also Michael A. Grisanti, "Mabbûl," NIDOTTE, ed. W. A. VanGemeren (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997), 2: 835, 836.

> and beasts and every creeping thing that creeps on the earth, and every man [to be discussed below]. [4] All in whose nostrils was the breath of life, [5] all that was on the dry [land], died. So he destroyed [6] all living things [7] which were on the face of the ground: [8, a variation of no. 2 above] both man and cattle, creeping thing and bird of the air. [9] They were destroyed from the earth. [10] Only Noah and those who were with him in the ark remained alive.

Hasel observes that "there is hardly any stronger way in Hebrew to emphasize total destruction of 'all existence' of human and animal life on earth than the way it has been expressed [in Gen 6-9]. The writer of the Genesis flood narration employed terminology, formulae, and syntactical structures of the type that could not be more emphatic and explicit in expressing his concept of a universal, world-wide flood."[46]

Besides the specific universalistic expressions examined above, other types of terminology in Gen 6-9 imply a global, not local, flood. These are summarized below.

19. *Terminology related to the ark and its construction.* The Genesis account utilizes a specific word for the ship built by Noah: *tēbâ* ("ark"). This term, occurring in Gen 6-9 some 26 times, is employed nowhere else in Scripture except Exod 2:3, 5, where it describes the "ark" made out of bulrushes for baby Moses—who is probably depicted by this usage as a new Noah.[47] The worldwide extent of the Flood is underscored by the enormous size of the ark detailed in Gen 6:14-15. According to the biblical account, the dimensions of the ark were 300 x 50 x 30 cubits, and assuming a cubit is approximately 18 inches, this translates into 450 x 75 x 45 feet, with a conjectured displacement of 43,300 tons.[48] A ship of such immense proportions, not equaled till modern times, certainly bespeaks a deluge that transcends a local Mesopotamian flood.

20. *Terminology related to the purpose of the ark.* The stated purpose of the ark was "to keep species [*zera*^{c}, 'seed'] alive on the face of all the earth" (Gen 7:2-3; cf. 6:16-21). A massive ark filled with representatives of all nonaquatic animal species would be unnecessary if this were only a local flood, for these species could have been preserved elsewhere in the world. Yet, the biblical record specifically states that the animals were brought into the ark to preserve representatives of all of the various species (Gen 6:19-20).

21. *Terminology for the animals saved and destroyed.* The four terms used for the animals brought onto the ark are the following: *ḥayyâ* ("beast/living creature"; or *ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ* "beast of the earth"), *ʿôp* ("birds"), *bĕhēmâ* ("cattle"), and *remeś* ("creeping things"). Some have claimed that the Flood account does not indicate that representatives of all air-breathing terrestrial animals went into the ark; they argue that

[46]Hasel, "The Biblical View of the Extent of the Flood," 86.

[47]Fretheim, 391.

[48]Lewis, 2:799.

only the domesticated animals went in, while representatives of the wild animals and birds of prey survived outside the ark.[49] But such attempts have mistakenly sought to define the terms for classifications of animals in Gen 6-9 based upon later usage of these terms in the Hebrew Bible, not recognizing that the Flood account is recalling the usage of these same terms in the creation account. The intentional reuse in the Flood narrative of the same four terms that comprehensively describe the terrestrial animals of the creation account[50] stresses the point that representatives of all air-breathing terrestrial creatures created by God went on the ark and that none of these creatures survived the Flood outside the ark. Furthermore, accompanying inclusive language leaves no doubt that all terrestrial air-breathing animals are intended, both as represented within the ark and as what totally perished outside the ark. The notion that some terrestrial animals survived cannot be textually supported in the face of such categorical statements as found in Gen 7:21-23: "And all flesh died that moved on the earth. . . . All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, all that was on the dry land,

[49]See Frederick A. Filby, *The Flood Reconsidered: A Review of the Evidences of Geology, Archaeology, Ancient Literature and the Bible*, with a foreword by Stephen S. Short (London: Pickering and Inglis, 1970), 85-86. Cf. Johns, "Theology, Science, and the Flood," 2-7.

[50]Gen 1 uses this list with several variations. In depicting the creation on the fifth day, v. 22 mentions the birds, while the depiction on the sixth day (vv. 24-25) refers to *ḥayyâ* ("beast"), first, as a general category meaning "living creature," and, then, as divided into three subcategories: *bĕhēmâ* ("cattle"), *remeś* ("creeping things"), and *ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ* ("beasts of the earth"). In v. 26, humans are given dominion over only three categories of terrestrial animals: "birds of the air," "cattle" (*bĕhēmâ*), and "creeping things" (*remeś*); there is no mention of the *ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ* (unless the reading of the Syriac is accepted, which is far from certain). In v. 28, humanity's dominion over terrestrial animals is summarized by only two categories: "birds of the air" and "every living thing [*ḥayyâ*] that moves [*rmś*, Qal participle] on the earth." Finally, in v. 30, in describing the food for the terrestrial animals, three categories are mentioned: "beast of the earth" (*ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ*), "bird of the air," and everything that creeps [*rmś*, Qal participle] on the earth"; and this is further summarized by indicating that it includes everything on land in which is the "breath of life" (*nepeš ḥayyâ*). In Gen 6:19-20, all four of the basic groups of animals (or four terms) are found entering the ark, and all four appear again in the list of Gen 7:14.

It is true that Gen 6 and 7 do not use the full phrase "beast of the earth" (*ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ*) to refer to animals that entered the ark, but this phrase is clearly used in Gen 9:9-10 to indicate what was in the ark with Noah: "Behold, I establish My covenant with you . . . and with every living creature that is with you: the birds, the cattle, and every beast of the earth [*ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ*] with you, of all that go out of the ark, every beast of the earth." Johns, 3, argues that the term "beast of the earth" in this verse refers to wild animals that were with Noah after the Flood but not with him in the ark. However, as Cassuto, *Genesis*, 131, points out, the purpose of the *Bet* prefix "is to explain and particularize," and it occurs equally before all the terms used for the animals, including *ḥayyĕtô-ʾereṣ* ("beast of the earth"). These categories of animals are all held together by one common *Bet* prefix, and then comes the prepositional *min*, as Cassuto notes: "Here in the sense of 'that is.'" "That is"—referring to all the categories just mentioned—"as many as came out of the ark." The Hebrew thus makes clear that all the animals mentioned in Gen 9:9-10 came out of the ark.

In sum, the flood narrative of Gen 6 and 7 utilizes an abbreviated list of the terrestrial, air-breathing animals, such as found in Gen 1:26. The record in Gen 9:9-10 adds the additional term that is missing in previous chapters of the narrative.

died. So he destroyed all living things which were on the face of the ground. . . . They were destroyed from the earth."[51] John Hartley summarizes by noting that in the Genesis Flood narrative "four references to the death of the animals, with differing verbs, stress that outside the ark no life that breathed survived."[52]

Furthermore, if only a local flood were in view, the building of any ark at all, even for Noah and his family, would have been superfluous—God could simply have warned Noah and his family in time to escape from the coming judgment, just as he did with Lot in Sodom. But the point of the narrative concerning the ark is that there was no other escape; in the midst of the Flood "only Noah and those who were with him in the ark remained" (Gen 7:23).[53]

22. *Terminology for the duration of the Flood.* The duration of the Genesis Flood ("And the waters prevailed [*wayyigbĕrû*] upon the earth a hundred and fifty days"; Gen 7:24) makes sense only with a worldwide flood. The *mabbûl* of torrential rain from above and jets of water from the fountains of the deep below continued 40 days (Gen 7:17). All the highest mountains were still covered five months after the Flood began, as the ark "rested" (Heb. *nûaḥ,* "to be tranquil," the same root as the name of Noah), i.e., found tranquil waters[54] amid the still-covered mountains of Ararat (Gen 8:4). The tops of the mountains were not seen until after seven months (cf. Gen 7:11;

[51]We have already examined the universal, inclusive Hebrew terminology in these statements and shown their universal/global connotations in the context of the worldwide creation language to which they allude. It is also clear from Gen 6:19 that representatives of all the terrestrial air-breathing animals were brought into the ark: "And of every living thing of all flesh you shall bring two of every sort into the ark, to keep them alive with you; they shall be male and female." Later God clarifies that of "every clean animal" and of "each of the birds of the air" Noah was to take seven pairs (Gen 7:2). In obedience to God's command, "of clean beasts, of beasts that are unclean, of birds, and of everything that creeps on the earth, two by two they went into the ark, male and female" (Gen 7:9). Gen 7:13-15 emphatically repeats the universal, inclusive statement: "On the very same day Noah and Noah's sons . . . entered the ark—they and every beast after its kind, all cattle after their kind, every creeping thing that creeps on the earth after its kind, and every bird after its kind, every bird of every sort . . . two by two, of all flesh in which is the breath of life." This same comprehensive list is repeated two more times in Gen 8:17, 19 to name the animals coming out of the ark. Gen 9:10 explicitly adds the phrase *bayyĕtô-ʾereṣ* ("every beast of the earth," commonly interpreted as wild animals) as one of the basic categories of animals that came out of the ark.

[52]Hartley, 103.

[53]Art Hill, "On Universal Language," *Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith* 55 (2003): 66.

[54]Victor P. Hamilton writes: "I see no credible way of harmonizing the information of v. 5 with v. 4. V. 4 clearly states that the ark rested on one of the mountains of Ararat in the 17th day of the 7th month. Yet v. 5 states that no mountaintop was spotted until the first day of the 10th month" (*The Book of Genesis: Chapters 1-17*, NICOT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990], 301). I suggest that the solution is found in the meaning of the word "rested" (Heb. *nûaḥ,* "to be tranquil"). It does not necessarily imply that the ark has *landed* on one of the mountains, but only that it had become tranquil in the less turbulent waters surrounded by yet-submerged peaks of Ararat.

Gen 8:5). And finally, the Flood waters were not dried up (*yābšâ*) enough for Noah to leave the ark until one year and ten days had passed (cf. Gen 7:11; 8:14). Such lengths of time seem commensurate only with a global and not a local flood.

23. *Terminology for the water activity during the Flood.* The receding activity of the water (Gen 8:3a, 54a) is described by the Hebrew phrase *hālôk wāšôb* (literally, "going and coming"). In parallel with similar phraseology and grammatical construction for the "to and fro" motion of the raven in the Flood narrative (Gen 8:7), this expression should probably be translated as "going and retreating,"[55] and implies oscillatory water motion, which lasted for 74 days (see Gen 8:3-5). The waters rushing back and forth, as in ocean tidal movement as the overall level gradually decreased, supports a universal interpretation but is incongruous with a local-flood theory.

24. *Terminology for the divine blessing after the Flood.* Exactly the same inclusive divine blessing is given to both Adam and Noah: *pĕrû ûrĕbû ûmilʾû ʾet-hāʾāreṣ* ("Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth"; Gen 1:28; 9:1). This is another linkage between universal creation and the universal Flood, between the original beginning and the "new beginning." As the human race at creation flows exclusively from Adam and Eve, so the postdiluvial humanity is populated exclusively through Noah and his three sons (Gen 9:19). Such could not be the case if only part of humankind outside the ark were destroyed by the Flood.

25. *Terminology for the covenant partners and sign after the Flood.* The Noahic covenant with its rainbow sign is specifically stated to include the whole earth and its inhabitants (Gen 9:9-17). God said to Noah: "The rainbow [*haqqešet*] shall be in the cloud, and I will look upon it to remember the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature of all flesh that is on the earth" (v. 16). This universal relationship between God and the earth with all its inhabitants is repeated at least six times in the space of ten verses (vv. 9-10, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17). If these universalistic terms for God's covenant partners (e.g., "every living creature," "all flesh," "the earth") are to be taken only in a limited and less-than-global sense, then the covenant would be only a limited covenant and the rainbow sign of "the all-embracing universality of the Divine mercy"[56] would be stripped of its meaning.

26. *Terminology for the covenant promise after the Flood.* After the Flood God promises that "never again [*lōʾ . . . ʿôd*] shall all flesh be cut off by the waters of the flood; never again [*lōʾ . . . ʿôd*] shall there be a flood to

[55]Steven A. Austin, "Did Noah's Flood Cover the Entire World? Yes." in *The Genesis Debate: Persistent Questions about Creation and the Flood,* ed. Ronald F. Youngblood (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990), 218; Hasel, "Some Issues Regarding the Nature and Universality of the Genesis Flood Narrative," 93.

[56]Franz Delitzsch, "Genesis," in *Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament: The Pentateuch,* Carl F. Keil and Franz Delitzsch, trans. James Martin (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 1:289-290.

destroy the earth" (Gen 9:11). Verse 15 repeats the divine promise: "the waters shall never again [*lō᾽ . . . ʿôd*] become a flood to destroy all flesh." The viability of God's promise (cf. Isa 54:9) and the integrity of God in keeping his promise are critical in the worldwide extent of the Flood. *If Gen 6-9 describes only a local flood, then God has broken his promise every time another local destructive flood has happened!* The only way God's promise not to send another flood to destroy all flesh can be seen to have been kept is if the Flood was a universal one and the whole human race and all terrestrial creatures outside the ark were destroyed.

27. *Terminology that portrays the Flood as a divine "uncreation."* The first description of the Flood activity in the narrative of Gen 6-9 occurs in Gen 7:10: "and the waters of the Flood were upon the earth" (*ûmê hammabbûl hāyû ʿal-hā᾽āreṣ*). This is followed immediately by the depiction of the source of the Flood waters in v. 11: "all the fountains of the great deep were broken up, and the windows of heaven were opened" (*kol-maʿyĕnōt tĕhôm rabbâ wa᾽arubbōt haššāmáyim niptāḥû*). These verses portray a divine act of "uncreation," reversing the action of Day 2 of creation week (in which God divided the waters above the firmament from the waters under the firmament, Gen 1:6-8), by which the earth is virtually[57] returned to the state before creation week, when the whole globe was covered by the "face of the deep [*tĕhôm*]" (Gen 1:2). The Flood "uncreation" also involves a reversal of Day 3 of creation week, when God said, "Let the dry land appear" (Gen 1:9). During the Flood the ever-rising waters escalated until "all the high hills under the whole heaven were covered" (*wayĕkussû kol-hehārîm hagg᾽abōhîm ᾽ašer-taḥat kol-haššāmāyim*) and "the mountains were covered" (*way᾽akussû hehārîm*) (Gen 7:19-20). Days 5 and 6 of Creation week were also reversed, as during the Flood, when the terrestrial animals which God created on these days (Gen 1:20, 24) were destroyed: "All in whose nostrils was the breath of the spirit of life, all that was on the dry land, died" (*kōl ᾽ašer nišmat-rûaḥ ḥayyîm bĕ᾽appāyw mikkōl ᾽ašer beḥārābâ mētû*; Gen 7:22).

Based upon the key expressions of these and other verses of the Flood narrative, a host of commentators have recognized that Gen 6-7 depicts a work of cosmic undoing or reversal of creation as divine judgment upon the antediluvian world. For example, Nahum Sarna writes that "the Flood is a cosmic catastrophe that is actually the undoing of creation. . . . In other words, creation is being undone, and

[57]Obviously, the "uncreation" does not entail an absolute undoing of the Gen 1 creation week or there would be no survivors in the Ark. Those few who reject the motif of uncreation in the Flood narrative—because in the Flood fish survive and the plants are not destroyed and the sun and moon still function—simply miss the point (see Fretheim, 314, for such rejection). The virtual return of the earth to its precreation appearance, totally covered by water, is ample testimony to the virtually universal divine judgment of "uncreation" upon his creation, who have well-nigh universally rejected him. Such reversal of creation is confirmed by the renewal of creation after the Flood, following precisely the same order as Creation week, as discussed in the next point below.

the world returned to chaos."[58] Tikva Frymer-Kensky describes the Flood as "the original, cosmic undoing of creation."[59] Umberto Cassuto points out that at the high point of the Flood, "we see water everywhere, as though the world had reverted to its primeval state at the dawn of Creation, when the waters of the Deep submerged everything."[60] For Joseph Blenkinsopp, "the deluge is an act of uncreation, undoing the work of separation by returning everything to the primeval, watery chaos from which the created order first arose."[61] Mathews describes the universal uncreation during the Flood: "Now the Lord sets in motion the un-creation of the world by releasing the powers that always stand ready to overwhelm life. The waters once separated will now be rejoined for the purpose of destruction. Earth's disruption is comprehensive; 'all' the waters of the 'great deep' came forth. The immense flood-waters involve the flow of waters from below and from above, a merism indicating the complete transformation of the terrestrial structures."[62]

Gerhard von Rad vividly underscores the universal implications of this undoing or reversal of creation: "We must understand the Flood, therefore, as a catastrophe involving the entire cosmos. . . . Here the catastrophe, therefore, concerns not only men and beasts . . . but the earth (chs. 6.13; 9.1)—indeed, the entire cosmos."[63] Harland devotes an entire chapter of his monograph on the Genesis Flood to the motif of "creation, uncreation, and re-creation," demonstrating how the Flood narrative is a worldwide undoing of creation: "The story of the flood presents the reader with an almost complete reversal of the account of creation in Gen 1-2. . . . God alone is the sovereign Lord of all that exists and since he is the sole creator, so too he can become the uncreator of the world. . . . The flood returned the world to the pre-creation state of one large ocean."[64] Only a cosmic/universal/global

[58]Sarna, 48, 85.

[59]Tikva Frymer-Kensky, "Pollution, Purification, and Purgation in Biblical Israel," in *The Word of the Lord Shall Go Forth: Essays in Honor of David Noel Freedman in Celebration of His Sixtieth Birthday*, ed. Carol L. Meyers and M. O'Connor (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1983), 410; cf. idem, "The Flood," in *Harper's Bible Dictionary*, ed. Paul J. Achtemeier (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1985), 312.

[60]Cassuto, *Genesis*, 97.

[61]Joseph Blenkinsopp, *The Pentateuch: An Introduction to the First Five Books of the Bible* (New York: Doubleday, 1992), 83; cf. idem, "Uncreation: The Great Flood: Gen 6:5-9:17," in *Pentateuch*, ed. Laurence Bright (New York: Doubleday, 1971), 46-47.

[62]Mathews, 376.

[63]Von Rad, *Genesis*, 128.

[64]Harland, 89, 92. Among the many other scholars who recognize the Flood as a cosmic/universal reversal of creation, see, e.g., D. J. A. Clines, "Noah's Flood: I: The Theology of the Flood Narrative," *Faith and Thought* 100/2 (1972-1973): 136; Waltke, 139; Wenham, 180-183; and Claus Westermann, *Genesis 1-11: A Commentary*, trans. John J. Scullion (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1984), 434.

Flood can encompass the cosmic/universal/global reversal or undoing of creation described in Gen 6-9.

28. *Terminology depicting a cosmic re-creation after the Flood.* The cosmic reversal of creation is followed by a cosmic New Beginning. As D. J. A. Clines states: "The 'uncreation' which God has worked with the Flood is not final; creation has not been permanently undone. Old unities of the natural world are restored (8:22), and the old ordinances of creation are renewed (9:1-7)."[65] Jacques Doukhan, among others, has demonstrated the precise literary parallels between the successive stages of "re-creation" in the aftermath of the Flood (Gen 8-9) and the seven days of creation in Gen 1:2–2:3:[66]

Day 1. The wind/Spirit (*rûaḥ*) over the earth and waters. Gen. 8:1; cf. Gen. 1:2.
Day 2. Division of waters. Gen. 8:1-5; cf. Gen. 1:6-8.
Day 3. Appearance of dry ground and plants. Gen. 8:5-12; cf. Gen. 1:9-13.
Day 4. Appearance of light. Gen. 8:13-14; cf. Gen. 1:14-19.
Day 5. Emergence of animals (birds mentioned first). Gen. 8:15-17; cf. Gen. 1:20-23.
Day 6. Animals together with men, blessing, food for men, "male and female," image of God. Gen. 8:18-9:7; cf. Gen. 1:24-31.
Day 7. Universal sign of the covenant. Gen 9:8-17; cf. Gen. 2:1-3.

The linkage between Day 7 (the Sabbath) and the Flood narrative is also evident in God's response to Noah's burnt offering which Noah offered upon leaving the ark (Gen 8:21): God smelled "a soothing aroma," literally, an "aroma of rest [*hannîḥōaḥ*]," utilizing a word from the same root *nûaḥ* employed for God's "rest" on the Sabbath (*wayyānaḥ*; Exod 20:11).[67]

In this "re-creation" of the world, Noah is a new Adam; and, as noted above, he and his sons are given the same command as to Adam and Eve in Eden: "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth" (Gen 9:1; cf. Gen 1:28). This New Beginning is clearly presented as the beginning for the entire earth, as at the first creation week, and not just for a localized area such as Mesopotamia. Thus, in the overarching literary structure of the "re-creation" in the Flood narrative, the global dimension of the Flood is underscored by parallels with the global creation account of Gen 1:3–2:3.

29. *Terminology alluding to the Genesis Flood elsewhere in the Hebrew Bible.* As

[65]Clines, "Noah's Flood," 138.

[66]Adapted from Jacques B. Doukhan, *Daniel: The Vision of the End* (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987), 133-134; cf. Gage, 10-20; Mathews, 383; Waltke, 128-129. Waltke and Mathews give even more precise verbal parallels than Doukhan, and slightly differ from him in their analysis in suggesting that there is no parallel between the Flood "recreation" and the fourth day of Creation because the sun and moon were not part of the uncreation. Further parallels to the fifth day of creation are shown with the birds that fly above the earth (Gen 8:6-12; cf. 1:20-23) and parallels to the sixth day of creation with the same basic list of animals (Gen 8:17-19; cf. 1:24-25).

[67]Gage, 11, 16.

noted in point 18 above, the technical term for the Genesis Flood, *mabbûl*, appears only one time outside Genesis. Its utilization in Ps 29:10 underscores YHWH's universal sovereignty over the whole world at the time of the Noahic Flood as well as in the time of the Psalmist: "The Lord sat enthroned at the Flood [*mabbûl*], and the Lord sits as King forever."

Another certain allusion to the Genesis Flood appears in the phrase *mê-Noaḥ* ("waters of Noah") in Isa 54:9, where the prophet records God's promise of future faithfulness in light of his promise made at the time of the Flood: "For this is like the waters of Noah to me: For as I have sworn that the waters of Noah would not flood the earth again, so I have sworn that I will not be angry with you nor rebuke you." Although by the time of Isaiah there had no doubt been many local floods of which he and his hearers were aware, it was possible for God to use the illustration of Noah's Flood only because it was clear to readers that Noah's Flood was worldwide, totally unlike any local flood since that time, and thus God's promise made in the time of Noah still stood even in the face of the subsequent occurrence of numerous local floods.

There are also many other possible OT allusions to the Noahic Deluge that utilize a variety of Hebrew expressions: *zerem* ("inundation, flood," Isa 28:2); *mayim kabbîrîm* ("mighty waters," Isa 28:2), *mayim rabbîm* ("great waters," Ps 18:17 [Eng. v. 16]), or simply *mayim* ("waters," Isa 43:2; Job 12:15; Ps 124:4); *nāhār/ nĕhārôt* ("floods, streams," Ps 93:3); *rahab* ("storm, Rahab," Job 26:12); *šibbōlet* ("flood, flowing stream," Ps 69:3, 16 [Eng. vv. 2, 15]); and *šeṭep* ("overflowing, flood," Dan 9:26; Nah 1:8; Ps 32:6). The forcefulness of these descriptors may also point beyond local floods to include reference to a global Deluge.

30. *Universal terminology in NT references to the Flood.* The NT reflects the technical meaning of the Hebrew *mabbûl* and only employs the Greek term translated *kataklysmos* ("flood, deluge") with reference to the Genesis Flood (Matt 24:38, 39; Luke 17:27; and 2 Pet 2:5, plus once using the related verb *kataklyzō* ["flood, inundate"] in 2 Pet 3:6). The NT passages concerning the Flood all employ universal language: "swept them *all* [*hapantas*, plural, 'everyone'] away," Matt 24:39; "destroyed them *all* [*pantas*, pl. 'everyone']" (Luke 17:27); "he did not spare the ancient *world* [*kosmos*], but preserved Noah with seven other persons, . . . when he brought a flood upon the *world* [*kosmos*] of the ungodly," 2 Pet 2:5; "a few, that is eight persons, were saved through water" (1 Pet 3:20); Noah "condemned the *world* [*kosmos*] (Heb 11:7). A local flood would not have ended the antediluvian world. Gleason L. Archer Jr. states: "We have the unequivocal corroboration of the New Testament that the destruction of the human race at the time of the flood was total and universal."[68]

The NT Flood typology assumes and *depends upon* not only the historicity, but also the universality of the Flood to theologically argue

[68]Gleason L. Archer Jr., *A Survey of Old Testament Introduction*, rev. ed. (Chicago: Moody, 1985), 208.

for an imminent worldwide judgment by fire (2 Pet 3:6-7). Peter argues that just as there was a worldwide, "eschatological" judgment by water causing the unbelieving antediluvian world to perish, so in the antitype there must be a global endtime judgment by fire, bringing about the destruction of the ungodly.[69]

Along with the abundant terminological evidence for a universal/global Flood depicted by Gen 6-9, and elsewhere in Scripture, there is also the contextual, thematic evidence of Gen 1-11, to which we now turn.

Universal Themes in Genesis 1-11

The trajectory of major themes prior to the Flood narrative in Gen 1-5—creation, Fall, plan of redemption, spread of sin—is universal in scope and calls for a corresponding universal judgment.[70] Likewise, the trajectory of major themes following the Flood narrative in Gen 10-11 is universal. The universal themes of Gen 1-11, which forms the larger context for the Flood narrative, are briefly outlined below.

Universal Creation. We have noted in reference to specific Flood terminology the numerous allusions to the global context of creation. The creation week set forth in Gen 1 is clearly global and not local in scope.[71]

The Universality of Sin and the Plan of Redemption. Likewise, the Fall of humanity in Adam and Eve led to the sinful condition of the entire human race (*hā'ādām*), not just the inhabitants of Mesopotamia (cf. Gen 6:5, 11; Rom 3:19; 5:12). The Protoevangelium outlined in Gen 3:15 involves the universal moral struggle between the spiritual descendants (*zera*^{c}, "seed," collective) of the serpent and the spiritual descendants (*zera*^{c}, "seed," collective) of the woman, culminating in the victory of the representative Messianic Seed (*zera*^{c}; "seed," singular with singular referents) over the serpent.[72] This plan of redemption is certainly universal in scope.

In harmony with the universal dimensions of preceding themes in Gen 1-5, the sinful condition of humankind at the time of the Flood

[69]See Davidson, *Typology in Scripture*, 326-327.

[70]D. J. A. Clines, "Themes in Genesis 1-11," in *I Studied Inscriptions from Before the Flood: Ancient Near Eastern, Literary, and Linguistic Approaches to Genesis 1-11*, ed. Richard S. Hess and David T. Tsumura (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1994): 285-309.

[71]For further discussion of the global scope of the creation language of Gen 1, see my study, "The Biblical Account of Origins," *JATS* 14 (2003): 35-36. Throughout Gen 1, the numerous references to the scope of God's creation—to the "earth" that was formless and empty, and the darkness "upon the face of the deep" (v. 2), the dividing of the light and darkness (v. 3), the dividing of waters from waters (v. 6), the gathering of the waters into "seas" (v. 10), the making of the "greater light" and the "lesser light" to "give light on the earth" (vv. 14-18), the creation of the birds "to fly across the face of the firmament of the heavens" (v. 20), the creation of land animals and humans to "be fruitful and fill the earth, and have dominion over . . . everything that moves upon the earth" (vv. 26-28)—all these are unambiguously global in their scope.

[72]See O. Palmer Robertson, *The Christ of the Covenants* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980); Afolarin Ojewole, "The Seed in Gen 3:15" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Andrews University, 2001).

includes more than those living in the Fertile Crescent. From *God's* perspective, not simply from the culturally conditioned local view of the narrator, there were worldwide results calling for the divine legal investigation: "And God saw that the wickedness of man (*hā'ādām*, humankind) was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually" (Gen 6:5). Such universal sinfulness naturally calls for universal judgment.

Universal Covenant. Unlike the other biblical covenants, the Noahic covenant is made not only with humankind, but with the whole earth (Gen 9:13), including every living creature (Gen 9:10, 12, 15, 16), and is thus completely unilateral and unconditional upon the response of the earth and its inhabitants. The sign of this everlasting covenant is the rainbow, which is not primarily for humankind, but for God to see and "remember" the covenant he has made with the earth (Gen 9:16).

Universal Genealogies and Dispersion of the Nations. The genealogical lines from both Adam (Gen 4:17-26; 5:1-31) and Noah (Gen 10:1-32; 11:1-9) are exclusive in nature, indicating that as Adam was father of all pre-Flood humanity, so Noah was father of all post-Flood humanity. Such exclusivity in the genealogies of Gen 4, 5, and 11 unequivocally portray the universality of both genealogical lines. From the descendants of Noah "the nations spread abroad on the earth after the flood" (Gen 10:32). The Table of Nations in Gen 10:1-31 makes evident the universal scope of this spreading far beyond the Mesopotamian valley. The Tower of Babel dispersion was God's means of scattering humanity across the globe, despite their intentions to congregate on the Plain of Shinar (Gen 11:1-19).

In the context of these numerous universal themes in Gen 1-11, if the Flood were merely local in extent, it would be the *only* restricted theme in these opening chapters of Genesis! Such a conclusion is hardly defensible. Rather, the Genesis Flood must be read just as universally as the other themes in Gen 1-11.

In light of the plethora of terminological and contextual evidence presented above, it is not surprising that the scholarly view in which Gen 6-9 describes a worldwide Flood is not a minority position in the history of interpretation. This, indeed, is the traditional Judeo-Christian understanding and the conclusion of a number of recent evangelical commentaries.[73] Furthermore, it is significant that virtually all modern critical scholars, who have no burden to seek to make the biblical text comport with a modern worldview, affirm that Gen 6-9 depicts not

[73]See, e.g., Mathews, 365, commenting specifically on the inclusive language of Gen 6:17: "This inclusive language [in Gen 6:17] as elsewhere in this account [see 6:7, 12-13; 7:4, 19, 21-23; 8:21; 9:11, 15; cf. 2 Pet 3:6] suggests that the cataclysm was worldwide in scope. . . .This kind of inclusive language for local events is attested elsewhere in Genesis (e.g., 41:54-57), but the insistence of the narrative on the encompassing character of the flood favors the literal understanding of the universal view." Cf. Waltke, 133: "The narrator, even allowing for oriental hyperbole, seems to have in mind a universal flood."

simply a local but a worldwide Flood.[74] For example, in his recent critical study of the Genesis Flood narrative, Harland states: "The story [Gen 6-9] is not the record of a local flood. The text speaks of a universal, not a partial, flood: 6:17, 7:4, 21, 23, 8:21. All flesh died. . . . In Gen 7:4 the writer would hardly have thought that everything which God had made included only part of the world."[75]

Theories of Dependence on ANE Traditions vs. Theories of Theological Polemic

Theories of Dependence upon ANE Traditions

While acknowledging that the text of Gen 6-9 affirms a worldwide Flood, most critical commentators further assert that the biblical narrative is either directly borrowed from other ANE Flood stories or ultimately derives from a common original Mesopotamian Flood tradition. Terrence Fretheim is representative of the modern critical consensus: "The Genesis account should be related to a major flood in the Mesopotamian valley, which in time was interpreted as a flood that covered the then known world (one severe flood has been dated around 3000 BCE)."[76]

Four main flood stories are found in ancient Mesopotamian sources: the Sumerian Eridu Genesis (ca. 1600 B.C.),[77] the Old Babylonian Atrahasis Epic (ca. 1600 B.C.),[78] the Gilgamesh Epic (Neo-Assyrian version, ca. eighth to seventh centuries B.C.),[79] and Berossus's account (Babylon, third century B.C.).[80]

The major similarities between these ANE flood stories, on one hand, and the biblical account, on the other, have been rehearsed by many scholars[81] and are conveniently summarized by Wenham as follows:[82] a divine decision to destroy humankind; a warning to the flood hero; the command to build an ark; the hero's obedience; the command to enter the ark; the entry into the ark; the closing of the door; the description of the flood; the destruction of life; the end of rain, etc.; the ark grounding on a mountain; the hero opens a window;

[74]See Gerhard F. Hasel, "The Biblical View of the Extent of the Flood," 78 and n. 16 for bibliography of representatives of this position, see, e.g., Fohrer, Koehler, Noth, Procksch, Skinner, Sarna, Speiser, von Rad, Vriezen, Zimmerli.

[75]Harland, 3.

[76]Fretheim, 388.

[77]Thorkild Jacobsen, "The Eridu Genesis," *JBL* 100 (1981): 513-529.

[78]See W. G. Lambert and A. R. Millard, *Atrahasis: The Babylonian Story of the Flood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

[79]See Alexander Heidel, *The Gilgamesh Epic and Old Testament Parallels* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

[80]See Lambert and Millard, 134-137.

[81]See especially the extended discussion by Heidel.

[82]Wenham, 163-164.

the birds' reconnaissance; the exit from the ark; offering of a sacrifice; the divine smelling of the sacrifice; and a blessing on the flood hero.

Without denying the common elements between the Mesopotamian flood stories and the biblical Flood narrative, I do not believe it is necessary to assume either a direct or indirect dependence upon the Mesopotamian traditions. Rather, in light of the similarity between all these accounts and other flood traditions throughout the world, and even more, in light of the profound theological differences between the biblical account and all these other Flood stories, it seems preferable to regard all of these stories as testifying to the historicity of the Genesis Flood and to recognize the Genesis Flood narrative as constituting a direct polemic against the ANE Flood stories. This alternative is discussed in the next section.

The Flood as (Historically Veracious)[83] Theological Polemic

Ancient flood stories are almost universal; more than two hundred different stories are known.[84] A flood is by far the most frequently given cause for past world calamities in the folk literature of antiquity,[85] with the stories nearest to the area of the Dispersion at Babel closest in detail to the biblical account. A remarkable number of these oral and written traditions agree upon the basic points of the biblical account: all humankind was destroyed by a great flood as a result of divine judgment against human sin, and a single man and his family or a few friends survived the deluge in a ship or other seafaring vessel. While critical scholars generally maintain that "stories from other cultures should be traced back to their own local flood traditions,"[86] it seems just as plausible, and I think more likely, that this vast body of ancient witnesses to a worldwide Deluge is powerful testimony to the historicity and universality of the biblical Flood.

In contrast to the extrabiblical ANE flood stories, in which no cause of the flood is given (e.g., Gilgamesh Epic) or where the gods decide to wipe out their human slaves because they are making too much noise (e.g., Atrahasis Epic and Eridu Genesis), the biblical account provides a profound theological motivation for the Flood: humanity's moral depravity and sinfulness—the all-pervading

[83]I place this reference to historicity in the heading because some think of a theological polemic as necessitating the misdrawing of history in the service of theology. I suggest that the biblical concept of polemic consists of theology that is radically rooted in what the narrator presents as real and accurate history.

[84]James G. Frazer, *Folk-Lore in the Old Testament: Studies in Comparative Religion* (London: MacMillan, 1918), 1:105-361; Byron C. Nelson, *The Deluge Story in Stone: A History of the Flood Theory of Geology* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1931).

[85]Stith Thompson, *Motif-Index of Folk-Literature: A Classification of Narrative Elements in Folktales, Ballads, Myths, Fables, Medieval Romances, Exempla, Fabiaux, Jest-Books, and Local Legends* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), 1:182-194.

[86]So Fretheim, 388.

corruption and violence of all living beings ("all flesh") on earth (Gen 6:1-8, 11-12), which demands divine punishment.

This theological motivation provides a divine justification (theodicy) for bringing the Flood. In contrast to the gods of other ANE flood stories, who arbitrarily act out of unreasoning anger, selfishness, and caprice, and seek to deceive the people rather to inform them of the impending flood, the biblical God is far different. According to the biblical account, God, in response to humanity's corruption, repents (*nāḥam*, "is sorry, moved to pity, having compassion, suffering grief"; Gen 6:6) of his decision to create humanity. He extends a probationary period of 120 years during which his Spirit is striving with humanity to repent (Gen 6:3), warning the antediluvian world through Noah, the "preacher of righteousness" (2 Pet 2:5; cf. 1 Pet 3:19-20; Gen 6:14-16).

The portrayal of humanity's moral depravity as the cause of the flood highlights human responsibility for sin. The Flood comes about as a result of corruption and violence on the part of humankind. At the same time, Noah's response of faith/faithfulness (*pistis*; Heb 11:7) underscores that accountability to God is not only corporate, but individual: Noah found "favor" (*ḥēn*) in God's sight; he was "righteous" (*ṣaddîq*), "blameless" (*tāmîm*), and "walked together" (*hālak*, Hithpael) in personal relationship with God (Gen 6:8-9); he responded in implicit obedience to his commands (Gen 6:22; 7:5, 9; cf. Ezek 14:14, 20).

Thus, God's act of destruction was not arbitrary. God "destroys" (*šāḥat*; Gen 6:13) what humanity had already ruined or corrupted (*šāḥat*; vv. 11-12), mercifully bringing to completion the ruin already wrought by humankind. Humankind's marring of God's creation is followed by God's judgment of cosmic uncreation. God's response to his chosen task is grief (*ʿāṣab*; Gen 6:6). The term *ʿāṣab* is the same Hebrew root used of the woman's "pain" and Adam's "anguish" (Gen 3:16, 17) in the divine judgment at the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, with the implication that God himself takes up humanity's pain and anguish.

The God of the biblical Flood is not only just and merciful; he is also free to act according to his divine will, possessing sovereign power and full control over the forces of nature (in contrast to the weakness and fright of the ANE gods during the Flood). Thus, the author's use of the two divine names, Elohim and YHWH, throughout the Flood narrative is intentional. Instead of indicating separate literary sources, the use of these names seems to highlight different aspects of God's character: the generic *Elohim* when his universal, transcendent sovereignty or judicial authority is emphasized; and the covenant name *YHWH* when his personal, ethical dealings with Noah and humankind are in view.[87]

God's grace is revealed before the Flood in the 120 years of probation granted the antediluvian world (Gen 6:3) and in his directions for the

[87]U. Cassuto, *The Documentary Hypothesis and the Composition of the Pentateuch*, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), 35-36; Leupold, 280-281.

building of the ark to save those faithful to him (Gen 6:14-21). The Flood narrative contains the first mention in the biblical canon of the motif and terminology of remnant: "Only Noah and those who were with him in the ark remained [*šā'ar*]" (Gen 7:23). The remnant who survived the cosmic catastrophe of the Flood were constituted thus because of their right relationship of faith and obedience to God, not because of caprice or the favoritism of the gods, as in the extrabiblical ANE flood stories.[88]

The word *bĕrît* ("covenant") first appears in Scripture in connection with the Flood (Gen 6:18; 9:8-17), with the covenant motif playing an integral role in the Flood narrative. The Noahic covenant comes at God's initiative and demonstrates his concern, faithfulness, and dependability. He covenants never again to send a Flood to destroy the earth. This covenant promise flows from the propitiatory animal sacrifice offered by Noah (Gen 8:20-22).[89] In no other ANE flood story does a god bind himself by covenant to never bring a flood again upon the earth to destroy humankind.

All of this theological polemic in the biblical Flood narrative builds upon and depends upon the historical veracity and universality of the Flood events. A tenable divine theodicy is rooted in the necessity of an actual, worldwide Flood to bring universal judgment upon humankind for their rebellion, to bring cosmic uncreation upon a world that had rejected its Creator and marred his creation, and to bring about a new creation for the faithful remnant.

Conclusion

There is a rich theology in the unified biblical Flood narrative, but inasmuch as the literary genre of this narrative underscores the historical nature of the events narrated, the theology of the narrative cannot be divorced from—and in fact is rooted in—the historicity of the Flood account. Numerous lines of biblical evidence converge in affirming that the biblical Flood narrative describes a worldwide, global Deluge and not a limited, localized flood.

The questions of the historicity and worldwide nature of the Genesis Flood are not just a matter of idle curiosity with little at stake for Christian faith. They are pivotal in understanding and remaining faithful to the theology of Gen 1-11 and the rest of Scripture. The many links with the global creation in Gen 1-2 noted in this study not only support the aspect of universality in the Flood, but serve to theologically connect the protology

[88]Numerous thematic and verbal parallels between the accounts of Noah's salvation and Israel's Exodus deliverance also reveal the author's intent to emphasize their similarity (John H. Sailhamer, "Genesis," in *The Expositor's Bible Commentary*, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1990], 2:89). Various references in the Psalms to God's gracious deliverance of the righteous from the "great waters" of tribulation may contain allusions to the Genesis Flood (Pss 18:16 [Heb. v. 17]; 32:6; 65:5-8 [Heb. vv. 6-9]; 69:2 [Heb. v. 3]; 89:9 [Heb. v. 10]; 93:3; and 124:4).

[89]Wenham, 189-190.

and eschatology presented in the opening chapters of Scripture. The Flood is an eschatological "uncreation" of the world and humanity followed by a "re-creation" of the new world. "Thus, the story of the Flood—and this is theologically the most important fact—shows an eschatological world judgment. . . . The world judgment of the Flood hangs like an iron curtain between this world age and that of the first splendor of creation."[90]

The theology of the universal Flood is, therefore, the pivotal point of a connected but multifaceted universal theme running through Gen 1-11, constituting an overarching pattern for the rest of Scripture: worldwide *creation* revealing the character of the Creator and his original purpose for creation; humankind's turning from the Creator and the universal spread of sin ending in the global "*uncreation*" through eschatological judgment; and *re-creation* in the eschatological salvation of the faithful covenant remnant and the global renewal of the earth.

[90]Von Rad, 129-130.

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SELECTED LEXICAL AND GRAMMATICAL STUDIES IN GENESIS 1[1]

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A traditional evangelical understanding has been that Gen 1:1–2:4 records the very recent and quick creation of the heavens and earth by the God of the OT, i.e., the "young earth" view. With the growing numbers of evangelicals who hold to Progressive Creationism or Theistic Evolution, either of which could be considered an "old earth" view, it is important to study the words of Scripture to establish a solid foundation for future discussion. With the Evangelical Theological Society's (ETS) emphasis on the inspiration and inerrancy of the autographs of Scripture, the Scriptures themselves must be the deciding factor in the issue.

To that end, this paper will analyze the Hebrew terms יוֹם ("day"), עֶרֶב ("evening") and בֹּקֶר ("morning"), and וַיְהִי־כֵן ("and it was so") as they are used syntactically within the remainder of the OT, in order to see if those other usages inform Gen 1:1–2:4. This paper will also analyze the jussive verbal forms of Gen 1:1–2:4 to ascertain what information these terms may add to the discussion.

There have been many recent attempts to harmonize the traditional young-earth view of the terms in Gen 1 with the seemingly overwhelming evidence from science as to the age of the earth. At the center of this discussion is the understanding of the use of the Hebrew term יוֹם ("day"). Hugh Ross, a popular proponent of the Progressive Creationist school, has stated:

> The first chapter of Genesis declares that within six "days" God miraculously transformed a "formless and void" earth into a suitable habitat for mankind. The meaning of the word *day*, here, has become the center of a controversy. Does it, or does it not, make for a conflict between Scripture and science?
>
> The answer to that question depends upon whether the time periods indicated are twenty-four hours or, rather, something on the order of millions of years. Most Bible scholars (and scientists, too) would agree that a correct and literal interpretation of the creation "day" is one that takes into account definitions, context, grammar, and relevant

[1]This paper was presented at the national 2001 Evangelical Theological Society meetings in Colorado Springs, Colorado.

> passages from other parts of Scripture. A careful analysis of all these elements yields many reasons for interpreting the creation days of Genesis as long periods of time.[2]

Bernard Ramm stated much earlier: "In view of the fact that such a great array of geologists and theologians accept the metaphorical interpretation of the word *day*, the case for the literal day cannot be conclusive nor the objections to the metaphorical interpretation too serious."[3]

Since many on both sides of the issue would agree that the proper understanding of "day" (יוֹם) is crucial, it is necessary to begin the investigation with the testimony of its use in Scripture as a whole before trying to understand its use within Gen 1.

Possible Syntactical Arrangements of יוֹם *in the Singular*

Basic Gloss

The anarthrous term יוֹם is glossed as "a day" in Ps 84:10 (clearly twenty-four hours or less) and as "day" in balanced parallelism with "night" (וְלַיְלָה) in Ps 19:2 (perhaps a twelve-hour day). It rarely serves as the subject of a sentence without numerical qualifiers or demonstratives.

Used with the article, הַיּוֹם is normally understood to have the meaning "the day," often as the genitive in construct relationships: e.g., "cool of the day" (Gen 3:8), "heat of the day" (Gen 18:1). Either of these types of usages, though generalized, is obviously limited by the day of twenty-four hours. With the article, יוֹם is often used as "today" or "this day."[4] In certain instances, it is found with the nuance of "at this time" or "this day and from now on" (Gen 4:14; 31:43).

With a Demonstrative

The singular of the term יוֹם appears often with near and far demonstratives זֶה and הוּא used attributively with the basic glosses of "this day" (הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה; e.g., Gen 24:42, 1 Kgs 1:25; also as "today") and "that day" (הַיּוֹם הַהוּא; Gen 30:35; Exod 32:28). In predicate position, the phrase "this is the day" is quite common (Judg 4:14; Ps 118:24). Similar

[2]Hugh Ross, *The Fingerprint of God: Recent Scientific Discoveries Reveal the Unmistakable Identity of the Creator*, 2d rev. ed. (Orange, CA: Promise, 1991), 146.

[3]Bernard Ramm, *The Christian View of Science and Scripture* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1955), 213.

[4]Allen P. Ross, *Introducing Biblical Hebrew* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 59.

types of usages are found with the plural of the term יוֹם. In each of these cases, the term serves as a reference for a point in time. Though it may be indefinite as to total length of time in a given context, it certainly must be understood as less time than that indicated by similar terms such as "that millennium, this century, that year, this month, that week" that are commonly used in English, some of which would have been readily available in Hebrew (e.g., week, month, year).

As a Temporal Adverb

Much has been made about the use of יוֹם in Gen 2:4, where it seems to indicate that the creation took place all in one day, since therein it is stated: "in the day the Lord God made earth and heaven."[5] This particular phrase involves the use of יוֹם with the inseparable preposition ב (בְּיוֹם, *bĕyôm*), followed by an infinitive construct. It is now thought by many scholars that this construction probably should be understood as an indefinite temporal adverb meaning "when."[6] Thus, the NIV translates it as "when" in Gen 2:4 (cf. Gen 2:17, 3:5, 5:1, 5:2). If this is to be understood as an idiomatic usage, then such occurrences add nothing to the argument one way or the other.

As the Construct in Bound Relationships

The term יוֹם often functions in bound relationships as the construct (initial word). In some cases, the construct may be made definite not by the presence of an article or a pronominal suffix on the term, but by the juxtapositioning of the words in sequence. Normally, the second word will be made definite by some means, but such is not always the case. If no definiteness is intended, such indicators will be absent. Both types, definite and indefinite, are found to be used with יוֹם as the construct word.

There are numerous examples of יוֹם in construct with an absolute form (the genitive) that function as a definite day in time. For instance, Lev 23:27-28 speaks about the Day of Atonement being on a specific day of the calendar (the tenth day of the seventh month). Judges 13:7 speaks about the day of the death of Samson (obviously

[5]I understand this to be the view of Augustine, for instance.

[6]See the translation of this word in Gen 2:4b in Bruce K. Waltke and M. O'Connor, *An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax* (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990), 250, 611; David M. Fouts, "Response Two to 'How Long an Evening and Morning,'" *Creation Ex Nihilo Technical Journal* 11/3 (1997): 303-304; and idem, "How Short an Evening and Morning?" *Creation Ex Nihilo Techical Journal* 11/3 (1997): 307-308.

within a twenty-four-hour framework, i.e., a date of death). Ecclesiastes 7:1 speaks as well about the day (date) of one's birth.

There are also numerous examples of יום plus the indefinite absolute functioning as an indefinite period of time. Such examples include the "day of battle" (1 Sam 13:22; Job 38:23), the "day of calamity" (Deut 32:35; Prov 27:10), the "day of vengeance" (Prov 6:23; Isa 34:8), the "day of prosperity" (Eccl 7:14), the "day of gladness of heart" (Cant 3:11 = Wedding Day [or week?]), "day of the Lord" (Joel 1:15, 2:1),[7] and the "day of salvation" (Isa 49:8). One may argue really either way for most of these terms. At times, the word "day" plus indefinite genitive may refer only to an event or events within a twenty-four-hour framework, or it may involve several days or longer. At times, context helps; at times, it doesn't. One should at least consider the significance of such phrases as 2 Kgs 7:9 ("This day is a day of good news") and 19:3 ("This day is a day of distress, rebuke, and rejection") in the discussion. In the first instance, even the indefinite "day of good news" is made date-specific in the context. On the other hand, the latter context lengthens indefinitely the day of "distress, rebuke, and rejection" for Hezekiah and those with him in Jerusalem. Yet, historically the siege of Sennacherib probably lasted only a few months.

With Pronominal Suffixes

The term יום occurs often with pronominal suffixes (*yôměka; yômô*). In these cases, a day of one's birth is generally indicated (Job 1:4; 3:1), but a like term can also mean the day of one's punishment, often by death (Ps 37:13; Jer 50:31). Though it is obvious that the day of one's birth is date-specific within a twenty-four-hour period, as is the date of one's death, it may be that a day of punishment can be a lengthier, undefined period of time.

Figurative Use

The term יום occurs often in the merism, a figure of speech indicating two opposite extremes that contain everything in between. Commonly used are terms such as "heaven and earth," which means "everything," or here, "day and night" meaning "continually."

[7]The term "Day of the Lord" is a theologically technical term with past, present, or future aspects of blessing or judgment, depending on the context in which it is found. The length of time involved varies according to God's purposes.

With Ordinal Numbers[8]

The term יוֹם occurs quite frequently with ordinal numbers (e.g., Exod 19:11; Lev 13:5; Esth 9:1). In every case where יוֹם occurs in the singular with ordinal numbers in the Hebrew OT it indicates a twenty-four-hour day—with possibly one exception: Hos 6:2, a clearly poetic expression of the ANE numerical parallelism formula x/x+1.[9] Clearly poetic (in contrast to the admittedly stylized narrative of Gen 1:1–2:4), this prophetic passage may or may not provide an exception to the rule. If it is a prophecy of the resurrection of Christ, twenty-four-hour days are still in view. However, if a national restoration of Israel is in view, it may be of indefinite stated length, but of finite duration. In other words, the restoration will *one day* be complete (pardon the double entendre). On the other hand, being a conventional poetical device, the occurrence in Hos 6:2 may not even be relevant in the discussion of the length of time indicated by the presence of יוֹם.

Possible Syntactical Arrangements of יוֹם *in the Plural* (יָמִים)

With Cardinal Numbers

The plural form of יוֹם (יָמִים) does not occur with ordinals (e.g., one would not say "the thirteenth days" or "the fourth days," for this would not make sense). When found with cardinal numbers, יָמִים normally refers to twenty-four-hour days (as in Judg 19:4 and 2 Sam 1:1). An idiomatic expression does exist where "three days past" refers to a short time ago (1 Sam 9:20).

In Construct Relationships

In construct with other nouns in the contracted form יְמֵי, the term functions as it does in the singular, but with the expanded development in phrases such as "the days of the Philistines," "the days of Noah," "the days of Uzziah," "the days of Ahasuerus," "the days of Josiah." These phrases, admittedly indefinite since some refer to life spans and others to periods of political influence, are nonetheless never understood to refer to periods of time necessary to support a meaning for יוֹם of millions of years.

[8]The singular term יוֹם also occurs with the cardinal number "one" (Gen 1:5; 27:45; 33:13; Num 11:19; 1 Sam 9:15; 27:1). The latter five of these all refer to activities within a twenty-four-hour period.

[9]For more on this literary convention of the ANE world, see Wolfgang M. W. Roth, "The Numerical Sequence x/x+1 in the Old Testament," *VT* 12 (1962): 300-311.

Idiomatic Usage

The plural of יוֹם is often used in Scripture to refer to the "days" of one's life and then normally expressed in a total of years (Gen 35:28; 47:9; Ps 90:10). This idiomatic usage would seem to suggest that one's lifetime is constituted of individual twenty-four-hour days, the total of which can normally be understood as a collection of years.

The Use of יוֹם *in Genesis 1:1-2:4*

Daylight (or Daytime)

The nominative is used as an equivalent with daylight in Gen 1:5. One notes here that it is God naming the period of light as יוֹם, in contrast to the period of darkness he names "night."[10] This same thought is repeated where "daylight" also should be understood, as יוֹם appears as the genitive object of the preposition בֵּין in 1:14, contrasting with "night." Similarly, in 1:16 in construct with the noun "rule" and as the object of the preposition בְּ in 1:18 ("to rule in the daytime"), this same "daylight" is in view for יוֹם.

As a Clear Measurement-of-time Passage

The term יוֹם is found a second time in Gen 1:14, seemingly with the meaning of "days" of twenty-four-hour duration[11] in the phrase expressing one of the purposes of the heavenly bodies: to be "for signs and for seasons and for days and years."

With Cardinal Numbers

One occurrence of יוֹם is with the cardinal number "one" (אֶחָד) in 1:5. An ordinal is probably not used here because there were no other days

[10]This fact should be important in the discussion. It is God who does the naming of the sequence of light and darkness as day and night respectively, showing his dominion over them.

[11]It is at least possible, in my thinking, that with the cataclysm of the Flood and the miracle of the long day of Josh 10, a rotation of the earth revealing the presence of the sun and moon may or may not have been of twenty-four hours' duration in the pre-Flood days. However, with the other terms used in the passage (as will be discussed below) and with the understanding of the author of the passage and later tradents, one doubts the possibility that the length-of-time passage that comprised a day of Gen 1:1–2:4 would have been significantly different from that which we now experience. In other words, if it were widely known and believed that the passage of time involved in these "days" was significantly different than that of the readers, other words depicting lengthier periods were available to the Hebrews who repeated the account to succeeding generations.

with which to compare it.[12] Other occurrences of the phrase יוֹם אֶחָד indicate activities within a twenty-four-hour period of time.[13]

With Ordinal Numbers

The use of the term יוֹם with the ordinal numbers second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh (1:8, 13, 19, 23; 2:2, 3) presents one of the major difficulties in the debate of the length of time involved for the activities of the creation account. Since it was observed above that the juxtaposition of יוֹם with an ordinal within the remainder of the OT (hundreds of times with only one dubious exception) indicates twenty-four-hour days, it seems unlikely that one should understand it differently here. Unless Gen 1 is to be understood as an entirely different and special type of creation genre rather than straightforward Hebrew narrative, the term יוֹם with ordinals seems to indicate twenty-four-hour days here as well.[14]

As a Temporal Adverb (בְּיוֹם Plus Infinitive Construct)

Only in 2:4b does the term יוֹם appear with the inseparable preposition בְּ before the infinitive construct. As was shown above, an acceptable understanding of this construction is to see it as the temporal adverb "when." If this is the case, as it appears to be, it argues for neither position as to the length of time involved with the other uses of יוֹם in the same passage.

Conclusion of the Use of יוֹם *in Genesis 1:1–2:4*

In none of these cases can יוֹם be understood as an indefinite and lengthy period of time from a grammatical/syntactical standpoint if one considers the similar usages of the same constructions elsewhere in the OT Hebrew text. In fact, "day(s)" is never used elsewhere in the OT in the sense of multiple thousands or millions of years, i.e., the period of time necessary for evolution to have occurred. The burden of proof rests upon those who would argue differently—scriptural usage does not allow for such nuances.

[12]Umberto Cassuto, *A Commentary on the Book of Genesis, Part One: From Adam to Noah* (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), 30.

[13]See n. 7 above.

[14]It may well be that some ANE passage more directly parallel to the Gen 1 account may someday be revealed by the turning of the spade or in the rubble of the gufa bucket. Until that occurs, however, one must accept the overwhelming data offered by like usage elsewhere in Scripture as paramount.

Evening and Morning (ערב ובקר)

The phrase offered repeatedly in Gen 1 is "and there was evening and there was morning, day x" (וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם x). This phrase is unique to Gen 1. The expression ordering "morning" before "evening" is more prevalent and normally indicates regular daytime activities, such as the sacrifices offered morning and evening (cf. 1 Chron 16:14; 2 Chron 2:4; Exod 18:13). When "evening" precedes "morning" outside of Gen 1, such as in Exod 27:21 and Lev 24:3, it refers to a daily task with emphasis on overnight activity (e.g., keeping the lamps burning in the tabernacle). In Num 19:21, it refers to the cloud of God's presence, which appeared as fire (Num 19:15), overshadowing the tabernacle throughout the night. Thus, it seems that the particular order of evening before morning in Gen 1 could simply be indicating the period of darkness following the daylight activity of the creative hand of God (decree followed by fulfillment and assessment: see discussion below). On the other hand, the phrase may simply indicate a twenty-four-hour day. The term "evening" precedes "morning" asyndetically twice in Dan 8. In Dan 8:14, the terms are qualified by the numerical modifier 2,300 (the KJV renders this as 2,300 days). This verse is the antecedent reference for the mention of the same in 8:26, wherein Gabriel explains to Daniel the certainty of the vision of the evenings and mornings. Time passage, as we would understand it, certainly seems to be in view in this passage.

Since "evening and morning" are understood and used in the vast majority of cases as "evening" and "morning" in the Hebrew Bible, there is no evidence to indicate they should have a differing meaning in Gen 1. Either ordering of the words effects a time passage of no more than twenty-four hours. In fact, the unusual construction of "and there was evening and there was morning, day x" seems in and of itself to mark a time passage of one twenty-four-hour day, since "day x" or the "xth day" seem to be in apposition to the phrase וַיְהִי־עֶרֶב וַיְהִי־בֹקֶר יוֹם.

The Statement of Completion (וַיְהִי־כֵן)[15]

Though the use of כֵּן ("thus, so")[16] is found quite frequently in the Hebrew Scriptures, the expression prefaced by the preterit וַיְהִי found in 1:7, 9, 11, 15, 24, 30 (i.e., at the end of the initial creative decree of God

[15]It is thought by some that the phrase "and there was light" (יְהִי אוֹר) in 1:3 serves as a statement of completion similar to וַיְהִי־כֵן. Cf. Ronald Hendel, *The Text of Genesis 1-11* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 20.

[16]"Yes" in Modern Hebrew.

on days 2, 3, 4, and 6) occurs elsewhere only twice.[17] In Judg 6:38, it refers to the completion of Gideon's first test with the fleece. It thus must be seen as reflecting the accomplishment of a task. The second occurrence of the phrase is found in 2 Kgs 15:12. The prophecy spoken to Jehu concerning his royal descendancy (2 Kgs 10:30) is said to have been fulfilled by the kingship of Zechariah. This fulfillment is registered by the phrase וַיְהִי־כֵן. Though these two examples do not provide absolutely conclusive evidence, they are the only two uses of the phrase outside of Gen 1. An adherent to the verbal, plenary inspiration of Scripture should at least consider the testimony they offer that something has been completed.

The Jussives of Genesis 1

The verbal forms of the decrees of God in Gen 1 traditionally have been understood as jussives.[18] Jussives of the weak verb are often grammatically indicated by a shortened form of the imperfect tense in Hebrew and are thus readily identifiable (such is the case for יהי in 1:3, 1:6, and 1:14, all from היה), or from differing vowel patterning (as for תַּרְאֶשׁ in 1:11 and תּוֹצֵא in 1:12, 1:24).[19] The verbs יִקָּווּ (1:9), יִשְׁרְצוּ with יְעוֹפֵף (1:20) in the decretive formulas are likewise thought to be jussives, though the form in the text could be construed in other settings to indicate imperfects instead. However, within the stylized structure of the passage, jussives fit better. Too, after the verb in 1:9, the statement of completion is given, suggesting a jussive nuance to the verb.

Jussives may be one of two types in Biblical Hebrew. These are the jussive of command and the jussive of request.[20] A jussive of request is offered from an inferior to a superior; a jussive of command is offered from a superior to an inferior. It is most likely that the jussives in Gen 1 must be understood as jussives of command rather than jussives of request, since the Bible is consistent in depicting no one greater than the Lord, the God of creation.

[17]Further study into the textual analysis of this phrase in both the MT and LXX can be found in Hendel, 20-23.

[18]1:3, 1:6, 1:9, 1: 11, 1:12, 1:14, 1:20, 1:24, 1:26. It is interesting to note at this point that the creation decrees offered by a god are unique to Gen 1 among ANE cosmogonies (David T. Tsumura, "Genesis and Ancient Near Eastern Stories of Creation and Flood: An Introduction," in *I Studied Inscriptions from Before the Flood*, ed. Richard S. Hess and David Toshio Tsumura [Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1994], 31).

[19]The root does not appear elsewhere in the Hiphil imperfect, but the form is analogous to other third-aleph Hiphil jussives (i.e., with a ṣere instead of the imperfect's ḥireq-yod).

[20]Allen P. Ross, 150.

It is probably instructive at this point to digress to a related issue—commands in the Bible. It seems in Scripture that the more power held by a king, the faster his commands were carried out. Such was the case with Pharaoh in Gen 41:14 ("then Pharaoh sent and called for Joseph, and they hurriedly brought him out of the dungeon") and for Ahasuerus in Esth 7:8 ("as soon as the word went from the king's mouth, they covered Haman's face"). In Dan 2:12-13, Nebuchadnezzar's power was seen in the response of his servants to his commands: "[The king] gave orders to destroy all the wise men of Babylon. So the decree went forth that the wise men should be slain; and they looked for Daniel and his friends to kill them." Even in the NT the power held by Herod Antipas is witnessed by the speed with which his commands were carried out: "And immediately the king sent an executioner and commanded him to bring his head. And he went and had him beheaded in the prison" (Mark 6:27).[21] The same seems to be true with Jesus, the King of Kings, in his earthly ministry: "Then He arose, and rebuked the winds and the sea; and it became perfectly calm" (Matt 8; Mark 4; Luke 8). "And He stretched out His hand, and touched him, saying, 'I am willing; be cleansed.' And immediately the leprosy left him" (Luke 4). "But Jesus rebuked the unclean spirit, and healed the boy, and gave him back to his father. And they were all amazed at the greatness of God" (Luke 9).

Though more work remains in this area, particularly in observing possible patterning in the jussives of command that may be present in other ANE inscriptions, it is certainly interesting to note that Jesus, God incarnate, the one who exegetes God, the King of Kings, and the agent of creation (John 1:3), operates almost always instantaneously in his miraculous dealings.[22]

The Stylized Narrative of Genesis 1

One increasingly *popular* view is that of Gen 1 as poetry. This claim implies that perhaps it is not meant to be understood as a literal accounting of the creation and that perhaps the terms used have symbolic rather than actual meanings. This would thus allow for a creation to have occurred over long periods of time and, therefore, might very well harmonize with the empirical data from scientific investigation. In fact, the NIV has indented the text of Gen 1:1–2:4 in

[21]All NT citations are from the NASV.

[22]In fact, the only impediment to universal obedience seems to be sourced in the sinfulness of humanity.

a way reminiscent of poetic formatting.[23]

However, the passage before us lacks the primary structural indicators of Biblical Hebrew poetry: that of parallelism and that of metrical balancing. Too, there are few (if any) figures of speech in the passage, a glaring omission for those who claim for it a poetic genre. There is instead a stylized narrative, as is indicated in the patterning by:

A decree by God employing a jussive of command (to be carried out quickly),
Followed by a statement of fulfillment/completion in the term "and it was so,"
At times followed by other information about that day's activities,
Followed by an assessment that the results of God's work were "good,"
Followed by the phrase "and there was evening and there was morning, day x."[24]

The point to be made at this juncture is that the passage is not poetry. It is not prophetic literature. Nor is it myth, as Waltke has recently observed.[25] The closest biblical genre it comes to is narrative.[26] It employs the use of narrative sequencing with the *waws* consecutive; it involves repetition, a feature highly valued in Hebrew narrative; and it purports to recount the events that occurred in the first week of earth history. One might add that the *tolĕdôt* formula, a key structural indicator in the narratives of Genesis, is found in 2:4.[27] If it is to be understood as a special genre, a creation genre, it reveals itself to be unique in the ANE by the presence of the decrees of the Creator God.[28] But no matter under what genre we classify it, it remains revelation from God, inspired by him. It may be that there could be no clearer way of expressing the uniqueness of each day, the separateness of each day, the succession of each day, and the length of each day than that which is offered in Gen 1:1–2:4.[29] Given that the

[23]It is my understanding that only one Hebrew manuscript has ever indented the passage in poetic format.

[24]This represents the preliminary observations of the present writer. Bruce K. Waltke sees the pattern as "*announcement, commandment, separation, report, naming, evaluation,* and *chronological framework*" (*Genesis: A Commentary* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2001], 56, emphasis original).

[25]Waltke, 74, states: "In this case, the word *myth* misrepresents the Genesis account and does an injustice to the integrity of the narrator and undermines sound theology."

[26]Claus Westermann, "Gen 1:1–2:4a is a Narrative," in *Genesis 1-11*, ed. Claus Westermann (Grand Rapids: Fortress, 1994, 80).

[27]Some would see Gen 1:1 as a variation of this formula.

[28]Tsumura, 31.

[29]I do not personally believe that the Hebrew language could express six actual days of creation in any better way. Gerhard von Rad has said: "In contrast, Genesis I presents the results of concentrated theological and cosmological reflexion in a language which is concise and always utterly direct in expression. Its statements are not allusive and

Hebrew language has ample vocabulary to express long periods of time, why were those terms not employed if a longer period was meant?

If one of the goals of the creation account was to establish the power of God as the sole Creator of all there is, and it took eons of time to do so, are we thus to conclude that the God of Israel is not as powerful as the Israelites thought? Psalm 33 seems to indicate that people are to fear God precisely because he is fully capable of acting instantaneously,[30] as demonstrated by the creation account. Are we therefore to understand that the Israelite writers were wrong in their recounting or that it was mythopoetic language, or perhaps even an etiological reflection on the beginnings of all things? Perhaps the God of creation, as depicted in Gen 1:1–2:4, is no better than the gods of the other cosmogonies offered by the surrounding nations of the ancient Near Eastern world. Such would certainly seem to be the case if the writer of the passage before us either offered the account solely for propagandistic purposes (i.e., to promote Yahwism) or was mistaken in the assessment of the event as evidenced by his word choice. On the other hand, if the writer of Genesis intended to demonstrate the power of God to create all observable things by the spoken word with instantaneous results (or nearly so), how else would he have done so than that which is present in the text before us?

It is the thinking of this present writer that one who would reinterpret the term יום in the context of Gen 1:1–2:4 is engaging in selective perception at best, in eisegesis at worst. One does not normally try to reinterpret other clear words in the passage. Heavens are normally understood as heavens (or skies), earth as earth (or land), seas as seas, dry land as dry land, grass as grass, plants as plants, trees as trees, fish as fish, birds as birds, light as light, darkness as darkness, creeping things as creeping things, sea creatures as sea creatures, land animals as land animals, people as people. The motivating factor in trying to reinterpret the term יום seems to be based in the desire to harmonize Scripture with science. If this reinterpretation is to be done by biblical scholars, it must be done within the biblical, literary, and archaeological disciplines, not from the paradigm of science. To do the latter, for us as biblical scholars, would be to commit the logical fallacy of appeal to misplaced authority.

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charged with a hidden meaning . . . but are everywhere clearly contoured and mean exactly what they say" (*Old Testament Theology*, trans. D. M. G. Stalker [New York: Harper and Row, 1962], 1:141).

[30]One may compare here Eccl 8:11.

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THE USE OF ἅγιος FOR THE SANCTUARY IN THE OLD TESTAMENT PSEUDEPIGRAPHA, PHILO, AND JOSEPHUS

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The recent responses by Norman Young[1] and Richard Davidson[2] to Roy Gane's article, "Re-Opening *Katapetasma* ('Veil') in Hebrews 6:19,"[3] illustrate a difference of scholarly perspective on the meaning of τὰ ἅγια in Hebrews.[4] While both Young and Davidson agree with Gane's conclusion that *katapetasma* in Heb 6:19 most likely refers to the inner curtain before the Most Holy Place, they disagree on whether the OT imagery behind Heb 6:19 is best understood in the context of the Day of Atonement ministry within the Most Holy Place (Young) or to the more general inauguration of the whole sanctuary (Davidson). An essential part of their disagreement revolves around whether the uses of τὰ ἅγια in Hebrews refer to the Most Holy Place of the sanctuary[5] or whether these uses constitute a more general reference to the whole sanctuary.[6] Since τὰ ἅγια in the LXX generally refers to the whole sanctuary, Davidson argues for its same use in Hebrews. While Young concedes that τὰ ἅγια in the LXX regularly refers to the whole sanctuary, he

[1]Norman H. Young, "The Day of Dedication or The Day of Atonement? The Old Testament Background to Hebrews 6:19-20 Revisited," *AUSS* 40 (2002): 61-68; idem, "Where Jesus Has Gone as a Forerunner on Our Behalf," *AUSS* 39 (2001): 165-173.

[2]Richard M. Davidson, "Inauguration or Day of Atonement? A Response to Norman Young's 'Old Testament Background to Hebrews 6:19-20 Revisited,'" *AUSS* 40 (2002): 69-88; idem, "Christ's Entry 'Within the Veil' in Hebrews 6:19-20: The Old Testament Background," *AUSS* 39 (2001): 175-190.

[3]Roy E. Gane, "Re-Opening *Katapetasma* ('Veil') in Hebrews 6:19," *AUSS* 38 (2000): 5-8.

[4]Though Gane's article did not directly deal with the issue of how τὰ ἅγια is used in Hebrews, the question was raised indirectly by implication since George Rice's understanding of *katapetasma* was tied to his view that τὰ ἅγια referred to the whole sanctuary in general, not specifically to the Most Holy Place. See George E. Rice, "Within Which Veil?" *Ministry*, June 1987, 20-21; idem, "Hebrews 6:19: Analysis of Some Assumptions Concerning *Katapetasma*," in *Issues in the Book of Hebrews*, ed. F.B. Holbrook (Silver Spring, MD: Biblical Research Institute, 1989), 229-234 (reprinted with corrections by the author from *AUSS* 5 [1987]: 65-71); idem, *The Priesthood of Jesus in the Book of Hebrew[s]* (unpublished manuscript, n.d.), 1-56.

[5]E.g., Harold W. Attridge, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1989); Victor C. Pfitzner, *Hebrews*, ANTC (Nashville: Abingdon, 1997); Donald A. Hagner, *Hebrews*, NIBCNT (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1990).

[6]E.g., Paul Ellingworth, *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993).

argues that the context of Hebrews would lead "any first-century Jew"[7] to associate the term with the Most Holy Place and the Day of Atonement.

To understand Hebrews from the perspective of its original first-century audience, it is crucial to pay attention not only to the use of τὰ ἅγια in the LXX and in the immediate context of Hebrews itself, but also to the larger context of the contemporary use of τὰ ἅγια during the first century. Surprisingly, this has been largely overlooked. While much has been written regarding the meaning of τὰ ἅγια in Hebrews and some regarding the use of ἅγιος in the LXX, virtually no published research has dealt with the use of ἅγιος in early Jewish literature written in Greek.[8] Without the latter, there is insufficient evidence to draw a firm conclusion about how "any first-century Jew" might have understood what he or she read in Hebrews. It is important, therefore, that any determination of the use of τὰ ἅγια in Hebrews must also consider the larger context of its contemporary Jewish usage. This article will attempt to fill some of that void by examining the use of ἅγιος as it occurs in the extrabiblical Jewish writings written in Greek and referred to as the OT Pseudepigrapha, as well as the works of Philo and Josephus.[9]

The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha

We begin with the use of ἅγιος in those writings generally believed to have been written between 200 B.C.E. and 200 C.E. that are commonly known as the OT Pseudepigrapha. The examination of ἅγιος in the OT Pseudepigrapha is significant since it provides insight into the use of ἅγιος in Jewish literature written after the LXX and is, therefore, in closer proximity to the milieu of Hebrews. In the singular and plural, ἅγιος appears approximately 97 times throughout the OT Pseudepigrapha.[10] The majority of these occurrences are used adjectivally in such phrases as "holy angels" (*1En.* 20:2-7), "holy words" (*1En.* 1:2), "sacred things" (*T. Levi* 14:8), and "holy people" (*Sib. Or.* 5:432). Used in relation to the tabernacle, ἅγιος appears 11 times

[7]Young, "Where Jesus Has Gone," 172; idem, "The Day of Dedication," 64.

[8]Though somewhat dated, the principal work in this area is still that by Henry S. Gehman, "*Hagios* in the Septuagint, and its Relation to the Hebrew Original," *VT* 4 (1954): 337-339; and Alywn P. Salom, "*Ta Hagia* in the Epistle to the Hebrews," *AUSS* 5 (1967): 59-70. While frequently cited, Salom's examination of τὰ ἅγια in the LXX is of limited use since his study failed to include the LXX references that were the basis for his findings. Outside of the LXX, Salom's study only referenced one passage in Philo and three references in Josephus where τὰ ἅγια occurs.

[9]This article is a revision of chap. 3 of my M.A. thesis, "A Study of *Ta Hagia* in the LXX, Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus, and Its Implications in Hebrews" (M.A. thesis, Nazarene Theological Seminary, 2000), 65-87.

[10]The Greek text from the OT Pseudepigrapha is taken from Albert-Marie Denis's *Concordance Grecque des Pseudépigraphes d'Ancien Testament* (Louvain: Université Catholique de Louvain, 1987).

throughout four books.[11] We will examine its use in each book in the chronological order that scholars believe the books were composed.

The *Sibylline Oracles*

Third Sibyl, a composite work written over a number of years, contains only one reference to ἅγιος that appears to refer to the sanctuary. The reference occurs in 3:308, a section dated to 163-145 B.C.E.,[12] as part of a woe pronounced on the Babylonians for their destruction of the Jerusalem temple. According to the account, the Sibyl announces that Babylon's judgment is to fall from heaven (ἐξ ἁγίων). Whereas Collins interprets ἁγίων as a reference to "holy ones,"[13] the idea of a heavenly judgment is better understood as a reference to the heavenly sanctuary, the place from where the judgment of God issued forth.[14] The idea that God's judgment emerges from his holy temple in heaven was common in the OT (e.g., Isa 26:21; Jer 25:30; 32:20 LXX; Ps 20:2; 19:3 LXX), and it makes sense that the author would draw on that sacred tradition. The concept of a judgment coming from the heavenly sanctuary is also developed later in the Apocalypse of John (cf. Rev 16:1ff.).[15]

The *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs*

Though scholars are divided on the exact date when the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* was composed, its use of the LXX indicates that it is in closer proximity to the time of Hebrews than is the LXX itself.[16] While the singular form of ἅγιος appears only once in relation to the sanctuary (*T. Levi* 8:17), the plural form is used four times in the *Testament of Levi* and once in the *Testament of Asher*.[17]

The first use of ἅγιος in the *Testament of Levi* appears in the singular form in 8:17, where Levi is told in vision that he and his descendants have been given the responsibility of the ministry of the Hebrew cultus: "From among them will be high priests, judges, and scribes, and by

[11] *Sib. Or.* 3:308; *T. Levi* 8:17; 9:9, 11; 18:2b, 18, 19, 53; *T. Ash.* 7:2; *Pss. Sol.* 1:8; 2:13; 8:11.

[12] J. J. Collins, "Sibylline Oracles: A New Translation and Introduction," in *OTP*, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 1:354-355.

[13] Ibid., 369.

[14] R. H. Charles also translates it as a reference to the sanctuary, "the Holy Place" ("The Testament of the XII Patriarchs," in *The Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha of the Old Testament in English*, ed. R. H. Charles [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913], 2:384).

[15] The lack of the definite article should not be taken as an indication against understanding the passage as a reference to the sanctuary since the definite article is missing in other references to the sanctuary (e.g., Ps 19:3 LXX).

[16] H. C. Kee, "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs: A New Translation and Introduction," in *OTP*, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1983), 1:777-778.

[17] *T. Levi* 18:2b, 18, 19, 53; *T. Ash.* 7:2.

their word the sanctuary [τὸ ἅγιον] will be administered" (8:17). This may be an allusion to Num 3:38 LXX, where Moses, Aaron, and his sons were assigned the responsibility of carrying out the sacred charge of τοῦ ἁγίου. As in Num 3:38, the singular τὸ ἅγιον refers to the entire sanctuary complex.[18]

A representative example of the plural usage is found in *T. Levi* 9, where Isaac is depicted as passing on specific instructions to Levi regarding the sacrificial regulations. Levi is warned to beware of fornication because by it his descendants would in the future defile τὰ ἅγια (9:9). In order to prevent his own defilement of the sanctuary, he is instructed to marry a virgin and to bathe before he enters and leaves τὰ ἅγια precincts (9:11).

The *Psalms of Solomon*

The *Psalms of Solomon* are a collection of eighteen psalms that appear to have been composed by a group of Jews in response to the capture of Jerusalem by Pompey and the Romans in 63 B.C.E.[19] An apparent reference to Pompey's death in 48 B.C.E. may indicate that the psalms were finally brought together sometime after that event. While the singular form of ἅγιος is not used of the sanctuary, the plural form is used three times.[20] Outside the use of the plural forms of ἅγιος, no other words are used of the sanctuary. The three plural references to τὰ ἅγια occur in three of the four pivotal psalms (Pss 1, 2, 8, 17) relied on for dating.[21] The first reference is in *Pss. Sol.* 1:8, where the lawless actions of the Romans are said to have surpassed all the wicked deeds

[18]Baruch A. Levine, *Numbers 1-20: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary*, AB 4 (New York: Doubleday, 1993), 161.

[19]For a more detailed discussion, see R. B. Wright, "Psalms of Solomon: A New Translation and Introduction," in *OTP*, ed. James H. Charlesworth (New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2:639ff.

[20]*Pss. Sol.*1:8; 2:3; 8:11. R. B. Wright translated the genitive plural ἁγίων in *Pss. Sol.*11:1 as "sanctuary" ("sound in Zion the signal trumpet of the sanctuary; announce in Jerusalem"). While "sanctuary" is a viable translation of ἁγίων, it seems better to understand it here as "saints" in the context of a gathering back to Jerusalem. Neither σάλπιγγι nor σημασίας is used in conjunction with ἁγίων as "sanctuary" in the LXX. Herbert Edward Ryle and Montague Rhodes James understood *Pss. Sol.* 11:1 as a reference to blowing a "holy trumpet" (ΠΣΑΛΜΟΙ ΣΟΛΟΜΟΝΤΟΣ, Psalms of the Pharisees, Commonly Called the Psalms of Solomon: The Text Newly Revised from all the MSS: Edited, with Introduction, English Translation, Notes, Appendix, and Indices [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1891], 101). G. Buchanan Gray's translation, however, seems more likely: "Blow in Zion on the trumpet to summon the saints" ("The Psalms of Solomon," in *APOT*, ed. R. H. Charles [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1913], 2:643). For a lucid study of the use of trumpets in early Judaism, see Jon Paulien, *Decoding Revelation's Trumpets: Literary Allusions and the Interpretation of Revelation 8:7-12*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series 11 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987), 210-216.

[21]Wright, 639-641.

of the Gentiles before them in that they "completely profaned the sanctuary [τὰ ἅγια] of the Lord." R. B. Wright comments that τὰ ἅγια "may refer specifically to the services and sacrifices of the sanctuary as in Lev 19:8, or more generally to the temple itself as in Ezek 5:11; 23:38, inclusive of both the buildings and the rites."[22] While the former is possible, the latter interpretation better reflects the immediate context, where *Pss. Sol.* 2:1-2 describes both the violation of the temple buildings and rites by the "sinner" (Pompey), who "broke down" the temple walls and went up to the "place of sacrifice." This may be an allusion to what was the greatest sacrilegious action taken by the Romans—Pompey's entrance into the Holy and Most Holy Places.[23] In *Pss. Sol.* 2:3, the psalmist attributes the sacrilegious actions of Pompey and the Romans as a divine chastisement for the godless behavior of the "sons of Jerusalem," which had already defiled τὰ ἅγια.

This same general reference to the entire sanctuary also fits with the third reference to τὰ ἅγια in 8:11, where the Romans are said to have stolen from the sanctuary of God.

The Holy of Holies

In addition to the uses of ἅγιος mentioned above, there are two occurrences in the OT Pseudepigrapha where a form of the literal translation τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ ἁγίου is used of the Holy of Holies.

In the *T. Levi* 3:4, the author uses the phrase ἁγίῳ ἁγίων to refer to God's dwelling place in the highest heavens. The context convincingly indicates that ἁγίῳ ἁγίων was not used in mere reference to the heavens as God's dwelling place, but as a direct reference to the specific place where God dwells, i.e., the Most Holy Place in the heavenly tabernacle. Having specified the place where God dwelt, v. 5 further describes heaven by means of temple terminology: angels are seen sacrificing "to the Lord in behalf of all the sins of ignorance of the righteous ones." As H. C. Kee notes: "The liturgy performed in the heavenly archetypal sanctuary corresponds to the offerings in the earthly temple, which is a copy of the heavenly (Exod 25:9, 40; 26:30; 27:8)."[24]

Our examination of the use of ἅγιος in the OT Pseudepigrapha has revealed that both the singular and plural forms of ἅγιος are used in reference to the sanctuary in general. However, when an author desired to make a specific reference to the Holy of Holies, the plural form of

[22]Ibid., 651. Gray, 631, translated this as "the holy things" of the Lord, but noted that the Greek may also mean "sanctuary" and the Syriac version can only mean "sanctuary." Ryle and James, 6, 10, contend, however, that both *Pss. Sol.* 1:8 and 2:3 refer "not to the Temple building but to the sacrifices and worship."

[23]*A.J.* 1.152.

[24]Kee, 789. The prologue to *3 Bar.* also employs another form of the Hebraism (τὰ τῶν ἁγίων ἅγια) to refer to the Holy of Holies.

ἅγιος by itself was not employed. Instead, one of the forms of the phrase τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ ἁγίου was used to refer to the Most Holy Place.

Philo

Philo (ca. 20-25 B.C.E. to ca. 45-50 C.E.) wrote within a few decades of the composition of the book of Hebrews. While Philo's writings reveal a variety of terms and expressions used in reference to the tabernacle (e.g., ναός, ἱερόν, ἁγίασμα, and σκηνή), our examination will focus on the plural and singular forms of ἅγιος.

Singular Usage

The singular form of ἅγιος occurs only twice in reference to the tabernacle; both are found in the third volume of Philo's *Legum allegorige*.[25] In the context of the passage, Philo is concerned with how the reasoning faculties should control the passions of pleasure that reside in the "breast and belly."[26] Because the "Sacred Word" understood how strong such passions could be, a remedy was provided in the allegorical interpretation of the breastplate of the high priest in Exod 28:30. In the process of explaining how the breastplate cures and heals the deviant passions of the heart, Philo includes a partial quotation of Exod 28:30 LXX. While the LXX refers to the Holy Place, the literal sanctuary is clearly not Philo's concern.[27] The singular references to ἅγιος are used merely as a part of a quotation that provides Philo with a springboard for his allegorical interpretation of the text. Thus, the use of ἅγιος in *Leg.* 3.119 and 125 reveals no insight into Philo's understanding or use of the singular form.

Plural Usage

The plural form of ἅγιος occurs twelve times in Philo and seems best understood as a general reference to the sanctuary.[28] The following examples are noteworthy. Colson and Whitaker render *Post* 173: "He [Moses], the seventh from Abraham, does not, like those before him, haunt the outer court of the Holy Place [τῶν ἁγίων] as one seeking initiation, but as a sacred Guide has his abode in the sanctuary [ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις]."

This passage occurs within the context of Philo's discussion of Gen

[25]*Leg.*, 3.119, 125. Unless otherwise noted, all Greek text and translation of Philo are from the Loeb Classical Library.

[26]Ibid., 116.

[27]The singular form ἅγιον also occurs in *Plant.* 53, where Philo quoted Exod 25:17. In the quotation, Philo replaced ἁγίασμα with ἅγιον, and through his allegorical hermeneutic understood the "Holy Place" to refer to the cosmos and not to the literal sanctuary.

[28]*Post.* 173; *Migr.* 104; *Her.* 226; *Fug.* 93, 100; *Somn.* 1.207, 216; *Mos.* 2.87, 114, 155; *Spec.* 1.115, 296.

4:25 and the raising up of "another" seed after the death of Abel. While Cain was separated from God and Abel left the world of mortals, Philo depicts Seth as the one who "will never relinquish" the human race, but be "enlarged" *in* it. This enlarging is seen in the descendants of Seth—Noah, Abraham, and down to Moses. Philo envisioned Moses as the greatest of Seth's descendants and depicts him as the one who did not have to relate to God from the outer courts of the sanctuary, but as one who was able to dwell within the Most Holy Place itself. Colson and Whitaker's translation, however, fails to denote the difference between τῶν ἁγίων and τοῖς ἀδύτοις by translating them respectively as "Holy Place" and "sanctuary." Philo's use of τῶν ἁγίων and τοῖς ἀδύτοις indicates that the contrast was between the outer courts of the temple and the Holy of Holies within the temple. It is also noteworthy that Philo chose to use ἀδύτοις for the *inner sanctum* rather than using the plural τῶν ἁγίων.[29]

Of the remaining eleven uses of the plural, ten are clearly used of the sanctuary in general. The only passage where the plural form might possibly be understood to refer to a specific compartment of the temple is in *Her.* 226.

Here Philo describes the sanctuary (τοῖς ἁγίοις) as containing only three pieces of furniture: the candlestick, table, and altar of incense. The use of τοῖς ἁγίοις could be understood to refer exclusively to the outer compartment of the temple, the Holy Place. There is, however, another possibility. It could also be understood to refer to the entire temple house and thus be understood in harmony with Philo's overall use of the plural form. According to Josephus, when Pompey captured Jerusalem in 63 B.C.E., he entered into both the Holy and Most Holy Places.[30] All Pompey reportedly saw in the temple, however, was "the lampstand and the lamps, the table, the libation cups and censers . . . and a great heap of spices and sacred money."[31] Later, in a description of the Holy of Holies, Josephus states: "Nothing at all was kept in it; it was unapproachable, inviolable, and invisible to all, and was called the Holy of Holies."[32]

Since, according to Josephus, the Holy of Holies was empty (*B.J.* 5.219), the only furnishings within the whole temple would have been the candlestick, the table, and the altar of incense. Thus, in light of the use of the plural form of ἅγιος elsewhere in Philo and the historical details from Josephus, τοῖς ἁγίοις in *Her.* 226 may be a reference to the

[29]This same distinction between ἀδύτοις and ἅγια also occurs in *Mos.* 2.87.

[30]Josephus, *J.W.*, in *The Works of Josephus: New Updated Edition, Complete and Unabridged in One Volume*, trans. William Whiston (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1987), 1.152; 5.219. Unless otherwise noted, translations of Josephus are taken from this version.

[31]Ibid., 1.152.

[32]Josephus, *The Jewish War*, trans. G. A. Williamson, rev. ed., intro., nn., and app. E. Mary Smallwood (New York: Penguin, 1981), 491.

entire temple and not an exclusive reference to the Holy Place.

The Holy of Holies

When Philo desires to single out the *inner sanctum* of the temple, he does so by the use of specific terminology such as ἀδύτοις (e.g., *Legat.* 306) or by some other qualifying phrase (e.g., *Somn.* 1.216). As in the LXX and the OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo also uses a form of the phrase τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ ἁγίου to refer to the Holy of Holies. The phrase τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων is used five times by Philo in exclusive reference to the Most Holy Place.[33]

A noteworthy example of the use of this phrase occurs when Philo makes reference to Lev 16 and the ministry of the high priest in the Holy of Holies: "For when the high priest enters the Holy of Holies (τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων) he shall not be a man" (*Somn* 2.189).[34]

As Colson and Whitaker's translation indicates, Philo clearly refers to Lev 16:17 LXX, where the singular form τῷ ἁγίῳ is used to refer to the Most Holy Place. What is significant, however, is Philo's choice not to use the singular τῷ ἁγίῳ to refer to the Most Holy Place as the LXX does,[35] but instead to use the expression τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων.[36] It would seem that if the plural form of ἅγιος were used idiomatically during the first century to refer to the Holy of Holies, Philo would have used it here rather than replacing it with the more specific phrase for the Most Holy Place. Moreover, even if one overlooks the fact that Philo seems to have had little knowledge of Hebrew, there is not even precedence in the Hebrew text for his translation, since the Hebrew does not read קֹדֶשׁ הַקָּדָשִׁים but only קֹדֶשׁ. It appears that for Philo the sanctity of the holiest part of the temple is best described with some qualifying term to indicate its most holy nature. The fact that in *Somn.* 2.189 Philo chose not to use the plural form of ἅγιος for the Most Holy Place, combined with his other uses of ἅγιος and the other ways he refers to the Most Holy Place, leads to the conclusion that he did not understand the plural form of ἅγιος to be a valid term for referring only to the Holy of Holies. Instead, as also seen in the OT Pseudepigraphical literature, Philo uses the plural form of ἅγιος by itself to refer only to the whole sanctuary.

[33]*Leg.* 2.56; *Her.* 84; *Somn.* 2.189, 231; *Mut.* 192. Colson and Whitaker suggest that the phrase τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων in *De Mutatione Nominum* should be amended to read "τὰ ἅγια <τῶν ἁγίων> τῶν ἁγίων (the holy place from the holy of holies)" (*Mut.* 192 n. 3).

[34]*Somn.* 2.189. In a different passage, *Heir.* 84 n. a, Colson and Whitaker comment on Philo's use of Lev 16:17: "The real meaning of the text is, of course, 'there shall not be another man in the temple till the priest comes out.'"

[35]The singular form of ἅγιος is used seven times in the Pentateuch for the Most Holy Place, all of which are from Lev 16 (2, 3, 16, 17, 20, 23, 27). John Williams Wevers notes that the singular form in Lev 16 appears to be "uniquely used to designate the adytum" (*Notes on the Greek Text of Leviticus*, SBLSCS 44 [Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1977], 240-241).

[36]An identical use of τὰ ἅγια τῶν ἁγίων occurs in *Somn.* 2.231 and *Her.* 84.

Josephus

Flavius Josephus's (37–post 100 C.E.) use of ἅγιος is extremely significant for understanding the contemporary Jewish usage of τὰ ἅγια since he would have been a contemporary with the author of Hebrews. In his first work, *The Jewish War*, published around 75 C.E., Josephus uses the singular and plural forms of ἅγιος almost forty times in relation to the sanctuary. In his second major work, *The Antiquities of the Jews*, published some twenty years later, the use of ἅγιος in reference to the sanctuary dwindles to only two occurrences. In his final two works, *The Life* and *Against Apion*, written in the second century during the reign of Emperor Trajan, ἱερόν and ναός continue to be used of the temple, but the use of ἅγιος disappears entirely.

Singular Usage

The singular form of ἅγιος is used a total of thirteen times in *The Jewish War*[37] and twice in his *Antiquities of the Jews*. Josephus uses the singular form of ἅγιος to refer to the sanctuary in a general sense and, as in the LXX, he also uses it at times in exclusive reference to the Most Holy Place.[38] The singular form, however, is not used in exclusive reference to the Holy Place.

The Sanctuary

In *BJ* 5.184-247, Josephus provides a description of the temple complex. Having described the original boundaries of the temple (ἱερόν) mount and the process by which it was expanded through the years, Josephus continues his tour across the Colonnade and into the outer court of the sanctuary precinct. At the center of the outer court stood the Temple House, the Court of the Israelites, and the Court of the Women, surrounded by a 4½-foot balustrade. At various points along the balustrade, signs were posted forbidding any Gentile, on penalty of death, of entering into τοῦ ἁγίου (5.194). Josephus then gives the precise meaning of τοῦ ἁγίου: "For that second (court of the) the temple [ἱερόν] was called "the Sanctuary" [ἅγιον]. Here Josephus is contrasting the outer court of the sanctuary, often called the Court of the Gentiles, with the actual precincts of the temple itself, where only Jews were allowed to worship. In both cases, the singular form is used as an inclusive reference to the temple and its inner courts.[39]

A clear example of the singular use of ἅγιος occurs in *B.J.* 5.394. In

[37]*J.W.* 1.26, 152; 4.150, 151, 159; 5.194, 195; 385, 394; 6.73, 95, 99, 260.

[38]Lev 16:2, 3, 16, 17, 20, 23, 27.

[39]E. Mary Smallwood, "Introduction, Notes, and Appendixes to Josephus," in *The Jewish War*, trans. G. A. Williamson, rev. ed. (New York: Penguin, 1981), 448 n. 46.

the midst of a passionate appeal for his countrymen to put down their weapons and surrender to the Romans, Josephus reminded them of the consequences their forefathers suffered when they were defeated in battle by Antiochus Ephiphanes: "This city was plundered by our enemies, and our sanctuary [τὸ ἅγιον] made desolate for three years and six months."

Another noteworthy reference is *B.J.* 1.152, where Josephus describes Pompey's entrance into the sanctuary: "But there was nothing that affected the nation so much, in the calamities they were then under, as that their holy place [τὸ ἅγιον], which had been hitherto seen by none, should be laid open to strangers." At first glance, it might appear that τὸ ἅγιον refers specifically to the Holy of Holies, but the context suggests that the violation refers to both the Holy Place and the Holy of Holies. This is indicated by the fact that Pompey is not only described as entering the place where "it was not lawful for any to enter but the high priest," but that he also "saw what was reposited therein, the candlestick with its lamps and the table." While the singular form can be used to refer to the Most Holy Place (e.g., Lev 16 LXX), the detail provided by Josephus suggests that the singular form τὸ ἅγιον was used to refer to the entire temple house (cf. *B.J.* 5.194-5; *A.J.* 3.125).[40]

The Most Holy Place

There are two passages where Josephus uses the singular form of ἅγιος in what may be an exclusive reference to the Most Holy Place.

In *B.J.* 6.260, Josephus relates how Titus and his generals entered the sanctuary and saw τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον before it was consumed in flames. The precise meaning of this phrase is somewhat ambiguous, however, since it could be literally translated as "the holy place of the temple." Is Josephus referring to the Holy Place, both compartments of the sanctuary, or the Holy of Holies?

The immediate context of the passage may be taken as an indication that Josephus was referring exclusively to the Holy Place. Before the fire consumed the temple, Titus is said to have seen "what was in it" and to have marveled at how "superior" it was to any foreign temple. Since Josephus states elsewhere that there were no furnishings in the Holy of Holies (*B.J.* 5.219), the phrase τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον could be understood as a reference to the Holy Place and its contents. On the other hand, the phrase could also be a reference to both compartments of the temple. The latter would be consistent with the other examples of the singular form as described previously.

A more likely alternative, however, is that the phrase is a reference to the Holy of Holies. The phrase τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον occurs only in one other place in Josephus, where it refers to the Holy of Holies (*B.J.*

[40]Both occurrences of the singular form in the *Antiquities of the Jews* also refer to the whole sanctuary (3.125; 12.413).

1.25). In *B.J.* 1.25-26, Josephus outlines the subjects he planned to cover in his work. Among others, he states that he intends to describe "the defenses of the City and the plan of the Sanctuary [τοῦ ἱεροῦ] and Temple [τοῦ ναοῦ]; and the exact measurements of these and of the altar . . . and a description of the Holy of Holies [τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον]."[41] William Whiston, G. A. Williamson, and Henry St. John Thackeray all translate τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον as a reference to the Holy of Holies.[42]

In order to understand the meaning of τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον in *B.J.* 1.25, one must consider the relationship between the three words used in relation to the sanctuary. E. Mary Smallwood notes that ναός is best understood in reference to the "central shrine" of the sanctuary (i.e., the temple itself) and that ἱερόν is generally used to denote "the enclosure and everything within it."[43] Assuming this is the case, one would expect Josephus to have gone on to describe some elements in relation to the sanctuary precinct and its services (i.e., ἱερόν) and then something about the temple itself (i.e., ναός). This is just what he does. It would be redundant to understand τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον in 1.25 as a reference to the whole temple house. Moreover, if Josephus had wanted to specify the entire temple house, he could have used either ναός or ἅγιον alone. The use of both words together indicates that Josephus had in mind a different meaning than expressed in either ναός or ἅγιον. Assuming that Josephus used both phrases in the same way, it seems best to understand τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον to refer to the Holy of Holies in both *B.J.* 1.25 and 6.260.

Plural Usage

The plural form of ἅγιος appears twenty-three times in the *Jewish Wars* and is used in reference to the sanctuary in only a general sense.[44] The plural form is never used in exclusive reference to either the Holy or Most Holy Places. The following example from *B.J.* 2.341 is representative of this use of the plural form.

In order to determine the attitude of the Jews towards the Romans, Cestius sent Neopolitanus to Jerusalem. Instead of finding a seditious attitude among the people, Neopolitanus was impressed with the positive spirit of the Jews and "after paying his devotions to the sanctuary [τὰ ἅγια] of God from the permitted area, he returned to Cestius."[45] Smallwood comments that the "permitted area" refers to

[41]Williamson, 30.

[42]Whiston, 545; Williamson, 30; Josephus, *B.J.* 1.26 (Thackeray, LCL).

[43]Smallwood, 409-410.

[44]*J.W.* 2.341, 401, 539; 4.162, 171(2), 173, 182, 183, 191, 201, 242, 323, 397; 5.406, 412; 6.104, 120, 124, 128, 165, 267 (some render as "holiness"), 346.

[45]Ibid., 2.341.

"the area outside the balustrade marking off the inner courts . . . sometimes called (without ancient authority) the Court of the Gentiles."[46] This instance of τὰ ἅγια is clearly a general reference to the temple and the courts surrounding it (cf. *B.J.* 5.194-195).

The Holy of Holies

When Josephus refers directly to the *inner sanctum* of the temple, he does so by following the same pattern as seen in the OT Pseudepigrapha and Philo. As we have already seen, Josephus can employ the singular form of ἅγιος, specific terminology such as ἄδυτον (e.g., *B.J.* 5.236) or the phrase τοῦ ναοῦ τὸ ἅγιον to refer to the Holy of Holies. Josephus, however, also uses two different forms of the phrase τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ ἁγίου in exclusive reference to the Holy of Holies.[47]

First, in describing the "inmost part" (ἐνδοτάτω μερός) of the temple in *B.J.* 5.219, Josephus says: "In this there was nothing at all. It was inaccessible and inviolable, and not to be seen by any; and was called the Holy of Holies [ἁγίου δὲ ἅγιον]." While this is a definite reference to the Holy of Holies, the form of ἁγίου δὲ ἅγιον is unique. This is the only place in the LXX, OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo, or Josephus where both forms of ἅγιος are separated by a conjunction. The lack of the definite article in both forms of ἅγιος also occurs in *T. Levi* 3:4.

The second variant of the literal translation τὸ ἅγιον τοῦ ἁγίου as the "Holy of Holies" occurs in *A.J.* 3.125. The context contains a physical description of the wilderness tabernacle built by Moses (*A.J.* 3.102-150). In *A.J.* 3.122, Josephus describes the two inner compartments of the temple. He describes the Holy Place as "the part open to the priests," while the Holy of Holies is referred to as the ἄδυτον. In *A.J.* 3.125, Josephus again refers to the Holy of Holies as τὸ ἄδυτον ("the adytum"): the place that was kept concealed from the Holy Place by a veil. It is at this point that Josephus says: "Now the whole temple [ὁ ναὸς] was called *The Holy Place* [ἅγιον]; but that part which was within the four pillars, and to which none were admitted, was called *The Holy of Holies* [τοῦ ἁγίου τὸ ἅγιον]."

Conclusion

Our examination of the overall use of ἅγιος in relation to the sanctuary in the OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus has revealed that the word can have a variety of meanings, depending upon its context (see table below). Despite the variety of uses of ἅγιος, one pattern, however, does appear to be consistent throughout: *the plural form by itself is never used to describe the Holy of Holies alone.* Whenever the plural form by itself

[46]Smallwood, 432-433.

[47]*B.J* 5.219; *A.J.* 3.125.

is used, it exclusively describes the whole sanctuary in general. Moreover, whenever specific reference is made to the Most Holy Place, the plural form by itself is never used. Instead, the Most Holy Place is referred to by either the use of the singular form of ἅγιος, a more specific word such as ἄδυτον, some qualifying term like ἐνδοτάτω μερός, or, more typically, a form of the phrase τὸ ἅγιον τῶν ἁγίων.

Based on this evidence, the plural form of ἅγιος does not appear to have been part of the contemporary Jewish usage to refer to the Holy of Holies during the first century. If it had been, we surely would have expected that Josephus—who was by birthright a priest, well trained in Halakah, and, as such, one of the most important sources on first-century Jewish law—would have used it at least once in that manner. He does not. Instead, the consistent use of τὰ ἅγια to refer to the sanctuary in general throughout the LXX, OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus indicates that this was the way τὰ ἅγια was used among Greek-speaking Jews. Of course, this does not prove that the author of Hebrews used the term identically, nor does it resolve all the issues associated with the use of τὰ ἅγια in Hebrews. It would seem to indicate, however, that the customary use of the word would have led any first-century author or reader to use or understand a reference to τὰ ἅγια by itself as a reference to the sanctuary in general and not to the Most Holy Place. In this regard, the use of τὰ ἅγια in the LXX and its consistent use throughout the OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus as a reference to the whole sanctuary would favor more the OT imagery of inauguration than the Day of Atonement as the background for Heb 6:19-20 and 9:11-12.

The Use of ἅγιος by Itself for the Sanctuary in the OT Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus

	Sanctuary in General	Holy Place	Most Holy Place
Singular	14	2	2
Plural	44	0	0
Total No. of Uses	58	2	2

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Καταπέτασμα: LEXICOGRAPHICAL AND ETYMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BIBLICAL "VEIL"

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In 2000, R. E. Gane argued convincingly that if the expression ἐσώτερον τοῦ καταπετάσματος (Heb 6:19) is based on the LXX, where "inner veil" is the only possible meaning (Exod 26:33; Lev 16:2, 12, 15), it should also be "inner veil" in Heb 6:19.[2] Gane's observation that the term καταπέτασμα is qualified by the term ἐσώτερον is important, because it recognizes a trend of the LXX translators with respect to the term καταπέτασμα. That is, while the Greek translators are often inconsistent in what Hebrew term they translate as καταπέτασμα (it can itself refer to any of three curtains in the tabernacle), the presence of contextual qualifiers, such as ἐσώτερον, seemed to have afforded the LXX translators such liberties.[3] This trend, it seems, was readily recognized by NT authors in the six texts in which the term καταπέτασμα appears. The term καταπέτασμα appears in the Synoptics (Matt 27:51a; Mark 15:38; Luke 23:45) as καταπέτασμα τοῦ ναοῦ. It also appears in Hebrews as τὸ ἐσώτερον τοῦ καταπετάσματος ("within the veil," Heb 6:19), τὸ δεύτερον καταπέτασμα ("the second veil," Heb 9:3), and τοῦ καταπετάσματος τοῦτ' ἔστιν τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ ("the veil that is his flesh," Heb 10:20). The purpose of this short article is twofold. First, it will explore the etymology of this rare but important word as it relates to its function in the temple, particularly vis-à-vis the variety of other curtain terms in the LXX and Second Temple Judaism. Second, it will attempt to

[1]Dedicated to Dr. Daniel B. Wallace, with gratitude. The author can be reached at dgurtner@yahoo.com. He is grateful to Roy Gane and Darian R. Lockett for their valuable suggestions for this article.

[2]"Re-opening Katapetasma ('Veil') in Hebrews 6:19," *AUSS* 38 (2000): 5-8. He wrote in response to a previous article by George Rice, who argues that the term καταπέτασμα is a metaphorical expression for the entirety of the heavenly sanctuary ("Hebrews 6:19: An Analysis of Some Assumptions Concerning *Katapetasma*," *AUSS* 25 [1987]: 65-71).

[3]It does not, as Fearghas Ó Fearghail suggests, "obliterate any distinction that may have existed in the Hebrew text" ("Sir 50,5-21: Yom Kippur or the Daily Whole-Offering?" *Bib* 59 [1978]: 309).

further demonstrate the importance of Gane's observation of the definitiveness of the contextual qualifiers in defining which "curtain" is in view by showing that καταπέτασμα is an *exclusively cultic* term.[4]

Etymological considerations of a biblical term often translated "veil" (καταπέτασμα) have been largely overlooked in the modern discussion of the term.[5] Joseph Henry Thayer and others widely assumed that καταπέτασμα was an Alexandrian Greek word, created by the LXX translators as a Judeo-Christian "specialty."[6] That is, it was thought to have come about by Jewish-Christian interests in tabernacle and temple furniture rather than drawing upon a use outside of these traditions. It was thought to be derived by that tradition from the more common παραπέτασμα, a word well attested up through the first century A.D.[7] Herodotus (*Hist.* 9.82.4) speaks of gold and silver and gaily-colored tapestry (παραπετάσμασι ποικίλοισι κατεσκευασμένην) as possessions of Mardonius. And Menander (c. 344–392 B.C.) speaks of "a curtain of foreign weave" (παραπέτασμα βαρβαρικὸν ὑφαντόν; *Dysk.* 923).[8] Παραπέτασμα is found in the biblical tradition only in Amos 2:8, where it refers to a curtain made out of garments (ἱμάτια).

[4]For a more comprehensive discussion of the role of the contextual qualifiers in determining the identity of the veil in the LXX and Synoptic contexts, cf. Daniel M. Gurtner, "Behind the Καταπέτασμα: An Examination of the Irregular Septuagint Translational Tendencies of 'Veil'," (under review).

[5]The most comprehensive discussions of this word have given little attention to etymological details. C. Schneider discusses its meaning, based almost exclusively on its apparent cultic function rather than etymological factors ("Καταπέτασμα," *TDNT*, ed. G. Kittle and G. Friedrich, trans. G. W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976], 3:629). Cf. Rice, 65-71.

[6]Adolf Deissmann, *Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World*, trans. L. R. M. Strachman (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1910), 101.

[7]"That which is spread before a thing, hanging, curtain" (H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, and H. S. Jones, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed., rev. supp. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996]). Cf. Aeschylus, *Fr.* 212.39; Pseudo (?) Philolaus, *Fr.* 19.3; Herodotus *Hist.* 9.82.4; Aristophanes, *Fr.* 45.1; 611.1; *Ran.* 938; Plato, *Prot.* 316e.5; *Pol.* 279d.3; Antiphanes, *Fr.* 63.2; 327.2; Demosthenes, *1 Steph.* 19.1; Aeneas, *Pol.* 32.9.1; Menander, *Dysk.* 923, 930; *Fr. Long.* 336.9; 405-406.9; 1094.2; *Fr.* 6.4; 175.2; 336.9; 936.2; Alexis, *Fr.* 41.2; 340.2; Chrysippus, *Fr. Log.* 178.7; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. Hist.* 11.56.8.2; Philo, *QG* 5.69.5.

[8]Pausanias, *Descr.* 5.12.4, has a similar description for the curtain of the Olympian temple, though he calls it a παραπέτασμα. Moses Hadas notes that apart from the Samos inscription, discussed below, καταπέτασμα "does not occur in secular literature . . . until Heliodorus and sixth-century papyri" (*Aristeas to Philogrates* [*Letter of Aristeas*] [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951], 15).

An inscription from Samos, a Greek island in the northeast Aegean Sea, 346-345 B.C., has overturned this view.[9] The inscription catalogues the furniture of the temple of the goddess Hera (whose Roman name was Juno). Her temple is one of the seven wonders of the ancient world,[10] and she is known as queen of the gods and bride as well as sister of Zeus. The discovery of her (second) temple in the late nineteenth century not only revealed one of the most primitive of Greek temples, but also provides both the earliest attested use of καταπέτασμα by at least a century and the only occurrence of the word from antiquity outside the Judeo-Christian tradition.[11] The earliest occurrence in that tradition is either the LXX translations, dating no earlier than the middle of the third century B.C., or perhaps the *Letter of Aristeas* (86) itself. Within Hera's temple was found a stone inscription with a lengthy list of artifacts and cultic instruments, including a καταπέτασμα τῆς τραπέζης, of which no further comment is made. Its contextual definition provides little illumination for the meaning of the word in general, except that it may have been a term exclusive to cultic furnishings.[12] The discovery of this inscription has vindicated Adolf Deissmann's earlier conclusions, especially because it predates any Greek literature from the Judeo-Christian tradition. Remarkably, however, outside of this inscription, without exception, every occurrence of the term is in reference to the hangings and veils in the Jewish temple, even well beyond the completion of the first century A.D. The reference in Hera's temple, as well as its conspicuous absence in secular literature, strongly suggests its proper place in distinctively cultic terminology.

While it is *possible* that one day καταπέτασμα may be discovered on an inscription within a throne room context, as do Semitic cognates to

[9]Cf. photograph from D. Ohly, "Die Göttin und Ihre Basis," *Mitteilungen des deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung* 68 (1953): Tafel IX.

[10]Though it does not appear on the usual lists, and perhaps may have been confused with the temple of Artemis in Ephesus (Antipater, *Greek Anthology*, 9.58; cf. Herodotus, *Histories*, 1.92; Valerius Maximus, *Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX*, 8.14.5; Strabo, *Geography*, 14.1.22; Acts 19:23-29, 34-35).

[11]Deissmann, 101; so J. H. Moulton and G. Milligan following, Deissmann (*Vocabulary of the Greek Testament* [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1997], 331). Cf. Otto Hoffman, *Die Griechischen Dialekte* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1891-1898), 3:72.

[12]Charles Clermont-Ganneau has argued that the preferred term καταπέτασμα is used exclusively in Josephus and Maccabees to refer to the hanging of the Jewish temple curtain (*Le Dieu Satrape et Les Phéniciens dans le Péloponèse* [Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1878], 56-60).

פרכת ("curtain"),[13] this is probably unlikely. For within such a context, Greek has other words from which an author can choose. For example, in Arrian's *Anabasis* (6.29.5), we find a description of the revered King Cyrus's sarcophagus covered with a material of "Babylonian" tapestry.[14] The cloth is not called a καταπέτασμα, but ἐπίβλημα. There seem to be simply too many other Greek words that can be used for "curtain" for καταπέτασμα to be required in such contexts. If such an inscription were found it would probably reflect both a strong ANE influence and familiarity with Greek cultic language of mostly Jewish origin. Though these are arguments from silence, the term has, to date, been only found in such cultic contexts.[15]

Etymological analyses of this word are incomplete and based on much later evidence, such as H. G. Liddell and R. Scott's account citing Heliodorus, *Aeth.* 10.28 and *P.Oxy.* 3150.37, both dating from the fifth to sixth century A.D.[16] Only a limited amount of credence can be afforded root analysis, for it can easily distort the meaning of a word, which must ultimately be determined by usage. Yet, here it may be illuminating to examine the etymological construction of καταπέτασμα since lack of raw data may provide only a limited understanding of its

[13]Cf. Jacob Milgrom and Roy Gane, "פרכת," *TWAT*, 6:755-756. T. Klauser looks to the Persian practice of maintaining a separation between its king and his subjects ("Der Vorhang vor dem Thron Gottes," *JAC* 3 [1960], 141f.). A. Büchler suggests the idea comes from the Roman court practice, according to which the judge himself sits behind a veil, advising ("Die Erlösung Eliša b. Abujahs aus dem Höllenfeuer," *MGWJ* 76 [1932], 412-456). פרכת may derive from the Sumerian *bára* or the Akkadian *parakku* or the verb *parāku*, which can mean simply "to spread open," but it most commonly means to "lay something across" something else, perhaps in a prohibitive manner (*TWAT* 6:755; Jacob Milgrom, *Leviticus 1-16* AB [New York: Doubleday, 1991], 234). For a summary of the debate regarding the etymology of this word, cf. *NIDOTTE*, ed. W. A. VanGemeren (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997), 3:688. Cf. also Umberto Cassuto, *Commentary on the Book of Exodus*, trans. I. Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), 359; Wolfram von Soden, ed., *Akkadisches Handwörterbuch* (Wiesbaden: Harassowitz, 1972), 2:828-829.

[14]τῶν Βαβυλωνίων; cf. Josephus's καταπέτασμα as Βαβυλώνος πικιλτὸς (*B.J.* 5.4.4 §212).

[15]In addition to occurrences of καταπέτασμα in canonical LXX texts, all others are likewise in exclusively cultic contexts: Sir 50.4; 1 Macc 1.22; 4.51; *Let. Aris.* 86; Josephus, *B.J.* 5.5.4 §212; 5.5.5 §219; 5.5.7 §232; 6.8.3 §389; 6.8.3 §390; 7.5.7 §162; *A.J.* 8.3.3 §75; 8.3.7 §90; 12.5.3 §250; Philo, *Gig.* 53; *Mut.* 192; *Mos.* 2.80, 86, 87 [2x], 95, 101; *Spec.* 1.171, 231, 274, 296. A *possible* exception is *Jos. Asen.* 10.2, though cf. G. Bohak, *Joseph and Aseneth and the Jewish Temple in Heliopolis*, Early Judaism and Its Literature, 10 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 70 n. 18.

[16]Cf. Liddell and Scott's supplement, 171.

meaning. Πέτασμα (—ατος, τὸ) is designated by Liddell and Scott as related to the verbal form πετάννυμι and means "anything spread out," whether the feelers of an animal (Aristotle, *Hist. An.* 541B.6) or a carpet (Aeschylus, *Ag.* 909). The only occurrence in biblical literature is a variant reading of Num 23:22. Alfred Rahlf's edition, which reads θεὸς ὁ ἐξαγαγὼν αὐτοὺς ἐξ Αἰγύπτου ὡς δόξα μονοκέρωτος αὐτῷ, can perhaps be translated: "It was God who brought them out of Egypt; as the horns of a wild ox he is for them." However, in the variant reading, Aquila reads πετάσμα for δόξα, perhaps explicitly suggesting the "protection" element of the wild ox (or unicorn), which is variously translated as "horns" (NAS), "strength" (ASV; Geneva Bible [1599]; KJV; NIV), "glory" (Brenton's LXX), and "towering might" (NAB), all likely seeing the ambiguity of the Hebrew תועפת. This variant is only found in Codex VII in the margin of manuscript 2^{da} of Origen's *Hexapla.* The word πετάσμα itself is relatively rare in Greek literature, with only three uses antedating the LXX[17] and a small handful postdating the LXX through the fifth century A.D.[18] Its verbal form, πετάννυμι, is better attested and can simply mean "to spread out," "spread abroad, disperse," or even refer to "the opening of doors."[19] With the preposition κατα ("down," etc.), it can then possibly mean "something which is spread downwards"[20] vis-à-vis παραπέτασμα, "that which is spread before" a thing.[21]

Deissmann's argument against Thayer,[22] that the proximity of καταπέτασμα to παραπέτασμα in Hera's temple inscription refutes an Alexandrian origin for the former term and thus demands that they be

[17]Aeschylus, *Ag.* 909; Aristotle, *Hist. an.* 541b.6; and possibly *Sib. Or.* 8.305.

[18]Aelius Herodianus, *Part.* 111.17; Athenaeus, *Deipn.* 2.1.38.35; Didymus, *Fr. Prov.* 39.1641.37; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Carm. Dog.* 415.7; 440.14; 490.13.

[19]Liddell and Scott say a closer verbal form may be καταπετάννυμι, meaning to "spread out" or "spread over." Its attestation, however, is extremely scarce, with the only two occurrences prior to the ninth century A.D. coming either in the first or second century A.D. (Plutarch, *Rom.* 5.5; Harpocration, *Lex. Atticos* 248.7).

[20]Cf. Andre Pelletier, "Le 'Voile' du Temple de Jérusalem est-il devenu la 'Portière' du Temple d'Olympie," *Syria* 32 (1955): 295; Immaneul Bekker, *Heliodori Aethiopicorum libri decem* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1855); Héliodore, *Les Éthiopiques*, ed. R. M. Rattenbury and T. W. Lumb, trans. J. Maillon (Paris: Les Belles letters, 1938), 10:28.

[21]Cf. Liddell and Scott.

[22]Joseph Henry Thayer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament*, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1896), 335. That is the opinion of H. A. A. Kennedy, who argues it always refers to the "inner veil" (*Sources of New Testament Greek: The Influence of the Septuagint on the Vocabulary of the New Testament* [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1895], 113).

distinct terms, is convincing.[23] In Deissmann's opinion, καταπέτασμα was a technical term "connected with the apparatus of worship," and he defines it literally as "that which is spread out downwards, that which hangs down."[24] Others simply designate it as a veil of the temple or tabernacle.[25]

The etymology of καταπέτασμα perhaps tells us more about how it hung (downward)[26] and where (cultic setting) than its particular function. Indeed, the term does not seem to occur in noncultic contexts until at least the eighth century A.D. By itself, the word seems to have no special meaning, though one should note its presence solely in cultic contexts before assuming it is synonymous with παραπέτασμα, which was typically not used in cultic contexts, except in Hera's inscription.[27] Naturally, however, its significance becomes enhanced by the use of grammatical qualifiers in both the LXX and NT and how the

[23]Deissmann, 101 n. 3.

[24]Ibid., 101; Schneider, 628.

[25]J. Lust, E. Eynikel, and K. Hauspie, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 1996), 1:241.

[26]Contra Hadas, 14, following R. Tramontano (*La Lettera di Aristea a Filocrate* [Naples: Ufficio succursale dell civiltà cattolica in Napoli, 1931]), who, in turn, follows Clermont-Ganneau, who argues the preposition suggests how veils were drawn(*Le Dieu Satrape et Les Phéniciens dans le Péloponèse*, 56-60). Pausanias, *Descr.* 5.12.4, speaks of the curtain "with Assyrian weaving and Phoenician purple," which Antiochus presented to the temple of Zeus at Olympia, and he remarks on its peculiarity in being let down to the ground by cords instead of drawn upwards to the roof. It has been plausibly conjectured that this was the very curtain that Antiochus plundered from Jerusalem in 170 (Cf. 1 Macc 1.22). B. Celada insists that a παραπέτασμα unfolds, while a καταπέτασμα hangs downward ("El velo del Templo," *CB* 15 [1958]: 110).

[27]On line 26 of the inscription, we read παραπετάσματα δυο βαρβαρικὰ ποικίλα ("two ornate foreign curtains"). Παραπέτασμα occurs about as often as καταπέτασμα, with an exhaustive TLG search revealing 32 references occurring through the end of the first century A.D. It is often used in reference to furnishing in a common home (Herodotus, *Hist.* 9.82.4; Menander, *Dysk.* 923, 930), a decoration (Aristophanes, *Ran.* 938), or an act of deception, concealing the truth (Demosthenes, *1 Steph.* 19.1; Philo, *QG* 4.69.5) or covering an attribute (Plutarch, *Tranq. an.* 471A:10), a skin (Plutarch, *Rect. rat. aud.* 41D:5), a curtain concealing a queen (Plutarch, *Art.* 5:3; here it is explicitly said to be pulled up, so that the queen was in view. This is perhaps revealing of the direction in which a παραπέτασμα worked) or the "awning" (not the sail) on a ship (Plutarch, *Pomp.* 24.3.7). Cf. also Aeschylus, *Tet.* 26 *Fr.* 212.39; Philolaus, *Fr.* 19.3; Aristophanes, *Fr.* 45.1; 611.1;. 45.1; Plato, *Prot.* 316E.5; *Pol.* 279D.3; Antiphanes, *Fr.* 63.2; 327.2; Aeneas, *Pol.* 32.9.1; Menander, *Fr.* 336.9; 405-406.9; 1094.2; *Fr.* 6.14; 175.2; 336.9; 936.2; Alexis, *Fr.* 41.2; 340.2; Chrysippus, *Fr. Log.* 178.7; Diodorus Siculus, *Bibl. His.* 11.56.8.2; Plutarch, *Rom.* 29.8.3. Each of these occurrences indicate that, apart from the inscription at Hera's temple, παραπέτασμα occurs exclusively in *noncultic* contexts.

καταπέτασμα is used in cultic life. It seems, then, that though a relatively rare word, καταπέτασμα is to be associated in some way with cultic life in antiquity. It has become for the Greek OT tradition a technical term for the hangings and veils of the tabernacle and temples.[28]

[28]See D. H. Madvig, "τὸ καταπέτασμα," *NIDNTT*, ed. C. Brown (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1975), 3:794. In only one occurrence (Num 4:5) is there mention of the καταπέτασμα being used as a "table-cover" as in Hera's inscription, though that is referring to the same פרכת ("veil") being used for such a purpose.

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MADABA PLAINS PROJECT— TALL AL-ᶜUMAYRI, 2002

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Introduction

A ninth season of excavation by the Madaba Plains Project—ᶜUmayri occurred between June 18 and July 31, 2002, at Tall al-ᶜUmayri, located about 10 km south of Amman's Seventh Circle on the Queen Alia Airport Highway at the turnoff for Amman National Park (Figure 1). It was sponsored by La Sierra University in consortium with Canadian University College and Walla Walla College and in affiliation with Andrews University.[1] This season, a team of 20 Jordanians and 36 foreigners, mostly from the United States, took part in the interdisciplinary project.[2]

[1]Previous reports in *AUSS* include Lawrence T. Geraty, "The Andrews University Madaba Plains Project: A Preliminary Report on the First Season at Tell el-ᶜUmeiri," *AUSS* 23 (1985): 85-110; Lawrence T. Geraty, Larry G. Herr, and Øystein S. LaBianca, "The Joint Madaba Plains Project: A Preliminary Report on the Second Season at Tell el-ᶜUmeiri and Vicinity (June 18 to August 6, 1987)," *AUSS* 26 (1988): 217-252; Randall W. Younker, Lawrence T. Geraty, Larry G. Herr, and Øystein S. LaBianca, "The Joint Madaba Plains Project: A Preliminary Report of the 1989 Season, Including the Regional Survey and Excavations at El-Dreijat, Tell Jawa, and Tell el-ᶜUmeiri (June 19 to August 8, 1989)," *AUSS* 28 (1990): 5-52; Randall W. Younker, Lawrence T. Geraty, Larry G. Herr, and Øystein S. LaBianca, "The Joint Madaba Plains Project: A Preliminary Report of the 1992 Season, Including the Regional Survey and Excavations at Tell Jalul and Tell El-ᶜUmeiri (June 16 to July 31, 1992)," *AUSS* 31 (1993): 205-238; Randall W. Younker, Lawrence T. Geraty, Larry G. Herr, Øystein S. LaBianca, and Douglas R. Clark, "Preliminary Report of the 1994 Season of the Madaba Plains Project: Regional Survey, Tall al-ᶜUmayri and Tall Jalul Excavations (June 15 to July 30, 1994)," *AUSS* 34 (1996): 65-92; Randall W. Younker, Lawrence T. Geraty, Larry G. Herr, Øystein S. LaBianca, and Douglas R. Clark, "Preliminary Report of the 1996 Season of the Madaba Plains Project: Regional Survey, Tall al-ᶜUmayri and Tall Jalul Excavations," *AUSS* 35 (1997): 227-240; Larry G. Herr, Douglas R. Clark, Lawrence T. Geraty, and Øystein S. LaBianca, "Madaba Plains Project: Tall al-ᶜUmayri, 1998," *AUSS* 38 (2000): 29-44; Larry G. Herr, Douglas R. Clark, and Warren C. Trenchard, "Madaba Plains Project: Tall al-ᶜUmayri, 2000," *AUSS* 40 (2002): 105-123.

[2]The reduced foreign staff was due to perceived insecurities in the political and social system of the Middle East following the terrorist attack on New York of September 11, 2001. Our team found nothing but a peaceful situation. The authors of this report are especially indebted to Dr. Fawwaz el-Khraysheh, Director General of the Department of Antiquities; Hanan Azar, Department of Antiquities representative; and other members of the Department of Antiquities who facilitated our project at several junctures. The American Center of Oriental Research in Amman, directed by Pierre Bikai and assisted by Patricia

During the 2002 season we worked in three fields of excavation, primarily at the western edge of the site (Fields B and H), but also at the southern lip (Field L) (Figure 2). Excavation centered on several periods of excavation: (1) We cleared two additional rooms of the major Late Bronze Age building in Field B from ca. 1400-1225 B.C. Two other rooms had been discovered in previous seasons. (2) We searched for the northern extent of the early Iron Age I (ca. 1200 B.C.) perimeter wall along the top of the northern slope. (3) We hoped to find more Iron I remains beneath a late Iron II (ca. 600 B.C.) house in the northeast section of Field B. (4) We sought to expand and deepen excavation in a sanctuary courtyard from the late Iron I period (ca. 1100 B.C.), nicely paved with cobblestones and plaster in Field H. (5) We hoped that excavations in the western part of Field H would throw some light on a possible gate into the city during the Iron I period. (6) We wanted to expand our exposure of the Hellenistic agricultural complex in Field L. Our results and interpretations follow.

Field B: The Late Bronze Age Public Building and Later Structures

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One of the initial aims of the Andrews University Expedition to Heshbon in the 1960s and 1970s was to discover the Amorite city of Sihon (Num

Bikai, provided invaluable assistance. The staff was housed in Muqabalayn at the Amman Training College, an UNWRA vocational college for Palestinians. We give special thanks to its Principal, Dr. Saleh Naji, for making our stay a genuine pleasure. This time the computer lab, with a new server provided by MPP—ʿUmayri, was put at our disposal. The Committee on Archaeological Policy of the American Schools of Oriental Research approved the scientific goals and procedures of the project.

The authors wish to thank each member of the staff. The field supervisor for Field B was Kent Bramlett of the University of Toronto, assisted by Douglas Clark; square supervisors included Wendell Bowes, Howard Munson, John Raab, and Janelle Worthington; assistant supervisors were Gayle Broom, Carmen Clark, James Hanson, Candace Jorgensen, Michal Kurzyk, Nicole Murphey, Christy Robinson, and Pawel Surowka. The field supervisor for Field H was Julie Cormack of Mount Royal College; square supervisors included Dick Dorsett, Don Mook, and Dean Holloway; assistant supervisors were Marcin Czarnowicz, Jonathan Francisco, Denise Herr, Larry Murrin, and Caroline Riegel. The field supervisor for Field L was David C. Hopkins of Wesley Theological Seminary; square supervisors included Mary Boyd, Kate Dorsett, and Franke Zollman; assistant supervisors were Kathleen Geraty, Ruth Kent, Audrey Schaffer, Tony Sears, Caroline Waldron, and Ingrid Wang. Camp staff and specialists included Carmen Clark (object registrar), Denise Herr (pottery registrar), Larry Murrin (computers and photography), Elzbieta Dubis (artist), and Abu Faisal (cook). Iyad Sweileh again served as our camp agent. Laundry technicians at ATC washed our clothes once a week. Caroline Waldron served as camp nurse and Dean Holloway took care of first-aid needs.

21). But Late Bronze Age remains at Tall Hisban (biblical Heshbon) were never found. Indeed, remains from the period are rare everywhere in Jordan, especially the central and southern parts of the country. Therefore, we were surprised when, in 1998, we began excavation of two rooms of a building that contained nothing later than Late Bronze Age pottery.[3]

The primary objective for Field B excavations this season involved the discovery of more of this Late Bronze Age building at the northern edge of the tell. With this in mind, we opened three new squares in an E-W row to the north of previous Field B excavations. Activity also took place within the two rooms already discovered, to complete excavation to their lowest floors and to reveal more clearly the western parts of the building. We particularly wanted to know if the building had more rooms to the north and to determine their functions.

The new excavations contributed considerably to the emerging plan of the building, called Building C (Figures 3 and 4). We can now tentatively outline two more rooms, C3 (north of C2) and C4 (north of C1). Both include walls that were constructed in a fashion similar to those in the first two rooms and preserved to nearly the same height (3-3.5 meters) (Figure 5). Passing through the doorway leading north out of Room C1 into C4, a doorway opening to the west into Room C3 is immediately encountered. Little more is known about Room C4, which awaits excavation beneath an Iron II house studied this season. The north-south walls that separate the two new rooms (broken by a doorway) are directly in line with the walls that divide Rooms C1 and C2. Exposure of the north wall of both rooms and the western wall of Room C3 awaits further excavation.

In Rooms C1 and C2 we were able to show that the building's walls and surfaces were built directly upon the inner slope of the Middle Bronze Age rampart as it descended toward the middle of the site. Unfortunately, no small finds were discovered on the floors.

Surrounding Building C was a Middle Bronze Age wall on the west and a major new wall with large stones on the east and south. These outer walls were very close to those of the building itself, except on the south side (Figure 6). An exterior wall on the north has not yet been located. Because of this perimeter wall, which isolates Building C inside a compound, and because of the thickness of its walls (over one meter thick), and its preserved height (ca. 3-3.5 meters; its original height must have been 8-10 meters high to judge by the brick destruction filling the structure), we have concluded that it served primarily as a small palace—perhaps belonging to a local governor—possibly of Amorite origin.

[3]Herr, Clark, and Trenchard, 2002, 118, Figs. 6-7.

Although separated from the rest of Building C by an unexcavated balk, the finds made in a new square next to the site perimeter wall may belong to the destruction of this building. They included a decorated goblet missing its pedestal base (Figure 7) and two juglets. The pottery in the brick debris belonged to the Late Bronze Age.

The early Iron I remains, so prominent in earlier seasons, saw little action this summer. However, we excavated more of the huge refuse pit associated with the four-room house and another house next to it,[4] nearly doubling its size to more than 10 m long and nearly 3 m wide (Figure 6). This year's work produced a number of small finds, including several seals and a necklace pendant, as well as approximately ten thousand more bones from the edible portions of animals. There were also a large proportion of cooking pots within the pit, illustrating its association with food-producing activities.

At the bottom of the fortification system, the dry moat of the Middle Bronze defense system was excavated in 1994. Because of its depth (5 m), we cleared only a two-meter width of the moat to the bottom at that time. This year we cleared it to a five-meter width (Figure 8). In the process, we revealed a layer of naturally occurring clay still covering a portion of the moat bottom along the plane the ancient excavators appeared to be following. We discovered a source of raw materials for use in the construction of the rampart and perhaps for the making of ceramic vessels.

The last vestiges of a large, pillared house from the late Iron II period were finally cleared (Figure 9), bringing to light more walls from the Ammonite period. Although we had already discovered several large pithoi (storage jars) sunk into the floors, this season also produced two more. The walls of this building were not significant and probably stood no higher than one story. The small finds—jar stoppers, spindle whorls, basalt grinder fragments, pounders/ballistica—suggest a domestic function for the building. The building probably housed the families of the people who worked in the royal Ammonite administrative complex we found farther south in previous seasons.

Field H: Sanctuary Courtyard and Possible Gate

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Mount Royal College

Field H is located at the southwestern corner of the site and was originally laid out to unearth the southern part of the large Ammonite administrative complex from the end of the Iron II period in Field A. This was largely

[4]Ibid., 116-117, Figs. 3-5.

accomplished in previous seasons. The major research questions this season revolved around a series of well-laid cobble-plaster floors discovered in one corner of a large room bounded by walls of the late Iron II period (ca. 550 B.C.) that we suggest is part of a sanctuary (Figure 10).

But the earliest remains we worked on this season in Field H may help us to understand the possible city gate of the early Iron I period, the biblical time of the early Judges, dating slightly earlier than 1200 B.C. We excavated more of an east-west wall we found last season (2000). It is parallel to the city perimeter wall found in Field A after it curved into the city (Figure 11). The wall in Field A may be the northern wall of a gate, while our wall, 4.5 m to the south, may be the southern wall. We need to further excavate both walls as well as the intervening space to see if we can relate them to each other. If our wall is indeed part of the gate complex, it probably extends slightly farther west before curving to the south and proceeding around the southern part of the site. Not many gates from this early part of the Iron I period are known elsewhere with which we can compare our example.

Remains from the end of Iron I (ca. 1100 B.C.) were also found in Field H. In 2000, we excavated a pitted portion of a large room paved with a thick plaster floor.[5] Several more surfaces made of plaster, beaten earth, and cobbles lay below.[6] Upon some of the layers were deposits of broken pottery and at least one model shrine.[7] The latter was put together after returning from the field and reflects a relatively complete model with figurines guarding the door (Figure 12). It was also determined that the long east-west walls of the room were later than the surfaces and, therefore, the northern and southern extent of the surfaces was not known.

This season we removed the surfaces limited by the present walls down to the level that was reached in 2000 (Figure 10). We were able to show that some of the "surfaces" actually made up a "suite" of surfaces constructed at one time. First, a layer of cobbles was laid. Then, the builders spread a layer of plaster, over which several other beaten-earth and plaster patches were laid. We found a basin within the "suite" of layers that was used to mix the plaster (Figure 13). The final plaster surface covered it, putting it out of use and showing that it was used in constructing the surfaces, not in their use. On one of the surfaces, we discovered a missing piece from the model shrine found in 2000, as well as other pieces from other shrines (Figure 14). These shrines were mixed with pottery dating to

[5]Herr, Clark, Geraty, and LaBianca, 2000, 44, Fig. 10.

[6]Herr, Clark, and Trenchard, 2002, 110-111.

[7]Ibid., 122, Fig. 13.

the end of the Iron I period or the eleventh century B.C.

Because the extent of the plastered and cobbled floors was so large, we interpret the area as an exterior space that, taking into account the presence of the model shrines, was used for religious activities. We therefore understand the space as a courtyard for a sanctuary or shrine. The present eastern and western walls of the courtyard seem to have been used by the sanctuary, but the northern and southern walls were later additions. We must, therefore, envision the space extending both to the north and the south. If the gate or entryway from the earlier period continued into this one, the present northern extent of the courtyard is very close to its ancient extent.

Several architectural features appeared on the lowest cobble surface and were probably foundations for features at a slightly higher elevation. Roughly in the center of the exposed room two flat boulders probably served as pillar bases, perhaps associated in some way with the line of five boulders farther to the north. Another boulder was discovered on the cobbles in the northeast corner of the excavation area. Opposite the five boulders in the southern part of the exposed courtyard is a line of smaller stones immediately beneath a later wall. We have not yet interpreted the use of these stones. Other large boulders were incorporated into later walls. Future excavations to the south may help us understand this space better.

No small finds were located immediately above the cobbles, but some were found in great numbers on some of the subsurfaces above. They included large numbers of pithos fragments and a few examples of model shrines. Other small figurine fragments found in Field H during earlier seasons may belong to similar models. A concentration of ash surrounded the small finds and was heaviest in the northern parts of the courtyard around the five boulders. No remarkable concentrations of bones were found anywhere in the courtyard.

The sanctuary seems to have been used throughout the Iron II period when subsequent surfaces were laid. It was put out of use, probably in the Persian period, by the long east-west walls (Figure 10).

Field L: The Southern Edge

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Ever since the beginning of excavations at ʿUmayri in 1984, one of our goals was to examine a shallow topographic depression near the center of the southern edge of the site (Figure 2). On either side of the dip, the wall line of the apparent fortifications is clearly visible with large

boulders to the west and a wide line of smaller stones to the east. Ground-penetrating radar produced anomalies that seemed to suggest the presence of a casemate wall to the west of the dip. We began excavations here in 1998 with three squares and discovered remains of a Hellenistic structure on top of the late Iron II/Persian buildings and surfaces. This season we opened two new squares and deepened one begun in 1998 in hopes of delineating the Hellenistic structure more fully. Excavated Hellenistic structures are relatively rare in Jordan.

The most extensive Iron I remains emerged 5 m downslope (south) and parallel to the lip of the site. Builders erected a narrow (.63-.73 meters) two-row wall preserved to a height of 1.15 meters. The stones were neatly laid in a "tight" masonry style. Artifact-poor fill behind the wall contained nothing later than late Iron I ceramics. The absence of living surfaces associated with the wall suggests that it functioned as a terrace.

Several walls from the late Iron II/Persian period were in line with walls of the same date found in 1998. They were also reused when the builders of the Hellenistic period constructed their buildings. These walls were not excavated this season.

The Hellenistic structure was our primary goal this season and we succeeded in exposing a large room or courtyard, measuring about 5 m wide by at least 12 m long (the northern wall has not yet been found). Two surfaces were used with the room, one on top of the other. The lower floor produced many ceramic objects, including several handmade juglets. The upper surface seems to have converted the western wall of the room into a support wall for a portico facing west, because around one of the pillar bases four Hellenistic lamps were found. Other features, such as possible bins, existed to the east of the room, but more needs to be excavated before they are understood clearly. This building seems to have been part of an isolated farmstead, whose inhabitants cultivated the area. Elsewhere in our region, especially at Hisban, the ruling group seems to have been the Hasmonean dynasty in Jerusalem (Vyhmeister 1989). Future seasons will see further clearing of the building.



Figure 1. Regional map of the Madaba Plains Project.



Figure 2. Topographic map of Tall al-ᶜUmayri.



Figure 3. Plan of the LB "palace."

Figure 4. LB "palace" from the southwest.



Figure 5. New walls of the LB "palace."

Figure 6. Eastern portion of the LB "palace" and the refuse pit (with people).



Figure 7. Goblet with painted decoration in LB destruction.

Figure 8. MB and early Iron I defensive system.



Figure 9. Plan of Iron II/Persian domestic building with pillars.

Figure 10. Lower cobble pavement of sanctuary courtyard (long walls at right and left are later).



Figure 12. Reconstructed model shrine found in 2000.



Figure 11. Plan of early Iron I remains (field H is at bottom).

Figure 13. Plaster-mixing basin.



Figure 14. Fragments of figurines from a second model shrine.

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NEW TESTAMENT GREEK MANUSCRIPT FACSIMILES AT ANDREWS UNIVERSITY

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The Greek Manuscript Research Center (GMRC) was voted into existence by the Andrews University Board of Trustees in February 1995. The purpose of this action was to create a research and resource institute specifically for the study of microfilmed NT Greek manuscripts. The primary motivation for founding the Center was that few North American research institutions actively collect and analyze the primary documents of the NT. This institute is able to serve both graduate students at Andrews University and the NT scholarly community throughout North America.[1]

Recently, the Center moved from its location in the James White Library to the NT Department in the newly renovated Andrews University Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary facility. Since the beginning of the Greek manuscript collection in 1994 in the James White Library at Andrews University, the GMRC's holdings have grown to more than 400 microfilmed manuscripts.[2]

This article includes the list of Greek manuscript facsimiles currently housed in the GMRC. The list follows the order given in the *Kurzgefasste Liste*: papyri, uncials, minuscules, and lectionaries:[3]

[1]The Center has served as a resource for the International Greek New Testament Project through the collation of primary NT documents. It has also exchanged print-copy manuscripts with private individuals and organizations. For further information about research at the GMRC, see our website at http://www.andrews.edu/SEM/GMRC/.

[2]Grants from Andrews University and generous private donations, such as those given in honor of Walter and Dorothy Peters, have helped to fund the GMRC.

[3]Content designations within this article are general rather than specific. For detailed manuscript content, see *Kurzgefasste Liste der griechischen Handschriften des Neuen Testaments*, 2d ed., ed. Kurt Aland, ANTT 1 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1994).

Abbreviations

Manuscript Content
(right column is for lectionaries only)

e = Gospels a = Acts and Catholic Epistles p = Pauline Epistles r = Revelation P = a given section of the NT contains only the books listed, e.g., eP: MtLJ means Mark is missing K = commentary manuscript + = contains gaps or has been completed by a later hand	*l*1616 = lectionary 1616 (example) *l* = readings from the Gospels *l*^{a} = readings from Acts and Epistles *l*$^{+a}$ = readings from Gospels, Acts, and Epistles *lc* = readings for all weekdays *lcsk* = readings for the weekdays between Easter and Pentecost, and Saturdays and Sundays of the other weeks Lit = liturgical book with single readings from NT U-*l* = uncial lectionary

Media Output: F = film-copy manuscript
HC = paper-copy manuscript

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
1	P^{24}	r+: Ap 5:5-8; 6:5-8	IV	
2	P^{53}	ea+: Mt 26:29-40; Act 9:33-10:1	III	
3	03 (B)	eap+	IV	
4	05 (D)	ea+	V	
5	06 (D)	p+	VI	
6	020 (L)	ap+	IX	
7	032 (W)	e+	IV / V	
8	036 (Γ)	e+	X	
9	039 (Λ)	eP: LJ	IX	
10	044 (Ψ)	eap+	IX / X	
11	045 (Ω)	e	IX	
12	046	r	X	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
13	049	ap+	IX	
14	0209	apP: R2K2P	VII	
15	1	eap	XII	
16	6	eap+	XIII	
17	13	e+	XIII	
18	33	eap+	IX	
19	36 = 2818	aK	XII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
20	48	eK	XII	
21	51	eap+	XIII	
22	61	eapr	XVI	HC (1-3J)
23	67	e+	X	
24	69	eapr+	XV	
25	76	eap	XIV	HC (1-3J, Jd)
26	88	apr+	XII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
27	94	aprK	r = XII; ap = XIII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
28	96	eP: J	XV	
29	104	apr	1087	
30	105	eap	XII	
31	118	e+	XIII	
32	124	e	XI	
33	157	e	ca. 1122	
34	179	e+	XII	
35	181	apr+	X	
36	203	apr+	1111	
37	209	eapr	eap = XIV; r = XV	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
38	213	e+	XI	
39	216	ap+	1358	
40	218	eapr+	XIII	HC (1-3J)
41	221	ap	X	
42	223	ap+	XIV	
43	227	e	XIII	
44	228	eapP: missing Jc-Jd, PhmH	XIV	
45	229	e+	1140	
46	230	e	1013	
47	231	e	XII	
48	232	e	1302	
49	233	eK+	XIII	
50	254	aprK	XIV	F (Jd)
51	256	apr+	XI / XII	
52	263	eap	XIII	
53	307	aK	X	
54	321	ap+	XII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
55	323	ap	XII	
56	325	apr+	XI	
57	326	ap+	X	HC (1-3J)
58	337	apr+	XII	
59	346	e+	XII	
60	348	e	1022	
61	378	ap	XIII	
62	383	ap	XIII	
63	385	apr+	1407	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
64	424	apKr	XI	
65	442	apPK: Jc-Jd, 1K 13:6-H; lacks Act	XII / XIII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
66	453	aK	XIV	
67	467	apr	XV	
68	475	e+	XI	
69	486	eP:J	XV	
70	487 = 1321	e	XI	
71	488 = 1326	e	XIV	
72	491	eap+	XI	
73	498	eapr+	XIV	
74	517	eapr+	XI / XII	
75	522	eapr	1515 / 1516	
76	529	e	XII	
77	537	e	XII	
78	538	e+	XII	
79	540	eP+: Mc	XIV	
80	541	eP+: MtMc	XV	
81	543	e+	XII	
82	546	e+	XIII	
83	565	e+	IX	
84	579	e	XIII	
85	614	ap	XIII	
86	621	apP(K)+: aR1K	XI	
87	630	ap	XII/XIII	
88	642	ap+	XIV	
89	643	aP: Jc-3J	XII / XIII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
90	665	ap+	XIII	
91	666	e +	XIII	
92	700	e	XI	
93	706	e	XIII	
94	707	e	XI	
95	708	e+	XI	
96	709	e+	XI	
97	710	e+	XIII	
98	713	e+	XII	
99	720	eapPK+: lacks Act	1138 / 1139	HC (1-3J)
100	808	eapr	XIV	F (Jd); HC (1-3J)
101	818	eK	XIV	
102	821	epK: J	XVI	HC
103	822	ePK+: Mt	XII	HC
104	826	e	XII	
105	828	e	XII	
106	876	ap	XII	
107	892	e+	IX	
108	915	ap+	XIII	HC (1-3J)
109	918	apPK+: lacks Act	XVI	HC (1-3J)
110	927 = 2618	eap	1133	
111	928	eap	1304	
112	937	e	XI	
113	938	e	1318	
114	942	e	X	
115	943	e	XII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
116	945	eap	XI	
117	951	eK	1317	
118	959	eap	1331	
119	962	e+	1498	
120	989	eK	XII	
121	991	e	XI	
122	992	e	XIII	
123	998	e+	XII	
124	999	eap	XIII	
125	1004	e	1291	
126	1005	e	XIV	
127	1006	er	XI	
128	1007	e	XII	
129	1008	e	XIII	
130	1009	e	XIII	
131	1010	e+	XII	
132	1011	e	1263	
133	1012	e	XI	
134	1013	e	XI / XII	
135	1014	e	XI	
136	1021	eK	XIII	
137	1023	e	1338	
138	1027	ePK+: Mt-L	1492	
139	1028	ePK+: Mt	XI	
140	1030	e	1518	
141	1071	e	XII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
142	1073	eaP: lacks Jc-Jd	X / XI	
143	1074	e	XI	
144	1076	e	X	
145	1077	e	X	
146	1078	eK	X	
147	1079	e	X	
148	1080	eK	IX	
149	1100	ap+	1376	
150	1110	e	X	
151	1113	e	XIII	
152	1185	e	XIV	
153	1186	e	XII	
154	1187	e	XI	
155	1188	e	XI / XII	
156	1189	e	1346	
157	1190	e	XII	
158	1191	e	XI / XII	
159	1192	e	XI	
160	1193	e	XII	
161	1194	e	XI	
162	1195	e	XI	
163	1196	e	XIV	
164	1197	e	XII	
165	1198	e	XII	
166	1199	e	XII	
167	1200	e+	XII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
168	1201	e	1250	
169	1202	e	XV	
170	1203	e	X	
171	1204	e	XII	
172	1205	e	XIII	
173	1206	e+	1247	
174	1207	e	XI	
175	1208	e	XIII	
176	1209	e	1067	
177	1210	e	XI	
178	1211	e	XI	
179	1212	e	XI	
180	1213	e	1286	
181	1214	e	XI	
182	1215	e	XIII	
183	1216	e	XI	
184	1217	e	1186	
185	1218	e	XII	
186	1219	e	XI	
187	1220	e+	X	
188	1221	e+	XI	
189	1222	e	XI	
190	1223	e	X	
191	1224	e	XII	
192	1225	e	X	
193	1226	e	XIII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
194	1227	e	XII + XIV	
195	1228	eP+: MtLJ	XII	
196	1229	e+	XIII	
197	1230	eK	1124	
198	1231	eP: Mc	XII	
199	1232	e+	XV	
200	1233	e	XV	
201	1234	e	XIV	
202	1235	e	XIV	
203	1236	e	XIV	
204	1237	e	XV	
205	1238	eP+: MtLJ	1243	
206	1239	e	XVI	
207	1240	eap: K with Mt	XII	
208	1241	eap+	XII	
209	1242	eap	XIII	
210	1243	eap	XI	
211	1244	ap	XI	
212	1245	ap	XII	
213	1247	eap	XV	
214	1248	eapr	XIV	
215	1249	ap+	1324	
216	1250	eap+	XV	
217	1251	eap+	XIII	
218	1252	eK	1306	
219	1253	eK+	XV	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
220	1254	ePK+: Mt	XIV	
221	1255	ePK+: L	XIII	
222	1312	eK+	XI	
223	1313	eK	XI	
224	1314	e	XI	
225	1315	eap+	XII	
226	1316	e	XII	
227	1317	e+	XI	
228	1318	e	XII	
229	1319	eap+	XII	
230	1320	e	XI	
231	1321 = 487	e	XI	
232	1322	e	XI	
233	1323	e	XII	
234	1324	e	XI	
235	1325	e	1724	
236	1326 = 488	e	XIV	
237	1327	eK	XVIII	
238	1328	er	XIV	
239	1329	e	XII	
240	1330	eP+: MtMcL	XIV	
241	1331	e	XIV	
242	1332	ePK+: Mt	XI	
243	1333	e	XI	
244	1334	e+	XIII / XIV	
245	1335	e+	XII / XIII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
246	1336	eK	1331 / 1332	
247	1337	ePK: McL	XIII	
248	1338	e+	XII	
249	1340	e	XI	
250	1341	e	XII / XIII	
251	1342	e+	XIII / XIV	
252	1343	e+	XI	
253	1344	e+	XII	
254	1345	e	XIV	
255	1346	e	X / XI	
256	1347	e+	X	
257	1348	e+	XV	
258	1349	e+	XI	
259	1350	e	MtMc = XII LJ = XIV	
260	1352 = 1352a	eap	XIII	
261	1352a = 1352	eap	XIII	
262	1352b (in 1352 / 1352a) = 2824	r+	XIV	
263	1353	e	XII / XIII	
264	1354	eap	XIV	
265	1355	e	XII	
266	1358	e	XI / XII	
267	1360	apK	XII	F (Jd)
268	1364	e	XII	
269	1365	e	XII	
270	1392	eK	X	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
271	1393	e	XII	
272	1394	e	1301	
273	1395	e	1366	
274	1403	e	1300?	
275	1404	eap	XIII	
276	1424	eapKr	IX / X	
277	1438	e	XI	
278	1439	e	XI	
279	1443	e	1047	
280	1444	e	XI	
281	1445	e	1323	
282	1447	e	1337	
283	1448	eap	XII	
284	1449	e+	XI	
285	1452	e	992	
286	1455	e	XI / XII	
287	1458	e	X	
288	1466	e	1269	
289	1470	e	XI	
290	1476	e	1333	
291	1478	e+	XI / XII	
292	1483	e	XI	
293	1486	e	1098	
294	1492	e	1342	
295	1500	eP+: MtMc	IX	
296	1503	eapr	1317	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
297	1505	eap	XII	
298	1506	epPK: R, 1K 1:1-4, 15	1320	
299	1507	eK+	X	
300	1510	e+	XI	
301	1513	e+	XI	
302	1514	e	XI	
303	1517	e+	XI	
304	1518 = 1896	ap	XIV / XV	
305	1519	e	XI	
306	1520	eP+: LJ	XI	
307	1522 = 1890	ap+	XIV	
308	1533	eK	1236	
309	1539	e	XII	
310	1540	e	XI / XII	
311	1542	e+	XII / XIII	
312	1543	e	1355	
313	1545	e	XI	
314	1546	e	1263?	
315	1547	e	1339	
316	1548	eap+	1359	
317	1554	e+	XIV	
318	1556	e	1068	
319	1557	e	1293	
320	1558	e	XIII / XIV	
321	1561	e+	XII / XIII	
322	1563	eapP+: lacks 1Th-H	XIII	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
323	1564	e+	1300	
324	1566	e+	XI / XII	
325	1569	e+	1307	
326	1570	eK	XI	
327	1572	eap+	1304	
328	1577	e	1303	
329	1582	e	948	
330	1583	e	XII	
331	1592	e	1445	
332	1594	eap+	1284	
333	1597	eapr	1289	
334	1604	e	XIII	
335	1605	e	1342	
336	1607	eP+: McL	XI	
337	1611	apr+	X	F (Jd)
338	1628	eap	1400	
339	1630	e	1314	
340	1637	eapr	1328	
341	1642	eap	1278	
342	1643	eap+	XIV	HC (1-3J)
343	1645	e	1303	
344	1646	eap	1172	
345	1647	e	1274	
346	1654	e+	1326	
347	1678	eaprK	XIV	HC (1-3J)
348	1720	ap	X	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
349	1724	ap+	XI / XII	
350	1725	ap	1367	
351	1727	ap	XIII	
352	1730	apP+: lacks 1T-Phm	XI	
353	1731	ap+	XIII	HC (1-3J, Jd)
354	1732	apr	1384	
355	1734	apr+	1015	
356	1735	ap+	X	
357	1738	apP+: lacks 2T-H	XI	
358	1739	ap	X	
359	1751	ap	1479	
360	1768	ap	1519	
361	1770	pP+: lacks R and Phm	XI	
362	1773	rK	XIV	
363	1832	ap+	XIV	F (Jd); HC (1-3J)
364	1835	a+	XI	
365	1845	ap	X	
366	1854	apr	XI	
367	1855	ap	XIII	
368	1874	ap	X	
369	1875 = 1898	ap+	X	
370	1876	apr+	XV	
371	1877	ap	XIV	
372	1878	pPK: R-2K	XI	
373	1879	pPK: G-H	XI	
374	1880	ap+	X	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
375	1881	apP: 1P-H	XIV	
376	1888	aprK	XI	
377	1889	ap+	XII	
378	1890 = 1522	ap+	XIV	
379	1891	ap	X	
380	1892	ap	XIV	
381	1893	apr+	XII	
382	1894	ap(r)+	XII	
383	1895	aK+	IX	
384	1896 = 1518	ap	XIV / XV	
385	1897	apP+: lacks G	XII / XIII	
386	1898 = 1875	ap+	X	
387	1900	pK+	IX	
388	2051	rK	XVI	HC
389	2053	rK	XIII	
390	2073	rK+	XIV	
391	2074	rK	X	
392	2077	rK	1685	
393	2085	ap	1308	
394	2086	ap	XIV	
395	2105	pK	XIV	
396	2106	ePK: McJ	XII	
397	2143	ap	XII	
398	2147	eap+	XI / XII	HC (1-3J)
399	2186	arPK: lacks Act	XII	
400	2191	eap	XI	

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
401	2197	apPK: lacts Act	XIV	
402	2248	pK+	XIV	
403	2259	rPK: Ap 13:14-14:15	XI	
404	2286	rK	XII	
405	2289	ap+	XII	
406	2298	ap	XII	
407	2303	aP+: ActJc1P	XIV	
408	2307	eP+: MtJ	XI	
409	2309	eP+: McLJ	XIV	
410	2353	eP+: parts of MtMc	XIII	
411	2354	e	1287	
412	2356	eap+	XIV	
413	2365	eP: parts of Mt	XII	
414	2403	rK+	XVI	HC
415	2412	ap+	XII	
416	2475	eap	XI	
417	2482	epK	XIV	
418	2492	eap	XIV	
419	2494	eapr	1316	
420	2495	eapr+	XV	
421	2501	ap	XVI	
422	2502	eap+	1242	
423	2527	apP+: 2P-H	XIV	F (Jd)
424	2618 = 927	eap	1133	
425	2652 = /1306	ap	XV	F (Jd); HC (1-3J)
426	2818 = 36	aK	XII	HC (1-3J, Jd)

	Gregory Number	General Content (cf. Aland, *Liste*)	Date	Media Output and Content
427	2824 = 1352b: in 1352 / 1352a	r+	XIV	
428	/220	/esk+	XIII	
429	/224	/esk	XIV	
430	/225	/esk	1437	
431	/227	/esk+	XIV	
432	/313	/e+	XIV	
433	/1306 = 2652	ap	XV	F (Jd); HC (1-3J)
434	/1577	/P	XIII	
435	/1578	/e+	XIV	
436	/1579	/e+	XIV	
437	/1610	/P: from L	XV	
438	/1611	/*Lit	XIV	
439	/1612	U-/	X	
440	/1615	/esk	XIII	
441	/1616	/esk	XIII	
442	/1617	/P	XIV	
443	/1638	/*Lit	XVI	

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MINIATURE SYMBOLIZATION AND THE YEAR-DAY PRINCIPLE OF PROPHETIC INTERPRETATION

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Introduction

A basic hermeneutical component of the historicist school of prophetic interpretation is the so-called "year-day principle." Those who advocate this hermeneutical principle argue that the prophetic time periods connected with the apocalyptic prophecies of Scripture have to be understood not as literal days, but rather as *symbolic days* that represent the same number of *literal years*. So, e.g., the 70 weeks of Dan 9:24-27 are usually interpreted as 490 years; the 1,260 days of Rev 11:3 and 12:6 (cf. Dan 7:25; Rev 11:2; 12:14; 13:5) as 1,260 years; the 1,290 days of Dan 12:11 as 1,290 years; the 1,335 days of Dan 12:12 as 1,335 years; and the 2,300 evenings and mornings of Dan 8:14 (also NASB, NIV)[1] as 2,300 years.[2]

But several critics have blamed the historicist school for applying inconsistently the year-day hermeneutical principle to some specific Bible prophecies and not to other ones. In 1842, Moses Stuart, professor at Andover Theological Seminary in Massachusetts, inquired ironically why historicists did not use their year-day principle to also interpret the 120 years of Gen 6:3 as "43,920 years"; the "forty days and forty nights" of Gen 7:4 as "forty years"; the 400 years of Gen 15:13 as "144,000 years"; the seven years of plenty and seven of famine of Gen 41:25-36 as "2,529 years of each in succession."[3]

Historicists have generally replied that those criticisms fall short by

[1]Unless otherwise indicated, all Bible references are from the RSV.

[2]The most comprehensive treatment of the historical development of historicism is found in Le Roy E. Froom's *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers: The Historical Development of Prophetic Interpretation*, 4 vols. (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1946-1954).

Insightful scholarly expositions supporting the historicist year-day principle are provided in William H. Shea, *Selected Studies on Prophetic Interpretation*, Daniel and Revelation Committee Series (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1982), 1:56-93; idem, *Daniel 7-12: Prophecies of the End Time* (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1996), 40-45, 55-60, 214-223.

[3]M[oses] Stuart, *Hints on the Interpretation of Prophecy* (Andover, MA: Allan, Morrill and Wardwell, 1842), 81-82.

disregarding the basic hermeneutical distinction between *classical* prophecies (worded in literal language) and *apocalyptic* prophecies (portrayed in symbolic language). Uriah Smith argued that "in the midst of symbolic prophecy" "the time is not literal, but symbolic also," in which a day "stands for a year" (cf. Num 14:34; Ezek 4:6).[4] William H. Shea has demonstrated that, first, the endpoint of each apocalyptic prophecy reaches beyond "the immediate historical context of the prophet" to a more distant "end of time when the ultimate kingdom of God will be set up"; and that, second, "the magnitude of the events involved" in each of those prophecies requires the year-day principle "to accommodate their accomplishment" within the timespan provided by the prophecy itself.[5]

Yet, it seems that contemporary historicism is lacking convincing answers to the following questions: Why should Num 14:34 and Ezek 4:5, 6 be used as a hermeneutical principle to interpret the time elements of the apocalyptic prophecies of Daniel and the Revelation?[6] Would not such a use be simply another example of the so-called proof-text approach? Why is the year-day principle applied to the expression "a time, two times, and half a time" of Dan 7:25 in which the word "time" is taken as a synonym of "year" (cf. Dan 4:16, 23, 25, 32; 11:13 [lit., "at the end of times, years"]),[7] and why is that same principle not applied to the equally apocalyptic "thousand years" of Rev 20:1-10?[8]

[4]Uriah Smith, *Thoughts, Critical and Practical, on the Books of Daniel and the Revelation* (Battle Creek, MI: Review and Herald, 1885), 144, see also 202, n.

[5]Shea, *Selected Studies*, 59-61.

[6]W[illia]m Miller states: "The scripture rule for reckoning a day for a year will be found in Numbers 14:34, and Eziekel [*sic*] 4:6, also in the fulfil[l]ment of Daniel's seventy weeks" (*Evidences from Scripture and History of the Second Coming of Christ about the Year A.D. 1843, and the Personal Reign of 1000 Years* [Brandon, VT: Vermont Telegraph Office, 1833], 11).

[7]William H. Shea states: In Daniel 4, "a 'time' refers to a year. Seven 'times' were to pass over Nebuchadnezzar until he regained his sanity (4:16, 23, 25, 32). The 'time, times, and half a time' of Daniel 7:25, then, equal three and a half prophetic years. Each year is made up of 360 days, making a total of 1,260 days. The year-for-a-day principle gives us 1,260 actual years (see Ezekiel 4:6; Numbers 14:34)" (*Daniel 1-7: Prophecy as History*, 176).

[8]In regard to the interpretation of the "thousand years" of Rev 20:1-10, the *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary* simply says: "Some commentators take this ['thousand years'] to be prophetic time, that is, 360,000 literal years, basing their interpretation on the fact that these verses are symbolic, and that therefore the time period must be symbolically interpreted. Others point out that this prophecy contains a mixture of literal elements, and that therefore it is not necessary to understand the expression symbolically. This commentary takes the position that the thousand years are literal" (rev. ed. [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1980], 7:880).

The present article explores briefly the concept of "miniature symbolization" in nineteenth-century Protestant literature. This concept can provide helpful hermeneutical insights for the process of responding to these questions from a historicist perspective. Only the actual lengths of the various prophetic time periods are considered, without any attempt to settle the starting and ending points of each period.

Miniature Symbolization in Nineteenth-century Protestant Literature

Some nineteenth-century historicist scholars argued that the year-day principle of prophetic interpretation should be applied only to the time elements of those specific symbolic prophecies whose symbols represent broader entities than the symbols themselves.

Frederic Thruston

In 1812, Frederic Thruston applied the principle of "symbolical symmetry" to interpret the prophetic time element expressed "in miniature" in Rev 11:3-4. He explained that

> a symbolical prophecy is a picture; and all the objects being visible at one view, are of course in miniature. *The times* must, therefore, be also in miniature, as days for years. A beast, the miniature picture of an Empire, could not with any correspondent propriety be said to live 1260 years. The prophetic times are therefore in miniature; and the idolatrous Empire, which prevails 1260 years, is represented by a beast who lived 1260 days. It is on the same principle as that alleged symbolical symmetry, which requires that *every word*, in a symbolical representation, be symbolically understood (emphasis original).[9]

George Bush

In 1843, George Bush, professor of Hebrew and Oriental Literature at New York City University, elaborated on the concept of "miniature symbolization."[10] He defined that concept in the following terms:

> The Scripture presents us with two distinct classes of predictions—the *literal* and the *symbolical*. Where an event, or series of events, of a historical character, is *historically* announced, we naturally look for the announcement to be made in the plainest, simplest, and most literal terms. No reason can then be assigned for designating

[9]Frederic Thruston, *England Safe and Triumphant; or, Researches into the Apocalyptic Little Book, and Prophecies, Connected and Synchronical* (London: Coventry, 1812), 1:145.

[10]George Bush, "Prophetic Designations of Time," *The Hierophant; or Monthly Expositor of Sacred Symbols and Prophecy* 11 (April 1843): 241-253.

> periods of time in a mystical or figurative diction. . . . But the case is entirely reversed in regard to the *symbolical prophecies*. . . . The prophets have frequently, under divine prompting, adopted the system of *hieroglyphic representation*, in which a single man represents a community, and a wild beast an extended empire. Consequently, since the mystic exhibition of the community or empire is in *miniature*, symbolical propriety requires that the associated chronological periods should be exhibited in *miniature* also (emphasis original).[11]

Bush argues further that

> the grand principle into which the usage of employing a day for a year is to be resolved, is that of *miniature symbolization*. As the *events* are thus economically reduced, the *periods* are to be reduced in the same relative proportion. What that proportion is, we cannot positively determine without some antecedent information touching the *rate* or *scale* of reduction. But the probability is, that such scale will be at the rate of a day or minor revolution of the earth round its axis, for a year or greater revolution of the earth round the sun (emphasis original).[12]

A large extract of Bush's article, "Prophetic Designations of Time," from which these quotes came, was reprinted by Joshua V. Himes in the Millerite periodical *The Advent Herald and Signs of the Times Reporter* (March 6, 1844). Himes described the article as a "triumphant argument in proof that the prophetic days are symbols of years."[13]

T. R. Birks

One of the most comprehensive nineteenth-century expositions of the year-day principle is T. R. Birks's *First Elements of Sacred Prophecy* (1843).[14] Birks, a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, suggested that God used the symbolical year-day principle "to keep the Church in the attitude of continual and lively expectation of her Lord's return," despite the fact that "the long delay" of that event was "prophetically announced," because it was announced "in such a manner that its true length might not be understood, till its own close seemed to be drawing near."[15]

[11]Ibid., 244-245.

[12]Ibid., 246.

[13]George Bush, "Prophetic Designations of Time," *The Advent Herald, and Signs of the Times Reporter*, March 6, 1844, 33-35. A short extract of this article appeares also in P. Gerard Damsteegt, *Foundations of the Seventh-day Adventist Message and Mission* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 72 n. 114.

[14]T. R. Birks, *First Elements of Sacred Prophecy: Including an Examination of Several Recent Expositions, and of the Year-Day Theory* (London: William Edward Painter, 1843), 308-419.

[15]Ibid., 311, 375, 416.

Discussing the so-called "*systematic employment of* MINIATURE *in hieroglyphical symbolization*"[16] as related to Num 14:34, Birks distinguished between a miniature in *type* and a miniature in *symbol* (emphasis original). He argued that

> a type is a real, and a symbol an unreal or ideal, representative of a real object. In the type, the spies, who were real persons, represented the whole nation [Num 13:1-16]; and the forty days of their search, a real period, represented the real time of the stay in the wilderness [Num 13:25; 14:33, 34]. In the visions of Daniel or St. John the ten-horned beast [Dan 7:7, 19, 20, 23, 24; Rev 13:1-8], or the sun-clothed woman [Rev 12:1, 2], unreal figures, represent an empire, or the Church of Christ; and twelve hundred and sixty days [Dan 7:25; Rev 11:3; 12:6], or forty-two months [Rev 11:2; 13:5], an unreal period grammatically suggested, represent the true period designed, of as many years. The analogy, therefore, contained in this Scripture history [Num 14:34] is precise and complete. It supplies us, from the lips of the All-wise God himself, with a distinct scale, by which to interpret every prophetic period which bears the internal marks of a suggestive character, as a miniature representation of some larger period.[17]

E. B. Elliott

In 1847, E. B. Elliott provided additional helpful insights about the concept of miniature symbolization. Elliott, late vicar of Tuxford and a fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, stated that "a *symbolic Beast's* time of prospering was intended probably to figure out some much longer time as that of the *Empire symbolized*" (emphasis original).[18] He argued also that "if *day* mean[s] *year* in one *miniature symbolic* vision [Ezek 4:5, 6] it seems reasonable so to construe it in all" (emphasis original).[19]

While other historicists applied the year-day principle only to those symbolical visions in which the personifying symbol was a person or animal, Elliott believed it should also be applied to other visions in which "the same chronological proportion of scale (if I may so say) between the personifying symbol and nation symbolized, is observed,"

[16]Ibid., 375. Birks also mentions that George S. Faber, in a work called "Provincial Letters," speaks about "the symbolic employment of MINIATURE in hieroglyphical symbolization" in his short but lucid defense of the year-day theory. Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any remaining copy of that work.

[17]Ibid., 339.

[18]E. B. Elliott, *Horæ Apocalypticæ; or, A Commentary on the Apocalypse, Critical and Historical*, 3d ed. (London: Seeley, Burnside, and Seeley, 1847), 3:224.

[19]Ibid., 227 n. 4.

such as in Isa 54:4, 6; Jer 2:2; 48:11; Ezek 23:3; and Hos 2:15,[20] where a person symbolizes Israel or a single human lifetime symbolizes the span of Israel's national history.

Elliot states further that

> even where the personifying symbol is not a *person* or *animal*, it may yet have its own scale of time, appropriate to the mutations figuratively described of it in the picture or poem: and if so, this is observed and applied; for example, in personifications under the figure of a *flower* or long-lived *tree* in their state of growth and decline. Even in symbolizations by wholly *inanimate objects*, the same observance of the fit scale of time may be often seen; as in Horace's symbolization of the Roman nation, and its civil wars, under the figure of a storm-tossed ship returning into port,—'O navis referent, &c;' where the *briefer* storm represents the *longer* civil commotions (emphasis original).[21]

The above-mentioned definitions of the concept of miniature symbolization provide some basic guidelines for studying the passages of Scripture to which historicists apply the year-day principle. The following section considers briefly how this concept can be identified in those passages.

The Concept of Miniature Symbolization in Specific Bible Passages

Historicists have usually regarded the expressions "for every day a year" (Num 14:34) and "a day for each year" (Ezek 4:6) as the hermeneutical keys to the time elements which occur in several passages of Daniel and the Revelation. The discussion that follows tries to show how the presence of a miniature symbolization in Num 14 and Ezek 4, on one hand, and in some apocalyptic prophecies of Daniel and the Revelation, on the other, provides a basic thematic correlation between that expression and those prophecies.

Numbers and Ezekiel

The expression "for every day a year" appears in the book of Numbers (14:34) in the *historical* episode of the twelve spies chosen from the twelve tribes of Israel "to spy out the land of Canaan" prior to its conquest (13:1-25). After "forty days" of searching, the spies returned to their camp (13:25). The negative report of ten of them (13:26-33; cf. 14:6-9) led "the whole congregation" of Israel to rebel against Moses

[20]Ibid., 224 n. 1.

[21]Ibid. (emphasis original).

and Aaron and "against the Lord," even to the point of deciding to stone the two spies, Joshua and Caleb, who did not agree with that report (14:1-10). Then "the glory of the Lord" appeared in judgment to all the Israelites (14:10-12). After Moses pled with God to spare the rebellious people from being completely destroyed (14:13-19), God announced the following sentence:

> And your children shall be shepherds in the wilderness forty years, and shall suffer for your faithlessness, until the last of your dead bodies lies in the wilderness. According to the number of the days in which you spied out the land, forty days, for every day a year, you shall bear your iniquity, forty years, and you shall know my displeasure (Num 14:33, 34).

The episode under consideration presents a parallel typological relationship between spies and tribes, and between days and years. Crucial in the whole narrative are *microcosmic* entities (twelve spies and forty days) representing larger *macrocosmic* realities (twelve tribes and forty years). According to Elliott: "We have, thus, from the lips of God himself, the clear relation established in this notable instance of chronological prophecy, that while the spies represent the nation, a day should represent a year."[22]

While in Num 14:34 the expression "for every day a year" occurs in a *historical* setting, in Ezek 4:6 the expression "a day for each year" appears in a *symbolic* prophecy. As Num 13-14 comprises a *typology* in miniature, so Ezek 4 portrays a *symbolic* representation in miniature. Several small symbols are mentioned in Ezek 4 and 5 to illustrate the coming destruction of Jerusalem. Already in 4:1-3, the prophet Ezekiel is asked to take a "brick" and "portray upon it" the city of Jerusalem, surrounded by a siege. That was a miniature model of the city surrounded by enemy armies prior to its destruction. But in vv. 4-8 the prophet himself becomes a miniature symbol, first, of the house of Israel and, then, of the house of Judah. In those verses we read the following:

> Then lie upon your left side, and I will lay the punishment of the house of Israel upon you; for the number of the days that you lie upon it, you shall bear their punishment. For I assign to you a number of days, three hundred and ninety days, equal to the number of the years of their punishment; so long shall you bear the punishment of the house of Israel. And when you have completed these, you shall lie down a second time, but on your right side, and bear the punishment of the house of Judah; forty days I assign you, a day for each year. And you shall set

[22]Birks, 338-339.

> your face toward the siege of Jerusalem, with your arm bared; and you shall prophesy against the city. And, behold, I will put cords upon you, so that you cannot turn from one side to the other, till you have completed the days of your siege.

Once again we are facing a small *microcosm* (the prophet himself) representing a broader *macrocosm* (first Israel and then Judah). The act of Ezekiel lying on his left side for 390 days was understood by Bush as

> a *miniature hieroglyphic* of Israel; a man, of a nation. Hence as the man represented the nation in miniature, so the 390 days represented the period of 390 years in miniature. In like manner, his lying forty days on his right side symbolized the foreseen iniquity of Judah through the period of forty years (emphasis original).[23]

The previous consideration confirmed the fact that the time periods mentioned in Num 13-14 and Ezek 4 occur within the context of specific miniature symbolizations. While in Numbers the context is of a miniature typology, in Ezekiel it is of miniature symbolization. But in both cases the hermeneutical principle, provided by the text itself to interpret the time elements involved, is each day for a year. This led several nineteenth-century historicists to believe that the year-day principle should be used only in regard to those time prophecies in which occur a similar miniature symbolization.

The discussion attempts now to verify how this principle can be applied consistently to the apocalyptic time prophecies of Daniel and the Revelation.

Daniel

Crucial to understanding the validity of the concept of miniature symbolization as a hermeneutical tool to interpret apocalyptic prophecies is the task of identifying precisely the passages of Scripture in which that concept occurs associated with some prophetic time period. In regard to the book of Daniel, the present discussion will consider how this concept is applicable to the following time periods usually interpreted by historicists from a year-day perspective: (1) "a time, two times, and half a time" (Dan 7:25); (2) 2,300 "evenings and mornings" (Dan 8:14 [also NASB, NIV]); (3) "seventy weeks" with their time subdivisions (Dan 9:24-27); (4) "a time, two times, and half a time" (Dan 12:7); and (5) 1,290 days and 1,335 days (Dan 12:11, 12).[24]

In the apocalyptic prophecy of Dan 7, all main entities are portrayed in

[23]Bush, *Hierophant*, 246.

[24]Cf. Birks, 319-324.

a clear miniature symbolization. According to the Protestant historicist tradition, the "lion" with "eagle's wings" (v. 4) represents the Babylonian Empire; the "bear" (v. 5) refers to the Medo-Persian Empire; the "leopard" with "four heads" (v. 6) describes the Greek Empire; the "fourth beast" with "ten horns" (v. 7) is an allusion to the Roman Empire; and the little "horn" (v. 8) is a symbol of papal Rome. As the entities ("beasts" and "horns") of the vision represent larger political powers (empires), so does the symbolic time-element involved represent a broader range. There is almost a consensus among historicists that "a time, two times, and half a time," during which the saints should be oppressed by that little horn (v. 25), stands for 1,260 literal years.[25]

Likewise, in Dan 8 two different animals are used as miniature symbols of larger empires. The "ram" with "two horns" (vv. 3, 4) is identified by the text itself as a symbol of Medo-Persia (v. 20); and the "he-goat," with "a conspicuous horn between his eyes" (vv. 5-8), as a representation of the Greek Empire (v. 21). Once again, the counterfeit activities of the little horn are mentioned (vv. 9-12), which would be reversed only at the end of the symbolic period of 2,300 "evenings and mornings" (vv. 13, 14 [also NASB, NIV]).[26] As the entities mentioned (animals and "horns") are symbols of broader and longer-living empires, so the time element (2,300 "evenings and mornings") is seen to represent 2,300 years.[27]

Daniel 9:24-27 mentions the prophetic period of "seventy weeks," subdivided into "seven weeks," "sixty-two weeks," and "one week." The content of the passage itself, isolated from the background context of Dan 8, is worded in apparently concrete language, without a clear miniature symbolization involved. But by recognizing that Dan 9:24-27 is a later appendix explaining the vision of the 2,300 evenings and mornings of Dan 8:14 (cf. 8:26, 27; 9:20-23), one might conclude rightly

[25]See Froom, *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers*, vols. 1-4, passim (references in the "Index" of each volume).

[26]The original Hebrew of Dan 8:14 actually reads 2,300 "evenings and mornings." For further study of this expression, see S. J. Schwantes, "*'Ereḇ Bōqer* of Dan 8:14 Re-examined," *AUSS* 16 (1978): 375-385.

[27]See Froom, *The Prophetic Faith of Our Fathers*, vols. 1-4, passim (references in the "Index" of each volume); Samuel Nuñez, *The Vision of Daniel 8: Interpretations from 1700 to [1900]*, Andrews University Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series, 14 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1987); Alberto R. Timm, *The Sanctuary and the Three Angels' Messages: Integrating Factors in the Development of Seventh-day Adventist Doctrines*, Adventist Theological Society Dissertation Series, 5 (Berrien Springs: Adventist Theological Society, 1995), 19-36, 64-79, 151-174.

that seventy weeks and its shorter time-period subdivisions have to be understood also within the miniature-symbolization context of Dan 8. Linguistic evidences indicate that the seventy weeks were actually "*cut off*" (Heb., *nehak*) of the larger period of 2,300 days-years and, therefore, must be interpreted as 490 years.[28] If not understood as 490 years, the seventy weeks becomes senseless as a messianic prophecy. So evident is the year-day principle in Dan 9:24-27 that this passage and Num 14:34 and Ezek 4:5, 6 are considered by historicists as the hermeneutical keys to interpret the time periods of other symbolic prophecies.[29]

Three significant prophetic time periods are mentioned in the concluding section of Daniel (12:4-13): (1) "a time, two times, and half a time" (v. 7); (2) "a thousand two hundred and ninety days" (v. 11); and (3) a "thousand three hundred and thirty-five days" (v. 12). One might be tempted not to apply the year-day principle to those time periods because of the fact that no explicit miniature symbolization is found in that specific section of the book. But this argument cannot be accepted when one looks beyond the narrow context into the larger prophetic scope of the book. Actually, "a time, two times, and half a time" (v. 7) seems to be just an echo of the same time period mentioned previously in Dan 7:25. If the miniature symbolization found in Dan 7 requires the time period in 7:25 to be understood as 1,260 years, then, to be consistent, the same period in 12:7 must also be interpreted as 1,260 years.

The allusion in Dan 12:11 (NIV) to the "daily" and the "abomination that causes desolation" connects the 1,290 and 1,335 days not only with the content of the vision of Dan 11 (see v. 31), but also

[28]For a more detailed study of the meaning and interpretation of the "seventy weeks" of Dan 9:24-27, see Gerhard F. Hasel, "The Seventy Weeks of Daniel 9:24-27," supplement to *Ministry*, May 1976; William H. Shea, "The Relationship between the Prophecies of Daniel 8 and Daniel 9," in *The Sanctuary and the Atonement: Biblical, Historical, and Theological Studies*, ed. Arnold V. Wallenkampf and W. Richard Lesher (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1981), 228-250; Jacques B. Doukhan, "The Seventy Weeks of Daniel 9: Exegetical Study," in ibid., 251-276; William H. Shea, "The Prophecy of Daniel 9:24-27," in *The Seventy Weeks, Leviticus, and the Nature of Prophecy*, Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, vol. 3, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1986), 105-108; Clifford Goldstein, *1844 Made Simple* (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1988), 43-55; Jacques B. Doukhan, *Daniel: The Vision of the End*, rev. ed. (Berrien Springs, Andrews University Press, 1989), 31-44, 172 n. 65; Brempong Owusu-Antwi, *The Chronology of Dan 9:24-27*, Adventist Theological Society Dissertation Series, 2 (Berrien Springs: Adventist Theological Society, 1995).

[29]See n. 6, above.

with the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" of Dan 8:14 (see 8:13; 9:27). The very same apostate power that would establish the "abomination that causes desolation" in replacement to the "daily" is described in Dan 7 and 8 as the "little horn," and in Dan 11 as the "king of the north." These recurrences confirm that the 1,290 days and the 1,335 days of Dan 12:11, 12 share the same prophetic-apocalyptic nature of "a time, times, and half a time" of Dan 7:25 and of the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" of Dan 8:14.

The attempt to isolate the content of Dan 12:4-13 from the prophetic chain of Dan 11 is not endorsed by the literary structure of the book of Daniel. Shea explains that in the prophetic section of the book of Daniel each prophetic period (70 weeks; 1,260, 1,290, 1,335, and 2,300 days) appears as a calibrating appendix to the basic body of the respective prophecy to which it is related. For instance, the vision of chapter 7 is described in vv. 1-14, but the time related to it appears only in v. 25. In chapter 8, the body of the vision is related in vv. 1-12, but the time appears only in v. 14. In a similar way, the prophetic time periods related to the vision of chapter 11 are mentioned only in chapter 12.[30] So, if we apply the year-day principle to the prophetic periods of Dan 7 and 8, we should also apply it to the time periods of Dan 12, for all these time periods are in some way interrelated, and the description of each vision points to only a single fulfillment of the prophetic time period related to it.

The above-mentioned symbolic time periods are interpreted by means of the day-year hermeneutical principle because of their direct or indirect relationship with a specific miniature symbolization setting. But in the book of Daniel there are also a few other prophetic time periods to which that principle of interpretation cannot be applied because of their historical nature, which is without any miniature-symbolization point of reference. Attention will be given to the "seven times" of Dan 4:16, 23, 25, 32; the "seventy years" of Dan 9:2; and the "three weeks" of Dan 10:2.

The "seven times" of Nebuchadnezzar's punishment for his pride (Dan 4:16, 23, 25, 32) were erroneously understood by some nineteenth-century historicists as 2,520 years (7 x 360 days = 2,520 days-years).[31] There

[30]Shea, *Daniel 7-12*, 217-218. See also idem, "Time Prophecies of Daniel 12 and Revelation 12-13," in *Symposium on Revelation: Introductory and Exegetical Studies—Book 1*, Daniel and Revelation Committee Series, 6, ed. Frank B. Holbrook (Silver Springs, MD: Biblical Research Institute of the General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1992), 327-360.

[31]See, e.g., Elliott, 227-228 n. 4. This interpretation is still upheld today by the Jehovah's Witnesses.

is no doubt that the "seven times" are mentioned within Nebuchadnezzar's symbolical prophetic dream of a huge and fruitful "tree" that would remain devastated for "seven times" (vv. 8-18). Daniel's interpretation of the dream (vv. 19-27) and its actual fulfillment (vv. 28-37) corroborate the fact that no miniature symbolization at all is involved in this incident. In the prophetic dream, the tree represented just one person (Nebuchadnezzar) with whom it was fulfilled (vv. 20-22, 28). The prophetic "seven times" (v. 16) were interpreted by Daniel as "seven times" (vv. 23, 25) and actually fulfilled just as "seven times" (v. 32). Understood as seven literal years,[32] this period can be easily accommodated within the lifetime of King Nebuchadnezzar. No room is left in the text for a year-day interpretation of this prophetic period that would stretch it beyond those seven years. Only an allegorical reinterpretation of the dream's basic entities ("tree" or "Nebuchadnezzar") can favor any other artificial fulfillment not contemplated by the text itself.

The prophetic promise that Jerusalem would be restored after "seventy years" of Babylonian captivity (Dan 9:2) is taken from Jer 29:10. References to the same time period are found also in Jer 25:11, 12, and 2 Chron 36:21. By reading the respective literary setting of each of those passages, one can easily perceive that not only in Dan 9:1-19 and Jer 29:1-32, but also in Jer 25:1-14 and 2 Chron 36:17-21, the narratives are always expressed in a literal language, without any miniature symbolization or other kind of symbolisms. Thus, the "seventy years" of Dan 9:2 have to be understood as a literal period of time.

Similarly, the "three weeks" of Dan 10:2-3 occur in a different literary context from the "seventy weeks" of Dan 9. In this passage, the prophet refers to his own concrete experience of "mourning for three weeks," abstaining from "meat, wine, and delicacies." There is nothing symbolic in these verses, the actions of which all occurred within "the third year of Cyrus" (10:1), so there is no basis for interpreting this time period as anything other than three ordinary, literal weeks.

The previous considerations on the occurrences of miniature symbolizations in the book of Daniel allow us to suggest that the year-day principle seems applicable in that book to the "seventy weeks" with their time subdivisions (9:24-27); "a time, two times, and half a time" (7:25; 12:7); the 1,290 days (12:11); the 1,335 days (12:12); and the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" (8:14). By contrast, the absence of such

[32]Cf. *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 4:790: "The majority of ancient and modern interpreters explain the Aramaic *'iddan*, 'time,' here (also in vs. 23, 25, 32; chs. 7:25; 12:7 [this last text is not in Aramaic but in Hebrew]) to mean 'year.' The original LXX reads 'seven years.' Among the earlier expositors supporting this view are Josephus (*Antiquities* x. 10.6), Jerome, Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Jephet. Most modern expositors also agree with this view."

symbolization in regard to the "seven times" (4:16, 23, 25, 32) and the "seventy years" (9:2) and the "three weeks" (10:2-3) implies that these specific time periods have to be taken literally as seven years, seventy years, and three weeks (10:23), respectively.

The discussion turns now to the book of Revelation, with special attention to the presence of prophetic time periods within a miniature-symbolization setting.

The Revelation

The discussion about the concept of miniature symbolization in the book of Revelation will center mainly around the following prophetic time periods: "ten days" (Rev 2:10); "five months" (Rev 9:5, 10); "the hour, the day, the month, and the year" (Rev 9:15); 42 "months" and 1,260 "days" (Rev 11:2, 3); "three days and a half" (Rev 11:9, 11); 1,260 "days" (Rev 12:6); "a time, and times, and half a time" (Rev 11:9, 11); 1,260 "days" (Rev 12:6); "a time, and times, and half a time" (Rev 12:14); and 42 "months" (Rev 13:5).[33]

The period of "ten days" mentioned in Rev 2:10 occurs within a literary setting not clearly symbolical (see vv. 8-11). But, according to the concept of miniature symbolization, it is not just the presence of some symbols that justifies the use of the year-day principle. The real point at stake is whether the main entity involved ("the church in Smyrna") can be considered a symbol (as in Ezek 4) or a type (as in Num 13-14) of a broader corporative reality. This means that if the "church in Smyrna" is considered just as a reference to the first-century Christian community of that specific town,[34] then the "ten days" would have to be taken just as a literal ten days. But if that church is understood as a miniature symbol of the Christian church between "about the close of the 1st century (c. A.D. 100)" and "about A.D. 313, when Constantine espoused the cause of the church,"[35] then the "ten days" should also be considered a miniature symbol of a longer period, most probably ten literal years.[36]

Twice in Rev 9:5, 10, appears a reference to "five months," during which "those of mankind who have not the seal of God upon their

[33]Cf. Birks, 321-324.

[34]An insightful description of Smyrna is provided in Fatih Cimok, *A Guide to the Seven Churches* (Istanbul, Turkey: A Turizm Yayinlari, 1998), 54-61. See also W. M. Ramsay, *The Letters to the Seven Churches of Asia and Their Place in the Plan of the Apocalypse* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1963), 251-280.

[35]*Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 7:746.

[36]See ibid., 747-748.

foreheads" should be tormented (v. 4). The entire narrative of the fifth "trumpet" (vv. 1-12), in which those references appear is crowded with symbolic entities, such as "star," "bottomless pit," and exotic war "locusts." Those interpreters who regard the presence of symbolic entities as sufficient to justify the use of the year-day principle would not hesitate to consider those "five months" as 150 literal years. But by looking beyond the presence of such symbolisms toward an actual miniature symbolization, one becomes once more dependent on a broader historical fulfillment of this trumpet to justify the application of the year-day principle. If the trumpet is seen as a miniature representation of an era of the Christian Church—for instance, from the "rise" of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1299 to the "downfall" of the Byzantine Empire in A.D. 1449[37]—then the "five months" can only be taken as 150 years.

In Rev 9:15, occurs the expression "the hour, the day, the month, and the year," of which at the end "four angels" were "to kill a third of mankind."[38] This time period appears within the description of the sixth trumpet (vv. 13-21), in which are used such symbolic expressions as "the great river Euphrates," "horses" with heads like those of lions, "mouths" that issued "fire and smoke and sulphur," and "riders" having "breastplates the color of fire and sapphire and of sulphur." As in the case of the "five months" (vv. 5, 10), so "the hour, the day, the month, and the year" can only be seen as 391 years and 15 days if this trumpet is considered a miniature portrait of the Christian church, for example from the "downfall" of the Byzantine Empire in A.D. 1449 to the fall of the Ottoman Empire in A.D. 1840.[39]

The 42 "months" and the 1,260 "days" mentioned in Rev 11:2, 3 (see also 13:5; 12:6) are recognized as synonyms not only of each other, but also of "a time, two times, and half a time" derived from Dan 7:25 (see also Dan 12:7; Rev 12:14).[40] This implies, just by itself, that the miniature

[37]J[osiah] Litch, *The Probability of the Second Coming of Christ about A.D. 1843* (Boston: David H. Ela, 1838), 153-157. Cf. Damsteegt, 26-29.

[38]Some authors seem to favor the notion that the expression "the hour, the day, the month, and the year" should be understood as a specific moment in time rather than a time period. See, e.g., R. H. Charles, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Revelation of St. John* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1985), 1:252; J. Massyngbaerde Ford, *Revelation*, AB 38 (New York: Doubleday, 1975), 153-154; G. K. Beale, *The Book of Revelation: A Commentary on the Greek Text*, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 508. Yet, historicists tend to see that expression as alluding to an actual time period.

[39]Litch, 157-158. Cf. Damsteegt, 26-29.

[40]Cf. David E. Aune, who states: "The period of forty-two months (also mentioned in Rev 13:5, where it is the period during which the beast exercises authority . . .) is a

symbolization by which the vision of Dan 7 is presented requires the year-day principle to interpret not only "a time, two times, and half a time" in Dan 7:25, but also all of the other correlated time periods. Yet, in addition to the miniature-symbolization prophetic background of Dan 7, the actual content of Rev 11:3-12, in which the 42 months and the 1,260 days are mentioned, is focused on the historical events related to the "two witnesses," also called "the two olive trees" and "the two lampstands" (v. 4). Despite the widespread tendency of reducing the two witnesses to two literal prophets (such as Moses and Elijah),[41] some authors argue in favor of a broader corporative understanding of the two witnesses.[42] Kenneth A. Strand argues that they actually represent the larger prophetic witnesses comprised by "the word of God" (the OT prophetic message) and the "testimony of Jesus Christ" (the NT apostolic witness).[43] This confirms the already-established notion that the 42 months and the 1,260 days of Rev 11:2, 3 have to be understood from a year-day perspective as 1,260 years.

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symbolic apocalyptic number for a divinely restricted period of time (often a limited period of eschatological tribulation), ultimately derived from Dan 7:25; 12:7. Forty-two months is equivalent to three and one-half years, a period of time that the author expresses differently elsewhere as 1,260 days (11:3; 12:6) and as 'a time, times, and half a time' (12:14). He uses the number three and one-half for the number of days between the death and the ascension of the two witnesses (11:9, 11)" (*Revelation 6-16*, WBC 52B [Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1998], 609).

For Millerite/Seventh-day Adventist expositions of this interrelationship of time prophecies, see, e.g., William Miller, *Evidence from Scripture and History of the Second Coming of Christ, about the Year 1843: Exhibited in a Course of Lectures* (Boston: Joshua V. Himes, 1842), 78, 96, 112, 215-216; Josiah Litch, *Prophetic Expositions; or A Connected View of the Testimony of the Prophets Concerning the Kingdom of God and the Time of Its Establishment* (Boston: Joshua V. Himes, 1842), 1:92-93; *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 4:833-834; C. Mervyn Maxwell, *God Cares*, vol. 2, *The Message of Revelation* (Boise, ID: Pacific Press, 1985), 326; Shea, "Time Prophecies of Daniel 12 and Revelation 12-13," 327-360.

[41]A partial listing of different individuals who have been considered as the "two witnesses" is provided in Massyngbaerde Ford, 177-178.

[42]See, e.g., *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 7:801; Kenneth A. Strand, "The Two Witnesses of Rev 11:3-12," *AUSS* 19 (1981): 127-135; Beale, 572-579.

[43]Strand, 127-135. Cf. Ellen G. White, who states: "Concerning the two witnesses, the prophet declares further, 'These are the two olive-trees, and the two candlesticks standing before the God of earth.' 'Thy word,' said the psalmist, 'is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path.' The two witnesses represent the Scriptures of the Old and the New Testament. Both are important testimonies to the origin and perpetuity of the law of God. Both are witnesses also to the plan of salvation. The types, sacrifices, and prophecies of the Old Testament point forward to a Saviour to come. The Gospels and Epistles of the New Testament tell of a Saviour who has come in the exact manner foretold by type and prophecy" (*The Great Controversy between Christ and Satan* [Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1911], 267).

Within the same pericope of Rev 11:3-12, there are also two references to a period of "three days and a half" (vv. 9, 11). By considering the "two witnesses" as miniature representations of the broader prophetic testimonies of the OT and NT, one can easily conclude that those "three days and a half" stand for three years and a half.[44]

In Rev 12, the time periods of the 1,260 days (v. 6) and "a time, and times, and half a time" (v. 14) are synonymously identified as the age during which the apocalyptic "woman" would find refuge in "the wilderness" (vv. 6, 14) from the satanic "dragon, with seven heads and ten horns" (v. 3). The presence of a symbolic "woman" as a miniature representation of God's faithful church[45] confirms the already-settled year-day interpretation of each of those periods as 1,260 years.

The prophetic period of 42 months reoccurs in Rev 13:5 as the period in which the "beast" with "ten horns and seven heads" (v. 1; cf. 12:3) would exercise the "great authority" granted to him by the dragon (v. 2). Here in Rev 13:1-8, the "little horn" of Dan 7 and 8 reappears under the symbol of a "beast" as a miniature representation of papal Rome. The nature of this symbolic vision also corroborates the 1,260 years of religious persecution.

In the book of Revelation, the time periods of "three days and a half" (11:9, 11); "ten days" (2:10); "five months" (9:5, 10); "the hour, the day, the month, and the year" (9:15); "a time, and times, and half a time" (12:14); 42 "months" (11:2; 13:5); and 1,260 "days" (11:3; 12:6) all occur within a miniature symbolization setting. To all those time periods the year-day principle of prophetic interpretation seems applicable. But what could be said on this matter about the 1,000 years of Rev 20? If the year-day principle is applied to all those periods, would it not be inconsistent to fail to also apply it to the 1,000 years?

If the only criterion to use the year-day principle is the presence of a given period within an apocalyptic narrative, then there would be no convincing reason not to interpret the 1,000 years of Rev 20 as 360,000 years. The attempt to consider the word "years" (vv. 2-7) by itself as an obstacle for the year-day principle does not seem convincing, however, because in other places that principle is applied to this word. Already in the expression "a time, two times, and half a time" (Dan 7:25; 12:7; Rev 12:14), the word "time" is taken as "year" and multiplied by 360, the number of days in a year in biblical times. The normal biblical lunar year included twelve months of twenty-nine or thirty days each, with an

[44]*Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 7:803.

[45]Ibid., 807.

additional month added as necessary to synchronize with the solar year (about seven times in nine years). That the idealized "prophetic" year contains 360 prophetic days is confirmed by the use of the terms three and one-half years, 1,260 days, and 42 months as synonymous designations for the same period (Rev 11:2, 3; 12:6, 14; 13:5; cf. Dan 7:25; 12:7). No more convincing is the argument that a "year" can be interpreted from a year-day perspective only when designated by the symbolic term "time." If this were the case, then serious problems would be created in regard to the apocalyptic expression "the hour, the day, the month, and the year" (Rev 9:15), in which the words "day" and "year" are used in the same symbolic time expression. In this case, should the year-day principle be used because the word "day" is mentioned or should it not be used because the term "year" is also present? But if the notion of miniature symbolization is a valid hermeneutical principle of prophetic interpretation, then the nature of the 1,000 years can be defined more easily by considering the presence or absence of a miniature symbolization in that context.

By reading Rev 20:1-10, where the 1,000 years are mentioned six times, one might notice that several apocalyptic symbols are mentioned, such as the "bottomless pit," "a great chain," thrones," the "beast" and "its image," "Gog and Magog," and "the false prophet." But it seems quite evident that the overall tone of this apocalyptic narrative cannot be considered a true miniature symbolization. First, the "beast" and "its image," which were the main miniature protagonists in Rev 13, are mentioned in Rev 20 only in a tangential way (vv. 4, 10). The predominant figure in the whole narrative is the "dragon," also called "old serpent" (v. 2). While the "beast" and "his image" gave to Rev 13 a miniature-symbolization tone, the presence of the "dragon" in Rev 20 does not have the same tone. This is due to the fact that in the book of Revelation, the "dragon" is not a miniature symbolization of a larger entity or community, but a designation for one spiritual being called "Devil" and "Satan" (20:2; cf. 12:9). For this reason, it seems more consistent to understand the 1,000 years of Rev 20 as a literal 1,000 years.

Some readers of the Revelation might wonder about the "half an hour" of "silence in heaven" when the Lamb (Christ) opens the seventh seal (Rev 8:1). If the sealed "scroll" (or "book," KJV) in Rev 5[46] and each of its "seven seals" (6:1-17; 8:1-5) are considered miniature symbolizations

[46]The meaning of this sealed "book" is discussed in Ranko Stefanovic, *The Background and Meaning of the Sealed Book of Revelation 5*, Andrews University Seminary Dissertation Series, 22 (Berrien Springs: Andrews University Press, 1996).

of broader historical realities, then that "half an hour" might be considered a symbolic time, representing about a week of literal time.[47] However, if one considers Rev 10:6 ("there should be time [Greek *krónos*] no longer," KJV) as implying that no symbolic time prophecy would reach beyond the fulfillment of the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" of Dan 8:14 in 1844 A.D.,[48] then not only the "half an hour" of Rev 8:1 but also the 1,000 years of Rev 20:1-10 would have to be understood as literal time periods, to which the year-day principle should not be applied. But this is a discussion that goes beyond the purpose of the present study.

Conclusion

In many apocalyptic prophecies, both the major entity and the time element involved have been zoomed down into a symbolic microcosmic scale that can be better understood by zooming them up into their macrocosmic fulfillment. The miniature-symbolization motif provides a basic thematic correlation between Num 14:34 and Ezek 4:6, on one hand, and the symbolical time elements of Daniel and the Revelation, on the other. The presence of this motif justifies the carrying of the "each-day-for-a-year" principle from Num 14:34 and Ezek 4:5, 6 over to those apocalyptic visions in which the time periods involved appear within a similar miniature-symbolization context. This miniature-symbolic parallelism enriches the year-day principle with a meaning that goes far beyond a mere proof-text approach.

The presence of miniature symbolizations in the book of Daniel allows the year-day principle to be applied to the "seventy weeks" with their time subdivisions (9:24-27): "a time, two times, and half a time" (7:25; 12:7); the 1,290 "days" (12:11); the 1,335 "days" (12:12); and the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" (8:14). But the absence of such symbolization in regard to the "seven times" (4:16, 23, 25, 32), the "seventy years" (9:2), and the "three weeks" (10:2) implies that these time periods have to be understood literally.

In the book of Revelation, the time periods of "three days and a half" (11:9, 11); "ten days" (2:10); "five months" (9:5, 10); "the hour,

[47]See, e.g., Joseph Bates, *Second Advent Way Marks and High Heaps, or a Connected View, of the Fulfillment of Prophecy, by God's Peculiar People, from the Year 1840 to 1847* (New Bedford, MA: Benjamin Lindsey, 1847), 43; E[lon] Everts, "The Seventh Seal," *Advent Review and Sabbath Herald*, January 15, 1857, 85; Uriah Smith, *Thoughts, Critical and Practical on the Book of Revelation* (Battle Creek: Steam Press of the Seventh-day Adventist Publishing Association, 1865), 139; *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 7:787. Cf. Ellen G. White, *A Sketch of the Christian Experience and Views* (Saratoga Springs, NY: James White, 1851), 11-12.

[48]See *Seventh-day Adventist Bible Commentary*, 7:798, 971.

the day, the month, and the year" (9:15); "a time, and times, and half a time" (12:14); 42 "months" (11:2; 13:5); 1,260 "days" (11:3; 12:6); and perhaps even "half an hour" (8:1), all occur within a miniature-symbolization setting. It seems evident that the year-day principle is applicable to these periods, but not to the 1,000 years of Rev 20, where no miniature symbolization occurs.

A comparative study of these passages leads to additional, more specific conclusions. First, prophetic miniature symbolization can involve entities such as symbols (as in Ezek 4) and types (as in Num 13-14). Second, the presence of miniature symbolization requires that the main entity or entities involved represent larger corporative powers (as the "little horn" in Dan 7 and the ten-horned "beast" in Rev 13). Third, tangential allusions to miniature symbols do not replace the lack of miniature characteristics in the main entity or entities (as with the "dragon" in Rev 20). Fourth, a prophetic time period is of a symbolic nature and has to be interpreted from a year-day perspective whenever it appears in the midst of miniature symbols (as with the 1,260 "days" and the 42 "months" in Rev 13:1-8) or in subsequent passages explaining those symbols (as with the 2,300 "evenings and mornings" in Dan 8:14 and the 70 "weeks" in Dan 9:24-27). Fifth, a prophetic time period previously defined as of a symbolic nature does not lose its symbolic nature when referred to in not so clearly miniature-symbolic contexts (as in "a time, two times, and half a time" from Dan 7:25, which reappears in 12:7 and Rev 12:14).

The relevance of the year-day principle of prophetic interpretation is dependent not only on the concept of miniature symbolization. Rather, sound scholarly studies of the Scriptures have demonstrated the internal (exegetical) and external (historical) need for a year-day interpretation of some apocalyptic time periods.[49] But I am personally convinced that the concept of miniature symbolization can strengthen the inner consistency of that principle of prophetic interpretation. Besides this, it also provides convincing answers to crucial questions in regard to the rationale to be used in defining when the year-day principle should or should not be used.

This article presented only a limited, general overview of how the concept of miniature symbolization can be consistently applied to the main symbolic time periods of Daniel and Revelation. I hope the preliminary concepts provided here will be refined and deepened by future investigations of this relevant topic for a historicist understanding of Bible prophecy.

[49]See Shea, *Selected Studies*, 25-93.

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THEODICY AND THE THEME OF COSMIC CONFLICT IN THE EARLY CHURCH

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In one of the most remarkable texts reflecting the early Christian view of reality, the writer makes the charge against Christians: "*[T]hat they make some quite blasphemous errors is also shown by this example of their utter ignorance, which has similarly led them to depart from the true meaning of the divine enigmas, when they make a being opposed to God; devil, and in the Hebrew tongue, Satanas are the names which they give to this same being.*"[1]

The people described in these deliberately unflattering terms are second-century Christians, and the specific target of scorn is their belief in the existence of personal evil. Those who hold this belief are charged with blasphemy for adopting an outlook that is an affront to the sovereignty of God and with ignorance for substituting a primitive doctrine for one that is more enlightened. Christians have, in effect, turned back the clock, leaving hard-won insight into "*the true meaning of the divine enigmas*" for a crude superstition.

It is important to note that this scathing indictment of the Christian view has not come to us firsthand. The words are those of Celsus, a philosopher of the Middle Platonic School,[2] who set out to refute the Christian teaching at some point during the reign of the emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180).[3] But Celsus's work on the *True Account*[4]

[1]Origen, *Contra Celsum* 6.42. References here are to the translation by Henry Chadwick (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965). A new critical edition of the complete Greek text has been published as *Origene: Contra Celsum libri VIII*, ed. M. Marcovich (Leiden: Brill, 2001).

[2]The evolution of the thought-world of Middle Platonism has been lucidly explained and discussed by John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists: 80 B.C., to A.D. 220*, rev. ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

[3]Silke-Petra Bergjan, "Celsus the Epicurean? The Interpretation of an Argument in Origen, *Contra Celsum*," *HTR* 94 (2001): 179-204. Origen mistakenly identified Celsus as an Epicurean at the beginning of *Contra Celsum*, but he then gradually seems to have realized his mistake since Celsus's argument is Platonic. Nevertheless, Origen allowed the notion of Celsus as an Epicurean to stand, possibly because of the rhetorical advantages of this impression.

[4]The Greek title was Ἀληθὴς λόγος. Attempts have been made to restore Celsus's text, such as by Robert Bader, *Der* Ἀληθὴς λόγος *des Kelsos* (Stuttgart-Berlin: Tübinger Beiträge zur Altertumswissenschaft, 1940). A convenient introduction to Celsus's views

would have been irretrievably lost were it not for the effort of the Alexandrian apologist and theologian Origen (185-254). After considerable reluctance, Origen was prevailed upon by his patron Ambrose to refute Celsus's unflattering attack some seventy years after its publication, most likely during the reign of Philip the Arabian (244-249).[5] In his book, Origen carefully reproduces the view of his deceased opponent before attempting to refute it. The passage in question thus stands as a testimony of the earlier writer's view of Christian belief in the latter half of the second century. Moreover, while Origen sometimes takes Celsus to task for misunderstanding or misrepresenting the Christian position, dismissing some objections as untrue or exaggerated, Celsus's statement on the Christian view of evil is not one of them. More often than not, Celsus has done his homework; it was indeed a fact that the Christians "*make a being opposed to God*," naming that being "devil" in Greek and "Satan" in Hebrew.

The Christian belief in the reality of this doctrine must be sought in the Christian record that precedes him rather than in Origen's own time and preoccupation. While the viewpoint reproduced by Celsus may be classified as patristic rather than apostolic, this chronology nevertheless aligns the Christian outlook at such an early point with the NT material that it creates a continuity of perspective.[6] Moreover, the NT witness to the reality of

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is found in Marcel Borret's essay, "Celsus: A Pagan Perspective on Scripture," in *The Bible in Greek Christian Antiquity*, ed. Paul M. Blowers (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 259-287.

[5]Henri Crouzel, *Origen*, trans. A. S. Worrall (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1989), 48. Chadwick's, xxiv-xxix, review and discussion of the dating of Celsus's *True Account* concludes with the period 177-180, although he does not rule out an earlier date. Michael Frede places Celsus's book between 160 and 175 C.E., expressing doubts about whether it was significant enough to warrant a reply, especially so many years later ("Origen's Treatise *Against Celsus*," in *Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews and Christians*, ed. Mark Edwards, Martin Goodman, and Simon Price [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], 131-156). Origen lived in Caesarea when he wrote *Contra Celsum*.

[6]It is not necessary to accept the apparent premise of Origen's passionate promoter Hans Urs von Balthasar that Origen's message must be eaten raw and whole or not at all (*Origen: Spirit and Fire* [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1984], 3-7). The dualist imprint on Origen's anthropology has been seen as an area of striking *discontinuity* between the earthy outlook of the NT and the relative denigration of material existence in Origen's thought. Origen's Platonic bent leaves a bleached version of reality, inviting increasing detachment from history, the body, and the earth. W. H. C. Frend's assessment seems more balanced, pointing out that Origen in his attempt to refute the Gnostics paid a high price in that his solution "reflected the outlook of contemporary Platonists" (*The Rise of Christianity* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984], 377). See also Padraig O'Cleirigh, "The Dualism of Origen," *Origeniana Quinta*, ed. Robert Daly

personal evil is considerably richer and more complex than contemporary theological priorities would lead one to believe.

Nevertheless, any positive tribute to Origen is not without risks. Despite his virtuous life,[7] exceptional intellect,[8] and prolific activity,[9] Origen has received mixed reviews from posterity.[10] His contribution is regarded with suspicion because he came to be regarded as a person who diluted and jeopardized distinctive Christian beliefs. True as that may be, it is worth considering whether Origen also preserved, developed, and defended aspects of the early Christian view of reality that have since vanished or fallen into disrepute through no fault of his. I suggest that the NT view of the reality and role of personal evil stands out as the most obvious candidate for making such a claim on behalf of Origen; his discussion of the subject in *Contra Celsum* is the most telling case in point. Aside from preserving Celsus's perception and criticism of Christian doctrine, Origen

(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 346-350.

[7]According to G. W. Butterworth, "Origen is one of those figures, none too common even in Church history, of whose character we can say that we know nothing but what is good" (*Origen on First Principles* [London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1936], v). Frend's tribute, 373, is similar: Origen "shared with Paul and Augustine the honor of being one of the few early Christian leaders who have deserved their reputation—unquestionably."

[8]Jean Daniélou calls Origen and Augustine "the two greatest geniuses of the early Church" (*Origen*, trans. Walter Mitchell [London: Sheed and Ward, 1955], vii). Crouzel, xi, thinks that Origen's "only peers are Augustine and Thomas Aquinas and he remains the greatest theologian the Eastern Church has produced."

[9]Crouzel, 37, suggests that Origen "may well have been the most prolific writer in the ancient world," ranking *Contra Celsum*, along with Augustine's *City of God*, as "the most important apologetic writing of antiquity" (ibid., 47).

[10]The controversy began in Origen's lifetime and came to an early head in his troubled relationship with the Alexandrian bishop Demetrius. Joseph W. Trigg, following Henri de Lubac, is probably correct in describing it partly as a conflict between charismatic and institutional authority and partly as a real concern for Origen's orthodoxy on subjects such as the resurrection of the body, the afterlife, and Christology (*Origen: The Bible and Philosophy in the Third-century Church* [Atlanta: John Knox, 1973], 130-146). Most scholars agree that Origen is controversial, but not on which aspect of his contribution should be seen as suspect. Crouzel, 11, who takes a positive view, acknowledges that "Origen lived as a Christian and thought as a Greek." Questions regarding Origen's orthodoxy continued smoldering for several centuries until the Fifth Ecumenical Council formally condemned his teaching in 553 and Justinian proceeded to prohibit and burn his books (Elizabeth Clark, *The Origenist Controversy* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]). Whether or not Platonic influences in Origen have been overplayed, as Crouzel suggests, it is well to heed Frend's, 374, assessment that "emotionally Origen was a Christian through and through."

makes an invaluable, if controversial, contribution in his defense of the Christian view. Moreover, his input is priceless precisely on the issue that has proved to be among the most contentious in contemporary Origen scholarship: his use of the OT to corroborate the Christian position.

Against this background, three objectives have been set for this essay. The first is to observe the dualism of personified good and evil[11] as a fact of early Christian belief[12] and to review briefly the biblical basis for this outlook, using Origen's *Contra Celsum* as a point of departure. The second objective is to survey Origen's exegetical method, gain an awareness of his priorities, and evaluate his approach in the light of his own historical context.[13] The third objective is to take a preliminary glance at the theological meaning of personal evil in the Christian outlook.[14] It should be pointed out that this inquiry is limited strictly to the reality of personal evil in the early Christian view of reality and that the accompanying discussion of Origen's exegetical method is restricted to this theme.

The Theme of Personal Evil in Early Christianity

Celsus's statement on the Christian belief in the reality of personified evil cannot be dismissed merely as a quirk in Origen's determined effort

[11]I am opting for a descriptive approach since the terminology of this duality is fluid and imprecise. I incline toward the term "cosmic dualism" in the sense of two opposing wills in the universe rather than as a term distinguishing between a material and an immaterial reality.

[12]The "cosmic dualism" of Christianity is modified in the sense that although evil is real, it is not eternal. It is seen as an intruder, an alien element with a definite beginning and a certain end. Satan represents another will, but he is not another god. Jeffrey Burton Russell, therefore, refers to Christianity as "a moderate dualist religion" (*Satan: The Early Christian Tradition* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981], 32); and as "a semidualist religion" (*The Devil: Perceptions of Evil from Antiquity to Primitive Christianity* [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987], 228).

[13]The most complete primary account of Origen's hermeneutical guidelines is found in Book IV of *On First Principles*, entitled *Peri archōn* in Greek and *De principiis* in Rufinus's Latin translation. The secondary literature on Origen's exegetical method is vast and divergent. Most useful and pertinent to this study have been Karen Jo Torjesen's lucid *Hermeneutical Procedure and Theological Method in Origen's Exegesis* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986); idem, "Influence of Rhetoric on Origen's Old Testament Homilies," in *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain le Boulluec (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 13-25; idem, "The Rhetoric of the Literal Sense: Changing Strategies of Persuasion from Origen to Jerome," in *Origeniana Septima*, ed. W. A. Biernert and U. Kühneweg (Louvain: Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Louvaniensis, 1999), 633-644.

[14]Russell credits Christianity with "the virtue of taking the problem of evil seriously" in contrast to "the monist complacency of the hidden harmony" and the "gravely unsatisfactory" view of evil in traditional monotheism (*The Devil*, 227-228).

to build a bridge between Christianity and Greek philosophy. A similar view also applies to Origen's summary of the essentials of Christian doctrine and view of reality in his earlier work *On First Principles*. Even though the voice is Origen's, the hands are those of the Christian community preceding him. He claims that it is a statement of fundamental beliefs held by Christians irrespective of their degree of theological sophistication. If these beliefs are traced to apostolic inspiration and authority, they deal only with the essentials. "The holy apostles, when preaching the faith of Christ," Origen writes, "took certain doctrines, those namely which they believed to be necessary ones, and delivered them in the plainest terms to all believers, even to such as appeared to be somewhat dull in the investigation of divine knowledge."[15] On this point, he does not pose as an innovator. The emerging "Rule of Faith" in the church obligates his own apologetic as much as it is mandated by the need to make the Christian position known and understood. Origen is, therefore, at pains to dissociate his own role somewhat from the doctrinal affirmation, casting it primarily as an account that is based on broader credentials and more ancient authority. In short, he proposes to defend merely "the kind of doctrines which are believed in plain terms through the apostolic teaching."[16]

Belief in the reality of personal evil is not Origen's first priority in *On First Principles*, but it is an important topic. He is, however, circumspect in pointing out that the satanic character to some extent has eluded precise description:

> Further, in regard to the devil and his angels and the opposing spiritual powers, the Church teaching lays it down that these beings exist, but what they are or how they exist it has not explained very clearly. Among most Christians, however, the following opinion is held, that this devil was formerly an angel, but became an apostate and persuaded as many angels as he could to fall away with him; and these are even now called his angels.[17]

Certain caveats notwithstanding, the statement leaves the impression that Origen here, as in *Contra Celsum*, is passing on a received teaching. What has been received is not limited only to belief in the reality of personal evil as such. Its origin, nature, and evolution have also crystallized in the minds of "most Christians." Henri Crouzel, whose magisterial grasp of Origen leaves him almost invulnerable to

[15]*First Principles* 1.3.

[16]Ibid., 1.4.

[17]Ibid., 1.6.

questioning, may in this respect not be entirely accurate when he claims that "Origen thus inaugurates a tradition," bequeathing to posterity "the affirmation of the greatness of Satan before the fall when he bore 'the seal of the likeness', that is to say shared in the image of God; the pride which brought about the catastrophe; the name Lucifer, *Eosphoros*, 'bringer of the dawn', denoting the morning star and applied also to Christ"—all on the strength of his own singular exegesis.[18] Instead, the evidence suggests that Origen is indebted to a theological and exegetical tradition that was established prior to him, one to which his own work may have added less than is commonly thought.[19]

Several factors support this conclusion. Isaiah's depiction of the fall of "Lucifer, son of the morning" (Isa 14:12, NKJV) occupies such a prominent role in Origen's writings that a degree of prior consensus on behalf of this reading must be assumed. That is to say, the ubiquity of this text in Origen's many references to the beginning of evil argues strongly against innovation on his part. Other hidden voices must also be ruled out. The suspicion of pervasive Platonic influence that clings to Origen's thought does not apply here because there is no equivalent Platonic counterpart to the Christian belief in personal evil.[20] Although later Platonists tried to delineate the origin, nature, and reality of evil to make it stand out more distinctly, they did not entertain any notion of a personal agent of evil who fell from a state of innocence.[21] The same

[18]Crouzel, 213.

[19]The fact that Tertullian (c. 145-220), earlier and independently of Origen (c. 207), adduces some of the same OT texts as Origen as evidence for his view of personified evil supports this view (*Against Marcion*, The Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 3, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989], 2.10; 5.11). Of interest also is the attribution of the fall of the *Eosphoros* to Origen or even to Irenaeus (c. 182) in the last two of thirty-nine scholia on Revelation that, in important respects, bear the marks of Origen (Constantin Diobouniotis and Adolf Harnack, *Der Scholien-Kommentar des Origenese zur Apokalypse Johannis nebst einem Stück aus Irenaeus*, libri. V, Graece Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altechristlichen Literatur 38 [Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1911], 41, 45-46, 62). Whatever the final verdict on the source of the first paragraph of scholion 38, it could be the first known Christian application outside the NT of the fall of the star in Isa 14:12 to the theme of the war in heaven in Rev 12:7-9.

[20]One cannot escape the impression that for Plato, evil is a property of matter, an unruly negative principle, and for that reason Plato is at pains to absolve God of direct responsibility for bringing the physical world into existence (*Timaeus*, trans. Desmond Lee [London: Penguin, 1977], 97).

[21]Plutarch (c. 45-125) and Numenius of Apamea (c. 150) transformed the negative unruly principle of Plato's *Timaeus* into an active force, a "Maleficent Soul." But this force is seen to preexist and lie outside God's ordering activity, with God unable to overcome it entirely. On the human level, evil is still an expression of material reality

holds true for Philo,[22] to whom Origen was largely indebted for the method of allegorical interpretation of the OT.[23] In Philo, any notion of personal evil is made unthinkable by his tendency to see evil in terms of impersonal abstractions and by his unqualified monotheism.[24] Plato, Philo, Plutarch, and others wrestled with the problem of evil, but there is neither the same explanation nor the same sharp focus as in the Christian account.[25] To the extent that these thinkers contributed to Origen's mind-set and theology, Origen's emphasis on the reality of personal evil runs against the grain; it is an area in his thought that clearly is *not* a spin-off of the Platonic worldview within which he lived and breathed. Moreover, while Origen no doubt was capable of originality, his intellectual background points to a Christian source for his understanding of evil.[26]

The reality of the *being that is opposed to God* belongs to another category, and this being looms at least as large in Origen's system as what Celsus had perceived him to do among Christians many years earlier. "The name Devil, and Satan, and Wicked One, is mentioned in many places of scripture," Origen claims in *On First Principles*, "and he who bears it is also described as being the enemy of God."[27] Moreover, the scriptural witness to the existence of this person is as abundant in the OT as in the NT. That is to say, the worldview in the OT has to the Christian community become identical to that of the NT. Both testaments assume the same reality, issues, and agencies. If the mention of the satanic agency seems more veiled in the OT, requiring the discerning eye of the Spirit-filled interpreter in order to

(Dillon, 202-204, 373-374).

[22]The dates for Philo are uncertain, but he was unquestionably a contemporary of Jesus and the apostle Paul. According to Samuel Sandmel, Philo's birth date is estimated to c. 25-20 B.C.E. and his death thought to happen c. 50 C.E. (*Philo of Alexandria* [New York: Oxford University Press, 1979], 3).

[23]Origen considered Philo to be a trustworthy predecessor in the interpretation of Scripture (David T. Runia, *Philo and the Church Fathers* [Leiden: Brill, 1995], 117-125).

[24]Cf. Philo of Alexandria, *On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses*, trans. and notes David T. Runia (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 238.

[25]The laid-back inquiries of Plato do not convey the seriousness and sense of existential crisis that is intrinsic to the Christian account of evil. Philo and the Middle Platonists also convey a less dramatic understanding, inhabiting as they do a world wherein evil is a constituent of matter.

[26]Cf. Annewies van den Hoek, "Origen and the Intellectual Heritage of Alexandria: Continuity or Disjunction? in *Origeniana Quinta*, ed. Robert Daly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 40-47.

[27]*First Principles*, 1.5.2.

strip off its guise, the same challenge applies to the pursuit of the divine Logos in the OT. Origen sees the satanic agency present throughout Scripture from the very beginning, cloaked in various metaphors starting with the earliest disguise as the Serpent in Genesis.[28] He urges the reader of Exodus to inquire "who that being was of whom it is said in Exodus that he wished to kill Moses because he was setting out for Egypt."[29] Using the LXX term "Apopompeus" instead of transliterating the Hebrew "Azazel" for one of the symbols in the Day of Atonement ritual in Leviticus, Origen probes for the identity of the figure "who in Leviticus is described as Apopompeus."[30] His list of examples is far from exhausted; there remain among others the enigmatic prince of Tyre in Ezekiel and the figure of Satan in First Chronicles, Job, and Zechariah.[31] "Let these examples from the Old Testament, so far as we can call them to memory at the moment, be now quoted to prove that the opposing powers are both named in the scriptures and are said to be adversaries of the human race and reserved for future punishment," he concludes at the end of his OT survey.[32]

The evidence in support of this view of reality is no less formidable in the NT. "But let us look also at the New Testament," Origen continues, calling as his first witness the Synoptic narrative of the Temptation, "where Satan comes to the Saviour, tempting him."[33] The Gospels speak of Jesus driving out "evil spirits and impure daemons," while Paul warns the Ephesians that "the saints' wrestling is not against flesh and blood."[34] Virtually all the extant writings of Origen include references to the adversary of God and human beings, often recapitulating the fallen being's background.[35] "He who was Lucifer and

[28]Ibid., 3.2.1; cf. Gen 3:1.

[29]Ibid., 3.2.1; cf. Exod 4:24.

[30]Ibid., 3.2.1; cf. Lev 16:8.

[31]Ibid., 3.2.1; cf. Ezek 28:11ff.; 1 Chron 21:1; Job 1:6; Zech 3:1.

[32]Ibid., 3.2.1. Origen takes the same line of argument in *Contra Celsum*, adding "the passage from Isaiah where a dirge is sung for the king of Babylon" (*Contra Celsum* 6.43; Isa 14:12-20).

[33]Ibid., 3.2.1. Cf. Matt 4:1-11.

[34]Ibid., 3.2.1. Cf. Mark 1:23ff., 32-34; 5:1ff.; Eph 6:12.

[35]Cf. *HomLuke* 31.4-6, in *Homilies on Luke: Fragments on Luke*, trans. Joseph T. Lienhard, The Fathers of the Church 94 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1996), 127-128; *ComJn* 32.302, in *Commentary on the Gospel of John: Books 13-32*, trans. Ronald E. Heine, The Fathers of the Church 89 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1993), 398; *HomJer* 27.5, in *Homilies on Jeremiah; Homily on 1 Kings 28*, trans. John Clark Smith, The Fathers of the Church 97 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1998), 247; *HomEzek* 13.1-2, in *Homélies sur*

who arose in heaven, he who was without sin from the day of his birth and who was among the cherubim, was able to fall with respect to the kindness of the Son of God before he could be bound by chains of love," he sums up with no apparent prodding from the text in a comment on Rom 6:8-10.[36] Having covered the same ground in more detail in his rebuttal to Celsus, his final remark on the subject, Origen is ready to apologize for boldness and lack of time, but he will retract nothing in terms of the biblical basis for the Christian position:

> However, although we have boldly and rashly committed these few remarks to writing in this book, perhaps we have said nothing significant. But if anyone with the time to examine the holy scriptures were to collect texts from all the sources and were to give a coherent account of evil, both how it first came to exist and how it is being destroyed, he would see that the meaning of Moses and the prophets with regard to Satan has not even been dreamt of by Celsus or by any of the people who are dragged down by this wicked daemon and are drawn away in their soul from God and the right conception of Him and from His Word.[37]

Not all interpreters share Origen's confidence. There is an element in his vision that in the eyes of critics leans too much on the imagination of the interpreter.[38] But even among those who think that Origen claims more than is warranted with regard to the OT, he is not building a lofty theological edifice on a nonexistent foundation. The early Christian belief in the reality of personified evil rises from the NT itself. It is a fair assessment of the NT evidence for Jeffrey Burton Russell to suggest that Satan "stands at the center of the New Testament teaching that the Kingdom of God is at war with, and is now at last defeating, the Kingdom of the Devil. The Devil is essential in the New Testament because he constitutes an important alternative in Christian theodicy."[39] What is lambasted by Celsus as an example of Christian ignorance and blight on God's honor, Origen willingly

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Ezéchiel, trans. Marcel Borret (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1989), 55-57, 409-413.

[36]*ComRom* 5.10.16, in *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, Books 1-5*, trans. Thomas P. Scheck, The Fathers of the Church 103 (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 377.

[37]*Contra Celsum* 6.44.

[38]R. P. C. Hanson sounds more than a cautionary note in this respect in *Allegory and Event* (London: SCM Press, 1959). More recently, Keith Graham has voiced similar criticism ("Can Anything Good Come Out of Allegory? The Cases of Origen and Augustine," *EvQ* 70/1 [1998]: 23-49).

[39]Russell, *The Devil*, 222.

defends as a vital Christian doctrine and one that lies at the heart of his own theodicy. The view that Satan is found in the biblical narrative from the earliest pages of Genesis is not Origen's invention. Here, too, he merely builds on a conviction that is already established in the NT. We are free to surmise that Origen elsewhere, in homilies or commentaries that have been lost, supplied an even more exhaustive exposition of what he claimed on behalf of the Bible in his answer to Celsus—"a coherent account of evil, both how it first came to exist and how it is being destroyed."[40]

Scriptural Exegesis in Origen

Since the Bible must be seen as the major determinant of the Christian belief in the reality of personal evil, Origen's reply to Celsus cannot be divorced from his understanding of Scripture. In his summary of the most basic Christian doctrines in *On First Principles*, Origen states the view of the early Church:

> Then there is the doctrine that the scriptures were composed through the Spirit of God and that they have not only that meaning which is obvious, but also another which is hidden from the majority of readers. For the contents of scripture are the outward forms of certain mysteries and the images of divine things. On this point the entire Church is unanimous, that while the whole law is spiritual, the inspired meaning is not recognized by all, but only by those who are gifted with the grace of the Holy Spirit in the word of wisdom and knowledge.[41]

Despite claiming virtual unanimity for the position he espouses, Origen's exegetical method has been among the most hotly contested areas of his many-faceted heritage. The assertion that the Scriptures do not only have "the meaning that is obvious, but also another which is hidden from the majority of readers" goes to the heart of the matter. If the meaning of Scripture is not found in the simple, straightforward reading that is accessible to the ordinary person, how does the reader grasp the hidden meaning? Is there any hope of predictable or reproducible results when different interpreters set to work on the same texts? What are the accepted controls that will prevent interpretations that are wildly subjective and arbitrary? The consequences of Origen's view on the interpretation of Scripture, voiced though it is as the united position of the church, has been fraught with so much controversy that

[40]*Contra Celsum* 6.44. It is not preposterous to conjecture that such discussions existed, e.g., in Origen's lost commentary on Genesis.

[41]*First Principles* 1.8.

it is prudent, at least temporarily, to jettison Origen as a guide to exegesis and instead use his writings merely as a starting point for further inquiry into the biblical parameters for the Christian view of reality. In the unforgiving view of one scholar, "Origen plods through the Bible, blind to its merits, deaf to its music, like a scientist trying to distill chemical formulae from Shakespeare."[42] Crouzel, on the other hand, sees in Origen a man who works under inspiration; he "possesses to a unique degree the gift of the exegete, analogous to that of the inspired author; he knows how to listen to God."[43]

But even this affirmation cannot quiet the concern that the search for a secondary, hidden sense may lead to a plethora of uncontrolled readings. Origen's liberal use of allegory leaves his work vulnerable to criticism that touches on all aspects of his work, including the way he brings the OT to bear on the existence of Satan in his answer to Celsus. This debate, begun in Origen's lifetime, flared up at irregular intervals and has received renewed attention with the revival of patristic studies in contemporary scholarship.[44]

In his most formal statement on the threefold meaning of Scripture in *On First Principles*,[45] Origen is careful to claim that his approach to the

[42]R. C. P. Hanson, Review of Henri Crouzel's *Origène*, *ZKG* 97/2 (1986): 279.

[43]Crouzel, 28. Harnack's verdict, based on a thorough and critical reading of all the available works of Origen, is worth noting: "Es hat nie einen Theologen in der Kirche gegeben, der so ausschliesslich Exeget der Bibel gewesen ist und sein wollte, wie Origenes" (*Der kirchengeschichtliche Ertrag der exegetischen Arbeiten des Origenes* [Leipzig: J. C. Hinrich, 1919], 2:4).

[44]See Rowan Williams, "Origen: Between Orthodoxy and Heresy," *Origeniana Septima*, ed. W. A. Bienert and U. Kühneweg (Louvain: Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Louvaniensis, 1999), 3-14. During the Reformation, this conflict loomed large in the debate between Erasmus and Luther. Luther's invective that "in all of Origen there is not one word about Christ" is certainly a gross misrepresentation (*Luther's Works*, vol. 54, *Table Talk*, trans. Theodore G. Tappert [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1967], 47). Luther also voiced his concern regarding allegory and the quest for hidden meaning in terms that are not far removed from the view of critical scholarship. Cf. Jon Dechow, "Origen's Shadow over the Erasmus/Luther Debate," *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain le Boulluec (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 739-757. André Godin credits Erasmus with a revival of interest in Origen during the Reformation; in *Érasme lecteur d'Origène* (Genève: Librairie Droz, 1982). In a statement that was hardly intended to endear him to Luther, Erasmus said that "a single page of Origen teaches more Christian philosophy than ten of Augustine" (ibid., 430).

[45]Karen Jo Torjesen argues that "the *Peri Archon* is best understood in relation to Origen's exegetical work as a philosophical handbook on the interpretation of scripture" ("Hermeneutics and Soteriology in Origen's *Peri Archon*," *Studia Patristica* XXI, ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone [Leuven: Peeters Press, 1987], 334). Likewise, Gunnar af Hällström

Scriptures and their meaning "is extracted from the writings themselves."[46] Taking his warrant from Prov 22:20, 21, he claims a threefold meaning in Scripture, each level leading to progressively deeper insight,[47] "so that the simple man may be edified by what we may call the flesh of the scripture, this name being given to the obvious interpretation; while the man who has made some progress may be edified by its soul, as it were; and the man who is perfect and like those mentioned by the apostle"—and here he appeals to 1 Cor 2:6, 7 for support—"this man may be edified by the spiritual law."[48] While the three levels of meaning are not always found or pursued with consistency, it is clear that only the search for hidden meaning leads to the heart of the spiritual message of Scripture.

Before evaluating Origen's approach to exegesis, whether its general outline or the aspects relating to the subject of personal evil, it is important to understand it. This stipulation suggests that at least some of the criticism of Origen's work stems from a failure to grasp his thinking. Moreover, denigration of Origen may also be due to a myopic view of one's own presuppositions and an inability to perceive one's indebtedness, however remote and concealed, to the very work that is subject to censure.

The first point to observe is that in Origen understanding of truth leads to method and not the other way around. This is important because the criteria of scientific thinking look to method to validate the claims of

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describes this book as "das älteste Handbuch der Hermeneutik der Alten Kirche" ("Probleme der Bibelauslegung bei Origenes," in *Bibelauslegung und Gruppenidentität*, ed. Hans-Olof Kvist [Åbo: Åbo Academy Press, 1992], 36).

[46]*First Principles* 4.2.4.

[47]Origen's notion of "threefold" counsel is derived from the LXX τρισσῶς. The Hebrew text is ambiguous on this point. *BHS* prefers שִׁלְשׁוֹם, having שְׁלִישִׁים as an alternate reading. The ambiguity is reflected in English translations: "excellent things" (KJV, NKJV, NASB) vs. "thirty sayings" (RSV, NIV, NEB, NRSV, GNB). Moffatt has "already," which is also the preference of several French translations. Needless to say, none of these options lends itself well to the notion of the threefold meaning that was important to Origen. It seems fair to Origen to assume that his claim of scriptural support stems more from an overriding homiletical instinct than from a strict exegetical purpose. In *Homilies on Genesis*, Origen takes the levels of the ark as a basis for two or three levels of meaning in Scripture (*HomGen* 2.1 and 2.6, in *Homilies on Genesis and Exodus*, trans. Ronald E. Heine, The Fathers of the Church 71 [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1982]). One should keep in mind that Origen's monumental *Hexapla* proves that he was a textual critic in his own right, sharing with Jerome the distinction as "the greatest critical exegete [Origen] and the greatest literal exegete [Jerome] of Christian antiquity" (Crouzel, 61).

[48]*First Principles* 4.2.4.

investigation. In contemporary terms, this means that the search for what is true is determined by something other than itself. Such was not the case in Origen's time or in his understanding of the truth claims of the Bible. Karen Jo Torjesen, whose examination of Origen's hermeneutics may be the most focused and incisive to date, says that "in the Hellenistic world this relationship of truth to method does not exist. The truth of things grounded in themselves justified a certain method of knowledge and not the reverse."[49] When Origen explains how to read the Bible, he may leave the impression that he begins by delineating method, but this impression is misleading. His method must rather be seen as a consequence of what he has come to see as the truth. It is his understanding of the whole that leads to perceive the parts, including the question of method. The whole, which to Origen is much greater than the sum of its parts, is recognized before sifting the various parts and then putting the pieces together.[50] When this understanding of the relationship of truth to method is kept in mind, Origen's exegesis on the whole meets the three criteria laid down by Torjesen:[51] he strives to be faithful to the church's Rule of Faith. Although his method does not meet the standard of modern criteria, he has a method; he does not simply interpret Scripture arbitrarily. Despite his preoccupation with the spiritual sense, resorting to allegorical excursions on many occasions that seem forced to the modern reader, all the elements in Origen's exegesis must nevertheless be seen as genuinely Christian.[52] His exegesis is based on the conviction that "the Old Testament in its entirety is a prophecy of Christ, who is the key to it."[53]

The second point is that Origen is a pastor in pursuit of a spiritual goal even more than he is an apologist and a scholar. "But when Moses had cut a stone God wrote them a second time and gave them again, which is as if the prophetic word was preparing the soul after the first sin for a second

[49]Torjesen, *Origen's Exegesis*, 4.

[50]Origen's emphasis on the Bible as an indivisible whole is pervasive: "The complete Word of God which was in the beginning with God is not a multitude of Words, for it is not words. It is a single Word consisting of several ideas, each of which is a part of the whole Word" (*ComJn* 5.5, in *Commentary on the Gospel according to John, Books 1-10*, trans. Ronald E. Heine, The Fathers of the Church 80 [Washington, DC: Catholic University of America, 1989]).

[51]The three criteria are (1) faithfulness "to the historical element of the Christian faith; (2) understanding of method, given that Origen's concept of method is so different from modern criteria; (3) that his exegesis must be shown to be fundamentally Christian" (Torjesen, *Origen's Exegesis*, 4-5).

[52]Ibid., 7.

[53]Crouzel, 64.

writing of God," he explains in *Contra Celsum*.[54] The overriding goal of spiritual formation is restoring the defaced image of God in the soul; this objective shines through in all his homilies.[55] Scripture must not be shorn of its moral and spiritual purpose of changing lives. Origen sees spiritual formation to be intrinsic to Scripture, harnessing his homiletical skills in order to advance this goal and toward that end conjuring up a spiritual vision in biblical metaphor like a Martin Luther King Jr. of the remote past. In order to perceive the truth, the reader must also be *of* the truth, seeking prayerfully the guidance of the Holy Spirit who inspired the Scriptures in the first place.[56] "Only the spiritual person can discern the hidden meaning of the text, but the hidden meaning of the text itself plays a major role in the formation of the spiritual person," writes Origen scholar Ronald Heine.[57] Crouzel makes the same observation, stating that "only like can know like: it is necessary to be similar to anything to know it."[58] Origen brings a pastoral, redemptive purpose to his exegesis of Scripture, convinced that Scripture cannot be read authentically otherwise. The modern interpreter does not necessarily share this presupposition, and it is inevitable that divergent presuppositions in this respect will significantly condition the interpretation of the text. But Origen's concern for spiritual development and the devout life plays a pivotal role in his work; Crouzel maintains that it is impossible "to understand his method of spiritual or allegorical exegesis if one does not see that it is spiritual in the strictest sense of the term."[59]

The foregoing should be specified in a third point that makes more

[54]*Contra Celsum* 1.4.

[55]A striking example is found in Origen's homilies on Joshua. He affirms the historicity of the Israelite conquest of Canaan, but he uses it to make a point closer to home. Featuring yet again the fall of Lucifer in Isa 14:12, Origen encourages his audience to claim the place in heaven that Satan and his angels lost. The territory of the Canaanites, Perizzites, and Jebusites now to be conquered is negative qualities of character—irritability, anger, pride, jealousy, and impurity (*HomJos* 1.6, in *Homélies sur Josué*, trans. Annie Jaubert [Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 2000], 109-111). See also Torjesen, "Hermeneutics and Soteriology," 337.

[56]The key is that "the Holy Spirit is not only the author of the Bible but also its interpreter" (Michihiko Kuyama, "The Searching Spirit: The Hermeneutical Principle in the Preface of Origen's *Commentary on the Gospel of John*," in *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. Gilles Dorival and Alain le Boulluec [Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995], 435).

[57]Ronald Heine, "Reading the Bible with Origen," in *The Bible in Greek Christian Antiquity*, ed. Paul M. Blowers (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1997), 145.

[58]Crouzel, 74.

[59]Ibid., 55.

explicit the stance that sets Origen apart from a modern exegete. Origen does not pretend to take a detached, neutral stand in the interest of scholarly objectivity.[60] His concern is to convince the reader as much as it is to explain and elucidate the text.[61] Gerald Bostock writes that Origen's primary concern in explaining the Scriptures "is always to move as quickly as possible to their allegorical or existential significance."[62] In a fascinating study of the subtle and evocative rhetorical elements in Origen, Torjesen takes this observation a step further. She contends that the presence of the hearer is the dominating factor in Origen's exegetical preaching and hermeneutical process, "not the historical past of the scriptural text."[63] The common criticism that Origen has little interest in the literal, primary meaning of scriptural narratives may therefore be exaggerated.[64] Such criticism should be tempered by greater sensitivity to Origen's priorities as an exegete. The importance of the hearer in his homilies and the relative unimportance of the hearer to the contemporary exegete who looks at the same text can easily lead to misleading conclusions. Origen pursues meanings and applications that seem foreign and contrived to many scholars, but the reason need not be that this pursuit is primarily dictated by his flawed grasp of the text. In this respect, Origen has been found to share at least one of the concerns of Paul Ricoeur: his overriding aim is appropriation.[65] Origen asks more than once: "What does it profit me

[60]Assumptions of objectivity may be overrated even where that is the aspiration to a greater extent than in Origen. All exegeses, no matter how "objective," are also exercises in persuasion.

[61]Origen explains the meaning of the Bible "with a kind of restless energy . . . an urgency to the tone, a forcefulness to the argument, and a passionate call to decision and action that goes well beyond the reading and explaining of a classical text" (Torjesen, "Influence of Rhetoric," 14).

[62]Gerald Bostock, "Allegory and the Interpretation of the Bible in Origen," *Journal of Literature & Theology* 1(1987): 46.

[63]Torjesen, "Influence of Rhetoric," 15.

[64]Hanson is a case in point, writing that "the critical subject upon which Origen never accepted the biblical viewpoint was the significance of history" (*Allegory and Event*, 363). While Platonic influences in Origen are pervasive, he nevertheless sees the majority of biblical narratives as real history. Noah and Abraham are historical persons; even "the assumption that he denied the existence of Adam as an individual is incorrect" (C. P. Bammel, "Adam in Origen," in *The Making of Orthodoxy*, ed. Rowan Williams [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989], 62).

[65]Christophe Potworowski, "Origen's Hermeneutics in the Light of Paul Ricoeur," in *Origeniana Quinta*, ed. Robert Daly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 161-166. "The role of the subjective element in Origen's discovery of the spiritual meaning of

to say that Christ has come to earth in the flesh He received from Mary, if I do not show that He has also come in my flesh?"[66]

Awareness of the rhetorical elements in Origen yields a fourth point that is critical both to our understanding of his situation and to taking stock of our own. Time and again Origen flavors his homilies with rhetorical markers that delicately enhance his status as interpreter and the precedence of his interpretation. The road from the literal to the spiritual interpretation is not linear or horizontal, but one of ascent. The literal meaning is no more than "a kind of foundation at the *lower* levels" (emphasis supplied),[67] enabling the reader to "ascend from the historical account to the mystical and allegorical understanding of the spiritual meaning."[68] Moreover, it takes exceptional discernment to arrive at the spiritual sense. Origen wants to "inquire what is the *inner* meaning of the proverb,"[69] leaving no doubt that he considers that interpretation inferior that is content to stay with "the *bare* letter" (emphasis supplied).[70] The genuine interpreter must move beyond what Origen calls the literal and corporeal sense, heeding the call of "the laws of *elevated* interpretation" (emphasis supplied).[71]

All these adjectives are rhetorical markers that create a polarity in the interpretative options that are available to the reader. One option is material, primitive, and naive; the other spiritual, elevated, and discerning. The tenor of these adjectival colorings suggests, on the one hand, that important meanings in the Bible are hidden to the naked eye and, on the other hand, that those who fail to see the deeper sense are prisoners of a stunted, truncated perception.[72]

But the context within which this exercise plays out may be lost on the modern reader. The absence of perspective explains to some extent why many exegetes hold Origen in such low esteem. Origen fights a battle on two fronts. On one side, there is Gnosticism that wants to do

scripture is constantly a stumbling-block to the modern reader. This is clarified by Ricoeur's hermeneutics centered on appropriation and his view of interpretation as the work of productive imagination" (ibid., 162).

[66]*HomGen* 3.7.

[67]Ibid., 2.6.

[68]Ibid., 2.1.

[69]*First Principles* 2.5.2.

[70]Ibid., 4.2.2.

[71]*ComLam* xxiii.

[72]Torjesen, "Rhetoric of the Literal Sense," 638.

away with the OT altogether, seeing the narrative of the OT as the track marks and fingerprints of an inferior god that has nothing in common with Jesus. On the other side, there is the Jewish interpretation of the OT, claiming Scripture for a view that leaves little room for Christians to harness these very Scriptures as the basis for their own message and mission. This context must be appreciated before passing judgment on Origen's effort. In order to wrench the OT away from the Jewish meaning, he has to show that the correct understanding of Scripture is not exhausted by the literal sense and the primary application of a given text at the time of its author. Faced with Jewish objections of opportunism and distortion on the part of the Christian interpretation, he has to address those objections and he has to do it in a way that does not leave him exposed to criticism of the Christian Gnostics, whose goal it is to prove that the deeds attributed to God in the OT cannot lead to the Jesus of the Gospels. Any verdict on the result of Origen's effort should at least begin by acknowledging the daunting task.

To be sure, Origen no doubt sees himself as merely continuing along the trail blazed by the NT appropriation of the OT.[73] Did not Jesus claim the OT as a witness to himself,[74] charging those who failed to grasp it with foolishness and slowness?[75] Had not Jesus himself said to his Jewish critics, "If you believed Moses, you would believe me, for he wrote about me"?[76] Did not Paul lead the way to a spiritual interpretation of the OT, seeing Jesus as the rock from which the Israelites drank in the wilderness?[77] Was not Paul the one who had pointed out the contrast between letter and spirit, attributing inferiority to the former?[78] Did not Paul, too, resort to rhetorical flourish, claiming to see a veil "over their minds" when discussing the Jewish inability to see the light?[79] Was not he the one who had hallowed the use of allegory in his own peculiar way, making an OT narrative say something other than what it seems to say?[80] Did not the author of First Peter

[73]Crouzel, 65.

[74]John 5:39; cf. *ComJn* 5.6.

[75]Luke 24:25; cf. *First Principles* 1.3.1.

[76]John 5:46; cf. *ComJn* 6.109.

[77]1 Cor 10:4; cf. *First Principles* 4.2.6; *Contra Celsum* 4:49.

[78]2 Cor 3:6; cf. *First Principles* 1.1.2.

[79]2 Cor 3:15; cf. *First Principles* 1.1.2; *Contra Celsum* 6.70; *HomJer* 5.8.1.

[80]Gal 4:24; cf. *First Principles* 4.2.6. Allegory is here defined "as the means whereby one thing is said and another thing is indicated. The Greek word *allegorein* means to say one thing openly but to imply something else" (Bostock, 39); see also David Dawson,

even claim that the prophets of the OT failed to understand their own messages, finding a measure of relief in their search only as they were reconciled to learn that they were writing about future events and for the benefit of coming generations?[81]

In Origen's understanding of the unity of Scripture there is undeniably the conditioning of the Platonic Logos, magnified by the influence of Philo's attempt to read the OT as the original template of Greek wisdom.[82] But these stipulations do not diminish and they must not be allowed to overshadow the role of the NT in the Christian view of the OT prior to Origen and in Origen's own thinking. The influence of Plato and Philo is a real but not sufficient element to a balanced reading of Origen's hermeneutics. The one sufficient element in this respect is the NT; Origen consciously strives to delimit the role of extrabiblical influences with the goal of promoting an avowedly Christian point of view.[83] It is his conviction that the OT Scripture should be conceived as a single storehouse of meaning; advice passed on by Origen to his contemporary readers bears quoting in full:

> As we are about to begin the interpretation of the Psalms, we shall disclose a very beautiful tradition handed on to us by the Hebrew which applies generally to the entire divine Scripture. For the Hebrew said that the whole divinely inspired Scripture may be likened, because of its obscurity, to many locked rooms in one house. By each room is placed a key, but not the one that corresponds to it, so that the keys are scattered about beside the rooms, none of them matching the room by which it is placed. It is a difficult task to find the keys and match them to the rooms that they can open. We therefore know the Scriptures that are obscure only by taking the points of departure for understanding

Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 3-4.

[81]1 Pet 1:10-12; cf. *ComMat* 15.27.

[82]Philo's ambition was not merely assimilating Jewish heritage to the Greek philosophical tradition. Instead, Philo sought to make Greek culture Jewish, a much bolder and presumptuous aspiration from a classical point of view. "Jewish interpretative subordination is in fact a hermeneutical usurpation in which classical writers are demoted to the status of Mosaic epigones, condemned merely to echo his original and sublime insights. Authentic Greek culture is actually Jewish" (Dawson, 82); see also Yehoshua Amir, "Authority and Interpretation of Scripture in the Writings of Philo," in *Mikra*, ed. Martin Jan Mulder (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 421-453.

[83]*First Principles* 3.3.2; 4.1.1. The spiritual interpretation pursued by Origen is in his eyes rooted in the OT as much as in the NT: "The prophets also do not limit the meaning of their sayings to the obvious history and to the text and letter of the law" (*Contra Celsum* 2.5).

> them from another place because they have their interpretative principles scattered among them.[84]

Does a simple, literal, historical reading of the OT lead to the NT? If Origen at times seems to doubt it, he has the evidence of contemporary Jewish exegesis to reinform his doubts. Acting as stewards of the primary meaning and the literal sense, Jewish exegetes do not perceive in the OT the witness to Christ that Christians make it out to be. For the early Christians, however, the road that leads from the OT into the NT takes for granted that the narratives of the OT point beyond the immediate historical situation. In their eyes, the Jewish Scriptures describe real people and actual events, but they are also figurations—shadows and types of Christ and the message of the NT. Moreover, the relationship between the OT and the NT is not merely the connection between promise and fulfillment. Following the NT writers, the early Christian apologists do not simply see the OT as prophecy of Christ; they see Christ in the OT. This is also the view of Origen. If he practices this conviction to excess, the difference between him and the NT is one of degree, not of kind.

The rhetorical aspect serves a function beyond the explication of texts. It also signals the underlying power struggle.[85] At stake are not only the meaning of the Scriptures, but also which group may rightfully claim them as theirs. Origen "is engaged in a fierce struggle to christianize the Jewish scriptures which the Christian had expropriated," notes Torjesen.[86] Equating the Jewish meaning with the literal sense, Origen denigrates it as too superficial and simple. He thereby invests the Christian interpretation with an aura of superiority, and secondarily gives himself and other like-minded scholars preeminence as interpreters of Scripture. But this emphasis and rhetoric are neither frivolous nor a trivial matter for the Christian teacher and apologist in the early part of the third century, buffeted by criticism of impiety and ignorance, as seen in *Contra Celsum*, by the threat of local and imperial persecution, and by the charge of having falsely usurped the Jewish

[84]*ComPs 1-25*, translation taken from Trigg, 70-71.

[85]Paul M. Blowers writes that "Christian-Jewish confrontations in this period were therefore more than trivial or bookish disputes over the scriptures; they were genuine struggles for credibility" ("Origen, the Rabbis, and the Bible: Toward a Picture of Judaism and Christianity in Third-century Caesarea," in *Origen of Alexandria*, ed. Charles Kannengiesser and William L. Petersen [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988], 109).

[86]Torjesen, "Rhetoric of the Literal Sense," 641.

Scriptures.[87] Rather, it was a matter of life and death.[88] Recognition of this may mute the disapproval of Origen and generate a fairer recognition of his achievement, perhaps even an appreciation of specific interpretations that have been belittled to the point that they are no longer seen as sound.

This possibility justifies a fifth point that brings out more clearly the contrast between early Christian interpretation up to and including Origen and viewpoints that seem more attuned to modern scholarship. There is a semantic field in time, a frame of reference surrounding words and concepts as they are imperceptibly shaped by usage, that has been called "a secondhand memory."[89] It is the notion of the "secondhand memory" of words that is relevant in the context of coming to grips with Origen's exegetical struggle. The "second hand memory" refers to the accumulated meaning that must accompany the interpretation of words. Seizing on this concept in describing the context for the Scriptures between Jewish tradition and Christian interpretation, Torjesen shows how the first generation of Christian exegetes "worked to repress, submerge or efface the 'second hand memory' of the words of the Septuagint—their Jewish meanings."[90] Origen's monumental *Hexapla* exemplifies the depth of this struggle. He was not working as a modern textual critic, trying to construct an original or authoritative text of the LXX; his goal was rather to provide "the Christian controversialist with a text that would be acceptable in the authoritative eyes of contemporary Jewish scholars."[91]

Torjesen focuses on this process at a time in the evolution of Christianity when the tide is already turning. Up to and including Origen, the Christian effort must be seen as an uphill struggle, trying to bleach from the OT the deep hues of Jewish meaning, replacing it instead with a Christian perspective that had to be pervasive in order to succeed at all. Less than two centuries after Origen, this process had

[87]Jewish allegations of foul play are implied when Origen somewhat self-consciously makes the comment that "we have explored these things without the support of any allegory, lest we leave an opportunity to those of the circumcision to clamor against the truth, as customarily happens" (*ComRom* 2.13.17).

[88]"Es ist leicht J. Lebreton zuzustimmen, der sagt: für Origenes ist die Allegorie 'une question de vie ou de mort'" (Hällström, 42).

[89]Trinh T. Minh-ha, *Woman, Native, Other* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 79.

[90]Trojesen, "Rhetoric of the Literal Sense," 633.

[91]S. P. Brock, "Origen's Aims as a Textual Critic of the Old Testament," *StPat* 10, ed. F. L. Cross (Berlin: Academic-Verlag, 1970), 216.

reached the point that it no longer served any utility. Where Origen painstakingly worked to carve out conceptual turf for the Christian position, Jerome was ready to scale back some of the claims and even to belittle the work of his predecessors.[92] But this only happens when the reading of the text has been conditioned by several generations of Christian interpretation. The text has, so to speak, acquired a new "secondhand memory." Between the times of Origen and Jerome the momentum has swung in favor of the Christian position as "layers of Christian meanings have been deposited on the bedrock of the Jewish text for nearly two centuries."[93]

By Jerome's day, the Christian "secondhand memory" of the words of the OT was firmly in place. The task of exegesis and the strategies of persuasion had moved on to other challenges—lesser ones, perhaps, because Christian interpreters would not again face the challenges confronting the generation of Origen.[94] The corrective of subsequent generations, from Jerome to Luther and beyond, must not be overvalued, because the shift in emphasis proceeds in part from the safe refuge provided by the battles fought by earlier generations. Luther's boundless confidence in what he considered to be the literal sense may have been inadequate for the task facing interpretation before Christianity became the ascendant religion. "Only the true principal meaning which is provided by the letter can produce good theologians," Luther writes in a statement critical of Origen, clearly implying that the Alexandrian fell short of his standard.[95] But changing circumstances and ingrained meanings can overestimate the powers attributed to the grammatical sense. Luther could advocate the straightforward meaning

[92]Torjesen writes that for Jerome "the meanings lie directly below the surface, their outlines are clearly visible, there is no complicated relationship between depth and surface. On the other hand for Origen meanings lie deep below the surface and extend to unfathomable depths, their outlines are not clear on the troubled surface, but still their luminous presence can be discerned by the trained eye" ("Rhetoric of the Literal Sense," 638).

[93]Ibid., 633.

[94]The question of the "virgin" in Isa 7:14 is the *locus classicus* in the Jewish-Christian contest of OT interpretation. Adam Kamesar shows that Jerome solves the challenge inherent in the Jewish position more successfully than his Christian predecessors, including Origen, even though Jerome looks to the literal sense and employs the tools of historical and grammatical analysis. What Kamesar does not show, however, is whether it would have occurred to Jerome or to anyone else to embark on the task unless the issue had arisen on other grounds ("The Virgin of Isaiah 7:14: The Philological Argument from the Second to the Fifth Century," *JTS* 41 (1990): 51-75.

[95]Luther, "Answer to the Hyperchristian Book," in *Luther's Works*, vol. 39, *Church and Ministry* 1, trans. Eric W. Gritsch (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1970), 178.

because the text had been saturated with the "secondhand memory" of Christianity and because the Jewish perspective no longer represented any threat. It could be—and was—dismissed by crass ridicule.[96] From Jerome onward, Christian interpretation reaps the benefits of centuries of Christian exegetical traditions. Moreover, an appraisal of its dominant position must also take into account the profound religious, social, and political transformation that took place during the period between Origen and Jerome. For centuries to come after Jerome, the Christian interpretation had the additional backing of institutions unimagined by Origen and his generation. The interpretation of the church was also to be "secured by the teaching office of the bishops and anchored in conciliar authority sanctioned by the state."[97]

This complete redrawing of the political and religious landscape must be broadened into a sixth and final point in order to grasp the immeasurable difference between Origen's setting and that of later generations.[98] At the time of Origen, the church was perceived as a menace to the state; whereas after the conversion of the emperor Constantine, the state became the chief sponsor of the church. The church of Jerome and Augustine, as well as the church of Luther and Calvin, is a church that plays a commanding role on the world stage and in the lives of individual citizens. The observed contrast in hermeneutical method from Origen to Luther is no greater than the dissimilarity in theological priorities, and their respective concern plays out against very different backgrounds.[99] Origen must explain God's ways to his audience. He cannot take the preeminence of Christianity for granted. He must win people to the Christian position as such on the merits of his message; he cannot count on axioms that have been engraved on the Christian society. Origen cannot command or

[96]Luther, "On the Jews and Their Lies," *Luther's Works*, vol. 47, *Christian in Society* 3, trans. Franklin Sherman (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 137-306.

[97]Torjesen, "Rhetoric of the Literal Sense," 641.

[98]Any attempt to establish a distinct theological paradigm in the absence of delineating the political situation of the church, as has been done for Origen and Augustine, is bound to be deficient. Cf. Charles Kannengiesser, "Origenes, Augustine und der Paradigmenwechsel in der Theologie," in *Theologie—wohin?* ed. Hans Küng and David Tracy (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Mohn, 1984), 151-164.

[99]The fact of an evolution in hermeneutical perspective and theological priorities is borne out in Wai-Shing Chau's study, *The Letter and the Spirit: A History of Interpretation from Origen to Luther* (New York: Peter Lang, 1995). However, little attention, if any, is devoted to the vastly different situations facing Origen compared with later interpreters.

proclaim; he must persuade.[100] This is reflected in his attempt to resolve the riddles raised by the stories in the OT,[101] by his repudiation of eternal punishment,[102] and by his emphasis on free will.[103] His argument is not based on an appeal to divine sovereignty, a take-it-or-leave-it proposition where human appreciation for God's ways counts for nothing and where God's sovereign will overrides human consent.[104] But if his theological orientation reflects the social and political situation of the Christian community as much as his own deeply held convictions, the same holds true for exegetes and theologians working in the era of Christian dominance. The arguments used by Origen in order to win acceptance for the Christians' God are less in demand

[100]Origen takes issue with Celsus's charge that Christian faith is devoid of rational reflection. He "cannot simply appeal to an institutional authority because he requires that disputes be settled by an appeal to rational argument" (Trigg, 54).

[101]E.g., *First Principles* 2.5.2. Trigg. 8, thinks that "Origen's initial impetus toward allegorical interpretations of Scripture may have come from the need to obviate Marcion's criticism," i.e., the charge that the OT tells of an inferior god.

[102]To Origen, Scripture indicates "that every sinner kindles for himself the flame of his own fire, and is not plunged into a fire which has been previously kindled by someone else or which existed before him. Of this fire the food and material are our sins" (*First Principles* 2.20.4). In a related comment, John R. Sachs writes that "on the day of judgment, when face to face with God, in the purity and perfection of divine love, sin will manifest its own true nature with a burning clarity. Sinners themselves will be their own accusers and the evil they have done will ignite within them, as a fever takes hold of a person who has indulged in bad food or intemperate, unhealthy behavior" ("Apocatastasis in Patristic Theology," *Theological Studies* 54 (1993): 626.

[103]Crouzel, 21, calls Origen "the supreme theologian of free will." René Cadious writes that for Origen "liberty became the most general of all the laws of the universe" (*Introduction au système d'Origène* [Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1932], cited in Daniélou, 205-206. Clark, 7, asserts that the challenge facing Origen, as well as his motives, were lost to view to his critics to the extent that "only [Origen's translator] Rufinus understood the religious issue confronting Origen that had prompted the writing of *On First Principles*: the need to construct a polemic against Gnostic and astrological determinism that would 'save' human free will and God's justice." To Origen, the meaning of the cross is related to freedom. The cross has a healing, not simply a judicial, purpose, and its reach extends beyond the "human order." "We certainly do not deny that free will always will remain in rational natures, but we affirm that the power of the cross of Christ and of his death which he undertook at the end of the ages is so great that it suffices for the healing and restoration not only of the present and the future but also of past ages. It suffices not only for our human order, but also for the heavenly powers and orders. For according to the Apostle Paul's own pronouncement: Christ has made peace 'through the blood of his cross' not only with 'the things on earth' but also with 'the things in heaven'" (*ComRom* 5.10.14).

[104]E.g., *First Principles* 2.1.2.

once the church is able to command the theological agenda. It is an irony that certain doctrines rejected as untenable and repugnant by Origen are later held proudly by the church and its leading theologians, whether Catholic or Protestant. Theodicy is replaced by soteriology as the main frame of reference, moving the focus to a more detailed picture within a much smaller frame. Eric Osborn writes fittingly that with the conversion of Constantine "theodicy gave way to triumphalism."[105] Osborn describes this transformation as a process of contraction: "Theology was narrowed, first, because the rule no longer had the need for the apocalyptic, Gnostic extensions of Origen's theodicy and second, because the whole rule was packed into christology and trinity."[106] Here the choice of words such as "contraction" and "narrowing" is revealing, pointing to the shrinking field of vision. In Origen, soteriology constitutes a smaller circle within the larger circle of theodicy, the latter exerting a controlling influence on the former. In later theology, soteriology stands largely alone.

Origen's Account of Evil

The above are elements that one is advised to recognize before passing judgment on Origen's work and the role played by the reality of personal evil in the understanding of the early church. All are in evidence when Origen brings out the OT verification for the Christian belief in *Contra Celsum* and in the more in-depth account in *On First Principles*. When Origen explains why passages in the OT point beyond the immediate historical circumstances of the writer, he is guided by his view of what the NT has singled out as important. But this argument is in turn corroborated by the pregnant nature of the OT itself, a conviction that Origen holds in common with the writers of the NT. As in *Contra Celsum*,[107] his two most important textual witnesses in *On First Principles* are Ezekiel's lament over the king of Tyre (Ezek 28:12-19) and the related lament over the king of Babylon in Isaiah (14:12-20). Clearly believing that his argument flows convincingly from the text itself, Origen quotes both passages *in extenso*, adding his own remarks prior to and after presenting the texts. The Ezekiel text, he claims, "is most evidently of such a kind that it cannot possibly refer to a man, but must

[105]Eric Osborn, "The Apologist Origen and the Fourth Century: From Theodicy to Christology," in *Origeniana Septima*, ed. W. A. Biernert and U. Kühneweg (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 58.

[106]Ibid., 58.

[107]*Contra Celsum* 6.43.

be understood of some higher power, which had fallen from higher places and been cast down to lower and worse ones."[108] The historical reality of Tyre is inadequate to fit the billing of the text, and the reference to "the prince of Tyre" must therefore be seen as an allusive and composite figuration:

> For when he who is called "prince of Tyre" is related to have been "among the holy ones" and "without stain" and set "in the paradise of God", "adorned with a crown of honour and beauty", how can I ask, can we suppose such a being to have been inferior to any of the holy ones? He is described as having been "a crown of honour and beauty" and as having walked "in the paradise of God" "without stain." How then can anyone possibly suppose that such a being was not one of those holy and blessed powers which, dwelling as they do in a state of blessedness, we must believe are endowed with no other honour than this?[109]

The shoes worn by the "prince of Tyre," then, are too big for the historical Tyre of Ezekiel's own day. While not denying that Tyre represented the manifestation of a proud and oppressive power, Origen takes the passage to speak to the subject of evil on a deeper level. In his eyes, the text conflates past and present, earth and heaven, the fall of the highest angel and the fall of human beings, but at its core lies the story of the undoing of the prince of evil himself in his supernatural and superhuman form. Origen's interpretation is conditioned by the conviction that the Christian worldview must apply to all the biblical manifestations of the conflict between good and evil—certainly in texts that in his eyes are bursting with primordial overtones and the connotation of ultimacy. Careful not to claim too much without presenting the evidence, Origen quotes the full text before asking rhetorically:

> Who is there that, hearing such sayings as this, "Thou wast a signet of likeness and crown of honour in the delights of the paradise of God," or this, "from the time thou wast created with the cherubim, I placed thee in the holy mount of God", could possibly weaken their meaning to such an extent as to suppose them spoken of a human being, even a saint, not to mention the prince of Tyre"? Or what "fiery stones" can he think of, "in the midst" of which any man could have lived? Or who could be regarded as "stainless" from the very "day he was created", and yet at some later time could have acts of unrighteousness found in him and be said to be "cast forth into the earth"? This certainly indicated that the prophecy is spoken of one who, not being in the earth, was "cast forth

[108]*First Principles* 1.5.4.

[109]Ibid.

into the earth", whose "holy places" also are said to be "polluted."[110]

A simple historical application would force the text into an implausible straitjacket if applied to "a human being, even a saint, not to mention the prince of Tyre," as Origen exclaimed. The latter example evidently fits the hypothesis especially poorly; he thinks it highly unlikely that the Tyre of history would be deserving of such an auspicious beginning.

A similar method is applied to the passage from Isaiah against the "king of Babylon" (Isa 14:12-20). After introducing the text as evidence, Origen claims that "it is most clearly proved by these words that he who formerly was Lucifer and who "arose in the morning" has "fallen from heaven."[111] For if, then,

> he was a being of darkness, why is he said to have formerly been Lucifer or light-bearer?[112] Or how could he "rise in the morning", who had in him no light at all? Moreover, the Saviour teaches us about the devil as follows: "Lo, I see Satan fallen as lightning from heaven." So he was light once. . . . Yet he also compares Satan to lightning, and says that he fell from heaven, in order to show thereby that he was in heaven once, and had a place among the holy ones, and a share in that light in which all the holy ones share.[113]

As with the passage in Ezekiel, indeed, as though these passages are two of a kind, the lament over the "king of Babylon" takes the story of the *being that is opposed to God* back to its mysterious beginning and forward to its inevitable end, employing the historical reality of Babylon as the literary vehicle for the unveiling. Origen may harness biblical

[110]Ibid. Tertullian's earlier exposition of the Ezekiel passage reads almost like Origen's: "This description, it is manifest, properly belongs to the transgression of the angel, and not to the prince's: for none among human beings was either born in the paradise of God, not even Adam himself, who was rather translated thither; nor placed with a cherub upon God's holy mountain, that is to say, in the heights of heaven, from which the Lord testifies that Satan fell; nor detained amongst the stones of fire, and the flashing rays of burning constellations, whence Satan was cast down like lightning. No, it is no one else than the very author of sin who was demoted in the person of a sinful man: he was once irreproachable, at the time of his creation, formed for good by God, as by the good Creator of irreproachable creatures, and adorned with every angelic glory, and associated with God, good with the Good; but afterwards of his own accord removed to evil" (*Against Marcion* 2.10).

[111]*First Principles* 1.5.5.

[112]This is Butterworth's English translation of the Latin text made by Origen's defender Rufinus around 397 C.E. almost one hundred and fifty years after the death of Origen. Jerome's Vulgate translation has the word "lucifer" in Isa 14:12, "quomodo cecidisti de caelo lucifer qui mane oriebaris corruisti in terram qui vulnerabas gentes."

[113]*First Principles* 1.5.5.

passages by methods, such as allegory,[114] typology, allusion, figural extension, historical generalization, or prophecy for a given purpose. In this instance, however, Origen is so impressed by the obvious "surplus of meaning" in these texts that he seems to count on a mere literal reading to shatter applications that stop at the respective rulers of Babylon or Tyre.[115] Moreover, these laments are part of the record of the conflict between good and evil; and the historical manifestations of this conflict, whether in biblical terms or in Origen's eyes, cannot be explained in human terms alone.

No less an authority than Luther apparently called the derivation of "Lucifer" from the passage in Isaiah "*instignis error totius papatus.*"[116] While this tendentious attribution will not stand, a number of critical scholars dismiss any link between this passage and Satan. Some deny that the Bible hints at anything that can be assembled into a coherent story of the fall of Lucifer from a state of innocence, or, if conceding that such ideas may be inferred, they deny that the passage in Isaiah applies to the subject.[117] Exegetes in the early church held a different

[114]A strictly allegorical interpretation of these passages is found in *Contra Celsum* when Origen applies the adversarial notion of "Satan" to any person "who has chosen evil and to live an evil life" (*Contra Celsum* 6.44).

[115]"Similarly the statements concerning the ruler of Tyre cannot be understood of any particular man who is to rule over Tyre. And as for the numerous statements made about Nebuchadnezzar, especially in Isaiah, how is it possible to interpret them of that particular man? For the man Nebuchadnezzar neither 'fell from heaven,' nor was he the 'morning star,' nor did he 'rise in the morning' over the earth" (*First Principles* 4.3.9).

[116]The attribution of this statement to Luther is found in Franz Delitzsch, *Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah*, trans. S. R. Driver (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1892), 310. Luther's understanding of this passage seems to have been ambiguous. Often he treats Isa 14:12 as a reference to the fall of Satan, but the context is generally rhetorical. An example of this is found in Luther's commentary on Ps 101 (Luther, *Luther's Works*, vol. 13, *Selected Psalms* 2 [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1995], 196). In what may be seen as intended exegesis of the passage, *Lucifer* is said to denote the historical king of Babylon (idem, *Luther's Works*, vol. 1, *Lectures on Genesis 1-5*, trans. Jaroslav Pelikan [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1995], 112; idem, *Luther's Works*, vol. 16, *Commentary on Isaiah 1*, trans. Jaroslav Pelikan (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1995), 140.

[117]G. B. Caird claims that "the Bible knows nothing of the premundane fall of Satan, familiar to readers of *Paradise Lost*" (*The Revelation of St. John* [London: A. & C. Black, 1966], 153). Graham, 34, deplores the persistence of Origen's application of the "King of Babylon" and the "Prince of Tyre" to Satan, citing these texts as examples of an erroneous interpretation "which persists in some quarters to this day." Ronald Youngblood dismisses any interpretation of "Lucifer" that goes beyond the immediate historical situation of the writer. In his eyes, it is the early Christian interpretation and not Lucifer that has fallen ("The Fall of Lucifer [in More Ways than One]," in *The Way of Wisdom: Essays in Honor of Bruce K. Waltke*, ed. J. I. Packer and Sven K. Soderlund

view, as we have seen, and it is likely that the outlook of modern exegetes is conditioned as much by different presuppositions and theological priorities as by the nature of the evidence.

Despite the weight of the considered reservations noted above, one should hesitate to canonize Luther's objection or accept the conclusions of scholars who deny any connection between the Isaiah passage and Satan. A host of scholars do, in fact, see in these texts elements that reach beyond the immediate historical situation quite apart from any intent to vindicate Origen or other readers in the early church. Scholars have not only acknowledged the compelling literary qualities of the poem in Isaiah,[118] but have also to a varying degree seen in it tantalizing hints that affirm many of the elements of the early Christian position: the primordial origin of evil, the banishment of a distinguished being from heaven, and the ultimacy of the poetic aspiration.[119] Moreover,

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[Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000], 173).

[118]Otto Kaiser calls the poem in Isaiah "one of the most powerful poems not only of the Old Testament, but of the whole literature of the world" (*Isaiah 13-39* [London: SCM, 1974], 29).

[119]Acknowledging the tenor of ultimacy in the text, Kaiser, 30-31, allows one interpretation to be "the moment in which God was to bring about the end of the final world ruler in the long chain of empires which had destroyed each other and yet remained essentially the same. The fact that the name of the ruler is not given, the jubilation throughout the liberated world at his fall, and the explicit statement that the staff of the wicked and of the tyrants has been broken, point in this direction." In contrast to interpreters who see nothing primordial in the text, R. E. Clements says that "vv. 12-15 appear to contain either a fragment of, or at least an allusion to, an ancient myth of the banishment of a divine being from heaven" (*Isaiah 1-39*, NCBC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980], 142). Gale A. Yee takes more than a small step in the direction of the early Christian interpretation, writing that "the poet transmits an ancient myth of the demigod Helel in the form of a dirge. By imbedding this dirge in the center of the overall lament, the poet assimilates the tyrant to this primordial figure, identifying the tyrant's rise and fall with that of Helel, the Bright One" ("The Anatomy of Biblical Parody: The Dirge Form in 2 Samuel 1 and Isaiah 14," *CBQ* 50 [1988]: 577-578). In a reference to Isa 14:12-15, Jon D. Levenson grants that the notion of a rebellion in heaven is found in the OT, but that this view is rarely expressed (*Creation and the Persistence of Evil: The Jewish Drama of Divine Omnipotence* [San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988], 136). He, 136, suggests that this outlook was theologically so troublesome that it was suppressed: "That snippets of it are indeed to be found evidences profound insecurity about YHWH's kingship even within the world of Israelite myth. . . . That the myth of theomachy or rebellion has been repressed rather than destroyed accounts for the fact that we now have snippets, and only snippets." Dissenting from the idea that "Lucifer" is merely a metaphor for the "King of Babylon," William L. Holladay concedes that the poem "does not press one directly to assume that the tyrant is a king of Babylon" ("Text, Structure, and Irony in the Poem on the Fall of the Tyrant, Isaiah 14," *CBQ* 61 [1999]: 635).

according to the NT, the correct grasp of the OT needs the help of interpretation.[120] The latter has only a partial disclosure of hidden realities, good or evil. With rare exceptions (e.g., Luke 2:25-38), the OT is for the early followers of Jesus a landscape concealed in fog, yielding its veiled secrets to the rising sun of the fuller revelation of the NT. If the prominence of Satan is quantitatively greater by orders of magnitude in the NT, the qualitative parameters are identical: the NT tells the story of how God makes right what according to the OT went wrong. Luther's deprecation of the early Christian interpretation of the disputed passage in Isaiah need not stem only from a sharpened and more critical hermeneutical perspective. As suggested already, it could also be a result of changing presuppositions, receiving from a given text only what is strictly in accordance with the questions asked. If Luther had no eye for theodicy because he had no need for it, the weight of his criticism must be modified accordingly. R. P. C. Hanson's verdict that "Origen's thought remained outside the Bible and had never penetrated within it" may apply to important areas of Origen's thought, but it is not persuasive with regard to Origen's account of the early Christian understanding of evil.[121] The stinging criticism that Origen plods heavy-footed and mechanically through the Scriptures—"blind to its merits, deaf to its music"—and therefore oblivious to the subtle intimations and soaring ascents of biblical poetry, would lead to quite the opposite result if tested by the early Christian scrutiny of the OT for evidence for the reality of Satan.[122] On that point, at least, it seems more appropriate to direct the stigma of impaired musicality to interpretations that insist on seeing the human and the immediate where inspired poets aspired to describe the primordial and the ultimate. Still more could be turned on its head in such a revaluation because the theological outlook that has little use for the early Christian belief in personal evil lies closer to the pagan critic Celsus than to the early Christian view.

Theological Implications of the Christian Belief in Personified Evil

It is evident that Celsus takes offence at the Christian doctrine because he is a confirmed believer in the tradition of the fathers, the stability of society, and the well-being of the empire. But it is a mistake to think that Celsus is concerned only with the prospect of dimming imperial fortunes if the new

[120]Such is the perspective of such texts as Luke 24:25-27; John 12:27-32; Heb 1:1-2.

[121]Hanson, *Allegory and Event*, 363.

[122]Hanson, Review of Henri Crouzel's *Origène*, 279.

teaching continues to gain adherents. Confronted with the Christian belief in personal evil, his ire has also been aroused on philosophical and theological grounds by the offensive character of the belief itself. The ignorance so apparent to Celsus has found expression in a proposition amounting to blasphemy in any meaningful religious system. His objections should, therefore, be read as a theological evaluation; it is the lack of theological merit in the Christian position that bothers him. By their belief in Satan, Celsus asserts, the Christians have departed "*from the true meaning of the divine enigma.*"[123] And what is that *enigma*? It is that any God worthy of the name would not permit such a challenge to his authority to exist. The notion is an affront to the sovereignty of God, and for Celsus the sovereignty of God is the most basic and sacred belief of any religion.[124] Conceding that ancient mythology also has notions of combat among the gods, Celsus sees the Christian view as distinct from these: the former "*are not like the tales which tell of a devil who is a daemon, or . . . who is a sorcerer and proclaims opposing opinions.*"[125] The existence and activity of the devil in the Christian view of reality have no genuine counterparts in pagan myths. In the Christian conception, evil has achieved a historical concretion and is accorded explanatory powers that pagans do not demand of their myths. Celsus has picked up the striking qualitative difference, a distinction that continues to elude even Christian interpretations that give Satan more than a passing glance: The devil, notes Celsus, has something to say; he "*proclaims opposing opinions.*" This, too, is unthinkable in the theological paradigm of Celsus, within which the imperial will of God must hold undisputed sway and no dissenting viewpoint is permitted. To Celsus, it is also sacrilege to infer that "*when the greatest God indeed wishes to confer some benefit upon men, He has a power which is opposed to Him, and so is unable to do it.*"[126] The Christian view has produced a God who appears impotent. By proposing the existence of an opposing power that infringes on God's domain, "*the Son of God, then, is worsted by the devil.*"[127] In Celsus's view, God is outsmarted and entangled by a foe that should have been easily put in his place by God's power. While Celsus has not fully grasped the meaning of the confrontation between Christ and Satan, he finds the thought ludicrous that it should be in the devil's power to inflict suffering on the Son of God.

[123]*Contra Celsum* 6.42.

[124]Chadwick, xxi, attributes quite high-minded motives to Celsus; his concern for the truth and for the good of society is taken to be deeply sincere.

[125]*Contra Celsum* 6.42.

[126]Ibid.

[127]Ibid.

This impugns the dignity of God and defies common sense. "*In my opinion,*" says Celsus, God "*ought to have punished the devil; he certainly ought not to have pronounced threats against the men who had been attacked by him.*"[128]

Origen's reply is characteristically circumspect. He agrees with Celsus that there is a certain resemblance between the Christian understanding of Satan and the combat myths of ancient mythology. In fact, he turns this part of Celsus's criticism to his own advantage, seeing in these myths clues to a perspective held in common, however vaguely articulated in the pagan myths. But he also agrees with his opponent that the figure of Satan stands apart, appealing for support to sources that to him carry more weight than a host of ancient writers, including Homer. Clearer than any other source and much older, claims Origen, it is the writings of Moses that "taught the existence of this wicked power that fell from the heavens."[129] In the form of the serpent, this agency "was the cause of man's expulsion from the divine paradise."[130]

Much as Origen feels bound and emboldened by Scripture, he is quite able to single out the difference between the Christian view and that of Celsus on a deeper theological and philosophical level. First, evil did not arise by necessity, as if by some flaw in the divine design or by a capricious withdrawal of divine favor. Sin lies instead in the choice and not in the nature of the beings that brought evil into the world.[131] Second, goodness itself has meaning only when the possibility of evil exists. Virtue is not worthy of the name if the option to choose otherwise has been ruled out. This point is as basic to Origen's underlying view of God as it is to his specific understanding of the origin of evil, fighting his battle against the determinism of the Gnostics and others who misinterpret the existence of evil to reflect negatively on God.[132] Third, there was no quick fix for the crisis that arose when evil came to exist contrary to God's will and purpose, as Celsus so condescendingly assumed. "*In my opinion he ought to have punished the devil,*" says Celsus, seeing God easily restricting the devil's range for harming others. But Origen is not fazed by the implied criticism that the God of the Christians lacked the power to put the devil in his place. In his view, there is more depth to God and more subtlety to the nature of evil than for such a crude remedy as power to succeed. "It was necessary for

[128]Ibid.

[129]Ibid., 6.43.

[130]Ibid.

[131]Ibid., 6.44.

[132]*First Principles* 1.1.5; 2.1.2; *Contra Celsum* 4.3.

God," Origen answers, "who knows how to use for a needful end even the consequences of evil, to put those who became evil in this way in a particular part of the universe, and to make a school of virtue to be set up for those who wished to strive lawfully in order to obtain it."[133]

Rather than admitting that Celsus has identified a weak spot in the Christian view of reality, Origen argues that it is Celsus who has failed to understand. He has demonstrated his ignorance of the Scriptures on this matter, and Celsus has also shown himself to be strangely naive as to the nature of evil itself. The origin and reality of evil cannot be restricted to the human sphere alone, because the Bible has mandated a wider frame of reference. Expressing his confidence that the story of evil is traceable from beginning to end in the Scriptures, Origen entices the reader to unearth the evidence and pursue the implications more fully.[134] He contends that the Christian case is the stronger one on theological and philosophical grounds, precisely the areas that Celsus attacks as the weakest. To Origen, the witness of Scripture is no embarrassment to reason. Scripture and experience reflect reality;[135] competing accounts, as Origen is eager to show, are far less persuasive.

Celsus, at least at the outset of his criticism, does not deny the reality of evil. He proposes to give a more sophisticated explanation by invoking philosophy. "*It is not easy for one who has not read philosophy to know what is the origin of evils*," says Celsus somewhat condescendingly,[136] but he prefers not to delve deeper into the subject than to make the assertion. Specifically how philosophy solves the dilemma is reserved for the few who are initiated. For the masses it is enough "*to be told that evils are not caused by God.*"[137] Backing off slightly on what the masses need to know, Celsus adds that the masses may also be told that evils "*inhere in matter and dwell among mortals.*"[138]

Appearing unconvinced by his own argument, Celsus then reverses

[133]*Contra Celsum* 6.44.

[134]Ibid.

[135]In a suggested improvement on Chadwick's translation of a passage in *Contra Celsum* 1.2, J. C. M. van Winden takes Origen's meaning to be that "a man who comes to the gospel with his Greek way of thinking will *judge that is true* and by *putting it into practice* he will *prove* that it meets the requirements of a Greek proof" ("Notes on Origen, *Contra Celsum*," in *Arché: A Collection of Patristic Studies*, ed. J. Den Boeft and D. T. Runia, VCSupp 41 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 161-162.

[136]*Contra Celsum* 4.65.

[137]Ibid.

[138]Ibid.

himself as if to prove that the study of philosophy has not been of much help to him in explaining the reality of evil. Quite unexpectedly, he brings up a deterministic, pessimistic, and somewhat rambling outlook that reads as though the notion of evil must ultimately be dismissed. Having begun on a note of superiority, leading the reader to expect an explanation for the reality of evil that is better than the Christian position, he appears rather sheepishly to take refuge in fatalism. If "evil" is a necessity and if human beings are trapped in a cycle that no one can escape, the concept of evil has no meaning. Celsus asserts that "*the period of mortal life is similar from beginning to end, and it is inevitable that according to the determined cycles the same things always have happened, are now happening, and will happen.*"[139]

Origen is not impressed by what Celsus brings to the table from his study of philosophy. To Celsus's claim that "*it is not easy for one who has not read philosophy to know the origin of evils*," Origen notes that his deceased opponent leaves the impression that "anyone who is a philosopher is easily able to know their origin, while for anyone who is not a philosopher it is not easy to perceive the origin of evils although it is possible for him to know it, even if only after much hard work."[140] This assumption is patently false because the learned have fared no better than the unlearned with respect to explaining the existence of evil. Deprived of insight that revelation alone can give, Origen claims that philosophy has come up short on several counts. Even on such basics as knowledge of God, ignorance of whom is the greatest evil, philosophy has failed to give a coherent answer, as Celsus well knows. Origen states modestly that "it is not easy even for one who has read philosophy to know the origin of evils, and probably it is impossible even for these men to know it absolutely, unless by inspiration of God it is made clear what are evils, and shown how they came to exist, and understood how they will be removed."[141]

At the deepest level, Origen dismisses Celsus as a traditionalist whose attack on the Christian view of reality cannot conceal his shallow view of evil and his deep-seated conviction that makes faithfulness to tradition and conformity to the values of the state the hallowed definition of what is good. Such an attitude is, in Origen's eyes, doomed from the outset. No one, says Origen, "will be able to know the origin of evils if he has not realized that it is an evil to suppose that piety is preserved by keeping the established laws of states in the ordinary sense of the word."[142]

[139]Ibid.

[140]Ibid.

[141]Ibid.

[142]Ibid.

Where Celsus claims to find the *True Account* on the basis of tradition and reason, Origen points to the Bible and to revelation for the better answer to the most perplexing questions facing human existence. In the connected, coherent, and comprehensive narrative of the biblical drama, Origen defends the Christian view of reality with a picture of God that emphasizes human and creaturely freedom more than divine sovereignty, love rather than power, and persuasion in contrast to the use of force. The framework of this early Christian belief is reflected in the imperiled situation of the Christian community. These views are not homegrown tenets of belief by an innovative and freewheeling thinker. Origen proposes to defend no more than what Christians believed in Celsus's day some seventy years earlier, and earlier still as this view of reality comes to light in the NT. Celsus's attempt to embarrass the Christian position has in Origen's eyes come to grief—as will others that refuse to acknowledge the personal and supernatural nature of evil. In Origen's answer, the Christian message takes the reality of evil seriously to a degree not imagined by Celsus. The latter stands exposed, caught in its own rhetorical web that, on the one hand, promised a better explanation and, on the other hand, implied that there is nothing to explain. To Origen, Celsus's wholehearted effort to uphold convention and his half-hearted and incoherent attempt to offer an alternative explanation are damning evidence that "no one will be able to know the origin of evils who has not grasped the truth about the so-called devil and his angels, and who he was before he became a devil, and how he became a devil, and what caused his so-called angels to rebel with him."[143]

In conclusion, I suggest that the theme of cosmic conflict and its accompanying theodicy in the early church represent a lost theological treasure that is waiting to be rediscovered and reclaimed. They expand the biblical narrative to its native, comprehensive scope and restore the neglected cosmic perspective to its rightful place. Theological issues that were eclipsed when Christianity became an ascendant political force in society may be due for a substantial revision in the light of this rediscovery. Issues poised to rise to the foreground will be the biblical story of the origin of evil and even Origen's view of liberty as "the most general of all the laws of the universe."[144] If this were to happen, the church of today may not only find itself in fruitful dialogue with the early church and its theological concerns. It may also, like Origen, have more to say to the contemporary person to whom the reality of evil is a real obstacle to faith, as are misconceptions of the God who permitted it to happen.

[143]Ibid.

[144]Cf. Daniélou, 205-206.

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LEADERSHIP FORMATION IN MINISTERIAL EDUCATION—PART 2: THE IMPACT OF GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL EDUCATION ON LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN THE LOCAL PASTORATE

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In order to evaluate the effectiveness of graduate theological education, Part 1 of this study sought to establish frames of reference for measuring success in pastoral ministry and to evaluate the relationship between leadership practices and those criteria.[1] Stated differently, Are leadership practices a predictor of success in pastoral ministry?

We concluded that "using superior leadership practices enables pastors to be more successful in their ministry. This study has demonstrated a strong correlation between the two. Thus, it would seem wise to devote a portion of graduate ministerial education to inculcating and developing the leadership practices described herein."[2] Given the correlation between leadership practices and pastoral success, the formation of key leadership practices that prepare a person for success in ministry is an appropriate goal of graduate theological education. We noted that the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) Church in its North American Division (NAD)[3] expects pastors to complete a Master of Divinity (M.Div.) program prior to their ordination.[4] The church

[1]Skip Bell and Roger Dudley, "Leadership Formation in Ministerial Education—Part 1: Assessment and Analysis of Leadership Traits in Seventh-Day Adventist Pastors in North America," *AUSS* 40 (2002): 277-299.

[2]Ibid., 290.

[3]The North American Division (NAD) covers the territory of the United States, Canada, and Bermuda. A conference is generally a regional judicatory, corresponding to the area of a state or province.

[4]The policy of the NAD requires an M.Div. degree for pastors prior to ordination to the ministry. "L 05 05 Educational Requirement—The educational requirement for entrance into the ministry (except as provided in L 05 20) shall be the completion of the seven-year ministerial training program. College ministerial graduates shall attend the Andrews University Theological Seminary to complete the nine-quarter program. Upon satisfactory completion of nine quarters, the graduate is eligible for a three-quarter assignment as a ministerial intern, or for other direct appointments to the ministry" (*North American Division of the General Conference Working Policy 1998-1999* [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 1999], 417). In practice, local conferences often

expects graduate-level ministerial education to contribute to the preparation of a candidate for professional ministry.

The purpose of this second stage of research is to assess and analyze the effect of graduate education on the leadership practices of persons in pastoral ministry in the SDA Church in North America. While this research will disclose the impact of graduate theological education in developing leadership effectiveness for ministerial students, the ultimate purpose, to be examined in the next research stage, is to discover specifically what in graduate theological education contributes to that development and, subsequently, make those findings available to those involved in the process of designing seminary experience.

This current research will establish a benchmark for SDA pastors in North America, from which new educational programs and student progress can be measured. The degree of correlation between the M.Div. program of study and growth in leadership traits will be a significant factor in forming church policy for pastoral education. The third research stage, proposed for the year 2004, will examine correlations between delivery system options, the learning environment, and course emphasis in a broad range of M.Div. programs beyond Andrews University in North America and will be valuable as ministerial education is refined in the future by the church.

Leadership Development in the Church—A Brief Review

Scripture defines the "church" as a body of ministering believers. The Greek word ἐκκλησία, translated as "church," corresponds to the Hebrew *qahal*, meaning a meeting of the people summoned together. "We first read of the ἐκκλησία in Jerusalem, which is explicitly referred to as such in Acts 8:1. In Acts 7:38 the people of Israel, led through the desert by Moses, is called ἐκκλησία."[5] The NT church was commissioned to witness, to lead people to Jesus for salvation, and to make disciples. At his ascension, Jesus commissioned the disciples: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, teaching them to observe all that I have commanded you" (Matt 28:18-19, RSV). The church was to witness in the power of the Holy Spirit (Acts 1:8). All

place pastors and ordain them without a graduate degree. Some of these pastors later continue their study in a master's-level extension program offered by the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) Theological Seminary.

[5]K. K. L. Schmidt, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. G. Kittel, G. W. Bromiley, and G. Friedrich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 3:504.

believers are called (*klesis*) and gifted for ministry (Eph 4:1; Rom 1:1, 6; 1 Cor 12:4-5). So the Christian church is a called-out community of ministering believers in Christ.

Specific ministries within the body are also delineated. Paul described overseers (*episkopes*, 1Tim 3:1), persons chosen from the congregation for distinct ministry and who were confirmed in their ministry by the laying-on of hands (Acts 6:5). Titus was encouraged to appoint elders in every city (Titus 1:5). When the church needed to resolve issues in its life or mission, it counseled with the "apostles and elders concerning this issue" (Acts 15:2-6). The NT church was served by leaders within its community. Instructed by the biblical teaching of servant leadership, this ministry continues in the contemporary church.

Seminary education contributes to the preparation of these leaders. *The ATS Bulletin: Procedures, Standards and Criteria for Membership* describes goals for a seminary program leading to ordination: "Since the educational procedures for this degree are designed primarily to prepare men and women for effective ministries of church and synagogue, goals and objectives should be stated in terms of knowledge and ability required for beginning such ministry."[6] In expanding the goal, thirteen points are developed in the *ATS Bulletin*, including: serving as a change agent, relational development of leaders, and assisting the congregation in developing its purpose and corporate life. It is apparent that leadership development is a part of congregational expectation and is required in ministerial training. But has leadership development been provided for in seminary curriculum?

Alan E. Nelson describes the development of formal ministerial training programs in the Christian church. Jesus modeled the personal apprenticeship exercised by the early church in training church leaders. The early church had no institutions of pastoral training. For instance, Justin Martyr founded a school in Rome in the second century, but it was not designed for the training of church leaders. Augustine first imposed a communal life for the preparation of candidates for priesthood as an enhancement of the apprenticeship system. Following his program, the majority of priests until the time of the Reformation had no university-level theological training. In 1563, the Council of Trent decreed the establishment of seminaries where the theology of the church was to be taught. Thus, seminaries were a response to the erosion of orthodoxy.[7]

[6]ATS Bulletin (Pittsburgh, PA: Association of Theological Schools, June, 1992), 38.

[7]Alan E. Nelson, *Leadership Training of Ministerial Students in Evangelical Institutions of Higher Education* (Ed.D. dissertation, University of San Diego, 1994), 52-54.

In the post-Reformation years, those preparing for pastoral ministry in the Protestant movements generally spent a few months to a year living in the home of one of the revivalist preachers to prepare for ministry. The practice was continued in America when Harvard was founded, with those who prepared for pastoral ministry in the liberal-arts program spending up to three years in a pastor's home while completing their course of studies. Harvard developed a separate chair of theology in 1721, followed soon after by Yale's institution of a similar position. Curriculum emphasis continued to be in the area of theology, while preparation for ministry was by apprenticeship. The first distinct theological seminary in North America was established in Andover, Massachusetts, in 1808. By the late nineteenth century, the tradition of a four-year college degree plus a graduate seminary experience was established, though not required.

Literature Review

The literature investigating the development of graduate theological education in America, and especially its contribution to leadership development among pastors, describes the limitations of graduate theological education in responding to the needs for leadership development. Seminaries are described as products of their educational and church traditions. Professional creativity takes second place to doctrinal orthodoxy. The apparent theme is the challenge the seminary faces in leadership development for the church.

Ron Clouzet states: "It was during the last part of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth centuries that the major institutional forms by which American Protestant clergy were trained took shape. The basic structure of ministerial education, namely, four years of college followed by three years of seminary, did not change after that."[8]

D. E. Messer notes the need for higher education enterprises committed to critical and creative theological teaching, scholarship, and research. He asserts these needs were not always self-evident to the church.[9] T. Christopher Turner finds that the development of seminaries was to provide graduate theological education in America and asserts that seminaries designed to prepare professional leaders for the church are still a relatively new experience, and, thus, often entangled in controversy.[10]

[8]Ron E. M. Clouzet, *A Biblical Paradigm for Ministerial Training* (D.Min. dissertation, Fuller Theological Seminary, 1997), 206.

[9]D. E. Messer, *Calling Church and Seminary into the 21st Century* (Nashville: Abingdon, 1995).

[10]T. Christopher Turner, *Seminary Practice and Ministerial Realities: A Dichotomy that*

J. W. Fraser, tracking the development of theological education in America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, suggests that the twentieth century was not creative in developing formal education for ministry. He asserts that no new patterns in theological education have emerged since the establishment of seminaries. Seminaries provide theological education, with the congregation serving as the primary setting for practical training in ministry.[11]

H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, and James M. Gustafson describe the role of tradition in establishing curriculum in theological schools: "Certain studies have always formed the foundation of the course because they stem from the scripture and tradition of the Christian faith. Study of the Bible, the history of doctrine, the history of the church, are established elements in all theological education."[12] The authors maintain that, at the time of their writing, curriculum in the content areas of practical ministry in the local church was not well defined or developed.[13] Their research did affirm a growing percentage of faculty in theological education prepared by pastoral or other church-based professional experience when compared to a similar 1930 study. In 1955, they reported, 77 percent of ministerial faculty had pastoral experience. The authors state that while it is difficult to give reliable comparisons with similar studies of faculties in 1930, they conclude from several indicators that the percentage of pastoral experience among ministerial faculty had grown significantly. Demands on academic preparation had also increased.[14] The authors do not mention leadership as a course of study in their inquiry, although they do give brief attention to administration, perhaps not clearly discerning between leadership and administration.

Niebuhr, Williams, and Gustafson also cited the problem of clarification of the church's mission and its link to theological curricula. They maintain that these are the primary problems in designing curriculum.[15] To support their thesis, they cite two exemplary theological schools that provide models, in their evaluation, of curriculum design: The Federated Theological Faculty at the University of Chicago, with a

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Calls for Change (Ph.D. dissertation, Washington State University, 2001), 24-25.

[11]J. W. Fraser, *Schooling the Preachers: The Development of Protestant Theological Education in the U.S., 1740-1875* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 61.

[12]H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, and James M. Gustafson, *The Advancement of Theological Education* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 78.

[13]Ibid., 79.

[14]Ibid., 16-20.

[15]Ibid., 80.

traditional core curriculum organized around seven areas, none of which speaks, in their appraisal, to the practice of professional ministry; and the Perkins School of Theology at Southern Methodist University, organized around four areas of study, one being the local church. The emphasis on church administration is reflected in the seminary's handbook: "The Perkins plan allows an adjustment for the student who takes Hebrew and Greek, though he must use some of his elective time for this."[16]

Niebuhr, Williams, and Gustafson sought responses in their inquiry from persons in pastoral ministry regarding what they saw as lacking in their ministerial preparation: "The surveyors received a remarkably consistent testimony from ministers as to the need for some imaginative new approaches to church administration. The American church depends in part upon skillful organization to maintain its effectiveness as a Christian community. Many of the conspicuous examples of ministerial failure which were reported to us had to do with ineptness in handling organizational problems."[17] The authors suggest the solution to this need should be addressed by new developments, but stop short of specific curriculum models or recommendations.

Francis S. Fiorenza has described three prevalent theories of how men and women are trained for ministerial service.[18] The first approach, developed by Edward Farley, asserts that the compartmentalization of theology in seminary education has fragmented the clerical paradigm. Urging seminaries to focus on knowing God as the object of theological education,[19] Farley states: "Theology has long since disappeared as the unity, subject matter, and the end of clergy education and this disappearance is responsible more than anything else for the problematic character of that education as a course of study."[20] Farley goes on to assert that theological inquiry should be the sole focus of graduate theological education.

H. Richard Niebuhr represents a second approach in Fiorenza's model. Niebuhr, as has been previously cited, urges that the mission of the church define the substance of theological education. Fiorenza cites the

[16]Ibid., 85.

[17]Ibid., 106.

[18]F. S. Fiorenza, "Thinking Theologically About Theological Education," *Theological Education* 24 (1988), Suppl. 2: 89-119.

[19]Edward Farley, *The Fragility of Knowledge: Theological Education in the Church and University* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988).

[20]E. Farley, *Theologica: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1983), ix.

problems Niebuhr sees with the separation of theology from ministry in the local church. He reported that most seminary presidents, deans, and professors in practical theology had some pastoral experience, but it was no longer a consistent expectation in areas of theology.[21] Like Farley, Niebuhr finds ministry education to be so compartmentalized that it contributes confusion to the identity of the pastor.[22] He notes that "our schools, like our churches and our ministers, have no clear conception of what they are doing but are carrying on traditional actions, making separate responses to various pressures exerted by churches and society, contriving uneasy compromises among values, trying to improve their work by adjusting major parts of the academic machine or by changing the specifications of the raw materials to be treated."[23] Niebuhr links the purpose of the seminary to that of the church and suggests that the church must clearly understand its mission in order for the seminary to provide unity within theological education.

Fiorenza's third approach is represented by James Glasse, who sees seminaries as providing professional development for ministry. Turner notes that Glasse "lists five characteristics of a profession and claims that all five can be found in formal ministry: first, a specific area of knowledge; second, expertise in a cluster of skills; third, service through a specific social institution; fourth, accepted standards of competence and ethics; and fifth, specific values and purposes of the profession for society."[24]

It is relevant to note that at least three approaches to developing leaders for the church are apparent in seminary education: knowing God is the object of seminary education; the substance of theological education is defined by the mission of the church; and seminaries exist to provide professional development for ministry.

Criticism of seminary curriculum in the discipline of leadership development is an apparent theme in literature. George Barna writes: "It is worth noting that among the relatively few pastors we interviewed who felt they had the gift of leadership, none of them said the seminary prepared them very well for their responsibilities of leadership they have since encountered in ministry."[25] He presses his assertion in his

[21]H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Advancement of Theological Education* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), 19.

[22]Ibid., 48-54.

[23]H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1956), 46.

[24]Turner, 25.

[25]George Barna, *Today's Pastors* (Ventura, CA: Regal, 1993), 126.

summary: "During a decade of study, I have become increasingly convinced that the church struggles not because it lacks enough zealots who will join the crusade for Christ, not because it lacks the tangible resources to do the job and not because it has withered into a muddled understanding of its fundamental beliefs. The problem is that the Christian church is not led by true leaders."[26]

Standing on the Banks of Tomorrow!, a report from a conference of evangelical pastors and seminary deans, is critical of seminary curriculum, describing it as preparing people for ministry in the church of the 1950s rather than the church of the 1990s. The report cites the failure to market and train for leadership and to teach relational leadership skills, strategic planning, visioning, and change process.[27]

Solutions are, of course, frequently offered. The Association of Theological Schools conducted a study of 4,995 lay and clergy people in the mid-1970s that defined eleven areas of ministry organization. The study revealed that while skills and knowledge were important, issues of character were the priority to members of the church and should guide seminary curriculum.[28]

The call for integration of apprenticeship in theological training is frequent. In 1992, J. Reed suggested church-based training for ministers similar to the apprenticeships prior to the formalizing of theological education. The Biblical Institute for Leadership Development is developing curriculum for such church-based leadership development programs.[29]

Nelson surveyed the programs of 77 undergraduate liberal-arts colleges offering majors in theology and 64 graduate seminaries. All were institutions operated by or affiliated with Protestant denominations in America. All the programs investigated were described as being designed for pastoral candidates. Only six were found to support leadership development, with two or more required courses in leadership theory or practice; only three were judged, after examination by an expert panel, to offer significant emphasis on leadership

[26]Ibid., 137.

[27]C. Weese, *Standing on the Banks of Tomorrow!* (Granada Hills, CA: Multi-Staff Ministries, 1993), 26-33.

[28]David S. Schiller, Merton P. Strommen, and Milo Brekke, eds., *Ministry in America* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1980).

[29]J. Reed, "Church Based Theological Education: Creating a New Paradigm" (Unpublished paper presented at the North American Professors of Christian Education Conference, Dallas, Texas, 1992).

development.[30] Nelson concludes that evangelical institutions do not effectively prepare pastors to lead.[31] He suggests a new curriculum, constructed in collaboration with leading seminary educators and church pastors, with major emphasis on leadership development.

Turner implemented several focus groups and panels for reflection in the process of his research and thus asserts that his recommendations reflect the vision of the church. He advises the continuation of the traditional M.Div. as a practical necessity for persons wanting to teach or do theological research, while creating a new program for the "reflective practitioner." The new program would have 90 or more credits, 75 percent in the practice of ministry, with faculty who were actively engaged in ministry.[32]

Clouzet cites studies examining the effectiveness of preparation for pastors at the SDA theological seminary. He describes Edward Dower's 1980 doctoral research, revealing that of fifty items ranked lowest in preparation for ministry by SDA seminary graduates, 44 were ministerial skill items and none were scholarly skills. Two-thirds of the respondents appealed for more practical preparation. In 1986, a report on student evaluations was reported to the Ministerial Training Advisory Council. Three years earlier, Clouzet reports, the SDA M.Div. curriculum had changed to the "first truly professional curriculum." Still, of the nineteen factors rated, practical emphasis was rated lowest by the respondents.

A 1988 study on pastoral effectiveness by Roger Dudley and David Dennis again showed that preparation for ministry was viewed as strong in academics but weak in practical training and spiritual formation. The study also indicated that the value of seminary education was significantly increased when preceded by two years of ministerial internship. A further investigation was undertaken by Dudley in 1995, in which the results on preparation for ministry still received low scores, though they were somewhat better than in the past.[33] In a 1996 assessment provided by the SDA Theological Seminary, 63.5 percent of the students indicated high satisfaction with the practical usefulness of their training. It was the first time practical preparation for SDA ministry was indicated as satisfactory by a majority of students.[34]

[30]Nelson, 71-82.

[31]Ibid, 165.

[32]Turner, 111-113.

[33]Roger Dudley, *An Evaluation of the Master of Divinity Program by Graduates of 1988 and 1993* (Berrien Springs: Institute of Church Ministry, 1995).

[34]Clouzet, 268-274.

Currently the SDA Theological Seminary at Andrews University requires one course in leadership of its M.Div. students.

However, the question remains, Do today's seminary graduates experience an effective preparation for ministry leadership? Does theological inquiry in itself form a person who is a more effective learner and who thus accommodates the leadership challenges of local church ministry more readily?

Methodology

The purpose of this second stage of research is to assess and analyze the effect of SDA graduate education on the leadership practices of persons in pastoral ministry in the SDA Church. Do seminary graduates typically possess greater leadership skills than pastors who have received only undergraduate training?

In order to investigate a possible differentiation, it was necessary to identify two groups of pastors who could be contrasted. This was accomplished by selecting a number of local conferences or judicatories. The SDA Church in the United States and Canada is organized into 56 local conferences. Pastors were chosen from 27 of these.

The process of selection was not random, but was done in a manner that ensured that all of the nine NAD union conferences[35] selected pastors from three local conferences within each union's jurisdiction. In addition to geographic diversity, the selection included conferences of different sizes and four regional or Black conferences. The pool from which to draw names is thus highly representative of the SDA Church in North America.

The next step was to write to the ministerial director of each of the selected 27 conferences. The ministerial director supervises pastoral work in the local conference and thus is in a good position to know the training and qualifications of the ministers in his field. The director was asked to supply the names of five pastors who possessed graduate theological education and five who did not—if the conference had as many as five in each category. We asked for pastors with four to ten years of ministry experience in each category. A form to collect the information was included. Twenty-six of the 27 directors provided data.

Not all of the data supplied by ministerial directors met the necessary criteria for this study, e.g., some did not provide ten names. In addition, some of the names were of associate pastors, who were not included in the study. After eliminating these names, the final list included 200 pastors. We then identified their congregations, or principal congregations in cases

[35]Union conferences supervise clusters of local conferences.

where a district encompassed more than one church. Lay officers, who held the positions of head elder, personal ministries director, and youth leader, for each congregation were selected. It was assumed that these three officers, being vitally involved in the operation of the congregation, would be in a good position to observe the leadership skills of their pastor.

The instrument chosen to rate the leadership skills was the Leadership Practices Inventory (LPI) developed by James Kouzez and Barry Pozner.[36] The LPI consists of thirty descriptions of behavior. The observer is asked to rate the pastor on each behavior using a ten-point scale from "almost never" to "almost always." Answers are then aggregated into five scales of six responses each. The scales are: Challenging the Process, Inspiring a Shared Vision, Enabling Others to Act, Modeling the Way, and Encouraging the Heart. In addition, we requested some personal information from the raters, such as gender, length of time as an SDA, ethnic background, level of formal education, and age group.

The LPI was mailed to 600 lay leaders, but 90 were returned as "addressee unknown" or "party moved and left no forwarding address." We assumed then that 510 surveys were actually delivered to the intended target. A second mailing was implemented several weeks later to those who had not responded. A total of 286 surveys were returned, approximately 56 percent of those delivered. Of these, 160 evaluated pastors who possessed a graduate theological degree and 126 evaluated pastors who had only an undergraduate education.

For each rating sheet the scores for the six variables that comprised each of the five practices were summed to establish a total score for that practice. In addition, the totals of each of the five leadership practices were summed to develop a master leadership scale. The t-test for the difference between independent means was employed to determine significant differences between the two groups of pastors on each of the five leadership practices as well as on the total leadership score. Finally, the leadership scores were correlated with various demographic items.

Findings

The purpose of this second stage of research was to assess and analyze the effect of graduate theological education on the leadership practices

[36]James M. Kouzes, Chairman and CEO of Tom Peters Group/Learning Systems, and Barry Z. Posner, Dean of the Leavy School of Business and Administration at Santa Clara University, generated the conceptual framework for this approach from research, interviews, and case studies. The Leadership Practices Inventory has subsequently been validated in numerous studies over the past ten years.

of persons in pastoral ministry in the SDA Church. Do seminary graduates in SDA ministry typically possess greater leadership skills than pastors who have received only undergraduate training?

Our research, while showing a slight consistent variation, finds no significant difference in leadership skills between the two groups. These current results are consistent with earlier studies and the conclusions of researchers over the past fifty years, as reported in the literature review.

The t-tests for independent means are displayed in Table 1. Each of the 30 items was scored 1 to 10. The value of each scale was the mean of the items answered. There were no extremes: all these means ranged in the sixes and sevens. Finally, the five means for each group were added, arriving at a combined leadership mean.

Table 1 shows that on every practice and on the combined scores the means are somewhat higher for those with graduate theological education than for those without it. However, it also shows that none of these differences is statistically significant. Therefore, we must conclude that this study demonstrates no significant difference in leadership practices between the two groups.

What does the research indicate? The most evident discovery is that the findings are consistent with earlier research. While we may have wished to discover improvement, no significant change in the impact of leadership formation through SDA graduate theological education has been discovered.

It is important to recognize the time frame referenced in this research. The pastoral samples were of persons with four to ten years of ministerial experience. This means the research measures the formative effect of theological education delivered to a pastoral population in the final decade of the twentieth century. Significant curriculum adjustments made at the SDA Theological Seminary in 1999 or later would have no effect on this study.

It should be further noted that current and recent past requirements in leadership courses in the curriculum of the SDA Theological Seminary reflect the norm in graduate theological education. Only one required two-credit course in leadership is currently included in the M.Div. curriculum at the SDA Theological Seminary.[37]

In regard to reliability, the task assigned to the lay leaders was subjective. While the reliability of the assessment instrument has been

[37]Note the findings and recommendations of Alan Nelson referenced earlier in this report.

well established,[38] a number of factors could influence the respondents. Examples might be local contextual factors such as economic or demographic shifts, church conflicts, or generational differences between the pastor and congregation, any of which may impact church health and may bias the perspectives of effective leadership unfairly.

Table 1
Comparisons of Pastors Who Have Graduate Theological Education with Those Who Do Not on Five Leadership Practices

Leadership Practice	Mean of Pastors Graduate Education	Mean of Pastors No Graduate Education	Significance
Challenging the process	6.83	6.62	.39
Inspiring a shared vision	7.34	7.18	.52
Enabling others to act	7.79	7.50	.19
Modeling the way	7.48	7.47	.97
Encouraging the heart	7.35	7.06	.21
Combined leadership	36.79	35.83	.38

Another possibility is that some factor other than education is influencing the ratings. We asked lay leaders to indicate their age groups as follows: under 25, 25-39, 40-54, 55-65, and over 65. We then correlated the ages with scores they gave to the pastor's leadership practices. The results are shown in Table 2.

Four of the leadership practices and the combined leadership scores were correlated with age. The correlation coefficients are quite modest, but with the exception of challenging the process all are significant beyond the .05 level, with two practices and the combined total reaching the .01 level. Older members tend to rate pastors higher, which could influence the education/noneducation equation.

[38]A technical presentation of the Leadership Practices Inventory may be obtained from the authors at www.kouzesposner.com.

Still, the most obvious conclusion is that graduate theological education is not doing a superior job of developing leadership practices.

Table 2
Correlations of Perceived Leadership Practices with Age Group Respondents

Leadership Practice	Pearson Correlation	Significance
Challenging the process	.11	.07
Inspiring a shared vision	.15	.01
Enabling others to act	.13	.03
Modeling the way	.15	.01
Encouraging the heart	.12	.04
Combined leadership	.14	.01

Since we know from Part 1 of this research that the use of superior leadership practices does predict pastoral success, then, certainly, leadership development should be a concern of seminary education.

Nelson found in his review of American seminaries that only three institutions demonstrated significant emphasis on leadership development.[39] We wish to continue the research question by observing graduates of those programs and examining those leadership curricula. Recent developments in learning theory and the field of leadership studies can provide a prescriptive base and inform change as the challenges of providing superior pastoral leadership for the church are met in the future.

[39]Nelson.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS

THE USE OF SCIENCE IN THEOLOGY: CASE STUDIES OF LANGDON B. GILKEY AND THOMAS F. TORRANCE

Researcher: Martin Frederick Hanna
Faculty Adviser: Fernando Canale, Ph.D.
Date completed: November 2003

Purpose

The purpose of this dissertation is to address the problem of the use of science in theology in the writings of Thomas F. Torrance and Langdon B. Gilkey. Chapter 1 introduces the problem in terms of definitions of science and theology and the history of the use of science in theology. Attention is given to definitions of science as exclusive or inclusive of theology and to definitions of theology as the study of God and/or the study of divine revelation. The historical background to the problem is surveyed in terms of premodern, modern, and postmodern shifts in science and in the use of scientific theory and method in theology.

Methodology

Chapters 2 and 3 analytically describe Torrance's and Gilkey's models for the use of science in theology. The following questions are addressed. Who are Torrance and Gilkey? Do they propose models for the use of science in theology? Are their models responsive to the postmodern shift in science, theology, and the use of science in theology? Are their models Christocentric, bibliocentric, or cosmocentric? Is a dialogical or dialectic/correlational model indicated in their references to the uses and the limits of the use of science in theology? Are the postmodern, dialogical, and dialectical elements of their models controlled by the Christocentric and cosmocentric structure of their models? Chapter 4 compares and contrasts their models. Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation and gives its conclusions and recommendations for further study.

Conclusions

In response to the postmodern shift, Torrance proposes a Christocentric-dialogical model for the use of science in theology, while Gilkey proposes a cosmocentric-dialectical model. There are comparison and contrast between the models in each area evaluated in this study. From each other's perspectives, contrasting elements and elements of comparison may indicate nonviability or viability of parts of their models. Another perspective would result from the use of a comprehensively revelational model based on biblical revelation. Such a model could provide a biblical interpretation of divine revelation in Christ and the cosmos and also be responsive to the postmodern shift in the use of science in theology.

INCARNATION AND COVENANT IN THE PROLOGUE TO THE FOURTH GOSPEL (JOHN 1:1-18)

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Date completed: September 2003

Most scholars would agree that the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel—as John 1:1-18 is usually called—introduces Jesus Christ as a divine, preexistent being, who at a certain point in time was made flesh and lived among humans. No agreement, however, exists on the point in the narrative at which the shift from one state to the other takes place. As John the Baptist is mentioned in vv. 6-8, many think that the following verses refer to the ministry of the incarnate Christ, while others, struck by the explicitness of v. 14, argue that this verse marks the transition from preexistence to incarnation. Some try to combine both views and argue that the central section of the Prologue (vss. 6-13) describes what they call the activity of the preincarnate Christ in OT times. There are also those who, not impressed either by vv. 6-8 or by v. 14, contend that it is only the first three verses of the Prologue that necessarily refer to the preexistent Christ. For a few interpreters the entire Prologue is about the incarnate Christ.

By making a detailed and comprehensive analysis of this issue and evaluating all differing views, the dissertation seeks to establish exactly at what point the Prologue begins to speak about the incarnate Christ. The analysis is based on the Prologue's present form and organization and presupposes its coherence and unity.

Three main chapters form the bulk of this study. These correspond to the natural divisions of the Prologue (vv. 1-5; vv. 6-13; vv. 14-18) and, to a certain extent, to the various views on the point of incarnation.

The first main chapter (chap. 2) considers the incarnation in vv. 1-5 and concludes that there is no evidence to support the claim that the transition from preexistence to incarnation occurs either in v. 4 or in v. 5, much less that the entire Prologue is about the incarnate Christ. The perspective of these verses is fundamentally cosmological and, as such, they refer to the preexistent Christ.

Chapter 3 addresses the question whether vv. 6-13 describe the ministry of the preincarnate Christ in the OT period. The conclusion is that they describe the historical ministry of Jesus Christ, whose coming into the world—the point of the incarnation—is mentioned in v. 9, although the modality of his coming is not spelled out until v. 14.

The last chapter establishes the meaning of v. 14 in view of an incarnational interpretation of vv. 6-13. This verse, together with vv. 15-18, is intended to announce not the incarnation proper, but its theological significance, which is based on the covenantal traditions of the exodus story and later prophetic expectations. It consists of a radical affirmation that the new eschatological era of salvation has been inaugurated with the incarnation of Jesus Christ.

THE EARLY BRONZE AGE CERAMIC ASSEMBLAGE FROM TELL TA^{C}ANNEK, PALESTINE

Researcher: Mark S. Ziese
Faculty Adviser: Randall W. Younker, Ph.D.
Date completed: July 2002

The Problem

Greenberg states that isolating temporal ceramic indicators for the Early Bronze II-III periods is "one of the thorniest issues in the archaeology of Palestine" (2000, 183). The problem is twofold: the homogenous nature of ceramic assemblages from Early Bronze Age Palestine, and a continued lack of published information. Both issues are addressed by this study. Excavations at Tell Ta^{c}annek between 1963 and 1967 unearthed the remains of a multiperiod site, including the residues of an Early Bronze II-III fortified settlement. The purpose was to isolate that portion of the site in the collected records and residues in order to produce a ceramic sample that is stratigraphically derived. From this sample, inferences may be drawn concerning chronology, technology, and trade.

The Method

On the basis of data drawn from field records, a relative chronology of the settlement was built by square and locus. This sequence was tested by the retrieval and analysis of saved ceramic sherds. Index forms forced alterations in the sequence that, in turn, prompted additional stratigraphic work. This cycle produced approximately 400 isolated loci and a working sample of some 2,000 sherds, which were then analyzed internally in typological and technological terms and externally through comparison with other published assemblages from North Palestine.

The Results

Deposition from the site suggests three Early Bronze Age strata and a corresponding ceramic sequence stretching from Early Bronze I (Stratum 1), Early Bronze II (Stratum 2), and early Early Bronze III (Stratum 3). While the presence of fortification and destruction debris is indicative of destabilization and armed conflict, the ceramic record of "Common Ware" is stable and fairly homogenous, interrupted only by the presence of Metallic and Khirbet Kerak Wares.

Conclusion

Using Metallic and Khirbet Kerak Wares as reference points, select "Common Ware" features may be isolated. These contribute to a growing set of knowledge that is promising for isolating temporal ceramic indicators for the Early Bronze II-III periods. It is suggested that most residents of Tell Ta^{c}annek were removed from, or resistant to, "imported" potting traditions that left a powerful imprint elsewhere in North Palestine. A preference for local wares over more expensive or exotic forms underlines a rural conservatism that is consistent with the site's location.

BOOK REVIEWS

Anderson, Robert T., and Terry Giles. *The Keepers: An Introduction to the History and Culture of the Samaritans.* Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002. xvi + 165 pp. Hardcover, $29.95.

Significant archaeological discoveries are waiting to be made in the deserts of American academia and the storerooms of American museums. In the spring of 1968, such a discovery was made in some cardboard boxes in a storage room under the football stadium at Michigan State University. It consisted of important artifacts and manuscripts that had been acquired from the impoverished Samaritans many decades before by E. K. Warren, a wealthy citizen of Three Oaks, Michigan. It was this discovery made by Robert T. Anderson, a professor at the university, that eventually led to the production of the present work, a brief and readable account of Samaritan history and religion. As compared with its larger predecessor by John Macdonald, *The Theology of the Samaritans* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), Anderson and Giles provide a more complete history (largely drawn from the much older work of James Montgomery and the German work of Nathan Schur), but a much more abbreviated description of theology.

The authors make a distinction, not always consistently, between Samaritans as a sect and what they call Proto-Samaritans or Samarians. They lay out three criteria as markers of Samaritanism: self-awareness as a religious sect, use of the Samaritan Pentateuch, and the choice of Mount Gerizim as their center of worship (9). Accordingly they do not see clear evidence for a final schism from Jerusalemite Judaism until the time of John Hyrcanus in mid-second century B.C.E. They ascribe to Josephus the application of charges of syncretism in places like 2 Kgs 17 against the Samaritan sect and regard it as unjust and tendentious (14-19), yet they acknowledge that the theophoric names found in the documents discovered in caves at Wadi ed-Daliyah (mid-fourth century B.C.E.) include both Yahwistic and pagan deities (26). They therefore term the materials "Samarian," but in the next paragraph they call the unfortunate owners "Samaritans."

After dealing with the biblical and nonbiblical sources for our knowledge of the Samaritans in the OT, NT, Josephus, and the rabbinic literature, as well as the traditions of the Samaritans themselves, the book covers, in successive chapters the Byzantine and Islamic periods and modern times. Though this people enjoyed occasional times of favor, prosperity, and revival, for the most part their situation has been so wretched that it is a marvel that they still survive at all. (Today they number only a few hundred, about the same number as four centuries ago, but more than at the beginning of the twentieth century.) Ever since the sixteenth century Western scholars have taken an interest in them and begun to acquire Samaritan manuscripts, but the dealings of Westerners until modern times must be characterized as deceptive and exploitive (92-103). The relationship between contemporary Samaritans and Israeli Jews is ambiguous: hostility is now minimal but intermarriage is exceptional and there is reluctance

to allow burial of Samaritans in Jewish cemeteries (103).

Chapter 8 provides a detailed account (with photographic illustrations) of the Samaritan Pentateuch, the earliest surviving manuscript of which is the Abisha Scroll, dating from the ninth century C.E. Written in a variety of the palaeo-Hebrew alphabet, the Samaritan form of the Pentateuch represents a textual tradition that is independent of the MT and the LXX, but related to both. Its recovery by Western scholars catalyzed the beginning of OT textual criticism, and representatives of its type of text have been found at Qumran. The clarity of this chapter is not helped by sentences such as: "The text itself is written in majuscule (large) Samaritan characters in Arabic, or frequently in Arabic using Samaritan characters" (110), especially since the manuscripts are for the most part in Hebrew.

Samaritan theology and religion (chap. 9) was obviously hammered out in dialogue with Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Our authors succinctly describe the theology under the rubrics of monotheism (very rigorous, but allowing for the role of angels), Moses (the ultimate and most exalted prophet), Torah (venerated as something like God's very presence), Mount Gerizim (the navel of the earth and location of all the pivotal events of sacred history), and the day of vengeance and recompense when the Taheb, a sort of messiah and second Moses (cf. Deut 18:18), appears and restores the time of divine favor. They also discuss the priesthood, the Mosaic pilgrimage festivals, and the other rituals of circumcision, Sabbath, funerals, and corporate worship. Special attention is given to the nature of the sacredness of Mount Gerizim (128-33). A final chapter is devoted to the Samaritan collection at Michigan State University, "the largest assemblage of Samaritan materials in the United States" (135).

The authors apparently envisioned a fairly broad audience for this book. Scattered throughout the text are boxed sidebars explaining matters that a lay readership might not be presumed to know, but the standard scholarly apparatus is all there as well. It is a useful introduction.

Andrews University ROBERT M. JOHNSTON

BibleWorks 6. Norfolk, VA: BibleWorks, 2003. Software Program. $299.95.

For those who have never used BibleWorks before, it might best be described as a Bible software tool with impressive information and searching capabilities containing all of the major Greek and Hebrew/Aramaic texts, as well as a large number of the best English and modern-language versions. Not a "library on CD" like some other biblical-software offerings, BibleWorks keeps its attention strictly focused on providing the most powerful and up-to-date resources possible for the primary tasks of exegeting the ancient text. This program is one of the small handful that I use (gratefully) every day, as I have done for years.

Verses, passages, and whole chapters can easily be looked up and displayed in several versions simultaneously, either vertically or side by side. Basic parsing and lexical information for the ancient-language biblical texts is always available onscreen as one rolls the cursor across each word. A broader range of lexicons can be consulted by the click of a mouse button; and, for those who want the

scholarly standards on-screen, both the latest Bauer-Danker and Koehler-Baumgartner editions can be added for an additional fee.

BibleWorks's searching ability ranges from the basic and easy-to-use word or phrase search to incredibly complex combinations of word, phrase, and morphology specifications using the powerful "Advanced Search Engine." Among other search options, one is able, e.g., to locate particular types of morphology, such as feminine nominative participles, either in a general search or as used in a particular word or list of words. Any search can be limited to a specific passage, book, or range of books. Search results are easy to transfer into any of the major word-processing programs, and verses or passages can even be imported from within the word processor without having to switch windows or perform a cut-and-paste operation.

BibleWorks also offers its own well-equipped word processor that is always open for use next to the biblical text. Besides doing the basic word-processing functions, this wordprocessor allows users to make their own notes on biblical verses or passages and attach them directly to the text so that they may be opened with the text at any future time. The "Notes Function," however, is probably the least user-friendly of any of BibleWorks's major offerings. It is difficult to perceive, e.g., how to save one's notes and how to move around between chapters and verses. Even the on-board tutorial on the subject is rather hazy on such specifics.

In recent years, BibleWorks has worked hard to make itself as valuable and useful for the beginner as it always has been for the experienced scholar. One of the available interfaces is designed especially for the beginner or layperson, making it accessible for just about anyone who wants to do things such as look up verses, check different versions, do simple word or phrase searches, and even find the meaning of an English word in its original Greek or Hebrew form. As expertise with the program is gained, the user can quickly graduate to the more powerful interfaces, which exchange simplicity of understanding for greater speed and research potential. While the program can be easy to use, it is not particularly affordable for the nonprofessional user. The $299.95 price tag is rather high for the average person to pay for these basic functions and will be most attractive for those who plan to do at least some work in the ancient languages. One other potential drawback to the BibleWorks program is the fact that it is available only for PCs, with no Mac version suggested in the near future.

The new offerings with BibleWorks 6 are practically irresistible. Somehow BibleWorks manages to keep coming up with exciting new features so that even those who just bought the previous version months earlier are left casting about for another $125 to buy the latest model. With BibleWorks 6, e.g., users get the complete works of Josephus (Greek, Latin, morphology, and English), the Apostolic Fathers (Greek and Latin), a collection of Targumim (Aramaic and morphology), and the Peshitta (Syriac and English). Those who pay an additional fee may add a collection of Qumran sectarian manuscripts and several top-notch grammar texts. Unfortunately, these new texts are not yet fully integrated into the BibleWorks system, and it takes some time to figure out how to get to and

manipulate them. In addition, full morphology and lexical data are not yet available. Other useful new tools BibleWorks 6 adds include editable outlines, a Greek and Hebrew flashcard builder, and the ability to build sentence and structural diagrams, to highlight text in various colors, and to automatically compare and highlight differences between same-language texts.

One particularly annoying new feature is the pop-up "Word Tip" window, which shows up next to the cursor as it is moved across the Greek or Hebrew text. Meant to make it even easier to read quickly through the original languages by providing instant parsing and definition of each Greek or Hebrew word near at hand, the "Word Tip" mini-window gets in the way of the surrounding text and gives away too much in a classroom setting where the professor wants the students to be working out this information for themselves. Since the same information is already automatically displayed in the "Auto-info" window below the "Results" window, one may elect to turn this function off—a simple procedure once one finds the instructions.

Overall, the small irritations are minor compared to the unsurpassed contribution BibleWorks makes to biblical research. The program is fast and, in the majority of areas, easy to use. With BibleWorks, scholars can work with the biblical text in ways they could only wistfully dream of, if even imagine, in the past. It is a pleasure to use. If one had to decide what five things he or she would take along for a study leave on a desert isle (assuming one has electricity), BibleWorks should be at the top of the list.

Andrews University TERESA L. REEVE

Botterweck, Johannes, Helmer Ringgren, and Heinz-Josef Fabry, eds. *TDOT*, vol. 11, trans. David E. Green. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001. xxiv + 615 pp. Hardcover, $60.00.

Volume 11 of the *TDOT* includes 83 articles on the theological significance of words in the Hebrew Bible, ranging from עוז ("strength") to פָּנִים ("face"). With the translation of this volume, the series is moving toward its completion, putting at the disposal of the OT student an important tool for understanding the *meaning* of the terms under discussion. One notices that the layout of each article, as in the preceding volumes, follows a similar pattern, although not rigidly applied, which typically includes the following items: etymology and ANE cognates; occurrences in the OT, LXX, and Qumran; biblical and extrabiblical usage, including the various grammatical derivatives of the lexeme; and theological meanings and concepts.

As a positive aspect of the dictionary, a number of articles include the study of lexical and semantic word-fields, avoiding the limitation of focusing artificially on one word without taking into consideration its linguistic and semantic relations. As a good example, G. F. Hasel's excellent treatment of the semantic field of פָּלַט ("escape; deliver") should be mentioned (551-567), where he discusses the semantic and syntactical proximity of the verbal root to other

stems such as נצל ("deliver"), נוס ("flee"), ישע ("save") (557-560). See also D. Kellermann's article on עֲטָרָה ("crown, wreath") (18-28), where he studies semantically related words such as נזר ("royal diadem"), לְוָיָה ("garland"), and תּוֹרִים ("decorations joined together to form a wreath"). However, the majority of the word studies uses a more traditional linguistic approach and focuses mostly on etymological relationships.

The articles are generally written from within the tradition of European form-critical and traditiohistorical scholarship. The majority of contributions stem from European, Scandinavian, and Israeli scholars, with only a small number of articles being written by authors from North America (six out of 53 in total). One has to take into consideration the interval of about thirteen years between the original German, which was published in 1988, and the translated present volume, which creates a certain gap between the dictionary and current scholarly opinion.

There are a number of minor orthographical errors, mainly occurring in the German titles in the footnotes, which basically appear to be errors of translation and copying (e.g., 39, n. 76; 394, n. 38; 402, n. 53).

One can only hope that the translation of the series will continue at a good pace and that the complete set will be available soon to the scholar of the OT who does not include German on the menu of his or her interests. Hopefully, the final price for the whole series will be accessible not only to institutions but also to individuals.

River Plate Adventist University MARTIN G. KLINGBEIL
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Engberg-Pedersen, Troels, ed. *Paul Beyond the Judaism/ Hellenism Divide*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2001. x + 355 pp. Paperback, $39.95.

Paul Beyond the Judaism/ Hellenism Divide is a handsome collection of essays by some of the leading scholars in Pauline research, dealing with sociology, anthropology, and Greco-Roman rhetoric. In some respects harking back to W. D. Davies (*Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology*, 4th ed. [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980]), the present volume argues that Judaism never existed in isolation from or as a religiocultural entity opposed to Hellenism. A volume teeming with rich ideas, this work should be a required reading for anyone with an interest in Paul's Jewish and Hellenistic backgrounds.

Due to its specific focus on Paul, as well as its sociohistorical orientation, the general direction of the present volume differs from *Hellenism in the Land of Israel* (J. J. Collins and G. E. Sterling, eds., Christianity and Judaism in Antiquity 13 [Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001]). But inasmuch as both works are among the latest responses to Martin Hengel's *Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter in Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period* (trans. John Bowden, 2 vols. [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974])—a work whose impact has been felt in nearly all the subsequent works on Judaism and Hellenism—reading the two works side by side (or one after another, as I did)

will provide the reader with a broader, deeper, and more balanced historical perspective on the question. Moreover, as a sequel to the earlier *Paul in His Hellenistic Context* (Troels Engberg-Pedersen, ed. [Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995]), the present volume has been produced with the same premise as that work, namely, that Paul needs to be understood "within a shared 'context,'" as one among many Greco-Roman personalities of antiquity (1). The chief difference is that the present volume extends that premise beyond Paul to Judaism, so that Judaism can also be understood as one among many ancient Mediterranean cultural groups struggling for survival and self-expression within "the comprehensive cultural melting pot" of Hellenism (2).

In his opening essay ("Judaism, Hellenism, and the Birth of Christianity"), Wayne A. Meeks offers a succinct sketch of past and present Pauline scholarship. Meeks persuasively argues that the evolutionary assumptions that lie behind the Hegelian dialectic of Tübingen and the *Religionsgeschichtliche* school of Göttingen have in recent years been set aside in favor of less ambitious and more concrete studies, concentrating on subjects such as "Paul's Greco-Roman rhetoric" or his "sociopolitical strategies." Then Dale B. Martin ("Paul and the Judaism/Hellenism Dichotomy: Toward a Social History of the Question"), largely in agreement with Meek's basic thesis, closes in with lethal arguments on the badly wounded behemoth that is the methodological legacy of nineteenth-century Germany. He avers that the all-too-neat, symmetrical dualism that sought to characterize Hellenism and Judaism as mutually exclusive, antithetical cultural opposites is a sheer *tour de force* of nineteenth-century Germany, an academic monstrosity that German intellectuals conjured up to bolster the value of German *Kultur* against the advancing political hegemonies of France and Britain. Martin declares: "German scholars throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were powerless to escape its grasp" (35).

Martin's essay itself, however, seems to be built on the dualistic assumption that Hellenism represents universalism and Judaism represents particularism. At the beginning of the essay, Martin offers a persuasive argument that nineteenth-century German scholarship had arbitrarily ascribed to Hellenism universalistic (therefore desirable) religiocultural values, using Judaism at every turn as a foil for the superiority of the German culture. Then, Martin goes on to argue that the contrary was true in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England and in post-World War II America, where scholars, by ascribing to universalism negative values such as colonialism, preferred the particularism of Hebraism (or Judaism in the case of America). Martin's primary aim in these discussions seems to be to show that Hellenism, i.e., universalism, was not uniformly favored by scholars outside of Germany. In the midst of his brilliant argument, Martin, however, may be overlooking an important point, that universalism and particularism are generic conceptual categories that have persisted in history to our day. I am in complete agreement with Martin that it is a mistake to see Paul's world in crude dualistic terms and equate, in a knee-jerk fashion, Hellenism with universalism and Judaism with

particularism. But as Stanley K. Stowers's essay in this book ably points out, universalism and particularism coexisted in Hellenism as parallel phenomena: whereas the Greek philosophers, especially those in the Platonic school, were universalistic in their thinking, most of the common people seem to have understood the Hellenistic culture in particularistic terms, such as land, generational continuity, and unique adaptation of different varieties of ethnic cult (87-88). Similarly, universalism also existed within Second Temple Judaism alongside particularism. The writings of Philo, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, and *The Letter of Aristeas*—in contrast to *Jubilees*, for example—were considerably more universalistic in orientation. Martin's essay unfortunately gives the impression that the dualism of universalism and particularism was itself an invention of nineteenth-century Germany. Rather, it appears that the fallacy of nineteenth-century Germany lay in the equation of Hellenism with universalism (therefore as something positive) and Judaism as a whole with particularism (therefore as the embodiment of everything sinful and evil). This falsity notwithstanding, the dualism of universalism and particularism must be recognized as an enduring conceptual category that transcends ethnic, cultural, and temporal boundaries.

Responding to Martin, Philip S. Alexander ("Hellenism and Hellenization as Problematic Historiographical Categories") asserts that any similarity between the Greek culture and Rabbinic Judaism—which ranged from individual concepts to major cultural conventions—was not so much the result of direct borrowing as of cross-pollination caused by geographical proximity and common historical circumstances going back many centuries. In support of his thesis, Alexander produces impressive and extensive documentation of the borrowed Greek words of the educated kind found in the Rabbinic literature to note that the writings of the rabbis offer no evidence of their formal training in Greek. This painstaking effort serves well as corroboration for Alexander's thesis, but it does little to clarify just what those Hellenized values were which are to be found in the Jewish material of Paul's time (other than the writings of Philo).

Stanley K. Stowers ("Does Pauline Christianity Resemble a Hellenistic Philosophy") advances an interesting hypothesis that Paul's communities differed from both Hellenistic volunteer associations and Jewish synagogues alike because, unlike these, there were no organic and symbolic relations developed or promoted between his communities and the "practices related to sacrifice, intergenerational continuity, and productivity" (86). Instead, Paul's communities resembled Hellenistic philosophical schools such as Pyrrhonism, Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Cynicism (93), which focused on questions concerning self-mastery, textual interpretation, and the workings of the soul ("technology of the self") with each centering on the school's central "unitary value," such as virtue, freedom, and friendship. Stowers's provocative hypothesis raises several questions that impinge on the overall thesis of the present volume. First, if the Greek philosophical schools intentionally fashioned their communities in opposition to the local consuetudinary practices both religiously and culturally (88-89), would it not be fair to say that the teachings of the philosophical schools were universalistic (cf.

100-102)? Also, if Stowers's thesis is correct, would it not be accurate to say that it was Pauline Christianity, rather than nineteenth-century Germany, which was ultimately responsible—by virtue of its unitary *universalistic* value (viz., Christ)—for the ideational tendency that gave rise to the dualism of Hellenism (universalism)/Judaism (particularism) in Pauline scholarship? In other words, if we go with Stowers's Judean hypothesis (83), the relationship of Paul and Judaism must be viewed as being on a par with, say, the universalistic Zeno's disdain for the local worshipers of Zeus. Finally, Stowers's hypothesis calls into question the key aspects of Krister Stendahl's thesis set forth years ago ("The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West," *HTR* 56 [1963]: 199-215) that the Western notions of introspective conscience were a later intellectual development that was not so elegantly worked into Christianity by Augustine. If Paul was creating communities styled after Hellenistic philosophical schools whose teachings focused on the questions of character and the inner workings of the soul, are not Paul's teachings ultimately introspective in character? If Stowers is correct, the problem of introspective conscience in the West may be a direct legacy of Paul's penchant for the mastery of the self, a legacy that was embellished, neatened, and passed on to posterity by Augustine.

Loveday Alexander ("*IPSE DIXIT*: Citation of Authority in Paul and in the Jewish and Hellenistic Schools") advances an intriguing hypothesis that explicit verbatim quotations were the literary means by which the tradents of antiquity made known their allegiance to their respective founding sages, whose doctrines they each espoused. If confirmed, this thesis will have a significant impact on our understanding not only of Paul's writings, but of the biblical writings as a whole. If explicit citations were indeed the time-honored method in the ancient Hellenistic world by which the founding teacher's ideas were passed on to the succeeding generations of pupils, one wonders why we do not find explicit quotations of Scriptures in any of the pre-Pauline Jewish writings of the Second Temple period except in the Dead Sea Scrolls, especially if the Hellenistic thought patterns and scribal practices had made inroads into Judaism, as the present volume maintains. If Alexander is correct, to what degree can the authors of the Pseudepigraphal writings, for example, be thought of as tradents, since none of them contains what could be characterized as explicit citations of Scripture? Is it possible that Second Temple Judaism had developed, in conformity with the practices of the biblical prophets and writers, its own system of transmission, unaffected by (or even in opposition to) the Hellenistic pedagogical influence? Moreover, if Alexander is correct, are we to assume that of all the Jewish sects in the Second Temple period the Essene pedagogy was most deeply influenced by the Hellenistic philosophical schools?

Wayne A. Meek's essay ("Corinthian Christians as Artificial Aliens") argues that Pauline communities, particularly those in Corinth, most closely resembled, by virtue of requiring conversion from their would-be members, the Jewish Diaspora communities, which in turn resembled other transplanted ethnic immigrant communities of the contemporary Mediterranean world. Meeks

characterizes Paul's Christian groups as "artificial aliens," partaking in the Jewish quest for identity, itself a quintessentially Hellenistic quest found in other ethnic associations trying to deal with the vexing question of where to draw the line between identity and assimilation. There is no question that Meeks is correct in his assessment that the people living in the ancient Mediterranean world would have viewed Paul's communities as just another odd sort of self-styled alien group.

John M. G. Barclay ("Matching Theory and Practice: Josephus's Constitutional Ideal and Paul's Strategy in Corinth") posits that Paul's community was a πολιτεία founded upon a "constitutional" ideal akin to that outlined in Josephus's *Against Apion* (144). According to Josephus, an ideal πολιτεία rested on five basic principles: matching of theory and practice, thorough education, comprehensive application of ethical principles in daily life, unquestioning adherence to the law, and harmony in belief and practice. Comparing Paul point by point with Josephus's five principles of constitutional structure (144-149), Barclay concludes that whereas Paul's civic program is deficient on practical specificity that Josephus ascribes to Judaism, it is very much comparable to the constitutional utopianism of Josephus. As one reads Barclay's scintillating comparisons of Paul's community and the Josephan Jewish polity, however, especially for anyone who cut his or her teeth on the old German school, it is difficult not to notice the hint of superiority (of course, unintended) in the expressions such as "flexibility and adaptability" (162) and "creative environments" (163), which Barclay uses to describe the Pauline community vis-à-vis Judaism, even if this Judaism is only a figment of Josephus's imagination. Paul's community—whose "structural *desideratum*" (162) was "an apparently conscious disinclination to spell out" (161) the observant life in rigid detail—would have been, I am sure for many, a superior environment in which to live and work compared to the straight-jacket polity of Judaism that Josephus describes. Barclay's essay offers a lot to ponder and many research ideas that need to be pursued, but his comparison ironically leads to a fateful fork in the road: the old and familiar path of the German schools or the new path that the present volume is trying to pioneer; either Paul was trumping the Josephan type of Judean ideals with his version of universalism in the style of the Hellenistic philosophical schools such as Stoicism (cf. Stowers), or Paul and Judaism were two similar but equally valid and fundamentally unrelated social phenomena growing randomly on the rich soil of Hellenism.

In any case, the three essays by Stowers, Meeks, and Barclay, espousing three very different characterizations of Paul's community, make plain that, to use the words of Barclay, Paul's churches were "new and culturally indeterminate" communities (141). It appears, however, that these essays unintentionally offer two somewhat opposing perspectives on Paul's community. Barclay's model comes closest to the insider view of how Paul and his converts would have thought about themselves, namely, as a community founded on the "constitution" of the gospel, a polity different from and superior to anything found in either

Judaism or Hellenism. By contrast, Stowers and Meeks offer the perspectives of outsiders who would have characterized the Pauline community as either an artificial alien association or a philosophical school.

Henrik Tronier ("The Corinthian Correspondence between Philosophical Idealism and Apocalypticism") posits a surprising view that Jewish apocalypticism ultimately derives from the Middle Platonic epistemology of *diairesis* (division) as formulated by Philo. Philo argued that cognitive transformation was needed before one could perceive the transcendent conceptual world whose dualistic rationality underpins the empirical world according to the logic of the logos, the agent responsible for both the ordering of the conceptual world and the impartation of the revelation effecting cognitive transformation. Thus in *1 Enoch*, the present empirical world, although spatially of a piece with its heavenly counterpart, becomes rationally comprehensible to Enoch only through the interpretive activities of heavenly messengers, who, due to their revelatory function, correspond to the Philonic logos. Then moving to Paul, Tronier locates, with impressive creativity and consistency, traces of Philo's *diairetic* epistemology in Paul's body metaphor (1 Cor 12), his description of a heavenly ascent (2 Cor 12), and his concept of the spiritual body (1 Cor 15). These, according to Tronier, are apocalyptic constructs whose aim is to effect cognitive transformation by reinterpreting the present situation against the backdrop of the pristine social order of the heavenly world, where the social hierarchy of this world is turned upside down and God's people of low status, such as Paul, are at the top of the pecking order. Although Tronier opens up new and promising ways of looking at Paul with these insights, his argument needs a broader evidentiary basis. For example, the interpretive activities of the heavenly messengers (the Holy Spirit in Paul's case), which unveil the rational meaning of the present empirical world, do not necessarily constitute evidence that the Jewish apocalypticists believed in a coherent and transcendent conceptual world comparable to that found in Platonism and Philo. Tronier's essay is creative and deserving of further study, but as it stands, its argument rests on tenuous grounds and its ideas (particularly those pertaining to 1 Cor 15) are a bit elusive.

In her essay ("Pauline Accommodation and 'Condescension' [συγκατάβασις]: 1 Cor 9:19-23 and the History of Influence"), Margaret M. Mitchell seeks to resolve the exegetical stalemate over 1 Cor 9:19-23 which, in her estimation, has been caused by the moribund hermeneutic kept afloat by the mistaken notion of the Judaism-and-Hellenism divide. The provenance of 1 Cor 9:19-23 cannot be traced, she argues, to a specific Hellenistic or Jewish source, as David Daube and Clarence E. Glad have tried to do in their works, but to Hellenistic-Jewish-Roman "commonplaces" that any reasonably well-informed denizens of the ancient Mediterranean world would have known. To prove her point, Mitchell examines with impressive erudition and care the works of Tertullian, Clement of Rome, Origen, and John Chrysostom, who, by virtue of living "closer to [Paul's] cultural milieu than we are" (213), were able

to explain the Pauline text based on the *topos* of condescension (συγκατάβασις) without explicitly referring to Homer, who first coined the word as a technical term to express the idea of divine variability. Mitchell contrasts and compares this plebeian exegetical practice of the fathers with that of Philo, who, in his explanation of the OT texts containing anthropomorphism as forms of divine condescension and variability, had no qualms about openly attributing the idea to Homer, a pagan author. Her point is that by the time Paul wrote 1 Cor 9:19-23, the *topos* of condescension or variability that was already a rhetorical commonplace in the Hellenistic world both in Judaism and Hellenism, was not attributable to any particular personality or source—in Mitchell's words, "a complex mix of Hellenistic Jewish assumptions and reappropriations" (214). One can only be grateful for Mitchell's beautifully conceived and ably argued thesis.

David E. Aune's essay ("Anthropological Duality in the Eschatology of 2 Cor 4:16–5:10") begins with a succinct summary of the scholarly debate on this passage, followed by a crisp, to-the-point delineation of the contrasting characterizations that have been mistakenly used in the past to describe Jewish apocalyptic eschatology and Hellenistic eschatology. Aune then leads his readers through a detailed exegesis of the passage, punctuating it with a massive body of evidence expertly culled from Hellenistic and Jewish literary sources, concluding that Paul is referring in 2 Cor 4:16–5:10 "to a temporary form of heavenly existence (an intermediate state)" occurring between one's death and resurrection (232). While cautiously recognizing that there is little direct evidence for this idea in the text (237 chart), Aune postulates, mostly on the basis of literary parallels, that Paul's notion of the intermediate state is "a conception that has both Hellenistic and Jewish features, but which is ultimately at home in neither" (239). Judging from the evidence appearing in the essay, the presence of Hellenistic conceptual categories in this passage seems to be a certainty, even if Paul obtained them either as transmitted through the Jewish writings or straight from popular philosophies traceable to Plato. Aune's main argument—that Paul came to believe in an interim heavenly postmortem existence that is fully "clothed" with a substance of some kind (if this is what Aune means) rather than in a disembodied state, as has been traditionally held—is interesting and deserves a further look. At the same time, Aune needs to answer more fully why this notion is at such variance with the rest of Paul's theology—a problem of which Aune is fully aware (236, 238)—because his postulation that Paul was creating a hybrid of Jewish and Hellenistic conceptual categories does not constitute a solution to this problem. Also, since according to Paul, the believer's inner transformation necessarily involves the body (cf. Rom 12:1-2), how would it have been possible for him, one wonders, to conceive of an existence that is without a body (cf. Tronier, 192), unless the interim existence involves no transformative experience at all?

Espousing Cilliers Breytenbach's thesis that Paul's reconciliation motif derives from the Hellenistic *topoi* of friendship and politics, John T. Fitzgerald ("Paul and Paradigm Shifts: Reconciliation and Its Linkage Group") argues that Paul did not

simply borrow the commonplaces, but fashioned new constructs out of them to bring about paradigm shifts in the thinking of the audience. For example, Paul took the original emancipation motif of the Sinai tradition and dramatically transformed it into a theme of enslavement. Also, he transformed the concept of atonement from a process initiated by humans through sacrifices and repentance into a process initiated by God through the sacrifice of his Son. The Hellenistic *topos* of reconciliation underwent similar changes at the hands of Paul, from being an appeal made by the offending party for a settlement and rapprochement to a grace settlement proffered by the offended party, which in this case was God. According to Fitzgerald, Paul was the first Jewish (Christian) person to bring together the ideas of atonement and reconciliation in a manner similar to Dionysus and Plato.

In his introductory essay ("Paul Beyond the Judaism/Hellenism Divide"), Engberg-Pedersen reveals and discusses the overall aim of the book, which is to put "a new program" of research (4) on the table for Pauline scholarship with the intention of replacing, for good, the misguided dualism of Hellenism and Judaism. As one makes one's way through the book, it becomes clear that, indeed, looking at Paul and Second Temple Judaism as subsets of Hellenism is not only a refreshing and fruitful interpretive approach, but an approach that is here to stay for quite a while. Nevertheless, the description given to the approach of the present work as a "new program" needs to be reconsidered, as it could give the false impression that the editor intends with these essays to put together a new *Schule* capable of bringing the entire Pauline scholarship on board, a feat that is no longer possible in our day.

Finally, one wonders whether looking at the NT through an outsider's perspective is necessarily a more accurate way of looking at history, unless, of course, one insists that history is an outsider's perspective, period. An urgent question is whether the insider's view of Paul, which, in my opinion, may be ultimately responsible for the dualism of Jewish particularism and Christian universalism (the nascent form of which has been pointed out in Barclay's essay), has any place in the current interpretive climate. If Paul, for example, formulated his gospel as a new interpretive possibility in the setting of the Jewish and Christian self-understanding that presupposed, rightly or wrongly, the dualism of Hellenism and Judaism, one wonders whether it is possible to understand Paul without referring to that dualism. In other words, one wonders whether the view of Paul offered in this volume, one which sees him primarily from an outsider's perspective, is not just as one-sided in the opposite direction as was the older view it seeks to replace.

Andrews University P. RICHARD CHOI

Fletcher-Louis, Crispin H. T. *All the Glory of Adam: Liturgical Anthropology in the Dead Sea Scrolls*, Studies in the Texts of the Desert of Judah, ed. F. García Martínez, vol. 42. Leiden: Brill, 2002. xii + 546 pp. Hardcover, $231.00.

In this work Crispin H. T. Fletcher-Louis mounts a full-fledged investigation into and reinterpretation of the anthropology of several significant Qumran

writings, in particular, the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice* and the *War Scroll*. Fletcher-Louis, who received his D. Phil. in Theology from Oxford University, is currently Lecturer in New Testament in the Department of Theology at Nottingham University. He has previously published his dissertation (*Luke-Acts: Angels, Christology and Soteriology* [WUNT 2.94; Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, 1997]), as well as a number of scholarly articles.

As Fletcher-Louis states in his preface, this work "is the development of a footnote" in his published dissertation (xi). He asks, "Has the liturgical *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice* from Qumran been misinterpreted, giving the wrong identification of the worshiping community it so rapturously speaks of?"

In chapter 1, Fletcher-Louis introduces the subject of angelomorphism in Late Second Temple Judaism, showing that this period took special interest in portraying Moses, kingship, and the priesthood with angelic characteristics. Chapter 2 is a case study devoted to pre- or proto-Essene traditions that speak of Noah in angelic and priestly terms, while chapter 3 further develops the conceptual background to an angelomorphic priesthood, with a focus on Sir 50. In chapters 4-7, he presents his understanding of how these concepts of a divine and angelic humanity and priestly angelomorphism are reflected in the Dead Sea Scrolls. Chapters 8-11 entail his detailed, focused, and revisionist reading of the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice* (largely in opposition to a number of Carol A. Newsom's earlier interpretations) in the light of his preceding discussion; he extends this approach to the *War Scroll* in chapter 12. A conclusion, bibliography, and series of three indices (authors, sources, subjects) round out the book.

Fletcher-Louis is to be commended for his comprehensive grasp of the primary literature of Second Temple Judaism, his attention to minute details, and his willingness to challenge scholarly opinion. His work is full of intriguing possibilities for a richer understanding of Second Temple Judaism. In spite of his attention to intricate details and his determination to squeeze every ounce he can out of the texts he examines, his work is readable and much easier to grasp than the subject material might suggest. Furthermore, his engaging style pulls the reader into the scholarly detective story he tells. I particularly appreciated his unexpected but fresh analogies to contemporary life (e.g., the temple cult as the "nearest equivalent to the modern fashion industry," 59).

Fletcher-Louis's work highlights the importance of the temple cult and its priesthood for understanding the theological anthropology of Second Temple Judaism—a stance he brings forcefully to the forefront (5). But he does not narrowly focus on just this particular issue, for he also deals with Jewish liturgy and the implications of understanding Jewish monotheism in reference to the veneration and worship of Jesus Christ. He is fully aware of the potential ramifications of his work on the latter topic (480), and I found myself looking forward to further work by him along these lines.

While the literary foundation of Fletcher-Louis's study is the writings of Second Temple Judaism, he also refers to NT literature to provide parallels or further explicate his points. While one cannot do everything in a work like this,

on occasion I felt a need for more reference to NT material. For example, his comment on "the strong priestly orientation to prophecy" (56) reminded me of the matrix of priesthood and prophecy in Revelation (cf. Rev 1:3, 6; 5:10; 10:11; 19:10; 20:6; 22:9). In this case, such a comparison might well have been illuminating because the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice* and Revelation have literary and conceptual parallels that occur nowhere else in Jewish and Christian literature through the end of the first century C.E.

It was around issues of methodology and conclusions, however, that I experienced my greatest frustration. A number of times, Fletcher-Louis found arguments from silence useful in supporting his interpretation of 4Q400 1 (281, 286-291). Yet to make a conclusion based on the lack of evidence, particularly when one is dealing with the extant yet fragmented copies of the Dead Sea Scrolls, is precarious in itself.

On the other hand, when there *was* evidence that did not support Fletcher-Louis's hypotheses and positions, it was sometimes downplayed: for instance, he discounts "meagre" evidence in support of "the sacrificial, atoning, [*sic*] activity of angels as a background to the material in the XIIIth Song" (359; cf. 360) and ultimately terms it "obscure" (261). But Rev 8:3-5—hardly an obscure text—refers to an angel offering incense in a golden censer at the altar in heaven, a fact which Fletcher-Louis recognizes. Nevertheless, he relegates it to a footnote, concluding that "its relevance for the *Sabbath Songs* is unclear since this [the altar of incense] is *not* one of the sacrificial items mentioned in the extant portion of Song XIII" (360, n. 8; emphasis original). This is, in my estimation, too narrow a restriction; however, it is an effective way to marginalize evidence of a potentially oppositional nature. Thus, one is left with two lingering questions: How much evidence does Fletcher-Louis need to temper his hypotheses? and What kind of evidence would he accept?

The dating of ancient Jewish and Christian sources is often a vexing issue. Fletcher-Louis exacerbates the problem by applying dating techniques inconsistently. On one hand, he is not averse to downgrading evidence because it is "from a later time (c. 100 A.D.)" (362 n. 15). On the other hand, a text such as the *Prayer of Joseph*, which he agrees can only "possibly" (28) be traced to the first century C.E., is used to illustrate beliefs about an angelic humanity (cf. 308). Similarly, while *2 Enoch* is also problematical with regard to dating before 100 C.E., he gives it several pages in his discussion of the divine and priestly Noah (49-51).

Fletcher-Louis frequently tempers his conclusions, realizing that the often fragmentary and interpretively problematic evidence is not always clear, and for this he is to be commended. Nevertheless, over-optimistic confidence overtakes his caution at times in interpreting texts, resulting in overstatement. For instance, he is confident that there are "many texts in which 'orthodox' Jewish practice and belief did, it seems, believe it appropriate under certain circumstances to worship a human being" (100-101). Yet, the eleven texts he refers to besides Sir 50 (101 n. 39) do not carry the weight of "many" in light of the huge corpus of available literature. Further, the "fact" (193) that a human high priest is in view in 4Q468b

is at best a strong possibility. And the "several" other pseudepigraphical texts Fletcher-Louis adduces in support of the righteous having a heavenly throne in this life are only two in number (207-208).

Similarly, strong assertions are sometimes followed by qualified substantiation. A good example is his reference to 4Q 416 1, "in which the disparaging position given to flesh *is present*" (118; emphasis supplied). This is followed by only one sentence of substantiation, tempered by the terms "appears" and "possibly." Later he says that he can "seal" his "claim" about the teaching function of 4Q400 1 i 17 by recalling that "the same constellation of ideas *seems* to be present in three other Qumran texts" (285; emphasis supplied). In another case, he concludes that angels dressed in the garments described in Exod 28 occur "[n]owhere" in Jewish literature contemporaneous with the Dead Sea Scrolls—and then footnotes the "one exception"—*Apocalypse of Abraham* 11:3 (362 n. 15). If it truly is an exception, the statement he has made is fallacious; if it is not an exception, the language of his footnote is at best injudicious.

At times, Fletcher-Louis utilizes evidence and methodology that he denies to others. For example, one of the reasons he criticizes John J. Collins's interpretation of 4Q491 11 is because in "so relatively brief a portion of text a confident assessment of total anthropological perspective is precarious" (208). He makes this criticism, however, after he has discussed similarly brief texts, ones whose interpretations are likewise precarious or uncertain—by his own admission (cf. 4QAaron A [189-92]; 4Q468b [193-94]; 4Q513 [194-95]).

Because of the length and detailed nature of this work, one should not be surprised to find typographic or grammatical errors. I was nevertheless startled by the number of errors that I encountered—many of them obvious—particularly in a book that costs as much as this one does. The following list is *not* exhaustive and I produce it here because a book this costly deserves a higher standard of copy-editing (note: "line" refers to the line of text, *not* to the line of a chapter subtitle):

Page Reference	What Needs Correction	Suggested Correction
7, line 6	43:23f.	44:23f.
7, lines 9ff.	*unusual line breaks (particularly lines 9 and 22)*	*reformat lines*
27, line 24	"whmo"	"whom"
28, line 23	"pronounced"	"pronounce"
83, line 25	"that"	"than"
99, line 2	"14"	*Delete*
126, line 1	"rising"	"was rising"
126, line 2	"makes"	"making"
151, lines 4-5	"are they"	"is he"

194, line 1	". . . line 6. Although the expression . . ."	". . . line 6, although the expression . . ."
199, n. 148, line 2	"180-38"	"180-83"
205, n. 166, line 11	"now"	"no"
207, line 18	"places"	"place"
207, line 26	"chapter 4"	"chapter 5"
208, line 17 (see also the index on p. 533)	"4Q491 1 i"	"4Q491 11 i"
217, line 13	"non"	"none"
236, line 10	"light filled"	"light-filled"
236, line 12	"דביר"	"דביר,"
242, line 9	"pslamist"	"psalmist"
255, n. 8, line 5	"liturgy"	"liturgy,"
257, line 13	"described"	"describe"
267, last line	"architects"	"architect's" or "architects"'
282, line 11	"(Isa 27 verse 9)"	"(Isa 27:9)"
309, line 26	"is"	"are"
325, line 19	"assent"	"ascent"
331, line 12	"line 42"	"line 41"
332, n. 49, line 1	". . . priests, if . . ."	". . . priests. If . . ."
335, line 12	"effect"	"affect"
335, line 15	"her"	"here"
354, line 18	"Ezekeil"	"Ezekiel"
355, line 23	"humans"	"humans,"
362, line 3	"Dan 9:5"	"Dan 10:5"
367, line 18	"?"	"."
380, last line	"'approach the King' (4Q405 23 ii 11)"	*The quote does not match the source*
399, line 8	"later"	"latter"
399, n. 11, line 1	"stills"	"still"
402, lines 1-3	"P.R. Davies has pointed . . . "	*Needs footnote*
410, line 28	"line 8 and line"	"lines 8 and 9"
430, line 14	"citation"	*Not a citation; at most an allusion*
435, line 16	"angles"	"angels"

460, line 7	"instances"	"instance"
461, line 8	"משרה"	*Need for consistency; ו is sometimes pointed (e.g., cf. p. 460, line 3), sometimes unpointed (e.g., 460, lines 8, 9, 18, 20; 461, lines 1, 4, 5)*
474, lines 15-18	"Israel, . . . Israel, . . ."	*Both the punctuation and verb tenses need reexamination*
478, lines 18-19	". . . in the late Second Temple period. Though a couple of points . . ."	". . . in the late Second Temple period, though a couple of points . . ."

Furthermore, the word "community" is confusingly related to both "has" and "have" (97, lines 7-8). Some embedded parentheses are unbalanced (115, line 4; 354, line 27). The sentence beginning "The Aramaic probably . . ." (48, line 21) is nonsensical. Finally, with regard to the source index: (1) the reference on p. 528 to 4Q213b (4QAramaic Levi^c) has been typeset incorrectly; (2) all the references to 4Q405 (4QShirShabb^e) 20 ii-21-22 (531) need to be reindexed; and (3) the references to 4Q541 (4QTLevi^d) 9 i and 24 ii (535) have been typeset incorrectly, yielding page numbers in the index that look like references to the Qumran text, while both 4Q541 24 ii and 24 ii 5-6 should be indexed *after* 4Q541 9 i 3-5, not before.

Despite the methodological concerns and typographical and grammatical errors described above, I have no hesitation in recommending Flether-Louis's book. Though costly, it is a goldmine of information and analysis of important literature found at Qumran, and the reader will be amply rewarded in studying his analyses. He raises provocative and important questions that deserve further study and dialogue. For example, can his view be sustained that the apparent interest of the Qumran community in the high-priestly breastpiece helps explain the name "Essenes," which has been the subject of so much discussion for decades? The dust has certainly not yet settled on his controversial, revisionist reading of the *Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice*. Yet, if the general outlines of his understanding of liturgical anthropology end up remaining in force, such an understanding will have a significant effect not only on the interpretation of the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Qumran community, but also on the interpretation of the literature of the Second Temple and the NT.

Berrien Springs, Michigan ROSS E. WINKLE

France, R. T. *The Gospel of Mark*, NIGTC. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002. 752 pp. Hardcover, $55.00.

France's commentary on Mark follows a typical pattern for Gospel commentaries: foreword, list of abbreviations, bibliography, and introductory questions, followed by extensive commentary on the Greek text, with concluding indices. Following the Foreword and list of Abbreviations, the author provides a

twenty-page Bibliography of works referred to in the commentary. Most of the works listed in the bibliography come from the twentieth century, particularly from the period 1960-2000 (although there is only one reference to 2000). Interestingly, there are many more references from the 1990s in the book section than in the articles section. France does note that the Anchor Bible commentary on Mark 1-8 by Joel Marcus was published too late to be taken into account in the current work and that the Word Biblical commentary on Mark 8:27-16:20 by Craig Evans had not yet been published when France's commentary went to press. The most recent commentary that France regularly interacts with is that of Robert Gundry, published in 1993. However, France also notes that his contribution is intended to be "a commentary on Mark, not a commentary on commentaries on Mark" (1).

After a brief discussion of his purpose, France proceeds to typical introductory material, including a discussion of the Gospel genre and related ideas (Mark fits roughly the "lives of famous men" type of literature, with its own distinctive touch [5-6]), an outline of the Gospel ("A Drama in Three Acts"—Act 1, Galilee, Mark 1:14-8:21; Act 2, On the Way to Jerusalem, Mark 8:22-10:52; and Act 3, Jerusalem, Mark 11:1-16:8 [13-14]); a discussion of Mark as storyteller (with particular focus on the sandwiching technique [18-20]), Mark's theology (Christology, discipleship, Kingdom of God, secrecy, eschatology, Galilee, and Jerusalem [23-35]); the origin and dating of the book (France takes early church tradition more seriously than many modern interpreters, discounting the value of reconstructions of the provenance from mainly internal criteria [35-41]); and the Synoptic problem (he believes Mark to be the earliest surviving Gospel, but quotes with favor J. A. T. Robinson's view that the most primitive state of the Synoptic tradition is not consistently in one Gospel [43-45]).

The commentary proper follows a consistent pattern of dividing the text into sections with three successive types of comments: textual notes on the manuscript evidence for important variant readings, overview of the ideas and issues that the textual section deals with, and specific commentary on individual verses. France does not provide either the Greek text itself or a translation of it, but makes ample reference to the Greek text in his notes and translates phrases or words that he is discussing. At the end of the commentary, France includes an appended note on the textual evidence for the ending of Mark, followed by an index of modern authors, a select index of Greek words and phrases, and an index of biblical and other ancient sources.

If there is one word I could use to evaluate France's commentary, it would be "balanced." He is a careful reader of the text and weighs not only what he reads, but what others have said about the text. While numerous illustrations of his skill as an exegete could be listed, I will provide just a few. At Mark 1:45, he persuasively argues against a suggestion that the first part of the verse has Jesus as subject rather than the leper. He also credibly counters Myers's and Malina's suggestion that Jesus is unable to enter towns because of his contact with a leper. At the introduction to 4:35-41, he has an interesting discussion of variation in

tenses in the pericope. At 8:30, he usefully notes that "this is the only place in the gospel where a specifically *messianic* secret is mentioned" (330). He then goes on to give thoughtful reasons for the secrecy motif and counters Wrede's contention that it was a Marcan apologetic invention. France's overviews of what he calls Act 2, 8:22-10:52 (320-321) and Act 3, 11:1-16:8 (426-427) provide a clear summary of Mark's story and themes. At 12:13-17, he gives an excellent summary about Jesus' teaching on the poll tax, with helpful historical and theological data. At 14:62-64, he carefully and thoughtfully wends his way through the difficult issues of Jesus' confession and the consequent accusation of blasphemy, giving a useful summary of recent scholarship and his balanced argumentation on the topic.

On the negative side, I was at first annoyed by the fact that the commentary does not contain either the Greek text or a translation of it. I did get used to it, but I would prefer the Greek text to be included. It would add only about thirty to sixty pages and would provide the reader with the Greek text that France was using for his comments.

France does not seem to take seriously enough the value of narrative studies in explaining Mark's story. This is well illustrated in his negation of 16:8 as the most likely ending of Mark. Contra exegetes who see Mark 16:8 as a provocative or ironic ending that calls on the reader to "go tell," France notes: "Unfortunately, most readers of Mark have not recognised this 'artful substitute for the obvious' (163) [quoting N. R. Petersen, *Interpretation* (34) 1980]; it sounds suspiciously like an exegetical counsel of despair on the part of an interpreter who recognises that, taken literally, 16:8 is an impossible ending" (672, n. 9).

France takes a minority view on Mark 13 that the Parousia is not the topic until 13:32. I do not find the argumentation convincing that 13:24-27 refers to the ingathering of the nations into the church, fulfilling 13:10. First, in Mark 6 the mission is outward going, not inward gathering. Second, in 13:10 the context of witness is one of persecution. The proclamation of the gospel to the nations may not be all about evangelism, but rather in this context more particularly about warning of judgment. Third, the term *eklektos* is used in the Gospel of Mark only in 13:20, 22, 27. In each case, it suggests those who are already linked to God and Christ, which is not the sense of the term *ethnos* in 13:10.

There are a few minor points that can be addressed briefly. In the 7:31-37 story of the healing of the mute man, the use of the term "dumb" and "dumbness" is recognized today as being pejorative. The terms "mute" and simply "unable to speak" are preferable. There are errors: e.g., on page 44 "Gspels" should be "Gospels" and on page 49 an open parenthesis stands where there should be a colon.

In conclusion, France's commentary is well worth reading. It contains a wealth of exegetical detail and presents, overall, a balanced and thoughtful exposition of the text of Mark.

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Gaustad, Edwin Scott, and Philip L. Barlow, with Richard W. Dishno. *New Historical Atlas of Religion in America.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. xxiii + 435 pp. Hardcover, $189.00.

"Anyone hoping to comprehend religion in its historical context ignores geography at severe peril" (xxi). With that premise, Edwin Scott Gaustad, Philip L. Barlow, and Richard W. Dishno launch their *New Historical Atlas of Religion in America.* In 1962, Gaustad published his *Historical Atlas of Religion in America,* which provided students of American religion with a graphic overview of religion in America from 1650-1960, using approximately 129 figures. That rather modestly sized reference work of 179 pages was updated and somewhat revised in 1976.

The current edition builds upon its predecessors but also moves beyond them in every way. The updated model, for one thing, is much larger. It now contains nearly 450 pages and the trim size for each of those pages has been expanded from 11 3/4" to 13." Beyond that, the 129 original figures have been replaced by some 460 maps, charts, tables, graphs, and diagrams. And in place of black-and-white figures, those in the latest edition are nearly all in full color, making the original atlas but a faint shadow of the newest edition. The additions and other improvements have greatly added to the usefulness of the volume and made it easier to interpret.

But even more important and revolutionary than the physical transformation of this classic reference work on American church history are the content expansions, which run along several lines. First is general context expansion. Parts 1 and 2 of the latest edition provide a comprehensive historical account in words and figures of American religious history from early colonial times to the present. This task was undertaken in the 1962 and 1976 versions, but in those editions those two parts provided the total content contribution of the work. The latest edition moves into new territories in its Parts 3 and 4. Part 3 offers detailed histories of three representative denominations in order to "illustrate promising areas for future historical mapping of American religion by examining, in more detail than is possible throughout the book as a whole," case studies on Lutheranism, Mormonism, and Roman Catholicism (xxii). Part 4 transcends the essentially denominational frame of reference of the first three parts by exploring issues such as religiously based place names, the religious makeup of the United States Congress, and the interaction of religion and education. The discussions in Part 4 are well illustrated, making them visually meaningful.

Beyond general expansion of coverage, the *New Historical Atlas* also reflects conscious treatments in special areas. First, there is coverage of Muslim, Hindu, Jain, Sikh, Buddhist, and other religious communities that matches their importance in the rapidly changing configuration of religion in America. Beyond that, the latest version of the atlas incorporates Native and African Americans as an intrinsic part of the main story rather than treating them almost as appendages in a catch-all section at the back of the book.

The above review refers to the *New Historical Atlas* as an edition of Gaustad's original work. There is a sense in which that label is true, since the latest version builds upon Gaustad's original format. But there also is a sense in which the label is false. After all, the entire text has been rewritten, and the book has so much fresh coverage that it truly deserves its revised title.

For all of its excellent contributions, the volume is not without its faults. At times, the colors representing such things as denominational institutions are so close together in tone as to make the illustrations difficult to interpret. But given the complexity of the material, there is probably no way to escape some of these technical problems.

On another level, the authors of any such volume are faced with the issue that many things of importance simply cannot be quantified. This problem is, of course, beyond the control of all researchers. And in spite of this inherent limitation, the authors show that a great deal can be learned from the quantification and mapping of those entities that exist in visible and quantifiable form.

Gaustad, Barlow, and Dishno have provided students of American religion with an indispensable reference work that will need to be consulted by all those in the foreseeable future who seek to grasp the shape of American religious history or the contour of any of its various constituent parts.

Andrews University GEORGE R. KNIGHT

Giberson, Karl W., and Donald A. Yerxa. *Species of Origins: America's Search for a Creation Story.* Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002. 277 pp. Paperback, $24.95.

American academics are writing books about the creation-versus-evolution debate at a furious pace. Most of these books take one position or the other and argue for its validity, but Giberson and Yerxa take a different approach in *Species of Origins: America's Search for a Creation Story.* Instead of arguing for or against creation, they follow the lead of Moreland and Reynolds in *Three Views on Creation and Evolution* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1999), attempting to document what the different positions are. Giberson and Yerxa do make an argument, but it is not that one position is correct; rather they seek to convince the reader that both creationism and Darwinism offer strong arguments, especially when taken within the context of the worldviews from which they spring.

Early chapters of *Species of Origins* present in stark contrast classical Darwinian and creationist positions. The middle chapters present what Giberson and Yerxa call "via media" positions that seek to reconcile differences between Darwinism and creationism. These "via media" positions include theistic evolution, the day-age model, and others, but the primary focus is on theistic evolution. The final chapters deal with Intelligent Design (ID), exploring the arguments and reactions to ID publications with special emphasis on those written by William Dembski and Michael Behe. Included in these chapters is a concise history of the ID

movement, along with several uncritically presented counter arguments made by opponents of ID including Ken Miller and Howard VanTill.

Trying to present all sides of an argument without bias, as Giberson and Yerxa attempt, may make the authors appear ignorant of problems in the claims they are documenting. This is a problem in *Species of Origins*; in fact, so much latitude is given to all positions that false claims are treated as factual. This is particularly true in the first few chapters and especially so in those chapters in which the "modern creation story" (Darwinism) is presented. Two errors of fact illustrate this problem. According to Giberson and Yerxa, "there is nothing particularly unique about the chemicals or the coding on which DNA is based, [*sic*] most researchers are convinced that comparable codes could easily have been constructed in other ways" (29). This is nonsense. A significant body of peer-reviewed scientific literature exists on the unique chemistry of DNA and the elegant way in which the genetic code appears to have either evolved or been designed to mitigate, among other things, the impact of mutations (cf. S. J. Freeland, R. D. Knight, L. F. Landweber, and L. D. Hurst, "Early Fixation of an Optimal Genetic Code," *Molecular Biology and Evolution* 17/4 [2000]: 511-518). In the course of my professional career, I have never met a colleague who believed that "comparable codes could easily have been constructed in other ways." In the next sentence, the claim is made that "we find no examples of alternate codes." Currently the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI) lists seventeen different genetic codes (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov). These different codes represent small but important variations from the "standard" genetic code found in most familiar organisms.

In *Species of Origins*, a description of modern Darwinism is given that is so sharply drawn and riddled with unqualified statements that the final product gives a warped impression of the clarity and factual basis of evolutionary theory. Unfortunately, it is not only "scientific" facts that are misrepresented. Although Yerxa is a professor of history at Eastern Nazarene College, there are a number of historical errors. These appear to be concentrated in chapters outlining the creationist position and, while they may be minor, are presented in such a way that it appears as if they originate in the writings of Henry Morris. For example, "Morris believes that Charles Darwin gets far too much credit for the triumph of evolution. . . . And the publication in 1859 of his *The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* was followed by a 'relentless evolutionary propaganda campaign' by Julian Huxley, Ernst Haeckel, Herbert Spencer, and others that soon converted most of the world to 'evolutionism'" (107). The problem with this quote is that Julian Huxley (1887-1975) was not alive in 1859 when *The Origin of Species* was first published. It seems far more probable that the authors were thinking of Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895), Julian's grandfather, who was known as "Darwin's Bulldog" due to his enthusiastic promotion of Darwin's ideas. How unfortunate that confusion of this sort is put in the mouth of Morris, who may or may not be wrong in the conclusions he draws, but certainly knows the difference between Thomas and Julian Huxley.

Another example that illustrates the problem with muddled history is on the next page (108), where the authors present Morris's argument about the ancient Babylonian king Nimrod as a possible early proponent of ideas related to evolution. Giberson and Yerxa state: "However, like Darwin some three millennia later, Nimrod was just a link in the great chain" (108). It may be that the authors embrace an extremely short-age view of history, but most authorities, including Morris, would put Nimrod at least four millennia before Darwin.

Errors and confusion in the first five chapters of *Species of Origins* sap one's motivation to read on. This is compounded by the distinct impression one gets that the authors didn't do their homework on creationism. It appears that they read one three-volume work, *The Modern Creation Trilogy*, by Morris, concentrating primarily on his concerns about the impact of evolution on society, and left it at that. In addition, the tone is grating, with numerous unqualified statements such as "*all* the data considered solid by the scientific community—astronomical measurements on stars, geological measurements of rock strata, radioactive dating of rocks, and evolutionary reconstructions of the history of life on the planet—converge on this calculation [that the earth is about five billion years old]" (emphasis original). Most informed people realize that no idea in science accounts for *all* the solid data; there are always outlying points that must be accounted for in some way or ignored.

Readers who give up on *Species of Origins* in the first few chapters will miss out on the significantly better last five chapters. These chapters explore attempts to reconcile views held by the "Council of Despair" (as Giberson and Yerxa call those who employ evolution to advocate a meaningless outlook on life) with those who believe meaning arises from man's status as creations in the image of God. Their somewhat dismal view is that reconciliation should be possible, but it is unlikely. A vague attempt is made to put a positive spin on this by suggesting that diversity in outlook may somehow be good, but no reason is given for why this should be so. Those who agree with them about the inability to reconcile these views are left wondering why these views should be reconcilable.

Species of Origins may be of interest to those exploring different views on the origin of life, particularly human life. Unfortunately, possibly due to the authors' efforts to make an uncritical presentation of the various views, numerous errors of fact are scattered throughout the text, especially in the early chapters. This, combined with an apparent lack of serious research into creationist thinking and vague pop presentation of Darwinism, make this book difficult to recommend.

Geoscience Research Institute TIMOTHY G. STANDISH
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Hoehner, Harold W. *Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002. xxx + 930 pp. Hardcover. $54.99.

Harold Hoehner, veteran New Testament professor at Dallas Theological Seminary, has labored long and hard to produce a magisterial commentary on

the Epistle to the Ephesians which joins vigorous defense of traditional views of the letter with detailed scholarship on the text. It will serve as a compendium of scholarship on Ephesians for years to come.

While its size is daunting, the commentary is written clearly and the page layout is pleasing. Hoehner follows his own detailed outline in presenting the text, and these headings stand out crisply in bold-faced type. The commentary treats the text in segments of one to three verses and, within these sections, discusses phrases of the Greek text which are also given as bold-faced headings. Hoehner regularly provides succinct summaries. All of this combines to provide a satisfying experience for the reader and means that, though the volume is massive, it is relatively easy to use in handbook fashion.

While the commentary does not include a comprehensive bibliography (which, Hoehner notes, would have added another 100 pages to the already expansive volume), it does include up-to-date bibliographies on the issue of the authorship of Ephesians (114-130) and one listing commentaries on the epistle (xxi-xxix). Moreover, some footnotes become virtual bibliographies in their own right (e.g., a note providing "key sources" concerning the form of Paul's letters [69-71] and another treating slavery in Greek and Roman times [800-801]). Thorough footnotes and an excellent author index help to make up for the absence of a comprehensive bibliography.

In the 130 pages given over to introducing the epistle, Hoehner takes up the issues of authorship, structure and genre, city and historical setting, purpose, and theology. He argues the case that Ephesians was composed by Paul. Using Brown's assertion that "*about 80 percent of critical scholarship holds that Paul did not write Ephesians*" as the whipping boy, he builds on W. Hall Harris III's work in calculating support for Pauline authorship. According to his reckoning, around 50 percent of scholars have supported Pauline authorship and around 40 percent have opposed it, with some taking the median position of uncertainty or a shifting point of view. Some may question whether the pages of detailed charts given to all of this are well used, especially in a volume that, despite its 960 pages, complains about "lack of space." However, Hoehner surely makes his point that scholars should avoid facile assumptions that the weight of scholarly opinion tells against Paul as the author of Ephesians.

In general, Hoehner parleys well the various reasons offered for denying the authorship of the letter to Paul. Occasionally, though, his bid to defend the traditional position raises dissonance. He argues, for example, that Ephesians is authentic on grounds that an imitator would have included greetings to make it look like one of Paul's letters. Then he notes that Paul does not give greetings in 2 Corinthians, Galatians, 1 and 2 Thessalonians, and Philippians, so, in not exhibiting greetings Ephesians looks like other authentic letters. Can both be true?

With regard to genre, Hoehner views Ephesians as an actual letter since it has the characteristics of Hellenistic letters and is similar to other Pauline epistles. The phrase ἐν Ἐφέσῳ should be retained in the text though the letter may have been addressed to many house churches in the area rather than to a

central congregation. A helpful discussion of the city of Ephesus is provided, along with a sketch of the chronology of Paul's engagement with the city. With some hesitancy, Hoehner concludes that Ephesians was composed toward the end of Paul's first Roman imprisonment, "some time in late 61 or early 62" (96). In his discussion of the theology of Ephesians, Hoehner reviews the themes of Trinity, fatherhood of God, Christology, pneumatology, soteriology, ecclesiology, and reconciliation.

The least satisfying part of the introduction is the treatment of purpose. After an able review of the various options, Hoehner makes an idiosyncratic choice, deciding that "the purpose of Ephesians is to promote a love for one another that has the love of God and Christ as its basis" (106). This seems too diffuse to provide help in understanding the purpose or function of the letter.

In treating the text, the volume lives up to its title as an "exegetical commentary." Hoehner does not often dally with how the preacher or teacher might appropriate the text in modern settings. His focus is clearly on understanding the meaning of the ancient text. Much of the commentary portion of the volume is given over to detailed word studies. Hoehner is discontent to simply reflect earlier lexical studies and extends the research to additional sources. On occasion, these word studies seem to become ends in themselves rather than clarifications of the text of Ephesians. A surfeit of data and statistics sometimes detracts from such understanding.

There is much to be praised in Hoehner's treatment of the text of Ephesians. In fact, he does such a consistent and able job elucidating the text that it seems carping to detract from it. However, two segments of the commentary that disappoint are the treatments of Eph 1:3-14 and 6:10-20. In treating Eph 1:3-14, Hoehner offers a lengthy excursus, "Election," objecting to Markus Barth's own excursus, "Election in Christ vs. Determinism." Hoehner seems to import a great deal into the discussion from the later history of Christian theology, and I became increasingly convinced that Barth was, indeed, closer to capturing the spirit and essence of Eph 1:3-14. Hoehner's conclusion that "in the end, no one seeks God and yet in his sovereign grace he chooses some for everlasting life in his presence" (192) may owe as much to Calvin as it does to Ephesians. To take a restrictive view of a passage that expansively proclaims God's purpose to sum up "all things" in Christ (v. 10) and swings the door wide for the two great divisions of humankind, Jews and Gentiles (vv. 13, 14), risks truncating the purposes of God and the intentions of the author. This announcement of God's "predestination" was surely good news to those who had been under the thrall of astral religion. They would have known with certainty that their lives had been destined by the astral powers. That their lives were destined was not the innovation offered by Paul in Ephesians, but by whom and for what purpose.

Hoehner denies the view that Eph 6:10-20 serves as a ringing conclusion to the entire document, seeing few connections between the passage and earlier segments of the letter. He believes Eph 6:10-20 portrays a defensive (rather than an offensive) stance on the part of believers. In taking this view, he misses

much of the point of Paul's military metaphor, which advocates energetic engagement against the foe. Hoehner also assumes a largely individualistic reading of the passage and fails to take full account of the trend in recent scholarship to view the passage as offering a corporate perspective.

In comparison to its contributions, the flaws of Hoehner's commentary are few, and it deserves full attention on the part of students of Ephesians. While pastors and teachers may find themselves frequently reaching for shorter treatments, anyone seeking a detailed understanding of Ephesians will learn to take advantage of Hoehner's thorough work and will be blessed in doing so.

Andrews University JOHN MCVAY

Kistemaker, Simon. *Exposition of the Book of Revelation*, New Testament Commentary. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001. x + 635 pp. Hardcover, $44.99.

Simon Kistemaker is emeritus professor of New Testament at Reformed Theological Seminary in Orlando, Florida. He is also editor of, and a major contributor to, the New Testament Commentary series, which he took over after the death of William Hendriksen in 1982. He comes to the book of Revelation as more of a generalist than a specialist, having written books on the Gospels, Acts, the Corinthian and Thessalonian letters, Pastorals, and Hebrews before taking on the last book of the NT. This observation may be the ground of some of the shortcomings noted below.

The reader is not in doubt from the first page that this commentary will be from the perspective of faith. Kistemaker sees Revelation as different from the Jewish apocalypses. It is not simply a human attempt to reach out to God. God himself, not John, is the primary author of this book. For Kistemaker, this means that its contents should be examined reverently as God's holy Word. I appreciated the faith-based, devotional tone of the commentary.

While in Kistemaker's view the Apocalypse does seem to anticipate a final judgment and an end to history, the primary approach of his commentary seems firmly located in the idealist camp. Kistemaker does not see Revelation as a history of past events or a detailed prophecy of the future. The book does not specify particular events, but rather principles that apply to the issues of any age and place. While the images in the book are drawn from the Mediterranean world of the first Christian century, the message of the book is universal and abiding. Through the book of Revelation, believers received comfort and assurance to endure spiritual conflicts to the end.

The aim of the book is not to forge new directions in scholarship, but to be a detailed guide for pastors and serious Bible students from an evangelical perspective. The book is clear and easy to read, provides a fresh translation, and is filled with practical applications that often are not easy to come by in a book like Revelation.

I believe, however, that the book has serious shortcomings from a scholarly perspective. While Kistemaker has noted the existence of most

significant Revelation scholars (the intriguing work of David Barr, however, is never mentioned), he has ignored recent major discussions, and there is little evidence of the periodical literature in the book. Extensive citation is largely limited to other authors of commentaries. Especially featured in the footnotes are Aune, Bauckham, Beale, Charles, Hendriksen, Swete, and Thomas.

An example of how current scholarship has been ignored is the section entitled "Persecution under Domitian" (35-37). Kistemaker takes the traditional position that Revelation was written in the context of persecution related to Domitian's demand for worship, repeating the views of writers such as Ramsay, Beckwith, Hemer, and Thomas. While he cites Leonard Thompson a single time in support of this view, he gives no indication that Thompson actually holds the opposite view. In his book *Apocalypse and Empire* (and an extensive article in *Semeia* 36 not cited by Kistemaker), Thompson offers extensive critique of the evidence that Domitian was a persecutor of Christians. Although Beale has offered cautions regarding Thompson's position in the Introduction to his 1999 commentary, the Reading the Apocalypse Seminar of the Society of Biblical Literature (late 1990s) found Thompson's case largely convincing. Regardless of the outcome of this significant debate, the reader of Kistermaker's commentary will be unaware of the issue unless he or she chooses to look up the lone reference to Thompson in a footnote on page 35.

At times, it also appears that Kistemaker has not done careful firsthand observation of the Greek text of Revelation, in spite of having produced his own translation. While the commentary is large in size, there are many exegetical omissions in it. A few examples from the seven seals will have to suffice for a short review.

In Rev 6:10, the souls under the altar cry out for "judgment" and "vengeance" (a negative with the present tense). The fulfillment of their request is found in the repetition of these words in the aorist tense in 19:2. The parallel is not mentioned in the commentary on either verse. In his translation of Rev 6:11, Kistemaker adds the phrase "the number of" to explain what is "completed" with no indication in the commentary that this phrase is an interpretive emendation rather than a translation of the text. As a result, there is no discussion of the exegetical possibilities of the text as it reads.

In Rev 7:1-3, Kistemaker translates accurately but does not note in his comments on the passage that while earth, sea, and trees are in danger (Rev 7:1, 3), the four winds are commissioned to harm only the earth and the sea (7:2). A close reading of this anomaly begs for explanation, but none will be found in this commentary. In Rev 7:4 and 9:16, one finds the only two places in the book where the phrase "I heard the number" occurs in the context of four angels. This parallel suggests a significant link between the 144,000 and the enemy hordes of the sixth trumpet. The parallel is not mentioned in Kistemaker.

I regret, therefore, that this well-written and inspiring commentary does not seem to have the kind of substance that would make it a constant reference in my future scholarly endeavors. A student who can afford only one or two

commentaries would be much better served by Aune and Beale. But I believe Kistemaker's work will find its place in the libraries of many pastors and serious lay students of the book of Revelation.

Andrews University JON PAULIEN

Longenecker, Richard N., ed. *Community Formation: In the Early Church and in the Church Today.* Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002. 237 pp. Paper, $19.95.

This reasonably sized volume, made up of essays by leading biblical scholars, theologians, and historians, provides a fascinating and readable introduction to the church's understanding and organization of its structure, both in earliest times and in recent years—a subject often more prosaically known as "church order." Using a loosely diachronic approach, the book begins with an overview of some of the forms of community prevalent in the NT world, followed by a major section devoted to exploring community formation in the various NT documents, two detailed chapters on some of its manifestations in the early church, and, finally, several aspects of its diversity in the church today.

Aimed at "the earnest reader and the Christian church at large" (xviii), the book's usefulness for the scholar and specialist is limited to some degree by its lack of footnotes. (Each essay does end with a generous bibliography, however, to which many authors make reference during the course of their essays.) For the novice, Longenecker provides in his introduction a brief overview of some of the struggles concerning church order over the past 150 years, paying particular attention to the divisive debates over whether God has actually originated and ordained any particular church structure.

Section 1 ("The Social Context") opens with an overview, written by Richard Ascough, of some of the more common Greco-Roman philosophic, religious, and (other) voluntary associations that were available as models for the newly forming Christian groups of the first and second centuries. Alan Segal then explores the community experiences of the Judaism(s) out of which Christianity developed, giving particular attention to the structures of temple worship, synagogue, and family observance, and the ways in which these structures adapted in response to the consecutive threats of Hellenism and Jerusalem's destruction. Standing a little apart from the other articles in this section, Peter Richardson's "Building 'an Association' (*Synodos*) . . . and a Place of Their Own" directs one's attention to the relevant architectural practices during this time period. Richardson notes significant similarities among buildings used by the various Christian, Jewish, and Greco-Roman voluntary associations, postulating that Christian churches at first modeled themselves on the pattern of the synagogue, later on the Greco-Roman voluntary associations (on which the synagogues themselves had earlier patterned themselves), and later after Constantine, on the basilica model of established power.

In the NT section, Craig Evans's opening essay on the Gospels focuses upon the major features of Jesus' ministry which later formed the model for the

ministry of the Christian church. Longenecker follows with a brief exploration of Paul's understanding of the church and its organization (divinely controlled and carefully ordered, yet contextualized to its time and place) in the ten letters associated with Paul that do not directly address church order. "Divine Power, Community Formation, and Leadership in Acts" are addressed by Scott Bartchy, who argues that Luke's account seeks to hold up before the Gentiles a uniquely "community-forming and community-sustaining [Divine] power"(91), who calls Christian believers from the domination and honor values of society-at-large to the mutual caring and loyalty of a surrogate kinship group created within the Christian community. I. Howard Marshall's "Congregation and Ministry in the Pastoral Epistles" ends the section, discussing the images of church found in these letters and the instructions given to Timothy and Titus regarding the choosing of lay leaders who would share the governance and instruction of these increasingly autonomous communities of the Spirit.

There are two chapters in the book that deal with the early postbiblical historical evidence for the shape and function of the Christian ministry. Both point out the danger of seeing in the historical evidence that which the reader wants to be the norm. Alan Hayes begins his chapter, "Christian Ministry in Three Cities of the Western Empire (160-258 C.E.)," with the earliest historical evidence for Christian ministry in Lyons, Carthage, and Rome, reminding one that most studies on early ministry and liturgy have been for "programmatic purposes." Frances Young states this position even more strongly in "Ministerial Forms and Functions in the Church Communities of the Greek Fathers," where she addresses the evidence from the Greek writers. She warns that most studies on early Christian ministry discover "a reflection of the investigator's own denominational face at the bottom of a deep well" (157). Other than to deconstruct much of the partisan interpretation of the twentieth-century liturgical movements, both authors present the historical data succinctly. Another important caveat adhered to by both authors is the comment of Paul Bradshaw from his book *Search for Origins* that "most liturgists are 'lumpers' while most historians are 'splitters'" (129). It is not surprising, then, to discover that Hayes finds the early evidence for Christian ministry in Lyons, Carthage, and Rome is sparse. For Lyons, there is, Irenaeus; for Carthage, Tertullian and Cyprian; and for Rome there are Paul, Clement, Justin Martyr, Hippolytus, and the quotations and remarks of Eusebius, quite after the fact. Whereas the early twentieth-century liturgists made much of these sources, the evidence that emerges for the "splitters," the minimalist historians, is indeed minimal, especially before Cyprian in the mid-third century. Hayes points out the lack of clear distinctions between presbyters and bishops and the near total lack of any sacerdotalism or hierarchy between bishops and presbyters prior to Cyprian. In this process, he discusses the growing scholarly consensus that the *Apostolic Traditions*, generally attributed to Hippolytus, a schismatic bishop of Rome in the early third century, are inherently problematic as representations of Roman liturgy of his time. This is especially true since the available MSS change dramatically according to time and place of production, thus matching the fluidity of other early church manuals. Hayes takes the strong and

reasonable position that chapters 2 and 3, which have been pointed to as the earliest clear distinction between bishops and presbyters, "were not in the original of *Apostolic Traditions* and that chapter 7, with its 'us' language, was originally a prayer for both bishops and presbyters, who were not yet clearly distinguished" (148).

Frances Young gives an overview of the development of church manuals from the *Didache* in the second century to the *Apostolic Constitutions* in the fourth century. This development traces the emerging dominance of the bishop in Christian ministry and the strength of the deacons relative to the diminishing role of the presbyters. She suggests that the paramount shift that saved the presbyters from obscurity was the shift away from the model of the church as a household, where the bishop as a single *pater familias* rendered multiple heads unnecessary except in an advisory capacity. The model of the church as "God's household" was replaced by the church as "God's people" (171), where the bishop is more of a *pater poleos* administering a number of congregations and where the presbyters function as the heads. Inherent to both these models is the increasing use of the OT priesthood typology applied to Christian ministry—with the bishop as the high priest—and its inevitable cultic implications for the Eucharist. Young persuasively shows that the OT typologies of "king" and "priest" were the dominant points of contact in interpretation of NT passages on ministry throughout the early centuries of the church; and Cyprian, she points out, was an innovator in the area of typology for the ministry as well as the clerical function.

Cyprian has often been applauded for and accused of being the central figure in the early church who effectively used the threefold ministry of bishop, presbyter, and deacon during his exile from Carthage at the time of the Decian persecution. His use of the presbyter as officer of the Eucharist during the absence of the bishop included statements which invested the bishop and the presbyter—only by extension from the bishop—with the priesthood. Cyprian's sacerdotal language pushed the understanding of the priesthood and Eucharist towards the mystagogy that became the norm for later generations. Young also brings to the fore an innovation by Cyprian that is often missed. Cyprian's typology of the Eucharist is a reinactment of Christ's passion, which, in turn, fuels his sacerdotal language. Cyprian builds this christological imagery and rationale on the already accepted OT priesthood typology for ministry.

Young shows that generations later this christological imagery and priesthood typology bore fruit in the mystagogy of the Christian priesthood and Eucharist, although he warns that Cyprian is often given too much credit for developing this typology. In spite of the early Christian rejection of animal sacrifice (as Jewish and pagan in nature) in favor of "bloodless sacrifices" of praise and thanksgiving, and in spite of the insistence that the Eucharist was a memorial of a once-for-all sacrifice rather than a repeated sacrifice, the force of the priestly typology brought the generation of John Chrysostom to an understanding of the many Eucharists as having a mystagogical connection

with the sacrifice of Christ. "Christian worship," Young concludes, "was increasingly assimilating the religious features of a dying paganism" (173).

These two chapters can be read as an excellent summary of the status of the academy's understanding of the development of the Christian ministry in the second through fifth centuries. The greatest critique, in our opinion, lies in the brevity of the chapters. The strength of Hayes's sharp focus on his three cities is his demonstration of the diversity of ministry from place to place, but the weakness of such a focus is the lacunae of times and places not covered. For instance, the later development of mystagogy in the West, such as the homilies of Ambrose, is not mentioned; and the early strength of the presbyters as church leaders in at least some parts of the East, as represented in the writings of Polycarp and Ignatius of Antioch, is also omitted. Thankfully, Young crosses over from the Greek writers to discuss Cyprian in her presentation of the development of the ministry into the priesthood.

The final section of the book focuses on the shape of the Christian community and ministry "in the Church today." Each of the three chapters focuses on one of the three major forms of contemporary Christian ministry: episcopal, presbyterian, and congregational. Each of the authors is well suited to talk from the inside of each of these forms. John Webster writes on "The 'Self-Organizing' Power of the Gospel: Episcopacy and Community Formation." David C. Hester presents "The Sanctified Life in the Body of Christ: A Presbyterian Form of Christian Community." Miroslav Volf shows "Community Formation as an Image of the Triune God: A Congregational Model of Church Order and Life." Each of these chapters emphasizes the community of believers in the church as found in its various forms, but the shape of each community pictured is quite distinct. Of course there are numerous current church communities that do not exactly fit any of these three models or that have elements of all three. This is not surprising in view of the suggestion in the earlier chapters of this book, correct in our opinion, that the early Christian communities had a variety of shapes, none of which exactly prefigured the current shapes of Christian communities.

Andrews University TERESA L. REEVE AND JOHN W. REEVE

Moskala, Jiří. *The Laws of Clean and Unclean Animals in Leviticus 11*. Berrien Springs: Adventist Theological Society, 2002. 484 pp. Paper, $19.95.

Jiří Moskala's Ph.D. dissertation, "The Laws of Clean and Unclean Animals in Leviticus 11" (Andrews University, 1998) is probably the most comprehensive on the subject. He begins with a lengthy review of everything written (1.1-111), followed by an analysis of the approaches taken in this literature (2.112-159), before applying his own analysis of the structure of these laws (3.160-280), their theology (4.281-344), and his conclusions (344-381). His work contains 10 tables and an overwhelming bibliography of about 1,330 items (382-484).

Moskala makes one major error throughout the dissertation. The seven pairs of clean animals that Noah brought on the ark (Gen 7:1-2) were only for sacrifice, not for food. When Noah offered sacrifice (Gen 8:20), he already followed an accepted practice (Gen 4:4). Only *after* the flood was Noah conceded the right to eat meat (Gen 9:3). This concession includes the entire animal kingdom, "every living thing that moves." If it were limited to pure animals, the text would have said so. The alimentary restriction to pure animals is first commanded to Israel in Lev 11: only quadrupeds qualified for the altar are eligible for the table.

Three main errors also stand out. "The impurity of unclean animals" (276-277; i.e., of carcasses) is indeed contagious (cf. Lev 11:26b, 27b, 28). Also, the dietary regulations are not applicable to aliens (278, 352-353), with the exception of the blood prohibition (Lev 17:10, 13) and the need to undergo purification after eating dead or torn animals (Lev 17:15). Furthermore, all priests are holy, even if they are blemished (227). Similarly, the dietary laws help Israel attain holiness even if they are blemished.

If these errors can be corrected, the dissertation could be published as a book. The blue pencil, however, should be applied generously, especially to the repetitive style in the theology section (chap. 4).

Some of my work will be helpful. For example, Moskala is absolutely correct in rooting the dietary laws in creation. He will find confirmation in *Maarav* 8 (1993): 107-116, where I demonstrate that the distinction between *šeqeṣ* and *ṭāmēʾ* animals is rooted in the six days of creation. Also, since only *visible* defects disqualify priests and sacrificial animals (Lev 21 and 22), so too the rabbit family (Lev 11:5-6), which *appears* to be chewing its cud, and the camel (Lev 11:4), which *appears* to possess no split hoof.

University of California JACOB MILGROM
Berkeley, California

Ryken, Leland. *The Word of God in English: Criteria for Excellence in Bible Translation.* Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2002. 336 pp. Paper, $15.99.

Among English teachers, Leland Ryken is the best-known conservative writer on the Bible as literature. My wife and I both used his textbooks when we were in college thirty years ago, and he is still writing and teaching English at Wheaton College.

The Word of God in English is influenced by the experience Ryken gained in the past few years serving as the literary stylist for the English Standard Version of the Bible. His assignment was to read through the entire Bible, making changes that would heighten the literary beauty of the version. The ESV is the prime example of Ryken's theories in action. The version reads well aloud, as Ryken meant it to. The language tends toward elevated diction meant to set it apart from more mundane writing.

Ryken has divided his book into five sections: "Lessons from Overlooked Sources"; "Common Fallacies of Translation"; "Theological, Ethical, and

Hermeneutical Issues"; "Modern Translations: Problems and Their Solutions"; and "Criteria for Excellence in the English Bible." Understanding that many readers might begin with whatever chapter seems most relevant to their interests, Ryken repeats many of his points in each chapter. For the scholar who reads from beginning to end, this makes the book seem quite repetitive.

Ryken's thesis is that only a literal translation adequately communicates the Word of God. I appreciate his celebration of the deliberate ambiguity often found in Scripture and his explanation of how making the ambiguity "clear" results in deleting one or more other meanings intended to reside together within the ambiguity. Every seminary student assigned to translate a passage of Hebrew or Greek would do well to heed Ryken's warning on this. (Of course, students and even professional translators who have not immersed themselves in great poetry or the writings of Shakespeare may not grasp the idea of ambiguity. Ryken might agree that the dynamic equivalence approach to translation is partly due to the realization that the majority of readers either don't notice ambiguity or aren't comfortable with it.)

Unfortunately, Ryken believes in verbal inspiration (and carries this rather close to verbal dictation, even though he may not realize it). He argues that the Bible in Hebrew and Greek is God's very words, the words God wanted us to have. If one grants this presupposition, it is difficult not to agree with Ryken that only a literal translation should be called God's Word. Of course, his position is not in line with what most theologians know about the composition of Scripture, and it is not even in line with the self-understanding of Scripture (correctly interpreted).

Anyone writing scholarly papers on biblical literature knows that one benefit of using a very literal translation is that it lets one make one's point without having to resort to a lot of extra explanations of what the text actually says in Hebrew or Greek. Of course, the difficulty is that a word-for-word equivalent translation may not allow for the fact that many Hebrew and Greek words have more than one meaning. A verse may be translated "literally" in a number of arguable ways, and sometimes the most likely translation is at odds with some church doctrine. One of the things I like best about the NEB is that the extensive translator's notes keep reminding readers that even when translators are trying to get as close to the original meaning as possible, choices must be made. In thousands of instances regarding word choice in translation, we simply don't know, so we do the best we can. Ryken seems unaware of this.

Indeed, as best as I can tell, Ryken has never bothered to study Hebrew or Greek. He deals only with the English text, and it seems that for him the ideal translation must have the grandeur of the KJV. (And he has achieved this in the ESV.) I don't think he realizes that in the original languages, some of Scripture is smooth, but some is rough; some is elevated, but some is earthy; some is simple, but some is complex or unclear. It seems to me that one of the great weaknesses of the KJV was the translation team's effort to produce a stately, majestic Bible from a text that was often not stately and majestic. I much prefer a translation that

reserves literary excellence for the passages where literary excellence exists in the original. That's part of being "literal." If the original is abrupt, let the translation be abrupt. (A recent review of the ESV in *JETS* lauds versions that use the word "behold" and deprecates versions that translate the original Greek word as "listen" because "behold" is iambic and flows smoothly, whereas "listen" is trochaic and too abrupt. Of course, the Greek word translated "behold" happens to have a trochaic rhythm. Really, it doesn't matter.)

Despite my negative remarks, *The Word of God in English* is a thought-provoking and sometimes persuasive book. Readers will be alerted to why a literal translation matters and to how much is lost in a dynamic equivalent version. Teachers would do well to assign at least parts of the book to students who have to do their own translations from Hebrew or Greek. Ryken knows a lot about English style. In a great many instances there is no reason why a translated passage should be not only accurate, but beautiful. Ryken offers many useful pointers about how to achieve this. Even teachers will gain a new appreciation of the Bible's literary beauty.

Kutztown University ED CHRISTIAN
Kutztown, Pennsylvania

Wright, N.T. *The Resurrection of the Son of God.* Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2003. xxi + 817 pp. Hardcover, $49.00.

With the issuance of *The Resurrection of the Son of God*, N. T. Wright adds volume 3 to his monumental series *Christian Origins and the Question of God*; the first and second volumes appearing under the titles *The New Testament and the People of God* (1992) and *Jesus and the Victory of God* (1996). The fourth volume in the series is slated to be on Paul, with a fifth volume to address the subject of "why the Gospels are what they are."

In the preface, Wright states that the length of the book is to be attributed in part to his seeking to correct a "misleading" understanding among current NT scholarship that "the earliest Christians did not think of Jesus as having been bodily raised from the dead; Paul [being] regularly cited as the chief witness for what people routinely call a more 'spiritual' point of view" (xvii). Nevertheless, he assures the reader that he has only cited a few examples "here and there," preferring rather to attend to the primary sources.

Wright describes the book as a "monograph with a single line of thought." He acknowledges that his argument is not a novel one, but instead claims his "point of entry" as the unique contribution to scholarship. This entry point is "the study of the way in which 'resurrection', denied by pagans but affirmed by a good many Jews, was both reaffirmed and redefined by the early Christians" (xvii-xviii). Wright asks the question, "So what did happen on Easter morning?" This, as a historical question, is the "central theme of the present book" (4). While acknowledging the problem of intertwining history with theology, he seeks to answer this question by means of two subquestions: "What did the early

Christians think had happened to Jesus, and what can we say about the plausibility of those beliefs?" (6).

In chapter 1, Wright lays out the arguments he is going to counter, followed by his own proposals, which he offers as "excellent, well-founded and secure historical arguments against each of these positions" (7). These arguments (7), which function as Wright's analysis of current critical scholarship, are:

> (1) that the Jewish context provides only a fuzzy setting, in which "resurrection" could mean a variety of different things; (2) that the earliest Christian writer, Paul, did not believe in *bodily* resurrection, but held a "more spiritual" view; (3) that the earliest Christians believed, not in Jesus' bodily resurrection, but in his exaltation/ascension/glorification, in his "going to heaven" in some kind of special capacity, and that they came to use "resurrection" language initially to denote that belief and only subsequently to speak of an empty tomb or of "seeing" the risen Jesus; (4) that the resurrection stories in the gospels are late inventions designed to bolster up this second-stage belief; (5) that such "seeings" of Jesus as may have taken place are best understood in terms of Paul's conversion experience, which itself is to be explained as a "religious" experience, internal to the subject rather than involving the seeing of any external reality, and that the early Christians underwent some kind of fantasy or hallucination; (6) that whatever happened to Jesus' body (opinions differ as to whether it was even buried in the first place), it was not "resuscitated", and was certainly not "raised from the dead" in the sense that the gospel stories, read at face value, seem to require.

Wright intends to argue against each of the above positions by clarifying the Jewish, Pauline, and early Christian viewpoints; by reexamining the Gospel accounts; and by asserting that the only reason Christianity began as it did was that the tomb really was empty and that people did meet the resurrected Jesus.

The introductory chapter includes a review of and answer to current scholarly arguments proposed both by those who insist that the search for the historicity of the resurrection *cannot* be done, and by those who posit that it *should not* be done. Wright's historical methodology is then briefly restated, having been more fully presented in part 2 of *The New Testament and the People of God.* Following the introductory chapter of the present volume, Wright explores background ideas to the concept of resurrection, both in the Greek world and that of the Jews. Chapter 2 examines the concepts of "soul" and "life beyond death in ancient paganism," ranging from the writings of Homer to Plato and beyond. Chapter 3 takes up a similar quest in the documents of the OT, with chapter 4 providing background material from postbiblical Judaism, including though not limited to examinations of the ideas of the Sadducees, Pharisees, Rabbis, and Targumim, along with discussions on Josephus, the Qumran writings, and Pseudo-Philo.

Part 2 examines resurrection in the Pauline writings. Here also Wright shows himself true to his attempt to be as far-reaching as space allows, looking in depth at all of the Pauline corpus. This includes an analysis of various texts, such as Paul's speaking of his "death" and "coming alive again" (220), which are open to interpretation as only allusions to Jesus' resurrection. Wright first examines the

bulk of the Pauline corpus, where allusions to resurrection abound, before turning his full attention to the key passages of 1 Cor 15 and 2 Cor 4:7-5:10.

Part 3 examines documents from early Christianity, ranging from the concept of resurrection in the Gospels outside of the Easter stories themselves to the rest of the NT writings. Wright also examines the noncanonical early Christian texts from the Apostolic Fathers through Origen, including documents from Early Syriac Christianity and the Nag Hammadi literature.

Wright's main argument thus far is that a bodily resurrection is the best explanation of why the early Christians focused on the Jewish concept of resurrection—ignoring the denials of such a possibility from the pagan world—but "redefined" it "beyond anything that Judaism had said, or indeed would say later" (553). As supporting evidence for this slight "mutation" of the Jewish conception of resurrection by the early Christians, Wright spends a chapter looking at the similar redefinition that he believes took place with the early Christians' assertion of Jesus as the Messiah.

After laying this foundation, in part 4 Wright examines the Easter stories in the Gospels. His reason for placing them last in the discussion is that "it is therefore important that we come to them having already acquired as clear an understanding as possible of what that early church seems to have believed about resurrection in general and that of Jesus in particular" (587). He argues that the Gospel accounts are "chronologically as well as logically prior to the developed discussions of the resurrection which we find in Paul and many subsequent writers" (612). After looking at various options for the origin of the narratives and addressing some of the "surprises" found in them, he analyzes each of the four accounts individually.

Part 5 begins with Wright's assertion that two events can now be "regarded as historically secure" (686). They are the empty tomb and the meetings with the risen Jesus. He then presents his argument in a seven-step demonstration of these two "facts." The crux of his argument lies at the center of his seven-step demonstration. The empty tomb by itself might have caused some consternation for a time, but not much more. Meeting Jesus, without an empty tomb, would have raised the assumption of hallucinations or apparitions. However, taken together they provide a "sufficient condition" (692) and indeed a "necessary" (706) one for belief among the early Christians that Jesus had indeed risen from the dead. This is Wright's key conclusion, which historians will, no doubt, debate.

One refreshing aspect of *The Resurrection of the Son of God* is the open dialogue with critical scholars who hold opposing views to that which Wright himself presents. Without being acrimonious, Wright manages to state clearly his position, which is often at odds with other interpretations. This is especially helpful to the student/scholar who is new to the field, allowing one to quickly learn lines of argument without possessing a prior degree of competency.

The willingness to engage history and theology with a balanced critique is a courageous attempt to reengage two disciplines that, as Wright himself recognizes, have been at odds with each other for some time. His attempt to

look critically at texts and their interpretations without fear that it will crush either his faith or his mind is laudable.

The Resurrection of the Son of God presents a wide breadth of coverage of the primary source material. This almost overwhelming presentation has to stand out as one of the chief reasons for its almost assured position as a future classic in the field. No respectable library should be without this volume. Though the style is notably academic, Wright manages to break the doldrums of reading an 800-page tome by inserting personable moments at various points in his monologue. For instance, while preparing to enter the "dangerous" territory of part 5, Wright comments that it reminds him of trying to finish a round of golf in the late evening, only to have the automatic sprinklers come on from all sides (686).

As might be expected, at times Wright's own theology appears to influence his interpretation. He himself acknowledges complete objectivity is impossible. For instance, in his analysis of Justin Martyr's understanding of the resurrection of body and soul and any intermediate state that might exist, Wright comments: "[Justin] offers no theory about an intermediate state, but from his cautious treatment of the question of the soul we may assume he would think in terms of continuity of soul while awaiting renewal of body" (503). This assertion is open to question. How does being "cautious" on the question of the soul imply continuity? Or is Wright reading his personal understanding into Justin's?

On a different note, in Wright's analysis of the Apologists, he devotes the same amount of space to Justin Martyr as he does to Tertullian, when Tertullian wrote so much on the topic that he could probably warrant a book by himself. However, though Wright often discusses the understanding of the soul as it appears in the documents at hand, with Tertullian this discussion is completely absent. It would seem that Tertullian should have warranted closer study regarding his understanding of the soul. This does not imply that Wright's conclusions would be altered as a result, but with the stated attempt at completeness of coverage, this is a definite oversight.

One small complaint regarding the physical construction of the book: in the review copy, at least, handling the pages left ink smudges on the fingers. Other than that, the book is remarkably well bound for such a large volume and opens easily for reading.

Overall, *The Resurrection of the Son of God* is a well-researched, well-argued, and well-written defense of the Christian faith in the resurrection.

Berrien Springs, Michigan THOMAS TOEWS

GUIDELINES FOR AUTHORS AND REVIEWERS

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For general English style, see Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers of Term Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 6th ed., rev. John Grossman and Alice Bennett (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996).

For exhaustive abbreviation lists, see Patrick H. Alexander and others, eds., *The SBL Handbook of Style* (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999), 68-152, 176-233. For capitalization and spelling examples, see ibid., 153-164.

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TRANSLITERATION OF HEBREW AND ARAMAIC

CONSONANTS

א	=	ʾ	ה	=	h	ט	=	ṭ	מ	=	m	פ	=	p	ש	=	š
ב	=	b	ו	=	w	י	=	y	נ	=	n	צ	=	ṣ	שׁ	=	ś
ג	=	g	ז	=	z	כ	=	k	ס	=	s	ק	=	q	ת	=	t
ד	=	d	ח	=	ḥ	ל	=	l	ע	=	ʿ	ר	=	r			

MASORETIC VOWEL POINTINGS

◌ַ	=	a				◌ֶ	=	e	◌ֵי	=	ê	◌ֹ	=	ō	◌ֺ	=	ô
◌ָ	=	ā				◌ֵ	=	ē	◌ִ	=	i	◌ֹו	=	o	◌ֻו	=	û
◌ַ	=	a	◌ְ	=	(vocal shewa)	◌ֱ	=	e	◌ִי	=	î	◌ְ	=	°	◌ֻ	=	u

No distinction is made between soft and hard begad-kepat letters; dāgēš forte is indicated by doubling the consonant.

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